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A e Turchia tra passato e futuro
Italia
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OPUn impegno comune, una sfida culturale
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a cura di
Esra DanacioÂlu Tamur e Fabio L. Grassi

Introduzione
di
Antonello Biagini

Edizioni Nuova Cultura

 Indice 3

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Copyright © 2009 Edizioni Nuova Cultura – Roma
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 Turco-Italian Relations between 1919-1922

di Mevlüt Çelebi R E
T O
' AUits boundaries rather imperialistically while
Turkey was striving L
Italy was trying to expand

E
century. Italian R
press
to save its very existence in the first quarter of 20th
had already begun to ask if there was any piece of
P for Italy since the beginning of the century. Shortly
land in Turkey 154

after I A Italy captured Rhodes and the Dodecanese and it encouraged

that,
P
OItalian expansionism. The Italian occupation of these islands was
C viewed as “the Italian representation in the East.”
Italy turned to Anatolia after the Tripoli War (The Libyan War).
155

Camillo Garroni, whose duty was to watch political and commercial

interests of Italy in Eastern Mediterranean, was appointed as Italian
ambassador in Istanbul.156 Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Antonio di
Sangiuliano prepared a programme aiming to “gain some exclusive
rights and prepare the region to Italian rule.”157
According to this policy, Italians took action in South-eastern
Anatolia, especially in Antalya (Attaleia). Anatoliàs climate, fertile soil,
forests, livestock, rich coal and lignite mines, etc. as well as its close
location to the Dodecanese increased Italians’appetite.158 Italians were
also reclaiming the lands of the Roman Empire using some nautical
terms spoken in Anatolia159 as a historical proof of “Holy Roman

154 R. Foa, C’è posto per l’Italia nell’Impero Ottomano?, Genova, 1911.
155 T. Sillani, L’Asia Minore, in Nuova Antologia, Anno 51, Vol. CLXXXI, Fasc. 1055 (1
Gennaio 1916), p.66.
156 R. A.Webster, L’imperialismo industriale italiano, 1908-1915, Torino, Einaudi.,1974, p.

458.
157 M. Petricioli, L’Italia in Asia Minore, Firenze, Sansoni, 1983, p.15.

158 R. Paribeni, L’Asia Minore e la regione di Adalia, Roma, 1915, pp. 6-7 e 14; G. Capra,

L’Asia Minore e la SÍrÍa nei rapporti con l’Italia, Benigno Canavese, 1915, pp. 3-7; G.
Bevione, L’Asia Minore e l’Italia, Torino, 1914, p. 27; F. Di Pretoro, L’Asia Minore e l’Italia
attraverso la storia, in Gerarchia, I, (25 Ottobre l922), p. 612.
159 R. Paribeni, L’Italia e il Mediterraneo Orientale, Roma, 1916, p. 53.

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 heritage” 160; they would be “reunited with their ancestors” when they
gained Anatolia.161
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In 1913 and 1914, a number of committees under the cover of
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“archaeologists” made explorations in the South-western Anatolia to
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gather information in the sake of Italian expansionism. During the
Turkish War of Independence, for instance, the Director of National
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Museum of Rome Roberto Paribeni162, together with Biagio Pace and

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Dr. Moretti, performed such explorations in the region.163 It is certain
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that these kind of explorations helped Italian policy. Naturally, Italy
I A
chose these regions to annex with secret agreements between the

O Pvictors of World War I.

C During this period Europe underwent major changes. Italy,

knowing it wasn’t as strong as the Great Britain, Germany, or France,
closely observed forming blocs of states and made an alliance with
Germany and Austria-Hungary. In spite of this alliance, Italy entered
World War I on the Allies’side (Entente Powers) by secret agreements
such as the London Agreement of 26th April 1915. According to this
treaty, Italy was guaranted with South-western Anatolia including
Izmir. Italy later signed St. Jean de Maurienne Treaty in 1917 with its
allies securing its rights over Anatolian lands. To colonize south
Anatolia it wasn’t enough to sign treaties with the Allies; it was going
to be more difficult to make settlements.
Italian Foreign Policy towards Turkey after World War I. After
World War I, Italy led a multi-faceted foreign policy towards Turkey to
achieve three objectives: (i) to maintain diplomacy with Turkey after
the Armistice of Mudros by assigning Carlo Sforza as the “High
Commissioner”, (ii) to make sure to sign a treaty in The Paris Peace
Conference which would guarantee Italian rights in Turkey, (iii) to
prepare to occupy some parts of Anatolia. Sforza, who said he would
like to look like a friend to Turks rather than a coloniser164, stated the
outline of Italian policy: “Italy must see Turkey as a market for Italian

160 T. Sillani, Ibid, p. 68.

161 G. Capra, Ibid, p. 4.
162 M. Petricioli, Ibid, pp. 49-52.

163 R. Paribeni, L’Asia Minore e la regione di Adalia, p. 9; B. Pace, L’Italia e l’Asia Minore,

Palermo, 1917, pp. 20-23; B. Pace, Dalla pianura di Adalia alla valle del Meandro, Milano,
1927, p. 37; G. Bevione, Ibid, p. 90; R. A. Webster, Ibid, pp. 508-509.

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 industry. It is necessary to sign a treaty to please both sides and Italians

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should try to seek Turks’ contentedness to ensure their interests.”165
Sforza, who had more accurate analyses about Turkey than the other
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diplomats’, visited the leader of Turkish War of Independence Mustafa
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Kemal Pasha in Istanbul.166
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The Paris Peace Conference opened on 18th January 1919. Italy did
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not get the back-up it had expected from the Allies and began acting

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separately in Turkey by initiating occupations in Anatolia. The first
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place Italians occupied was Antalya (Attaleia). Before the occupation
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Italians had built a radio-telegram station and provided health service.

O PThey invited some of the retailers and artisans to the cruiser anchored

C at the bay and got them to sign a document stating they were being
treated well.167 Italians used this document, which was signed by these
tradesmen and artisans without knowing the contents, as an invitation
to occupy the city.168
Italians also used some incidents as a pretext to occupy the city and
the invasion began at 15.00 hours on 28 March 1919 with 300 soldiers
from Cruiser Regina Elena.169 Italians ignored the reactions of the Allies
against the invasion and encountered no resistance, so Col. Giuseppe di
Bisogno was assigned the task of capturing Konia with 500 troops

164 C. Sforza, L’Italia, dal 1914 al 1944, Quale io la vidi, Roma, A. Mondadori, 1944, p. 57;

G. Giordano, Carlo Sforza: La diplomazia 1896-1921, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1987, p. 90;
G. Artieri, Tre ritratti politici e quattro attentati, Roma, Atlante, 1953, p. 77.
165 C. Sforza, Ibid, p. 60; Id., Makers of Modern Europe, Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merill Co.

1930, pp. 361-362; Id., Costruttori e distruttori, Roma, 1945, pp. 362-363.
166 M. Çelebi, Mütareke Döneminde Mustafa Kemal Paóa-Kont Sforza Görüómes, in Atatürk

AraótÍrma Merkezi Dergisi, Vol. XV, 45, (November 1999), pp.791-800.

167 N. Köstüklü, Millî Mücadelède Denizli, Isparta ve Burdur SancaklarÍ, Ankara, Kültür

BakanlÍÂÍ YayÍnÍ, 1990, p. 15.

168 B. Pace, Dalla pianura di Adalia alla valle del Meandro, p. 52, “Adalia”, Enciclopedia

italiana, Vol. I, p. 463, Lo sbarco degli italiani ad Adalia, Rivista Coloniale, -XIV-, (Aprile
1919), p. 221.
169 Archivio Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, (AUSSME), E3-9/10, E3-6/1;

Archivio Storico Diplomatico Ministero degli Affari Esteri-Affari Politici (ASDMAE-AP),

1919-1930, Busta (B).1646-7746; Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt BaókanlÍÂÍ
Aróivi (ATASE Aró), Klasör (Kl).401, D.2, Fihrist (Fh).4; L. Flussi, La diplomazia delle
cannoniere: Gli sbarchi italiani in Anatolia nel 1919, in Analisi Storica, Anno I, No 1,
(Luglio-Dicembre 1983), pp. 39-56; M. Çelebi, Millî Mücadele’de Gtalyan Gógalleri, in
Atatürk AraótÍrma Merkezi Dergisi, Vol. IX, 26, (Mart 1993), pp.395-416.

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 equipped with heavy machine guns at the night of 24/25 April 1919.

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The unit arrived in Konia on 26 April without incident.170 Meanwhile,
United Kingdom, France, and United States approved a Greek invasion
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of the West Anatolia on 6 May 1919. Italian Foreign Minister Sonnino
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ordered the invasion Fethiye (Telmessus/Makri) and Bodrum
(Halicarnassus) the following day.171 Italians invaded Fethiye, Bodrum,
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and Marmaris (Physkos) in Mugla Province on 11 May.172 Invasions

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continued one after another: They had taken over Scala Nuova
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(KuóadasÍ), Ephesus (Selçuk)173, Gulluk174, Milas175, Ahikoy (Yatagan),
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Cine176, and Burdur177 until they captured Mugla on 23 July. 178 The

O POttoman Government never activated any kind of resistance and kept

C its reactions to a minimum degree through bureaucratic protests.

The Italians aimed to turn occupied regions into semi-colonies at
least. To do this they tried to win the peoplès hearts first. People lived
in occupied regions generally agreed on “the fact that Italians treated
people very well.”179 This is true to some extend but it actually was a

170 AUSSME, E3-6/1; AUSSME, E3-12/2; ASDMAE-AP, 1919-1930, B. 1646-7746; Türkiye

Cumhuriyeti Roma BüyükelçiliÂi Aróivi (TCRBA), Kutu. (K.)125, Dosya: (D.) 7; Lo sbarco
degli italiani a Conia, in Rivista Coloniale, XIV, (Maggio 1919), p. 280; B. Pace, Dalla
pianura di Adalia alla valle del Meandro, pp. 53-54.
171 AUSSME, E3-3/3.

172 AUSSME, E3-3/3; AUSSME, E3-6/2; AUSSME, E3-7/3; AUSSME, E3-9/8; TCRBA Dalla

pianura di Adalia alla valle del Meandro, K.125, D.7; ATASE Aró., Kl.401, D.2, Fh.90; B.
Pace, Dalla pianura di Adalia cit., p.56; L. Flussi, cit., p.49.
173 ASDMAE-AP, 1919-1930, B. 1646-7746; AUSSME, E3-3/3; AUSSME, E3-6/2; ATASE

Aró., Kl.14, D.55, Fh.8; Biagio Pace, Ibid., p. 56; L. Flussi, Ibid, p. 50.
174 ATASE Aró., Kl. 401, D.2, Fh. 118.

175 AUSSME, E3-6/2; AUSSME, E3-11/1; Luciano Flussi, Ibid, p.50; M. kefik Aker, Gstiklâl

SavaóÍ’nda 57. FÍrka ve AydÍn Millî Cidali, Vol:2, Gstanbul, Askerî Mat., 1937, p. 23.
176 AUSSME, E3-11/1; L. Flussi, cit, p.50; M.kefik Aker, Ibid, p. 29.

177 AUSSME, E3-11/1; Nuri Köstüklü, Ibid., p. 22.

178 AUSSME, E3-7/3; ATASE Aró., Kl.27, D.102, Fh.43; Ünal Türkeó, Kurtuluó SavaóÍ’nda

MuÂla, (2 Vol), Gstanbul, 1973, p. 224.

179 I had a few opportunities to make interviews with those who lived those days:

Hüseyin Dönmez from Bodrum (born 1909) said: “The Italians treated people well,
committed no atrocities. The soldiers were cheerful. They were always dressed up in
their uniforms. They would make jokes and play games. Their favorite pastime was
picking frogs around the place called Torba. People in Bodrum had seen a bicycle for
the first time when the Italians brought one. We, children, used to gather around the
bicycle riding soldiers and inspect the bicycles; for children it was a great joy to watch

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 result of a systematical policy. The submissive attitude of the Ottoman

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Government was another reason for the local people not to show any
armed resistance against Italian troops. In contrast, Turkish people
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fought the Greek forces in spite of the Ottoman Government. In fact,
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Italy was greedy for Turkish soil, too, since the Libyan War and the
Turkish intelligentsia were cautious.180 However, Italians managed and
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execute occupations more cunningly; they issued passports,

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“protection documents”181, and distribute belts in the colors of Italian
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flag to locals. 182 Italians opened some institutions in order to gain
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Turkish peoplès support. They built hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, and

O Pcasualties in Antalya, Konya, Mugla, Burdur, Fethiye, Kusadasi,

C Marmaris, Bodrum, Soke, Gulluk, Milas, Cine, Bucak, Kocarli.183 They

also founded Italian schools184 to teach and spread Italian culture,
language, and Christianity185 in Konya, Kusadasi, Burdur, Soke, Mugla,
Fethiye, and Antalya.
Additionally, archaeologists like Biagio Pace, Dr. Giuseppe Moretti,
Dr. Azelio Beretti, Dr. Guido Calza, Dr. Carlo Anti conducted
researches in Konya, Antalya, Bodrum, KuóadasÍ etc., in 1919-1921 in
spite of objections of Turkish authorities.186

soldiers when they were riding bicycles. The Italians used to give us ship biscuits.”
Raci Ulusoy from Söke (born 1902) told: “The Italian soldiers, who treated us well, used
to give things to people who went to their dormitories. An Italian soldier gave me his
jacket when I was working in my field and I gave it to one of my employees.” Mustafa
Bilgin (born 1907) talked about the Italians in Kusadasi: “The Italians treated people
very well. They used to distribute candies and chocolate to children, rice to the poor,
and coffee to civil servants.” Ayse Arican (born 1908) from Fethiye and Mehmet Gökce
(born 1911) from Fethiye confirmingly told similar memories. Ayse Arican added that
she had sold milk and eggs to Italians who had paid good money.
180 A. F. Cebesoy, Millî Mücadele HâtÍralarÍ, Gstanbul, 1953, p. 172.

181 ATASE Aró., Kl. 809, D. 38-24-70, Fh. 47.

182 ATASE Aró., Kl. 401, D. (3-1)4, Fh. 190; Nuri Köstüklü, Ibid, p .45.

183 AUSSME, E3-4/2; AUSSME, E3-4/5; AUSSME, E3-9/1; ASDMAE-AP, 1919-1930, B.

1653-7759.
184 ASDMAE-AP, 1919-1930, B. 1653-7760; AUSSME, E3-22/1; AUSSME, E3-33/7.

185 TCRBA, K.144, D.2.

186 M. Petricioli, Archeologia e politica estera tra le due guerre, Firenze, 1988, p. 30;

AUSSME, E3-7/3; G. Imperatori, In Anatolia. Dal Meandro al Duden, in Rassegna Italiana

del Mediterraneo, n. 7, (Agosto 1921), p. 207.

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 Turkish War of Independence and Italy. The Turkish War of Independence,

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a.k.a. “Turkish Revolutionary War”, or sometimes “Greco-Turkish
War”, was called in Italian documents as “il Movimento Nazionalista”,
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“il Movimento Nazionale”, “il Movimento di Mustafa Kemal”, and “la
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Resistenza Nazionalista”. The members or supporters of the Turkish
side was tagged as”i Kemalisti”, “i nazionalisti”, or “i nazionalisti
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turchi”.Italian people and authorities, as well as Italian government,

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analyzed rationally the Turkish War of Independence under the
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leadership of Mustafa Kemal. They stated that “The invasion of Izmir
I A
had stirred Turkish Patriotism” so, “The Turkish War was a reaction

O Pagainst the Greek occupation of Izmir.”187 According to Italians, this

C resistance emerged in spite of the Sultan’s and the Istanbul

Government’s will188, the aim of this war was to drive Greeks out of
Anatolia.189 On the other hand, there were some Italians who warned
about the “danger”190 of Turkish resistance. Di Soragna, who was an
important Italian figure in Istanbul, described this danger in these
sentences: “Once the revolutionaries prove successful and beat United
Kingdom and France, they will not give Italy any political or
commercial privileges. On the contrary, they will be arrogant and
strengthen the slogan of ‘Turkey belongs to the Turkish’.”191
Although Italy was an invading power too with its 14,606 troops192 -
according to a Turkish source, this number was 17,900193 -, Ankara
Government saw Italy as a lesser evil. Italians’ non-violent occupation
policy, recognition of Turkish National Movement, and, in some cases,
their previous help had prepared a friendly ground between the
Turkish National Parliament and Italy. In spite of Mustafa Kemal’s

187 AUSSME, E3-8/4.

188 AUSSME, E3-12/4.
189 F. Coppola, Viaggio nel Levante II, in Politica, VI, (30 Ottobre 1920), p. 278, 286; B.

Pace, Per la nostra posizione in Asia Minore, in Rivista Coloniale, XV, (Febbraio 1920), p.
68; A. Signoretti, La guerra nell’Asia Minore, in Gerarchia,I, (25 Settembre 1922), p. 482.
190 A. Signoretti, cit. p. 485.

191 Ö. KürkçüoÂlu, Türk-Gngiliz Gliókileri, (1919-1926), Ankara, 1978, p. 120.

192 AUSSME, E3- 21/1, 1 May 1920.

193 Türk Gstiklâl Harbi, C.7, Gdarî Faaliyetler, Ankara, Genkur. Baók. Yay., 1975, p.61. G.

Baj Macario, Notizie sulla campagna Turco-Greca, 1919-1922, I, in Rivista militare italiana, -
V-, (Novembre 1931), p. 1678.

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 suspicions toward Italy194, it was not especially showed open

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hostility.195 To formulize the relations between Ankara and Rome, let’s
say Turks called Italians “enemy” only in theory, but they were
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“friends” in practice. Italy was “enemy” because the Turkish War of
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Independence was fought against all foreign powers in Turkey—Italy
was obviously one of the invading powers. However, Mustafa Kemal
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even said Italians had been “friends” because they ignored the patriotic

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activities of the Turkish militia in the Italian influence zone in Anatolia.
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Italy did not prevent them from using seaports in Antalya and
I A
Kusadasi and allowed Turks to open agencies in Rome and helped

O Pthem to advocate their cause. For this kind of reasons Turkish

C Revolutionaries did not categorize Italy as one of the Allies but of

course any invader power was just unacceptable. The Turkish National
Parliament and its president Mustafa Kemal knew that a possible
victory over the Greek would be discouraging for Italians. Mustafa
Kemal explained the strategy against Italy in one of his telegrams to his
generals dated 9 January 1920: “Our serious effort to drive Greeks out
of AydÍn Province will doubtlessly cause Italians to leave our country
as our second achievement.”196
The Empty Hands Policy. The basis of Italian policy was the treaties of
London and St. Jen de Maurienne. With the treaty of Sevres and a
secret agreement between Italy, the United Kingdom, and France
(L’Accordo Tripartito) Turkey was divided into influence zones.
L’Accordo Tripartito solidified Italian influence zone in Anatolia: The
region covering Alexandretta, Lamasu Stream, and as far as Mount
Erciyes in Anatolia. In the north, the area surrounded by Mount
Erciyes, Aksehir, Kutahya, excluding the railroad, Mount Uludag, Lake
Ulubat, and Gulf of Edremit. In the west, the area which spread from 5
km. north of Kusadasi, all the coast down to Meis Island and Lamasu
Stream. Italy additionally claimed some privileges in Eregli Coal
mines.197

194 L. Villari, Da Mustafa Kemal a Kemal Atatürk, in Nuova Antologia, Anno 73, Fasc. 1601
(1 Dicembre 1938), p. 331.
195 C. Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe, p. 365.

196 Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri, IV, Ankara, TTK Yay., 1991, p.155.

197 ASDMAE-AP, 1919-1930, B. 1658-7768; Vico Mantegazza, Italiani in Oriente, Eraclea,

Roma, 1922, pp. 203-211; A. Giannini, La Questione Orientale alla conferenza della pace,

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 With L’Accordo Tripartito, Allies approved Italian rights which

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had been defined in the treaties of London and St. Jean de
Maurienne198. Italian influence zones were rich in mineral deposits.
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Antalya had silver, lead, chrome, and magnesium, Soke and Kusadasi
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had lignite, Selcuk had emery, Afyon had mercury and lead, Konya
had chrome and potassium. Italians were calculating how to operate
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mines in Bodrum, Fethiye, and Salt Lake with Italian capital.199 Italian

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influence zone had also fruitful agricultural soil. In Konya Plain and
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the land stretching from Antalya to Menderes, grain, olives, opium
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poppy, figs, tobacco, etc. could be grown.200 L’Accordo Tripartito met

O Pthe needs of Italy in Anatolia and the Ottoman Government had

C agreed. During the Turkish War of Independence, Italy supported

Turkish revolutionaries but tried to impose the same treaty to the
Ankara Government in return. For Ankara it was out of question
because Turkish revolutionaries had aimed unconditional political,
military, commercial, and economic independence. Ankara and Rome
were oriented by different motives and point of views so they never
shared a common ground.
Italy even managed to get a representative of Ankara to sign a
document accepting its expectations in the London Conference. The
Allies decided to hold a conference in London when Ankara
government rejected the conditions of Sevres. The conference opened
on 21 February 1921. During the conference Turkish Foreign Secretary
Bekir Sami and his Italian counterpart Sforza signed a treaty. The treaty
was signed on 12 March 1921 and was composed of six articles.
According to the treaty Italy was given its influence zones in Anatolia,
in return Italy was supposed to advocate Turks’rights over Izmir and
Thrace.201

Roma, 1921, pp. 40-41; B. Pace Dalla pianura di Adalia cit, pp. 290-293; Gkdam, 9 Teórin-i
evvel 1920, p. 1; Türk Gstiklâl Harbi, Vol. II, BatÍ Cephesi, 1. KÍsÍm, Ankara, Genkur.
Baók.Yay., 1963, p. 403.
198 R. Rainero, Storia della Turchia, Milano, Marzorati, 1972, p. 249.

199 C. Manetti, L’Anatolia, Firenze, 1922, pp. 122-124.

200 Id., La politica italiana nel Levante e l’espansione economica in Anatolia, Firenze, 1921,

p.33-35; Id:, L’Anatolia, pp. 132-34.

201 ASDMAE-AP, 1919-1930, B. 1661-7773; Oriente Moderno, I, (15 Giugno 1921), p. 18;

Trattati e Convenzioni fra il Regno d’Italia e gli altri Stati, Vol: 27, (1 Gennaio-31 Dicembre

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 The treaty caused reactions in Ankara; Mustafa Kemal blamed

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Bekir Sami with “not completely embracing aims and ideals of the
Turkish Revolution.”202 Ankara Government’s refusal203 to accept
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obligations of this treaty resulted in the Turco-Italian relations
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worsening. A fight between a Turkish person and an Italian soldier in
Antalya, disputes over a crashed Greek plane around Kusadasi in May
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1921, a firearm attack to an Italian boat in Gulluk, and some incidents

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in Soke in June 1921 caused disturbance to the relations, too. Moreover,
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Sforza had to resign when Giovanni Giolitti resigned from the office.
I A
Sforzàs Turkish policy had been labeled as “the empty hands policy”

O Pby nationalist and fascist groups.204 When “Anglophile”205 Pietro

C Tomasi Della Torretta became the next Italian Foreign Minister in

Ivanoe Bonomi’s cabinet, Italian foreign policy took a new turn.206
Although some of the Italian press was hoping “to continue Sforza’s
policy”,207 Italy associated its foreign policy with the English.208
The Evacuations of the Occupied Regions. Italy could not anticipate
a Turkish resistance against occupations. Although the Turkish war
was being fought primarily against the Greek, it was going to be
inevitable for Turks to fight the Italians, too. Turkish triumph over the
Greek resulted in dissuasive effects on Italians like Mustafa Kemal had
identified. Italians decided to withdraw its troops from Anatolia rather
than lose a war. Italy evacuated Antalya first on 5 July 1921; Soke and
Kusadasi were going to be the next to evacuate. Withdrawal of all
Italian troops began to be discussed in December 1921. The decision
was made in a meeting in which Italian civil and military authorities

1921), Roma, Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, 1931, pp. 26-27; F. L. Grassi, L’Italia e la
questione turca (1919-1923). Opinione pubblica e politica estera, Torino, Zamorani, 1996, pp.
136-137; M. Çelebi, “Millî Mücadele Döneminde Türk-Gtalyan Gliókileri”, Belleten, Vol.
LXII, 233, (April 1998), pp.179-180.
202 G. M. Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk-Söylev, Vol. II- Ankara, TTK YayÍnÍ, 1984, p.791.

203 G. M. Kemal Atatürk, cit. p. 787.

204 B. Pace, Dalla pianura cit., p. 221.

205 S. R. Sonyel, Türk Kurtuluó SavaóÍ ve DÍó Politika, Vol: II, Ankara, TTK YayÍnÍ, 1986, p.

159.
206 Alfredo Signoretti, cit, p. 485.

207 From italian newspaper Corriere della Sera Hâkimiyet-i Milliye, 26 Temmuz 1921, p.

1.
208 A. Signoretti, cit, p. 484.

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 participated on 1 April 1922.209 Stefani Agency announced the decision

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of withdrawal on 19 April 1922.210 Italian troops started the evacuation
in Soke on 20 April, in Kusadasi on 24 April, in Marmaris on 27
April.211
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Commercial Relations. Italy had not maintained only diplomatic relations
but also commercial relations. According to Mondros Treaty, Turkish
L
Army had to hand in most of its equipment. In order to overcome this

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obstacle, Ankara formed a “Purchase Committee” and was helped by
P
Bolsheviks. The committee members went to some European countries
I A
via Italy and, to transfer the arms they purchased, they used Italian

O Pseaports.

C The Purchase Committee made an attempt to buy fighter planes,

too. A contract was signed to purchase 25 airplanes 9 of which would
be delivered at Antalya dock after the Battle of Sakarya. Before the
Great Turkish Offensive, Turks purchased a large amount of military
equipment from Italy such as bayonets, cartridges, Mauser rifles,
uniforms, tents, canteens, rucksacks, etc. To quote some figures: 30,000
combat uniforms, 52,000 tents, 15,000 jackets and trousers, 160,000
flannel undershirts and flannels, 100,000 canteens. For instance, 42,000
canteens were delivered on 22 January 1922, so did 25,000 German-
made rucksacks, before the Great Offensive. This military cargo from
Italy and other European countries was transported via Italian
seaports. Turkish military cargo was also carried to the fronts by an
Italian company-Catania.212
Turkish Victory and Italian Public Opinion. Italy and Italian press
observed closely the Great Turkish Offensive, which started on 26
August 1922. Turkish victory hit the headlines in Italy, Il Messaggero’s,
for instance, read “The Greek defeated and they retreat from
Afyonkarahisar”. Il Giornale d’Italia reported that The Greek had lost

209 ASDMAE-AP, 1919-1930, B.1673-7806.

210 A. Masala, Echi della guerra di indipendenza Turca nella stampa italiana, (1919-1923), in
Atti del simposio di ricerhe e di studi per uno sviluppo scientifico dei rapporti Italo-
Turchi, (Ankara-Gstanbul 9-14 October 1980), Milano, Giuffré, 1981, p. 88.
211 ASDMAE-AP, 1919-1930, B.1673-7806.

212 S. M. Çelebi, Millî Mücadele Döneminde Türk-Gtalyan Gliókileri, Ankara, Atatürk

AraótÍrma Merkezi Yay., 2002, pp. 315-332.

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 the war and they had quickly evacuated Eskisehir on 1 September.213

R E
On 5 September Corriere reported that the Turkish forces had captured
Usak, and the next day it headlined “the rout of the Greek”.214 Corriere
O
announced Izmir’s capture in its headlines on 11 September.215 Il
T
' AU
Giornale d’Italia reported on 12 September that the Turkish forces had
entered Izmir and added that the Greek had set some streets on fire
L
before they had abandoned the city. La Stampa, quoting an American

ER
journalist, reported that the Greek had filled mosques with women and
P
children to torch them. According to Il Messaggero the Greek had set
I A
Izmir on fire.216 In an editorial in Popolo d’Italia it was declared that

O P“the Imperial Government had become a shadow and the only

C authority was the Ankara Government.” The Sultan was interpreted as

“a magnificent prisoner without his position or power, facing his
mistakes.”217
Some newspapers like Avanti and L’Idea Nazionale claimed that
Italy’s interests in Anatolia had ended with Turkish victory. On 14th
September L’Idea Nazionale wrote: “Goodbye benefit dreams, fatigue
of armies, petrol and mines. Goodbye monopolies, influence zones.
From now on, we need to wake up from the dream of claiming the
heritages of Venice and Geneva and make an agreement in the equal
conditions.” 218
Italians – although they never gave up their economic interest - had
believed in and declared the righteousness of Turkish War of
Independence and Turkish victory before the Allies did. The victory of
Turkish Army was received well with the compliments of being right
in Italian public opinion.219 After the victory, when Italian journalist
Filipucci Giustiniani applied for an interview with Mustafa Kemal
Pasha to be the first to interview220, articles about Turkish victory were

213 A. Masala, Gtalya BasÍnÍnda Mudanya Mütarekesi, 70. in YÍlÍnda Mudanya Mütarekesi
ve UluslararasÍ SonuçlarÍ, Bildiriler, Bursa, Uluda Üniversitesi, 1993, p. 85.
214 Id., Echi della guerra di indipendenza Turca nella stampa italiana, p. 100.

215 Id., Ibidem,, p. 104.

216 Id.,, Gtalya BasÍnÍnda Mudanya Mütarekesi, pp. 87-88.

217 Il Popolo d’Italia’dan BabalÍk, 21 September 1922, p. 1.

218 F.L. Grassi, cit., p.180.

219 P. di Roccalta, Angora e Kemal Pascià, Roma, Anonima Romana Ed., 1932, p. 67.

220 B. N. kimóir, Atatürk ile YazÍómalar, I, (1920-1923), Ankara, 1981, p. 417.

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 published in Italian magazines by writers such as Benito Mussolini.

R E
Benito Mussolini, who interpreted Turkish War of Independence as a
revolt against imperialism, gave one of his articles the title of The Rising
O
Crescent (La luna crescente). According to Mussolini “…with the Turkish
T
' AU
victory Greek expansionism has collapsed and the English have lost
prestige in the Islamic World” and he added that with the victory Turks
L
have returned to Europe. Another important figure who was pleased

ER
with the Turkish victory was Italian ambassador in Paris the Count
P
Sforza. He said, as quoted by Il Giornale d’Italia on 14 October 1922,
I A
that he had always advocated a fair policy toward Turkey and added

O Pthat Turks knew it and it was an advantage of Italians for their

C interests.”221 Although Francesco Coppola was disappointed with the

failure of L’Accordo Tripartito he evaluated the Turkish victory justly
by stating: “with the Turkish victory, pan-Hellenism failed and along
with it four-year-old adamant English eastern policy in Lloyd George’s
person.”222
Conclusion. Turkish people have always gratefully remembered those
who supported them in their war of independence. Italians have had a
special place in Turkish peoplès eyes, too. Both Italians in Turkey and
most of the Italians in the mainland believed in the righteousness of the
Turkish Cause and acted accordingly, thus winning the heart of
Turkish people.
When Italians supported Turks against the Greek, they knew hostile
policies had a negative effect on Turkish people only to cause them to
resist stronger. However, the Turkish revolutionaries had Italians leave
Anatolia if not by engaging in battles. After the Treaty of Lausanne,
Turkish leaders had hoped to bring Italic-Turkish relations to a new
level, nevertheless Italians under the leadership of Benito Mussolini,
who was trying to be a “warlord”, could not help getting angry with
Turks because of their rejection of an Italian occupation in Anatolia.
While Turkey was able to maintain better relations with the United
Kingdom and France after the War of Independence, relations would
not be brought a desired level in spite of Turkey’s efforts.

221 F.L. Grassi, Ibid, p. 176.

222 F. Coppola, La catastrofe orientale, in Politica, XIII, (30 Settembre 1922), pp. 168-183.

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