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Feeling Better But Doing Worse: Effects

of Facebook Self-Presentation on
Implicit Self-Esteem and Cognitive Task
Performance
a
Catalina L. Toma
a
Department of Communication Arts , University of Wisconsin-
Madison , Madison , Wisconsin , USA
Published online: 30 May 2013.

To cite this article: Catalina L. Toma (2013) Feeling Better But Doing Worse: Effects of Facebook
Self-Presentation on Implicit Self-Esteem and Cognitive Task Performance, Media Psychology, 16:2,
199-220, DOI: 10.1080/15213269.2012.762189

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 Media Psychology, 16:199–220, 2013
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1521-3269 print/1532-785X online
DOI: 10.1080/15213269.2012.762189

Feeling Better But Doing Worse: Effects of

Facebook Self-Presentation on Implicit
Self-Esteem and Cognitive Task Performance
CATALINA L. TOMA
Department of Communication Arts, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
Madison, Wisconsin, USA
Downloaded by [University of Edinburgh] at 08:10 15 October 2014

This study uses self-affirmation theory to draw predictions about

the effect of Facebook profile self-presentation on two psychologi-
cal outcomes: users’ state self-esteem and their performance in a
cognitive task. In an experimental procedure, participants were
randomly assigned to examine either their own profiles, which
tend to highlight social connectedness and treasured aspects of the
self, or a stranger’s profile. Afterward, participants reported their
self-esteem using an implicit measure that is immune to reporting
biases, and completed a serial subtraction task. Results show that
a brief exposure to one’s own profile raised state self-esteem, but
that it hampered performance in a subsequent cognitive task by
decreasing the motivation to perform well. The results advance the
emerging literature on the effects of online self-presentation and
also provide a theoretical contribution to self-affirmation theory.

How media content affects people’s subsequent perceptions and behaviors

is a topic of longstanding interest to communication scholars (see Roskos-
Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Carpentier, 2002). Studies have investigated
the effects of television, newspaper, and magazine content on a range of per-
ceptual and behavioral outcomes, such as self-esteem (Rivadeneyra, Ward, &
Gordon, 2007), cognitive task performance (Appel, 2011; Reinecke, Klatt, &
Krämer, 2011), stereotyping, aggression, and altruistic behaviors (see Mares
& Woodard, 2005, for a review). Recently, the extraordinary popularity of
interpersonal media, such as social network sites (SNSs), is raising a similar

The author is grateful to Ashley Downs, Rachel Boochever, Stephanie Friedman, Jessica
Hwang, Kerri Lopez, Kate Pascucci, and Thaisa Tirado for their help with data collection, and
to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback.
Address correspondence to Catalina L. Toma, Department of Communication Arts,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6144 Vilas Hall, 821 University Avenue, Madison, WI 53717,
USA. E-mail: ctoma@wisc.edu

199
 200 C. L. Toma

set of questions, but in reference to a novel type of media content. Indeed,

unlike mass media content, SNS content is both produced by the media
users and also features them as protagonists. How does exposure to media
content that centers around the users themselves and their identity, interests,
and social connectivity affect subsequent perceptions and behaviors?
The present study approaches this question by investigating percep-
tual and behavioral effects that stem from exposure to one’s own profile
on Facebook, a quintessential and highly popular SNS. Facebook profiles
constitute a detailed self-presentational act, where the identity of the profile
owner is captured through self-descriptions (e.g., ‘‘about me’’ section, status
updates), photographs, social connections with ‘‘friends’’ within the system,
and information contributed by these friends.1 On the perceptual front,
we ask how Facebook profile self-presentation affects users’ evaluations
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of self, operationalized as state self-esteem. On the behavioral front, we

examine effects of Facebook self-presentation on cognitive task performance.
As mentioned earlier, these perceptual and behavioral processes have been
shown to be affected by exposure to media content. Additionally, they
have also been shown to be affected by self-presentation (e.g., Baumeister,
Hutton, & Tice, 1989; Baumeister & Tice, 1984; Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas,
& Skelton, 1981; Paulhus, 1982).
These research questions are addressed through the lens of self-affirmation
theory (Sherman & Hartson, 2011; Steele, 1988), which has been shown to
be a useful theoretical tool for understanding the types of self-presentation
users compose on Facebook profiles and the psychological effects of en-
gaging with this version of self (Toma & Hancock, 2013). Importantly, self-
affirmation theory can be advanced by examining it in the ecologically valid
context of Facebook, as will be described in more detail later.
In addition to advancing self-affirmation theory, the current research
aims to contribute to the literature on the effects of interpersonal media
in several ways. First, the self-affirmation lens provides much needed the-
oretical advancement in the area of SNS effects, where there is currently
a dearth of theoretical explanations for observed effects (for an exception,
see the social capital framework espoused by Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe,
2007). Second, this research uses an experimental methodology that allows
increased confidence in conclusions about causality; as such, it provides a
necessary supplement to existing research that has relied predominantly on
correlational methods (e.g., Kirschner & Karpinski, 2010; Valenzuela, Park,
& Kee, 2009; Valkenburg, Peter, & Schouten, 2006). Third, it recognizes that
Facebook use is not a monolithic entity and, to offer a systematic explanation
of Facebook effects, it is important to isolate specific activities undertaken by
users on Facebook (e.g., constructing and then browsing one’s own profile,
posting on others’ profiles, checking on friends’ activities, playing video
games). As mentioned earlier, the present article examines the effects of
engaging with one’s own Facebook self-presentation. Finally, in considering
 Effects of Facebook Self-Presentation 201

behavioral effects (i.e., cognitive task performance), this research provides

an important addition to the existing literature that has focused on perceptual
effects (e.g., Ellison et al., 2007; Valenzuela et al., 2009).
The following section discusses the applicability of self-affirmation the-
ory to Facebook self-presentation. Then the self-affirmation framework is
used to derive predictions regarding the effect of Facebook profile self-
presentation on our dependent variables of interest, cognitive task perfor-
mance, and self-esteem.

FACEBOOK SELF-AFFIRMATION

What is the nature of Facebook profile self-presentation? This self-presenta-

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tional outlet is shaped by technological parameters that affect users’ motiva-

tion as well as ability to self-present. One such parameter is the presence of a
typically large audience, comprised of friends, family members, and acquain-
tances. This audience should have a two-fold effect on self-presentational
processes: (a) it should raise Facebook self-presenters’ motivation to con-
struct desirable self-images, since publicness enhances self-presentational
concerns (Leary & Kowalski, 1990); and (b) it should discourage deception,
since the audience is composed of offline connections, many of whom know
the self-presenters well (Ellison et al., 2007) and can easily verify the veracity
of profile claims.
Additional noteworthy technological parameters are asynchronicity, or
unlimited time to ponder and then craft self-presentational claims, and ed-
itability, or the ability to perpetually revise and refine these claims. According
to the hyperpersonal model of online communication (Walther, 1996), these
affordances endow online communication with substantial control over self-
presentational claims and hence increase their likelihood of successfully
generating desired images. The highly controllable online self-presentation
has been dubbed selective self-presentation, because it can be more aligned
with self-presentational goals than its face-to-face counterpart (Walther, 2007;
see also Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008).
Considered together, the above-mentioned technological parameters
should increase Facebook users’ motivation to craft self-presentations that
are desirable (in order to impress the audience) yet honest (in order to
avoid deception detection), and also their ability to successfully achieve these
self-presentations. Consistent with these claims, recent research has shown
that Facebook profiles are self-enhancing in the sense that they portray
the self positively, but that they are also accurate (Back et al., 2012) and
comprehensive (Toma & Carlson, 2012).
Self-affirmation theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988) is a useful
instrument for understanding the effects of the type of self-presentation
that is likely to be constructed in Facebook profiles. Self-affirmation theory
 202 C. L. Toma

is predicated on the premise that people have a fundamental need for

self-worth and self-integrity, or for seeing themselves as good, appropriate,
worthy, and valuable. This need is satisfied by pursuing activities that boost
and protect the self. One such activity is self-affirmation, or unconsciously
attending to information in the environment that captures essential aspects of
the self-concept (i.e., social roles, meaningful personal relationships, values)
in a positive and accurate manner. Self-affirmation satisfies the fundamental
need for self-worth because it reminds people of who they are, what is
important to them, and what makes them valuable. A notable side effect
of self-affirmation is that it switches off other self-protective strategies (e.g.,
defense mechanisms), because self-affirmed individuals already feel secure
in their self-worth and no longer need to boost it in other ways (Sherman &
Hartson, 2011).
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An important goal for self-affirmation research has been to identify self-

affirming activities, or those activities that boost people’s sense of self-worth
and self-integrity. Several such activities have emerged: writing about one’s
most important values, receiving positive feedback on important dimensions
of the self-concept, simply thinking about one’s family and friends (McQueen
& Klein, 2006), and, critically for the present article, examining one’s Face-
book profile self-presentation (Toma & Hancock, 2013). In fact, research
has shown that examining one’s Facebook profile is a self-affirming activity
of similar strength to writing about one’s most important values, the most
validated self-affirming activity in the literature (Toma & Hancock, 2013).
As the above analysis shows, Facebook profiles are self-affirming be-
cause they represent a flattering yet honest version of self. An added con-
sideration is that Facebook profiles, by design, capture and visibly display
social connectivity with friends and family. These personal relationships have
been shown to be the most potent source of self-affirmation (see Sherman &
Cohen, 2006). As a self-affirming activity, how does one’s Facebook profile
self-presentation affect users’ cognitive task performance and self-esteem?

EFFECT OF FACEBOOK SELF-PRESENTATION ON

COGNITIVE TASK PERFORMANCE

Consider first how Facebook profile exposure affects cognitive task perfor-
mance. Two opposing predictions have been derived from self-affirmation
theory regarding the effect of engaging in self-affirming activities on perfor-
mance in subsequent tasks.
On the one hand, the ‘‘performance enhancer’’ perspective proposes
that a self-affirmation activity should improve performance on a subsequent
task because it reduces the stress that is often associated with performance.
Indeed, research has shown that performance deteriorates under conditions
 Effects of Facebook Self-Presentation 203

of stress, but that self-affirmation provides a buffer against stress, thus, restor-
ing the ability to perform well (Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999; O’Brien &
Crandall, 2003; Schmader & Johns, 2003).
In a notable experiment, Cresswell and colleagues (2005) found that self-
affirmation significantly reduces cortisol, a physiological response to stress.
Other studies have shown that self-affirmation palliates the stress stemming
from stereotype threat—that is, the fear of conforming to negative stereo-
types about the self (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; O’Brien &
Crandell, 2003). Women under stereotype threat performed better on a math
task after completing a self-affirmation exercise—in fact, equally well as men
(Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006). African-American students
(who were experiencing stereotype threat) earned significantly higher grades
throughout the course of a semester and were less likely to drop out after
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completing a single 20-minute self-affirmation activity (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel,

& Master, 2006). To summarize, this line of research suggests that a self-
affirmation exercise, such as examining one’s Facebook self-presentation,
can be expected to boost performance by reducing task-related stress.
On the other hand, it is plausible that completing a self-affirmation
exercise may hurt performance. This ‘‘performance hindrance’’ view is based
on the premise that, if self-affirmation fulfills the fundamental need for self-
worth, individuals may be less inclined to pursue other venues for increasing
their perceptions of self-worth, such as performing well on a task. Indeed,
performing well on a task is an opportunity to showcase one’s abilities and,
thus, can constitute a self-affirming activity in and of itself. Completing a
prior self-affirming activity can then be demotivating, deterring individuals
from pursuing subsequent venues for self-affirmation, particularly if these
venues are effortful (i.e., performing well on a task).
This view is supported by research claiming that, when it comes to
self-worth, individuals are satisficers, not maximizers. That is, they seek to
maintain positive self-views, and most importantly to restore them when
they are threatened, but do not take any available opportunity to enhance
self-worth (Tesser & Cornell, 1991). For instance, individuals who did not
experience interpersonal contempt made less of an effort to restore self-
worth through good task performance than individuals whose ego had been
threatened through contemptuous social interactions (Melwani & Barsade,
2011). Similarly, having just completed a self-affirmation exercise, individuals
may no longer experience a psychological need to enhance self-worth, and
hence maybe less inclinedto do so through excellent task performance.
Examining these opposing predictions in the context of Facebook self-
presentation is dually beneficial. On the one hand, it addresses an important
issue in the area of SNS effects (i.e., how does Facebook profile browsing
affect cognitive performance?). On the other hand, it presents an opportunity
to clarify the operations of self-affirmation: Does a prior self-affirmation
activity reduce motivation, leading to worse performance, or does it boost
 204 C. L. Toma

the ability to handle task-induced stress, leading to better performance? Does

self-affirmation primarily affect the motivation or ability to perform? Hence,
we offer these competing hypotheses:

H1a: Exposure to one’s own Facebook profile self-presentation improves

performance on a subsequent cognitive task.
H1b: Exposure to one’s own Facebook profile self-presentation hurts per-
formance on a subsequent cognitive task.

EFFECTS OF FACEBOOK SELF-PRESENTATION ON

SELF-EVALUATIONS
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Consider now how Facebook self-presentation affects self-evaluations. The

evaluations one makes about oneself, affectively and cognitively (i.e., what
one thinks and feels about oneself ), have been broadly construed as self-
esteem (Bosson, 2006; Rosenberg, 1965). Although various definitions have
been proposed, by far the most common is that self-esteem is a favorable
global evaluation of oneself (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Mruk, 2006).
Self-esteem can be experienced as a state—that is, the evaluative response
to the self that is elicited by a particular occasion—or as a trait—that is, the
overall evaluative response to the self averaged across a variety of occa-
sions. Additionally, self-esteem can be experienced consciously, when self-
evaluations are available to conscious awareness, or unconsciously, when
these evaluations are either inaccessible to the self or incorrectly identified
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
What is the effect of Facebook profile self-presentation on state self-
esteem, or momentary self-evaluations? Recall that, according to the hyper-
personal model of online communication, Facebook users should be both
motivated and able to create flattering self-presentations on their profiles
through the process of selective self-presentation (Walther, 2007). Following
exposure to this carefully crafted, optimized version of self whose accuracy
and attractiveness is vetted by one’s often extensive network of friends,
Facebook users should experience a boost in state self-esteem. In the same
vein, research within the self-affirmation framework predicts that exposure to
self-affirming information should increase state self-esteem (Fein & Spencer,
1997; Koole, Smeets, Van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999).
In analyzing self-esteem, an important issue to be considered is its
measurement. Self-report measures of self-esteem can be problematic in
several ways (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner,
Le, & Schmitt, 2005). First and foremost, they are subject to social desir-
ability bias, meaning that respondents are able to control their responses in
order to conform to social norms. High self-esteem is particularly desirable
in Western cultures, which renders self-presentational biases highly potent
 Effects of Facebook Self-Presentation 205

(Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989). Second, it is possible that respondents

lack awareness of their own self-evaluations, leading them to incorrectly
report their self-esteem even when they are not motivated to conceal the
truth. Third, respondents may vary in the degree of effort they are willing to
expend on correctly identifying their self-evaluations. In this instance, they
may simply not be motivated to engage in sufficient introspection to provide
accurate responses.
A solution to these challenges is offered by implicit measures of self-
esteem, which tap nonconscious, automatic self-evaluations. Implicit mea-
sures gauge attitudes toward the self that may not be accessible to the
conscious mind or that are inaccurately identified at a conscious level, and
are largely immune to social desirability biases (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
Research has found that implicit and explicit (i.e., self-report) measures of
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self-esteem are, at best, only moderately correlated (Greenwald & Farnham,

2000) and that implicitly measured self-esteem has superior predictive ability
in a variety of contexts (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Spalding & Hardin,
2000).
Because of their substantial advantages, we use implicit measures of
self-esteem in our analysis, and advance the following hypothesis:

H2: Exposure to one’s own Facebook profile self-presentation raises implicit

self-esteem.

SELF-ESTEEM AS A MEDIATOR OF COGNITIVE

PERFORMANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF FACEBOOK

So far we have reviewed evidence that Facebook profile self-presentation,

a self-affirming venue, is expected to affect cognitive task performance and
also enhance self-esteem. The next question of interest is whether increased
state self-esteem acts as a mediator of the effects of Facebook profile expo-
sure on cognitive task performance.
Identifying the mechanism of self-affirmation effects is an issue of on-
going debate (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Sherman & Hartson, 2011). Self-
esteem has been proposed as a promising candidate because, theoretically,
an increase in one’s overall perception of self-worth and self-integrity (i.e.,
self-affirmation) should be accompanied by an increase in state self-esteem.
However, evidence for this mediation effect is mixed. In an initial study,
Fein and Spencer (1997, Study 3) found that a self-affirmation exercise re-
sulted in increased state self-esteem and decreased stereotyping (a classic
marker of self-affirmation) and that state self-esteem mediated the relation-
ship between self-affirmation and the reduction in stereotyping. Subsequent
studies failed to replicate this mediational effect (Galinsky, Stone, & Cooper,
 206 C. L. Toma

2000; Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). However, these studies employed self-
report measures of self-esteem. Given this mixed evidence, we advance the
following research question:

RQ1: Is increased state self-esteem a mediator of the effect of Facebook

profile self-presentation on cognitive task performance?

THE CURRENT STUDY

To examine these hypotheses and research question, we asked participants

to examine their Facebook profile self-presentation, a self-affirming venue,
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for five minutes. In the control condition, participants examined the Face-
book profile of an average stranger—an equivalent yet non-affirming activity.
This manipulation was shown to be a reliable induction of self-affirma-
tion and to operate identically to other well-validated inductions of self-
affirmation (Toma & Hancock, 2013). After the Facebook self-affirmation
activity, participants were asked to complete a measure of implicit self-
esteem and to perform a cognitive task.

METHOD

Participants and Recruitment

Participants were undergraduates at a university in the Northeastern United
States, who were compensated with extra credit in their communication or
psychology courses. They were recruited through a Web site that advertises
ongoing research studies. The advertisement called for participation in a
study about the link between personality traits and cognitive abilities. SNSs
were not mentioned.
A total of 178 undergraduates signed up for the study. Several of them
were eliminated for the following reasons: Two were suspicious of the pur-
pose of the study, five experienced technical difficulties (i.e., the Facebook
server not responding, the computer freezing), and 12 reported not being
Facebook users. This resulted in an effective sample size of N D 159 (70.4%
women; age M D 19.76, SD D 1.63, min D 18, max D 35).

Procedure
Upon arriving at the lab, participants were informed that the study for which
they signed up was very short and were given the option to participate in
an additional short study in order to double their extra-credit points. All
participants agreed to complete both studies.
 Effects of Facebook Self-Presentation 207

The first study was described as a Web site evaluation study. Participa-
tion entailed browsing a Web site for five minutes and answering a set of
questions. Participants were randomly assigned to examine either their own
Facebook profile (treatment condition, N D 77) or a stranger’s Facebook
profile (control condition, N D 82). All participants were told they could
examine any portion of their assigned profile (e.g., wall posts, photographs,
videos, friend lists), but were asked not to navigate to anyone else’s profile.
At the completion of the study, participants in the treatment condition were
asked to temporarily ‘‘friend’’ the experimenters on Facebook, such that we
may show their profile to another participant. All participants agreed.
Each participant in the control condition was shown the profile of the
previous participant in the treatment condition, provided that the two were
not acquainted with each other. If they were acquainted, the participant in
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the control condition was assigned to view the profile of the person who
participated in the treatment condition immediately prior to the acquainted
participant. Thus, the two conditions were yoked, a procedure which en-
sured that participants in the control condition, as a group, examined the
exact same profiles as participants in the treatment condition, the only dif-
ference being that the profiles were not their own.2
Immediately after the profile browsing task, all participants completed
an implicit measure of self-esteem.
At this point, participants were invited to start the second, unrelated
study, which ostensibly investigated the relationship between cognitive abil-
ities and personality traits. To measure cognitive abilities, participants were
asked to engage in a mental arithmetic task consisting of rapid serial sub-
tractions. Specifically, they were asked to verbally count down from 1978
by intervals of seven as quickly as possible for two minutes. A research
assistant timed and audio recorded their responses. This measure of cognitive
performance has been used widely in the psychology literature (e.g., Arndt,
Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; Schimel, Arndt, Banko, & Cook,
2004; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997).
Participants did not complete any personality measures. After finishing
the counting task, they were thanked and debriefed. A funneled debriefing
procedure was employed in order to identify suspicious participants.

Measures
TASK PERFORMANCE

Participants’ performance in the subtraction task constituted the behavioral

dependent measure. Recall that participants were required to serially subtract
the number seven from 1978 (e.g., 1978, 1971, 1964, etc.) as quickly as
possible during a 2-minute time interval. Two performance measures were
obtained: (a) number of attempted answers (i.e., the total number of subtrac-
 208 C. L. Toma

tions participants performed in the allotted time) and (b) number of correct
answers (i.e., the total number of correct subtractions participants performed
in the allotted time). If participants had made an error in the subtraction task,
they were only penalized for that one subtraction, and not for subsequent
correct subtractions from that incorrect number. For instance, the series
of 1971–1963–1956 was only considered to contain one error. Participants’
error rate was calculated as the percentage of attempted answers that were
incorrect.

TASK DIFFICULTY

To assess how stress-inducing the subtraction task was, a two-item ques-

tionnaire was administered. Participants reported how threatening they per-
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ceived the task to be on a scale of 1 (not at all threatening) to 7 (very

threatening), and also projected how well they thought they would do in
the task on a scale from 1 (not at all well) to 7 (very well).

IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM

State self-esteem was measured using an Implicit Association Test (IAT),

which captures automatic evaluations (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). The
IAT has been widely used to measure unconscious attitudes that are typically
subject to socially desirable responding, such as racial and gender bias,
and political and religious attitudes. The IAT has demonstrated excellent
reliability and predictive validity (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).
IATs operate under the logic that (a) people assign value to objects and
(b) encountering these objects automatically activates the associated value
judgment. IATs capture these automatic evaluations by measuring the speed
with which participants associate the objects under consideration (e.g., race,
gender, self ) with value statements (e.g., good, pleasant, dominant). The IAT
for self-esteem gauges the association between concepts related to the self
(e.g., I, me) and, for comparison purposes, concepts related to an unspecified
other (e.g., they, them), with positive (e.g., marvelous, wonderful, lovely) or
negative (e.g., horrible, terrible, awful) evaluations.
The IAT procedure involves several steps. Participants are presented
with two bins located on the left and right sides of a computer screen. The
bins represent combinations of the target object and the evaluative statement
(e.g., self C good and other C bad; or self C bad and other C good). Then,
the previously described stimulus words (e.g., me, I, them, marvelous, awful)
are quickly flashed on the screen. Participants are asked to place the stimuli
into the correct bin as quickly and accurately as possible using the left and
right arrow keys. Participants complete a total of six trials, during which the
combination of the target object and evaluative statement is reversed (e.g.,
self C good, then self C bad), and so is the position of the bins on the
screen (i.e., left or right).
 Effects of Facebook Self-Presentation 209

Implicit self-esteem is operationalized as the response latency between

seeing the stimuli on the screen and placing them in the correct bin. Partici-
pants with high implicit self-esteem more quickly associate words related to
the self with positive than with negative evaluations. Conversely, participants
with low implicit self-esteem find it more difficult (and, hence, take longer) to
associate self-concepts with positive than with negative evaluations. Implicit
self-esteem is expressed as a standardized metric conveying the direction
and magnitude of the association between self and positive evaluations. This
metric can take values between 2 and C2. Higher values indicate higher
state self-esteem.

COVARIATES
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To ensure no systematic differences between the experimental and control

conditions, several covariate measures pertaining to participants’ ability to
perform mental arithmetic were collected. Participants self-reported their
gender. Their major and grade point average (GPA) were recorded from the
university’s human resources management system. The major information
was re-coded to reflect whether participants were students in (a) the social
sciences or humanities (e.g., communication, psychology, government, film);
(b) science and engineering (e.g., math, physics, engineering, computer
science, economics); or (c) other (e.g., biology, nutritional sciences, archi-
tecture, undecided).
Additionally, because mood has been shown to impact task perfor-
mance (e.g., Hirt, Levine, McDonald, Melton, & Martin, 1997; Hirt, Melton,
McDonald, & Harackiewicz, 1996), measures of affect were collected using
an established scale (Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008). Before engaging
in the serial subtraction task, participants reported how much they currently
experienced both positive (e.g., feeling joyful, grateful, loving; ˛ D .94) and
negative affect (e.g., feeling sad, angry, confused; ˛ D .81).

RESULTS

Effects of Facebook Profile Self-Presentation on

Task Performance
Did self-affirmed participants perform better on the mental arithmetic task?
A one-way analysis of covariance with experimental condition (self-affirmed
vs. control) as the predictor and gender, major (dummy coded), GPA, and
positive and negative affect as covariates was set up for each dependent
measure. For attempted answers, the analysis revealed a significant effect of
experimental condition, F (1, 139) D 5.87, p D .02, partial 2 D 0.04, with
participants who viewed their own self-affirming profiles attempting fewer
answers (M D 26.96, SE D 1.41) than participants who viewed a stranger’s
 210 C. L. Toma

profile (M D 31.76, SE D 1.35). Of the covariates considered, gender had a

significant effect, F (1, 139) D 27.28, p < .001, with men performing better
than women, but major, GPA, and positive and negative affect did not (all
Fs < 1.5, ns).
A similar pattern emerged for correct answers. A significant effect of
experimental condition was observed, F (1, 139) D 5.10, p D .03, partial
2 D 0.04, with participants who examined their own Facebook profile self-
presentation producing fewer correct answers (M D 25.10, SE D 1.46) than
participants who examined a stranger’s profile (M D 29.78, SE D 1.40). As
before, gender was a significant covariate, F (1, 139) D 27.76, p < .001, with
men outperforming women, but major, GPA, and positive and negative affect
were not (all Fs < 1.5, ns).
Participants’ error rate (i.e., percentage of attempted answers that were
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incorrect) did not differ by condition, F (1, 139) D 0.08, ns, even after ac-
counting for all the covariates. Participants who examined their own Face-
book profile self-presentation made the same percentage of errors (M D
8.58, SE D 1.20) as participants who examined a stranger’s profile (M D
8.10, SE D 1.14). This pattern of results, in which self-affirmed participants
attempted fewer answers but did not make more errors than their non-
affirmed counterparts, suggests that they were less motivated, rather than
less able, to perform well on the subtraction task.
Before interpreting these results, it is important to assess how stress-
inducing the mental arithmetic task was. On a scale from 1 (not at all
threatening) to 7 (very threatening), participants rated it as moderately threat-
ening (M D 3.59; SE D 0.14). They also reported expecting to perform
below average on the task (M D 2.95; SE D 1.21). No differences between
conditions were observed. These analyses show that the task was perceived
as moderately difficult.

Effects of Facebook Profile Self-Presentation on Implicit

State Self-Esteem
How did examining their own Facebook self-presentation affect participants’
self-evaluations, as assessed by the self-esteem IAT? As predicted, the data
reveal that participants who examined their own self-affirming profiles ex-
perienced a significant boost in state self-esteem (M D 0.57, SE D 0.04)
compared with participants who examined a stranger’s profile (M D 0.37,
SE D 0.04), t (157) D 3.62, p < .001, Cohen’s d D 0.55.

Mediational Analyses
Did the boost in state self-esteem account for participants’ reduced perfor-
mance on the mental arithmetic task? To answer this question, Baron and
Kenny’s (1986) mediational procedure was employed for each dependent
 Effects of Facebook Self-Presentation 211

measure (i.e., attempted answers, correct answers, and error rate). This
procedure includes four criteria. The first criterion is that the independent
variable (i.e., self-affirmation manipulation) predicts the dependent vari-
able. The previous analyses confirm that the self-affirmation manipulation
predicted task performance, thus fulfilling Baron and Kenny’s (1986) first
criterion (for attempted answers, ˇ D 0.22, p D .006; for correct answers,
ˇ D 0.22, p D .007). However, this was not the case for error rate (ˇ D
0.04, ns), which was dropped from further analyses. The second criterion is
that the independent variable predicts the proposed mediator (i.e., implicit
state self-esteem), which was also fulfilled (ˇ D 0.28, p < .001).
The third criterion is that the proposed mediator be a significant pre-
dictor in a regression model with the dependent and independent variables
included. Consider first attempted answers as the dependent variable. In a
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regression model with experimental condition as the independent variable

and gender, major, GPA, and positive and negative affect as covariates,
the potential mediator (implicit self-esteem) did not achieve significance
(ˇ D 0.02, ns). The same was the case for the correct answers dependent
measure (ˇ D 0.04, ns). Thus, the data are inconsistent with either partial
or full mediation.

DISCUSSION

The present experiment is one of the first to consider perceptual and be-
havioral effects of exposure to media content that is generated by users
and focuses on their identities. Drawing on self-affirmation theory, we in-
vestigated the effects of Facebook profile self-presentation, or exposure to
a computer-mediated version of one’s identity, on users’ perceptions of self
(i.e., state self-esteem) and their behaviors in a cognitive task (i.e., cognitive
task performance). The results reveal notable effects of Facebook profile
self-presentation and have implications for both the growing literature on
SNS effects and for self-affirmation theory.

Effects of Facebook Profile Self-Presentation

As a self-affirming activity, Facebook profile self-presentation affected users
in predictable ways. First, upon engaging with the flattering self-image en-
capsulated in the Facebook profile, users experienced a significant boost
in state self-esteem—that is, they viewed themselves more favorably on a
deep, unconscious level. Note that one prior study shows that exposure to
one’s own Facebook profile and writing on the profile raised users’ self-
reported self-esteem, measured using Rosenberg’s (1965) trait self-esteem
scale, when compared to looking at themselves in the mirror (Gonzales
& Hancock, 2011). The current research extends these findings by using
 212 C. L. Toma

a more sensitive measure of self-esteem and a new and meaningful control

condition. Together, these studies lend substantial credence to the claim that
Facebook profile browsing benefits users by elevating their self-esteem, both
compared to viewing the profile of an average stranger (as was the case in
the present study) and to looking at one’s own image in a mirror (as was
the case in Gonzales & Hancock, 2011).
At a theoretical level, the self-esteem boost generated by Facebook
advances the hyperpersonal model of online communication (Walther, 1996).
As mentioned earlier, this model proposes that technological affordances
such as those present in Facebook profiles (e.g., asynchronicity, editability)
enable users to engage in selective self-presentation, a streamlined, opti-
mized, carefully managed type of self-presentation. Further, the model argues
that, during online interactions, a consequence of a sender’s selective self-
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presentation efforts is that the receiver will form idealized, overly positive im-
pressions of the sender. The current results have two important implications
for the hyperpersonal model. First, the finding that online communication
doesn’t just affect others’ evaluation of a communication partner, but also the
communicator’s own self-evaluation, pushes the model’s boundaries from
the interpersonal to the intrapersonal arena (see also Gonzales & Hancock,
2010). While the original conceptualization of the hyperpersonal model did
not directly stipulate intrapersonal effects, the emergence of such effects
underscores the model’s robustness. Second and relatedly, the finding that
simply reviewing one’s static self-presentational claims is sufficient to induce
hyperpersonal effects suggests that reciprocal interaction may not be nec-
essary for the idealization process to be activated. Even though audience
feedback was initially proposed as necessary in producing hyperpersonal
effects, it may only be so in interpersonal contexts. Intrapersonal hyperper-
sonal effects may then be qualitatively different from interpersonal ones,
in that they require fewer conditions to emerge (i.e., only selective self-
presentation).
Second, the increase in self-worth and self-integrity induced by Face-
book profile exposure was shown to backfire by reducing users’ motivation
to perform well in a subsequent cognitive task of moderate difficulty. By
affirming the self, Facebook profiles may render additional efforts to prove
oneself superfluous. Previous studies on the effect of exposure to media
content demonstrate that subsequent cognitive task performance is affected
through a constellation of psychological processes, such as priming (Roskos-
Ewoldsen et al., 2002), assimilation and contrast (Appel, 2011), learning
(Lauricella, Gola, & Calvert, 2011), and psychological recovery (Reinecke
et al., 2011). The present study highlights an additional psychological process
that is affected by media exposure: motivation. When media content features
the self as protagonist and does so in an enhancing and accurate fashion,
it appears to tap into motivational processes that, in turn, affect cognitive
performance. Future research is necessary to investigate the extent to which
 Effects of Facebook Self-Presentation 213

motivational processes are affected by media content that go beyond self-

presentation.

Self-Affirmation Theory Revisited

In addition to understanding effects of Facebook profile browsing, one of
the primary goals of the current study was to advance self-affirmation theory.
Although a preeminent theory in social psychology, self-affirmation theory
still presents some empirical and conceptual lacunae, such as (a) a relative
lack of focus on behavioral outcomes of self-affirmation and (b) inconclusive
results regarding the mechanism through which self-affirmation operates
(Sherman & Cohen, 2006).
The first contribution of the present study is focusing on behavioral
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outcomes of self-affirmation, specifically task performance. Prior work on

this topic is relatively scarce and offers two contradictory propositions, one
claiming that self-affirmation enhances task performance by improving ability
to perform, with the other suggesting that it hinders it by decreasing moti-
vation to perform. Although incompatible on the surface, these claims are
jointly plausible as long as their boundary conditions are explicated: Under
what conditions does self-affirmation affect ability versus motivation to per-
form? The present study represents a first step in exploring these boundary
conditions. Results show that self-affirmation hindered performance by de-
creasing motivation to perform when (a) participants did not experience any
prior ego threat; (b) the task at hand was short in duration and moderately
stressful; and (c) the task was diagnostic of an important domain of the self-
concept, but did not have repercussions on participants’ lives outside of the
experimental setting. Future work is needed to consider additional boundary
conditions, such as the nature of the cognitive task under consideration (e.g.,
stressful vs. non-stressful, short vs. long in duration) and participants’ initial
levels of motivation to excel in the task.
The finding that affirmed participants performed significantly worse in
a cognitive performance task than non-affirmed participants is consistent
with Tesser and Cornell’s (1991) assertion that the self is satisficing, rather
than maximizing: People seek to maintain a good enough sense of self-
worth rather than take anyopportunity available to increase it. In the present
study,participants’ self-worth and self-integrity were already secured by a
self-affirmation exercise, and therefore they experienced little psychological
need to prove themselves by performing well in an unpleasant yet diagnostic
task.
A second contribution of this study to self-affirmation theory lies in its
investigation of implicit self-esteem as a potential mediator of self-affirmation
effects, an issue that has yielded mixed results in the literature. The present
study uses a novel measure of self-esteem—the IAT, and finds that, while
Facebook self-affirmation was accompanied by a rise in state self-esteem, this
 214 C. L. Toma

rise was not responsible for the behavioral effects of self-affirmation. This
is consistent with Koole and colleagues’ (1999) findings that self-affirmation
raises state self-esteem (implicitly measured using the name–letter effect), but
that this increase does not affect self-affirmation outcomes. Together, these
two studies provide compelling evidence that self-affirmation is accompanied
by elevated state self-esteem, but that the two processes are independent
of each other. Future work is necessary to untangle the conceptual and
operational meaning of self-worth and self-integrity, the building blocks of
self-affirmation theory, and self-esteem. In what way are these two pro-
cesses different, and what is the relationship between them? Future work is
also necessary to consider other potential mediators. For instance, affirmed
participants may experience increased cognitive load, or rumination over
aspects of their self-concept, leading them to perform slower in a cognitive
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performance task.

Practical Implications and Future Research

The applicability of the present results on users’ lives is contingent on
whether, and to what extent, Facebook users do in fact spend time examining
their profile self-presentation. While this question is not directly addressed in
the literature, evidence suggests that users update their statuses and post pho-
tographs, and hence contribute information to their profile self-presentation,
with some frequency ( Joinson, 2008; Pew Internet Report, 2011). It is plausi-
ble that the effects demonstrated here do in fact occur in everyday life; how-
ever, more research on users’ practices is required to investigate this claim.
Several empirical studies have identified negative effects of Facebook
use, such as decreasing school performance and encouraging procrastina-
tion ( Junco, 2012; Kirschner & Karpinski, 2011). The current finding that
participants performed worse in a cognitive task after attending to their
Facebook self-presentation are pertinent to this literature, yet they need to be
interpreted with caution. The task examined here, while difficult and mod-
erately stressful, had no bearing on participants’ actual school performance.
Rather, it was only symbolically meaningful in that performing well could
reinforce participants’ self-perceptions of being academically competent. The
effect of Facebook self-affirmation on tasks of higher stakes remains to be
investigated. However, it is possible that, as a psychologically fulfilling place,
Facebook may be alluring to users to the detriment of other tasks, and hence
may encourage procrastination.
Future research and theorizing is also necessary in the area of SNS
self-presentation. The present research operationalized self-presentation as
one’s own Facebook profile. However, Facebook users can and do make
identity claims by posting on other users’ profiles and on group pages. SNSs
may then offer researchers the opportunity to define self-presentation more
broadly, by capturing behaviors that are not necessarily archived and visible
 Effects of Facebook Self-Presentation 215

in a single online location. The effects of this broader self-presentation on

users’ self-esteem, task performance, and other relevant outcomes are worth
investigating.

CONCLUSION

The present study introduced a novel theoretical framework for understand-

ing SNS effects on perceptions and behaviors. Findings show that one’s Face-
book profile self-presentation exercises influence on both how users evaluate
themselves affectively, and also on their subsequent cognitive processes. This
study highlights the subtle, but potent ways, in which our media-based selves
can impact our offline selves.
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NOTES
1. Facebook profiles typically contain a mixture of self-generated content (information posted
by the profile owners themselves) and other-generated content (information posted by
their friends). In traditional face-to-face settings, self-presentation has been generally op-
erationalized as self-generated information. However, in the Facebook profile context,
we argue that both self- and other-generated content posted on the profile constitute
self-presentation, for the following reason. Self-presentation is defined as ‘‘the process of
controlling how one is perceived by other people’’ (Leary, 1996, p. 2; see also Leary &
Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker, 1980). Profile owners, in fact, exercise a substantial amount
of control over information contributed by friends, by (a) monitoring and deleting it if
they view it as undesirable and (b) allowing only a select group of people to post on
their profiles, typically those who have been invited to be Facebook ‘‘friends.’’ Previous
studies have similarly operationalized Facebook self-presentation as including both self-
and other-generated content (Buffardi & Campbell, 2008; Ong et al., 2011).
2. Our control condition, where participants viewed a stranger’s Facebook profile, may raise
the question of whether social comparison processes were elicited. These social com-
parison processes could be problematic in interpreting the results, because upward com-
parisons (i.e., comparing to a clearly superior other) may decrease self-esteem, whereas
downward comparisons (i.e., comparing to a clearly inferior other) may increase self-
esteem. We do not believe this to be a problem with the current experimental design
for two reasons. First, the yoking procedure ensured that control participants, as a group,
viewed the profiles of over 70 other students. In all, these profiles can be taken to represent
an average stranger, rather than someone consistently superior or inferior. Second, our
experimental manipulation was shown to operate identically to the most validated self-
affirmation manipulation in the literature to date (Toma & Hancock, 2013). In this classic
self-affirmation procedure, participants rank a series of values in order of personal impor-
tance. Self-affirmed participants write about why their highest ranked values are important
to them, whereas control participants write about why their lowest ranked values are impor-
tant to the average college student. This classic procedure was used in hundreds of studies,
including studies examining the relationship between self-affirmation and self-esteem, and
self-affirmation and performance (see McQueen & Klein, 2006, and Sherman & Cohen,
2006, for reviews). Since our manipulation was empirically shown to elicit the same self-
affirmational processes as the classic procedure, we believe it to be appropriate and valid.
 216 C. L. Toma

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