Keith Buersmeyer

AQUINAS ON T H E ''MODI SIGNIFICANDI"

Dr. K E I T H B U E R S M E Y E R (Universidad de Navarra, Biblioteca

de Humanidades, Apartado 273, 31080 Pamplona, Navarra,
Spain), received his Ph.D. from the University of Navarra,
where he has been Assistant Professor for the past three
years. He has published articles in philosophical
journals in Spain, Australia, and the United States
and presently is writing a book on Albert the Great.

There can be no doubt that the philosophical and theological writings o f

Thomas Aquinas evince a great sensitivity towards language and its "ways o f
s i g n i f y i n g . " Hence it is inevitable that recent philosophers have attempted to
find in Aquinas a " f o r e r u n n e r " o f modern linguistic philosophy. For example,
David Burrell i n Aquinas: God and Action states that the "medievals' way o f
doing grammar is philosophical, since it reflects the background conviction that
the f o r m o f one's discourse reveals something o f the structure o f the w o r l d . A
conviction that language and reality are structurally isomorphic underlies every
attempt at philosophical analysis, o f course, even i f it takes an exceptionally
reflective thinker like Peirce or Wittgenstein to call our attention to i t " — i n the
process grouping Aquinas, medieval speculative grammar, semiotics and ana-
lytic philosophy together i n what is termed "philosophical grammar."*
This global amalgamation o f such diverse philosophical positions serves, I
think, only to obscure what was Thomas Aquinas' real contribution to a
philosophy o f language. A n d it fails to capture an essential element i n Aquinas'
frequently detailed analyses o f the "ways o f s i g n i f y i n g " — t h a t this is always a
secondary concern aimed at a deeper grasping o f the "ways o f being." It also
fails to recognize that Thomas Aquinas rejects any simple isomorphism between
language and the w o r l d , although it is true that he does find a certain spontane-
ous reflection o f the structure o f the w o r l d i n the structure o f language. Aquinas'
theory o f language, although to a certain extent limited i n that it shows little
interest i n pragmatics and contextual semantics which are so important i n
modern linguistic philosophy, does I think provide clear general principles
which can help to explain the d i f f i c u l t problem o f the inter-connection between
language, knowledge and reality: a problem that has given rise to much o f
twentieth-century philosophy.
Aquinas accepts the traditional medieval triad o f the ''modi significandi^
''modi intelligendiy' and "modi essendi." The source o f this triad was Aristotle's
observation in the Peri Hermeneias that words are conventional signs o f our

The Modern Schoolman, LXIV, January 1987 73

concepts, which i n turn are natural likenesses o f the f o r m s o f things. The
theologians o f the t w e l f t h and early thirteenth centuries developed a theory o f
the ''modi significandi'' to explain the possibility o f talking about G o d . H o w -
ever, as Chenu has pointed out, their theory o f the "modi significandi" of
language tended to postulate a naive, exaggerated realism, seeing i n grammati-
cal categories an exact correspondence w i t h the structure o f reality.^ This
tendency to establish a one-to-one correspondence between w o r d and thing
contrasts w i t h Aquinas' more critical approach to the "modi significandi."
Although Thomas finds a certain spontaneous reflection o f the "modi essendi"
o f things i n the "modi significandi" o f language, he is acutely aware o f the
importance o f the knowing subject in the process o f signification, and thus
places great importance on the refracting role o f the "modi intelligendi"
between the "modi essendi" and the "modi significandi." He is careful to
distinguish what belongs to the w o r k o f the intellect (and hence how something
is signified i n language) f r o m what belongs to things "in rebus." Thomas came
to realize this importance o f the "modi intelligendi" i n his early writings on how
G o d can be named by us, and this awareness o f the shortcomings o f the "modi
significandi" i n grasping the "res significata" is never far o f f f r o m any o f his
later discussions o f language i n properly philosophical contexts: we frequently
see h i m warning that the "modi significandi" must be "seen t h r o u g h " i n order
to accurately apprehend the "res significata." A n d it is precisely this w h i c h
permits the "critique o f language" w h i c h is undoubtedly present i n his writings.
Before considering i n detail Aquinas' " c r i t i q u e " o f the "modi signifi-
candi" o f language, I think it is useful to look briefly at an " i s o m o r p h i c " theory
o f language, i n order to contrast it w i t h Aquinas' approach to the relation
between language and reality. Medieval speculative grammar represents an
interesting attempt to establish an isomorphic theory o f language, although it
serves i n the end I think only to show that a strict isomorphism between

•David Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action
(Notre Dame, 1979), p. 4.
^See M.-D. Chenu, "Grammaire et theol¬
ogie auxXIle etXIIIe sieclesr AHDLMA, 10
(1935-36), pp. 5-28.
. . the theory of language set out by the
modistae (that is, the speculative grammari-
ans) in terms of the modi essendi, intelligendi
and essendi, however, rests on a 'moderate
realism,' basically an Aristotelian view as in-
terpreted by St. Thomas Aquinas." In R. H.
Robins, A Short History of Linguistics (Lon-
don: Longmans, 1967), p. 87.
'•We will see that, although the speculative
grammarians accept in theory the intermedi-
ary role of the "modi intelligendi" between
the "modi significandi" and "modi essendi,"
in practice this role tends to be overlooked.
^For the history of speculative grammar, see
Jan Pinbor^, Logik und Semantik in Mittelal-
ter: Ein Uberblick (Stuttgart: Frommann,
1972) and his "Speculative Grammar" in The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philos-
ophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J.
Pinborg (Cambridge: 1982). A good gram-
matical treatment of the movement is found in
G. L. Bursill-Hall, Speculative Grammars of
the Middle Ages (The Hague and Paris:
Moutin, 1971). Many interesting texts of the
early speculative grammarians are collected in
C. Thurot, Extraits de divers manuscrits latins
pour servir a I'histoire des doctrines gram-
maticales au moyen age (Paris, 1869).

74
language and reality—between grammar and metaphysics—is impossible to
maintain, since this leads clearly to the absorption o f one order by another. I n
speculative grammar, the tendency is f o r grammar to disappear and become
metaphysics. I t is only when due importance is given to the refracting role o f the
"modiintelligendr between the "modi significandi" and the "modi essendi"—
when this isomorphism is broken—that the three orders o f signification,
intellection, and being can be preserved, and what belongs to each order clearly
determined.

I . SPECULATIVE G R A M M A R : A N ATTEMPT AT ISOMORPHISM

One recent history o f linguistic theory does not recognize any opposition
between the theory o f the "modi significandi" i n speculative grammar and i n
Thomas Aquinas. I n fact, the author goes so far as to find i n Aquinas an
important source f o r speculative grammar.^ I t is tempting to see an influence o f
Aquinas i n speculative grammar, especially since this movement flourished at
Paris i n the generation after Aquinas. B u t I think it can be shown that
speculative grammar represents a rather uncritical absorption o f metaphysical
terminology into grammar, w i t h a resulting loss o f distance between w o r d and
thing, between sign and what is signified "in rebus" The distinction i n Aquinas
between the "modi significandi" and the "res significata" which is central to
his thoughts on language, does not seem to have f o u n d much o f an audience i n
the speculative grammarians o f the f o l l o w i n g generation.*
The remote source o f speculative grammar is usually traced to Peter Helias
who taught at the University o f Paris i n the late t w e l f t h century. Peter wrote a
long Summa in Priscianium attempting to find a philosophical explanation f o r
the rules o f grammar. This approach to grammar takes on great importance w i t h
the newly discovered works o f Aristotle, and Peter's ideas are soon expanded by
Robert Kilwardby, Michel de Marbais, and Roger Bacon i n the mid-thirteenth
century. From about 1270 onwards there appear numerous De Modis Signifi-
candi produced by a school o f grammarians centered at Paris. This school o f
"modistae" as they came to be called reached its height i n the early fourteenth
century w i t h the 1 works o f Thomas o f E r f u r t , Simon de Courtrai, and Radulphus
B r i t o , who c o d i f y the insights o f the earlier "modistae" i n a highly f o r m a l i z e d
language.^
Speculative grammar can be seen as the attempt to apply the newly
discovered philosophical works o f Aristotle to the study o f grammar. Grammar
had always been o f importance i n the M i d d l e Ages as one o f the liberal arts, but
its study had traditionally involved the reading o f classical Greek and Roman
authors and the distillation o f rules o f elegant, correct w r i t i n g f r o m these

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Keith Buersmeyer

75
writers. W i t h the discovery o f Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, an attempt was
made to fit grammar into the m o l d o f a strict science. Science is viewed by
Aristotle as the necessary knowledge o f things through their causes. To
conceive grammar as this type o f study meant that the basic categories o f
language—its essence—must be the same f o r all men despite the superficial or
accidental differences f o u n d i n human languages. Robert K i l w a r d b y argues that
the science o f grammar must abstract universal rules o f grammar f r o m the
variety o f languages i n the same way that the science o f geometry abstracts the
universal concept o f quantity f r o m many different shapes.^ Grammar is seen as
having a geometric method, proceeding by means o f necessary deductions. One
early speculative grammarian goes so far as to suggest that grammar, being a
strict science based on objective "modi essendi" was actually invented by
philosophers after a diligent study o f the nature o f things. This author argues
that it is impossible to signify a thing using "modi significandi" w h i c h are not
appropriate to it.^ The tendency i n speculative grammar to a radical correspon-
dence between w o r d and thing is here clear. N o t only do the "modi significandi"
have a foundation i n the "modi essendi" but there is a necessary one-to-one
correspondence between the t w o . The difficulties into w h i c h such an approach
can lead are seen i n Thomas o f E r f u r t w h o is faced w i t h the problem that the
w o r d "deltas" which i n Latin has the "modus significandi" o f feminine gender,
does not seem to correspond to the "modus essendi" o f God. A word's f e m i n i n e
gender should be based on a "modus essendi" o f passivity, but i n what is signi-
fied by ''deitas" there is no property o f passivity. Thomas o f E r f u r t cannot resist
seeking a necessary reason f o r the fact that "deltas" is feminine i n L a t i n . He
finds this reason i n our need to imagine G o d as passive i n his receptivity to our
prayers. Hence f e m i n i n i t y is an appropriate "modus significandi" for God.
Thomas, i n viewing grammar as a strict science, cannot allow an element o f
pure chance or convention into his grammatical system.^
W i t h i n speculative grammar, the "modi significandi" are a structuring
provided by the intellect w h i c h result i n the traditional grammatical categories
o f noun, verb, and so f o r t h . Each o f these i n turn is based directly on the
"modus essendi" o f what is signified. I n the case o f a noun, its "modus signifi-
candi" is based on the substantial "modus essendi" o f things, while a verb is
based on the "modus essendi" o f actions flowing f r o m substances w i t h m o t i o n

^Thurot, op. cit., p. 127.
''"Grammatica (est) . . . . impositur a pro-
prietatibus rerum ut non possit significare rem
ipsam sub modis significandi qui repugnant
proprietatibus ipsius rei." Ibid., p. 123.
*See ch. 2 of the "De Modis Significandi"
of Thomas of Erfurt. This work, since it was
long attributed to Duns Scotus, is found in
Vol. I of the Opera Omnia of Scotus (Paris:
Vives, 1891). The first sentence of this work
emphasises the scientific (in Aristotle's sense
of the term) nature of grammar: "Quoniam
'quidem intelligere et scire contingit in omni
scientia, ex cognitione principiorum,' ut scri-
bitur prima Physicorum text., comment., nos
ergo, volentes habere scientiae Grammaticae
notitiam . . . ."
^J. Pinborg, "Speculative Grammar," op.
cit., p. 258.
*<Thurot, op. cit., p. 159.

7fi
and hence involving time. Thus the "modi significandi" are a secondary
imposition by the intellect on the phonetic element ("vox"), coming after the
"vox" has been converted into a meaningful w o r d ("dictio") via a previous
connection made by the intellect between the "vox" and a f o r m "in rebus." I n
this way, a w o r d achieves a t w o - f o l d connection w i t h its referent: it signifies a
f o r m a l aspect o f the referent and "consignifies" (via its "modus significandi" or
grammatical f o r m ) a property o f the referent (its "modus essendi" o f substance,
action, and so f o r t h ) . Pinborg has described this role o f the "modi significandi"
well: they "are a k i n d o f semantical modifiers, further determining the lexical
meaning o f the 'dictio,' thus preparing it f o r various syntactical functions. The
ontological counterparts o f the 'modi' are some general features o f the object
signified, which do not belong to the definitional properties o f the object, and
accordingly are not signified direcdy, but only implied."^
A distinctive feature o f the language o f the "modistae" is the widespread
use o f ontological terms to describe grammatical concepts. M i c h e l de Marbais
employs frequently such terms as " f o r m , " "essence," and "accident" i n his
grammar. We also see h i m resorting to metaphysics i n order to explain w h y the
noun, verb, pronoun, and participle—the so-called declinable parts o f speech—
have more perfect "modi significandi" than the indeclinable parts o f speech
(adverb, conjunction, preposition, and interjection).'^ He argues that since
action f o l l o w s being, higher beings such as man have more noble operations
than lower beings. Thus, since the declinable parts o f speech s i g n i f y more
perfect beings "in rebus," they must have more perfect "modi significandi,"
taken directly f r o m the "modi essendi" o f what is signified. Siger o f Courtrai
goes even further towards the importation o f metaphysics into grammar when
he explains w h y the verb is the most perfect part o f speech. I n the same way that
in the hierarchy o f beings there is one highest and noblest Being w h i c h rules all
lesser beings, so i n the hierarchy o f parts o f speech i t is necessary to posit a
highest part—the v e r b — w h i c h rules all others."
In Radulphus Brito (who is considered by Pinborg as perhaps the most
important and comprehensive exponent o f the theoretical principles o f specula-
tive grammar), we find a clear tension between his desire to make grammar a
strict science and his realization that the "modi significandi" o f words often f a i l
to correspond directly to the "modi essendi" o f the object signified. I n Question
21 o f his Commentary on Questions from Priscian, he asks i f all "modi signifi-
candi" must be founded directly on the "modi essendi" o f objects "in rebus."
Radulphus raises objections to this position: we can name non-existent beings
such as privations and chimaera where clearly the "modus significandi" o f the
name cannot be taken directly f r o m the object signified, since no real objects

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Keith Buersmeyer

77
correspond to these names. Also the verb "sum" should, like all verbs
according to the principles o f speculative grammar, signify "per modum fieri"
this "modus signficandi" being taken f r o m the property o f motion and change i n
actions. B u t i n fact "est" often serves to predicate a stable essence (and hence is
frequently termed the "verbum substantivum" by medieval grammarians).
Radulphus responds to these objections by making a careful distinction. He
admits that all "modi significandi" must be based on the "modi essendi" of
things. The intellect which imposes the "modi significandi" is p r i m a r i l y a
passive faculty and no passive faculty, w h i c h is i n itself indetermined, can
determine itself i n act unless it is moved by something else. The intellect w o u l d
never be able to establish a determinate "modus significandi" i f it were not first
placed i n act by a property o f an object "in rebus." There are substantives i n
grammar only because there are substances "in rebus;" there are verbs only
because there are processes o f change and m o t i o n , and so f o r t h . Because o f this
foundation i n the "modi essendi" grammar can aspire to be a strict science.
But the second part o f his response to this question is important: Radulphus
concedes that it is not always necessary that the "modus significandi" o f a given
w o r d be taken directly f r o m the "modus essendi" o f the thing signified by that
w o r d . Names f o r privations such as blindness are clearly possible, but only
because the intellect, after drawing on the substantial "modus essendi" o f real
objects, can apply the grammatical "modus significandi" o f substantive to a
non-existent object. Although the "modi significandi" are founded ultimately i n
the "modi essendi" one must recognize the intermediary role o f the "modi
intelligendi."^^
Thus Radulphus B r i t o , although holding that grammar is a strict science,
recognizes the "modi intelligendi" as an important intermediary between the
"modi significandi" and the "modi essendi" w h i c h accounts f o r the fact that the
"ways o f s i g n i f y i n g " do not have to retain a one-to-one correspondence w i t h
what is signified. As we shall see, i n Aquinas the "modi intelligendi" also play
an important refracting role between the "modi significandi" and the "modi
essendi." However, when we look at the elaborate meta-language used by
Radulphus and other speculative grammarians to explain the "modi signifi-

mid., p. 321. whe:e their "modus essendi" is their "modus

^^The text of Radulphus Brito's Questions
super Priscianum, nn. 3, 4, 11, 18-23 is at-
tached as an appendix to H. Enders, Sprachlo-
gische Traktate des Mittelalters und der Se-
mantikbegriff (Munich: Schoningh, 1975),
pp. 213-245.
"In the case of a name for a privation,
Radulphus adds that "ille modus intelligendi
est suus modus essendi quia ilia privatione
non habent esse nisi in intellectu." Heidegger,
in his thesis on Thomas of Erfurt, comments
succinctly that, in the case of privations,
intelligendi" "son etre effectif est son etre
connu." See M. Heidegger, Traite des catego-
ries et de la signification chez Duns Scot
(Paris: Gallimard, 1970), p. 146. At the time
of Heidegger's thesis, this work by Thomas of
Erfurt was still attributed to Scotus. For a
discussion of Heidegger's thesis and its failure
to understand the basic concerns of the specu-
lative grammarians, see O. Pöggeler Der
Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Neske: T. H.
Laupp, 1963).

78
candi," this intermediary role o f the "modi intelligendi" tends to be lost, and
the "modi significandi" are i n practice equated w i t h the "modi intelligendi" and
"modi essendi."
This tendency can be seen clearly i n Question 18 o f Radulphus' Commen-
tary, where he asks whether the three "modi" are i n fact the same. His solution
consists i n dividing the "modi significandi" and "modi intelligendi" into a
passive and active element: the passive "modus significandi" is the very
property of the thing as i t is " c o n s i g n i f i e d " by the w o r d . Similarly, the passive
"modus intelligendi" is the very property of the thing as grasped by the
intellect. Radulphus states that materially the passive "modi significandi" and
passive "modi intelligendi" are equated w i t h the "modi essendi" o f the object
signified. However, there are also active "modi significandi" and "modi
intelligendi" which are not materially properties o f the object: the active "modi
significandi" are a property o f the "vox" and the active "modi intelligendi" are
a property o f the intellect. Thus Radulphus is enabled to maintain a strict
correspondence between the "modi significandi," "modi intelligendi," and
"modi essendi," since the three modes are, i n their passive content, materially
the same, while he also recognizes an active element which differentiates the
properties o f the w o r d and intellect f r o m the properties o f the object. I t is the
passive "modi significandi" and "modi intelligendi" which permit grammar to
be an exact science, while the active "modi significandi" and "modi intelli-
gendi" prevent a strict one-to-one correspondence between word and object, at
least i n theory. The meta-language is further complicated by introducing a
formal, as w e l l as material, distinction between the passive and active "modi
significandi" and "modi intelligendi."
A l l o f this complicated meta-language arises f r o m the tension between the
desire to f o u n d grammar as an exact science and the recognition that grammati-
cal categories are frequently arbitrary. I n fact, speculative grammar died out
quickly as a school i n the fourteenth century, possibly under the weight o f its
o w n elaborate meta-language. I n the end, it is the identification o f the passive
"modi significandi" and "modi intelligendi" w i t h the "modi essendi" which
characterized speculative grammar as a movement, along w i t h the use o f
metaphysical terminology to define grammatical categories. The fundamental
concern to convert grammar into a rigorous science by basing it directly on
metaphysics allows one to characterize speculative grammar as an isomorphic
theory o f language, even i f i n practice this isomorphism broke d o w n when faced
w i t h the reality o f linguistic facts.

I I . T H O M A S A Q U I N A S ' APPROACH TO T H E "WAYS OF S I G N I F Y I N G "

I n Aquinas we find a theory o f the "ways o f s i g n i f y i n g " which is far

Aquinas on the ''Modi Significandi"

Keith Buersmeyer

79
removed f r o m any simplistic isomorphism between language and reality. But it
is true that Aquinas often finds a spontaneous reflection o f the "modi essendi"
of things i n the "modi significandi" o f language, although he frequently adds
the warning that what belongs to the realm o f language must not be taken as an
exact copy o f the real w o r l d . I n the f o l l o w i n g discussion o f Aquinas' theory o f
language, I w i l l begin by l o o k i n g briefly at passages i n w h i c h he seems to find at
least a certain spontaneous reflection o f the "modi essendi" i n the "modi signifi-
candi." As we shall see, even i n these passages there is almost always present,
at least implicitly, a rejection o f any isomorphism between w o r d and t h i n g .
Secondly, Thomas Aquinas' explicit " c r i t i q u e o f language" w i l l be discussed i n
detail.
The tendency to find a spontaneous reflection o f the "modi essendi" i n the
"modi significandi" can be seen i n Aquinas' discussion o f the "nomen"—a
broad category i n medieval grammar w h i c h included both what today w o u l d be
termed nouns (the "nomen substantivum") and adjectives (the "nomen adiec-
tivum"). Substantival names s i g n i f y "per modum substantiae" and adjectival
names "per modum accidentis." Accidents depend on the substance i n w h i c h
they inhere f o r both their existence and unity. This dependent " w a y o f b e i n g " o f
accidents is reflected i n the " w a y o f s i g n i f y i n g " o f adjectives: these cannot
stand alone but take their number and gender f r o m the substantival name w h i c h
they modify. I n L a t i n , where an adjectival name is able at least grammatically to
stand alone as the subject-term i n a predication such as "musicus est albus" one
must understand a substance name w h i c h functions as the logical subject o f the
predication. Thomas points out that this predication must be interpreted as
saying that "this particular m a n — f o r example Socrates—who happens to k n o w
music, is pale."^^ But there is no necessary reflection o f the "modi essendi" in
the "modi significandi" o f names. The abstract name "albedo" even though it
signifies an accident "in rebus" does not s i g n i f y "per modum accidentis" but
rather "per modum substantiae." Therefore i t can f u n c t i o n as the subject o f a
predication as i n "albedo est color" w i t h no " c o n s i g n i f i c a t i o n " o f a substance
in w h i c h it inheres. The "modus significandi" o f "albedo"—"ut aliquid
subsistens"—hides the fact the "secundum rem" whiteness can only be f o u n d

i^See In I Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2. The non se habent ut agens et patiens . . . quamvis

quotations from this work are taken from the
Vives edition. All other works of Thomas
Aquinas are cited from the Marietti editions.
^HnlPost. Analyt., lect. 33, n. 281.
'^See In VMetaphys., lect. 9, n. 894.
"See Q. D. Virt. in Comm., q. un., a. 11.
^nnl Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1. Although the
Vives edition places this text in a footnote with
the indication "Farm, omittit," the idea ex-
pressed is clearly Aquinas'. The same idea can
be found expressed in various works of
Thomas Aquinas. "Intellectum et intelligens
quantum ad modum loquendi videantur ut
agens et patiens significari." In Q. D. de
Verit., q. 8, a. 6, ad 3. Also see Q. D. de
spirit, creatur, q. un., a. 4, ad 6.
mid., d. 33, q. l , a . 2.
'^Ibid.,<\. 18, q. 1, a. 5, ad 5.
^^De Ente et Essentia, ch. 2, n. 15.
^^In librum de causis expositio, lect. 22, n.
383.
2^See De Ente et Essentia, ch. 2, n. 15 and /
5. Th., q. 85, a. 5, ad 3.

80
existing in a substance. This can lead to confusion i n the case o f names f o r the
virtues. Although we give the virtues substantival names such as "justice,"
"honesty," and so f o r t h , the virtues "in rebus" are accidental qualities which
can exist only i n a substance. Thomas points out that some philosophers have
fallen into the error o f treating the virtues as i f they really were substances.'^
Aquinas frequently warns that what is implied grammatically by a proposi-
tion cannot be taken as a necessary reflection o f what exists, often employing
the phrase "nisi grammatice loquendi, quantum ad modum significandi" in
contrast to what is "secundum rem." He presents the example o f an object
which is said " t o be k n o w n . " When one says " I know that person," the
grammatical implication is that the person has undergone some action since
grammatically "person" is the direct object o f the verb. But there is no change
"secundum rem" in what is k n o w n , only a certain relation to the knower
"secundum rationem."
Although abstract names signify "ut aliquid subsistens," it is only their
grammatical role (in so far as they can serve as subjects o f predication) that
involves an element o f subsistence. W h e n attention is turned f r o m grammar to
the "res significata," Aquinas views abstract names as signifying "ut forma"
which cannot exist or act alone but only in a concrete substance.'^ "Sapientia"
signifies "ut quo aliquis est formaliter sapiens." I n this sense it is the very
"abstractness" o f a name such as "sapientia" which indicates the incomplete
"modus essendi" o f what is signified. Hence the apparent contradiction in
Aquinas that an abstract name signifies both "ut subsistens" (grammatically)
and "per modum formae" (in light o f what is signified). I n De Ente et Essentia,
he points out that both "humanitas" and "homo" signify the same essence, but
"diversimode" : "humanitas" signifies human nature "ut forma quaedam" or
"ut pars."^^ "Humanitas" cannot be predicated o f an individual because it
signifies only the f o r m a l element o f human nature: that whereby a man is a man.
I n contrast, the concrete general term "homo" signifies human nature "ut
totum," including an indefinite individual i n its signification, and therefore can
be predicated o f an individual man.
The "way o f s i g n i f y i n g " o f a concrete name such as "homo"—which
signifies not only a f o r m but also an indefinite individual which can possess the
f o r m o f humanity—permits a concrete name to function in a proposition as
either a logical subject or predicate. "Homo" can refer to a concrete individual
in a predication such as "homo est albus," signifying that "this particular man is
pale." It can also be predicated o f any individual w h i c h "has" humanity as i n
"Socrates est homo." I n one passage Aquinas contrasts the "modi significandi"
of concrete and abstract names by pointing out that concrete names signify "per
modum completi participantis" and abstract names "per modum diminuti et

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81
partis formalis."^^ Here the "modus significandi" o f a concrete name seen i n the
De Ente et Essentia—"ut totum"—is expanded to include the metaphysical
notion o f participation. When "homo" functions as a logical subject, it
supposes or stands f o r a concrete individual participating i n the substantial f o r m
o f humanity. When "homo" functions as a logical predicate, i t signifies
"habens humanitatem indistincte" and can be predicated o f any individual
w h i c h participates i n the act o f being a man.^^
This signification o f "habens humanitatem" by the term "homo" is a clear
example o f Aquinas' tendency to f i n d i n the "modi significandi" o f names a
reflection o f the participated status o f creatures, w h i c h is a central concept i n his
metaphysics. "Socrates est homo" is a true predication because Socrates
participates i n the f o r m o f humanity, l i m i t i n g the act o f being human to his
concrete individuality.^ I n this way there is a close correspondence between the
"modi significandi" o f concrete names and the "modi essendi" o f individuals
" h a v i n g " or "participating i n " their natures. "There is f o u n d i n any creature a
distinction between 'the individual h a v i n g ' and 'what is had' . . . the individual
'has' its nature, as a man 'has' humanity and as he 'has' i n addition the act o f
esse''^^ This double participation is reflected in the "modi significandi" of a
paradigm predication such as "Socrates est homo" w h i c h attributes a nature to
an individual: the concrete name "homo" signifies as " h a v i n g the nature o f
humanity," and the verb "est" signifies that this nature is really " h a d " or
possessed by the individual, since it signifies the primary act o f "esse" w h i c h
places any f o r m i n act.^
A concrete name s i g n i f y i n g an accident, such as " p a l e , " also reflects a
participation i n an act, s i g n i f y i n g as " h a v i n g paleness" i n the predication
"Socrates is pale." However the type o f " h a v i n g " or participation implied by
this predication is very different than that implied by the essential predication
"Socrates is a man." Socrates can lose his act o f being pale and continue to exist
as an individual, but not his act o f being human. This ontological difference i n
types o f acts is reflected only partially i n the f o r m o f the predication. Aristotle
had pointed out i n his Topics that one can predicate the definition o f " m a n " o f
Socrates (that is, "rational a n i m a l " ) , but not the definition o f "pale." Socrates
is said to be a man, or an animal or rational; but, although he can be said to be

24See Compend. TheoL, ch. 9, n. 580.
^^Q. D. de Potentia, q. 7, a. 4.
26See In I Periherm., lect. 5, n. 73.
27See In III Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1 where
Aquinas links Aristotle's comments in his Top-
ics (Book I I 109a 34ss.) with the common
medieval notion of denominative predication.
'^SeeInISent.,d. 2, q. l,a. 3.
^ h e same importance is given to the "re"/
"ratione" distinction at the beginning of Book
2 of his Commentary on the Sentences: "...
duratio Dei, quae aeternitas ejus est, et na-
tura ipsius sunt una res, et tamen distinguun-
tur ratione vel modo significandi. . . . et simi-
liter solvuntur multae aliae similes
objectiones, ut in I libro dictum est." In II
Sent.,d. l , q . l,a. 5, ad9.
^See Q. D. de Potentia, q. 7, a. 7, ad 3.
Aquinas points out that a name becomes anal-
ogous only when objects with different "modi
essendi" are being talked about: " . . . diversa
habitudo ad esse impedit univocam praedica-
tionem entis." Ibid., cor.
''In I Sent., d. 22, q. l,a. 2.

82
pale, he can never be said to be a color or a quality: rather he is colored or
qualified, having accidentally a color or quality. Aquinas comments that an
externally possessed property such as "being clothed" is always predicated i n
an inflected f o r m : Socrates can never be said to be "clothes" but only
" c l o t h e d . " T h i s necessity to use an inflected f o r m o f the predicate is a sign o f
the extrinsic "modus essendi" o f what is predicated. Since color is an intrinsic
accident, it admits a non-inflected f o r m when a color-term such as " p a l e " is
predicated directly o f "Socrates." Since "being clothed" is a purely extrinsic
accident, it can never appear i n the predicate i n a non-inflected f o r m .
Therefore, Thomas Aquinas does find a spontaneous reflection o f the
"modi essendi" i n the "modi significandi" o f language. But he never loses sight
of the fact that this reflection is at best imperfect and requires a careful critique i f
one is not to confuse the characteristics o f words w i t h the characteristics o f
things. I t is this critique o f language w h i c h w i l l be discussed i n the next part o f
this article.

I I I . A Q U I N A S ' CRITIQUE OF T H E " M O D I S I G N I F I C A N D I "

Up to this point, I have been considering the extent to w h i c h Aquinas finds

a certain spontaneous reflection o f the "modi essendi" o f things i n the "modi
significandi" o f language. As we have seen, he is aware that this i n no sense
implies an isomorphism between reality and language, and that failure to take
this into account can lead to philosophical errors. I w o u l d like to turn now to his
critical approach to language i n more detail: here the "modi intelligendi" play a
key intermediary role between the "modi significandi" and the "modi essendi."
Aquinas first became sensitive to this refracting role o f the "modi intelli-
gendi" i n his early struggle to c l a r i f y the possibility o f speaking coherently
about God. God is the fullness o f perfection, existing i n the transcendent Pure
A c t o f "Esse Subsistens." However, because o f the limitations o f the human
intellect, we are forced, i n attempting to talk about God's perfection, to defract
this absolute simplicity o f Pure A c t into a multitude o f names w h i c h we
predicate o f h i m , saying that God is good, is wise, is intelligent, and so f o r t h .
This plurality o f concepts predicated does not correspond to God's absolute
simplicity, but is the result o f the "modi intelligendi" our intellect is forced to
employ.^* What belongs to the "res significata"—the absolute simplicity o f
Pure A c t — i s distinguished clearly f r o m what belongs to the w o r k o f the
intellect—the plurality o f concepts or "rationes" expressed i n multiple names
f o r God.
This distinction between what is "secundum rationem" and what is "secun-
dum rem"—and the equivalent distinction i n grammatical contexts between the

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83
"modi significandi" o f a proposition about God and the "res significata"—is
employed frequently throughout the first book o f his Commentary on the
Sentences, and remains central in all o f Aquinas' later works to what he says
about the possibility o f predicating names o f God.^'^ It is thus central f o r
understanding what he has to say about analogy, which founds the possibility o f
predicating the same names properly o f both God and creatures.
The same name can be predicated univocally o f t w o objects when both
share i n the same f o r m . Even i f there is a quantitative difference i n the degree to
which a given f o r m is shared i n , the univocal nature o f the predication is not
affected. Thomas remarks that to call snow " w h i t e " is not exactly the same as
to call a w a l l " w h i t e " since the f o r m e r is much " m o r e w h i t e " than the latter; but
" w h i t e " retains its basic meaning i n both cases and therefore is a univocal
term.^" God and creatures however do not share i n any f o r m s since they have a
radically different " w a y o f being." This means that the only possibility o f
predicating the same name properly o f God and creatures is that it signify
analogously, and Thomas is faced w i t h the problem o f establishing that this is a
real possibility.
Aquinas' earliest attempt to solve this problem o f the analogous predication
o f names o f God is found i n his Commentary on the Sentences, where he argues
that the intellect, i n judging " h o w God i s , " must "see t h r o u g h " the "modi sig-
nificandi" o f the language we are forced to employ, and have recourse directly
to the "res significata" or perfection predicated.^* A n important distinction is
drawn i n the types o f "res significata" possible: some names necessarily
include i n their very signification a l i m i t e d "modus participandiThese are all
names signifying corporeal natures, such as " l i o n , " "stone," and so f o r t h .
Their very signification is a limited "modus essendi" since the essence i n
question limits or contracts the act o f "esse" to specific " w a y o f b e i n g . "
Therefore these names can never be properly predicated o f G o d . This is the case

'Hbid., ad 2: " . . . quamvis non nominemus
Deum nisi ex creaturis, non tamen semper
nominamus ipsam ex perfectione quae est pro-
pria creaturae secundum proprium modum
participandi illam; sed etiam possumus nomen
imponere ipsi perfectioni absolute, non con-
cernendo aliquem modum significandi in ipso
significata, quod est quasi objectum intellec-
tus; quamvis oporteat in consignificato sem-
per modum creaturae accipere ex parte ipsius
intellectus, qui natus est ex rebus sensibilibus
accipere convenientem intelligendi modum"
^^A recent book on analogy—Portraying
Analogy by J. F. Ross (Cambridge: 1981)—
summarizes thus Aquinas' position on anal-
ogy: "Aquinas and Aristotle apparently
thought that the natural language so closely
reflects reality that the final step in explaining
any meaning relationship must always lie in
some entitative relationship. They did not look
to the language for the explanation of the
meaning relationships (of analogy, equivoca-
tion, metaphor, etc.) but looked through the
language to what they regarded as ultimate"
(pp. 18-19). It is true that Aquinas "looks
through" the "ways of signifying" of lan-
guage to grasp the meaning of analogous state-
ments, but this is not for the reason that Ross
suggests: an isomorphism between language
and reality. Rather, precisely because the
"modi significandi" obscure the "way of be-
ing" of what is being talked about, they must
be "seen through" by the intellect.
^Q. D. de Potentia, q. 7, a. 5, ad 2.
C. Gent., ch. 30.

84
because o f the "res significata" and has nothing to do w i t h their grammatical
status as concrete names w h i c h always signify as " h a v i n g " or "participating
i n " the act signified. Aquinas is not worried about the "modus significandi"
here, but rather about what is signified. However certain names signify perfec-
tions without including i n their signification a limited or contracted "modus
essendi." These are the names o f all the so-called transcendental perfections
which are convertible w i t h the Pure A c t o f "Esse Subsistens": "good,"
" k n o w i n g , " " w i s e , " and so f o r t h . I n this case, the "res significata" is really
found i n G o d , and creatures have goodness or w i s d o m only to the extent that
they participate i n these perfections. Thus names signifying these perfections
can be properly predicated o f God: God is "per essentiam" what the creature is
only "per participationem."
But Thomas must face the problem that both a concrete name such as
" g o o d " and an abstract name such as "goodness" have "modi significandi"
which are inappropriate to G o d . " G o d is g o o d " implies a partial sharing i n
goodness, and " G o d is goodness" implies a non-substantial way o f being. His
solution is that the "modi significandi" o f these predications about God must be
"seen through," and the perfection signified must be attributed to God i n a
" n o n - l i m i t e d " or "non-participated" manner." We must use the same language
to talk about God and creatures: both can receive the same predicates "is w i s e "
or "is good." But i t is the predication as a whole w h i c h must be read or
interpreted analogously. The only way o f k n o w i n g how to interpret the predicate
is by taking into account the subject: i n the case o f G o d being the subject, the
predicate must be read as "having the perfection signified i n a non-participated
or essential manner." Analogy i n this case is the means f o r language to escape
the self-imposed bonds o f the "modi significandi." Here we find an idea that is
central to Aquinas' treatment o f language: since the "res significata" w i l l often
fail to be captured accurately by language and its "modi significandi " lan-
guage—reflecting man's desire to grasp the whole o f reality—has had recourse
to the device o f analogy, allowing f o r d i f f e r e n t ways o f interpreting the same
predicate based on what is being talked about.
However when Aquinas speaks o f "seeing t h r o u g h " or "transcending" the
"modi significandi" o f language and predicating directly the "res significata"
there is a serious d i f f i c u l t y i n predications made o f G o d . As we shall see i n the
next section, Aquinas' critique o f language is based precisely on this possibility
of "seeing t h r o u g h " the "modi significandi" when the abstract nature o f our
language or the logical structure o f a predication "obscures" the "modus
essendi" o f what is being talked about. I n this case we must have recourse
directly to the "res" based on previous knowledge o f its " w a y o f b e i n g "

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85
provided by the senses and imagination. But i n the case o f G o d , no direct
recourse is possible through the senses and imagination. A c c o r d i n g to Aquinas,
the intellect must come to see the possibility o f a perfection existing i n a non-
participated or non-limited manner, and " p r o j e c t " this radically d i f f e r e n t " w a y
o f b e i n g " o f the perfection onto G o d . That the intellect is able to achieve this, at
least to a certain extent, is what Aquinas means by analogous knowledge o f
God. B u t he is also aware o f the "tenuous" nature o f this knowledge, w h i c h
necessarily includes an awareness that the "res significata" completely tran-
scends the grasp o f the human intellect. I n one text, f o l l o w i n g Pseudo-
Dionysius, he describes three steps i n any analogous predication made o f G o d :

1) We first predicate o f G o d a perfection participated i n by creatures, as i n

"Deus est sapiens"
2) We must then negate the l i m i t e d "modus essendi" o f the perfection
f o u n d i n creatures. This allows one to a f f i r m t r u t h f u l l y "Deus non est
sapiens" because o f the radical difference between God's " w a y o f
b e i n g " and the creature's.
3) Finally, we come to see that w i s d o m is denied o f G o d , not because o f
any lack o f perfection i n h i m , but because this perfection exists i n h i m i n
such an eminent and inconceivable manner that one should rather say
"Deus est supersapiens"^

Therefore, although analogy does permit us to predicate names properly o f

G o d , Thomas comes to the conclusion f i n a l l y that we k n o w better what God is
not than what he is.^^ A l t h o u g h forced to this negative conclusion because o f the
transcendence o f G o d , this distrust o f language and its "modi significandi" will
yield f r u i t i n a penetrating critique o f language used f o r the humbler task o f
speaking about objects i n the created w o r l d .

IV. T H E R E F R A C T I N G R O L E O F T H E " M O D I I N T E L L I G E N D I "

Thus Thomas' early struggle w i t h the problem o f predicating names o f G o d

yielded the perspective w h i c h w o u l d enable h i m to undertake a critique o f
language i n properly philosophical contexts: the truth o f a proposition depends
ultimately on how the intellect sees an object " t o be," and not o n the "modi sig-

^Peter Geach has pointed out clearly the
important difference between Thomas
Aquinas' position that the intellect can "see
through" the "modi significandi " and the
doctrine often found in scholastic manuals that
"a thought of things as being, as if they were,
what they are not, may both be inescapable for
minds like ours, and not be false thought."
The latter view, Geach says, is a "sheer mud-
dle and inconsistency." See his Logic Matters
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), p. 318.
37See/5. TÄ., q. 85, a. 5, ad3.
3*". . . universalia, secundum quod sunt un-
iversalia, non sunt nisi in anima. Ipsae autem
naturae quibus accidit intentio universalitatis,
sunt in rebus. Et propter hoc, nomina commu-
nia significantia naturas ipsas, praedicantur
de individuis." In Aristotelis Librum De An-
ima Comm., lect. 12, n. 380.
'^SQQ In II Physic, lect. 3, n. 162.
^See/5. r ^ . , q . 85, a. 3.
'**See In Librum De Divinis Nominibus, ch.
11, lect. 4, n. 931.
«Ö. D. de Veritate, q. 2, a. 2, ad 11.

86
nificandi" it is forced to employ i n talking about the o b j e c t . T h i s is precisely
because the intellect is capable o f a reflexive awareness o f the "modi intelli-
gendi" it employs. This reflexive awareness o f the "modi intelligendi " and
their refracting role between the "modi significandi" and "modi essendi " is
essential to Thomas' critical approach to language. He finds the t w o principal
"modi intelligendi" i n abstraction and predication, both viewed as acts o f the
intellect i n its attempt to grasp things as they exist i n the extra-mental w o r l d .
The abstract character o f k n o w i n g is the result o f the immateriality o f the
human intellect which has as its proper object the essences o f concrete i n d i v i d -
uals. This tension between the immateriality o f the intellect and its proper object
is what generates the necessity o f abstraction. Since knowledge involves the
identification o f the knower w i t h what is k n o w n , the intellect must abstract the
nature f r o m its material individuality: the likeness o f the thing is received i n the
intellect "secundum modum intellectus," and not "secundum modum rei"^^ The
nature, after being abstracted f r o m its material individuality, exists i n the
intellect immaterially as a universal w h i c h can be predicated o f many
individuals.^^
Having seen that abstraction is the principal "modus intelligendi" Aquinas
is able to point out the error i n the metaphysics o f Plato. The latter held that
everything which was abstract "secundum intellectum" was also abstract
"secundum rem"^^ Plato failed to realize that universality is supplied by the
intellect: i t is a "modus intelligendi" and not a "modus essendi" o f things.^
This i n turn led h i m to postulate the existence o f subsistent universals or Ideas.
Since the "modi significandi" o f names f o l l o w the "modi intelligendi" it is
equally invalid to attempt to deduce the "modi essendi" o f things f r o m a given
"modus significandi": the Platonists held that whatever is said abstractly, also
exists abstractly.
Although Aquinas holds that the "modi intelligendi" do not correspond
necessarily to the way things exist, this can be interpreted incorrectly. I n
Disputed Questions on the Truth, he discusses to what extent i t is possible f o r
the intellect to "intelligere rem esse aliter quam sit,"^^ and still be true. I f one
takes this phrase as referring to the "modus cognoscentis" o f the intellect it is
valid, since the "res quae habet esse materiale, solum immaterialiter intelligi-
tur" However, i f reference is being made to the "modus rei cognitae" it is false,
since any knowledge which represents an object as being i n a different way than
it actuaUy exists is, by definition, false. But the simple fact that a material object
is k n o w n abstractly does not f a l s i f y that knowledge, since the object is not
asserted to exist abstractly f r o m matter: "abstrahentium non est mendacium"^^
It is only when an object is separated, i n the intellect's judgment, f r o m an act or

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87
property w h i c h i n fact belongs to it "in rebus" that falsity enters.^
The abstract character o f intellectual knowledge, which is the central
"modus intelligendi" o f the intellect, is i n constant tension w i t h the concrete
"modus essendi" o f things. This abstract "modus intelligendi" in turn generates
"modi significandi" which f a i l to reflect accurately the "res significata." Even
on the level o f univocal predication, the gap between language and reality is
apparent. We have already seen this in the case o f accidental predicates such as
" w h i t e " which permit a signification o f "more or less sharing" i n the act
signified depending on what is the subject o f the predication. The same is true
even w i t h substantial predications. "Socrates is a m a n " is a true predication,
but the general term " m a n " fails to express the fact that "Socrates is a m a n "
signifies quite a d i f f e r e n t way o f being than " N e r o is a m a n . " A n y species name
such as " l e a f , " "horse," " f l o w e r , " and so f o r t h necessarily abstracts f r o m the
concrete richness o f the individuals sharing i n these species. Language is
possible only because the intellect is able to abstract general intelligible
structures f r o m the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the real. I f one had to produce a d i f f e r e n t
term f o r every individual object and f o r every change i n these objects, c o m m u n -
ication w o u l d break d o w n . But language, based as i t is on conceptual k n o w l -
edge, makes use o f patterns and regularities w i t h i n objects: one w o r d such as
" l e a f " is able to signify a potentially infinite number o f individuals, each i n
some sense unique. The function o f language is not to reproduce reality or to
provide an exact picture o f what is signified.'*^

The second key "modus intelligendi" after abstraction is predication. We

have already seen the extent to w h i c h predication (at least in its paradigmatic

*UnISent., d. 30, q. I , a. 3, ad I . that is) as an attempt to base metaphysics on

4^See In III Metaphys., lect. 7, n. 422.
*^Max Black has characterized well the pov-
erty of abstract words in the face of concrete
reality: "Consider the impossibility of render-
ing in words even such familiar experiences as
the first taste of water after thirst, or the smell
of ripe limburger cheese. Whatever language
we use for description now seems abstract and
thin, by contrast with the immediacy and con-
creteness of lived experience. Where reality is
a web of specific, particular, individual things,
each with its own tang, language now appears
as a disembodied ballet of abstractions." The
Labyrinth of Language (London: Pall Mall
Press, 1968), p. 119.
'^See/zi VII Metaphys., lect. 17, n. 1658.
^^Burrell has mis-interpreted Aquinas'
statement in In VII Metaph. lect. 2, n. 1287
that metaphysics and logic have a certain af-
finity (because both sciences treat everything
the method of logic. In this interpretation,
metaphysics is limited to the study of the ways
of predicating being, and never reaches being
"extra animam." See D. Burrell, Analogy and
Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 113-115.
''^Plato is criticized precisely for using a
logical method to investigate physical reali-
ties: "//// qui considerant physice, idest na-
turaliter, attendentes rebus sensibilibus . . . et
Uli qui considerant logice, idest rationaliter,
attendentes communibus rationibus, sicut
Platonici." In De Generatione et Corrup-
tione, lect. 3, n. 525.
*''/rt/5^/ir..d. 4, q. 2,a. 2, ad2.
^Inl Periher., lect. 10, n. 125.
^'"Per se autem dicitur inesse aliquid alicui
quod inest ei secundum rationem propriae
definitionis." De Fallaciis, ch. 12.
f o r m ) can be seen as reflecting the "ways o f being." But Thomas often speaks o f
predication i n a different light, viewing it as an act o f the intellect w h i c h ,
although founded "in rebus" must be distinguished f r o m the "modi essendi"
A t times Aquinas distinguishes logic f r o m metaphysics by assigning the
"ways o f predicating" as the subject matter o f the former, i n contrast to
metaphysics which has as its subject the "ways o f b e i n g . " ^ This characteriza-
tion o f logic as being concerned w i t h the "ways o f predicating" occurs at the
end o f his commentary on Book 7 o f the Metaphysics. Aquinas points out that i n
Book 7 Aristotle has been treating substance and essence logically, looking at
the way we can predicate "quod quid erat esse." But Book 8 is going to look at
these same principles metaphysically, viewing essence as a real principle o f
existent things. Book 8 w i l l thus consider substance "secundum rem" and not
"secundum rationem."'^'^ This "re"I "ratione" distinction is seen as differentiat-
ing the science o f metaphysics f r o m logic. The concepts or intentions studied by
logic are termed "second" intentions which f o l l o w upon the "modi intelli-
gendi." They are accidents which result f r o m the existence o f things i n the
intellect and which do not belong to things "in rebus."
B y viewing the "ways o f predicating" as the subject matter o f logic,
Aquinas highlights the intermediary role o f the intellect i n the act o f predica-
tion. This is clearly seen i n the case o f the fundamental "modus significandi" of
any predication: "inesse." The predicate o f any proposition is signified as being
in the subject: "praedicatum semper significatur inesse subiecto.""^^ This is true
both when the subject-term is universal and when it is singular: "necesse est
quandoque enuntietur aliquid inesse vel non inesse alicui universalium, quan-
doque vere alicui singularium."^^ But Aquinas is f u l l y aware that this implica-
tion o f "inesse" is a "modus significandi" conferred on the predicate by the
intellect. This way o f signifying does not have to correspond to a real inherence
"in rebus." When the subject-term is a universal, the predicate can be " i n " the
subject as part o f its definition. This is termed a "per se" predication and the
"inesse" implied is a logical relation between c o n c e p t s . I n "man is an
animal," the concept " a n i m a l " is part o f the definition o f what it is to be a man,
and therefore the predicate can be seen as having a logical relationship o f
"inesse" to the subject. This is a purely logical "inesse" and i n no sense implies
that " a n i m a l i t y " inheres in " m a n " as an accidental f o r m . Frege's terminology
can help to clarify this logical relation between concepts: the concept " m a n "
has " a n i m a l i t y " as one o f its marks, and hence we could view " a n i m a l i t y " as
part o f the concept " m a n . "
However, when the subject is a singular-term such as "Socrates," there is a
serious problem in the first category o f substance where an essence or substance

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is predicated o f an i n d i v i d u a l . The other categories after substance a l l predicate
an accident o f an i n d i v i d u a l , and therefore there is no d i f f i c u l t y involved w i t h
their "modus significandi" o f "inesse," since this way o f s i g n i f y i n g is appropri-
ate to the way o f being o f an accident. B u t i n the predication "Socrates is a
man," the predicate's "modus significandi" o f "inesse" does not reflect a real
inherence "in rebus " The property o f being a man is not in Socrates; rather
Socrates is constituted as an individual by his being a man—a way o f being
w h i c h he cannot lose and remain the same i n d i v i d u a l .
Aquinas was w e l l aware o f Aristotle's concern to eliminate any i m p l i c a t i o n
o f inherence i n essential predication i n v o l v i n g a singular subject-term. I n his
Categories, Aristotle refused to allow abstract denominative nouns such as
" h u m a n i t y " to be f o r m e d f r o m essential predicates i n order to eliminate the
danger o f Plato's relation o f participation between the individual and its
separately existing essence. The implication o f inherence i n an accidental
predication such as "Socrates is pale" and the f o r m a t i o n o f abstract nouns such
as "paleness" is allowed by Aristotle, since accidental properties clearly can
exist only in an individual substance, and thus there is not the same danger o f
postulating independently existing abstract properties. B u t i n "Socrates is a
man," the predicate must be taken as being identical with the subject: i f Socrates
is not identical w i t h the predicate "a m a n , " he w i l l be related to i t , opening up
the possibility o f participating i n the F o r m or Idea o f H u m a n i t y . " G . E . L . O w e n
thinks that this search f o r identity i n the signification o f essential predications,
motivated by AristoUe's fear o f Platonic participation, leads Aristotle into l o g -
ical difficulties i n the Metaphysics: "Some o f the perplexities o f Meta Z stem
f r o m this rejection ( o f the impossibility that the predicate can be the same as the
subject o f w h i c h it is predicated) f o r it leads h i m to argue that, i f we take any
primary subject o f discourse . . . and say just what it is, we must be producing a
statement o f identity, an equation w h i c h defines the subject. A n d this in turn
helps to persuade h i m that the primary subjects o f discourse cannot be i n d i v i d -
uals such as Socrates, w h o cannot be defined, but species such as m a n . " "
Aquinas, when commenting on Aristotle's struggle w i t h this problem i n
B o o k 7 o f the Metaphysics, returns to Aristotle's earlier remark that substantial
predicates such as " i s a m a n " or " i s a tree" s i g n i f y not "hoc aliquid" but
"quale "^ This echos Aristotle's early discussion o f secondary substances i n
Categories 3" 10 where he stated that a secondary substance does not s i g n i f y a

"See P. T Geach and E. Anscombe, Three
Philosophers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), pp.
76-77.
^^G. E. L. Owen, "The Platonism of Aristo-
tle," in P. F. Strawson, Studies in the Philoso-
phy of Thought and Action (Oxford: 1968), p.
160.
5'»See/« VIIMetaphys., lect. 13, n. 1585.
^^In I Periherm., lect. 5, n. 73.
5<^See Quest. Quodlib., "Quodlibetum Se-
cundum," q. 2, a. 1.
^"^In I Periherm., lect. 5, n. 59.
58See/n VIIMetaphys., lect. 13, n. 1576.
^'See De Natura Generis, ch. 5, n. 512.
Although the authenticity of this work has
been disputed, recent Thomists accept it as
genuine. See C. Fabro, Introduccion al
Tomismo (Madrid: Rialp, 1967), pp. 21-24.

90
" t h i s " but a qualification; however not an accidental qualification but a substan-
tial qualification. But i n B o o k 7 o f the Metaphysics he is concerned to
emphasise the identity between an essential predicate and its subject i n order to
avoid, as we have seen, any suggestion o f participation. Aquinas however does
not share Aristotle's fear o f participation and hence is more concerned to
preserve Aristotle's original insight that subject and predicate always s i g n i f y i n
radically different ways. A n essential predication such as "Socrates est homo"
is not a statement o f identity but a predication—the attribution o f a, i n this case
substantial, way o f being to the individual signified by the subject term. The
predicate "est homo" signiües as "habens humanitatem," participatingin the act
of being human. But Thomas does not see i n this signification o f participation
any danger o f r e i f y i n g a substantial F o r m o f Humanity. The predicate's signifi-
cation o f "participating i n the act o f being h u m a n " is simply the reflection o f the
metaphysical principle that act is limited only by potency; outside o f G o d — w h o
is Pure A c t — a n y act must be received i n a concrete individual. This explains
Aquinas' use o f the term "inesse" i n one passage to describe the relationship o f
both accidental and substantial f o r m s to the individual w h i c h "has" them.^^
"Inesse" here is seen as i m p l y i n g not an accidental inherence but the participa-
tion by an individual i n an act.
Therefore, all predications made o f creatures signify "per participa-
tionem" since no creature is its actuality, but is a partial sharing i n the Pure A c t
of "Esse Subsistens."^^ However f r o m the point o f view o f Aristotle's catego-
ries, this solution to the problem o f predicating essences o f individuals is not
available. A s we have seen, Aristotle's fear o f a metaphysical participation by
an individual i n a separately existing substantial f o r m forced h i m finally to posit
a relationship o f identity between the individual and its essence.
Thomas himself faces this problem i n a number o f passages f r o m an
Aristotelian viewpoint without having recourse to his o w n metaphysics o f
participation. I n this context, Aquinas' solution is based precisely on the fact
that predication is one o f the principal "modi intelligendi" and on the distinction
between the "modi significandi" o f predicates and the "res significata." I n his
Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, Thomas distinguishes between how a
predicate signifies and what is signified "in rebus." The subject-term o f any
predication signifies "ut qui inhaeret aliquid" and the predicate signifies "per
modum actionis de cuius ratione est ut inhaeret."However, what is predicated
is not always an inhering accident, but can also be the essence o f the individual.
I n "Socrates est homo," the separation o f the property "being a m a n " and its
subsequent attribution to the individual Socrates is possible only i n the intellect
and not i n things; hence i t is possible only logically and not metaphysically, or,
what amounts to the same, only "in ratione" and not "in re."^^

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 The active role o f the intellect i n predicating an essence o f an individual is
clearly brought out i n a discussion o f this question i n De Natura Generis. A
substantial predicate seems to have a signification o f "inesse" (which is
appropriate only f o r accidents) because the intellect confers an accidental
"modus essendi" on the substance: a substance is able to be predicated o f an
individual only because o f the intellect's act w h i c h " t r a n s f o r m s " the substance
into an accident w i t h i n the predication.^^ The "modus significandi" of a
substantial predicate (as inhering i n the subject) is seen as being purely the result
o f the "modi intelligendi": the intellect i n predicating a secondary substance
"quodammodo induit similitudinem inhaerentiae accidentalis."^
The fact that an essential predicate such as "est homo" signifies a substan-
tial quality "in rebus" i n contrast to the predicate "est albus" is not reflected i n
the "modi significandi" o f the t w o predicates.^* Both predicates can be para-
phrased alike: "est habens humanitatem" and "est habens albedinem"; and
both have a "modus significandi" o f "inesse." We k n o w that the first predicate
signifies a substantial quality w i t h no implication o f accidental inherence only
by looking at how the individual ( f o r example Socrates) exists, and realizing
that humanity is his essential "modus essendi" which Socrates cannot lose and
remain the same individual.
Therefore a predication can be interpreted accurately only by looking
beyond the " w a y o f s i g n i f y i n g " to the " w a y o f b e i n g " o f what is predicated.
This comes out clearly i n Aquinas' discussion o f the categories i n his Commen-
tary on the Metaphysics.^^ Here predication is seen as a way o f "saying b e i n g , "
but how something is "being said to be" depends on how the subject exists.
Since each category predicates a d i f f e r e n t " w a y o f b e i n g , " "est" must signify
analogously, changing its signification i n each category. I n the predication
"Socrates est homo," "est" signifies a substantial way o f being. Secondly,
"est" can signify an intrinsic accidental way o f being, when one predicates a
qualified or quantified "modus essendi" o f an individual. These are accidental
perfections really possessed by the individual such as those reflected i n the
predications "Socrates est albus" or "Socrates est parvus." The category o f

n. 513. tum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique

**'We have seen that it is possible to speak of
a partial reflection, in that the two predications
admit different "higher" predicates. "Socra-
tes est homo" admits "Socrates est animal"
but "Socrates est albus" does not admit "So-
crates est color." See earlier discussion of this
point.
^^"Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad
diversa genera secundum diversum modum
praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum mo-
dum essendi Quia igitur eorum quae
praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest
substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quan-
modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut
cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat
substantiam. Cum autem dicitur, homo est
albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de aliis." In
V. Metaphys., lect. 9, n. 890.
^•'C. S. Lewis, An Experiment in Criticism
(Cambridge, 1969), p. 3.
. . cum autem intellectus composi-
tionem format, accipit duo, quorum unum se
habet ut formale respectu alterius: unde acci-
pit id ut in alio existens, propter quod praedi-
cata tenentur formaliter." In IX Metaphys.,
lect. 11, n. 1898.

92
relation is included i n this second group o f meanings f o r "est," although
Aquinas points out that strictly speaking a relation does not exist in a substance
absolutely but only i n respect to another being. The third group o f meanings
which can be taken on by "est" are extrinsic "ways o f being." Here Aquinas
includes the accidents o f habit, time and place, and action and being acted upon,
but he is careful to point out that, although all o f these are to some extent
"extrinsic" to the substance, each represents a unique way o f being and the sig-
nification o f "est" varies accordingly.
What is striking i n Aquinas' discussion o f the analogous signification o f
"est" i n the various categories is his direct appeal to the "modi essendi" as a
pre-requisite f o r accurately interpreting the predicate i n each case. H o w an
individual is "being said to be" can only be grasped by looking at how it " i s " i n
the extra-linguistic w o r l d . I n each category "est" takes on a different meaning
depending on what type o f being—substantial or accidental, intrinsic or
extrinsic—is predicated o f the subject. This capacity o f "est" to take on a
variety o f significations is what permits a predication to capture the variety i n
the "ways o f b e i n g " o f an individual.
However it is only i n the paradigm f o r m o f a predication f o u n d i n the
categories that the subject-term corresponds to a real individual and the
predicate to a characteristic or act o f that individual. I n fact the process o f
thought is not, o f course, restricted to making judgments only about real,
concrete individuals: the intellect can accept any process or abstract idea as a
subject of judgment and predicate a characteristic o f it. For example, one could
cite the f o l l o w i n g judgment taken f r o m a w o r k o f C. S. Lewis: "The first
reading o f some literary w o r k is often an experience so momentous that only
experiences o f love, religion, or bereavement can f u r n i s h a standard o f compar-
ison."^^ Here the subject corresponds to a complex activity and the predicate to a
characterization o f that activity based on an elaborate comparison. But we can
still view the predicate as s i g n i f y i n g , i n the terminology o f Aquinas, "ut
forma": signifying how the subject is "seen as being." The unity o f the
predicate is not based on a real f o r m "in rebus," but is derived f r o m the
intellect's act o f j u d g i n g . Rather than saying that what is predicated is a f o r m ,
Aquinas prefers to say that the predicate signifies as a form.^ I n this view o f
predication, the active role o f the intellect is given primacy: "intellectus id quod
ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte
praedicati, trahit ad naturam formae in supposito existentis "
This active role o f the intellect i n f o r m i n g a judgment allows Aquinas to
consider predication i n a much broader vision than that f o u n d i n the categories.

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Predication or judgment is seen as the act o f the intellect w h i c h gives assent to
the truth o f a proposition. I n this case, the copula "est" ( f o u n d at least i m p l i c i t l y
in any predication according to Thomas) signifies the truth o f the composition
effected by the intellect. Thomas insists repeatedly that "est" can s i g n i f y both
real being i n the categories and the truth o f a proposition.^ A proposition is true
when there is an adequation between what it asserts and what is i n reality. B u t
this adequation is not a simple copying o f the structure o f reality by the intellect
in f o r m i n g its judgment. Rather the intellect grasps its c o n f o r m i t y to reality i n a
reflexive act w h i c h enables the intellect to "see" its o w n c o n f o r m i t y to reality.
I n an important text i n the De Veritate, Thomas states that truth is grasped by the
intellect when i t reflects upon its o w n a c t — k n o w i n g not only its o w n act but
also the proportion o f its act to the thing k n o w n . I n sense knowledge and the
f o r m a t i o n o f concepts, this element o f reflection is lacking: since the k n o w i n g
person is not aware o f his c o n f o r m i t y to reality, truth is not f o r m a l l y attained.
Truth is only attained i n the intellect's act o f j u d g i n g w h i c h expresses its
c o n f o r m i t y to reality w i t h the verb "est" s i g n i f y i n g " i t is true that."
The element o f adequation i n the classical definition o f tru th is preserved by
Aquinas since the evidence w h i c h permits the intellect to issue its judgment is
always the "pressure" o f the real, and thus identity is achieved between what is
asserted and what really is. But the reflexive element i n judgment permits the
intellect to assert that something is true without having to copy reality passively.
It is this reflexive aspect w h i c h enables the intellect i n its judgment to grasp an
extra-linguistic "res" without having to maintain an isomorphic relation be-
tween the f o r m o f the judgment and the "res significata." A n d this is the
ultimate reason w h y the "modi significandi" o f a proposition do not have to
reflect directly the "modi essendi": w h y the subject-term does not have to refer
directly to a real individual and the predicate-term to a property o f that
individual. That this direct correspondence between a proposition and reality is
frequently the case is natural given the element o f adequation i n any true
assertion. I f one asserts "Socrates est albus," the parts o f the p r o p o s i t i o n —
subject and predicate—maintain a direct correspondence w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l
Socrates and his property o f paleness, w i t h the copula serving both to mark the
proposition as asserted (when the context makes clear that an assertion is
intended) and to refer to the act o f "esse" w h i c h actualises all o f the f o r m a l acts

Th., q. 13, a. 12. a proposition, see A. Llano, Metafisica y Len-

^"Ens et esse dicitur dupliciter. Quandoque
enim significat essentiam rei, sive actum es-
sendi; quandoque vero significat veritatem
propositionis." Q. D. de Potentia, q. 7, a. 2,
ad 1. Also see / 5. T/i., q. 48, a. 2, ad 2 and In
I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1. For an excellent
discussion of the various meanings of "esse"
in Aquinas as well as of the importance of the
reflexive element in the grasping of the truth of
guaje (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1984). Aquinas'
distinction of the meanings of being is of
course based on Aristotle. Franz Brentano's
On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1975) is
still the best modern discussion of Aristotle on
this point.
^^See Q. D. de Veritate, q. 1, a. 9.

94
in an i n d i v i d u a l . But a proposition can be true without maintaining this direct
correspondence w i t h the "modi essendi/' as i n " I t is late" or "Jogging is
popular": here the subject and predicate do not refer directly to an individual
and one o f its properties. Truth is attained (or can be attained) i n these
propositions, not by copying reality, but by a reflexively possessed identity,
based on the evidence o f the real, between what is asserted and what is i n reality.

CONCLUSION
Aquainas' tendency to find a spontaneous reflection o f the "modi essendi"
i n the "modi significandi" echoes an approach already present i n Aristotle who
frequently looks at how something is expressed i n language as a starting point
f o r his philosophical analysis. A n d the same approach has o f course become
widespread i n analytic philosophy. But Thomas' careful distinction o f the
"ways o f s i g n i f y i n g " f r o m the "ways o f being," w i t h the consequent rejection
of any isomorphic relation between language and the w o r l d , contrasts w i t h
much o f recent linguistic philosophy w h i c h has tended to absorb the "ways o f
b e i n g " w i t h i n the structure o f the linguistic sign system. I n view o f this,
Thomas Aquinas' approach to the "modi significandi" can serve to show that
this radical absorption is not a necessary consequence o f a philosophical
concern w i t h language.

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