Human Intellectual Knowledge Op The Material Singular According To Francis Suarez

This d issertation has been 65—14,186
m icrofilm ed exactly a s receiv ed
STENGREN, G eorge L „ 1928-

HUMAN INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE
OF THE MATERIAL SINGULAR
ACCORDING TO FRANCIS SUAREZ.
Fordham U n iversity, P h.D ., 1965

Philosophy
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

Copyright by
GEORGE L. SfENGREN
1966
HUMAN INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE OP THE MATERIAL SINGULAR
ACCORDING TO FRANCIS SUAREZ
BY
GEORGE L. STENGREN
A.B., St. John's University, '55

M.A., St. John's University, '56
DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF PHILOSOPHY AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY
NEW YORK
1965
F O R D H A M UNIVERSITY
G raduate Sc h o o l of A rts a n d Sciences
May 10 .19
This dissertation prepared under my direction by
____________ George L.-Stengren----------------------
entitled I n t e l l e c t u a l S a o w lf d g e o f t h e
M a te r i a l S i n g u l a r A c c o rd in g t o F ra n c l a S u a re z
has been accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
ta r P h .D .
Degree of___________________________________ ________ _____
(Faculty Adviser)
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................
Chapter
I. THE BACKGROUND
Origin of the Problem in A r i s t o t l e .............
II. THE POSITION OF ST. THOMAS A Q U I N A S ............. . 1 9
The Principle of I n d i v i d u a t i o n .................. 20

Individuation and Intellectual
Knowledge of S i n g u l a r s ........... 25
III. THE POSITION OF JOHN DUNS S C O T U S .............. 54
Theory of Individuation ........................ 59

Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition ........... 71
IV. THE POSITION OF WILLIAM OF O C K H A M ................ 85
V. SUAREZ ON INDIVIDUATION AND DISTINCTION . . . . 103
Enumeration and Discussion of the Positions

Taken by Other T h i n k e r s ........... 106
The Suarezian Principle of Individuation . . . 130
Unity, Individuation, and the Theory of
Distinctions ........... 132
VI. HUMAN INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL SINGULARS

.........................142
The Object of the I n t e l l e c t .................... 144

The Necessity and Role of the Agent
Intellect ........... 147
Abstraction of a Spiritual Species
Representing a Meterial Singular ......... 155
Criticism of the Thomistic Theory of
Reflex Knowledge ..............163
Exegesis of a Text of A r i s t o t l e ................ 170
VII. PRODUCTION OF THE U N I V E R S A L ................ 174
Various Opinions Discussed and Analyzed

by S u a r e z .................. 175
Formation of Universal Concepts Presupposes
Direct Intellectual Knowledge
of S i n g u l a r s ............. 189
VIII. REFLECTIONS ON SUAREZ' POSITION
IX. CONCLUSION ....................
BIBLIOGRAPHY
HUMAN INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATERIAL SINGULAR
ACCORDING TO FRANCIS SUAREZ
INTRODUCTION
The problem of human Intellectual knowledge of the
material singular engaged the attention of some of the best
minds of the medieval period in philosophy. The resolution
of this problem is one of the chief stumbling blocks of
every theory of knowledge. Certainly the problem of univer-
sals is one of the central issues of medieval philosophy,
and so the discussion of cognition of singulars as an as
pect of the problem of Universals has more than routine
speculative and practical value. The position taken by
Francis Suarez, one of the last of the medieval philoso
phers (if not also one of the first of the moderns), should
prove significant if only from the viewpoint of its his
torical interest. That the doctrine of Suarez on this
topic is important for its own sake as an epistemological
theory which represents an original synthesis of several
previous theories is one of the conclusions of this disser
tation.
Apart from its importance from the standpoint of
epistemology, Suarez' position has cultural significance
as well. The years between the death of St. Thomas in 1274
and the birth of Suarez in 1548 had seen Europe torn in
many directions. The Reformation, the rise of nationalism,
the Church»State conflicts, had changed the face of Europe.
Pervading all this was a radically new recognition of the

unique value of the individual human person. While the
Iberian Peninsula was less profoundly affected by all this
turmoil than the rest of Europe, Suarez was very much a man
of his times. His concern with the importance of the indi
vidual and the crucial issue of human freedom pervades the
calm, placid, and generally dispassionate pages of his
voluminous writings. Thus the cultural and social Issues
of his time are also reflected even in such areas as his
treatment of the metaphysical problem of individuation and
the eplstemologlcal problem of intellectual knowledge of
the material singular. That Suarez also did a great deal
to affect the subsequent development of modern European
philosophy has been noted by several astute historians of
philosophy.
Nevertheless, Suarez remains a badly neglected fig
ure in the history of philosophy. There are very few
thorough and objective studies of Suarezlan thought. There
are a number of highly polemical tracts, some defending,
others excoriating Suarez. This situation explains, in
part, the relative lack of references to secondary sources
in the pages that follow. More than this negative reason,
it is the present writer's conviction that this type of
study must concern Itself chiefly with primary sources.
Since comparatively little has been written in recent years
about the philosophy of Suarez, and even less about his
teaching on this specific topic, it was deemed useful to
present simply an exposition of Suarez' position, with 1

3
some treatment of the history of this problem and the ap
proach of those who had a major Influence on Suarez,
specifically, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus,
and William of Ockham. Since the principle of individuation
is inextricably bound up with any treatment of intellectual
knowledge of material singulars and the question of univer-
sals, there will be a brief statement of this principle as
seen by these important thinkers.
Finally, inasmuch as Suarez1 theory of distinctions
is an important, albeit implicit, controlling principle in
the development of both the theory of individuation and in
his discussion of knowledge of the singular, a brief dis
cussion of his notion of distinction is included. The im
portance of Suarez' theory of distinctions must be stressed
here, since its relevance to the larger context of Suarezlan
thought may not be initially evident. The fact that Suarez
never mentions his theory of distinctions explicitly in his
treatment of individuation and knowledge of the singular
does not alter its direct relevance to these topics.
f
I
CHAPTER I
THE BACKGROUND
Origin of the Problem in Aristotle
While it may not be quite accurate to say that the
problem of the universal originates in Aristotle, the char
acter of the positions taken by thinkers in the later Middle
Ages seems to have an Aristotelian base* No attempt will be
made here to give a complete survey of the history of this
problem, but only a summary of those theories on human in
tellectual knowledge of the material singular that have had
an influence on the development given to this topic by
Francis Suarez. Apart from Aristotle, there were three
major thinkers in Suarez* approach: Saint Thomas Aquinas,
John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham.
For the purpose of setting the problem as the later
scholastics saw it, then, it will be sufficient to mention
only one key text of Aristotle that seems to have been the
source of the distinctly different interpretations advanced
by Thomas on the one hand, and Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez on
the other. That text is:
"The universal is known by reason, and the singular

is known by sense..."1
Âristotle, Physics. Book I, chapter 5, (189 a 5); as

quoted by Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologlae, la, q.8 5 , a.l,
sed contra. The modern English translation of this Aristo
telian text differs somewhat, but it would seem that what
5
There are at least two ways of interpreting this
text; one, a strict interpretation given by Aquinas, and the
other, a broader interpretation adopted by Scotus, Ockham,
and Suarez.
According to the first interpretation* this statement
is to be taken exclusively, so that it should be understood
to mean that Just as the senses know singulars only, so the
intellect knows only universals directly (and not singulars).
The other interpretation, which might be called an inclusive
one, agrees that the senses are restricted to the knowledge
of singulars, but the intellect knows both singulars and
universals.
Thus this text of Aristotle may be taken as a point
of departure for an examination of the divergent positions
adopted by the later scholastics.
Aquinas attributes to Aristotle is more significant for the

purposes of this investigation than what modern scholarship
may have found to be what Aristotle really said. Cf. The
Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, the
Physics trans. by R.P. kardie and R.K. Gaye (New York:
Random House, 1941), p. 228. A similar passage occurs in
Aristotle’s De Anlma: In the Version of William of Moefrbeke
and Commentary of Sfe. TKomas Aquinas Frans, by Kenelm Foster
ancT Sylvester HumpKrles (Hew rfaven: Yale University Press,
1954), Book II chap. 5 (417b 18— 4l8a), p. 246. Curiously,
in De Verltate q. 10, art. 5» sed contra, St. Thomas attri
butes the same statement to Boethius (Oommentarla in
Porphyrlum. I; PL 64: 85).
6
Moreover, the adjustments made necessary by Aris
totle’s rejection of Plato's theory of subsistent forms log
ically forced the issue of the metaphysics and eplstemology
of the singular existent. If science is of the universal
and necessary, and only singular mutable beings exist, then
science will be possible only if the mind can penetrate to
a core of necessity and draw from the singular existent a
universal concept by a process of abstraction. Aristotle's
theory of matter and form, which he found useful in many
and diverse contexts, was particulary applicable in this area.
Form, for Aristotle, is the principle of intelligibility and
actuality. Matter is opaque to the mind, passive, the prin
ciple of Instability, dispersion, and numerical multiplicity
within a specific class. At least as far as our ordinary
experience goes, neither matter nor form can exist alone.
They are correlative principles, together they constitute the
material singular being. This attitude implying the opacity
of matter is clearly a Platonic-Aristotelian heritage which
exercised a considerable influence on St. Thomas A q u inas.^
2For a recent study of the ramifications of Aris

totle's abondonment of Plato's theory of Ideas, see Whitney
J. Oates, Aristotle and the Problem of Value (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 19 b 3 )•
3"In any case, it is the individual that is truly

substance, and only the individual. There is, however, this
further point to be observed. According to Aristotle, the
sensible individuals cannot be defined owing to the material
element in them, which renders them perishable and makes
them obscure to our knowledge. On the other hand, substance
is primarily the definable essence or form of a thing, the
principle in virtue of which the material element is some
Yet, Aristotle did not settle the problem of knowl
edge definitively. Even In his doctrine of the hylomorphlc
constitution of Individuals, he left open the possibility

|i
of the two conflicting Interpretations alluded to above.
In fact, Owens observes:
The notion of abstracting a universal or 'essence*

from singulars ('total' abstraction) does not occur
In Aristotle. A sensible thing may be considered as
universal or as singular. The difference lies between
potential and actual cognition. As known actually,
the sensible thing is singular. As known potentially,
It is universal.5
It might be argued that the exclusive Interpretation Is con
firmed by this, since man's first actual knowledge of a thing
is derived through sensation, and the universal Is contained
potentially In this sense datum of the particular. However,
the implication Is that the form which Is intelligible is
definite concrete object. It follows from this that sub

stance is primarily form which Is, in Itself, Immaterial,
so that if Aristotle begins by asserting that individual
sensible objects are substances, the course of his thought
carries him on toward the view that pure form alone is truly
and primarily substance...• It is certainly not unreasonable
to discern here the Influence of Platonism, since, in spite
of his rejection of the Platonic theory of Ideas, Aristotle
evidently continued to look on matter as the element which
is Impenetrable to thought and on form as the intelligible.
It is not suggested that Aristotle was wrong in thinking
this, but right or wrong, it is clearly a legacy of Platon
ism." Frederick C. Copieston, A History of Philosophy.
vol. 1, "Greece and Rome" (Westminster, Maryland: The
Newman Press, 19^6), pp. 305-306. Cf, also Joseph Owens,
The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics
{Toronto: PontTfleal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951)*
p. 272.
**Supra, p. 5.
5
Owens, 0£. clt. p. 239.
8
neither singular nor universal.*’
Form, the principle of intelligibility, is neither
universal nor singular in itself, but it is prior to both
singularity and universality. However, it is not the same

7
as the "common nature" of John Duns Scotus. According to
Owens, for Aristotle form is:
what first and most immediately confronts the intel

ligence in the singular thing. "Two-footed animal)1
is the form or logos of a man. The intellect, as a
matter of fact, sees that form in this man and then
in that man and in numbers of other such singulars.
It sees also, by the fact of predication, that that
same logos-can be applied universally to all those
singulars.”
This would seem to favor the inclusive interpretation
adopted by the later scholastics.. At any rate, Aristotle
6"The form is an Entity and a 'this,' without being

of itself either singular or actually universal. Because
it is not singular, it can be knowable and can be the prin
ciple of knowablllty for the singular thing. Knowledge of
the form will be knowledge of the singular individual, be
cause the form is identified per se with that singular
thing as its act, and the form contains all the knowablllty
found in the singular. At the same time the form can be
Entity, because it is not actually universal.... It is the
actual and formal principle and cause of a singular thing,
without being of itself a singular. As the act of sensible
matter, the form is the cause of Being to the sensible
Entity, which is singular. In the passive mind the same
form Is without its physical matter. It is the act of that
passive mind.... In this intelligible matter it forms the
logos or definition of the sensible thing, and aa- such can
be applied universally to all the individuals which are the
same in form." Ibid. .pp. .2)12-243 (italics in original).
Îbid., p. 243. Cf. discussion of Scotus* notion of

common nature infra.
8Ibid.
set up the problem in such a way that the later controversy
was inevitable. It is probably also true that if the medi
eval thinkers had not inherited this problem from Aristotle,
they might very well have initiated it anyway.
Furthermore:
Form, singulars, and universals are all facts that con

front the intellect. None has to be deduced from the
others. Their interrelationship is what has to be
explained. Analysis shows that the form is most immedi
ately known. Through it the different singulars are
known. An explanation has to be given of how that same
form is found in a plurality of singulars, without the
least addition to its knowablllty. From this situation
the presence of unknowable matter is deduced. By means
of that matter the singulars are the same in form, but
different in matter, specifically the same but numeri
cally different, and the same form can be in different
things.9
Hence, form is the central fact in the encounter
between being and the mind. Since only singulars exist
9lbid., pp. 243—244. Owens adds in a footnote (#74):

"Some commentators meet this situation by saying that the
form is at once singular and universal....
However, the form cannot be singular, because it con
tains no matter, and it cannot be a universal because it is
Entity.... To explain the form in the same context as singu-
lar=.and universal is to Involve an open contradiction.
Rather, the priority of form over both singular and universal
is clear in the text of Aristotle . The form, as the primary
Entity, is prior to the singular composite of matter and
form. This singular composite is in turn prior to the uni
versal species, and to the accidents. The universal is
from the logical viewpoint a secondary Entity, in comparison
to the singular, which in that context (i.e., the logical)
is the primary Entity.
There is in Aristotle, therefore, no problem of re
conciling the this and the what. The two notions are
originally one,...namely the form which is prior to both
singular and universal. The form is in the thing. It cannot
be conceived as an intermediate between the cognitlonal and
the real orders. So it corresponds even less to the 'datum*
or 'essence' of the American Critical Realists than it does
10
outside the mind any actual knowledge will be of the form
existing In the singular, and as it exists In that singular.
This can then be employed in the elaboration of a universal
applying to all such singulars. Seen in this respect, It is
form which is known, and which is prior to both singular and
universal. "The singular and the universal, accordingly,
are to be explained in terms of form, and not vice-versa. All
three are given as facts, with form prior in knowablllty. If
the problem is posed in two terms only, singularity and uni
versality, it becomes utterly insoluble."10
Every text in which St. Thomas treats of human intel
lectual knowledge of the material singular refers to matter
as the principle of individuation. Aquinas' reasoning then
follows the pattern of developing the implications of this
in relation to abstraction seen as a progressive demateria
lization. The obvious result will be that to the extent
that form is liberated from the individuating influence of
matter, the form will be universalized. There are several
passages (especially in the earlier works) where St. Thomas
says explicitly that form by itself is universal.11
to the Scotistic common nature." Ibid., pp. 402-403

(italics in original).
10Ibld. . p. 244.
llFor example, "Sicut autem omnis forma, quantum est

de se, est universalis, ita habitudo ad formam non facit
cognoscere materlam nisi cognltione universal!." Quaestiones
Dlsputatae: De Verltate. q. 10, art. 5 corpus articuii
(Turin: ifarietti, 1953).
On the surface, at least, It would appear that
St. Thomas has departed from Aristotle on a fundamental is-

12
sue in metaphysics. However, as will be shown in the ex
position of St. Thomas' position to follow, there are several
other principles that pervade the Angelic Doctor's theory of
knowledge, and which are at work implicitly in his explan
ation of human Intellectual knowledge of material singulars.
It may be that as his thought developed, St. Thomas radi
cally revised his position without changing the linguistic
expressions used in the earlier works.
This situation becomes more understandable in the
light of what appear to be rather vague formulations of
Aristotle's extraordinarily subtle doctrine of form. As
Owens points out:
The difficulties inherent in considering the form as

primarily universal or as primarily singular appear
when the 'principle of individuation' is sought. The
answer has been given both as the matter and as the
form, in full realization that in either case there
are texts which imply the contrary. The question of a
principle of individuation, however, arises when the
form is primarily considered as universal. Then a
12Whether this is the case or not, certainly no value

judgment is implied. It is not of great moment here to
discover to what extent St. Thomas was or was not an ortho
dox Aristotelian. One may, however, be permitted to ob
serve that St. Thomas was very far from being merely a
Christianizer of Aristotle, There are many non-Aristotel
ian elements in the philosophy of Aquinas, although Aristo
telian terminology and categories are found throughout.
On occasion, St. Thomas even expresses Platonic (and neo-
Platonic) notions in Aristotelian style. See W. Norris
Clarke, "The Limitation of Act by Potency,” The New
Scholasticism. XXIV (1952), 167-191*. There are also
several studies of the non-Aristotelian aspects of St.
Thomas' thought•
12
principle is sought to limit it to a singular. For the

Stagirlte the physical form is in Itself neither singu
lar nor universal, nor is it made singular in the com
posite. The composite is a singular, but is known by
its form. Such knowledge of the composite...should be
actually singular and potentially universal. In this
background the ’principle of individuation* appears a
very unaristotelian question.13
Concern about the principle of individuation may be un
aristotelian, but it is beyond doubt that it assumes con
siderable importance in medieval philosophy, and cannot
be disengaged from St. Thomas' explicit treatment of human

i ii
intellectual knowledge.
There are two ways of understanding a sensible com
posite— as a singular (Entity) or as a universal (not
Entity). "The composite, as singular, is a 'this.' The
form, as separate (in notion) from matter and composite, is
likewise a 'this.' A 'this' cannot be a universal or a
quality."1^ Rather, a 'this' is something determined, def
inite, and it belongs to the first category (i.e., sub
stance) "either as singular, or as a form considered with
out matter."16
13owens, 0£. cit., p. 244 (italics in original).
l^This is one of the conclusions of the present re-

search-the intimate connection between St. Thomas' theory
of individuation and his treatment of human intellectual
knowledge of material singulars may be contrasted with a
relative lack of concern about individuation and a differ
ent point of view regarding intellectual cognition of the
material singular in the later scholastics.
lÔwens, o£. cit.. p. 245.
l6Ibid.
13
Actual knowledge is knowledge of a 'this,* and not of
a universal. "Knowledge of the universal is only potential
knowledge of the thing. Sensation as well as science at
tain the universal per accldens on the occasion of knowing
a ’this.’" ^ Furthermore:
Aristotle makes no attempt to demonstrate that the same

form can be found in many singulars. He dogs not seem
interested in deducing its possibility. He sees it
rather as an empirical fact. The form ’two-footed ani
mal' is seen in one individual man, then in another and
another indefinitely. That is a fact of experience. It
is accounted for by the matter, which can enter into a
composite with the form, and yet not add the least de
gree of knowablllty. For any addition in knowablllty
would destroy the form.lo
That is, since form is the principle of intelligibility,
any addition or diminution in knowablllty on the essential
17ibid., p. 272. Owens continues: "What does such a

doctrine imply?
Certainly it does not say that there is knowledge of
singulars, as such. Although the genesis of the problem,
in its Platonic background, is presented in the antithesis
of singular and universal, the treatment proper carefully
avoids the expression 'singular.' Instead, the term 'this',
which can apply either to a singular or to a physical form
(separate in notion), is used. A 'this'...is not a univer
sal. It may or may not be a singular.
Of such a 'this* there is actual knowledge. Poten
tially, that knowledge is universal.... The problem can be
simplified by leaving-as Aristotle does- the singular out
of consideration.••• So the question of knowing the thing
can be restricted to knowing tts' form, and yet examples of
the individual color or the individual alpha can be used
to illustrate the doctrine. The form as seen in the thing
is not universal. It is this definite form. That same
form, however, is seen in other singular things, indefin
itely numerous. Yet the knowledge of the form as seen in.
the one definite instance in a singular, is able to be
applied indefinitely to all things in which that form hap
pens to be found." Ibid. (italics in original).
l8Ibid., p. 273.
19
level would mean that there is a different form involved.
"This is the only explanation required from the standpoint
of the Stagirite. The empirical fact is that the same def
inite form is found indefinitely multiplied in singulars.
Matter is the sufficient explanation." 20
Henee even the slightest intelligible difference in
form would constitute a specific difference, that is, the
form would belong to a different species. Matter does not
add any intelligibility or precision to form.
Matter and indefiniteness are therefore the explan

ation of universality both from the side of things
and in knowledge. The actual knowledge and knowing
are definite and a ’this'. What they know-the form
■^"And as, wh e n one of the parts of which a number

consists has been taken from or added to the number, it is
no longer the same number, but a different one, even if it
is the very smallest part that has been taken away or added,
so the definition and essence will no longer remain when
anything has been taken away or added.... And as number
does not admit of the more and the less, neither does sub
stance, in the sense of form, but if any substance does, it
is only the substance which involves matter." Aristotle,
Metaphysics. Book VIII (H), chap. 3 (1043b 36-1044a 14),
trans. W.D. Ross, In The“Baslc Works of Aristotle, edited
by Richard McKeon, (New York: Random House, 19^1).
200wens, 0£. cit., p. 273. Cf. "...in the formula of

the substance tEe material parts will not be present (for
they are not even parts of the substance in that sense, but
of the concrete substance; but of this there is in a sense
a formula, and in a sense there is not; for there is no
formula of it with its matter, for this is indefinite, but
there is a formula of it with reference to its primary
substance-e.g. in the case of a man the formula of the
soul-for the substance is the indwelling form, from which
and the matter the so-called concrete substance is derived;
e.g. concavity is a form of this sort, for from this and
the nose arise 'snub nose' and 'snubness'); but in the
concrete substance, e.g. a snub nose or Calllas, the matter
will also be present." Aristotle, op.cit.. Book VII (Z),
chap. 11 (1037a25-35).
15
and the thing according to its form-is likewise some

thing definite and a ’this*. But, though actually
definite in one singular thing, the form-as form-could
just as well have been that of any other singular of
the same species* Its possibility, as a form, of being
the form of such other individuals, is indefinite* In
this way it is potentially indefinite and universal.2!
On the other hand, actual knowledge is definite. But
this definite knowledge of the form can, in principle, be
applied indefinitely and indifferently to all individuals in
the same species, it is potentially indefinite and universal*
"As such it can be regarded as matter for each new actual
cognition of a singular. That is why...a singular thing can
be known or perceived only in the actual cognition. When
the actuality ceases, it is known only by the universal for
mula. It is known only potentially.”22
From the standpoint of logic and in logical discourse
the universal has primary importance. But since Metaphysics
concerns the real, and universals have reality only in the
mind, whereas outside the mind only singulars exist, it
follows that the metaphysician will consider universals
2l0wens, 0£. cit., p. 273.
22Ibid. Cf. "But when we come to the concrete thing,

e.g. this circle, i.e. one of the individual circles,
whether perceptible or intelligible (I mean by intelligible
circles the mathematical, and by perceptible circles those
of bronze or of wood)-of these there is no definition, but
they are known by the aid of intuitive thinking or of per
ception; and when they pass out of this complete reali
zation it is not clear whether they exist or not, but they
are always stated and recognized by means of the universal
formula. But matter is unknowable in itself. And some
matter is perceptible and some intelligible, perceptible
matter being for Instance bronze and wood and all matter
that is changeable, and intelligible matter being that
16
potential (rather than actual) knowledge of things. Actual
knowledge of things Is definite, universals are indefinite.
Hence:
In the logical works, Aristotle repeatedly asserts that

knowledge is of the universal. From the viewpoint of
Primary Philosophy, such knowledge is the potential,
not the actual, knowledge of things. The actual knowl
edge of things is definite, not universal. This must ...
be considered Aristotle's express answer to the problem.
This problem, concerning the quantitative and on
tological status of the first principles, was posed early in
the Metaphysics. This it comes about that the problem of
universals is linked with the distinction between actual and
potential knowledge later in the same work. Aristotle ex
presses the difficulty thus:
We must not only raise these questions about the first

principles, but also ask whether they are universal or
what we call individuals. If they are universal, they
will not be substances; for everything that is common
indicates not a 'this' but a 'such', but substance is
a 'this.' And if we are to be allowed to lay it down
that a common predicate is a 'this' and a single thing,
Socrates will be several anlmals-hlmself and 'man' and
'animal', if each of these indicates a 'this' and a
single thing.
If, then, the principles are universals, these
results follow; if they are not universals but of the
v nature of individuals, they will not be knowable; for
the knowledge of anything is universal.2 ^
which is present in perceptible things not qua perceptible,

i.e. the objects of mathematics." Aristotle, Metaphysics.
Book VII (Z), chap. 10 (1036al-12).
23owens, 0£. cit.. p. 273.
2l*Aristotle, Metaphysics. Book III (B). chap. 6

(1003a5-15).
S
17
This presents what seems to be an Impossible choice:
either deny the reality and objectivity of the first prin
ciples by making them universals or commit the absurdity of
implicitly denying the knowablllty of the first principles
by making them individuals,25 The way out of this seeming
Impasse is to make an important distinction— already dis
cussed above— between actual and potential cognition.
The statement that all knowledge is universal, so that

the principles of things must also be universal and not
separate substances, presents indeed, of all the points
we have mentioned, the greatest difficulty, but yet the
statement is in a sense true, although in a sense it is
not. For knowledge, like the verb 'to know', means two
things, of which one is potential and one actual. The
potency, being, as matter, universal and indefinite,
deals with the universal and indefinite; but the actu
ality, being definite, deals with a definite object-being
a 'this', it deals with a 'this.'2®
Actual, definite knowledge is knowledge of the form.
Both the universal and material singularity are potential,
indefinite.
The difference between form on the one hand, and the

universal and the singular on the other, is quite ap
parent in this treatment. The form is definite. The
singulars and the universal are both indefinite. Since
definiteness has been a characteristic prominently
associated all along with Being, it stamps the form as
able to play the primary role. Neither singular nor
universal, because neither is definite, could be the
25cf, ibid., Book XIII (M), chap. 10 (1086bl3-

1087al0), where the difficulties mentioned in Beta are re
peated and amplified.
26Ibid., (1087al0-l8 ).
18
primary Instance of Being In the context of the Aristo

telian Wisdom. Form, because It Is definite, Is able
to fulfill that function.2 '
For Aristotle, then, the universal Is only an in
dividual form seen to be capable of being found in many
numerically distinct (but specifically identical) individu
als. In this respect the universal
plays the leading role in the order of logic. But all

that is actual in what the universal denotes is the in
dividual form. The only Entity involved, from the view
point of the Primary Philosophy, is the individual act.
While nothing universal can be Entity, the reality im
plied in the universal is the form, which is individual,
and the composite, which is singular and which finds
its actual expression in the form. In this way and ac
cording to these relations do universal, form and Entity
coalesce as the cause of Being in sensible forms. The
same form, by its very nature, is actually individual
and potentially universal. That is the significance of
form as act. 2°
It is not surprising that medieval thinkers adopted
divergent points of view given the somehwat imprecise
formulation of this intricate doctrine in Aristotle. The
actual texts do not readily yield a clear expression of the
Stagirlte's thought. Because of its speculative and practi
cal importance, the question of human intellectual knowl
edge of material singulars had to be dealt with by the
major scholastic thinkers.
27owens, 0£. cit., pp. 273-271* (italics in original).
% 2®Ibid., p. 27^ (italics in original).

A' +
CHAPTER II
The Position of St. Thomas Aquinas
Every text in which St. Thomas deals with the ques
tion of human intellectual knowledge of the material singu
lar shows that the basis of his solution is in his doctrine
of individuation by matter. It is doubtful whether he could
have taken any other position on knowledge of the singular
given this principle of individuation. On the other hand,
contemporary interpretations of St. Thomas' philosophy have
brought out other principles which permeate his theory of
knowledge, so that the explicit mention of the principle of
individuation must be balanced against other principles that
are implicit in the wider context of St. Thomas' teaching.
Hence, it may be useful first to present briefly and in the
chronological order of the texts St. Thomas' theory of in
dividuation. It will be noted incidentally that St. Thomas'
thought underwent a development, so that the later texts re
veal a refinement not found in the earlier writings. Fol
lowing this, St. Thomas' explicit teaching on human intel
lectual knowledge of material singulars will be summarized
from the relevant texts. Finally, the explications of some
representative contemporary Thomlsts will be mentioned.
Needless to say, however, secondary sources will be drawn
upon in the exposition of St. Thomas' teaching when appro
priate.
20
The Principle of Individuation
In an early work, Thomas points out that matter is
the principle of individuation, but he emphasizes that this
is not any sort of matter or matter in general, but "signate
matter.11 And although he later modified this, by signate
matter he means here matter "considered under determined
dimensions."1
St. Thomas restates this principle when he speaks of
the individuation of the human soul, and the problem of how
the soul retains its individuality after death. Aquinas
says that it is evident that one soul cannot unite with sev
eral bodies. Human souls do not differ from one another in
species, but only numerically. Numerical difference arises
from material principles. Therefore the diversity of human
souls must derive from something material. The diversity
and plurality of souls is to be understood according to their
l"Et ldeo sciendum est, quod materia non quomodo-

libet accepta est prlnclplum Indlvlduatlonls, sed solum
materia signata. Et dlco materlam slgnatam quae sub certis
dimensionlDUS consideratur." Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et
Essentia. Chapter 2 (Turin: Marietti,. 19^8 ). C77 w ...duplex
est materia a qua fit abstractio; scilicet materia intelli-
bilis et sensibilis...intelligibilem, ut quae consideratur in
natura continul; sensibllem autem slcut materia naturalls.
Utraque autem dupllclter accipitur; scilicet ut signatajet
ut non signata: et dlcltur signata secundum quod consider-
atur cum determinations dimensionum, harum scilicet vel il-
larum; non signata autem quae sine determinatione dimension
um consideratur.
Secundum hoc igitur est sciendum, quod materia
signata est indlvlduatlonls prlnclplum, a qua abstrahit
omnis intellectus, secundum quod dlcitur abstrahere ab hie
et nunc." Aquinas, Quaestlones Dlsputatae: De Verltate.
21
relations to the diverse quantities of matter with which the

2
souls are united.
All men are alike In having the same kind of soul.
The soul, therefore, cannot be that by which men differ.
Since man Is a'composite of soul and matter, and there Is no
third element, matter must be the principle of numerical
multiplicity. In this text Thomas seems simply to apply the
principle of individuation of the earlier De Ente to the
question of the human soul. But in other passages of the
Summa Contra Gentiles there are certain differences that in
dicate a refinement of principle of individuation. For in
stance, Thomas says that just as it belongs to the human
soul that it be united to a body of a certain species, so
one human soul differs from another only numerically from
the fact that it has a relationship to a numerically dif
ferent body. Thus human souls are individuated in relation
q.2, a.6, ad lm (Turin: Marietti, 1953). Italics in editions

cited.
p
"Quod autem sit impossiblle unam anlmam diversis
corporlbus unirl, sic patet. Animae enim humanae non dif-
ferunt specie ab invicem, sed numero solo: alloquin et homi
nes specie differrent. Differentia autem secundum numerum
est secundum principia materlalia. Oportet lgltur diversi-
tatem animarum humanarum secundum aliquld materlale suml.
Non autem ita quod lpsias animae sit materia pars:...quod
est substantia intellectualis, et quod nulla tails substan
tia materlam habet. Rellnqultur ergo quod secundum ordinem
ad diversas materlas quibus animae uniuntur, diversltas et
pluralitas animarum sumabur..." Aquinas, Summa Contra
Gentiles. Book II, chap. 83 (Turin: Marietti, 193*0.
to their bodies, but the soul's individuation is not caused
by its body.^ Matter cannot be the cause (in the sense of
an active or efficient cause) of the individuation of any
form if matter is considered a pure passive potentiality.
Thus, the human soul is a special case of the general prin
ciple of individuation of forms by matter. As one writer
has put it:
The human soul is not individuated by matter; it

is individuated by the fact that it possesses by its
very nature a relation, a habitudo, to a particular
quantified body. If the human body is the material
principle of individuation, the human soul is the
formal principle.1*
The diversity of human souls does not proceed from
the diversity of bodies but presupposes it. Each human soul
is substantially adapted to one body, and is thus substan
tially (but not essentially) different from every other
human soul. What Thomas appears to be saying is that each
human soul is custom-made for a definite body, is separately
actualized for this body, and is therefore permanently indi
viduated by its relationship to a particular body, and that
this individuating relationship survives the dissolution of
the body-soul composite.^
Îbid., chap. 75 and 81.
^Robert A. O'Donnell, "Individuation: An Example of

the Development in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas," The
New Scholasticism. XXXIII (1959)* 57 (Italics In original).
SAquinas, De Ente et Essentia, chap. 6 (Marietti).

Maurer trans. chap. £. p . T 2 ; ûmma“~Contra Gentiles. Bk. II,
chap. 81. How a relationship can perdure when only one of
the relata exists is an intriguing question, especially in
However, in general, dimenslve quantity is the foun
dation of the multiplicity of individuals in the same species,
for only dimensive quantity has a nature capable of serving
in this way.^
Apparently St. Thomas saw the implication that was
developing from these efforts to explain individuation on
the basis of quantified matter. Quantity is an accident, and
St. Thomas certainly does not mean that material individuals

<3
are only accidentally distinct. Hence, another attempt must
be made, and accidental modifications must be deemphasized.
Typically, St. Thomas makes a distinction: corporeity may
be taken in a twofold sense. Corporeity may mean either the
substantial form of a body, which form requires a tri-dimen-
sional subject, or it may mean the accidental form according
to which a body is classified in the category of quantity.
the light of certain aspects of Ockham's philosophy. How

ever, in his Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences.
d.8, q.5, a.2, ad 6, St.“Thomas points out T h a t the relation
ship to the body is only secondary and the occasion for the
Individuation of the soul. The soul's superior being is
such that (unlike material forms) it remains individual even
apart from matter. The Angelic Doctor uses a particularly
felicitous example: "Si enim allquid unum non retinens figu-
ram dlstlnguatur per diversa vasa, slcut aqua; quando vasa
removebuntur, non remanebunt proprie flgurae distinctae; sed
remanebit una tantum agua. Ita est de formis materlallbus
quae non retlnent esse per se. Si autem sit aliquid retinens
figuram quod dlstlnguatur secundum dlversas figuras per di
versa instrumenta, etlam remotis illis, remanebit distinctio
figurarum, ut patet in cera; et ita est de anima, quae re-
tlnet esse suum post corporis destructlonem, quod etiam
manet in ipsa esse lndlviduatum et distinctum." (Venice, 1776).
6Summa Contra Gentiles. Book IV, chap. 65.

In the latter sense, "corporeity is nothing other than the
three dimensions which constitute the essence of body."?
Obviously, the first of these two meanings is the one which
is central to the problem of individuation. Thus a substan
tial form, which of its very nature actualizes and deter
mines prime matter to constitute this particular material
composite, is necessarily individual in view of the exigen
cies of corporeal, extramental being.
This seems to be the real meaning of the Thomistlc
doctrine of individuation of forms by matter. Since we
find many individuals having the same nature (and therefore)
the same kind of substantial form) it must be possible for
this nature to be Individuated without becoming a different
species. Therefore the ontological basis for this possibil
ity is the fact that a body must have three dimensions (and
therefore be distinct from every other body) and the equally
7
"'Corporeitas autem dupllclter accipi potest. Uno
modo, secundum quod est forma substantialis corporis, prout
in genere substantiae collocatur. Et sic corporeitas culus-
cumque corporis nihil est aliud quam forma substantialis
eius, secundum quam in genere et specie collocatur, ex qua
debetur rei corporali quod habeat tres dimensiones...Oportet
igitur quod corporeitas, prout est forma substantialis in
homlne, non sit aliud quam anlma rationalis, quae in sua
materia hoc requirlt, quod habeat tres dimensiones: est enim
actus corporis allculus. -Alio modo acclpitur corporeitas
prout est forma accidentalls, secundum quam dicitur corpus
quod est in genere quantitatis. Et sic corporeitas nihil
aliud est quam tres dimensiones, quae corporis rationem con-
stituunt. Etsi igitur haec corporeitas in nihilum cedit,
corpore humano corrupto, tamen impedlre non potest quin idem
numero resurgat: eo quod corporeitas prlmo modo dicta non
in nihilum cedit, sed eadem manet." Ibid.. chap. 81.
25
important fact that form cannot function entitatively unless
it is individuated. This is true not only of substantial
forms which are individuated by matter in this primary sense
but also of accidental forms which are individuated by their
inherence in numerically distinct material substances
(second matter).
Therefore quantity is a proper accident of corporeal
substance, and as a property quantity flows from the sub
stantial form. Hence when St. Thomas says that the prin
ciple of individuation is signate matter, he means that when
a substantial form is united with matter, the accidental
form of quantity is actualized and produces definite dimen
sions. When in the case of the human soul these actual
dimensions disappear at death, the accidental form of quan
tity continues to exist virtually in the soul, and this vir
tual presence of dimensions is sufficient to maintain the
individuation of the soul. Therefore, if the soul is re
united with matter these dimensions will be immediately
actualized again.8
Individuation and Intellectual Knowledge of Singulars
Having taken this position on the individuation of
forms, St. Thomas' teaching on human intellectual singulars
can take only one direction. The singular as such is not
unknowable to the human (or any other) intellect, but rather
I 8Ibld.
26
the material singular, because of its materiality, cannot

g
be directly known by the human intellect. The reason for
this is that the principle of singularity in material
things is individual matter, and the human intellect under
stands by abstracting an intelligible species from matter
of this sort. What is abstracted from individual matter is
a universal.10
Thomas* teaching on this topic remains basically the
same in all the relevant texts, and there are only a few
refinements and clarifications in the later texts.
Direct knowledge of the singular, however, is not im
possible for every intellect, since God knows singulars and
angels know singulars.11 In the text from the De Verltate
9".,.singulare non repugnat lntelligibilitati in

quantum est singulare, sed inquantum est materiale, quia
nihil intelligitur nisi immaterialiter. Et ideo si sit ali-
quod singulare immaterlale, slcut est intellectus, hoc non
repugnat lntelligibilitati." Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la,
q.86, a.l, ad 3m (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos,
1951).
10lfRespondeo dicendum quod singulare in rebus ma-

terialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere
non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia prlnclplum slngularitatls
in rebus materlalibus est materia individualist Intellectus
autem noster,...intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibi-
lem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia lndividuall
abstrabitur, est universale. Unde intellectus noster directe
non est cognoscitivus nisi unlversalium." Ibid., corpus
artlculi.
llwDeus singularia cognoscat non solum in univer-

salibus causis, sed etlam unumquodque secundum propriam et
singularem sui naturam
Ad cuius evldentlam sciendum, quod scientla dlvina,
quam de rebus habet, comparatur scientiae artificis, eo quod
est causa omnium rerum, sicut ars artificlatorum. Artifex
autem secundum hoc cognoscit artlflciatum per formam artis
27
just cited, St. Thomas contrasts God's knowledge with the
knowledge that a human artist has of the products of his
art. The artist knows his artistic production through a
form he has In his mind and according to which he produces
that artifact. The artist produces only the form-nature has
prepared the matter. Thus, prior to their production, the

12
artist knows his works only with respect to form. "Now,
every form is of itself universal;" and, hence, the builder,
through his art, certainly has a universal idea of house,
but no knowledge of any particular house except as he has
knowledge of it through his senses.*3 But if the artist
were to produce matter as well as form (instead of merely
quam habet apud se secundum quod lpsam producit: artifex

autem non producit artlflclatum nisi secundum formam, quia
materiam natura praeparavlt; et ideo artifex per artem suam
non cognosclt artiflciata nisi ratlone formae. Omnls autem
forma de se universalis est; et ideo aedificator per artem
suam cognosclt quidem domum in unlversall, non autem hanc
vel 111am, nisi secundum quod per sensum elus notitiam ha-
buit.
Sed si forma artis esset productlva materiae, sicut
est formae, per earn cognosceret artlflclatum et ratione
formae et ratione materiae. Et ideo, cum individuationis
prlnclplum sit materia, non sulum cognosceret ipsam secundum
naturam universalem, sed etiam in quantum est singulare
quoddam.
Unde, cum ars dlvina sit productlva non solum formae,
sed materiae, in arte sua non solum existit ratio formae, sed
etiam materiel; et ideo res cognosclt et quantum ad materiam
et quantum ad formam; unde non solum universalia sed etiam
singularia cognosclt." Aquinas, Quaestlones Dlsputatae: De
Veritate, q.2, art. 5c (Turin: Marietti. 1^53): c^> QuaesET-
ones Quodlibetales, Quodlibetum VII. q.l. a3c (Rome: Mari-
e T C T , 1956). ---- --------
12Aquinas, De Veritate. q.2, a.5c.
13ibid.
I
using already existing matter), then by means of his art
the artist would be able directly to know the artifact un
der both aspects-that of matter and that of form-by means
of a properly intellectual act. Hence "since the principle
of individuation is matter, he would know it not only ac
cording to its universal nature, but also Inasmuch as it is
something singular."1^
Since the likeness of a thing can be in God only in
an immaterial way and the human intellect receives the forms
of things in an immaterial way, how is it then that God
knows singulars and the human Intellect does not? There is
a difference between the relationship between a thing and
its likeness in the human intellect and the relationship
between a thing and its likeness in the divine intellect.
The human intellect receives a likeness from the thing ac
cording as it acts on our intellect by acting first on the
senses. ^5 But matter, because of the weakness of its
actuality, since it is only being in potency, cannot be a
111Ibid.
15lbid., 11.. .similitudo rei non sit in Deo nisi 1m-

materialifcer; unde est quod intellectus noster, ex hoc ipso
quod immateriallter reclpit formas rerum, singularia non
cognosclt: Deus autem cognosclt.
Cuius ratio manifeste apparet, si consideretur
dlversa habitudo quam habet ad rem similitudo rei quae est
in intellectu nostro, et similitudo rei quae est in intel-
lectu divino*
Ilia enlm quae est in Intellectu nostro, est ac
cepts a re secundum quod res agit in intellectum nostrum,
agendo per prlus in sensuj..."
29
principle of acting. Therefore, a thing which acts on our
soul acts only through form. Or, in other words, the like
ness of a thing in the human intellect is a likeness of the
form a l o n e . ^
Obviously, the matter of which St. Thomas speaks here
is what is called ’’first matter,” the ontological correlate
of form, and not "second matter," the actually existing
composite of prime matter and form, which can and does act,
e.g., on the senses. But since matter (in either meaning)
cannot act on the spirit, the material object must be ren
dered compatible with the human intellect in a preliminary
stage prior to intellectual knowledge. This is accomplished
by an active, non-cognitional phase of the intellect itself,
called the agent intellect,1^
In other words, as a necessary condition and preparation

for intellectual knowledge, the sensible, material ob
ject must be put in that condition in which it can be
recognized by a spiritual faculty. The process by which
the phantasm is transformed into an Intelligible species
does not add any new characteristics to the object. Cer
tainly it does not create a new object, because the ob
ject offered through sensation is already present to the
^ Ibld., "...materia autem, propter debilitatem

sui esse, quia est ens in poten tla tant um, non potest
esse prlnclplum agendi; et ideo res quae agit in animam
nostram, agit solum per formam. Unde similitudo rei quae
lmprlmltur in sensum, et per quosdam gradus depurata, usque
ad lntellectum pertlngit, est tantum similitudo formae."
17
'"Ad Primum ergo dicendum, quod formae sensibiles,
vel a sensibilibus abstractae, non possunt agere in
mentem nostram, nisi quatenus per lumen intellectus agentis
lmmateriales redduntur, et sic efficiuntur quodammodo
homogeneae intellectu! posslbili in quem agunt," Aquinas,
De Veritate. q, 10, art. 6, ad 1 m.
senses. In placing the object of the senses In that
condition in which it can be known by the intellect,
all that is done in this preliminary process is to make
possible the establishment of those relations between
the object to be known and the faculty of knowing which
are necessary for knowledge. As a result of this trans
forming process certain characteristics of the object
are left aside, those characteristics which individuate
the material object; but this does not mean that the
object has been mutilated. It merely implies that the
intellect is not prepared to accept all that is offered
in the sense image.1®
And so, since m a n ’s knowledge is derived from things,
and since the process of knowledge involves demateriali
zation, the likeness of things in the human Intellect is a
likeness of form only. In other words, the human mind does
not create the objects of knowledge. For man, being is
always prior to knowledge.1^
On the other hand, the likeness of things which is
in the divine intellect is a likeness which causes things.
God's knowledge is prior to created being. And however
weakly or strongly a thing participates in being, it has
its share In being only from God. And so the immaterial
likeness in God is not only a likeness of form, but of mat
ter. For a thing to be known, its likeness must be In the
knower, but not necessarily in the same way as it is in
1®John V. Burns, "The Problem of Specific Natures,"

The New Scholasticism. XXX (1956), 290-291.
^ T h i s , of course, does not exclude aesthetic (or

other) creativity, since human creativity is combinatory
and developmental, not absolutely originative. Man does not
creat in the absolute sense of the word, and as St. Thomas
indicates in this passage, even the artist learns from the
artifact produced by his craft at least with regard to its
sensible realization.
31
reality* Thus man does not have direct intellectual knowl
edge of material singulars, since this would depend on
knowledge of matter, and the likeness of matter is not in
the human intellect. According to St. Thomas the likeness
of the material singular cannot be in the human intellect
in an immaterial way (while remaining singular), although
it can be in the divine intellect immaterially.20 M a n ’s in
tellectual knowledge is received from material things, and
sensible forms or forms abstracted from sensibles can

not act on our mind except insofar as they are rendered
Immaterial through the light of the agent intellect,
and thus in some way are made homogeneous with the pos
sible intellect on which they act.21
Hence, since whatever is received must be received ac
cording to the mode of the recipient, forms must be re
ceived by the human intellect in an immaterial way. In
20”Sed similitudo rei quae est in intellectu divlno,

est factiva rei; res autem sive forte sive debile esse
participet, hoc non habet nisi a Deo; et secundum hoc simi
litudo omnis rei in Deo existit quod res ilia a Deo esse
participat: unde similitudo formae, sed materiae.
Et quia ad hoc quod aliquld cognoscatur, requiritur
quod similitudo elus sit in cognoscente, non autem quod
sit per modum quo est in re: inde est quod intellectus noster
non cognosclt singularia, quorum cognltio ex materia dependet
quia non est in eo similitudo materiae; non autem ex hoc
quod similitudo sit in eo immateriallter: sed Intellectus
divlnus, qui habet similitudinem materiae quamvls immater
iallter, potest singularia cognoscere." Aquinas, £e Veri
tate. q. 2, art. 5 c .
21” ...Formae sensibilis, vel a senslbilibus abstrac-

tae, non possunt agere in mentem nostram, nisi quatenus per
lumen intellectus agentls immateriales redduntur, et sic
efflciuntur quodammodo homogeneae intellectui posslblli in
quern agunt." Aquinas, De Veritate. q. 10, art. 6, ad 1 m.
32
this regard, the likeness of matter is not in the human in-

22
tellect. That is, the human intellect has no direct know
ledge of matter, since its potentiality is actuated only by
forms abstracted from matter. Human intellectual knowledge
of matter is indirect, reflexive, relative, and secondary.
This intellectual knowledge of matter is, furthermore, only
a knowledge of matter in general, not of individuating

23
matter. J
22,,Nevertheless, a form does acquire a new mode of

existence when it is known because of the manner of exis
tence of the subject in which it is known. The subject of
understanding, the intellect, is immaterial and cognosci-
tive, therefore the form as known exists immaterially and
in a certain manner universally. The fact therefore that
knowledge is universal arises from our intellect; the fact
that it is knowledge of a reality of such a kind, arises
from the fact that what is known is the form of* a thing
of such a kind.
“ Briefly then, it is maintained that the objective
reality which corresponds to the concept of a specific
nature is the substantial form, not the individuated sub
stantial form, but the substantial form viewed as a form
of such a kind.
When the substantial form abstracted from matter
gives birth to the concept of a specific nature, that mat
ter from which it is abstracted is individuating matter or
three dimensional matter or signate matter. The intellect
in abstracting the forma totius does not abstract from com
mon or universal sensible matter.
The nature absolutely considered which is capable
of being known as common to many is not the form, but this
nature includes also the idea of matter, not the idea of
concrete matter of such and such dimensions, but the idea
of universal matter.” John V. Burns, ar t . cit.. p . 307
(italics in original). This would seem to conflict with
the assertion that the likeness of matter does not exist in
the human intellect. However, Burns continues: "The con
cept then of a nature abstracted, or a nature absolutely
considered, is a concept in which the substantial form
has been conceived together with its connatural matter. The
form is known directly and the common or universal matter.
indirectly. bub bobb are comprised in FfTe concept of an
essence." ibid.. pp.jd7-30o (italics added).
33
! Experience attests that we abstract universal
forms from their particular conditions, and this is to make

24
these forms actually intelligible. In other words, the
process of intellection is a process of progressive demater
ialization of form, and since designated matter is the prin
ciple of individuation, this process liberates form from
its particularizing conditions, whereupon form is immediately
universal and actually intelligible for the human intellect.
Form without matter is a universal, and is actually intel
ligible. And so, the likeness of a thing which is first a
sense impression is purified in several steps, and when it
reaches the human intellect it is a likeness of form alone,
but it is also understood to be a form which naturally re-

25
quires matter-it is a "rorm of-," Material things must
be understood according as they are abstracted from matter
23»Cognitio enim mentis humanae fertur ad res

naturales primo secundum formam, et secundario ad materiam
prout habet habitudinem ad formam, Sicut autem omnis forma,
quantum est de se, est universalis, lta habltudo ad formam
non facit cognoscere materiam nisi cognitione universali.
Sic autem considerata materia non est individuationis
prlnclplum, sed secundum quod consideratur materia in singu-
larl, quae est materia signata sub determinatis dimenslon-
ibus existens: ex hac enim forma indivuatur." Aquinas,
De Veritate, q.10, art,5c.
?4
"Et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus
nos abstrahere formas unlversales a conditionibus particu
lar ibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia." Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae. Ia, q.79, a.4c,
2 5 « n i a enim quae est in intellectu nostro, est

accepta a re secundum quod res agit in intellectum nostram,
agendo per prius in sensu;...Unde similitudo rei quae lm-
{ primltur in sensum, et per quosdam gradus depurata, usque
ad Intellectum pertlnglt, est tantum similitudo formae."
pg
and material likeness (phantasms). The human intellect
stands midway between the sense powers and the angelic in
tellect. A sense power is the act of a corporeal organ,
and so its object is the form as it exists in corporeal
matter. Since this sort of matter is the principle of in
dividuation, the sense powers are restricted to the know
ledge of particulars only. The angelic intellect is not the
act od a corporeal organ, nor is it joined to corporeal mat
ter in any way. Hence its object is form subsisting with
out matter, and even though it knows material things, it
contemplates them only in immaterial things, either in it-

27
self or in God. The human intellect is situated between
these two levels of powers. It is not the act of an organ,
but it is a power of a soul which is the form of a body.
Hence its proper role is to know a form existing individually
Aquinas, De Veritate. q.2, a.5c; cf. De Veritate. q.10, a.5c.

pg
C D "Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur in
quantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus mater-
ialibus, quae sunt phantasmata." Aquinas, Summa Theologlae,
la, q-85, a.l, sed contra.
27
"Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivae virtutis.
Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis,
scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae po-
teitiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et
quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo
omnis potentia sensitivae partis est cognoscitiva particu-
larium tantum. Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae
neque est actus organi corporalis, neque est aliquo modo
corporali materiae conjuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus.
Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae obiectum est forma sine
materia subsistens: etsi enim materialia cognoscant, non
tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, scilicet vel in
seipsis vel in Deo.” Ibid.. corpus articuli.
35
in corporeal matter, but not in the way it exists in such
r
matter. To know in this fashion is to abstract the form
from individual matter, which phantasms represent. Thus
one must say that our intellect understands by abstracting

28
from phantasms.
The likeness of the known informs the knowing
power and is the principle of actual knowledge. Hence all
knowledge is determined by the condition of the form (like-

29
ness) in the knower.
Therefore, since the likeness of the thing which

is in our intellect is received as separeted from
matter and from all material conditions, which are the
principles of individuation, it follows that our in
tellect does not know singulars directly, but only
universals. For every form, as form, is universal,
unless it happens to be a subsistent form, which, -,q
from the fact that it subsists, is incommunicable.
P8
"Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet:
non enim actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus
animae, quae est forma: corporis,....Et ideo proprium eius
est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali indivi-
dualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia.
Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individual!, non
prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia
individual!, quam representant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse
est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia
abstrahando a phantasmatibus;..." Ibid. "...necesse est
dicere quod intellectus, qui est inteliectualis operationis
principium, sit humani corporis forma." Ibid., q.76, a.lc.
29 " S i m i l i t u d o autem cogniti, qua informatatur po-

tentia cognoscitiva est principium cognitionis secundum
actum sicut calor calefactionis; et ideo oportet ut quae-
libet cognitio sit per modum formae quae est in cognoscente."
Aquinas, De_ Veritate. q.2, a.6c.
3°"Unde, cum similitudo rei quae est in intellectu

nostro, accipiatur ut separata a materia, et ab omnibus
materialibus conditionibus, quae sunt individuationis
principia; relinquitur quod intellectus noster, per se
loquendo, singularia non cognoscat, sed unlversalla
Thus, according to St. Thomas, the human intellect
cannot know the material singular directly and primarily,
by its own properly intellectual act, because the likeness
of the material thing which is in the intellect lacks the
characteristics that make that thing a singular. What the
human intellect knows directly is a universal form, and
this is a likeness of the thing only as regards its form
(apart from its individuating matter). Since, for the
human intellect, matter as such is unknowable directly and
in itself, and matter is the principle of individuation, it
follows that whatever intelligibility a thing has belongs
to it by reason of its form-and this form (purified of
matter and material conditions) is a universal. For man,
the material singular as such is not directly intelligible-

31
the human intellect can have no direct knowledge of it.
tantum. Omnis enim forma, in quantum huiusmodi, universalis

est; nisi forte sit forma subsistens, quae, ex hoc ipso
quod subsistit, incommunicabilis est." Ibid.
3^"Cum autem genus sit principium cognoscendi,

utpote prima definitionis pars, materia autem secundum se
sit ignota; non potest secundum se ex ea accipi diversitas
generis, sed solum illo modo quo cognoscibilis est.
Est autem cognoscibilis dupliciter. Uno modo per
analogiam, sive per comparationem,..,ut dicamus hie esse
materiam, vel quod materia hoc modo se habet ad res natura-
lesj sicut lignum ad lectum....Alio modo cognoscitur per
formam per quam habet esse actu. Unumquodque enim cognosci
tur secundum quod est actu, non secundum est in potentia,
ut dicitur, IX Metaph.
Alio modo penes materiam sumitur generis diversi
tas, secundum quod materia est perfecta per formam. Et cum
materia sit potentia pura, et Deus sit actus purus, nihil
aliud est materiam perfici in&actu, qui est forma, nisi
quatenus participat aliquam similltudem actus primi, licet
Limperfecte; ut scilicet id quod est iam composltum ex
37
It will be useful to focus on two points which St.
Thomas emphasizes throughout his discussions of human in
tellectual cognition, viz., the receptivity of the human in
tellect, and the potential intelligibility of objects in the
physical world. That is, the human intellect at birth is
devoid of content-there are no innate ideas. Hence whatever
is in the human intellect must have been received from some
thing else. In this respect the human intellect is passive,
materia et forma, sit medium inter potentiam puram, et

actum purum.
Non autem materia ex omni parte aequaliter recipit
similitudinem actus primij sed a quibusdam imperfecte, a
quibusdam vero perfectius, utpote quaedam participant di-
vinam similitudinem, secundum quod vivunt, quaedam verbic-i;-
sedundum quod cognoscunt, quaedam vero secundum quod intel-
ligunt. Ipsa igitur similitudo primi actus in quaecumque
materia existens, est forma eius, Sed forma talis in qui
busdam facit esse tantum, in quibusdam esse et vivere; et
sic de aliis in uno et eodem, Similitudo enim perfectior
habet omne id quod habet similitudo minus perfecta, et ad-
huc amplius." Aquinas, In Librum Boetll de Trlnltate Expo-
sitio, Lectio I, q.2, a.?c ."ITpuscula frheoToKica. vol.2
(¥urin: Marietti, 195*0. Later in the same passage St.
Thomas adds:
"Nulla autem forma, inquantum huiusmodi, est haec
ex seipsa. Dico autem inquantum huiusmodi, propter animam
rationalem, quae quodam modo ex seipsa est hoc aliquid, sed
non inquantum forma. Intellectus vero quamlibet formam quam
possibile est recipi in aliquo sicut in subiecto, natus est
attribuere pluribus: quod est contra rationem eius quod est
hoc aliquid. Unde forma fit hie per hoc quod recipitur in
materia. Sed cum materia in se considerata sit indistincta,
non potest esse quod formam in se receptam individuet, nisi
secundum quod est distinguibilis. Non enim forma lndivi-
duatur per hoc quod recipitur in materia, nisi quatenus re
cipitur in hac materia vel ilia distincta, et determinata
ad hie et nunc." Ibid. Cf. also excerpt from Summa Theolo-
giae, Ia,q,86, a.lc, quoted in note #10 supra, in another
work St. Thomas says: "...dicendum quod esse individuale non
repugnat ei quod est esse intellectum in actu: quia substan
tiae separatae sunt intellectae in actu, cum tamen sint in-
dividuae; alioquin non haberent actiones, quae sunt singular-
38
that is, it is in potency with regard to any definite know
ledge. In its first condition it is a passive potency, and

•ap
it is actuated by an intelligible datum. This does not
mean, however, that the human intellect is a purely passive
power. Rather, man's intellect is active in one respect,
and passive in another respect. The reason fortthis is that
the objects in man's environment are only potentially in
telligible, and they must be made actually intelligible by
something in act in the order of intelligibility.^ Hence
ium..., Sed habere esse materiale, repugnat ei quod est

esse intellectum in actu; et ideo formae individuales quae
individuantur per materiam, non sunt intellectae in actu,
sed in potentia tantum." Aquinas, Quaestlo Dlsputata: De
Splrltualibus Creaturis. art.9, ad l^m (Vurin: Marietti, 1953).
32 "Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in

ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini
intellectus, est in potehtia respectu intelligibilium, et in
principio est slcut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scrlptum.
ut Phllosophus dieit in III D e AnTma. Quod manTfeste ap-
paret ex hoc, quod in principTo sumus intelligentes solum
in potentia, postmodum autem efficimur intelligentes in
actu. Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quod-
dam pati. secundum tertium modum passionis. Et per con-
sequens intellectus est potentia passive." Aquinas, Summa
Theologlae, la, q.79, art.2c (italics in ed. cited).
33
"Non enim distinguitur potentia activa a passiva
ex hoc quod habet operationem: quia, cum cuiuslibet poten-
tiae animae tarn activae quam passivae sit operatio aliqua,
quaelibet potentia animae esset activa.
Cognoscitur autem eorum distinctio per comparation-
em potentlae ad obiectum. Si enim obiectum se habeat ad po-
tentiam ut patiens et transmutatum, sic erit potentia activa;
si autem e converso se habet ut agens et movens, sic erit
potentia passiva. Et inde est quod omnes potentiae vege-
tabilis animae sunt activae, quia alimentum transmutatur per
potentiam animae tarn in nutriendo quam in generando; sed po
tentiae sensitive amnes sunt passivae, quia per sensibilia
obiecta moventur et fiunt in actu.
Circa intellectum vero aliqua potentia est activa, (
the human intellect has a twofold aspect, referred to as
the possible intellect and the agent intellect. The possible
intellect is passive and receptive, the agent intellect is
active and makes potentially intelligible objects to be

34
actually intelligible.
Because of this polarity of potentiality on the
side of the object and on the side of the intellect, there
is required some power which can simultaneously reduce both
to act. And so, unlike sensible things which are actually
sensible, the ordinary objects of the human intellect are
not found in an actually intelligible state in the physical
world. That is:
the natures of the material things which we understand

do not subsist outside the soul as immaterial and in
telligible in act, but they are only intelligible in
potency existing outside the soul: and therefore there
aliqua passiva, eo quod per intellectum intelligibile in

potentia fit intelligibile actu, quod est potentia activa.
Ipsum etiam intelligibile in actu facit intellectum in
potentia esse intellectum in actu; et sic intellectus pos-
sibilis erit potentia passiva," Aquinas, De Veritate. a.l6.
a.l, ad 13m. Cf. Summa Theologlae. Ia, q.75*, “a.'T," ad lm.
3^"Respondeo dicendum quod necessitas ponendi in

tellectum possibllem in nobis, fuit propter hoc, quod nos
invenimur quandoque intelligentes in potentia et non in actu:
unde oportet esse quandam virtutem, quae sit in potentia ad
intelligibilia ante ipsum intelligere, sed reducitur in
actum eorum cum fit sclens, et ulterius cum fit considerans.
Et haec virtus vocatur intellectus possibilis. -Necessitas
autem ponendi intellectum agentem fuit, quia naturae rerum
materialium, quas nos intelligimus, non subsistunt extra
animam immateriales et intelligibiles in actu, sed sunt
solum intelligibiles in potentia, extra animam existentes:
et ideo oportuit esse aliquam virtutem, quae faceret illas
naturas intelligibiles actu. Et haec virtus dicitur intellec
tus agens in nobis.” Aquinas, Summa Theologlae.Ia. q.54,a.4c.
40
must be some power which makes those natures intelli

gible in act. This power in us is called the agent
intellect.35
The reason why material things are not immediately and ac
tually intelligible to man is not the fact that they are in
dividuals, but precisely their materiality, "since a thing
is actually intelligible from the fact that it is immateri-

36
al." Experience confirms this, "since we perceive that
we abstract universal forms from their particular condi-

37
tions, which is to make them actually intelligible." And
this is why St. Thomas repeatedly and consistently asserts
that "the singular individual is not directly known by the
Îbld, Cf. "Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit for

mas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem
in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu: seque-
batur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas in-
telligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem
reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu:
sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibilia in actu. Oportebat
igitur ponere aliauam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae
faceret Intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum
a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponen
di intellectum agentem." Aquinas, Summa Theologlae, la,
q.79, a.3c. Moreover, "sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra
animam: et ideo non oportult ponere sensum agentem. -Et
sic patet quod in parte nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt acti
vae; in parte sensitiva, omnes passivae; in parte vero in-
tellectiva est aliquid activum, et aliquid passivum." Ibid.,
ad lm.
^ " . . . q u i a ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu,

quod est immateriale." Aquinas, Summa Theologlae. Ia, q.79,
a.3c. Cf. Aquinas, Quaestio PisputaEa: be Splrltualibus
Creatufrls. art.9, ad '15m.
3?"Et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus

nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus partlcu-
laribus, quod est facere actu Intelligibilia." Aquinas,
Summa Theologlae. Ia, q.79, art.4c.
oo
intellect, but by the senses or imagination.10
Thus, the human intellect’s mode of receptivity of
form differs from the way material things receive form.
Material things are mutually active and passive in the same
order. But the intellect is in potency to the forms of
material things only insofar as they are elevated to an im
material, actually intelligible state through abstraction.
The phantasm, since it is still in the material order, can
not act on the intellect. The agent intellect must act on
the phantasm so as to make its potentially intelligible con
tent suited for reception by the possible intellect. Hence,
operational primacy belongs to the agent intellect, not to

on
the phantasm. ^
Or, in other words:
Aristotle *s De Anlma: in the Version of William

of Moerbeke and the Commentary of^ t . Thomas Aquinas, brans.
EjT Kenelm Foster and Sylvester Humphries (Mew Haven: Yale
University Press. 1954), Comm. In III De Anima, chap.4,
lectio 8, #716, p.418.
^"Differt tamen hoc quod invenitur in anima, ab eo

quod invenitur in agentibus naturallbus. Quia ibl unum est
in potentia ad allquid secundum eundem modum quo in altero
actu invenitur: nam materia aeris est in potentia ad formam
aquae eo modo quo est in aqua. Et ideo corpora naturalia,
quae communicant in materia, eodem ordine agunt et patiuntur
ad invicem. Anima autem intellectiva non est in potentia ad
slmllltudines rerum quae sunt in phantasmatlbus per modum
ilium quo sunt ibl: sed secundum quod illae slmllltudines
elevantur ad aliquid altius, ut scilicet slnt abstractae a
conditionibus individuantibus materialibus, ex quo fiunt in
telligibiles actu. Et ideo actio Intellectus agentis in
phantasmate praecedit receptionem Intellectus possibilis.
Et sic prlncipalitas actionls non attrlbultur phantasmatl
bus, sed intellectui agenti." Aquinas, Summa Contra Genti
les . Book II, chap.77.
42
since the forms of objects in the sense faculties are

particular, as we Just said [chap.82] they are intel
ligible not in act, but only in potency. For the intel
lect understands nothing but universals. But what is in
potency is not reduced to act except by some agent.
Hence there must be some agent that causes the species
existing in the sense faculties to be intelligible in
act. The possible intellect cannot perform this ser
vice, for it is in potency with respect to intelligible
objects rather than active in rendering them intelli
gible. Therefore we must assume some other intellect,
which will cause species that are intelligible in poten
cy to become intelligible in act, just as light causes
colors that are potentially visible to be actually visi
ble. This faculty we call the agent intellect, which
we would not have to postulate if the forms of things
were intelligible in act, as the Platonists held.Ô
This does not mean, of course, that man has two
separate intellects: there is but one intellect with two

41
phases of operation. This distinction arises from the
exigencies of human understanding. The human soul is both
actually immaterial and capable of receiving (according to
its proper mode of receptivity) the forms of material things.
These things are represented by phantasms, which as sensory
data are only potentially immaterial. Thus the human soul,
as actually immaterial has the power to make things actually
immaterial (the agent intellect), and as receptive of the
forms of material things, it has the power (the possible in-

42
tellect) to assimilate these forms.
^°Aquinas, Compendium of Theology. Part I, chap.83,

trans, by Cyril Vollerfc (St. touTs: 6. tferder Book Co., 1952^,
pp. 76-77.
^ H e n c e it is somewhat misleading to speak of "agent

intellect." Perhaps it would be better to retain the Latin
word order, translating "Intellectus agens" as intellect act
ing."
The agent intellect is not the object which is
known, rather it makes potentially intelligible objects
actually intelligible. Since the intellect is devoid of
content prior to experience, it is necessary that the sen
sory powers serve the intellect by bringing its raw material
into the zone of intellect.
Hence it is necessary to postulate the existence
of an agent intellect, since the possible intellect is in
potency with regard to intelligibles, and these intelligi-
bles must actuate this capacity of the possible intellect.
However, the intelligible does not exist as such in reality
in the way in which it must activate the possible intellect,
and the non-existent cannot actuate anything. The reason
lip
"Ad quartum dicendum quod anima intellectiva est
quidem actu imraaterialis, sed est in potentia ad determina-
tas species rerum. Phantasmata autem, e converso, sunt qui
dem actu similltudines specierum quarundam, sed sunt poten
tia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandam inimam
inquantum est immaterlalis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem
per quam faciat immaterialia in actu abstrahendo a condition
ibus individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur in
tellectus agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi
specierum, quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum
est in potentia ad huiusmodi species." Aquinas. Summa Theo-
logiae. Ia, q.79, art.4, ad 4m. Cf. ibid., q.84, art. ic.
**3”Ad tertlum dicendum quod, si intellectus agens

compararetur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum agens ad
potentiam, slcut vislbile in actu ad visum; sequeretur quod
statlm omnia intelligeremus, cum intellectus agens sit quo
est omnia facere. Nunc autem non se habet ut obiectum, sed
ut faciens obiecta in actu: ad quod requiritur, praeter
praesentiam Intellectus agentis, praesentla phantasmatum,
et bona dlspositlo virium sensitivarum, et exercitlum in
huiusmodi opere; quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia
lntellecta, sicut per termlnos propositiones, et per prima
principia conclusiones." lb i d .. q.79, art.4, ad 3m.
44
<*. for this is that the possible intellect understands some
thing as a universal, as a one-in-many, as that which is
common to many. Since this universal does not exist as such
outside the mind, it must be produced by an intellective
power other than the possible intellect (that which is in
potency cannot actuate itself). Therefore, there must be
an agent intellect which causes the intelligibles which

44
actuate the possible Intellect,
Furthermore, the agent intellect causes these in
telligibles in act by abstracting them from matter and from
material conditions which are the principles of individua
tion. Since the specific nature does not intrinsically con
tain the individuating principles whereby the same nature
may be found in many distinct individuals, the intellect
will be able to receive this abstracted nature as a univer-
^ " D i c e n d u m quod necesse est ponere intellectum

agentem. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod, cum
intellectus posslbilis sit in potentia ad intelllglbllla,
necesse est quod intelligibilla moveant intellectum pos-
sibilem. Quod autem non est, non potest aliquid movere.
Intelligibile autem per intellectum possibilem non est
aliquid in rerum natura existens, in quantum intelligibile
est; intelligit enim intellectus posslbilis noster aliquid
quasi unum in multis et de multis. Tale autem non inveni-
tur in rerum natura subsistens, ut Aristoteles probat in
VI1 Metaphys. [chap. 13 (1039al5 ff.)]. Oportet igitur, si
intellectus posslbilis debet moveri ab intelligibile quod
huiusmodi intelligibile per intellectum fiat. Et cum non
posslt esse id quod est, in potentia ad aliquid factum
ipsius, oportet ponere praeter intellectum possibilem
intellectum agentem, qui faclat Intelllglbllla in actu,
quae moveant intellectum possibilem." Aquinas, Quaestip
Dlsputata: De Anima, art.4c (Turin: Marietti, 1953).
45
a 45
Ip sal, or a one-in-many.
Matter cannot act on spirit, and so the phantasm,
which is subject to the limitations of material conditions,
cannot act on the intellect, which is spiritual of its very
nature. It is never the case that an intellectual mover is

46
the instrument of a non-intellectual mover. And so
"sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellect-

47
ual knowledge," Sensation requires the cooperation of
the body, and since this involves interaction on the same
level of being, there is no reason why sensation cannot be

48
caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense.
But Aristotle held that the intellect had an

operation which is independent of the bo d y ’s coopera
tion [De Anlma. Book III, chap. 4 (429al8-429b5)].
Now noFITing corporeal can make an impression on an in
corporeal thing. And therefore in order to cause the
intellectual operation, according to Aristotle, the
impression of sensible bodies does not suffice, but
something more noble is required, since the agent is
more noble than the patient. as he says [be Anlma.
^"Facit autem ea per abstractionem a materia, et a

materialibus conditionibus, quae sunt principia individua-
tionls. Cum enim natura speclel, quantum ad id quod per se
ad speciem pertinet, non habeat unde multiplicetur in di-
versis, sed individuantia principia sint praeter rationem
ipsius; poterit intellectus accipere earn praeter omnes
conditiones individuantes; et sic accipietur aliauid unum."
Ibid.
^ " I n nullo ordine movent ium invenitur quod movens

per intellectum sit lnstrumentum elus quod movet absque
intellectum, sed magis e converso." Aquinas, Summa Contra
Gentiles. Book I, chap. 44,
^ " A d tertium dicendum quod sensitiva cognitio non

est tota causa intellectualis cognitionis." Aquinas,
Summa Theologlae. Ia, q.84, art.6, ad 3m.
L
Book III, chap.5 (430al8)]...the higher and more noble
agent which he calls the agent intellect...makes the
phantasms received from the senses to be actually in
telligible, by way of abstraction.^9
There is a way, however, in which the senses (by
means of the phantasm) may be correctly said to cause in
tellectual knowledge. Phantasms cannot directly affect the
possible intellect-they must be made actually intelligible
by the agent intellect-and so "it cannot be said that sen
sible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellec
tual knowledge, but rather that it [sense knowledge] is in

50
a way the matter of the cause." That is, the phantasm
may be viewed as a partial cause of intellection7~the matter
from which the principal cause of intellection, the agent
intellect, produces the intelligible in act. Since this is
jig
Ibid., corpus articuli. Cf. Aquinas, Quaestlo
Disputata: E>e Anlma. art.4, ad lm.
llQ
^"Intellectum vero posuit Aristoteles habere opera-
tionem absque communicatione corporis. Nihil autem corpor-
eum imprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causan-
dam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non
sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiri-
tur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est honorabllius patlente.
ut ipse dicit...illud superius et nobilius agens quod vocat
intellectum agentem...facit phantasmata a senslbus accepta
intelllglbllla in actu, per modum abstractionis culusdam."
Aquinas, Summa Theologlae. Ia, q.84, art.6c. (Italics in ed.
supra clt.)
5°"Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum in-

tellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantas
mata non sufflciunt immutare Intellectum possibilem, sed
oportet quod fiunt intelllgibilia actu per intellectum
agentem; non potest d i d quod senslbilis cognltio sit to
talis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed ma-
gis quodammodo est materia causae." Ibid.
47
done by abstraction from matter, and matter is the principle
of individuation, the intellect deals with universals and
not singulars,^1
The agent intellect is often said to illuminate the
phantasm. The agent intellect may be compared
to light which ’in a w a y ’ brings colours from potency

to actj -'in a way' b e c a u s e . c o l o u r is visible of
Itself; all that light does is to actualise a trans
parent medium which can then be modified by colour so
that colour is seen. The agent intellect, on the other
hand, actualises the intelligible notions themselves,
abstracting them from matter, i.e. bringing them from
potential to actual intelligibility.52
And so the agent intellect is in act with regard to intel-
ligibles since it is "an active immaterial force able to
assimilate other things to itself, i.e. to immaterialise
them. In this way it renders the potentially intelligible
actually so (like light which, without containing particu-

53
lar colours, actually brings colours into act)."
Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the whole set
of circumstances involved in the process of intellection
lead to the conclusion that for the human intellect the
material singular is not directly intelligible. Since ma
terial things are only potentially intelligible they must
51"E x hoc aliqua res est intelligens quod est sine

materia: cuius signum est quod formae fiunt intellectae in
actu per abstractionem a materia. Unde et intellectus est
universalium et non singularium: quia materia est individua-
tionis principium," Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles. Book I,
chap. 44.
•Âquinas, In III De Anima, chap.5, lect.10, #730.
53Ibid., #739.
be made actually Intelligible. This Is accomplished by the
agent intellect through an abstractive process. In this ab
straction matter and material conditions are left aside to
focus on the intelligibility which is latent in the phan
tasm. Since matter is the principle of individuation, abs
traction from matter liberates form from particularizing

5*»
conditions and form is thereby universal.
Indirect Intellectual Knowledge of Material Singulars
But the human intellect, does have some knowledge
of the material^singular indirectly and secondarily through
reflection on the phantasms from which the intellect de-
rived the universal species, J This is possible because the
human intellect can never actually understand anything in
this life without turning to phantasms. And this 10 so not
only in the acquisition of new knowledge by abstraction from
"Respondeo dicendum quod singulare in rebus ma-

terialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere
non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularita-
tis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis: intel
lectus autem noster,...intelligit abstrahendo speciem in-
telligibllem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia
individuali abstrahitur, est universale. Unde intellectus
noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium,"
Aquinas, Summa Theologlae» la, q.86, art.lc.
-^"Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflex-

ionem, potest cognoscere singulare: quia...etiam postquam
species lntelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas
actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in
quibus species lntelligibiles intelligit.... Sic igitur
ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe in
telligit ; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phan-
tasmata.” Ibid.
49
phantasms, but also whenever the Intellect uses the know
ledge it already has, it needs the cooperation of the ima-

56
gination and the other cognitive powers.
Thus:
In one way flesh and its essence can be discerned by

powers in the soul which are completely distinct; the
essence discerned by the intellect, the flesh by the
senses; and this happens when we know the individual
in itself and the specific nature in itself. But in
another way the flesh and its essence may be discerned,
not by two distinct faculties, but by one faculty
knowing in two distinct ways-knowing in one way flesh,
in another the essence of flesh; and this happens when
the knowing soul correlates the universal and the in
dividual. For, just as it would be impossible for us
...to distinguish sweetness from whiteness if we had
not a common sense faculty which know both at once, so
also we could not make any comparison between the uni
versal and the individual if we had not a faculty which
perceived both at once. The intellect knows both at
once, but in different ways.57
The intellect "knows the specific nature or essence of an
object by going out directly to that object; but it knows
the individual thing indirectly or reflexively, by a return
to the phantasms from which it abstracted what is intelli-

58
gible," The human intellect's proper and direct know
ledge is of the universal, the specific class. The senses
56"Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est intel

lectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo pos-
sibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu,
nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata...manifestum est quod
ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat non solum accipi-
endo scientiam do novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam ac-
quisita, requlritur actus imagj»dfriiftet ceterarum virtutum."
Ibid., q.84, art.7c; Aristotle, De Anlma. Book III, chap.7,
and St. Thomas' Commentary thereon, lectio 12 (ed. supra
cit., pp. 442-45?!:
€ ^'Aquinas, In III De Anlma. chap.4, lectio 8 , #712.

~ j
50
know the material singular directly. Indirectly, by re
flection, by coordination with the senses, man can have in
tellectual knowledge of the material singular. "But the sin
gular individual is not directly known by the intellect, but

59
by the senses or imagination."
Hence, according to St. Thomas, the human intel
lect contacts singulars indirectly inasmuch as it has con
tinuity with the sense powers which are directly concerned
with singulars. This continuity is twofold. First, the

60
intellect is the natural goal of human sensory activity.
Knowledge begins when the sense powers contact a material
thing, and knowledge is complete only when the intellect
grasps a universal representation of that object. The in
tellect, in knowing its object, a universal nature, can
know its own act, and from that know the species which is
6l
the principle of its act, and thus contact the phantasm
58Ibid., #713.
59Ibid., #716.
^°"Videmus enim quod sensus est propter intellec

tum, et non e converso. Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens
participatio intellectus:,.." Aquinas, Summa Theologlae.
Ia, q.77, art. 7c.
8lCf. "...per reflexionem quandam intellectus

seipsum intelligat, et suum intelligere, et speciem qua in
telligit. Suum autem intelligere intelligit dupliciter:
uno modo in particulari, intelligit enim se nunc intelli
gere; alio modo in universal!, secundum quod ratiocinatur
de ipsius actus natura." Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles,
Book II, chap.75. Commenting on this passage, Klubertanz
observes: "This is a crucial point in St. Thomas' explana-
tion. The two kinds of reflection are quite different acts.
from which it abstracted the species. In this indirect,
reflexive way, the human intellect can have some knowledge

62
of singulars.
The second way in which the intellect has continu
ity with the senses involves the superior power’s control
over the lower powers. In the process (the ultimate source
of which is the soul) of dealing with singular things the
mind has contact with particular things through the cogita
tive power, an internal sense power that is sometimes called
particular reason. The m i n d ’s universal judgment about
actions can be applied in particular cases only through some
power which grasps the singular. The intellect supplies the
general principle, the cogitative power applies this to a
particular case, and together they choose a singular thing

63
to be done, as a kind of syllogism in the practical order.
We are not here concerned with the second kind, by which the
intellect reasons to the nature of its act, of itself, and
of its intelligible species. But the first kind of reflec
tion, which is a direct perception that it understands, that
it is, and that it has an intelligible species, is an impor
tant step in attaining the knowledge of the material singu
lar. For this kind of knowledge, which is of an actually
intelligible singular, is intermediate between the knowledge
of intelligible universals, and that of material singulars."
George P. Klubertanz, The Discursive Power (Saint Louis:
The Modern Schoolman, 1 ^ 2 ) , p.190. (Italics in original)
0 For this whole passage on the first type of con

tinuity, see Aquinas, Quaestlones Dlsputatae: De Verltate.
q.2, art.6c. St. Thomas treats this twofold division of
continuity succinctly in De Verltate, q.10, art.5c. Cf.
also Summa Theologlae. Ia, q.86 , art.lc.
^ A q u i n a s , De Verltate. q.10, art.5c. Aristotle.

De Anima, Book III, cKap.4 (42<)b5-22); chap.11 (434al6-21);
JCquinas, Commentary, lectio 8, #705-719; lectio 16, #845-846-'.
A
St. Thomas anticipates some of the objections of
the later scholastics to his position, and inseach case the
Angelic Doctor's response is based on his theory of indi
viduation by matter and universalizing intellectual abstrac-

64
tion from matter. As has been shown, the considerations
of potency and act, the impossibility of matter acting on
spirit, and the relationship and subordination of human cog
nitive powers are all intimately linked with this topic in
St. Thomas' position, although they are not always explicit
ly mentioned in his ex, professo discussions of human intel
lectual knowledge of the material singular.
St. Thomas certainly cannot be accused of failing
to deal with this problem and its ramifications, but, in the
light of subsequent developments it is certainly legitimate
to question whether his treatment was adequate, or if so,
adequately worked out in his actual writings. As will be
shown, some of the later scholastics felt that there were
A rather interesting and original study of the relationship

between intellect and senses may be found in Joseph Mar£chal
Le point de dgpart de la mgtaphysique. Cahier V, "Le Thomis-
me a e v a n t T a philosophle* critique,1* (Paris: Descl£e, 1949),
pp.203-215, where he deals with the subordination of powers
in two ways; according to the order of nature and according
to the order of generation or temporal origin. This paral
lels Aquinas, Summa Theologlae. Ia, q.77, articles 4 and 7.
Klubertanz, op. clfc. (passim), also discusses St. Thomas'
teaching on Human intellectual knowledge of material singu
lars according to this twofold division of continuity, which
he appropriately classifies as speculative and practical
(or dynamic). Klubertanz' treatment concentrates on the
latter, which is more closely connected with his own topic.
6**Summa Theologiae. Ia, q.86, art.l, obj.1-4 and

serious difficulties in Thomas' position and so they attack
ed the problem in different ways and elaborated other solu
tions .
replies thereto; Quaestlones Disputatae: De Verltate. a.10.

art. 5, obj.1-6 and replies.
CHAPTER III
The Position of John Duns Scotus
It often happens that the noveltios that are op
posed by the conservatism of one age become the orthodoxy
of a later time, and the former conservatism arises again
in the guise of a dangerous new doctrine. It is not unusual
that one man's orthodoxy may be another man's heresy. The
vagaries of what may be loosely categorized as Aristotelian-
ism vs. Augustinianiam in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries can be seen in this light.
This situation is reflected in the works of St.
Thomas, for example, when he refers to magistrl antiqul
and magistrl moderni. The antlqui at the time of St. Thomas
were those who were teaching theology at Paris before the
inundation of the new Aristotelian learning (between 1180
and 1220, the terminal date being more important). The
magistrl moderni were those who were caught up in the tre
mendous surge of Aristotelian acholarship between 1220 and

1
1230, The antiqul showed a preference for St. Augustine,
and there was hostility towards Aristotle even in the late
twelfth century. The emphasis during the twelfth century
was on assimilation of the deposit of Revelation and the
patristic tradition rather than speculation on the meaning,
ramifications, and implications of religious truths. There
^Marie-Dominique Chenu, IntroductIon \ l'£tude de

saint Thomas d'Aquin, 2me ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1 ^ 4 7 , p.116. J
55
was no clearly defined philosophical trend at the end of the
twelfth century in Paris. Yet St. Augustine was certainly
the leading inspiration for the thinkers of the late twelfth

2
and early thirteenth centuries. Apart from the Timaeus of
Plato and the logic of Aristotle, there was practically no
direct knowledge of Greek philosophy until the beginning of
the thirteenth century. Then the monumental work of many
translators began to penetrate to the intellectual centers

3
of Europe. During the first twenty years of the thir
teenth century the Aristotelian movement began in earnest
in the Faculty of Arts at Paris, However, this was an
Arabian-tinged Aristotelianiam with a strong neo-Platonic
element.
The theologians saw grave dangers in some of the
doctrines being taught in the name of Aristotle, and they
brought about a series of condemnations of Aristotle. The
first of these was one of the decrees of the Council of
Paris, held in 1210, which forbade the teaching (but not
the reading) of Aristotle’s books on natural philosophy.
Again in 1215, the papal legate, Robert of Courson, made
the earlier condemnation more explicit by prohibiting the
2Fernand Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the W e s t ,

trans. Leonard Johnston (Louvain: E . toauweiaerEs’, 1^55),
pp. 38-42.
^Paul Vignaux, Philosophy in the Middle Ages,

3rd ed., trans. E.C. Hali (New YorkTTMeridian Books, 1959)*
pp. 73-74. Cf. Van Steenberghen, 0£. clt,, pp. 61-66 and
Chenu, 0£. c l t ., pp. 28-34.
56
teaching of the books of Aristotle on metaphysics and na-

4
tural philosophy.
But as the Masters of Arts went up to the Faculty
of Theology during the period between 1220 and 1250, they
brought their lively interest in Aristotelianism with them.
When these young Masters of Theology began to replace the
antiqul. there was the gradual spread of Aristotelianism
in the Faculty of Theology. By 1240, the moderni had gained
the upper hand, and after 1250, they completely dominated
the Faculty of Theology at Paris. While the prohibitions
against Aristotle were not formally revoked, by 1250 they

5
were no longer generally observed. In 1255, the works of
Aristotle were imposed as a requirement in the Faculty of

6
Arts.
Between 1250 and 1270, peace prevailed between the
Faculty of Theology and the Faculty of Arts. During this
time there was also the development of an explicit Aristo
telianism along two incompatible lines: one, an orthodox
Aristotelianism palatable to Christians worked out by
scholars such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, and
the other, a heterodox Aristotelianism repugnant to Christ
ian theologians elaborated by Siger of Brabant and Boethius
**Van Steenberghen, 0£. clt., pp. 66-77; Vignaux,

o p . clt., p. 80.
^Van Steenberghen, op. clt., pp. 95, 108-11,

125-126 .
^Chenu, ££• clt., p. 32.

This began to generate an explicit Augustinianism
elsewhere, and predictably, the renewal of hostilities be
tween the Faculty of Arts and the theologians, leading to
the condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris and that of
1277 at Oxford. While these condemnations were largely di
rected against dangerous or heretical doctrines, some pro
positions which were compatible with Christianity were in
cluded, Thus, even some of the doctrines of St. Thomas were
included in these condemnations, despite his stout opposi-

g
tion to extreme Averroism.
The general spirit during the last thirty years of
the thirteenth century was in favor of a return to tradi
tional Augustinianism. The work of Albertus Magnus and
Thomas Aquinas was a philosophical revolution. It is not
surprising, then, that such an apparent threat to tradition
al modes of thought was resisted by many of the scholars of
the last quarter of the thirteenth century. That Duns
Scotus received his education as a member of the Franciscan
Order, mostly at Oxford rather than at Paris, sheds light
on the fundamental and general opposition between his thought

9
and that of St. Thomas.
^Van Steenberghen, 0£. c i t ., pp. 1*»7 ff.
8Ibid.. pp. 198-238.
V f r e m Bettoni, Duns Scotus; The Basic Principles

of His Philosophy. trans. and e d . Bernardine Bonansea (Wash
ington: the datholic Univ. of America Press, 1961),pp.15-18.
Without minimizing non-Aristotelian elements in
the Thomistic synthesis, it can be said that Thomas follows
the Stagirite on many points. It is also quite true that
'St. Thomas agrees with Augustine whenever he can. Yet it
can hardly be denied that there is a vast difference be
tween Augustinianism and Thomistic Aristotelianism, and
that this difference is based on silid theoretical difficul
ties. If this be granted, and if the historical circum
stances be considered, the attitude of Duns Scotus will be
better understood. That Scotus criticized and disagreed
with Aquinas is undeniable, but his motives were the same
as those of St. Thomas or any other serious scholar-to find
the truth. Powerful and original thinker that he was,
Scotus could not merely repeat the doctrine of any master
or authority uncritically. Scotus was a member of what is
called the Franciscan School, but this does not mean that
he was simply another disciple of Bonaventure or Augustine.
Scotus attempted to harmonize Augustinianism and
Thomism into a higher synthesis that would meet the demands
of both schools. Thus criticism plays an important role in

10
his works. As one writer has observed:
But whatever the Justice or injustice of this or

that individual criticism may be, Scotus certainly
did not criticise for the sake of criticism. If he
insisted, for example, on some intellectual intuition
of the singular object and if he emphasized the reality
of the ’common nature,’ without however, falling into
59
the exaggerated realism of early medieval philosophers,

he did so, not simply in order to safeguard, as he be
lieved, the objectivity of knowledge.11
Scotus1 teaching on human intellectual knowledge
of singulars is radically different from that of St. Thomas
because Scotus does not share some of the fundamental as
sumptions of the Angelic Doctor. Their attitudes differ on
the primary object of the human intellect, for instance, but
this difference is slight compared with their opinions on
the principle of individuation. It is his doctrine on the
latter that leads St. Thomas to employ his theory of "con
version to phantasms" as has been shown.
Theory of Individuation
Scotus considers and abandons St. Thomas’ theory
of individuation by matter. If prime matter is suggested
as the principle of individuation, it must be rejected,
since prime matter is of itself indistinct and indetermin
ate. Quantity cannot be the primary reason for diversity
and distinction since quantity is an accident and substance

12
cannot be individuated by an accident. To avoid what
seemed to him difficulties inherent in the attempts of
Thomas, Giles of Rome, and Godfrey of Fontaines to solve
the problem of individuation and still account for universal
"^Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy,

v °l. II: Medieval Philosophy: Augustine toTscotus (Wgstmin-
ster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1950),“p.' 1
12
John Duns Scotus, Cpus Oxonlense, II, d. 3, q. 5 ,
60
concepts without losing sight of the dignity of the indivi
dual, Duns Scotus elaborates a new theory to explain the
constit ution of the individual being.
According to Scotus, the concrete thing is composed
of distinct "formalities," that is, the res is composed of
"realities," among which are its common nature and its in
dividuality. According to Grajewski: "a formality is a
positive entity which, antecedently to the operation of the
Intellect is Inseparably and really conjoined with the being

13
or essence within which it is found." A reality in this
context is the same as a formality, that is, a real, object-

11)
ive aspect of a thing, but not a thing itself.
no. 1 (Paris: Vives, 1891-1895). Hereafter cited as Ojd. Oxon.
^ M a u r i c e J. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of

Duns Scotus, (Washington, D.C.: The CatVo 1ic University of
America Press, 19*^0, pp.71-81. The ilalicized definition
is given on p. 76. He adds the following clarification:
"Here are mentioned all the conditions sine qulbus non of a
formality, namely, its positive character, its real or act
ual existence in a subject, and its inseparability. What
this definition fails to mention must be gathered from the
proper understanding of the terms involved. For example,
inseparability denotes not only the actual non-separation
but likewise excludes potential separation even by divine
power. The phrase 'conjoined with the being or essence'
includes real being, essence, form, or substance, so that a
formality is a metaphysical section of a form, of essence,
of being, of a substance, depending on the matter or prob
lem under consideration." Ibid.. pp. 76-7 7 .
l2*Ibld., pp. 78-81. Grajewski distinguishes the

various senses in which Scotus uses the words "res" and
"realitas," and as in his treatment of the notion of "for
malities^ he bolsters his conclusions with abundant docu
mentation in the works of Scotus, He concludes on p. 81:
"All realities are formalities and vice versa. Scotus is
wont to define or present his formalities as realities in
The common nature is the essence of a thing con
sidered apart from its singularity (in the thing) and its
universality (in the mind). This common nature is a reality
which has its own metaphysical unity independently of the

15
singularity of things. According to Scotus
the nature by itself is not singular, but is prior to

the modality that contracts it to be this or that sin
gular thing; and inasmuch as by itself it is prior to
the modality that contracts it, it is not repugnant to
it to be without that m o d a l i t y . ^
Common nature, then, by itself is neither universal nor sin-

17
gular, and never actually exists as such. ' It Exists as a
universal only in the order of intentional being in the in
tellect and as a singular in extramental existence. Thus,
for example, "human nature can be considered simply as such,

18
without reference to individuality or to universality."
The species or common nature has a metaphysical unity that
"though excluding a division into essential parts...does not
order to show that they are not pure mental concepts but
•realities’ or diminutive ’res ' existing not in themselves
but in another. These formalities are inherent realities
recognized by the mind in things, i.e., the mind abstracts
them from things but does not create them."
15
Bettoni, Duns Scotus, pp. 511-512,
Scotus * 2£. Oxon.. II, d. 3 # q.l, n. 7.

17
In fact, it is not even common. "Et isto modo
bene intelligitur illud dictum avicennae, 5. Met'aph. cap.l,
quod natura de se non est universalis, nec particularis, sed
tantum natura." Scotus, Qua'estiones subtlTlssimae in Meta-
physicam Aristotells. Bk. V l i . a . l b . n .b (Paris:Vlt c s.
18
Copleston, ojd . clt.. pp. 511-512.
exclude a division into subjective parts, whereby the repre
sentatives or carriers of the species can be multiplied in-

19
definitely.” And so the common nature is the foundation
of universality, but even apart from its individuation prin-

20
ciple, it is not a universal as such. The common nature
is not numerically the same in the various individuals with
in a species, it is really individuated in its several actu-

21
alizations. Although the basis of universality is the
common nature, the cause of universality is the intellect,
and the cause of singularity is within the existing thing
itself
Although the common nature has a certain meta
physical unity, the individual possesses an even more per
fect unity. The specific unity of the common nature ex
cludes division into essential parts, but permits division
into subjective parts, i.e., into distinct individual actu
alizations of that common nature. The unity of the indivi-
^ B e tt on i, o£. c l t .. p. 6l.
20
"In his endeavor to determine the precise mean
ing of the foundation of the universal, Duns Scotus elabora
ted the theory of the natura communis or the physical univer
sal... it cannot be denied that this doctrine represents a
remarkable step toward greater precision in the terms in
volved in the problem of universals. It is also a step
forward in the proposed solution of moderate realism."
Ibid., p. 58.
21
Copleston, 0£. clt., p. 551.
22
Bettoni, 0£. clt.« p. 59. Cf. also Grajewski,
o p . c i t .. pp. m o - i ^ S T
63
dual is such that it excludes division into subjective
parts, "The individual is the only representative of it-

23
self." Since unity and being are correlative, a more
perfect unity requires a more perfect being. "Hence the
transition from specific unity to individual unity cannot
take place without the addition of an intrinsic perfection

24
to being itself." This entitative perfection, or act,
that the individual has in addition to species is called
"haecceity."
For Scotus, then, the principle of individuation
is neither prime matter, nor signate matter, nor quantity,
"nor can it be the nature as such, since it is precisely
with the individuation of the nature that we are concerned.

..25
What is it, then? It is an entitas indlvldualis." In a
notable text, Scotus considers what this "individual entity"
or "haecceity" is which constitutes the individual differ
ence, It is neither matter, nor form, nor the composite,

26
but rather the ultimate ontological reality of all three.
2^Bettoni, ojd .c lt ., p. 61.

24
Ibid.
2^Copleston, 0£. cit.. p. 516.

2&
Scotus, 0]3. Ox on ., II, d.3» q.6, n.15: MEt si
quaeras quae est isEa entitas individualis, a qua sumitur
differentia individualis? Estne materia, vel forma, vel
compositum? Respondeo, omnis entitas quidditative sive
partialis, sive totalis alicujus generis, est de se indif-
ferens, ut entitas quidditative ad hanc entitatem et illam,
ita quod ut entitas quidditative est naturaliter, sicut non
f convenit sibi esse hanc, ita non repugnat sibi ex ratione
sua suum oppositum. Et sicut compositum non includit suam
All three, matter, form, and the composite can be
thought of as universal and thus cannot be the principle of
individuation. Each of the three can be conceived of with-

27
out evoking the concept of any individual thing. This
"quidditative entity" or common nature considered simply as
such is indifferent to any particular actual being. There
fore, this individual entity or principle of individuation
is neither matter nor form nor the composite thing, insofar
as any of these is a nature, but it is the final reality of

28
the being which is matter or form or the composite thing.
For Scotus the principle of individuation is, then
a positive entity, the final reality of matter, form,

and the composite thing. A human being, for instance,
is this composite being, composed of this matter and
this form. The haecceltas does not confer any further
qualitative determination; but it seals the being as
this being.29
entitatem, qua est hoc Inquantam natura, ita nec materia in
quantum natura includit suam entitatem, qua est haec materia,
nec forma inquantum natura includit suam; ergo ista entitas
non est materia, vel, forma, nec compositum, Inquantam quod-
llbet istorum est natura, sed est ultima realitas entis,
quod est materia, vel quod est forma, vel quod est composi
tum."
27Ibld.
28
Ibid.
29
Copleston, 0£. c l t ., p. 517. (Italics in the
original.) Copleston continues: "Scotus* view certainly
cannot be equated with the theory that every nature is of
itself individual, since this he expressly denies, though
...it seems to be implied that a thing has haecceltas or
'thisness' by the fact that it exists. His theory is not
the same as that of the Nominalists, since he postulates
contraction of the nature by the 'ultimate reality';" and
this is acquired through existence, but is not identical
with existence.
65
Haecceity Is not like a specific difference added to genus,
nor is it
just a perfection added to the form and within the form,

but a new mode of being that affects matter, form, and
the composite, i.e., the whole common nature, which is
thereby contracted and forced to come out of that sort
of indetermination which is proper to the specific
n a t u r e . 30
Although the nature of a thing cannot be separated
from that thing's individuality, and though that nature
cannot exist in any other thing, there is a formal object
ive distinction between the nature and the haecceity of a

3 1
thing. For Scotus, the formal objective distinction is
a type of real distinction - it is a real distinction
secundum quid required by a formal non-identity in things,^2
The distinction between the diverse formalities of a thing
is not a distinction between things that are really separate
or separable, but rather a distinction that the mind recog
nizes in distinct but inseparable aspects of a real t h i n g . ^
In short, one should not conceive the composition

of common nature and haecceity, which contracts it,
as a real composition, analogous to the composition
that results from the union of matter and form.
Haecceity is not a really distinct principle, but
merely the ultimate entity of form, or its ultimate
3°Bettoni, Duns Scotus. p. 6l.

qi
Copleston, o^. c l t .. pp. 5 1 1 - 5 1 2 , 51 6 .
32Grajewski, o£. c i t ., pp. 3 9 - 1 0 1 . The real dis

tinction slmpliclter is found only "Inter rem et r e m ." be
tween things which are actually separate or separable. Ibid,
pp. 5 9 - 6 0 .
3^Thus it is not a mental distinction, since the

distinction is found in extramental reality and is prior to
66
necessary perfection in the order of being. Common

nature can never exist without haecceity, nor is it
related to it as one thing to another, but as reality
to reality, that is, as a mode of being to a mode of
being of one and the same thing. Between them there
is only a formal distinction.34
This formal objective distinction between haecceity
and nature in a concrete object is necessary "since other
wise, that is, if the nature were of Itself individual...
there would be no objective foundation, no valid ground for
our universal statements."
According to Scotus, the primary object of the in
tellect in general is being as being. If this is so, then
every being, all that is intelligible, lies within the com
petence of the intellect. This is the primary object of the
intellect as such, not the first object of a particular in-

36 •
tellect in a given case. When speaking of the primary ob
ject of the human intellect, the word primary may be taken
in several senses. First, primary may be understood as
first in time, or secondly, it may mean first in the order
of perfection, or finally, it may indicate that to which the
human intellect is ordered by its very nature. "To ask,
therefore, what the first object of the human intellect is,
the intellect’s operation.

■all
Bettoni, ojd . clt., p.62.
55
-’■'Copleston, op. c l t .. p. 512, For other indica
tions of Scotus’ concern for the objectivity of human intel
lectual knowledge, see Copleston, ibid.. pp. 484 and 489,
and Bettoni, ojd . clt., p. 121,
J Copleston, 0£. c l t .. p. 487.

67
is equivalent to asking, 'What is the adequate object, that
is, the object that fully corresponds to the natural power
of the human intellect? "'37
If this primary, proper, and adequate object of
the human intellect is being as being, then the richer in
being a thing is, the more knowable and more easily grasped
that thing must be. God, who is most eminently being,
should be best known to us, by an almost spontaneous, ex
tremely pleasurable act. But this is obviously not the case.
Man acquires natural knowledge of God only with great dif
ficulty and only after long, arduous reasoning processes
which are fraught with possibilities for error and never
final, never universally convincing, and within the ability

38
of only a small number of men. Common experience tes
tifies that human knowledge of material things is far easier,
clearer, and more perfect. This would seem to confirm the
opinion of those who hold that the proper object of the hu
man intellect is the essence of material things.
Duns Scotus agrees that "the more perfect a thing
is, the easier, the more pleasant, and the more perfect
38
should be its union with our intellect." 7 Thus God should
^ Bettoni, 0£. clt ., pp. 27-28.

38
Ibid., p. 39• On the difficulties hindering
man's natural knowledge of God, cf. Aquinas, Summa Contra
Gentiles. Bk. I, ch. 5.
39Bettoni, o p . c l t .. p. JJO,
68
be the first and best known object of the human intellect.
But this does not happen because of the situation of the
human intellect in its present state. In its present state
the human intellect understands only those things whose like-
ness is reflected in the phantasm. The reason for this
dependence of the intellect on phantasms is the decree of
divine wisdom, either as punishment for original sin, or
for the sake of the natural harmony of the powers of the
soul in operation, or because of our infirmity. This har
mony of powers does not stem from the nature of the human
intellect, either as intellect or as human (i.e., as the

in
intellect of a soul united to a body).
Hence, although man happens to know creatures
first,
this does not mean that the primary adequate object

of his intellect is not being as being. It may be added
that this doctrine does not mean that the human intellect
has a natural power of knowing the divine essence in
itself...since the general...concept of being does not
include this particular essence as particular.**2
Scotus denies that the primary object of the human
intellect is the essence of a material thing, unless primary
is taken as meaning first in point of time, and then this
^°Scotus, Oxo n., I, d.3, q.3, n. 24.

41
Ibid. Cf. Bettoni, loc.cit .» and Ciipleston,
o p . cl t., pp. 489-490.
42
Copleston, 0£, clt.. p. 487. (Italics in original)
69
applies only to the present condition of the human intellect
The primary object of the human intellect, considered in
itself and not just in its present condition, includes both
immaterial and material things, in short, being as being.
Furthermore, only individuals exist. Essences exist only
in individuals. An individual is richer in being than its
specific essence. Hence, the individual should be more know
able even in this life, than any essence.
For Scotus, then, the primary object of the in
tellect is being as being, whether purely immaterial or
sensible, and that as a matter of fact, and for the reasons
which have been given, the intellect in its present con
dition knows only that which is derived through intellect
ual penetration of sense experience, and finally, the sen
sible beings that we know are singular existents. This
logically forces the question whether and how the human in-
jjli
tellect (in its present state) knows the singular.
The problem and its solution will be clarified by
a twofold division: first, whether the singular is intelli
gible in itself, and this is a metaphysical issue; and sec-
^Copleston, o£. cit.. p. 488.
^ E t i e n n e Gilson, Jean Duns Scot: introduction £

ses positions fondamentales. (Paris; Vrin-, 1952), p. 5437
"on a vu que l ’objet premier de 1'intellect est l'£tre, pris
dans son ind£termination £ l 1intelligible comme au sensible;
qu'en fait, et pour les raisons qui ont £t£ dites, l fintel
lect ne connalt, prolstatu isto. que les quiddity's abstraites
du sensible; enfin, que les iitres sensibles connues de nous
sont des existants singuliers: il est done inevitable de se
demander si et comment l fintellect humain, pro statu isto,
70
ond, does man actually know the singular, which belongs to
the field of psychology. The first of these two problems
is governed by the solution given to the problem of indivi
duation. Since the singular is supremely real, it is supre-

45
mely intelligible. That man has some intellectual know
ledge of the singular is generally acknowledged. The heart
of the matter is the manner and status of man's intellectual
knowledge of singulars. Since, moreover, it is commonly
agreed that immaterial singulars are directly and actually
intelligible, the question reduces to an inquiry into man's
intellectual knowledge of material singulars.
One further precision is necessary. According to
Duns Scotus, there are two distinct kinds of intellectual
cognition on the level of simple apprehension: intuitive

46
and abstractive cognition.
conna^t le singulier."
^ Ibld. note 1. "Le probleme se devise en deux: le

singulier est-il intelligible de soi, qui est un probleme
mdtaphysique; le connaissons-nous en fait, qui est un prob-
lfeme psychologique (relevant du De Anima). Le premier de
ces deux problemes est rdgl£ depuTs qu'on a r£solu celui du
principe d'individuation, Le singulier €tant supr^mement
r£al, il est supr£ment intelligible (In M e t ., 1. VII, 2.15,
n.4)j C'est principalement du second probleme qu'il sera
ici question."
46
Sebastian J. Day has done a thorough study of
this doctrine in Scotus and Ockham in his book Intuitive
Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholas
tics (StT BonavenFure, n .y T : The /rancTscan Institute, 1947).
Gilson reached somewhat different conclusions in his work on
Scotus already cited. It is interesting to note that most
of Gilson's references are to the Reportata Parlslensia
with relatively few citations of Op. flxon. a n d the Quaestlo-
71
Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition
On the level of simple apprehension the intellect
can act in one way concerning an object so that it is in
different to the existence or non-existence, the presence
or absence of that object. Man frequently experiences this
act, since he understands universals or the quiddities of
things equally well whether they have real existence in extra
mental reality or not, and whether the object is present or

.
not.
47
The other act of the intellect on the level of
simple apprehension regards the object which is present pre
cisely as present - the existing object known as existing

48
-and this type of intellection Scotus calls intuitive.
nes Quodlibetales. Day, on the other hand, relies heavily

on the Quodlibeta and the Ojd. Ox on . and deliberately eschews
the use of the fteportata Parisiensla. Day chooses several
key texts in whicn Scotus gives an explicit treatment of
his teaching on intuitive cognition. Prom Scotus* Quaestlon-
es Quodlibetales. which Day considers one of the latest works,
He selects questions six and thirteen for extensive treat
ment. According to Day, this is not only one of the last
works of Scotus (written between 1304 and 1308), it is one
of the most important in the Scotistic corpus. Scotus makes
this distinction: "...distinguitur de duplici actu intel-
lectione sive intellectione obiecti simplicis." Quaestlones
Quodlibetales. q.6. Hereafter cited as Quodllbet.
47
'Scotus continues in the passage just cited in
Quodllbet. q.6, speaking of the twofold act of the intellect:
"unus indifferenter potest respectu obiecti existentis et
non realiter praesentis, sicut et realiter praesentis; istum
actum frequenter experimur in nobis, quia universalia, sive
quidditates rerum, intelligimus aeque, sive habeant ex na-
tura rei esse extra in aliquo supposito, sive non, et ita de
praesentia et absentia.”
72
We not only frequently experience abstractive cog
nition, but it can be shown that man must have this know
ledge which is indifferent to the existence or non-exis
tence of its object. Knowledge of a conclusion or of an in
tellectual principle remains in the intellect equally well
whether the object exists or not. Hence it must be likewise
possible to have understanding of the extremes of that pro
position on which the understanding of the proposition it-

49
self depends.
While the text just cited does not clearly indi
cate that Scotus believed that man has abstractive intellec
tual knowledge of the material singular, it would not be im
possible to interpret this passage as implying such cogni
tion. If man can have abstractive intellectual cognition
of a conclusion or understand a principle through abstract
ive knowledge, he can understand the elements, the "extremes11
48
Ibid. "Alius autem actus intelligendi est, quern
tamen non ita certitudinaliter experimur in nobis; possi-
bilis tamen est talis, qui scilicet praecise sit obiecti prae
sentis ut praesentis, et existentis ut existentis...ista
inquam intellectio potest proprie dici intuitiva, quia ipsa
est intuitio rei, ut existentis." Scotus speaks tentatively
here: we do not experience this act in us as certainly as we
do abstraction, yet intuition is at least possible. There
are other texts (to be cited shortly) in which he positively
affirms that man does have intuitive cognition in this life.
49
Ibid. "Et etiam hoc probatur a posteriori, quia
scientia conclusionis vel intellectus principii, aeque in
intellectu manet, re existente et non existente, praesente
vel absente, et aeque potest haberi actus sciendi conclusion-
em, et intelligendi principium; ergo aeque potest haberi in
tellectio extremi illius, a quo dependet illud intelligere
complexum conclusionis vel principii; iste actus intelligen-
73
or terms (lncomplexa) without which there can be do under
standing of the conclusion or principle (complexam). Since
many of the conclusions with which man concerns himself have
singular subjects, one can legitimately infer that Scotus
would agree that there is abstractive intellectual cognition

50
of the material singular.
Yet there are texts which seem to hold the con
trary:
...for although the quiddity of a material thing

can exist only in some singular, yet to exist in a sin
gular is not of its nature. Therefore the intellect,
which is abstract, can understand a quiddity, not un
derstanding it as it exists in some singular.51»
However, this text actually proves nothing more
than that Scotus holds that there can be abstractive intel
lectual knowledge of what is called the common nature. That
is, there can be abstractive knowledge of the nature of an
di,...potest satis proprie dici abstractivus."

50
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologlae, la,
q.86, art.l, obj.l and ad lm, obj.2"ancT ad 2m; De Veritate,
q,10, art.5, obj.3 and ad 3m, obj 4 and ad 4m. T s has been
shown above, St. Thomas had anticipated this position and
disposed of it largely in terms of his doctrine of indivi
duation by matter and reflection on the phantasm, Scotus,
having a different theory of individuation and a different
notion of the subordination and relation of cognitive powers
in man, is enabled to maintain the above consistently.
51
"Quamvis enim quidditas materialis non sit nisi
in aliquo singular!, tamen existere in aliquo singulari non
est de ratione ejus, Ideo intellectus, qui est abstractus
potest intelligere quidditatem, non intelligendo earn ut
exist it in aliquo singulari." Scotus, Reportat'a Parisiensia.
I, d. 3, q. 5, n. 11. Hereafter cited as R e p .T a r .
7M
object without recognition of its individuality. It is no
more a denial of abstractive intellectual knowledge of the
material singular than it is a denial of such knowledge of
the universal.
On the level of simple apprehension, the twofold
act of the intellect parallels the diverse acts of the ex
ternal and internal senses. Just as the external senses re
quire the actual presence of an object for their operation,
so intuitive intellectual cognition grasps the object which
is actually existent and present to the knower. In a sense
the imagination is independent of the actual existence of
its object (provided only that initially and in some way
the imagined object has affected the senses), and this is
a type of abstraction. This abstractive activity of the
lower power is found in a more perfect way in the higher

52
power.
Whatever perfection of the cognitive order can be
long to the sensitive power can belong eminently to the
intellect. It is of perfection in the act of knowing as
^ "II y a d'autre part la connaissance intuitive,

qui est une vue,,,de la chose en elle-meme,..Ce deuxi&me
genre d'intellection est l ’analogue, pour l ’intellect, de
ce q u ’est la vue directe d'un objet dans la connaissance
sensible, car on peut imaginer un objet,consslenceouv^ftir^ce
bref le connaltre dans son image, ce qui est une sorte
d ’abstractlon, ofc la connaissance est ind£pendante de
l 1existence de l'objetj mais on peut aussi le voir dans son
£tre actuel d ’existant, et comme toute faculty sup£rieure
peut en son ordre ce que la faculty inf^rieure peut dans la
sien, il faut bien que l 1intellect jouisse de deux genres
d ’intellection correspondant & ces deux genres de connais
sance sensible,” Gilson, o p . clt .. p. 5 M ,
75
knowledge to reach the primum cognltum In itself. The sen
sitive power has this perfection in its knowledge since it
can attain the object in itself, as existing and present.
So too, this perfection belongs to the intellect in its
operations. That is, the intellect can grasp the object as
existing and as present in its own existence.

53
The implications latent in this text are clear:
just as the senses can have a direct awareness of the
presence and existence of their object, so too, the intel
lect can have a direct grasp of the presence and existence
of its object (intuitive knowledge). Since only individuals
exist, there must be direct intellectual knowledge of the
material singular (by means of intuitive cognition). Fur
thermore, there must be direct abstractive intellectual
knowledge of the material singular, since the abstractive
act of the intellect parallels the abilities of the internal
senses. If it is possible to have a sharp, distinct image
53
"Omnis perfectio cognitionis absolute, quae
potest competere potentia sensitivae, potest eminenter
competere potentia cognitivae intellectivae; nunc autem
perfectionis est in actu cognoscendi, ut cognitio est,
perfecte attingere primum cognitum; non autem perfecte attin-
gitur, quando non in se attingitur, sed tantummodo in ali-
qua diminuta, seu derivata similitudine ab ipso; sensitiva
autem habet hanc perfectionem in cognitione sua, quia potest
obiectum attingere in se, ut existens, et ut praesens est in
existia reali, et non tantum diminute attingendo ipsum in
quadem perfectione diminuta; ergo ista perfectio compfetit in
tellectivae in cognoscendo; sed non potest sibi competere,
nisi cognosceret existens, et ut in existentia propria prae
sens est...." Scotus, Quodllbet.. q. 6 . Scotus gives prac
tically the same argument in briefer form in Ojd. Oxon., II,
d .3 , q.9 , n.6 .
of a definite individual (as well as a vague general image
of a type of thing), -then it must be possible for man to
have abstractive intellectual knowledge, not only of the

5
universal, but also of the material singular,
Scotus considers the distinction between intuitive
and abstractive cognition again (without using these words)
in another question of the Quodlibeta. Here too, he dis
tinguishes between two cognitive operations, one which
grasps the object in its proper actual existence, the other
which attains its object without consideration of its pre
sent existence or non-existence. This latter is either be
cause the object does not exist, or because this cognitive
act (abstraction) does not take cognizance of the existence
or presence of the object.
The first kind of cognition (intuitive) may be
compared to seeing a color, or any other act of the exter
nal senses. The second kind of cognition (abstractive) is
like the imagining of a color - we can imagine a color when

55
it does not exist just as when it does exist.
If one grants, Scotus adds, that the human intel-
51*Cf. Gilson, l o c . cl t.. and Aquinas, loc. c l t .
^ "D is ti ng uo de operatione; aliqua cognitio est

per se existentis, sicut quae attingit obiectum in sua pro
pria existentia actual!. Exemplum de visione coloris, et
communiter in sensatione sensus exterioris. Aliqua etiam
est cognitio obiecti, non ut existentis in se, sed vel ob
iectum non existit, vel saltern ilia cognitio non est eius,
ut actualiter existentis. Exemplum, ut imaginatio coloris,
quia contingit imaginari rem, quando non existit, sicut
77
lect can have intuitive cognition, that is, the type of
knowledge by which the intellect grasps the object as exis
ting, then it must be conceded that the human intellect can
have this intuition of any object, since the human Intel®

eg
lect is potential with regard to every intelligibility.-'
Therefore the distinction between intellect and
sense is not a distinction between two powers on the same
level, as, for example, the distinction between two sense
powers,
The distinction between intellect and sense should

rather be understood as a distinction between a super
ior cognitive faculty and a cognitive faculty subordin
ated to this superior faculty. Consequently the axiom
^Yntellectus est unlversallum. sensus autem partlcular-
l u m 1 should be interpreted thus: b h e s u p e r i o r faculty
can know any object under any aspect, whereas the senses
can not. The senses are limited, not the intellect.
In other words, the relation of difference between in
tellect and sense is not symmetrical. More important
still, this axiom is not to be understood in an exclu
sive sense - i.e., it does not mean that the intellect
is limited to one mode of cognition and the senses to
another; for the intellect is capable of anything that
pertains to the inferior faculty, though the converse
does not hold.57
quando existit." Scotus, Quodllbet.» q.13, n.8 .

eg
"Et si concedatur de intellectu nostro, ipsum
scilicet posse habere talem actum cognitionis, quo attingat
rem, ut existentem in se, pari ratione potest hoc concedi
de quocumque obiecto, quia intellectus noster est poten-
tialis respectu cuiuscumque intelligibilis." Ibid/
5?Day, o p . clt.. p.59. Italics in original. This

is based on a portion of Scotus' Quodllbet.. q.13, n.9,
which Day then quotes: "Dici potest quod distinctio quae
ponitur communiter inter cognitionem intellefttivam et sen-,
sitivam ex parte obiecti, puta, quod intelligimus universale,
sentimus singulare, et quaecumque distinctio alia isti cor-
respondens, non debet intelligi tamquam inter potentias dis-
paratas ex aequo, sicut est distinctio visus in videndo
o
Intuitive cognition is of an existent onject only,
and therefore is always a direct intellectual grasp of a
singular. Since in this life man ordinarily encounters
material beings only, it follows from Scotistic principles
that man does in fact have direct intellectual knowledge

58
of material singulars.
But intuitive cognition is not just a grasp of the
singular, it is essentially of the existing nature as exist
ing, since the nature is prior to singularirt. The essence
may be the same - it is different in each singular repre
sentative of a given nature, "from which it follows that the

59
essence can be known, but not its singularity."
colores, ab audito in audiendo sonosj sed debet intelligi

distinctio intellectus a sensu, sicut potentiae superioris
cognitivae ab aliqua cognitiva subordinata sibi, et per con-
sequens, quod potentia superior potest cognoscere aliquod
obiectum, vel sub aliqua ratione, quod obiectum, vel sub
qua ratione potentia inferior non potest cognoscere, non
tamen a converso, quod inferior possit aliquod obiectum,
vel sub aliqua ratione cognoscere; quin superior possit etiam
perfectiori modo obiectum illud cognoscere, et sub eadem
ratione cognoscibilitatis ex parte obiecti." Cf. Op. Ox on ..
IV, d.^5, q.3, n.17, and Copleston, o£. cit., pp.
5®As Gilson observes: "Ces analyses conduisent

done aux £galit£s suivantes: tout ce qui existe actuellement
est singulier; l 1intuition porte toujours sur an existant;
done elle porte toujours sur un singulier, de sorte que
toute connaissance intuitive est connaissance d'un singu
lier." Gilson, o£. cit., pp.51l8-51J9. Cf. Bettoni, 0£. cl t..
p. 1 2 2 .
59
"Ad propositum tamen dico, quod cognitio intui-
tiva non est tantum singularis, inquantum est cognitio in-
tuitiva, sed essentialiter est ipsius naturae existentis,
ut existens est, quia prius competit esse naturae, quam
sit ut haec, sive ut singulare, eo quod essentia sit ejus-
dem rationis in omnibus singularibus, non autem singulari-
79
That is, in his present condition man knows things in their
concrete existence, as individuals, but he cannot grasp a
thing's haecceity. Man has direct intellectual knowledge
of the individual but not of its singularity. He does not
know what it is that makes this individual to be an indivi-

60
dual.
When considered in its phenomenological origin,

human knowledge always starts from the intuition of
the concrete thing. The product of this first meeting
of intellect and thing is the species speclallsslma.
or the idea of the individual thing, this idea is
quite proper to the object that stands before me; it
is through it that the intellect has the first grasp
of what it wants to knoe. However, as soon as my in
tellect tries to find out exactly what the thing is
and looks for its definition, it has recourse to uni
versal concepts, precisely because it is incapable of
grasping the haecceity,
According to Scotus, then, on the level of simple
apprehension, the human intellect has two distinct acts.
Intuitive cognition which regards the object as present and
actually existent, seems to precede abstractive cognition.
Abstractive cognition is indifferent to the existence or non-

62
existence of the object. The difference between intuitive
tas ipsa est ejusdem rationis in omnibus, sed diversa in

quolibet singulari unius essentiae, ex quo sequitur quod
essentia potest cognosci, non tamen singularitas ejus."
Scotus, Rep. Par., IV, d.^5, q.3, n.13.
60
Bettoni, ojd . cit., p. 122.
6lIbid.
62
In addition to the texts already cited, many
others can be mentioned: e.g., in Quodllbet.. q.7, n.8 ,
Scotus says "etsi cognitio abstractiva possit esse non ex
istentis, aeque sicut et existentis, tamen intuitiva non
est nisi existentis, ut existens est." Again in Ojd. Ox on .,
80
and abstractive cognition is not so much on the basis of
what is known, but rather how it is known, or the relation
ship between knower and object known. In both intuitive
and abstractive cognition the nature (as prior to singular
ity) and the singular as such (but not its haecceity) can
be known. Intuitive cognition, however, properly speak
ing, is not only of the singular, but is essentially of the

64
singular’s nature as existing. Intuitive cognition is
necessary, for without it the intellect would not be cer-

65
tain of the existence of any object. Therefore, the
human intellect must have intuitive cognition in this life
if human knowledge is to be o b j e c t i v e . ^
The intellect knows intuitively what the senses
know, and it also knows the sensations themselves. There-
II, d.3, q.9, n.6 , Scotus speaks of intuitive cognition as

knowledge which is "Quidditatis rei" according to its actual
existence.
6 *3
^Scotus, Op. Oxon, III, d.l4, q.3» n.4: "duplex
est cognitio, scilicet abstractiva et intuitiva...et utra-
que cognitione potest cognosci tarn natura, ut praecedit
singularitatem, quam singulare ut hoc."
^ S c ot us , Rep.Par., IV, d.45, q.3: "...cognitio

intuitiva non est tanturn singularis, inquantum est cognitio
intuitiva, sed essentialiter est ipsius naturae, ut exis-
tens est."
65
Scotus, O p . Oxon., IV, d.45, q.2, n.12: "cog
nitio quae dicitur Intuitiva, potest esse intellectiva,
alioquin intellectus non esset certas de aliqua existentia
alicujus obiecti."
^ " W e have seen that Scotus considered his doctrine

concerning the primary object of the intellect to be essen
tial for the maintainance and justification of metaphysics^
He also considered his doctrine of the intellectual apprehen*
81
fore, there can be no doubt that Scotus teaches that the
human intellect has direct intellectual knowledge of mater-

67
ial singulars in this life.
Gilson praises Scotus’ teaching on intuitive and
abstractive cognition, but he draws some rather debatable
conclusions, He finds Scotus’ emphasis on the mi n d ’s grasp
of existence significant, but strangely, he claims that the
doctrine of Scotus on this is fundamentally in agreement
with that of St, Thomas, and that Scotus denies to man any
68
intellectual intuition of essences in this life.
Intuitive cognition is necessary for verification
sion of the individual thing as essential to the mainten

ance of the objectivity of human knowledge." Copleston,
o p . c l t ., p. 491.
67
Scotus, Ojd. Oxon., IV, d.45, q.3, n,17: "...in-
tellectus non tantum cognoscat universalia...sed etiam in
tuitive cognoscat ilia, quae sensus cognoscit..,et etiam
cognoscit sensationes..."
fifl N
"...nos dirons que Duns Scot donne iei a 1 ’im
portant probleme de la connaissance de 1 ’existence une so
lution qui s ’accorde, pour l ’essentiel, avec celle de Saint
Thomas d'Aquin. Les deux doctrines fond de 1 ’existence une
Evidence intellectuelle intuitive saisie dans le sensible.
Celle de saint Thomas explicite aussit^t cette vue de 1 ’ex
istence en jugement. Celle de Duns Scot, oil 1 ’existence et
l ’essence n ’entrent pas k titre d ’elements distincts dans
la composition de l'%tre, attribue simplement k. l ’objet
le pourvoir de se faire directement connaltre comme exis-
tant. C ’est de ce point de vue et pour cette raison que la
distinction scotiste entre cognitio intuitiva et cognitio
abstractiva pr^sente une r£ele importance, et ^ e s t comme
rSvS'latrice de 1 'existence q u ’il convient de 1 'interpreter,
non en en prenant occasion pour attribuer it Duns Scot une
doctrine de 1 'intuition intellectuelle des essences que,
pro statu lsto, il nous a toujours refusee." Gilson, o p .
c'lfcV,' p.%5d. This curious interpretation by an eminent
scholar points up the difficulty in working with the texts
of Scotus in their present condition.
82
of contingent truths. The fact that we know and formulate
contingent truths in propositions proves that we know the
terms of these contingent propositions by intuitive intel
lectual cognition. To form propositions and syllogisms is
proper to the intellect, and when singulars and contingent
facts are involved, the intellect must know them directly

69
in order to form propositions from them.
Gilson interprets this text as meaning that in
tuitive cognition focuses only on the perception that knows

70
the existing object. On the other hand, Day sees in this
^ S c o t u s , 0£, Oxon., IV, d.^5, q.3, n,17: the in

tellect "cognoscit propositiones contingenter veras, et ex
eis syllogizat; formare autem propositiones et syllogizare
proprium est intellectui; illarum autem veritas est de
objectis ut intuitive cognitis, sub ratione scilicet ex-
istentiae, sub qua cognoscuntur a sensu." Cf. St. Thomas,
Summa Theologlae, la, q.86, a.l, ad2m and De Veritate, q.2,
a.6 , ad2m, aa 3mj q,10 , a.5 , ad 2m-1<m.
^°"En d'autres termes, '1’intellect connaft intui-

tivement ce que conna'it le sens, 1 parce que les v£rit£s con-
tingentes qu'il conna£t portent sur des objects dont 1 *ex
istence est intuitivement connue par le sens. En effet,
si Je connais intellectuellement ma perception sensible de
l'existence d'un objet, je connais intuitivement l'existence
qui cette perception conna'rt. Ce qu'il y a ici d'intuition
dans la connaissance intellectuelle ne porte directement
que sur la sensation, non sur l'objet." Gilson, op. c i t ..
p. 552, n.l. Much depends on Gilson's meaning o f ^ l a per
ception sensible." If he means the exterior senses then
the intellect knows the object directly through the exter
ior senses. If Gilson means the interior senses (e.g. the
imagination) then intuitive cognition does not bear on the
object as existing, since they can operate whether the ob
ject exists or not, whether it is present or not. In
either case, if intellectual knowledge is a direct knowledge
of sensations, there is at least some direct intellectual
knowledge of a material singular, since sensations are such.
In any case, Gilson's interpretation would make the objecti
vity of human intellectual knowledge problematic.
83
text a rejection of the Thomistic position on human intel
lectual knowledge 'of contingent truths and material singu
lars. 71 However, Scotus clearly indicates that intuitive
cognition bears on the object and not just on the sensation
perceiving the object. Whatever is a perfection in any or
der belongs to the superior if it belongs to the inferior
in that order. Intuitive cognition belongs to the senses,

72
and so it must belong to the intellect.1 Again he says:
"since intuitive cognition belongs to the sense concerning
its object; it therefore also belongs to the intellect
concerning its o b j e c t , "73 And the object of the intellect
is all created being, being as being. There is no difference
between abstractive and intuitive cognition in this res-
71"st. Thomas would agree with Scotus that univer

sal concepts are not sufficient to give us knowledge of con
tingent truths, but instead of realizing that this factlleads
necessarily to the idea of intuitive cognition he sought to
explain our knowledge of contingent facts by basing our
knowledge of material singulars on a mysterious ’converslo
ad phantasma*. Scotus1 reasoning here exposes one of the
weaknesses Inherent in such an explanation, for the phantasm
is merely a representation of a thing and as such is indif
ferent to the thi ng ’s existence or non-existence. The phan
tasm remains the same even if the thing represented in it
ceases to exist." Day, on. cit .. p.8 5 , n.72. This criti
cism, while somewhat harsh, sharply delineates the issue.
73scotus, 0]D. Oxon.. IV, d.^9, q.8 , n.5: "...quod

est simpliciter perTectionis In aliquo genere, si competit
inferiori in illo genere, competit et superior!; sed cog
nitio intuitiva competit sensui; ergo multo magis intellec
ts."
73ibid., q,1 2 , n. 3 : "...quia cognitio intuitiva

competit sensui circa objectum suum; ergo et intellectui
circa objectum suum." These two texts also show that Scotus
=( believed that man does have intuitive cognition in this life,
84
74
pect. Therefore, since there is intuitive intellectual
cognition of material singulars, there must also be abstract-

75
ive intellectual cognition of material singulars.
To sum up, it seems that we are justified in main

taining that Scotus teaches that we know material par
ticulars intellectually and directly in this life - and
that he teaches this explicitly, even though he is not
always as clear on this point as could be d e s i r e d . 7°
and therefore also direct intellectual knowledge of material

singulars.
74
"Totum ens creatum est objectum proportionatum
tali intellectui, quantum ad cognitionem tarn abstractivam
quam intuitivam,” ibid, d.10, q. 8 , n,5 .
75 Day, 0£. cit., p. 138.
76.
’ibid., P. 123.
CHAPTER IV
The Position of William of Ockham
Ockham, the stormy English Franciscan, approaches
this problem from an entirely different tack,'*' For in
stance, Ockham does not have any "problem of individuation."
Consequently, he will almost necessarily hold that man does
have direct intellectual knowledge of material singulars.
For Ockham, the problem is not one of individuation, but
rather of universalization. If one takes strictly the dic
tum that only individuals exist, and that there is no uni
versal being, then one's explanation of the fact that man
does have universal concepts will be largely determined by
the precise character of one's denial of universality in
things. Previously, (e.g., in Aquinas and Scotus) the
problem was: how is this common nature (which is grasped in
a universal concept) present in a singular? For them, the
material singular is a contracted universal. Ockham, how-
În addition to St. Thomas, Scotus, and Ockham,

there were many other thinkers of the later medieval period
who contributed to the advancement and refinement of the
problem of human intellectual knowledge of the material sin
gular, and who, in varying degrees, influenced Suarez'
treatment of this problem. Some of those who lived during
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were
James of Metz, Hervaeus Natalis, Durandus, Peter Aureoli,
and Henry of Harclay. Any complete account of the history
of this problem would have to include these men (and many
others). However, that would be far beyond the scope of
this dissertation. On the other hand, Aquinas, Scotus,
and Ockham are the three pivotal figures in any such history,
and their influence on Suarez is evident.
86
ever, maintains that there is no real thing outside the
mind that is common. His denial is absolute. For Ockham,
the universal is a blend of concepts of similar individuals.

2
According to Ockham, all real things are unique singulars.
The word "singular" has two meanings. First,
whatever is one thing and not several is a singular. In
this sense, if a universal is a mental content that can be
predicated of many things, even the universal as an ens
ratlonls is a singular. The universal is an individual
mental content that signifies many things. The universal is
singular in its being and manifold in its applicability.
The other meaning of "singular" is "that which is one and
not several things and is not of such a nature as to be the

3
sign of several things." Mo universal is a singular in
this sense, "since every universal is of such a nature as to

li
be a sign of, and to be predicated of, several things."
There are many texts that can be adduced to sup

port this, since it is one of the central themes in Ockham’s
philosophy. "...Nam accipio hanc propositionem: ’Omnis sub
stantia sensibilis componitur ex materia et forma.’ Aut hie
subiicitur res extra animam, aut tantum intentio in anima,
aut vox. Si res, et non res communis, quia nulla talis est,
...ergo subiicitur aliqua res singularisj., William of
Ockham, Expositio super vili libros Physlcorum. Prologue, in
Ockham: Philosophical Writings. ed. ana trans. Philotheus
Boehner (New Vork: kelson, 1957 )% p . 11. Hereafter, unless
otherwise noted, all citations and quotes from Ockham will
refer to this selection, e.g. Ockham, Expos, lib. Phys..
Prologue; Nelson, p. 11.
Ôckham, Summa totlus loglcae. I, chap. xiv;

Nelson, p. 33.
11Ibid.
87
A universal is numerically one, but it signifies many things.
"Therefore nothing is universal except by signification, by

5
being a sign of several things,"
There are two sorts of universal, natural and con
ventional. A natural universal is a content of the mind,
and its whole nature is to be a sign predicable of many
things.and therefore no substance outside the mind and
no accident outside the mind is such a universal."^ A
conventional universal signifies many things by agreement,
not by nature. A good example of this is a word, which is
a singular physical entity but which has the function of
signifying many things. It is common or universal by con-

7
vention. In neither case is the universal some thing out
side the mind. Universality is.found only in signification
or predication, not in reality,
A universal is not a thing existing outside the
mind. No substance is universal. If a universal were a
substance existing in singular things and yet distinct from
them, 'Jit would follow that it could exist apart from them;
for every thing naturally prior to another thing can exist
apart from it by the power of God. But this consequence is

g
absurd."
5lbid.
6Ibid., p. 34.
Îbid.
Îbld.. chap. XV; Nelson, pp. 35-36.

88
For Ockham, then, there is nothing real in real
things that is distinct from then yet common. If that opin
ion were true, "no individual could be created, but some
thing of the individual would pre-exist; for it would not
get its entire being from nothing, if the universal in it

9
has existed before in another individual." It would also
be impossible to destroy one individual without destroying
all the other individuals that are part of this common es
sence, since to destroy one individual would require the
destruction of the whole of its essence, and that would mean
the destruction of the universal in that individual and
in others, thus destroying other individuals as well, "since
they cannot remain without a part of themselves, such as

..10
the universal is held to be."
Such a universal would have to be intrinsic to the
essence of the individual, "and consequently the individual
would be composed of universals; and thus the individual
would not be more singular than universal.
Ockham’s view is that "...it is clear that a uni-
9Ibid.. p. 36.
10Ibid.
Îbid. Following this, Ockham gives an argument

that part "of* the essence of Christ would be miserable and
damned; since that common nature which really exists in
Christ, really exists in Judas also and is damned. Therefore,
something is both in Christ and in one who is damned, namely
in Judas. That, however, is absurd." It is also a misin
terpretation of Scotus1 doctrine on the common nature. Ac
cording to Scotus* view, human nature in one is distinct
89
versal is a mental content of such a nature as to be pre-

12
dicated of many things,” A substance cannot be predica
ted of many things. Only a mental content or conventional
sign is of such a nature that it can be predicated of many.
A proposition is either in the mind or expressed in lan
guage, and so too are its parts. It follows that "no pro
position can be composed of substances; but a proposition
is composed of universals; hence universals are in no way

13
substances." This disposes of crude realism, the position
of those who hold that universals have a real existence as
universals outside the mind.
But there is another, more subtle type of realism
which maintains that although the universal does not ex
ist as a substance outside the mind, it does have a real
extramental existence in some way in individuals. Both
St. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus hold this view.
However, Ockham concentrates on the Scotistic opinion in
his criticism of this position.
As ockham sees it, the proponents of this second
opinion on the ontological status of universals hold that
the universal exists in individuals, but it is not really
but only formally distinct from them. This universal is
from human nature in another. In the individual, the nature

is not common, it is individual. Ockham is correct, however,
in not denying that these common natures are real things.
12Ibld.
I 13Ibid., p. 37.
"contracted” or individuated by some principle or an in
dividual difference which is not really but only formally

1**
distinct from this nature. "Hence the nature and the in
dividual difference are not two things, although the one is

15
not formally the other."
Ockham thinks that this opinion is completely im
probable, since he allows no distinction in creatures ex
cept a solid, physical distinction between separate (or
separable) things.1^ In Ockham’s view, there are only two
kinds of distinction, real and rational. Outside the mind
all distinctions are either real (as between two things)
or there is no distinction at all, and within the mind there
is only the rational distinction, a distinction between two

1 7
ideas. Ockham gives a long series of arguments against
Ibid., chap. XVI; Nelson, p. 37. This is, of

course, another misinterpretation of the Scotistic theory
of common nature. Scotus does not hold that the universal
actually exists outside the mind, nor does he claim that
the nature (as it exists in the individual) is actually uni
versal or common. Scotus intends rather to give the univer
sal (in the mind) objective Justification. Cf. supra
pp. 2*1- 30, especially pp. 25 and 26 ,
is
■'Ockham, loc. cl t.
l6Ibid., pp. 37-38.
^ O c k h a m admits the formal distinction only in the

Trinity. "Die Hauptsorge verlegt Ockham auf eine sorgfaltige
Gegenstansanalyse. Der Begriff muss am Gfegenstand und nicht
umgekehrt gemessen werden, Gerade in der Projizierung von
Begriffen in die Wirklichkeit sieht er einen der Haupt-
fehler der Scotisten. Das gilt vor allem auch von den
Distinktionen, Darum nimmt er im Bereich des geschopflichen
Seins sur eine Real-Distinktion an; die Formal-Distinktion
lStest er nur in der Trinitat gelten. Dagegen geh6*rt die
91
the Scofclfctic formal distinction between common nature and

18
individual difference (as he understands it). He con
cludes: "Therefore it must be said that in creatures there
is no such formal distinction; but whatever in creatures is
distinct, is really distinct, and constitutes a distinct
thing, if each of the two things distinguished is truly a

19
thing."
Two of the above arguments go beyond refutation of
the Scotistic position and tend toward a proof of Ockham's
own theory, which is, curiously, similar in some respects
to that of Suarez.
Furthermore, if common nature were really the same

as the individual difference, then there would be in
reality as many common natures as there are individual
differences, and hence none of them would be common,
but each one would be proper to the difference with
which it is really identical.
Furthermore, everything which is distinguished
from something else is distinguished either of itself
or by something intrinsic to itself; but the humanity
of Plato is one thing and the humanity of Socrates
another; therefore they are distinguished of themselves;
therefore not by having differences added to them.20
The implication here is that there are as many
Distinctio rationis nur der Begrifflichen Welt an." Cor

rected Articles on Ockham, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St. feon-
aventure, W.JJ.: TKe Franciscan Institute, 1958), Philotheus
Boehner, "Der Stand der Ockham-Forschung," p. 20. Cf. also
Philotheus Boehner, "A Recent Presentation of Ockham's
Philosophy," Ibid., pp. 140-141.
18
Ockham, Summa totlus loglcae. I, chap. xvi;
Nelson, pp. 38-40.
19Ibid.. p. 40.
20
Ibid., p. 38. Italics in Boehner's translation,
natures as there are individuals, Ockham's position is that
two individuals may have completely similar characteristics,
but this does not mean that one is entitles to assume that
they have something real in common, Socrates may be like
Plato in every w a y - Socrates is certainly more similar to
Plato thanei-thes/is to a donkey. This is a sheer factual
situation, however, and the postulation of an ontological
basis for this similarity is not justified merely by an ob
served similarity. Socrates and Plato are Just similar,
there is no reason why they should be, it is simply a fact
that they are.
We ought not to say that 'Plato and Socrates agree

(share) in some thing or inssome things, but that they
agree (are alike) by some things, that is, by them
selves and that Socrates agrees with (convenit cum)
Plato, not in something, but by something, namely
himself
That is, "there is no nature common to Socrates and Plato,
in which they come together or share or agree; but the
nature which is Socrates and the nature which is Plato are

22
alike."
Thus two individuals may be alike in every way,so
much so that they are in no way dissimilar. This perfect
21Prederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy,

vol. 3: Ockham to Suarez (Westminster, MaryTand: The
Newman Press, 1 ^ 3 ) * p. 57t Copleston cites Ockham's I Sent.
(Ordinatio), d, 2, q. 6 , EE, "Respondeo quod conveniunt
(Socrates et Plato) aliquibus, quia seipsis, et quod Socrates
convenit cum Platone non in aliquo sed aliquo, quia seipso."
22Copleston, l o c . cl t. Italics in original.

93
similitude can extend to both substantial and accidental
aspects of the beings concerned, so that no dissimilarity
can be found in the several accidental forms of each being.
Ockham refuses to admit that in the real world

there is anything that corresponds to the universality
of a concept; in other words, he does not admit any
universal in re, common nature, etc,- anything which
is not compTeFely individual. It is by no means self-
evident, says Ockham, that in its own right the nature
or essence of a thing is not individual. Almost all
his predecessors had maintained that natures and essen
ces considered in themselves had some kind of general
ity or commonness; in order to become numerical units
or individuals or singulars, natures had to be indivi
dualised by a principle of individuation. Ockham’s
predecessors had thus approached this problem from the
side of the universal; Ockham attacked it from the side
of the individual; a change of outlook almost as epoch-
making as the Copernican revolution in astronomy.
Thus, for Ockham, the real issue concerns the deri
vation of universal concepts from radically singular, albeit
similar, beings. Ockham grants that the universal is first
as the adequate object of the intellect, but he denies that
Ôckham, III Sent. (Reportatio), q.9. In this

passage Ockham speaks of one type of univocal concept;
" ...uno modo acciptur pro conceptu communi aliquibus haben-
tibus perfectam similitudinem in omnibus essentialibus sine
omni dissimilitudine, ita quod hoc sit verum tarn in substan-
tialibus quam in accidentalibus, sic quod in forma acciden
tal! non est reperire quod est dissimile cuilibet formae in
alia forma accidentali.... Et sic accipiendo univocum, con-
ceptus solus speciei specialissimae est univocus, qua in in-
dividuis eiusdem speciei non est reperire aliquid alterius
rationis in uno et alio." Quoted in Boehner, "A Recent Pre
sentation of Ockham's Philosophy," Collected Articles on
Ockham, p. 141.
oil
. P h i l o t h e u s Boehner, Ockham: Philosophical Writ
ings (supra clt .), "Introduction," p. xxvii. Prior to
Ockham, the French Franciscan, Peter Aureoli had also taken
the same position. See Copleston, op. cl t.. pp. 29-30,
57- 58, and Vignaux, 0£. clt.. pp. lFo-lbl.
94
the universal is first in the order of origin of intellect-

215
ual cognition. This is consistent with his clear rejec
tion of any universale in re. Since only singulars exist,
singulars must be first known, both by the senses and by the
intellect, which (Ockham says) have exactly the same object.
In the order of the origin of cognition, the singular is
the first object of the sense power, and so it must also be

2S
the first object of the intellect. By "singular” Ock
ham means that which is "neither a written expression nor
a concept nor a significant oral utterance, but only a

27
thing which is not a common sign," or in other words, a
really existing thing which is a singular in the ordinary
sense of the word.
Ockham holds that man does have a proper and simple
intellectual knowledge of a singular, and that the singular
is what is first known. What is first known is something
outside the mind which is not a sign, and since outside the
mind there are only singulars, it follows that singulars

28
are first and directly known by m a n ’s intellect.
Ockham follows Scotus in dividing the first act of
the human intellect into intuitive and abstractive cogni-
25
Ockham, Quodlibeta. I, q. 13; Nelson, p. 32.
2 6Ibid.. Nelson, p. 27.
2Îbid.. Nelson, p. 28.
28Ibid.
tion.2^ His teaching on this topic is, in general, a contin
uation and development of the Scotistic doctrine. In the
Prologue to his Ordinatio, Ockham says that he intends "to
show that our intellect, even in this life, can have two
specifically distinct kinds of non-complex knowledge even
when it is concerned with the same object under the same
aspect. The one may be called intuitive, the other abstrac-

30
tive cognition,..." He then distinguishes between two
acts of the intellect. The first is an act of apprehension,
and this includes not only non-complex knowledge, but also
complexa, such as "propositions and demonstrations, and im
possibilities and necessities, and, in general, anything

31
within the scope of the intellective power." The second
act of the intellect is an act of judgment, by which the
intellect assents or dissents to its object. This act in
volves propositions (complexa) exclusively. For any pro
position, then, a twofold act is possible, one of apprehen
sion and one of judgment. That such a distinction is war
ranted can be shown by the fact that a perspn can apprehend

32
a proposition without assenting or dissenting to it. How
ever, the act of apprehension must always precede an act of
judgment concerning a proposition. Moreover, every judgment
29C f. Day, Intuitive Cognition, pp. 143-146.
3°Ibld,, q.l, Nelson, p. 18.
31Ibid.
32Ibid.
96
"presupposes in the same faculty a non-complex cognition of
the terms; for it presupposes an act of apprehension, and
the act of apprehending a proposition presupposes a non-com-

33
plex cognition of the terms."
Ockham then makes a distinction between two types
of non-complex cognition on the level of apprehension. He
supports this distinction by a series of arguments after
which he identifies the two kinds of apprehension as abstrac-

34
tive cognition and intuitive cognition.
Intuitive cognition furnishes grounds for evident
cognition of a contingent fact whereas abstractive cognition
does not. "Now it is certain, as experience teaches, that
the intellect can have a non-complex cognition of both
Socrates and whiteness, on the strength of which it cannot

35
know evidently whether Socrates is white or not." This
is abstractive cognition. "But besides this knowledge, the
intellect can have another cognition by which it is able to

..36
know evidently that Socrates is white, if he is white."
37
This type of knowledge is intuitive cognition.
^ Ibld.. Nelson, p. 19.

34
Ibid., Nelson, pp. 20-22.
35Ibid., Nelson, p. 20.
36Ibid.
3^Por further treatment of Ockham’s teaching on in

tuitive and abstractive cognition ancjl the distinction be-
*v tween them, see Philotheus Bo.ehner, Ockham: Philosophical
!> Writings. "Introduction," pp. xxiv-xxv; P. Boehner, ^Vhe
97
Throughout his discussions of intuitive and abstra
ctive cognition Ockham affirms that man has direct intellec
tual knowledge of singulars, and that without it evident,
certain knowledge of contingent facts, and even of univer-
sals, in fact, all human intellectual knowledge in the na
tural order would be impossible.
Mention has already been made of Ockham’s con
viction that a singular thing "is what is first known, in
a cognition that is simple and proper to this singular

38
thing." This first cognition is an intuitive cognition
since "abstractive cognition of a singular thing presupposes
an intuitive cognition of the same object, and not vice

..39
versa." Ockham goes on to say that such an intuitive cog
nition is proper to one singular thing since it is imme
diately caused by this singular thing and by no other, even

40
of the same species. Ockham’s next statement seems to
compromise his other assertions that the chief difference
between intuitive and abstractive cognition is that the
first is based on the actual presence and existence of the
object so that the object causes an evident cognition of it-
Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents According to William Ock

ham," Collected Articles, pp. 269-274; and Sebastian J. Day,
Intuitive Cognftlon. pp. 1M0-203.
OQ
Ockham, Quodllbeta. I, q.13; Nelson, p. 28.
3Îbld.
110Ibid., pp. 28-29.

98
self whereas abstractive cognition is not necessarily root
ed in the actual existence of the known and thus does not
provide evidence for a judgment that an object exifets, and
that except for this difference the same thing is known in
both intuitive and abstractive cognition. The curious text
referred to is: "I maintain that the abstractive cognition
which is simple and comes first in the order of origination
is not proper to a singular thing, but is sometimes, indeed

m
always a cognition common to many," Proper and simple
cognition of a singular thing requires specific knowledge
of it. There are occasions in which the object causes
a sense perception on the basis of which one can judge only
that the object sensed is an existing thing. In such a case
the first abstractive cognition is "the cognition of exis
tence, and of nothing less g e n e r a l c o n s e q u e n t l y it is not

2
a specific concept nor a concept proper to a singular thing.
As has been said, there may be many individuals having a
perfect similarity to each other, and so no simple abstrac
tive cognition of one of them is more perfectly a likeness
of that one than of the others like it, and (in contrast
with intuitive cognition) such cognition is not necessarily
and of its very nature caused by one and only one thing.
"Therefore no such cognition is proper to a singular thing,
ltlIbld., p. 29.
iip
H<£Ibid.
99
43
but every such cognition is universal." Intuitive cog
nition is, however, proper to an individual (even though
that individual may be similar to many others) since in
tuitive cognition is naturally caused by one individual
being and cannot be caused by another (no matter how simi-
lar).
However, Ockham concedes that "when I see some
thing, I do have a proper abstractive cognition; only it
will not be a simple cognition, but one composed of simple

45
cognitions." This combination of simple cognitions serves
as a basis for proper abstractive knowledge of a definite
individual; for I recall Socrates because I have seen him
with such a figure, colour, height and width, and in such a
place, and by putting these together I recall having once

46
seen Socrates." Accurate recollection may be no more
proper to Socrates than to another man who is very similar
to him: "Therefore a simple abstractive cognition is not
proper to a singular thing; however, a composite cognition

47
may well be proper to one."
In one of his discussions on the formation of uni-
versals, Ockham again asserts the primacy of intellectual
213Ibid.
44
Ibid.. p. 30
i‘5Ibid., p. 31
Ibid
t Ibid
100
knowledge of singulars. The intellect grasps a singular
and "elicits in itself one cognition, which is of that sin-

48
gular alone..." This cognition can, of its very nature,
stand for this singular thing. "Hence, just as the spoken
word stands by convention for a thing, so the act of the
intellect, by its very nature, and without any convention,

49
stands for the thing to which it refers."
The intellect can go beyond this grasp of the sin
gular thing to form other acts which apply to several
things equally. "For instance, just as the spoken word
'man1 does not signify Socrates more than Plato, so it would
be with an act of the intellect which does not relate to

50
Socrates any more than to Plato or any other man."
The basis for such a general cognition is a speci
fic likeness between the individuals included in it. "And
so it could be said that one and the same cognition refers
to an infinite number of singulars without being a cognition
proper to any one of them, and this is so because of some
specific likeness between these individuals that does not

51
exist between others." That is, since there is a close
similarity between all men so that a man can be distinguishes
from any other being, it is possible to form a general con-
48
Ockham, Expositio super librum Perlhermenlas. Nel
son, p.44. The translation given here differs slightly from
that of Boehner.
49Ibid.
50Ibid.
101
ception of man. But such a general cognition would not
be proper to any individual man. It would apply equally ..
well to each man, and would exclude every other being.
Since Ockham rules out any universale in r e , this general
cognition depends on an observed similarity in things which
is simply a fact and not the result of any ontological com
mon factor.
There is, then, according to Ockham, a sequence in
the genesis of human intellectual knowledge. This is an im
mediate intellectual grasp of an existing thing which is
known by the sense*. Through intuitive cognition man has
direct intellectual knowledge of a singular. Two partial
causes concur in producing this knowledge-— the object and
the intellect. Intuitive knowledge of a singular is proper
to that singular since no other object can cause knowledge
of this singular as existing and actually present.
An abstractive cognition of the same singular thing
is also caused. Since abstractive cognition does not require
the presence of the object, it is preserved in the intellect
as habitual knowledge.
These two cognitions concern singulars alone. In
addition to these,,and using them as a basis, the intellect
can produce another abstractive cognition which is common
to many similar individuals and not proper to any of them.
51Ibid.; p. 45.
(
102
This cognition is a universal in that it applies equally to
all individuals of the same type and leaves out of con
sideration their individual differences. The universal is
formed by the intellect spontaneously and naturally, with
out any special operation of the intellect itself. Exactly
how this happens is not explained by Ockham.
(
52Philotheus Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism
of William Ockham," Collected Articles, pp. 159-160,
CHAPTER V
Suarez on Individuation and Distinction
Suarez agrees with the common and traditional
teaching that everything that is an actual being, all that
exists or can exist immediately, is singular and individual.
In support of this, Suarez argues that whatever exists has a
certain determinate being, and this implies division from
all others, and thus also singularity and individual unity.
The fact that a being is determinate makes it incapable of
being divided from itself, and thus it cannot be divided
into several things of the same kind. If it were so divided,
the whole original being would be in each new entity, so
that as the original being is in one, it would be divided
from itself to the extent that it is in another, and this
clearly involves a contradiction. Hence every being, inas
much as it is one entity in nature is one and distinct, and

1
is therefore singular and individual.
"...dicendum est res omnes, quae sunt actualia

entia seu quae existunt vel existere possunt immediate,
esse singulares ac individuas,... Nunc probatur assertum,
quia quidquid existit habet certam et determinatam entita-
temj sed omnis tails entitas necessarlo habet adiunctam
negationem; ergo et singularitatem individuamque unitatem.
Minor patet, quia omnis entitas, hoc ipso quod determinata
entitas est, non potest dividi a seipsaj ergo nec potest
dividi in plures quae tales sint, qualis ipsa est, alioqui
tota ilia entitas esset in singulis, et consequenter, ut
est in una, divideretur a seipsa prout est in alia, quod
manifestam involvit repugnantiam. Omnis ergo entitas, hoc
ipso quod est una entitas in rerum natura, necessarlo est
una praedicto modo, atque ideo singularis et individua."
Francis Suarez, Disputaclones Metafisleas. Latin text ed.
Likewise, universals cannot exist apart from sin-
gulars. If there were a universal ’’m a n ” existing outside of
Peter and Paul, then either the universal would be in Peter
and Paul also, or it would be altogether separate and ex
terior to them. If the latter, then "man as such" would be
a certain singular thing Just as distinct from Peter and
Paul as they are from each other, and hence it would not be
a universal. Furthermore, neither Peter nor Paul could be
called man if "man" is something entirely separate from

2
them and not in them in any real way.
On the other hand, if the universal "man" is in
both Peter and Paul, it is neither entirely the same really
and entitatively in each, or it is really and entitatively
distinct in each. In the first case, Peter and Paul would
not be two men but only one. In the second case, the separa
ted universal "man" would either be some third thing distin
ct from Peter and Paul, and therefore could not be said to
and translated into Spanish by sergio R^bade Romeo, Salvador

Caballero Sanchez, and Antonio Puigcerver Zan6n (Madrid:
Biblioteca Hispanica de Filosofia, i960), Disputatio V,
Sectio 1, no. 4. This bilingual edition is based on the Latin
text of the Vivls ed. (Paris, 1856-1878) corrected and com
pared with several other editions, from which the editors
have adopted variant readings. Hereafter cited as: DM.
2" ...universalia non posse esse a singularibus
separata, quia si homo universalis existeret extra Petrum et
Paulum, etc., vel ille esset etiam in Petro et Paulo vel
omnino maneret separatus extra illos; si dicatur hoc poste-
rius, iam homo ut sic esset quaedam res simgularis con-
divisa a Petro et Paulo; falso ergo dicetatur universalis.
Et praeterea sequitur nec Petrum nec Paulum esse homines,
quia, ut praedicatum essentiale alicui conveniat, necesse
105
be in them and be universal, since it could only be some
singular thing distinct from others; or if the universal is
both separate from singulars and yet identical with each, it
would have to be both distinct from itself and really one
and many essentially and as it exists in reality, and this
is clearly contradictory. For these reasons, it must be held
that every thing, according as it exists in reality, is

■3
singular and individual.J
Suarez next considers whether individuality adds
anything real to common or specific natures. He has estab
lished that there is an individual, singular anityîfir.things.
What this unity is can be seen more clearly by showing what
it adds to the common nature, that is, what we omit when we

ii
form an abstract universal concept.
est ut non sit separatum ab illo." Ibid., no. 5.
3"Si vero [universalis] est in Petro et Paulo, vel

est idem omnino realiter et entitative in utroque, et ita
Petrus et Paulus non erunt duo homines, sed unus; vel est
distinctus secundum rem et entitatem in utroque eorum, et sic
ille homo universalis et separatus aut esset quidam tertius
condistinctus a Petro et Paulo, et sic falso diceretur esse
in illis et esse universalis, quia non esset nisi quidam
singularis distinctus ab aliis, aut certe si idemmet esset
in uno et altero oporteret esse et distinctus a seipso et
unus et plures realiter secundum essentiam eamdem prout in
re existentem, quae sunt aperte repugnantia. Hac ergo ratione,
necesse est ut omnis res prout a parte rei existit singularis
et individua sit," Ibid.
^"Ostendimus esse in rebus unitatem individuam et

singularem; nunc incipimus declarare quid ilia sit, quod non
potest melius aliter fieri quam declarando quid addat supra
communem naturam seu quae a nobis abstracte et universe
concipitur." Ibid., sect. 2, no. 1.
106
r i
Enumeration and Discussion of the
Positions Taken by Other Thinkers
There are several opinions on this point, that of
Scotus, the opinion of Ockham, and the position of St. Thomas.
Suarez considers each of these and concludes with his own
theory.
The first opinion, which Suarez attributes to
Scotus, holds in general that at least in the case of created
things, the individual adds some real mode to the common na
ture. This mode is distinct from the common nature and to-
gether they compose the individual itself. This opinion is
based on several aspects of a distinction between universals
and singulars. Sciences, demonstrations, proper and essential
definitions are of universals and not of singulars. Likewise,
properties, which directly inhere in things, belong to
things because of universal natures. All of these point to
some objective distinction between the individual and the
common nature, and this distinction would be impossible un
less the individual added something to the common nature.^
5"Prima sententia generaliter affirmat saltern in

rebus creatis individuam addere communi naturae modum ali-
quem realem ex natura rei distinctum ab ipsa natura et com-
ponentem cum ilia individuum ipsum." Ibid., no. 2 . In addi
tion to Scotus, Suarez cites Antonius Andreae, Peter Fonseca,
and John Baptist Monlerius,
^"Fundamentum huius sententiae esse potest illud

fere quod (teste Aristotele) Platonem movit ad ponendas
ideas universalium a singularibus abstractas, scilicet,
quia scientiae et demonstratlones sunt de universalibus et
Furthermore, man is not essentially some individual
but must be made an individual. Hence something else must
belong to the individual man in addition to the nature of
man, and consequently, that additional factor must be objec
tively distinct from "man as such."^ This follows from the
fact that if human nature were essentially individual there
could be only one man, and it would be illegitimate to form
a concept of man unless individuation and singularity were
included, since a thing cannot be conceived apart from that
which belongs to its essence. But the contrary is t r u e ~ a
distinct concept, and even an essential definition of man
.can be formed without including individuation. To be an indi
vidual is to be something in reality, and this does not
belong to the essence of a common nature, since many indi
viduals can have the same essence. Hence, individuality
Son desingularibus. Item, quia definitiones essentiales et

propriae dantur de universalibus et non de singularibus.
Item, quia proprietates, quae per se insunt rebus, conveniunt
illis, mediis universalibus naturis, ita ut verum sit dicere
Petrum esse risibilem, quia homo est risibilis; sicutse con-
trario praedicata contingentia conveniunt communibus naturis
ratione individuorum; homo enim currit, quia Petrus currit;
ergo haec omnia indicant distinctionem aliquam ex natura rei
inter individuum et naturam communem; sed haec distinctio
esse non potest nisi quatenus individuum aliquid addit supra
naturem communem, quia includit totam illam; ergo non potest
distingui ab ilia nisi ut aliquid addens illi." Ibid.
7",,.homo, verbi gratia non est essentialiter in

dividuum quid; ergo cum fit individuum, aliquid ei additur
extra essentiam hominis; ergo necesse est ut illud sit ex
natura rei distinctum ab homine ut sic," Ibid., no. 3.
108
includes something beyond the common nature. Since neither
belongs to the essence of the other, there is a distinction

Q
between the individuality of a being and its common nature.
The second opinion is diametrically opposed to the
first. The proponents of this opinion hold that individual
ity adds absolutely nothing positive or real to the common
nature, and that they are neither really nor mentally dis
tinct; every thing or nature is directly, primarily, and
immediately an individual~no individualizing principle need
be added to a nature which is singular in itself. Suarez
attributes this position to the Nominalists, among them
William of Ockham and Gabriel Biel.^
O
"...si homo essentialiter esset ho individuum, non
posset in plura multiplicari; immo nec posset concipi absque
aliqua individuatione et singularitate, quia non potest res
concipi absque eo quod est de essentia eius; potest autem
concipi homo distincte, immo et definiri essentialiter abs
que aliqua individuatione.... Prima vero consequentia vide-
tur per se nota, quia esse individuum, aliquid est in rerum
natura, et illud non est essentiale naturae communi, immo
neque ipsi individuo (ut communiter dicitur), quia omnia
individua sunt eiusdem essentiae; ergo oportet ut addat ali
quid praeter communem essentiam. Et hinc probatur facile
secunda consequentia, quia quod est de essentia et quod est
extra essentiam videntur ex natura rei distingui; immo ea
maxime ita distinguuntur, quorum unum non est de essentia
alterius; sed id quod individuum addit specie! est extra
essentiam eius, ut ostensum est; ergo." Ibid.
9"Secunda sententia extreme contraria est, individu

um nihil omnino addere communi naturae quod positivum et
reale sit, aut re aut ratione distinctum ab ilia, sed unam-
quamque rem vel naturam per se esse individuam primo et
immediate," Ibid., no. 5. Suarez adds that, in a way, Henry
of Ghent can also be said to favor this position since he
holds that "the individual adds to the species only a
negation."
t
109
The basis of this opinion is that every real being
must be a singular.10 Consequently, it would be a contradic
tion to hold that a thing is singularized by the addition of
something real to the common nature. The unity of the singu
lar rules out any real addition of a positive constituent
postulated as the reason for the individuation of a nature.
Whatever is added is either essential or accidental. If the
individuating principle is essential, the species would be
divided by essential differences, every individual would be
essentially different from every other individual, and final
ly, one could and ought to define individuals with a proper
and adequate essential definition. If the individuating
principle is accidental, then the individual would be a being
per accidens, and then an accident would not be added to an
individual subject but would make the subject an individual,
and this is impossible. If one is individuated by the other,
it is the accident that must receive individuation from the
subject
lOnpundamentum est quia nihil potest intelligi reale

quod singulare non sit, ut probatum est sectione praeceden-
tij..." Ibid. Cf. DM, Disp. V, sect. 1.
11” ...ergo repugnat quod res fiat singularis per

additionem alicuius realis supra naturam communem, Secundo,
quia nulla res fieri, potest una per realem additionem ali
cuius positivi,...ergo neque singularis et individua. Patet
consequentia, turn quia singularitas est quaedam unitas, turn
etiam quia vera ac realis unitas nulla est praeter unitatem
singularem et individuum. Tertio, quia vel id quod additur
est essentiale, vel accidentale; si essentiale, sequitur
speciem dividi posse per essentiales differentias,...unde
plterius sequitur individua essentialiter diferre, et speciem
110
The third opinion distinguishes between material
and spiritual things. Nothin# is added to the nature of an
immaterial thing to individuate it, but something must be
added to the nature of a material being to make it an indi
vidual. Suarez attributes this opinion to Aristotle, Philo-
ponus, Averroes, St. Thomas Aquinas, Cajetan, and the Tho-

1?
mistic School in general. The basis of this opinion is
that immaterial substances do not have matter, they have no
relation or affinity to matter, and nothing in them can be
thought of which would be imposed on their essence, and so
immaterial things are individuals in themselves. In the case
of composite things, however, "signate matter" is added to
the essence, and this is something which the individual has
over and above the species.
non dicere totam essentiam seu quidditatem individuorum....

Deniciue secuitur individua posse et debere definiri prooria
et adaequata definitione essentiali,.... Si vero id, quod
additur, est accidentale, sequitur individuum esse ens per
accidens; seouitur etiam accidens non advenire subiecto in-
dividuo sed constituere illud, quod impossibile est, quia si
unum ex alio individuatur, potius accidens a suiecto, quam e
converso, individuationem accipit." DM, Disp, V, sect.2, no.5.
12
'"Tertia sententia potest distinctione uti inter
res spirituales et materiales; nam in immaterialibus res
singularis nihil addit supra naturam communem; in material-
ibus vero aliquid." Ibid., no. £.
13
"...fundamenturn huius sententiae, scilicet, quia
substantiae immateriales, cum nec materiam habeant nec ad
illam dicant habitudinem, nihil etiam in eis excogitari
potest quod addant supra essentiam, et ideo se ipsis sunt
individuae; at vero in rebus compositis additur materia sig-
nata, ex qua sumi potest aliquid quod individuum addat
_ supra speciem." Ibid.
t
Ill
There is general agreement, Suarez continues, that
the "individual adds to the common nature some negation for-

14
mally completing or constituting the unity if the individual."
Speaking of the individual formally, inasmuch as it is one,
then unity adds a negation to its formal concept, and not
just to the abstract and universal concept of the common
nature, but also to the whole singular entity precisely as

15
conceived in a positive way. The reason for this is that
this whole entity can be conceived as a singular, individual
lli
"Primo indubitatum est apud auctores omnes indivi
duum addere supra naturam communem negationem aliquam formal-
iter complentem seu constituentem unitatem individui." Ibid.
no.7. Suarez adds that this is self-evident from the mean
ing of unity as explained in the preceding disputation (IV)
and the first section of the fifth disputation. In the
fourth disputation, Suarez argues that unity adds nothing
positive to being either really or mentally distinct from
being (D.M., Disp, IV, sect. 1, nos. 6-12), Unity implies a
negation of division in a thing (no.13), and the unity of a
thing demands that it be divided from others (nos. 15-18).
ic
...si formaliter loquamur de individuo, quatenus
tali modo unum est, negationem addit in suo conceptu formally,
non solu- supra naturam communem abstracte et universe con-
ceptem, sed etiam supra totam entitatem singularem praecise
conceptam sub fcatione posTtiva..V . ,J IFid. underscoring
added to emphasize two salient Suarezian tenets. As will be
shown later, Suarez holds that the principle of individua
tion in every created substance is nothing other than its
"whole entity." Cf. D.M., Disp. V, sect. 6. Suarez distin
guishes between the "Formal concept" and the "objective con
cept." The formal concept is the act or word by which the
intellect conceives some thing or "common ratio." It is cal
led a concept because it is, as it were, the offspring of
the mind. It is called formal because it is the last form
of the mind, or because it formally represents the thing
known to the mind, or since it is the intrinsic and formal
term of mental conception, and in this way the formal con
cept differs from the objective concept. The objective con
cept is the thing or essence which is properly and immedia
tely known or represented by the formal concept. For ex
ample, "when we conceive man, that act which we bring about
112
unit only if it is conceived of as being incapable of divi
sion into several things of the same kind. Suarez is not
concerned here with this negation or with whether it formally
belongs to the nature of this unity (he has already dealt
with it in the fourth disputation). His problem here is to
explain the basis of this negation. The negation in question
cannot be based on the common nature alone, since the common
nature of itself does not exclude division into several simi
lar things. Hence, Suarez proposes to investigate why this

16
negation belongs to the singular.
Suarez begins with the assertion that the indivi
dual adds something real to the common nature making it
this individual and because of this real addendum that ne
gation of divisibility into several similar things belongs

17
to it. As has been said, this negation of divisibility
in the mind to conceive man is called the formal concept;

but man known and represented by that act is called the
objective concept." D M , Disp. II, sect. 1, no. 1.
16 „
"...quia tota haec entitas non concipitur ut una
singulariter et individuae, donee concipiatur ut incapax
divisionis in plura eiusdem rationis. Difficultas ergo
praesens non est de hac negatione, sive ilia formaliter
pertineat ad rationem huius unitatis sive non; nam de hoc
etiam sunt opiniones, de quibus iam diximus praecedenti dis-
putatione quid verius existimemus; sed est difficultas de
fundamento illius negationis; nam cum non videatur posse fun-
dari in sola communi natura, ilia enim de se indifferens
est et non postulat talem indivisionem in plura similia, sed
in ea potius dividitur ideo inquiremus quid sit in singular!
et individua, ratione cuius ei conveniat tails negatio."
DM, Disp. V, sect. 2, no. 7.
17
"Dico primo: individuum aliquid reale addit
praeter naturam communem, ratione cuius tale individuum est
does not belong to the common nature as such, and yet, it
does belong to the nature directly and intrinsically as it
exists in reality - as this individual. Something must be
added to the nature, then, since every negation which be
longs intrinsically and necessarily to some thing is based
on something positive, and this must be real, objective,
extramental, and not merely conceptual, since that unity

18
and negation belong to the thing itself.
Secondly, the individual does not add something
really distinct from the specific nature, so that individu
ality and the specific nature would constitute a real compo
sition in the same thing. Suarez denies that in an indivi
dual man humanity as such is really distinct from that which
is added to humanity to make it this (haecceity or indivi
dual difference), thus making a real composition of the com-

19
mon nature and the individual difference in the thing itself.
et ei convenit ilia negatio divisibilitatis in plura similia."

Ibid.. no. 8.
18
"...nam communis natura de se non postulat talem
negationem, et tamen illi naturae, ut in re existit et facta
est haec, per se et intrinsice convenit t&lis negatio; ergo
additum est ei aliquid, ratione cuius illi adiuncta est,
quia omnis negatio ab intrinseco et necessarlo conveniens
alicui rei, fundatur in aliquo positivo, quod non potest esse
rationis, sed reale, quandoquidem ilia unitas et negatio ipsi
rei vere et ex se convenit," Ibid.
19
"Dico secondo: individuum, ut sic, non addit
aliquid ex natura rei distinctum a natura specifica, ita ut
in ipso individuo Petro, verbi gratia, humanitas, ut sic, et
haec humanitas, vel potius id quod additur humanitati ut
fiat haec (quod solet vocarl haecceitas vel differentia in-
dividualis), ex natura rei distinguantur et consequenter
faciant veram compositlonem in ipsa re." Ibid.. no. 9. Cf.
Ilk
If the nature and the individual difference were really dis
tinct, each would have its own unity, Hence the nature would
have a real unity, and this would have to be either an indi
vidual unity or the unity of the universal. The nature can
not have individual unity (apart from the individual differ
ence), since this would make the individual difference un
necessary (and so any claim of such a distinction would be
absurd). On the other hand, the nature as it exists in real
ity (and considered apart from the individual difference)
would have to have the unity of the universal, but this is

20
impossible, since universals do not actually exist as such
in things.
Suarez recognizes and rejects the Scotistic doc
trine of a formal objective unity (midway between indivi-
chaps. Ill and Iv, supra, where Scotus' opinion and Ockham's
criticism of it are discussed. Suarez does not attribute a
real distinction to Scotus, but is merely elaborating the
possibilities. Certainly Scotus can be misunderstood on
this question, but Suarez is not guilty of doing so.
20"...si in ipsis individuis id quod addit indi

viduum supra naturam communem est distinctum ex natura rei
ab ilia, ergo et e converso ipsa natura in re ipsa praescin-
dit a tali addito seu differentia individuali; atque adeo a
parte rei natura et haecceitas sunt duo, si non ut duae res,
saltern ut res et modus; ergo unaquaeque earum habet per se
unitatem suam, quia non potest lntelligi quod aliqua sint duo,
nisi sint unum et unum: numerus enim supponit unitates; ergo
ilia natura ut praecisa a differentia individuali habet in re
ipsa unitatem; ergo vel unitatem individualem, vel univer-
salem. Primum dici non potest,...,alioqui natura esset in
dividua ante differentiam individualem, et ita superflue
tails differentia adlungeretur; ergo iuxta hanc sententiam
necessarlo dlcendum est naturam illam, prout in re ipsa
praescindit et ex natura rei distinguitur a differentia in
dividuali, habere unitatem universalem quod esse impossibile."
D M . Disp. V, sect. 2, no. 9.
115
dual and universal) of the nature as distinct from its indi-

21
viduation, Suarez does not grant that there can be any
such distinction in things that would be a genuine, actual
distinction, and yet really prior to every activity of the

22
intellect. Such a distinction would have to be either be
tween two real entities or between a real entity and its
mode. If the former, there wpuld be a real distinction,
since each real entity would have to be one and singular.
If, on the other hand, it is a distinction between an entity
and its mode, then the precognitional objectivity of such a
distinction would require that such an entity (understood
apart from its mode) have real, true entity in the thing
itself. The mode either constitutes the entity formally
and intrinsically or it does not. If the mode does so con
stitute the entity, then it cannot be objectively distinct
from the entity, but must rather be included in it intrin-
21
"Responderi potest iuxta doctrinam Scoti naturam,
ut in re praecisam ab individuatione, nec habere unitatem
individuam, neque universalem, sed unitatem formalem, quae
est veluti media inter praedictas unitates, et nihil aliud
est quam unitas essentiae, quae per definitionem explicatur.
Sed contra primo, quia licet in tali natura haec unitas for-
malis possit ratione distingui ab unitate individuali, tamen
concipi non potest quod a parte rei sit secundum entitatem
suam praecisa et ex natura rei distincta ab unitate indi
viduali et quod ut sic etiam careat unitate universali."
Ibid., no. 10.
22
"Atque hinc argumentor secundo, directe osten-
dendo non posse esse talem distinctionem in rebus quae sit
vera et actualis distinctio ex natura rei intervertens omnem
operationem intellectus;...” Ibid., no. 11.
sically and essentially. Hence, no concept of that entity
could exclude such a mode. If, on the other hand, the mode
is not constitutive of the entity, the mode must be added
to an already constituted entity. But this kind of dis
tinction between the individual difference (mode) and the
common nature (entity) is unintelligible. If the nature
has its own entity apart from the mode, it must be singu
lar and individual, and so it would not need any further
individuation, nor could the nature be distinguished from

23
its individuation.
Furthermore,in two individual humans, for instance,
3 " . . . n a m omnis talis distinctio esse debet inter

reales entitates aut inter realem entitatem et modum eius.
Et quidem, si sit superiori modo erit distinctio realis,
quae necessario supponet unamquamque entitatem in se singu-
larem et individuam, quod est per se notum et ita a nemine
negatur, quia distinctio entitatum supponit utramque enti
tatem in se constitutam atque adeo unam et singularem.
Si autem distinctio sit inter entitatem et modum
eius, quails hie esse dicitur, ut sic vera distinctio ex
natura rei necesse est quod tills entitas praeciso modo in-
telligatur in reipsa habere veram entitatem realem, alioqui
intelligi non posset distinctio ex natura rei inter talem
modum et entitatem. Quia vel modus ille intrinsece et for-
maliter constituit entitatem illam vel non; si constituit,
ergo non distinguitur ex natura rei ab ilia, quia intrinsece
et essentialiter includetur in ilia, ita ut nihil concipi
possit in ilia entitate quod non includat ilium modum; si
autem modus ille non intelligitur ita intrinsece et formal-
iter constituere talem entitatem, necesse est ut intelliga-
tur supponere illam in sua entitate constitutam et realiter
advenire illi et modificare illam, cum ponatur in re ipsa
distinctus ab ilia. Impossibile autem est lntelllgere hunc
modum distinctionis inter differentiam individualem et na
turam communem; ergo. Probatur minor, quia, si praeciso
illo modo intelligitur natura habere entitatem suam, ergo
ilia entitas per seipsam, et ut est prior illo modo, debet
necessario esse singularis et individua; ergo non indiget
individuatione superaddita, nec potest ab ilia ex natura
"there is a twofold composition of the common nature and
the individual difference;" hence not only is the individual
difference of one really distinct from that of the other,
"but also the entity of the nature which is in one" is real
ly distinct "from the entity of the nature which is in the
other; therefore those two natures are intrinsically and
entitatively distinct as two singular things," even consid
ered apart from individual differences. There can be no real
distinction between actual entities unless they are singular
individuals
Someone might say that two things are distinguished
by their individual differences, as two material things are
said to be formally or quantitatively distinct. Suarez pro
poses to consider this later; for the present he is content
to say that in general, he thinks that it cannot happen
that one thing (A) is really distinct from another thing
(B) by means of something else that is distinct from A.
Rather a thing is distinct through its own entity, by which
it is constituted as such an actual being, since a thing is
Efil distingui;..." Ibid.

Oil
"... nam in Petro et Paulo, verbi gratia, est
duplex compositio ex natura communi et differentia indivi
duali; ergo in utroque est distincta realiter nan solum
differentia individualis unius a differentia individuali
alterius, sed etiam entitas naturae quae est in uno, ab
entitate naturae quae est in alio; ergo distinguuntur illae
duae naturae intrinsice et entitative tamquam duae res sin-
gulares, etiam prescindendo per intellectum differentias
individuales, quia non potest intelligi realis distinctio
inter actuales entitates, nisi quatenus individuae et sin-
gulares sunt." Ibid., no. 12.
distinguished through that by which it is constituted. J
The individual difference in Peter is really dis
tinct from the individual difference in Paul, Each of these
individual differences actuates a real nature, and together
they (nature and difference) constitute an individual (Peter)
which is entirely and really distinct from the other (Paul).
This distinction involves not only the individual difference,
but it includes also the whole entity of the nature. Thus,
even leaving these differentiae out of consideration, what
really remains in Peter and Paul must be really distinct and
therefore singular. "Otherwise, one would have to say that
some thing altogether really the same is contracted through

26
individual differences in Peter and Paul." It is neither
really the same nature nor formally the same nature which
is contracted. Formal identity, insofar as it can exist in
reality, is only a certain similarity. This presupposes a
215
"Dices distingui quidem per differentias indivi-
duales, sicut duae materiae dicuntur distingui per formas
vel quantitates. Sed de hoc exemplo dlcemus postea; in
universum enim existimo fieri non posse ut una res distin-
guatur realiter ab alia per aliam a se distinctam, sed per
suammet entitatem, per quam in tali esse constituitur, quia
servata proportione, per illud res distinguitur, per quod
constituitur." Ibid., no. 13.
2 "...in Petro et Paulo sunt duae differentiae
individuales inter se realiter distinctae, et unaquaeque
earum actuat natbram realem, a qua distinguitur ex natura
rei et cum qua componit suum individuum omnino realiter dis-
tinctum ab alio, non solum quoad differentiam, sed etiam
quoad totam entitatem naturae; ergo necesse est ut, etiam
praecisls per intellectftm ipsis differentiis, id quod manet
a parte rei in Petro et Paulo, sit distinctum realiter atque
ldeo singulare; alioqul dicendum esset rem allquam omnino
realiter eamdem contrahi per differentias individuales in
Petro et Paulo." Ibid.
real distinction, and therefore also the individuation of the
things that are said to be similar. Formal identity conceived
of as a type of unity is not a real unity but a unity of
reason only through a conceptual denomination.2?
The individual differences of Peter and Paul are
really distict from each other as two incomplete things,
singular and individual to the extent that they exist. Yet
there is a similarity between the individual differences of
two men, since they are more like each other than either is
28
to the individual difference of a horse or a lion.
Suarez warns that we should not be deceived by the
way we think and speak of the similarity and distinction
encountered in individuals so that we assume that there is
27
"Neque enim satis est dicere non eamdem naturam
realiter contrahi, sed eamdem formaliter; nam haec identitas
formalis, prout in re esse potest, solum est similitudo
quaedam, quae supponit realem distinctionem, et consequenter
individuationem eorum quae similia dicunturj prout vero con-
cipitur per modum unitatis, non est unitas realis, sed
rationis tantum per denominationem a conceptu mentis, ut
postea dicemus.” Ibid.
28
"...illaemet differentiae individuales Petri et
Pauli inter se realiter distinguuntur tamquam duae res in-
completae, singulares tamen et individuae eo modo quo sunt,
et nihilominus inter se habent similitudinem et convenien-
tiam, quia revera similiores sunt inter se quam cum differ
entia individual! equi vel leonis,.,.” Ibid., no. 14.
This is strikingly similar to the opinion of Ockham, al
though Suarez makes no reference to the Venerable Inceptor
here. In view of the fact that Suarez1 own teaching on in
dividuation is closer to Ockham’s than to either Thomas' or
Scotus', and may even be said to be an original development
and enrichment of Ockham's point of view, the atypical pau
city of references to Ockham throughout the Fifth Disputa
tion strikes one as very curious. Cf. chap. IV, supra,
p. 92.
a real distinction between the nature and its individuality.
Even though we may conceive of a nature and its individua
tion in different ways, neither can be separated from the
other, and therefore there is no reason to imagine a real

29
distinction between them. The nature of man in Peter is
so intimately related to the proper individuation of Peter
that neither can be separated from the other. It is also a
mistake to say that the nature of man is separable from
Peter simply because it can also exist in Paul. This does
not take into account the nature of man as it exists in
reality, but only as it is conceived by the mind. Hence,
Suarez concludes, there is only a mental distinction between
the common nature (understood in the abstract) and the in
dividual, since the nature can exist in this way only in

30
the mind.
2Q
^"...tota ilia distinctio quae fingitur esse ex
natura rei inter naturam et individuum, sumpta est ex modo
concipiendi et loquendi ex convenientia et distinctione
quae inter ipsamet individua reperitur; hoc autem signum
nullum est ad indicandam distinctionem ex natura rei, et
aliunde sunt multa, quae urgentius indicant nullam esse in
re talem distinctionem; ergo." Ibid.. no. 15. Here also,
one notices a possible influence of Ockham in two respects^
the first the admonition that our way of speaking about “*
things may be deceptive and not accurately reflect how
things are. Secondly, for Suarez (as for Ockham) separabil
ity is the criterion of a real distinction (DM, Disp. VII,
sect, 1, no. 1; sect. 2, no. 9). Cf. also the passage
quoted in the following note,
30
"Quae ultimo confirmatur a slgno inseparabili-
tatisj nam ea quae, licet diverso modo concipiantur a nobis,
ita se habent in re, ut neutrum ab altero separetur vel
separari possit etiam de potentia absoluta, sine causa
finguntur ex natura rei distincta, ut infra latius dicam in
Individuality adds something real to the common
nature, but they are only mentally distinct. The nature
and its individuality belong to the same category of being,

31
and together they compose the individual metaphysically.
This is true both of material things and immaterial things,

32
excepting only God.
The concept of the individual is not, properly
speaking, composite. Hence it cannot be resolved into a
concept of the common nature and a concept of the indivi
dual difference. The concept of the individual is only a
disputatione de distinctionibusj sed ita se habent in Petro

ratio hominis et propria individuatio Petri, ut separari
nullo modo possint nec tails modus a natura, nec natura
prout est in Petro a tali modo; ergo. Neque quidquam iuvat
dicere rationem hominis esse separabilem a Petro quia po
test esse in Paulo, quia hoc non est considerare rationem
hominis prout realiter existit, sed solum prout mente con-
cipitur, et ideo non satis est ad distinctionem ex natura
rei, quae esse debet inter ea quae a parte rei sunt, si est
distinctio inter res positivas, vel inter rem et modum rea-
lem positivum. Unde ilia distinctio quae intelligitur inter
rationem communem hbstracte intellectam, et individuum,
solum est rationis, quia ilia natura ut sic nullubi est,
nisi obiective in mente.” D M , Dlsp. V, sect. 2, no. 15.
3^”Dico tertio individuum addere supra naturam

communem aliquid ratione distinctum ab ilia, ad idem prae-
dicamentum pertinens, et individuum componens metaphysice,
tamquam differentia individualis contrahens speciem et indi
viduum constituens.... Nec vero inde sequitur id quod addi-
tur esse allquid rationis; nam, sicut est aliud distingul
ratione, aliud vero esse tantum rationis, fieri enim potest
ut quae realia sunt sola ratione distlnguantur, ita etlam id
quod additur potest esse reale, sicut revera est, quamvis
sola ratione distlnguantur." Ibid., no. 16.
3 2 " D 1 c o quarto: individuum non solum in rebus

materialibus et accldentibus, sed etiam in substantils lm-
materlalibus creatls et finltis addlt aliquid ratione dis
tinctum supra speciem. Excludimus ab hac conclusione di-
vinam naturam,..." Ibid., no. 21. Cf. ibid.. nos.22 and 23.
122
more exact concept of the specific nature itself, as that
nature really exists in a certain entity. Neither that en
tity, nor anything about it can be conceived without inclu
ding its specific nature. Nor can that specific nature, as
really existing, be distinctly conceived except as contracted

33
in an individual entity.
Suarez, then, rejects the theory of individuation
by matter. Matter, either in itself or as quantified, is
insufficient as an adequate and radical source of individua
tion, Although matter enters into the individuation of ma
terial things, it cannot serve as an adequate principle
for the individuation of the whole range of created being.
Quantified matter alone is not a satisfactory principle of
individuation even in material substances, since quantity
is an accident, and an accident cannot be the principle of

34
individuation of a substance.
00
JJI,sic ergo in praesenti dici potest conceptum in-
dividui non esse proprie compositum et resolubilem in con
ceptum alterius modi, seu differentiae individualis, sed
esse solum expressiorem conceptum ipsius naturae specificae
prout in re existit in tali entltate, in qua nec concipi
potest talis entitas neque aliquid illius entitatis, quin
talem specificam rationem includat, neque ipsa ratio speci-
fica potest, ut in re existit, distincte concipi, nisi ut in
tali vel tali entitate contracta," Ibid., no. 18.
34”Sed haec sententia imprimis supponit materiam

signatam esse adaequatum principium illius individuationis,
in qua individuum addit aliquid positivum ration! specificae,
quae potest dici individuatio positiva; haec autem supposi-
tio in praedicto sensu falsa est,,,.ergo supponunt materiam
vel secundum se vel ut signatam quantitate esse adaequatam
radicem talis individuationis,,., Sed quamvis daremus in
materialibus substantiis huiusmodi individualem differentiam
sumi a materia, non posset efficaciter inferri materiam esse
123
There Is no reason, then, why Immaterial substances
must be essentially different in order to be distinct indi
v i d u a l s . ^ This would be the case only if one assumes that
signate matter is the adequate principle of individuation.36

The human soul, for example, is a simple, spiritual entity,
and yet it is not an individual by reason of its essential
nature, but rather because of something added to that nature.
One might say with St. Thomas, for example, that the human
soul is individuated by reason of its having a transcenden
tal relation to its body. But this is uncertain— it may be
just as true to say that this soul has this relation to the
body because it is already an individual soul. Whichever it
is does not matter, says Suarez, since the human soul is
not individuated precisely in virtue of that relation to the
body. The individuation of the human soul arises from the
addition of a conceptually distinct factor through which

“3 7
the soul has this unique relationship to a certain body.J '
adaequatum principium illius differentiae in tota latitudi-

nem entis creati;...ut infra ostendam, quantitas, cum sit
accidens, nullo modo potest ingredi principium individua-
tionisssUbStantiarum.” Ibid., no. 24.
35ibid., nos. 21-30.
36ibld.. no. 24 (see footnote 34 supra).

07
” ...nam anima rationalis physice considerata
etiam est simplex entitas et spiritualis, et tamen non est
individua ex ratione essential!, sed aliquid secundum ratio
nem addit. Sed dicunt amlmam rationalem habet transcenden
tal em habitudinem ad corpus, et inde individuari. Sed hoc
imprimis est incertum, nam fortasse tarn verum est hanc
animam ideo dicere talem habitudinem ad corpus, quia talis
ipsa est, sicut e converso. Et deinde quidquid de hoc sit,
124
In the fourth section of the fifth disputation
Suarez considers whether substantial form can be the princi
ple of individuation in material substances. Avicenna, Aver-
roes, Durandus, and others seem to have taught this, Suarez
says, although Durandus held a modified version of this
opinion. Even Aristotle can be interpreted in this way,
according to his statement in the second book of the De
Anlma. chap. 1 (4l2a), "form is that which constitutes this
particular thing." Suarez traces this opinion to that text
of Aristotle, since "the principle of individuation should
be that which intrinsically constitutes this substance, and
is most proper to it." That which is most proper to a
thing is in the substantial order— accidents do not add up
to substance, much less a particular substance. Furthermore,
the principle of individuation must be form and not matter,
since "this matter" is not especially proper to a certain
individual— it can be the subject of other forms. Thus,
ad praesens non refert,...anima enim rationalis, quae habet

suam specificam rationem cum habitudine transcendentali ad
corpus, non habet individuationem ex vi illius praecise,
sed ex addltione aliqua secundum rationem, per quam ilia
habitudo determinatur ad tale corpus, vel potius ad talem
habitudinem ad corpus;..." Ibid., no. 29. In section 3 of
this disputation, Suarez considers at length (and Rejects)
signate matter as the individuating principle of material
substances*
38«Et ex hoc verbo Aristotelis sumendum est prae-
cipuum fundamentum huius sententiae; nam principium indi
viduationis esse debet id quod intrinsece constltuit
hanc substantiam, et est maxime proprium illius;,,." DM,
Disp. V, sect. 4, no. 1.
I
according to this argumant, substantial form must be the
39
principle of individuation in material substances.
A second argument for this position may be offered,
according to Suarez, based on the fact that the principle
of a thing's unity is the same as the principle of its en
tity, But a material thing properly has being from form
and so form must also be the source of its individual

40
unity.
It is true, Suarez continues, that according to
this argument the adequate intrinsic cause of the indivi
dual unity of a material substance is form and matter. Yet
the principal cause of individual unity is form, and this is
the reason the proponents of this opinion call substantial
form the principle of individuation. Matter is necessary
for the unity of the species, since the nature of a material
thing necessarily implies matter. But form is the distinc
tive component, and only presupposes matter as a potential,
39
^"...ergo ratione primae proprietatis esse debet
aliquid substantiale; nam accidentia, ut saepe dictum est,
nec constltuunt substantiam, neque hanc substantiam, nam
haec substantia, etiam ut est haec, est ens per se et sub
stantiale. Ratione autem alterius proprietatis, hoc prin
cipium non potest esse materia, sed forma, quia haec materia
non est maxime propria huius individui, cum sub aliis for-
mis esse possit; ergo forma est principium individuationis."
Ibid. It should be noted that Suarez presents here an
argument for a point of view with which he does not entirely
agree.
40
"Unde argumentor secundo, quia idem est princi
pium unitatis quod entitatis,,... Sed unaquaeque res pro-
prie habet esse a forma; ergo et unitatem individualem."
Ibid., no. 2.
126
indifferent subject. Form completes the substantial nature
of the individual, and so individuation derives chiefly from
form.**1
Suarez mentions several criticisms that might be
offered of this theory of individuation by substantial form.
Form is not particular of itself, form is ontologically or
dered toward matter, and forms are numerically multiple only

42
insofar as they are received in diverse material subjects.
All of these objections are based on the assumption that
matter is the principle of individuation, and so in this
view, a form is particular only because it is received in
distinct matter. But, he continues, almost all of these
objections can also be turned against the proponents of
matter as the principle of individuation. Suarez grants
that form is not the principle of individuation of a com-
" ...verum quidem esse adaequatam causam intrin-

secam individuales unitatis substantiae materialis esse for-
mam et materiam, ut argumentum concludit; tamen, si haec duo
inter se comparentur, praecipuam causam huius unitatis esse
formam, et hoc sensu illi speciallter attribui quod sit
individuationis principium. Sicut etiam materia necessaria
est ad rationem seu unitatem specificam; non enim potest
ratio hominis vel humanitatis ut sic sine materia constitui,
...et nihilominus absolute dicitur ratio specifica sumi a
forma, quia ilia dat materiam ut quid potentiale et indif-
ferens." Ibid., no. 4.
42
Sed adhuc obiicitur contra hanc sententiam et
rationem factam, quia licet forma ut sic det esse specifi-
cum, tamen non dat esse individuale et numericum nisi ut est
haec ergo non forma ut sic, sed id unde ipsa forma habet ut
sit haec, est individuationis principium; sed est haec ra
tione materiae; ergo materia potius est prima radix indivi
duationis. Probatur minor primo, quia forma non per seip-
sam haec;.... Secundo, quia forma habet totum suum esse in
ordine ad materiam;.... Tertio, quia formae multiplicantur
posite according to the specific nature of the form, but
only inasmuch as it is this particular form. The same con
cession must be made regarding matter, since matter in gen
eral does not constitute a particular material being as an
existent. Matter can do this only if it is "this matter."
The question of the source of this singularization remains
unanswered.
To suggest that it is G o d ’s will is irrelevant,
since this is the extrinsic source of individuation, and
the question concerns the intrinsic principle of individua-

43
tion. Someone might suggest that this matter is "this"
because of this quantity. "But this is false, and it does

44
not dispose of the difficulty." Since this matter is pre
supposed by this quantity, matter cannot be individuated by
an accidental addition. Hence, this matter cannot be indi-
numero, quatenus in diversis materiis recipiuntur,..."

Ibid., n o . 5.
43
"Hae obiectiones sunt fundamenta opinionis trac-
tatae sectione praecedenti [i.e., that matter is the prin
ciple of individuation], quae potius hanc sententiam quam
nunc tractamus declarant et confirmant, Possunt enim fere
omnes retorqueri, et fieri de ipsa materia, Concedo itaque
formam non esse principium individuationis compositi secun
dum specificam rationem suam, ut est per se notum, sed in
quantum est haec; sed hoc ipsum dicendum est de materia,
quia etiam materia habet specificam et communem rationem,
secundum quam non est sufficiens ad constituendum individu
um; ergo, si constituit, id facit in quantum est haec.
Quaeram ergo rursus unde habet quod sit haec. Respondent
aliqui, quia Deus voluit hanc potius creare quam aliam; sed
hoc extra rem est, non enim hie inquirimus extrinsecum prin
cipium individuationis, sed intrinsecum;..." Ibid., no. 6.
44
"Alii respondent hanc materiam esse hanc ratione
huius quantitatis. Sed hoc et est falsum, et non evacuat
128
viduated by quantity, since it is rather this quantity that
is ordered to this matter instead of the converse. It may
also be asked how quantity acquires its definitive particu
larity, and lest one become involved in an infinite regress
or vain circularity of reasoning, it must be said that it

iig
resides in a certain thing which of itself is particular.
If it be said that matter and quantity are two in
complete entities and that they are individuated by a re
ciprocal relation, it would be better to say this of matter
and substantial form, rather than of some accident, since
matter and form are more directly connected and related to
each other. Hence Suarez concludes, all the arguments
against form as the individuating principle can also be
applied against matter. Matter has a certain priority over
form in individuation in that matter "is a certain occasion
for producing various and individual forms," but form is
superior to matter in individuation since form "chiefly con
stitutes the individual, and because it [form] is more pro-
difficultatem." Ibid.
45
"...cum haec materia simpliciter supponatur huic
quantitate, non potest per illam individuari. Item, quia
rationes supra factae universaliter probant nihil substanti
ale posse individuari per accidens superadditum;...ergo non
potest haec materia intrinsece individuari per quantitatem,
quae est res ab ilia distlncta, nec per ordlnem ad illam,
cum potius haec quantltas dicat ordinem ad hanc materiam,
quam e converso. Secundum de quantitate patet, quia de ilia
etiam inquiram unde sit haec, cum id non habeat ex sua speci
fics ratione, et cum non sit procedendum in infinitum, nec
vlt&osus et inutilis circulus commlttendus, sistendum erlt
in aliqua re, quae per seipsam sit haecj..." Ibid.
129
Is more proper to it [the individual], and because matter is
for form rather than the converse,...therefore, all things

46
considered, the chief principle of individuation is form.”
Suarez concludes this section with the judgment
that the opinion which holds that substantial form is the
principle of individuation in material substances is "pro
bable enough, and comes close to the truth." But form
alone is not the full and adequate principle of individua
tion of material things, if we speak of their whole entity,
..." However, Suarez grants that form is the chief cause

47
of the individuation of material substances.
46
"...ergo hoc potius tribuendum est substantiae
quam accidenti, cum ilia sit prior magisque absoluta en-
titas; vel, si admittendum est duo entia incompleta per
mutuam habitudinem ad invicem individuari, secundum di-
versa genera causarum, id potius dicendum erit de materia
et forma substantial! inter se, quam cum aliquo accidente,
quia magis per se connectuntur, et se invicem respiciunt.
Ergo omnia argumenta facta possunt idem de materia con-
cludere quod intendunt de forma, nam est inter eas, quo
ad hoc, quaedam aequalitas, Et aliunde materia solum
superat formam in hoc, quod est quaedam occasio producendi
formas varias et individuas, ut supra declaratum est;
forma vero superat materiam in hoc, quod praecipue con
st ituit individuam, et quod est magis propria eius, et
quod materia potius est propter formam quam e converso,
...ergo, pensatis omnibus, potissimum individuationis
principium est forma." Ibid.
47
Est ergo haec sententia, prout a nobis ex-
posita est, satis probabilis, proximeque ad veritatem ac-
cedit, Simpliciter vero dicendum est formam solam non
esse plenum et adaequatum individuationis principium re
rum materialium, si de tota earum entitate loquamur,
quamvis sit praecipuum, ideoque iuxta formalem modum lo-
quendi interdum censeatur sufficiens ad denominationem
eiusdem individui," Ibid., no. 7.
130
^ The Suarezian Principle of Individuation
Having considered all these opinions, in the sixth
section of the fifth disputation Suarez presents his own
opinion on this problem. He proposes to give a principle
of individuation that will apply to every created substance,
Prom what has been said so far against the above

opinions as it were by a sufficient enumeration of
parts it remains that every singular substance of
itself, or through its entity, is singular [and] no
other principle of individuation is needed besides its
entity, or beyond the intrinsic principles on which
its entity depends.49
Suarez' principle of individuation applies equally
well to simple and composite substances. A simple sub
stance is an individual of itself and by its simple entity.
A composite substance is individuated by the same principles
which constitute its entity; fo* example, if it is composed
of matter united with form, just as the principles of its
entity are matter and form and their union, so also these
50
same principles are the principles of its individuation.
^®The title of this section is: "quod tandem sit

principium individuationis in omnibus substantiis creatis."
"Ex hactenus dictis contra superiores sententias

videtur quasi a sufficient! partium enumeratione relinqui
oknem substantiam singularem se ipsa, seu per entitatem
suam, esse singularem neque alio indigere individuationis
principio praeter suam entitatem, vel praeter principia in-
trinseca quibus eius entitas constat." Ibid., no. 1.
50
"Nam, si talis substantia, physice conslderata,
simplex sit, ex se et sua simplici entitate est indlvidua;
si vero sit composita, verbi gratia, ex materia et forma
unitis, sicut principia entitas eius sunt materia, forma
et unio earum, ita eadem in individuo sumpta sunt principia
individuationis eius; ilia vero, cum sint simplicia, seipsis
It seems clearest of all to Suarez that there can be no
51
foundation of unity distinct from the entity itself.
Individual unity does not add any real positive
increment to the individual entity, since the entity is
the basis of every unity. Likewise, the positive ground of
this unity taken as the negation of division does not add
any positive physical component to the entity which is one
and individual. The entity itself, through itself, is the

52
basis of this negation and the principle of individuation.
This does not conflict with the opinion that in regard to
the individual entity a mental distinction can be made be
tween its "common nature" and its individual entity, and
that in this way it can be said that the individual adds
something to the nature which is conceptually distinct from
it, because metaphysically it has the intelligibility of
an individual difference. But in the individual substance
that individual difference has no special principle distinct
individua erunt." Ibid.

51
"Mihi tamen videtur omnium clarissima,,..quia
revera non potest fundamentum unitatis ab ipsa entitate dis-
tingui." Ibid.
52 "Unde, sicut unitas individua pro formali non

potest addere aliquid positivum reale supra entitatem indi-
viduam, quia quoad hoc eadem est ratio de ilia et de omni
unitate, ita positivum fundamentum huius unitatis quoad
negationem quam dicit, nihil positivum addere potest, physice
loquendo, illi entitati, quae una et individua denominatur;
ergo ilia entitas per seipsam est fundamentum huius negatio
ns®, et hoc sensu dicitur ab ilia opinione seipsa esse prin
cipium individuationis." Ibid.
from its entity. And so in this sense, every entity through
itself is its own principle of individuation.-^
Although the diversity of bodies is the best sign
a posteriori of the distinction of human souls, it is only
an occasion for producing many souls and not a proper and

15h
intrinsic principle of individuation for human souls.
Unity, Individuation, and the Theory of Distinctions
With this theory of individuation, so redolent of
Ockham, Suarez will be able to hold that intellectual abs
traction initially produces a concept of the singular.
Since matter is not the principle of individuation for
Suarez, even complete dematerialization through abstraction
Does not change the singular character of the object as
known directly through the intellect. How this takes place
CO
J "Non enim negat haec opinio in ilia individua
entitate posse ratione distingui naturam communem ab enti-
tate singular!, et hoc modo individuum addere supra speciem
aliquid ratione distinctum, quod, secundum metaphysicam con-
siderationem, habet rationem differentiae individualis,...
illam differentiam individualem non habere in substantia
individua speciale aliquod principium vel fundamentum quod
sit in re distinctum ab eius entitate; ideoque in hoc sensu
dicit unamquamque entitatem per seipsam esse suae indivi
duationis principium. Est igitur vera haec sententia recte
explicata;..." Ibid.
5^'»corporum ergo varietas est optimum signum a

posteriori distinctionis animarum, quia est veluti occasio
producendi diversas animas, non est tamen proprium et in-
trinsecum principium individuationis earum." Ibid.. no. 8.
This is close to the mature position of St. Thomas, but
Suarez goes beyond the somewhat tentative statement of
Aquinas on this, Cf. supra, chap. II, pp, 21-22,
133
will be treated in the next two chapters.
However, since the theory of individuation is
crucial to what follows, it will perhaps be helpful to con
sider this theory in the wider context of Suarezian thought.
Suarez discusses individuation under the general heading
of transcendental unity. He considers this aspect of being
in the fourth through the seventh disputations of his
Dlsputationes Metaphysicae. Unity in general is treated in
the fourth disputation, and in the fifth disputation he
discusses individual unity and the principle of individua
tion. Universals and the unity of a universal are examined
in the sixth disputation, and in the seventh disputation
Suarez considers the various kinds of distinctions. The
seventh disputation is the capstone of the whole treatise
on metaphysical unity, and it getsûp the implicit ground
rules throughout. For while there is little mention of the
theory of distinctions in the fifth disputation, there is
no question but that this theory is beneath the surface,
controlling the entire discussion of individuation. Suarez
himself calls attention to this fact in the introduction
to the seventh disputation:
The present disputation seems necessary at

this point to complete our treatise on the attrib
ute or property of being we call unity. For, since
u ’.'tunity implies negation of division, and is there
fore opposed to multitude, which arises from divi
sion or distinction, a comprehension of all the
kinds of distinction is required for a comprehen
sion of all the kinds of unity.55
^ S ua re z, Dlsputationes Metaphysicae. Disp. VII,

134
In the light of this consideration, some of the
points made in the present chapter take on perspective.
The same will be true of the chapters which immediately
follow. In fact, it is not at all excessive to speak of
Suarez| theory of distinctions as one of the central supports
of his entire metaphysical edifice. It is, for example, one
of the chief controlling factors in his disagreement with
what he considers to be the Thomistic position on the dis-
tinction between essence and esse in contingent being,-'
Suarez holds that individuation adds something real
to the common nature, and in virtue of this real increment
the individual which results is incapable of further divi
sion. in other words, the common nature cannot be divided
into essential parts, but it is capable of division into
subjective parts, that is, the whole nature is susceptible
of numerical repetition by being duplicated in several dis
tinct recipients. However, individual unity is such that
the concretized nature does not admit of any division at
Prologue. Unless otherwise noted, the English translation

of all quotations from the seventh disputation will be from:
Francis Suarez: "On the Various Kinds of Distinctions,"
(Dlsputationes Metaphysicae. Disputatio VII, de varlls dls-
tinctionum generlbus). i r . w i t h intro, by CyrTT Voliert
(Milwaukee: Marquet 1e University Press, 1947). The quotation
above appears on page 16 of this translation,
5^Suarez discusses this in the thirty-first dispu
tation. Cf. George L. Stengren, "The Doctrine of Being in
the Mtaphysies of Suarez," (Unpublished Master’s disserta
tion, St. Jo hn ’s University, 1956).
57Cf. supra, pp. 112-113.

135
all. The individual is incommunicable— it cannot be divided
in reality without being destroyed. For this reason, once
individuality is added to the common nature, individuality
is only mentally distinct from the nature to which it belongs.

eft
To deny this would destroy any real unity in the bein g ,J
Individuation adds something real to the nature, but since
this is a real union, there can be only a mental distinction
between them in any *ctual being. For Suarez, as for Ockham,
separability is the criterion of a real distinction:
...although a number of signs are usually proposed

to assist us in recognizing a real distinction, two
of them, based on separation, seem the most import
ant, One is based on separation alone, with refer
ence to real union; that is, a distinction is real
if both extremes can simultaneously and actually
be preserved apart from a real union between them.
The other is based on mutual separation with res
pect to existence; that is, a distinction is real
if one extreme can be preserved immediately and
by itself without the other, and vice versa, to
the exclusion of any ordinatiop to or necessary
connection with a third thing,59
Hence the desirability of interpolating a brief
discussion of what Suarez meant by the various kinds of
distinctions seems evident at this point. This will serve
as a nexus between the Suarezian theory of individuation
and Suarez' doctrine on human intellectual knowledge of
the material singular.
58Cf. supra, pp. 119-121.
59suarez, DM, Disp. VII, sect. 2, no. 9 (Vollert

trans. p. 46). Suarez adds: "...there is no point to inquir
ing whether such separation can take place naturally or
only through God's absolute power." Ibid., no. 10.
Suarez examines three kinds of distinctions; real,
mental, and modal. The first two will receive greater atten
tion because of their relevance to the present discussion.
Suarez' order will be followed, but only the main points
of his doctrine will be touched upon.
In the first place, there is the real distinction.
This, says Suarez, is self-evident. "For greater clarity
this is usually called a distinction between thing and
thing. It consists in the fact that one thing is not another,
and vice v e r s a . " ^ This is evident in the case of two
things which are not even united with each other, for
example, two supposita. But it is also possible to have
a union between two really distinct things, although in
this case a real distinction may be extremely difficult
to discover.^1
Secondly, there is certainly another kind of dis-
tinction, the mental distinction.
This sort of distinction does not formally and

actually intervene between things designated
as distinct, as they exist in themselves, but
only as they exist in our ideas, from which
they receive some denomination,62
Suarez subdivides the mental distinction into two
SOsuarez, DM, Disp. VII, sect. 1, no. 1 (V. tr.p. 16).

61 Ibid, (tr. p. 17).
^2Ibld.. no. 4 (tr, p. 18), This is the way in

which the human intellect distinguished one attribute
from another in God, for example.
137
varieties: the purely mental distinction, which arises from
the activity of the intellect alone, without any objective
counterpart; and the mental distinction with a foundation
in reality. The latter is a mental distinction since
"actually and formally it is not found in reality, but has
its origin in the mind," It has a foundation in reality
"because it arises not entirely from the sheer operation
of the intellect, but from the occasion offered by the
thing itself on which the mind is reflecting."^3
On the other hand, a real distinction rests on
a solid objective foundation independent of any mental
activity on man's part.
Whatever exists in reality has its own real essence.

Therefore things that are really distinct have
in reality distinct essences,,,. Consequently
they have in reality distinct entities, which
is what is meant by a real distinction.
He gives two reasons for this conclusion:
"First, the entity of a thing is nothing but its real
essence as it exists outside its causes" so that if the
real essences are distinct and exist outside their causes,
they are distinct entities. "Secondly, if we have here two
real essences, each of them is the essence of some real
bein..." but a single thing can have only one essence—
"therefore if there are two real essences, there are two
real beings."^5
63Ibid.
t
64Ibid., no. 12 (tr. p. 23).
Now there is a third kind of distinction which, as
has been said, will receive only cursory examination here.
This is the modal distinction. It is like the real distinc
tion in that it precedes any activity of the mind, but it
does not intervene between two entities, and is notas great
a distinction as the real distinction. A modal distinction
intervenes between a thing and its m o d e . ^ Suarez means by
this that in created things, besides their entities, there
are certain real modes that are something positive and of
themselves "modify the very entities by conferring on them
something that is over and above the complete essence as
individual and as existing in nature.

There are only three possible categories of dis
tinctions, "Besides modal, real and mental distinctions,

..68
no further distinction is possible." All other distinc
tions may be reduced to one of these three. "If the ex
tremes of a distinction are not actually distinct in the

69
real order, we invariable have a mental distinction."
Both real and modal distinctions rest on some actual dis
junction antecedent to human knowledge.

139
But If the extremes of a distinction are actually

distinct in the real order, either each is a true
thing having its own simple or composite entity,
or one extreme is a thing and the other is a mode
of that thing.70
One further quotation will show the close inter
relationship between the various aspects of Suarezian meta
physics. Suarez rejects the opinion that a sign of a real
distinction is that "things that are really distinct have

71
distinct existences." Among other reasons, this criteri
on for a real distinction must be rejected since "existence

72
is nothing other than the very entity of actual essence..."
Hence, since only individuals exist in reality,
and natures do not (and cannot) exist outside the mind ex
cept as individuated, it follows that there cannot be a
real distinction between the nature and its individuality
in terms of Suarez' meaning of a real distinction. Given
that the criterion of a real distinction is separability,
which requires at least two concrete entities each of
which is capable of existing in its own right, it is ob
vious that there cannot be a real distinction between a
nature and its individuation. The nature cannot exist ex-
^°Ibld.. (tr. p. 33).
^1Ibid., sect. 2, no. 13 (tr. p. 49).
^2Ibid., no. 14 (tr. p. 50). For a complete treat

ment of the Suarezian theory of distinctions, see Michael
V, Murray, The Theory of Distinctions in the Metaphysics of
Francis Suarez (unpublished doctoral dissertation. Fordham
University,1944),
tramentally unless it is individuated, and certainly indivi
duality as such cannot exist apart from the nature which it
individuates,
But the mind can distinguish between the nature
and its individuality. As will be seen in the seventh chap
ter, Suarez’ explanation of the formation of universals de
pends on this point. Once the intellect has conceptualized
the singular nature, the intellect can prescind from the
singularity of the nature to consider the nature alone, and
then through comparison see that nature to be something com
mon to many individuals. The important point here is that
this involves a mental distinction between the nature and
its individuality. Whether this is a purely mental distinc
tion or a mental distinction with a foundation in reality
is not of supreme importance. However, that there is some
extramental foundation for this mental distinction may be
seen from the fact that the same specific nature is found
in many individuals, whereas the same individuality cannot
be duplicated. Thus there is some occasion furnished by
reality for making this distinction, although the criterion
of separability necessary for a real distinction cannot be
met. It is likewise certain that the modal distinction
cannot be relevant, since it is not the case that indivi
duality is a mode of nature.
Thus, although individuation adds something real
to the nature, there is only a mental distinction between
them, since neither can be actually separated from the other.

This is the crucial point of Suarez1 argument. Only if this
meaning of a real distinction is accepted will his arguments
against individuation by something really distinct from the
common nature still hold.
The close relation between individuation, the
theory of distinctions and Suarez’ doctrine on intellectual
knowledge of the singular will be brought out in the next
three chapters. In the eighth chapter it will be necessary
to point out that the integration of these three themes
logically forced Suarez to adopt his unique position.

CHAPTER VI
Human Intellectual Knowledge of Material Singulars
At this point it will be useful to note the con
nection between the preceding chapter and the chapters to
follow. It has been shown that for Suarez a being is an
individual by reason of its whole entity. In the case of
material things, although matter alone is not sufficient
as a principle of individuation, matter does enter into
their individuation. Hence, when Suarez says that whatever
has entity is intelligible, he will take this to include
material singulars. What this means for Suarez will be
considered shortly.
The structure of the present chapter is dictated
by this orientation. First, Suarez' notion of the object
of the intellect will be discussed briefly. This leads to
a consideration of how the intellect makes contact with its
object. Suarez follows the Aristotelian approach in this,
which involves the postulation of an agent intellect. He
agrees with Aristotle and St. Thomas that an agent intellect
is necessary, but in his explanation of how the agent in
tellect works, he holds that the agent intellect produces
a spiritual species which represents the material singular
as such.
Thus, for Suarez, the fact that man has direct in
tellectual knowledge of material singulars emerges from his
distinctive points of view on individuation, the object of

Ill3
the intellect, and the production of the concept. Further
more, Suarez finds confirmation of this fact in experience.
This is seen, for example, in his insistence that man makes
singular judgments, and that this demands direct intellect
ual knowledge of the terms of such judgments. Since Suarez
agrees that there is a real distinction between the senses
and the intellect, his understanding of this type of dis
tinction makes it impossible for him to see how there can
be a single act produced by two really distinct powers.
St. Thomas does not deny that man has intellectual
knowledge of material singulars. The precise point of
difference between Suarez and St. Thomas is that Suarez
maintains that this knowledge is direct, whereas St. Thomas
holds that it is indirect or reflexive. Thus Suarez attempts
to show the validity of his own position by excluding the
various theories of reflex knowledge of the singular (as
he understands them). At the same time, he hopes to show
that direct knowledge of the singular is a necessary con-

1
sequence of this refutation.
In Chapter VII, another aspect of this topic will

be discussed. Since Suarez insists that man has direct in
tellectual knowledge of the material singular, it will be
profitable to see how he explains the formation of the uni
versal, and whether there is any objective basis for the
universal concept. Briefly, it will be seen that for Suarez,
the formation of universal concepts presupposes direct in
tellectual knowledge of singulars. Chapter VIII traces
principles underlying Suarez1 explicit treatment of this
topic.
i
The Object of the Intellect
According to St. Thomas, the proper object of the

2
human intellect Is the quiddity of a material thing.
Suarez seems to differ: he holds that the human intellect

■3
can know whatever has any entity. He adds that all agree
11
on this, and it is evident from experience and induction.
M a n ’s intellect "knows God, Angels, and material things,

5
and [knows] their accidents and essence..."
Suarez’ reasoning is that whatever is intelligible
can be known by the intellect, since the intelligible and
the intellect are mutually related. Whatever has entity is
intelligible, and so the object of the intellect is that
2
Summa Theologlae, I a, q. 12, a. Me; I a, a. 8M,
a. 7c; I a, q. 85* a. lc. The implications of this have
been discussed in the second chapter,
•a
"...quidquid entitatem aliquam habet, potest ab
intellectu nostro cognosci." Suarez, De A nl m a . Book IV,
chap. 1, no. 2, Opera Omnia, vol. Ill TFari'sWives, 1856).
1}
"Haec est certa apud omnes, ac experentia constat
et inductione:.,." Ibid. Suarez ignores the distinction
between the proper object of the human intellect and the
adequate object of intellect as such. In the Summa Theolo
glae alone, St. Thomas speaks more frequently of the ade
quate object of the intellect (ens in commune) than of the
proper object of the human Intellect"(quidditas slve natura
in materia corporall existens). For examp1e : "...obiecturn
Intellectus est e n s v e i verum commune." Summa Theologlae ,
I a. q. 55, a. lc. See also I a, q. 79, a. 7c; I a, q.
a. M, ad lm; I A , q. 87, a. 3, ad lm; I a, q. 105, a. Me;
I a-IIae, q, 9, a. lc; I a-II ae, q. 10, a. 1, ad 3m.
"...namque intellectus noster cognoscit Deum,

Angelos, et res materiales, earumque accidentia et essenti-
am: ergo, etc." Suarez, loc . cit.
145
which has entity. Since, as has been shown in dhapter V,
only singulars exist, and Suarez holds that a thing is sin
gular by reason of its whole entity, it is implied here that
even the material singular is an object of the intellect.
The human intellect can know whatever entity a thing has,
and thus also singular entity. Consequently, the intellect
has the same object whether we are speaking about the divine
intellect, an angel's intellect, or a human intellect.
This is evident from the fact that the nature of the intel
lect is not changed in the separated soul simply by its sepa

7
ration from the body. Hence the adequate object of the
human intellect cannot be the quiddity of material things
exclusively, but it must extend to everything which has en
tity, The adequate object of man's intellect considered in

8
itself is being in the widest sense. The adequate object
of a power includes everything with which that power can be
"...quidquid est intelligibile, potest intellectu

cognosci, nam intelligibile et intellectus sibi mutuo re
spondent, atque adaequantur, sed quidquid habet entitatem
est intelligibile: ergo idipsum potest intellectus noster
cognoscere aliquo modo." Ibid,
7
"Tandem de anima separata id constat omnino, quia
cognoscit Deum, Angelos, etc., non mutat autem intellectus
naturam, et speciem suam per separationem: ergo, etc."
Ibid.
Q
"Objectum adaequatum intellectus nostri secundum
se considerati est ens in tota latitudine sua spec$atum."
I bid., no. 3. Once again it should be pointed out that
Suarez does not mention here the distinction between the
proper object and the adequate object of the human intellect
This does not mean, however, that Suarez holds that the
adequate object of the human intellect is its only object.
concerned. The human intellect can know whatever has being,
9
and therefore that is its total or adequate object. That
10
is, the object of the intellect is true or real being.
However, the above applies to the intellect as
intellect. The human intellect is a power of a soul which,
albeit spiritual, is the substantial form of a corporeal
being. Thus, since our soul according to it natural con
dition requires existence in a body of which it is the form,
it also follows that our intellect must understand by means
of species received from the senses. Hence, as a power of
a spirit in matter, our intellect can know only sensible
things directly, since they are proportioned to it. This
is evident from the fact that our intellect can receive the
species of these corporeal things through the senses. But
that is the proportionate object of the intellect which can
be known through its proper species. Therefore, the pro
portionate object of the human intellect in its natural

11
state is a sensible or material thing.
Q
"...nam objectum adaequatum ambit omnia, circa
quae potest versari potentia, sed intellectus potest, cog-
noscere quidquid habet rationem entis: id ergo erit objec
tum totale ipsius," Ibid.
10"Statutum ergo sit objectum intellectus esse ans

verum et reale,..." Ibid.. no. 4.
11,lObjectum proportionatum intellectui humano secun

dum statum naturalem suum est res sensibilis, seu material-
is. Probatur, nam anima nostra secundum naturalem suam con-
ditionem postulat esse in corpore, cujus forma est, unde in
tellectus noster etiam ex se vendicat intelligere per species
a sensibus acceptas: ergo ex se vendicat tantum cognoscere
res sensibiles, utpote illi proportionates. Consequentia
The Necessity and Role of the Agent Intellect
All knowledge involves a union of the object known
with a knowing power. The means by which this union is ac
complished is called a species. The human intellect re
quires the species and likenesses of things in order to

12
know. These species must be spiritual, since the intel
lect which receives them is spiritual. This creates a prob
lem, since the intellect is moved only by an object repre
sented within the phantasm. But the phantasm is material,
and therefore it cannot act on the intellect, which is
spiritual, nor can the phantasm produce a spiritual species.
Therefore, in order to explain the undeniable fact that such
a species is produced, and that it specifies the human in
tellect in the order of knowlddge, and that this species
must come in some way from the phantasm, another more appro-
valet, quoniam harum tantum rerum potest intellectus recipere

species per sensus, ut notum est. Illud autem est.objectum
proportionatum intellectui, quod ab illo per propriam spe-
ciam potest cognosci: quare, etc." Ibid., no. 5.
12
"Unio objecti cognoscibilis cum potentia neces-
saria est in omni cognitione. Est fere communis omnium theo-
logorum et philosophorum, qui in potentiis cognoscitivis
ponunt similitudines quasdam objectorum, ut per illas objec
ts uniantur potentiis, easque vocant species intentionales,
species quidem quia sunt formae repraesentantes: intention
ales vero non, quia entia realia non sint, sed quia notioni
deserviunt, quia intentio dici solet," Suarez, De Anlma.
Book III, chap. 1, no, H, "Ostendimus in superioribus,
lib. 3, cap. 1, in omni cognitione esse necessariam unionem
objecti cum potentia,,..animae autem essentia, cum sit fi-
nita, non omnia continet: nec repraesentat: ac adeo non po
test illas cognoscere: unde supra conclusimus intellectum
indigere speciebus et similitudinibus rerum ad cognoscen-
priate principle is demanded; this principle we call the
•• 13
agent intellect..
If one admits that when the soul is created it is
completely devoid of species, it follows that these species
must be acquired. Then the difficult problem of explaining
how the soul acquires them must be investigated. Philo
sophers following Aristotle have affirmed that there is in
man a certain spiritual power which is called the agent
intellect. The function of this power is to illuminate

14
phantasms, and 'thereby produce intelligible species. It
is certainly necessary, then, that there be a spiritual

15
power in man capable of producing intelligible species.
However, the difficulty of explaining how this
dum,..," Ibid., Book IV, chap. 2, no. 1.

13
” ...intellectum indigere speciebus...utique ne-
cessario spiritualibus, cum ipse intellectus eas recipiens
spiritualis sit. Hinc vero oritur quaestio proposita: nam
intellectus non movetur nisi ab objecto interius in phan-
tasmate repraesentato, phantasma autem materiale est: ergo
non potest agere in intellectum spiritualem, spirituales
species: aliud ergo principium accomodatius quaerendum est,
quern vocant agentem intellectum,” Ibid.
^ " C o n s t a t ergo, animam sine speciebus creari, et

illas in corpore acquirere, sicque perstat difficultas de
modo acquirendi illas, quae coegit Aristotelem, et omnes
philosophos ad asserendum esse in nobis virtutem quamdam
spiritualem, quam intellectum agentem vocant, cujus munus
sit illustrare phantasmata, oeque pacto afficere species
intelligibiles." Ibid., no, 3.
]C
^"Conclusio certa sit, necessarium esse virtutem
spiritualem, cujus vi fiant species intelligibiles: siqui-
dem effectus producibiles sunt, atque immateriales."
Ibid., n o . 4.
power produces the species remains. Obviously the product
ion of the species does not belong to the agent intellect
alone; a fortiori the production of the intelligible species
cannot be accomplished by the phantasm alone. The phantasm
existing in the internal sense is necessary, and in some
way it c-operates in the production of the species. Still
the difficulty remains: how do the agent intellect and the
phantasm function together in the production of the species.
There are three aspects of the activity of the
agent intellect: first, to illuminate phantasms; second, to
make a thing intelligible in act; and third, to abstract

17
the intelligible species from the phantasms. Whether
these are three separate acts or simply one threefold act
will be considered shortly. In any event, the act of illu
minating the phantasm certainly does not precede the produc
tion of the intelligible species.
"Restat vero difficultas, quomodo ea virtus ef-

ficiat species: constat enim non solum illam, sed etiam
phantasma in sensu interiori existens necessarium, et aliquo
modo concurrere ad talem productionem: nam si sola virtus
spiritualis id posset sine ulla omnino dependentia a phan-
tasmate, simul, eta principio posset efficere species om
nium rerum, neque in ea re haberet dependentiam a sensu
aliquo: cujus contrarium experientia demonstrat: est ergo
certa res, phantasma esse necessarium, et concurrere aliquo
modo ad productionem speciei. Quia vero solum illud non
est sufficiens, ut ratio facta ostendit, ideo superadditur
virtus spiritualis. Difficultas ergo superest circa modum,
quo intellectus agens, et phantasma conveniunt ad produc
tionem speciei." Ibid.
■^"...est notandum intellectui agenti triplicem

tribui operationem: primam illuminare phantasmata: secun-
dam efficere res actu intelligibiles: tertiam abstrahere
150
There are various opinions regarding the nature of
this illumination. One ofthem holds that the illumination
of the phantasm is a real action of the agent intellect, and
so something is really produced by this act of illuminating.
If so, this effect must be either in the phantasm itself or
in thepossible intellect. Neither can be the case, for if
one holds that the effect is in the phantasm, then the phan
tasm is changed, and thus it would no longer represent ex
actly the same thing. Furthermore, the action of the agent
intellect is entirely spiritual, and so it-cannot imprint

X8
anything on the phantasm which is material. If one holds
that the effect of illumination is on the possible intel
lect there is also a difficulty. This amounts to an iden
tification of the act of illuminating and the production of

19
the species, since the agent intellect acts on the possible
20
intellect only in regard to specification. But this opin-
species a phantasmatibus:...” Ibid., no. 14.

X8
"praeterea illuminatio ilia phantasmatis actio
realis est intellectus agentis: ergo per illam aliquid reale
producit: ergo vel in phantasmate, vel in intellectu possi-
bili: non primum, ut probatum est." Ibid., no, 5. Suarez
has already said in the same passage: irPeto enim, an per
illam actionem sit aliquid impressum phantasmati, atque adeo
an ipsum phantasma sit realiter immutatum? neutrum enim dici
potest, nam tota actio intellectus agentis est spiritualis:
ergo nihil materiali phantasmati imprimere potest: ergo non
immutat illud realiter:.,,"
■^This is a difficulty only for the proponents of

the opinion Suarez is discussing here, since such an identi
fication would be incompatible with the presuppositions of
this first opinion. Suarez makes precisely the same iden
tification in numbers 14-18 of this chapter.
151
** ion has an additional difficulty: if the phantasm is in no

<►
way changed, there is no real action of the agent intellect
on it, the phantasm remains material, and consequently is

21
always of a singular thing.
Another common opinion is that the phantasm is
united with the agent intellect as an instrument is united
with its principal agent, and both concur in the production

22
of the species. But this opinion labors under the same
difficulties as the first. An instrument of a lower order
cannot naturally bring about an effect of a higher order,
and obviously the spiritual order is superior to the mater
ial order. The order of nature demands that for the pro
duction of anything there is needed a power of the same
(or superior) order as the thing produced. It would be
above the order of nature for a material thing to have a

23
spiritual effect.
20
"Si autem dicatur secundum: ergo dicta illumina-
tio est ipsa speciei productio: nam intellectus agens in
possibilem, non agit nisi speciem." Ibid.. no. 5.
21
"...turn quia si phantasma nullo modo est mutatum,
neque intellectus agens habet actionem realem circa illud:
plane non potest ejus repraesentatio variari: turn quia re-
praesentatio phantasmatis permanet semper materialis: ergo
semper est rei singularis:..." Ibid. Again, this is a
difficulty only for the advocates of the opinion under dis
cussion here. As will be seen, Suarez holds that the intel
lect produces a spiritual species which represents the sin
gular.
22
” ...phantasmafra cum intellectu agente uniri tan-
quam instrumentum cum suo agente principal!: atque utrumque
concurrere ad productionem speciei," Ibid.. no. 6.
po
~)".,.facit enim contra illam communis ratio, quod
Because of this strbng objection some Thomists say
that the relationship between the phantasm and the agent in
tellect is not one of efficient causality but is rather in
the realm of material causality. They do not mean by this
that the phantasm is matter from which the species is drawn,
since this is imposs ib le ~a spiritual form cannot be educed
from a material subject. On the contrary, the phantasm con
curs materially in that it furnishes (as it were) matter or
content for the agent intellect to bring about the species.
Nothing is done to the phantasm, which serves only to bring
the potentially intelligible object into the zone of the
intellect. What is contained in the phantasm remains there,
but it furnishes a model or pattern according to which the
agent intellect reproduces the object in the possible in
tellect by means of an immaterial intelligible species
which is isomorphic to the object in its intelligibility.
Suarez affirms that this opinion "rightly explained" seems

24
the more probable one.
instrumentum inferioris ordinis non potest naturaliter attin

gere effectum perfectioris ordinis, ac tarn superioris, quam
est natura spiritualis ad materlalem collata,...Ultimo argu-
mentor. Quia naturae ordo postulat, ut ad productionem rei
cujusque destinetur virtus ejusdem vel superioris ordinis
cum re producenda: ergo supra ordinem naturae erit rem mater
ialem assumi ad efficiendam spiritualem,11 Ibid., no. 7.
24
"Propter haec ergo nonnulli etiam ex Thomistis
aiunt phantasma non concurrere effective, sed materialiter
ad productionem speciei, solumque intellectum agentem illam
efficere, quod non ita intelligunt, ut ipsum phantasma sifc
materia, ex qua educatur species, id enim impossibile esset.
Primo, quia spiritualis forma educi nequit ex subjecto
153
The action of the agent intellect is in some way

25
determined by the phantasm. This determination does not
consist in any physical transfer of something from the phan
tasm into the intellect. But by reason of the substantial
unity of man, the phantasm and the intellect exist in the
same soul, and thus the phantasm can serve as the matter on
which the intellect works, and provide an exemplar for the
agent intellect. There is an order and harmony between the
activities of these two powers, so that every time the in-

26
tellect operates, so too does the imagination.
materiali. Secundo, quia forma inde educitur, ubi recipi-

tur: species autem non recipitur in phantasmate, sed in
intellectu possibili: ergo de potentia tails intellectus
educitur, non autem de potentia phantasmatis. Neaue rursum
dicitur phantasma materialiter concurrere, quasi existat
propria materia, circa quam operatur intellectus agens, hie
enim operatur circa subjectum, in quo ejus actio recipitur,
recipitur autem in intellectu possibili, non in phantasmate:
ergo, etc. Dicitur ergo phantasma materialiter concurrere
eo quod praebet veluti materiam intellectu! agenti ad ef-
ficiendam speciem intelligibilem. Quae opinio recte ex-
plicata videtur in praesenti probabilior," Ibid., no. 10.
Cf. no. 12, infra.
^"Intellectus agens nunquam efficit speciem, nisi

a phantasiae cognitione determinetur. Haec patet ex dictis,
et experientia ilia,...Ratio autem esse potest: quoniam
intellectus agens indifferens est ad efficiendas species:
ut ergoefficiat has vel illas, eget aliquo determinante:
nihil est autem a quo possit determinari, nisi sensitiva
cognitio: quare, etc." Ibid., no. 11.
26
"Praedicta determinatio non fit per influxum
aliquem ipsius phantasmatis, sed materiam, et quasi exem
plar intellectui agenti praebendo, ex vi unionis quam habent
in eadem anima...est enim notandum, phantasma et intellec
tum hominis radicari in una eademque anima: hinc enim pro-
venit, ut mirum habeant ordinem et consonantiam in operando,
unde (quod patebit infra) eo ipso quod intellectus operatur,
■4* imaginatio etiam sentit." Ibid,, no. 12.
The agent intellect as such has only one operation,
and that is to produce the intelligible species. Thus, il
lumination of phantasms, rendering things intelligihle in
act, and abstracting species from phantasms are the activi
ties usually attributed to the agent intellect. But these
three are really only aspects of the production of the spe
cies. They are not three distinct acts, but only one act
27
designated by several names.
The third aspect, Abstraction of the species, needs
some clarification. To abstract the species does not mean
to remove the species from a phantasm as if it (the species)
were mixed into the phantasm and only needs to be separated
by the agent intellect and passed on to the possible in
tellect. "It would be silly to think this," Suarez comments,

28
"for how would the spiritual be mixed with the material?"
To abstract the species means nothing more than the action
of the intellect by which it produces a spiritual species
which represents the same nature that the phantasm repre-
27
"Intellectus agens, ut sic, nullam aliam actio
nem habet, quam speciei, intelligibilis effectionem diver-
sis nominibus significatam. Ad probationem est notandum
intellectui agenti triplicem tribui operationem: primam il-
luminare phantasmata: secundam efficere res actu intelligi
biles: tertiam abstrahere species a phantasmatibus:....
Esse autem tres distinctas non existimo, sed unam, et eam-
dem diversimodo nominatam,..." Ibid., no. 1*1.
28 ,.
"De tertia tandem operatione, id est, abstrac-
tione est observandum, speciem non dici abstrahibilem, vel
abstrahi a phantasmatibus, quasi ipsa species prius esset
immixta phantasmatibus, unde postea separetur ab intellectu
agente, ac transferatur in possibilem: hoc enim puerile
esset cogitare, quo enim modo spirituale mixtum esset
155
29
sents in a material way.
Abstraction of a Spiritual Species
Representing a Material Singular
This is a crucial stage in the development of Sua
rez' thought. Given the Suarezian teaching on individuation,
namely, that the principle of individuation of every being
is its "total entity," and that individuation does add some
thing real to the nature, it follows that when this singu
lar nature is represented in a quasi-immaterial condition
in the phantasm there will be no change in its singularity
even though the agent intellect reproduces it in a fully
spiritual state on the screen of the possible intellect.
Within the context of the various elements of his thought,
Suarez implicitly affirms that the material singular can be
represented in the intellect by a spiritual species that
differs from its objective extramental referent only in its
entitative character, since for Suarez, dematerialization
does not entail loss of singularity inasmuch as matter alone
is not a sufficient principle of individuation. Hence the
first step in human intellectual knowledge is a concept of
materiali?" Ibid., no, 18.

29
"Intellectum ergo abstrahere speciem, nihil est
aliud quam virtute sua efficere speciem spiritualem reprae-
sentantem eamdem naturam, quam phantasma repraesentat, modo
tamen quodam spiritualis illaque elevatio a materiali rep-
raesentatione phantasmatis ad spiritualem repraesentationem,
( speciei intelligibilis dicitur abstractio: ex quo aperte
constat abstractionem non esse actionem distinctam a pro-
ductione speciei:..." Ibid.
156
the singular nature. This concept is spiritual and singu
lar, but what it represents is a material singular.
Thus, Suarez affirms that the human intellect
knows the material singular through the formation of a

30
proper and distinct concept of it. He offers several ar
guments in support of this. The intellect forms a pro
position from a singular and a universal term, and so it
must have a proper concept of each. It would be unreason
able to claim that in such a proposition (e.g., "Peter is a
man")the subject is in the cogitative sense and the predi
cate is in the intellect, "for where, I ask, will the copu
la be? or how will one power itself be able to compare the

31
predicate with the subject unless it knows both." The
intellect can distinguish between "man" and "Peter," and so

32
it must have distinct knowledge of each. Secondly, pru
dence is concerned with singulars, with whether this or
"Intellectus coghoscit singulare formando pro-

prium et distinctum conceptum illius." De Anlma, Book IV,
chap, 3» no. 3. That Suarez is speaking of the human intel
lect and of material singulars is clear from the context
and from the chapter heading: "An Intellectus Noster in
Rebus Materialibus Cognoscat Singularia, an Universalia
Tantum."
31
"Quoniam intellectus format propositione, ex
singular!, et universal! termino: ergo concipit utrumque
extremum proprio conceptu. Quod vero quidam volunt in tali
aliqua propositione, verbi gratia, Petrus est ho mo , sub-
jectum esse in cogitativa, et praedicatum in intellectu,
omnino est alienam a ratione, nam ubi, quaeso, erit copula?
aut quomodo una ipsa potentia posterit comparere praedica
tum subjecto, nisi utrumque cognoscat." Ibid., italics in
ed. cit.
32
"Praeterea intellectus distinguit hominem a
157
that action or thing should be pursued or avoided. Pru
dence is an intellectual virtue, and so the intellect must
know the material singular in order to make a prudential
judgment. Finally, it may be argued a priori on the basis
of the universality of the intellectual power, that the in
tellect as the superior cognitive power can know everything
that the senses, the lower powers in the same order, can
know. The intellect directs the senses and corrects their
errors. Therefore, the intellect knows singulars much bet-

33
ter than the senses do.
According to Suarez, then, the human intellect
knows the material singular through a species proper to

34
that material singular. There is no reason whay there
cannot be a spiritual impressed species which represents
the material singular thing as such, Hence, the intellect
in its active phase can produce such a species, and so the
Petro: ergo utriusque habet distinctam cognitionem:...nulla

potentia discernere valet inter duo, nisi utrumque norit
et est satis evidens, qui enim discernet inter incognita?”
Ibid.
33
"Item prudentia versatur circa singularia, hoc
scilicet, aut illud esse prosequendum, vitandum, etc. Sed
prudentia est intellectualis virtus: ergo, etc.... Ratio
a priori sumitur ex universalitate potentiae, est enim su
perior et potens omnia, quae inferiores sensus, imo dirigens
illos et errores illorum corrigit: multo ergo melius singu
laria novit, quam sensus." Ibid. Suarez also argues that
divine faith often concerns singulars, and faith is an in
tellectual virtue; charity deals with material singulars
through the will, which follows the intellect.
•^"Intellectus noster cognoscit singulare materi-

l'* ale per propriam ipsius speciem," Ibid.. no. 5.
158-
intellect in its passive phase can know the singular through

35
its proper species. As has been seen in the case of singu
lar propositions, and from the examples of divine faith, pru
dence, and charity, the human intellect can produce an ex
pressed species, that is, a proper concept of the singular
thing, and so it must also be able to produce an impressed

36
species which is proper to the material singular. If
angels can have singular spiritual species which represent
material singulars as such, there is no reason why material
singulars cannot be represented in the human intellect by

37
means of a spiritual species. Universal material essen
ces can be represented by a spiritual species, so also mat
erial singulars can be represented by a spiritual species.
If a material essence can be represented by a spiritual
quality at all, it makes no difference whether it is singu-

38
lar or universal.
35
"...quia nihil repugnat dari speciem spiritualem
impressam repraesentativam singularis rei materialis, ut
sic: ergo talis species produci valet ab intellectu agente^
ergo a possibili Jam cognoscetur singulare per prflpriam “
speciem." Ibid.
"...nam potest dari species expressa, seu pro-

prius conceptus rei singularis, ut probatum est [supra
no. 33: ergo et species impressa, ac propria..." I b i d .
37
...nam in Angelis,..., et slngulares repraesen-
tantes propria singularia materia, ut sic: ergo non repug
nat materiale singulare repraesentari per speciem spiritua
lem." Ibid.
q Q
"Tertio res universales materiales repraesentan-
tur per speciem spiritualem? ergo et singulares poterunt
repraesentari. Nam si semel per spiritualem qualitatem
potest repraesentari res materialis, nihil interest, singu-
159
If a spiritual species representing the individual
material thing is incompatible with m a n ’s passive intellect,
it is either because the passive intellect is incapable of
receiving it, or because the agent intellect cannot produce
it. Suarez' answer to these alternatives reveals again two
interesting facets of his thought: first, that Suarez tends
to minimize the distinction between the proper object and
the adequate object of the human intellect, and secondly,
that his different principle of individuation changes the
epistemological situation. Suarez maintains that it cannot
be said that man's passive intellect is incapable of recei-
laris ne sit, an universalis." Ibid. "Res" is taken to

mean "essence" in this text, not only because it would be
absurd to speak of a "universal material thing," nor only
because Suarez denies that any thing existing outside the
mind is universal (Disputatlones Metaphyslcae, Disp . V; cf.
also chap. 3 supra, where this is discussed explicitly), but
also because of the positive identification Suarez makes be
tween res, essentia, and ens taken as a noun. In the Dlspu-
tatlonesTfyletaphyslcae, Disp. II, sect. 4, no. 15, Suarez says
that ens* taken as a noun and res are identical in meaning,
and they differ only etymologfcally. Res is said of an es
sence insofar as it is firm and stable and not synthetic,
wherefore it can be called a real essence. A thing is"cal
led an ens in this sense because it has a real essence. Ens
formally signifies actual existence, but res signifies only
real quiddity oto real essence. In the same section (no. 7)
Suarez says that the basic hallmark of a real essence is t
tftat it is that which involves no intrinsic contradiction
and is not merely a mental construct. This is the negative
aspect of essence. Positively, essence is the principle or
root of real operations or effects, as an efficient, formal,
or material cause. A real essence (in the order of creation)
is one which can be constituted in actual being. It is
that which of itself is capable of being, of really existing.
For a dissenting opinion on Suarez' position summarized here,
see Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed.
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute 'of Medieval Studies, 1952)
pp. 97-107.
160
vlng a spiritual species which represents the individual ma
terial thing as individual. The intellect, as intellect, is
capable of receiving such a species, since the angelic in
tellect can do so. Hence it is not incompatible with the
human intellect. On the contrary, the human intellect would
seem even more capable of receiving it, since it is more in-

39
timately associated with materiality. The second alterna
tive is also rejected. It is not beyond the capacity of the
agent intellect to produce such a species. "For the active
power of the agent intellect ought to be adequate to the

„40
capacity of the possible intellect:..." Thus, if the pos
sible intellect can receive a spiritual species which repre
sents a material singular, the agent intellect should be
able to produce it. Since it is granted that the intellect
can produce universal species, it seems to Suarez that it

41
should require less efoort to produce a singular species.
39
"Deinde probatur primo consequentia, quia si
repugnaret fieri talem speciem in nostro intellectu pas
sive, vel repugnaret propter illius incapacitatem: vel quia
licet capax sit recipere, intellectus tamen agens non po
test illam producere. Non primum, intellectui enim, ut in
tellectus est, non repugnat habere speciem propriam rei
singularis, ut patet in angelico: ergo nec repugnat humano:
non enim est major ratio, quin potius humanus videtur apt-
ior, quia magis accedit ad materialitatem," Suarez, De
Anima, loc . clt.
IfO
"Secundum etiam dici non potest. Nam virtus
activa intellectus agentis debet esse adaequata capacitati
intellectus possibilis:..." Ibid.
lii
"...si non repugnat es parte intellectus pos
sibilis, non repugnat ex parte agentis, seu minus assigne-
tur ratio aliqua ejusmodi repugnantiae intellectus agentis,
cur etiam possit efficere species univerdalium, non vero
161
Although he does not say so explicitly, Suarez seems to have
in mind the notion that an unutilized capacity for direct
knowledge of material singulars on the part of the possible
intellect would be superfluous, and natura nihil fit frustra.
Suarez thinks that the human intellect must be able to re
ceive singular spiritual species of individual material
things in this life, since the separated soul must retain
knowledge of singular things and of the particular actions
which it did in this life. This is the case only because
the human mind of itself has a natural capacity for pro
ducing and receiving the species of material singulars in

42
this life.
If the human intellect in its active phase cannot
produce the species of a singular thing, it cannot form a
proper and distinct concept of that thing. If, on the other
singularium, quandoquidem possibiles admittuntur." Ibid.

42
"Confirmatur haec ratio. Nam in anima separata
manet cognitio rerum singularium, et actionum particularium,
quas gessit in vita, ut patet ex coliLoquio divitis cum
Abrahamo, quod refertur Lucae 15 [sic; actually chap. 16],
...manant ergo species in ea anima rerum singularium, non
enim dicendum videtur a Deo denuo infundi: turn quia super-
fluum id videretur, neque etiam ratio ulla daretur, cur
infunderentur horum potius, quam aliorum singularium
species: turn quia si tunc prlmo infundantur, non id sane
continget propter capacitatem solummodo obedientialem in
tellectus, alias animae separate supernaturaliter cognos-
cerent singularia materialia, quod est absurdam: infundun-
tur ergo ob naturalem capacitatem; ergo animus noster de
se est capax specierum rerum singularium: ergo ilia apti-
tudo et potentia virtute intellectus agentis in hac vita
actuari, explerique potest," Ibid.
162
hand, it has such a concept, as has been shown in the case
of singular propositions and so forth, the intellect must
be able to form a concept which is proper to the singular
thing. The intellect cannot grasp a thing any more fully
in second act (conceptualization) than its capacity in first
act (production of the species) allows. If it does not have
the species proper to the singular thing it cannot form a

43
concept proper to that individual. Hence, according to
Suarez, the human intellect knows the material singular di
rectly, by producing a spiritual species which directly re
presents the material singular, and which makes possible
the formation of a singular concept. He proposes to streng
then this conclusion by excluding the various ways in which
the singular is said to be known by the intellect indirect-

44
ly, or by reflection.
The human intellect, according to Suarez, knows
material singulars directly, without reflection. Every
thing which is known through its proper species can be
known directly by means of that species. Man can know
43
"Se intellectus noster careat specie rei singu
laris, non poterit formare proprium, et distinctum ejus
conceptum:...ergo a contrario, si habet propriam, ut est
probatum, necesse est propriam efformet conceptionem. Pro-
batur consequentia, quia non valet intellectus de re cogi-
tare amplius in actu secundo, quam datum ei sit in actu pri-
mo, seu per speciem: ergo sit non habet propriam speciem de
re singulari, neque propriam formabit conceptionem." Ibid..
no. 6.
44
"Tandem confirmatur magis consequentia haec ex-
cludendo modod, auibus dici solet singulare cognosci ab
intellectu reflexe." Ibid.
singulars through their proper species, and so the human in
tellect can know material singulars directly. This is to be
proved by refuting all the theories which hold that the hu
man intellect knows the material singular only by reflec

ts
tion.
Criticism of the Thomistic Theory of Reflex Knowledge
Suarez understands the position of St. Thomas to
be that the singular is known insofar as the intellect,
once it knows the universal nature, returns to that phan
tasm from which the universal species was abstracted, and in

46
this way it knows the singular thing. But, Suarez asks,
45
"Intellectus noster cognoscit directe singularia
materialia absque reflexione. Probatur ex praecedenti con-
clusione, [nos. 5-6] Nam omne, quod cognoscitur per propriam
speciem, per illam valet directe cognosci: ostendimus autem
singularia, de quibus agimus per propriam cognosci speciem,
ea igitur directe attinguntur ab humano intellectu. Deinde
probatur, excludendo modos omnes cognoscendi tantum per
reflexionem." Ibid., no. 7.
46
"...ex S. Thoma,,.,est singulare cognosci qua-
tenus intellectus cognita prius natura universali reflec-
titur ad phantasma ipsum, a quo rei universalis species
fuerat abstracta, ac per illud rem singularem cognoscere,"
Ibid. Suarez refers to the Summa Theologlae. I a, q. 86,
a. 1, and the De Verltate. q. 2, a. b . These texts of St.
Thomas (and many others) have, of course, been considered
in the second chapter of this dissertation. Whether Suarez
has interpreted St. Thomas correctly is certainly open to
argument. Suarez understands the position of St. Thomas to
be that the universal is known first and then by a subse
quent act of reflection or conversion to the phantasm the
intellect indirectly knows the singular. There are texts,
e.g., S.T., I, q, 85, a. 3, which might seem to Justify
this interpretation. However, Suarez* critique is not di
rected against the temporal sequence, but rather against
the theory that the material singular is known intellectu
ally in some indirect way.
164
by what reason and through what species is the singular
known by this conversion to the phantasm? The singular is
known either by means of the phantasm as through an object,
a known medium, or the singular is known as through an un-

47
known medium, a species. Suarez gives several arguments
against the first alternative.
In the first place, he maintains, the singular
cannot be known by the intellect's having the phantasm as
an object of knowledge, since the intellect would have to
know the phantasm before knowing the singular represented
in it. This is contrary to experience, "since many know
singulars, and reason about them, who know nothing about

48
phantasms." Then too, the phantasm itself is a material
singular. If the intellect knows the phantasm as an object,
and if the singular thing is represented in the phantasm as
in an object, then at least in this case the intellect

49
knows a material singular directly. This is possibly
47
"Rogo autem, qua ratione per conversionem hanc
per phantasma singulare cognoscatur: et per quam speciem.
Nam vel cognoscitur per phantasma, tanquam per objectum,
seu medium cognitum:vel tanquam per speciem." Suarez, ibid.
UQ
"Tanquam per objectum cognosci, est impossibile
primo, quia alioquin prius foret cognoscendum ab intellectu
phantasma ipsum, quam singulare in eo repraesentatum, quod
est contra experientiam: multi siquidem singularia norunt,
ac de illis ratiocinantur, qui nihil noverunt de phantasma
tibus." Ibid. In fairness to St. Thomas, it must be ob
served that Suarez1 objection in the present instance is
far from convincing. One's ignorance about phantasms hard
ly disproves their existence ot? the possibility of their
having a role in indirect, reflexive knowledge of singulars.
Ziq
^"...quia phantasma ipsum est quid singulare, ac
165
f> Suarez' most persuasive argument, but there Is no evidence

i*
that the proponents of the reflexive theory hold that the
phantasm is directly and consciously known as an object by
the human intellect. On the contrary, it would seem more
generally the case that the phantasm is postulated as a co
requisite with the agent intellect in the Aristotelian ex
planation of ideogenesis. In this way, even knowledge about
the phantasm would be indirect and reflexive. Mutatis
mutandis, the smae must be said of Suarez1 remaining ob
jection on this score, viz., if the intellect knows the
singular in the phantasm an intelligible species will have
to be assigned by which the intellect knows it. But this
cannot be a universal species, since the universal does not

50
especially represent one singular more than another.
The other alternative, that the singular ia known
through the phantasm as through a species or unknown medium,
must also be rejected. The reason for this is that a mater
ial thing which is of the lower order "cannot concur in a

51
spiritual act." The activity of the imagination is ir-
materiale: ergo si cognoscitur, ac in alio res singularis

tanquam in objecto repraesentatur, jam singulare ipsum
materiale directe cognoscitur." Ibid.
50
"Quarto si cognoscitur singulare in phantasmate,
assignanda erit intelligibilis species, qua illud cognoscat,
non quidem species rei universalis, quia indifferens est,
nec magls hoc, quam illud singulare representans." Ibid.
^1"Jam vero cognosci singulare per phantasma tan

quam per speciem, seu medium non cognitum, dici nullo modo
( potest. Quia res materialis et inferioris ordinis non
potest concurrere in actum spiritualem." Ibid.
166
relevant and insufficient if the intellect is not intrinsi-

5
cally competent to know both the singular and the universal.
It might be suggested that the singular is known
intellectually by means of a knowledge of the whole set of
that singular's accidents. To this Suarez answers that these
accidents are known either in general or severally. If they
are known as universals, then they cannot be the means of
knowing a definite singular. If the accidents are known in
dividually, then singular accidents are known directly
through a species proper to each, and hence, at least some
material singulars are known directly by the human intel-

53
lect. And if this is so, Suarez implies, then why should
the material singular remain only indirectly knowable to the
intellect?
Suarez gives three arguments against every theory
that holds that the human intellect knows the material sin
gular only indirectly or by reflection.
The first argument is from experience. It is a
"...namque operatio phantasiae impertinens est,

atque insufficiens, si intellectus ipse intra se non habet
sufficiens principium cognitionis, qualis non est rei uni
versalis species, sed sola species rei singularis: ergo, etc."
Ibid.
CO
^J"Alii tandem ponunt cognosci singulare cognita
Integra collectione accidentium illius. At tunc redit
quaestio de accidentibus, an in universal!, an in singular!
potius cognoscantur. Si primum, per ilia profecto non de-
venienius in cognitionem hujus singularis. Si secundum:
ergo accidentia singularia cognoscuntur directe per pro
priam speciem, quod est intentum." Ibid.
imabter of common experience, Suarez says, that one knows the
singular intellectually before he proceeds by a reflexive
descent from the universal nature back to the singular. The
uneducated man knows "John Jones" and the other individual
things, and he reasons about them directly and immediately,
even though he may not know anything about universal natures
The learned man can also experience this truth if he con
siders the way in which he knew singulars before he mastered

54
philosophy or dialectics.
Secondly, Suarez argues that if there were only a
universal species representing the generic or specific na
ture in the intellect, through which universal species the
intellect would know that nature, then there would be only
one species in the intellect representing man in general.
If this wer the case, every other species representing man
would be superfluous. This one universal species represen
ting man universally would be abstracted only once from the
phantasm of the individual man first known. Subsequent sen
sory encounters with other men would not result in the ac
quisition by the intellect of any species of the men ex
perienced after that first one. If this were so, the intel-
^ " P r i m u m ab experientia: nam antequam sciat unus-

quisque reflecti descendo a natura universali ad dingularia,
novit ipsa singularia. Rusticus enim cognoscit Petrum, res-
que caeteras individuas, ac circa illas ratiocinatur immedi
ate, cum prorsus ignoret naturas universales, quod etiam doc
tus quilibet valet in se experiri, si consideret modum, quo
singularia noverat, antequam philosophiam perdisceret, aut
etiam dialecticam," Ibid. . no. 8,
168
lect could not know them distinctly, since the intellect
could not refer to their phantasms if it had not originally

55
derived discrete species from these different phantasms.
The final argument is based on the fact that the
human intellect is on a scale of perfection between G o d ’s
intellect and the sense powers. Certainly the human intel
lect is inferior to the divine— and God knows singulars
directly. And so, no reason or experience can be offered
as grounds for denying that the human intellect has direct
knowledge of the singular. Such denials are founded either
on the perfection of the human inte-lect as a cognitive
power, or on its imperfection, If this denial is based on
the perfection of the human intellect, it must be answered
that the intellects of angels and of God are far more per
fect, and yet they know singulars directly. On the other
hand, if the denial emphasizes the imperfection of the in
tellect, the senses are far more imperfect, and yet even
56
the senses perceive singulars directly. However, if it
is said that the human intellect is the most imperfect on
the scale of intellects and so it is incapable of grasping
'’-’''Secundum argumentum sit: quia si in intellectu

esset tantum species universalis naturae specificae, vel
genericae, per quam cognosceret ipsam, sequeretur dari in
intellectu unam tantum speciem repraesentantem hominem in
communi: namque una producta omnes aliae essent superfluae:
ergo species hominis semel tantum abstraheretur ex phantas
mate singularis hominis primo cogniti: ergo occurentibus
sensui aliis hominibus, intellectus nullam de caetero spe
ciem acquiret: ergo non posset illos distincte cognoscere,
cum ibi nulla esset conversio ad phantasmata, siquidem in
tellectus nullam haberet speciem desumptam ab eorum phantas-
169
the material singular directly, it ought to be denied in
stead that the human intellect can grasp universal natures-
and it should, on this supposition, be claimed that the hu
man intellect is restricted to the knowledge of material sin
gulars. But, Suarez says, it would surely not be correct to
maintain this. No matter how imperfect the human intellect
is, it is still above the perfection of the senses. For
this reason, only the intellect can attain to a knowledge
of universals, and no sense can do this. Hence the intel
lect should have whatever perfection there is in the lower
powers, and their perfection is the direct perception of

57
singulars.
matibus." Ibid.
56
"Nulla ratio, aut experientia se offert ad de-
negandam intellectui directam cognitionem singularis, quia
aut negatur propter ipsius intellectus imperfectionem, aut
propter perfectionem. Si hoc posterius dicatur, sane multo
perfectiores sunt intellectus Angelorum, ac Dei, qui tamen
singularia directe noscunt: si prius illud asseratur, multo
imperfectiores sunt sensus et tamen etiam ilia percipiunt."
Ibid.
57
"Quod si occurratur, impotentiam provenire ex
imperfectione alterius rationis, nimirum, quoniam intellec
tus noster in gradu et ordine intellectuum est imperfectis-
simus, ideoque valere quidem naturas universales cognoscere,
non tamen individua: hoc certe non recte dicetur: intellec
tus enim quantumvis imperfectus elevatur super perfectionem
sensus: qua de causa nullus sensus, solus vero intellectus
ad universalium cognitionem potuit attingere. Habere ergo
debet quidquid perfectionis est in potentiis inferioribus,
cujusmodi est directa singulorum perceptio." Ibid. The
argument that whatever the inferior power can do the super
ior power of the same order can do, is, of course the ar
gument of Scotus, and it was anticipated (and rejected) by
St. Thomas, Each handled it differently, however, as has
been shown in the second and third chapters of this disswr-
tation. Curiously, contrary to his usual practice, Suarez
170
Exegesis of a Text of Aristotle
Suarez recognizes several objections and difficul
ties concerning the position he has taken. One such prob
lem has already been considered in the first chapter of this
dissertation, that is, a text of Aristotle which seems to

58
deny knowledge of the singular to the intellect. It was
observed that this text admits of a twofold interpretation
(exclusive or inclusive), and that St, Thomas adopts an ex
clusive interpretation, whereas Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez
interpret this passage inclusively.
The passage which Suarez quotes in the present in
stance is one of several Aristotelian texts bearing on this
topic. The idea conveyed by this text is that the senses
distinguish between the hot and the cold since flesh is a
certain balance of hot and cold; but the essential charac
ter of flesh itself is discerned by a non-sensory power,
which is either separable from the sense powers, or related

59
to them as a bent line is related to itself as straightened.
does not mention either St. Thomas or Scotus or cite any of

their works here.
58
Cf. supra, chap. 1, pp. 4-5, and footnote no. 1;
the passage quoted was: "The universal is known by reason,
and the singular by sense..." Aristotle, Physics. Book I,
chap. 5, (lo9a5).
59
"Sensitiva ergo pars calidum discernit et frigi-
dum, quorum quaedam est ratio, caro: alia vero esse carnis
discernit, aut separabili, aut sese habente ad seipsam,
perinde ac se habet cum sese extendit linea reflexa."
Aristotle, De Anl ma , Book III, chap. 4 (429bl5), as quoted
It is difficult to see why this particular quota
tion from Aristotle can be considered an objection against
the position taken by S&arez, but he adds that the inference
commonly drawn from this text is that the singular is known

60
intellectually only by a reflex act. However, Suarez con
tinues, this text is not a conclusive objection, since anoth
er interpretation is possible:
...indeed Aristotle means only that it is the same

intellect which knows [both] the singular and the
universal: for just as the same line is curved and
straight, only in different respects, so also the
intellect knows these two.°-*-
And so when Aristotle says that understanding is of univer-
sals and sensation is of singulars, Suarez interprets this
in an inclusive way, that is, that the sense knows only
by Suarez, D<3 Anlma. Book IV, chap. 3, no. 9. Actually the

immediately preceding lines of Aristotle's text (429bl0-15)
seem more germane? "Since we can distinguish between a spa
tial magnitude and what it is to be such, and between water
and what it is to be water, and so in many other cases
(though not in all: for in certain cases the thing and its
form are identical), flesh and what it is to be flesh are
discriminated either by different faculties, or by the same
faculty in two different states: for flesh necessarily in
volves matter..." Aristotle, De Anlma. Book III, chap. 4
(429b 10-15), trans. J.A. Sml£ET, in fehe Basic Works of
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 19^1)
p. Cf. also Aristotle, De_ Anima, Book II, chap. 5
(4l7b20); and Physics. Book I, chap. 5 (l89a5).
^ " E x quo loco infertur communiter singulare ab

intellectu cognosci actu quasi reflexo." Suarez, De Anlma.
Book IV, chap. 3» no. 9.
61
"Sed non urget locus: quippe Aristoteles inten-
dit solum eumdem esse intellectum, qui cognoscit singulare
et universale: nam sicut eadem linea curva est, et recta,
habens se tantum diversimode, ita et intellectus duo ilia
cognoscens," Ibid.
172
singulars, but the intellect knows both singulars and uni-
versals.
The intellect is a spiritual power which abstracts
from matter and from the conditions of matter, but this does
not mean that it is thereby unable to know material things
with all their individuating circumstances. Rather it means
only that the species (or intentional form through which the
62
intellect knows singulars) ought to be spiritual. Thus
the work of the agent intellect in abstracting should not be
understood as the production of a species representing the
common nature without individuating factors, but as pro-
"...dic intellectum dici et esse potentiam spi-

ritualem abstrahentem a conditionibus materiae, non ob esse
quominus possit cognoscere res materiales cum omnibus con
ditionibus individuantibus, ut in Angelis patet: solumque
posse inferri speciem, per quam intellectus cognoscit sin-
gularia, debere esse spiritualem, cum quo stat representare
posse rem singularem, ut ostensum est." Ibid., no. 10.
Since Suarez has adopted a principle of individuation which
does not necessarily involve matter, he is able to take this
position. St. Thomas, on the other hand, having adopted
matter as the principle of individuation, could not hold
that man has direct intellectual knowledge of material sin
gulars. For St. Thomas, m a n ’s intellectual knowledge of
material singulars is indirect and always involves the co
ordination of sensory and intellectual powers. Although this
has been treated at length in the first chapter of this dis
sertation, it is well to recall it here for the sake of com
parison. So too, Suarez' critique of other theories of in
dividuation and his own deceptively simple theory of indivi
duation, discussed in the third chapter, allows him to hold
that not only spiritual singulars but also material singu
lars are directly knowable t6 the human intellect. This
connection between Suarez' theory of individuation and his
teaching on human intellectual knowledge of material singu
lars is of primary importance, and so it has been stressed
throughout.
X
ducing a spiritual species whose actuality Abstracts from
63
the materiality of the phantasm.
/To
"...intellectus agentis abstractionem intelligi
non debere piroductionem speciei representantis naturam
communem sine conditionibus individuantibus, quas phantas-
mata repraesentat, ut plerique voluerunt: sed intelligi
productionem speciei spiritualis abstrahentis in suo esse
a materialitate phantasmatis, sicut jam supra exposuimus.
Et haec de modo cognoscendi singularia," Ibid.
CHAPTER VII
Production of the Universal
As was seen in the previous chapter, Suarez asserts
that the fact that man has direct intellectual knowledge of
the material singular is confirmed by experience. In line
with his theories of individuation and distinction, he holds
that the agent intellect produces a singular spiritual spe
cies which represents the object contained in the phantasm.
There are only two important differences between the phan
tasm and the species produced by the agent intellect. The
phantasm is quasi-material and only potentially intelligible,
the intelligible species is spiritual and actually intelli
gible. Hence the concept is a singular spiritual represen
tation of the material singular object. The concept is
spiritual in its state of being, but its cognitive content
includes the matter of the object (not physically, but
intentionally).
Suarez illuminates this topic further in his dis
cussion of the way in which the human intellect knows uni-
versals.* He considers three opinions regarding the forma
tion of universal concepts. His typical moderation appears
in his efforts to weigh and adjust these opinions so that
rejects only the first opinion and resolves the other two
1Suarez, De Anlma. Book IV, chap. 3, nos. 11-14j

Disputatlones Metapfiys 1 cae. Disp. VI, sect. 6, nos. 1-7
and 11-1 •}.
175
<► by finding an acceptable element in both the second and
third opinions. Dominating the whole discussion is his con
viction that man has direct Intellectual knowledge of the
material singular, and so knowledge of the universal is
only subsequently derived from singular concepts. For Sua
rez, then, the formation of universal concepts presupposes
direct intellectual cognition of singulars.
He begins with the traditional distinction be
tween the agent intellect, which produces intelligible spe
cies, and the possible intellect, which employs and under
stands through these intelligible species. The intellect
has a twofold activity bearing on the present issue. One
operation of the intellect
is called direct, by which it directly tends toward

the thing which the intelligible species represents
and to which it leads the intellect per se and simply,
The other is called reflex, by which the intellect
thinks back on a prior cognition or on its object
according to those conditions or denominations which
it receives from the cognition.2-
Various Opinions Discussed and Analyzed by Suarez
Suarez recognizes three possible opinions on the
formation of universals. The first is that the universal
is formed by an operation of the agent intellect which pre-
p
.[Intellectus] habet autem duplicem operatio-
nem (praetermissis aliis quae ad praesens institutum non
spectant): una vocatur directa, qua directe tendit in rem
quam species intelligibilis repraesentat et ad quam ducit
intellectum per se et simpliciter. Alia vocatur reflexa,
qua intellectus revolvitur supra priorem cognitionem vel
{' supra obiectum eius secundum eas conditiones vel denomina-
tiones quas ex cognitione accipit." Suarez, Disputatlones
176
cedes any function of the possible intellect. This activity
of the agent intellect consists in the production of an in
telligible species which represents the common nature as

3
prescinded and abstracted from all individuals.
According to the second opinion, "the universal is
not made by the agent intellect, but by the possible [intel
lect] through a direct operation by which it knows the com
mon nature according to its precise formal ratio and essence,"
without considering its inferiors or individual embodiments,
and also without formally and actually considering the com
monness of that nature. Only the essence (which is common)

4
is considered.
The third opinion is that the universal comes about
through a comparative knowledge "by which the possible in
tellect, after it apprehends the nature precisely and ab-
Metaphyslcae, Disp. VI, sect, 6, no. 1.

■a
"Tres igitur in hac re possunt esse opiniones:
prima est universale fieri per operationem intellectus
agentis quae antecedit omnem operationem intellectus possibi-
lis, et consistit in productione speciei intelligibilis re-
praesentantis naturam praecisam et abstractam ab omnibus in-
dividuis," Ibid., no. 2. Suarez attributes this position to
St. Thomas (and others) and cites the Summa Theologlae, la,
q. 85, a, lc and ad 4m; In VII Metaph., lectio 1 ^; De Ente
et Essentia, chap. 4 (see also Aquinas, In YT De AnTmaT"T e c t .
17, nos. 375-380, and In III Ete Anlma. lect. 1?T7 no. 731) .
i|
"Secunda opinio est universale non fieri ab in-
tellectu agente, sed a possibili per operationem directam
qua cognoscit naturam communem secundum suam praecisam ratio-
nem formalem et essentiam, nihil de inferioribus rationibus
vel de individuis considerando, neque ctiam formaliter et
quasi in actu signato considerando,coraraunitatem ipsius:natu
rae sed solum essentiam, quae communis est." Suarez, D M ,
stractly, compares it so conceived with the things in which
it exists and understands it as one which is apt to be in

5
many inferiors and may be predicated of them,”
Proponents of the first opinion, Suarez adds, hold
that the possible intellect does not know material singulars
directly, but only common natures, because of the species
which it receives from the agent intellect. This species
directly represents only the common nature prescinded from
all individuals and is thus universal in representation.
The nature represented in this way, objectively and by ex
trinsic denomination becomes universal through this kind of
abstraction, "for, if the singular and individual is made
by contraction, the universal and common will be made by

,.6
abstraction."
Those who hold that the possible intellect knows
Disp. VI, sect. 6, no. 3.

5
"Tertia sententia est universale fieri per noti-
tiam comparativam qua intellectus possibilis, postquam
naturam praecise et abstracte apprehendit, confert illam sic
conceptam cum rebus in quibus existit et intelligit illam
ut unum quid aptum ut sit in multis inferioribus et de
illis praedicetur." Ibid., no. 5.
^"Quae sententia supponit imprimis intellectum

possibilem directe et ex vi speciei quam recipit ab intel-
lectu agente, non cognoscere singularia materialia sed tan-
tum naturas communes. Ex quo infert speciem productam ab
intellectu agente tantum repraesentare directe naturam com-
munem praecisam ab omnibus individuis et consequenter esse
universalem in repraesentatem, obiective et denominations
extrinseca fieri universalem per huiusmodi abstractionemj
nam, si contractions fit singularis et individua, abstrac
tions fiet universalis et communis." Ibid., no, 2.
singulars (both material and spiritual) directly, should
teach the second opinion, at least to the extent of denying

7
that the agent intellect forms the universal. According
to this opinion, the agent intellect, properly speaking,
forms a species which is singular both in its being and in
its representation of the individual, singular thing. The
reason for this is that the intellect can know the singular
primarily and directly only if it receives a species which
represents that singular properly and as a particular thing.
Thus, according to this opinion, the agent intellect does
not abstract the universal from singulars, but only abstract
an intelligible species from the phantasm. In this view,
the work of the agent intellect is to separate the intelli
gible species from the conditions of matter from the stand
point of its real being, but not with regard to the object
it represents. The agent intellect produces a species
which is spiritual in its being and which represents numeri
cally the same individual which is represented by the phan
tasm. There is no reason, Suarez adds, why a material in-
^"Hanc [secundam] sententiam quoad priorem partem

negantem in qua differt a praecedente, necessario docere
debent qui tenent intellectum possibilem cognoscere directe
singularia, etiam materialia." Ibid.» no. 3.
Q
"Nam iuxta illam opinionem consequenter dicendum
est intellectum agentem, per se loquendo, efficere speciem
singularem, non solum in essendo sed etiam in repraesentan-
do rem individuam et singularem; quia non posset earn intel
lectus primo et directe cognoscere, nisi reciperet speciem
proprie et in particular! repraesentantem illam." Ibid.
179
dividual cannot be represented in the intentional order by

9
an immaterial form or quality.
According to the third opinion10 the nature which
exists in singulars has only a remotely potential universa
lity. This nature is not common positively, as something
really one which somehow also exists in many simultaneously,
and it is not common negatively, as something which is not
proper to any one thing. "But there is in it only a certain
similitude and agreement of several things among themselves
which furnishes an occasion and remote foundation for uni-

12
versality," However, the nature as it exists in the mind
g
"Quo fit ut iuxta hanc sententiam intellectus
agens non abstrahat universale a singularibus solumque di-
catur abstrahere speciem intelligibilem a phantasmate quia
separat illam a conditionibus materiae, quantum ad esse reale
illius, non vero quantum ad obiectum quod repraesentat: pro-
ducit enim speciem spiritualem et immaterialem in entitate
sua, repraesentantem eamdem numero rem individuam quam re
praesentat phantasma; non enim repugnat materiale individuum
per immaterialem formam seu qualitatem intentionaliter re-
praesentari." Ibid. Cf. no. 7, and Suarez, D £ Anlma,
Book IV, chap. 3» n o , 10.
10That is, that the possible intellect, having

grasped the nature, then compares that nature with the
things in which it exists and sees that it is a unity that
has an aptitude to be in many, and to be predicated of
many. DM, Disp. VI, sect, 6, no. 5.
11Cf. Ockham's critique of Scotus' theory of com

mon nature discussed in the second chapter of this disser
tation.
1P
"Sed est tantum in ilia quaedam similitudo et
convenientia plurium rerum inter se quae praebet occasionem
et fundamenturn remotum universalitati." DM, Disp. VI,
sect. 6, no. 5. This sounds very much lilo? Ockham, but
curiously, it is not attributed to Ockham or to anyone
else.
can be said to have a proximately potential universality,
since it is negatively common, that is, conceived abstract-

13
ly in itself and not as proper to any individual. The
nature is not actually universal until it is conceived to
have an aptitude to be in many and an aptitude to have a re
lation to many. It receives this relation from comparative
knowledge, and only then is the nature actually universal.
Universality is not a thing which really exists outside the
mind, Suarez continues (echoing Ockham), "but it is only
a being or relation of reason; therefore it exists objec
tively only in the intellect;" and so it comes about only

ill
through this process of comparing.
At this point, the discussion becomes somewhat
intricate because of Suarez' characteristic fairness and
painstaking analysis of all sides of an argument. Suarez
is not interested in partisan scholarship— he is concerned
only with discovering the truth. He tends to see the value
I?
"Natura vero abstracte cognita dici potest uni
versalis in potentia proxima, quia iam est communis nega
tive, quia concipitur secundum se et non ut propria alicuius
individui;,.." This seems to be the real meaning of Scotus'
"common nature," as has been brought out in chapter III.
•^"Nondum tamen censetur esse actu universalis,

quia nondum concipitur ut habens aptitudinem et relatio-
nem accipit per notitiam comparativam, et ideo per illam
dicitur ultimo constitui universale in actu. Quod ulterius
probatur, quia universalitas non est res aliqua habens veram
existentiam, sed est tantum ens seu relatio rationis; ergo
tantum habet esse oiective in intellectu; ergo tantum est
quando actu fit ab intellectu, nam tunc solum est obiedtlve
in intellectu; ergo tantum est per notitiam comparativam,
quia per earn solam fit seu excogitatur ab intellectu," D M .
Disp. VI, sect. 6, no. 5.
in conflicting opinions even though this sometimes requires
an agile benevolence on his part. Thus, he says that the
first opinion is quite probable if its initial postulate is
granted, that the agent intellect does not produce species
which represent individuals. Suarez holds that it is certain
that the agent intellect never impresses a species which
represents only the difference a^ difference, but rather
what the agent intellect impresses upon the possible intel-

1S
lect is a species representing the whole specific nature. ^
Given the principle of individuation of St. Thomas (and
perhaps that of Scotus), the first opinion concerning the
formation of the universal and the corresponding denial of
direct intellectual knowledge of material singulars would
follow consistently. However, Suarez has a different theory
of individuation, and he does not grant any more than a
logical or mental distinction between an individual nature
and its differentia indlvldualis. As a result, Suarez holds
that the agent intellect abstracts a spiritual species
which represents the individual nature. Much depends, then,
on the exact status of that nature as it is embodied in the
individual. If the nature is an inchoate, frozen universal,
the first opinion logically follows. If on the other hand,
15"inter has sententias prima est quidem probabilis

ex suppositione illius sententiae, quod intellectus agens
non producit species repraesentantes individua,...quia im
primis certum est intellectum agentem nunquam imprimere
speciem repraesentantem solam differentiam, ut differentia
est, sed totam specificam naturam," Ibid.. no, 6.
182
^ the nature as it exists in the individual is really singular

•4>
and only potentially universal in the order of knowledge,
then the first opinion must be rejected. In either case,
just as the phantasm represents the whole individual in the
sensory order, so in the order of intelligibility the agent
intellect produces a species which represents the whole
specific nature of the individual as a totality.
Finally, Suarez adds, a proper and true comprehen
sion of the nature of the intelligible species will show
that it is quite incorrect to say that the nature is uni
versalized through the abstracting function of the agent
intellect. According to what Suarez holds to be the true
opinion, the impressed species is not a formal image and
it is in no way a formal representation. The species re
presents effectively, it is, as it were, a seed or instru
ment of the object. The purpose of this instrument is to
bring about a formal intentional representation of the ob
ject, and this is done through the m i n d ’s goncept.1^
In an expression reminiscent of Cicero, Suarez
professes to leave unmentioned the fact that the first

17
opinion stems from a false hypothesis. It is simply more
1^”Addo ergo ulterius, si proprie as vere intelli-

gatur ratio et natura speciei intelligibilis, satis impro-
prie dici per hanc abstractionem fieri naturam universalem,
quia iuxta veram sententiam, species impressa neque est for-
malis imago neque ullo modo formaliter repraesentat, sed
effective quatenus est veluti semen seu instrumentum obiebti
ad efficiendam formalem repraesentationem intentionalem,
quae fit per conceptum mentis." Ibid., no. 7.
true, he says, that the species impressed by the agent intel
lect represents the same individual represented by the phan
tasm, and this impressed intelligible species abstracts only
from the real, entitative materiality of that phantasm. Even
though the individual is material, it can be represented
without its actual materiality (by a spiritual species),
since there is no contradiction in the existence or produc
tion of such a representation "through a spiritual form or
quality or entity, as is evident in the case of angels and

1 ft
in God Himself." This is another application of Suarez’
theory of individuation. That is, while matter may enter
into the individuation of a material substance, it is not
sufficient in itself (even as quantified) to be the complete
principle of individuation. Thus, for Suarez, the abstract
ive function of the agent intellect is simply the continu
ation and perfect completion of the demateriali'Zation ini
tiated by the senses and which is only partially achieved
in the phantasm. The phantasm is quasi-material, the species
produced by the agent intellect is fully immaterial, i.e.,
•^"Omitto primam illam sententiam procedere ex

faj.sa hypothesi;..." Ibid.
18",t.simpliciter enim verius est, speciem impres-
sam ab intellectu agente non abstrahere a repraesentatione
eiusdam individui rep rae sent aiti in phantasmate sed solum a
materialitate reali et entitativa ipsius phantasmatis sine
qua esse potest repraesentatio eiusdem individui, quantumvis
materialis; hanc enim non repugnat esse aut fieri per formam
seu qualitatem aut entitatem spiritualem, ut in angelis et
in Deo ipso patet." Ibid.
spiritual. It does not lose its singularity when actual,
physical matter is left aside.
Since a spiritual species representing a material
entity is not self-contradictory, there is no reason why
such a species cannot be produced by the agent intellect;
"but it should not be denied without reason, since this is
more consistent both with various experiences and with the
natural order of knowing, and with the goal and natural ac
tivity of the agent intellect itself," whose purpose is to
furnish, by its spiritual action, means for representing in
the possible intellect a likeness of what is represented in

19
the phantasm. "It is clear," Suarez continues, "that ab
straction of the universal is in no way produced of necessi
ty by the agent intellect, and perhaps it cannot even be
produced in any way..." by the agent intellect, since once
it is granted that the agent intellect produces species of
singular things, it is likely that it can never produce
species which represent universal natures abstracted from

20
singulars. Universals are never encountered as such in
"Quod si non repugnat, nulla potest afferri physi

ca ratio ob quam non possit tails forma vel species ab in
tellectu agente fieri; sine ratione autem id negandum non
est, cum hoc sit magis consentaneum et variis experimentis
et natural! ordini cognoscendi et fini et activitati natu-
rali ipsius intellectus agentis, qui ad hoc datur ut media
actione spirituali intellectum possibilem reddat similem
repraesentationi phantasmatis, quantum potest,..." Ibid.
20
"...constat abstractionem universalis nullo modo
fieri ex necessitate ab intellectu agente, immo et fortasse
nullo modo fieri posse; nam, si intellectus agens semel poni
tur productivus specierum rerum singularium, verisimile est
185
experience, and the agent Intellect acts only as a catalyst
— it does not add anything to the representative content of
the species it produces. Hence, the universal must be pro
duced by another act of the mind subsequent to abstraction
of the species and conceptualization.
Before considering the second and third opinions,
it is necessary first to distinguish a twofold meaning of
- ,- "universal.” One meaning of universal is that it is some
thing absolute in its being which can be the basis of some
relation. This would be a "universal substance," for ex
ample, "man" subsisting apart from every individual human

21
being, "according to the Platonic opinion." This would
not be universal by reason of a real, existential relation
to inferiors, but by reason of its own unity as a universal
with an intrinsic, substantial aptitude for existing in
many. But whether this is a universal ante rem or a univer
sal in re^ there are serious difficulties in this position.
Suarez explicitly rejects any theory that would postulate a
really existing extramental universal. According to Suarez,
universals exist as such only in the mind, and they are
nunquam posse producere species repraesentantes naturas

[universales] abstractas a singularibus." Ibid.
PI
"Primo, ut quid absolutum secundum esse, quod
potest relationem aliquam fundare.... Prtmo modo intellige-
retur substantia universalis, si esset homo a parte rei
subsistens separatus ab omni contractione, iuxta platonicam
opinionem;..." Ibid,, no. 8.
22
universal only in representation.
However, if there is some basis in reality for the
universal, if the universal can be considered an absolute
which is prior to and the foundation of its predicability
of many inferiors, then there is some validity in the second
opinion regarding the formation of universals (viz., that
the universal is formed by a direct activity of the possible
intellect knowing the common nature in itself.) Hence, the
universal, taken in its first meaning (as an absolute),
would be produced by a direct activity of the possible in
tellect precisely and abstractly conceiving the common na-

23
ture apart from its contracting differences.
In its second meaning "universal" is taken as some
thing relative in its being, expressing a relation to infer-

24
iors. The universal understood in this way cannot come
about through abstraction alone, but must be produced by
comparison, since the relation involved is not real but one
of reason. Hence this relation to many is not in the nature
itself as abstractly and absolutely conceived, since in the
act of abstracting the intellect does not compare it or re-
22
See D M . Disp. V, sect. 1; and chap.V of this dis
sertation.
2 3"Universale igitur priori modo conceptum fit per

directam operationem intellectus, quae praecise et abstracte
concipit naturam communem absque differentiis contrahentibus
quod satis probant rationes factae in secunda opinione."
D M . Disp. VI, sect. 6, no. 9; cf. ibid., nos. 3 and 4.
24
"Secundo, ut relativum secundum esse dicens or-
dinem ad inferiora." Ibid.. no. 8.
187
i* fer it to its inferiors, and the nature is not so related
in the real order. Therefore, therrelation of universality
does not yet exist. This meaning of "universal" is the one
adopted by the advocates of the third opinion on the forma
tion of the universal (viz., that the singular individual
nature is abstracted, seen to be similar to other natures or
predicable of many, and by comparison with other similar na-

25
tures the universal is formed in the possible intellect).
Thus there are two theories which purport to ex
plain the formation of the universal, and each conforms to
a certain notion of the being of the universal. The uni
versal is either absolute in its being as a universal prior
to its reference to inferiors, or the universal is relative
in its being and stems from the act of the intellect com
paring a nature to its inferiors, For Suarez, these alter
natives are not mutually exclusive. Both may be true, that
is, the universal may be absolute in one way and relative
in another way.
Therefore, if those two opinions affirm one and

do not exclude the other, they are not mutually
contrary, nor do the reasons for one militate
•’"At vero loquendo de relatione universalitatis

prout a nobis concipitur ad modum relationis secundum esse,
haec non potest resultare per solam abstractionem sed eo
modo quo est, fit per comparatione-, quia, ut suppono, haec
relatio non est realis sed rationis; ergo non est in natura
ipsa dum absolute et abstracte cogitatur, quia ex vi illius
actionis, ilia non refertur per intellectum quia intellectus
nondum comparat illam ad sua inferiora, neque etiam refer
tur realiter; ergo nondum est talis relatio." Ibid., no. 10;
I cf. ibid., no. 5, and supra, footnotes 72-76.
188
26
against the other.
There is no reason, Suarez continues, why the two
fold meaning of universality (absolute and relative) cannot
correspond to the same nature through the work of the intel
lect, which can produce each through different operations.
And there is no reason why the absolute cannot be the proxi-

27
mate foundation of the relative.
What sort of knowledge is this "precisive" or com
parative cognition through which both types of universal are
said to be made? Again, there are two main varieties of
knowledge involved.
The first of these is the abstraction of the com
mon nature "through a pure precision of the nature from one
inferior without any comparison" either of the superior with
some inferior or of the inferiors with each other, as, for
example, when simply from "Peter" alone, by prescinding from
his individuating properties, one considers only human na-

28
ture. While some think that the universal cannot be pro-
"Quocirca, si illae duae opiniones unum affirment

et aliud non excludant, non sunt inter se contrariae neque
unius rationes contra aliam procedunt." Ibid., no. 10.
27
"Quia nihil obstat quod eidem naturae possit per
intellectum convenire duplex ratio universalitatis, absoluta,
scilicet, et respectiva, et quod illae per diversas opera-
tiones intellectus fabricentur, et quod una, scilicet, quae
absoluta est, sit proximum fundamentum alterius, scilicet,
relative." Ibid.
P8
"Variis enim modis potest universalis natura
praescindi vel comparari. Primo enim abstrahi potest na
tura communis per puram praeclsionem naturae ab uno infer
ior! absque ulla comparatione vel superioris conceptus ad
189
duced by this pure precisive knowledge, Suarez holds that
the "absolute universal" (i.e., the foundation of the rela
tive universal) is formed in this way. However, this pre
cisive knowledge alone does not provide sufficient knowledge
of the universality of the nature so conceived or of its
"superiority," that is, its aptitude to be in many and to

29
be predicated of many inferiors.
Secondly, the common nature can be .abstracted through

a comparison of singulars or inferiors with each other,
as when by comparing Peter with Paul, I know them
to be mutually alike in human nature.30
Formation of Universal Concepts Presupposes
Direct Intellectual Knowledge of Singulars
This comparative cognition presupposes a prior pre
cision, a concept of that nature prescinded from eachindi
vidual, since it implies that each singular is known to be
of such a nature. The comparison adds only the knowledge
of the similarity of several inferiors in that abstracted
aliquem inferiorem vel ipsorum inferiorum inter se, ut quan-

do a solo Petro simpliciter praescindo individuantes proprie-
tates et sisto in humanae naturae consideratione." Ibid. no.11.
29
"Et per hanc notitiam pure praecisivam putant
aliqui nullum universale fieri. Verius tamen est per earn
etiam fieri universale absolutum, iuxta ea quae de secunda
opinione diximus, Nam hoc etiam probant rationes factae;
quamquam haec notitia non sufficiat ad cognoscendam in na-
tura sic concepta universalitatem seu superioritatem quam
habet, ut iam dicam." Ibid.
"Secundo abstrahi potest natura communis per com-

parationem singularium seu inferiorum inter se, ut quando
conferendo Petrum cum Paulo, cognosco eos esse inter se
f* similes in natura humana." —Ibid..
— no. 12.
31
nature.
There are two stages in this comparative abstrac
tion, and for Suarez each Involves direct intellectual know
ledge of singulars. The first stage is the consideration
simply of the relation of the particulars with each other
from the standpoint of their mutual similarity. This first
type of comparison does not constitute the universal. The
second stage involves the consideration of the relationship
of the common nature with the particulars in which it exists.
Having grasped the similitude of Peter and Paul in that each
is a man, the intellect can then consider that this predi
cate "man" is related to Peter and Paul as something common
to particulars. The meaning and structure of the universal
(as a mental relation of a unity common to many) is fulfil-

32
led in this latter comparison.
According to Suarez, then, the human intellect
knows universals in a proper concept by abstracting from
singular concepts, that is, by disregarding their singular
ity. "This is clear from experience, for we consider man
— — — >mmmm— — — i ■ ■! i ■ ■!«{..n — i — — —
31
"Quae comparatio supponit priorem praecisionem,
nam supponit de utroque singular! cognosci esse talis natu
rae; unde supponit conceptum talis naturae ut praescindi-
tur a singulis individuis. Unde per hanc comparationem
solum additur cognitio convenientiae et similitudinis plu-
rium inferiorum in tali abstracta ac praecisa natura."
Ibid.
op
J "Haec autem comparatio ulterius potest subdis-
tingui, quatenus per earn considerari potest vel sola habi-
tudo particularium inter se ut inter se habent habitudinem
similium, et haec comparatio ut sic non pertinet ad consti-
by not considering Peter and Paul,” This is also evident
from reason, since the superiority of the intellect over the
senses resides especially in:_the intellect's ability to know
the proper quiddities of things, and these quiddities, Sua-

34
rez says, are clearly universals.
The chief difference, according to Suarez, between
tutionem universalis sed ad considerationem cuiusdam rela-

tionis mutuae inter ipsa particularia. Vel quatenus per earn
consideratur habitudo naturae communis ad particularia in
quibus existit, Postquam enim intellectus apprehendit Pet-
rum et paulum esse similes in esse hominis, rursus consider-
at hoc praedicatum homo habere se ad Petrum et Paulum ut
quid commune ad particularis; et in hac comparatione videtur
consummari ratio universalis, etiam respectivi; per earn enim
consurgit in mente, vel potius in re menti obiecta, habitudo
rationis unius rei communis ad plura," Ibid. (italics in ed.
cit.). Suarez adds that there can be a further, more reflex
cognition which involves knowledge of the abstracted common
nature together with its inferiors, and which produces the
rational denominations of genus, species, etc. This is not a
further universalization but only a more formal contempla
tion of the universal. Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Book VI, chap.
4 (l4lb30-33). See also Suarez, De AnlmaV Sook VI, chap. 3»
no. 22, where he discusses universals from another approach
(and with greater clarity). In this passage, Suarez makes a
threefold division of the universal: the "physical univer
sal" which is the extramental basis for the universal pro
perly so-called, the "metaphysical universal" (absolute
universal) which is produced by the mind in the first stage
spoken of above, and the "logical universal" (relative uni
versal) which is the application of the second type in pre
dication, etc. See also James F. Ross, "Suarez on 'Univer-
sals'," The Journal of Philosophy. LIX (1962), 736-748.
33
"Intellectus cognoscit proprio conceptu univer-
salia, abstrahendo a singularibus, seu non curando de illis>
Haec constat experientia, consideramus enim hominem non con-
siderando Petrum et Paulum." Suarez, De Anlma, Book IV,
chap. 3, no. 11.
oh
"Nimirum haec est vis intellectus supra sensum,
ut proprias rerum quidditates cognoscere possit, quae plane
universales sunt, et communes; quare, etc." Ibid.
192
Intellectual knowledge of singulars and of universals is the
presence or absence of Individuating circumstances in cog
nition. Singulars are known intellectually through a proper
species which represents individuating conditions. The uni
versal is known through a species which represents the nature

35 , ’
without those conditions. The intellect grasps the uni
versal through the species which represents the singular
thing. That is, given the phantasm representing Peter, for
example, the agent intellect produces a species in the pos
sible intellect which represents Peter. Since the agent in
tellect has the power to do this, and there is no obstacle,
it follows that the agent intellect produces a species of
the individual, not of the universal, man. The species re
presenting Peter cannot represent "this man" without re-

36
presenting "man". Through the same species, then, the ab
solute universal, "man” can be known intellectually. The
agent intellect does not abstract two species, one represen
ting Peter, the other representing man, for this would imply
the separate abstraction of all the superior genera (animal,
■3K
"...jam ex dictis habemus singularia cognosci
per propriam speciem repraesentantem nimirum conditiones rei
individuantes: Universale autem cognoscitur per speciem
repraesentantem naturam absque iis conditionibus: per suam
ergo unumquodque attingitur," Ibid., no. 12.
3^"Posito phantasmate Petri, verbi gratia, intel

lectus agens producit speciem Petri in intellectu possibili,
habet siquidem virtutem ad illam efficiendam: estque natu-
rale, ac universale agens non impeditum: ergo non efficit
speciem hominis universalis. Posterior haec consequentia
ostenditur primo: quia species Petri repraesentare nequit
living, etc.). Suarez applies Ockham's razor to this:intel
ligible species should not be multiplied without necessity.
The inferior contains everything contained in the superior,
and so, a species which represents the inferior provides

07
sufficiently for knowledge of the superior genera. Accord
ing to Suarez, experience shows that the agent intellect
initially impresses only the species of the singular thing,
and through that species the possible intellect can know
both that singular and the universals contained in it.
Universals are known in this way, then: when the intellect
knows (together or successively) different singulars which
are also of the same nature, it understands them through
diverse species, since they are abstracted from different
phantasms. These species partly agree and partly differ in
representation, since they represent the same nature con
tracted in diverse ways. Therefore the intellect, says
Suarez, has the power not only to know these individuals
hunc hominem, quin repraesentet hominem:...atque adeo super-

flua est species alia." Ibid.
37»si intellectus agens duas species abstrahit,

unam repraesentantem hominem, alteram vero Petrum, abstrahet
similiter aliam, atque aliam animalis, viventis, caeterorum-
que superiorum generum, cum aequa sit distinctio omnium
inter se gradum, etiam usque ad individuam differentiam:
consequens autem falsum est: jam enim multiplicabuntur
intelligibiles species absque necessitate: cujus ratio a
priori est, quoniam in inferiori omnia superiora continen-
tur, sicque species repraesentans illud sufficiens principi-
um est cognoscendi ista," Ibi d.
3®"...intellectus agens a principio imprimit tan

tum speciem rei singularis, per illamque possibilis attin-
194
as such, but also that which is common to the things repre-

•3Q
sented by the species, and this is to consider universals.
A related question is: which does the human intellect
know first, the universal or the singular? Although he has
already anticipated the answer to this question, Suarez now
deals with it explicitly. St. Thomas, and those who follow
him in the opinion that singulars are known only reflexively,
consistently hold that the concept of the universal is formed
first.1*0 Suarez, however, holds that the intellect conceives

ill
the singular before the universal. "The intellect can know
the singular directly, and the first species which is impre
ssed on the intellect is of the singular thing: therefore,
git tarn singulare ipsum, quam universalia in eo contenta,”

Ibid.
39"modus autem universalia cognoscenai hie esse
videtur: namque dum intellectus cognoscit diversa singularia
etiam ejusdem rationis, sive simul, sive successive (hoc
enim parum ad rem interest) per diversas plane species ea
intelligit, cum a diversis phantasmatibus fuerint abstractae:
species autem ejusmodi partim in repraesentatione conveniunt,
partim differunt, quia repraesentant diversimode contracta;
intellectus ergo vim habet turn ad consideranda individua
ipsa, ut talia sunt: turn etiam id, quod commune illis per
species repraesentatur, quod est considerare universalia:
atque hoc eodem modo cognoscit genera per convenientiam
scilicet specierum." Ibid., no. 13.
**^Cf, Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la-* q. 85, art. 3.
**1,,Scotus,.. .nobiscum sentiat dari propriam speciem

intelligibilem singularis materialis sensati, Durandus~wero,
...et Gregorius [Ariminensis],..volunt prius concipi ab in-
tellectu singulare, quam universale, quod est mihi probabi-
lius, sumiturque ex dictis..." Suarez, De Anlma, Book IV,
chap. 3, no. 15.
I
that which is first conceived is the singular itself."
Again Suarez employs the Scotistic argument that what the
lower power can do the higher power of the same order can
do. From the fact that the senses know singulars it may be
concluded that the intellect knows singulars most easily.
But the intellect does not know universals quite so easily
since there is first required knowledge of singulars and of
their similarity, and then the common nature is abstracted.
Suarez gives an example: since they see a single sun, pea
sants do not form a concept of "sun" in general, but only a
concept of that particular sun which they observe. Anyone
will have the same conviction about this, before he knows
about the theory of abstraction. Before there is any con
cept of "Sun" in general the concept of "this Sun" is formed.
Both concepts (of "Sun" in general and of "this Sun") are
present in the intellect, "since it is ridiculous to think
that peasan-s never conceive the sun in the intellect, since

43
they reason about both."
lip
"Intellectus potest directe cognoscere singulare,
ac prima species, quae in intellectu imprimitur, est rei
singularis: ergo id, quod prius concipitur, ipsum est singu
lare." Ibid.
^3» e o ipso, quod sensus cognoscit singulare, potest

intellectus facillime illud cognoscere, universale vero non
ita facile, siquidem prius requiritur cognitio singularium,
et convenientia illorum, ut ab illis abstrahatur natura com
munis: ergo prius concipitur singulare, quam universale.
Confirmatur: nam rudes, quia unicum vident solem, conceptum
soils in communi non formant, sed illius tantum quern vident,
ut quisque etiam apud se compertum habebit, antequam hasce
abstractiones noverit: ergo formatur prius conceptus hujus
196
Another argument in favor of the opinion that the
intellect knows singulars before it knows universals may be
drawn from the process of human knowledge: 11...our knowledge
begins from sense: therefore what is more easily perceived
by sense is also more easily conceived by the intellect, if
it is not otherwise incompatible:.,." Suarez sees confir
mation of this in a statement in Aristotle's Posterior Ana
lytics : "he [Aristotle] says that those things are better
known to us which are closer to the senses, but singulars
are such:..." and according to Suarez, Aristotle is speaking

45
about singulars in a strict sense, i.e., material singulars.
Solis, quam Solis in communi, ille autem conceptus apud

intellectum est, cum ridiculum sit existimare rusticos ho
mines nunquam intellectu solem concipere, cum circa ilium
utrumque ratiocinetur, etc." Ibid.
44
"Tertio cognitio nostra a sensu incipit: ergo
quod facilius sensu percipitur, facilius etiam concipitur
intellectu, si id alioquin non repugnet: ergo, etc." Ibid.
This is, of course, susceptible of another interpretation.
St. Thomas, for example, might agree that the intellect more
easily knows that which is more readily known by the senses,
but knows it in a different way, as a universal. Both St.
Thomas and Suarez agree that normally in statu isto the in
tellect depends on the senses to put iF“into contact with
things to be known. But again, because of a different prin
ciple of individuation, St. Thomas holds that the material
singular which is directly known by the senses is incompat
ible with direct intellectual knowledge for man. However,
as has been shown throughout this chapter and in the pre
ceding chapter, Suarez, on the basis of a different prin
ciple of individuation, sees no incompatibility in direct
intellectual knowledge of the material singular. See also
the note immediately below.
45
"Quae sane ratio est Aristotelis 1, Posteriorum,
cap. 2, ubi sit notiora nobis ea esse, quae sunt sensui
proximioria, talia vero sunt singularia: ubi de singularibus
in rigore loquitur,..." Ibid. Aristotle does say this in
the place cited (71b 30~72aF), but it is questionable
According to Suarez, then, the human intellect is
capable of making two different abstractions: one is the
whether this passage serves to bolster Suarez' argument.

In this passage Aristotle makes a distinction which occurs
rather frequently in his works, viz., the distinction be
tween what is more knowable to man but less knowable in it
self and what is more knowable in itself but less knowable
to man. Some other places where Aristotle makes this dis-
tenction:
Metaphysics, Book II, chap. 1, 993b9-ll.
Metaphysics. Book VII, chap. 3, 1029a35-b 12.
De Anlma, book II, chap. 2, 4l3a 11.
PTfyslcs. Book I, chap. 1, I84al5-l85bl0.
frhysics, Book I, chap. 5, I88b30-l89a9.
Physics, Book I, chap. 7. l89b30-33.
Topic's".' Book VI, chap. 4, I4la2^-1^2a22.
The last cited text provides a possible Aristotelian footing

"for the solid falls under perception most of all— more than
a plane— and a plane more than a line, and a line more than
a point; for most people learn things like the former ear
lier than the latter; for any ordinary intelligence can
grasp them, whereas the others require an exact and ex
ceptional understanding." (I4lb9-lil)
However, other passages seem to go against Suarez'
interpretation (and theory on direct intellectual knowledge
of material singulars), e.g., Physics. Book I, chap. 1,
l84a20-25, "thus we must advance from generalities to par
ticulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-
perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehen
ding many things within it, like parts." And ibid; chap. 5,
l89a5-9, "The universal is more knowable in the order of
explanation, the particular in the order of sense; for ex
planation has to do with the universal, sense with the
particular."
In any event, it is clear that Suarez' argument
does not depend in any important way on his reference to
Aristotle, or any other argument from authority, but as a
typical medieval scholar, Suarez wishes to show that he is
within the tradition. Ross' remark on an allied matter is
just: "The novelty of what his view entailed sees to have
escaped Suarez, who constantly construes Aristotle and
Aquinas as the source of his views." James P. Ross, "Suarez
on 'Universals'," The Journal of Philosophy, LIX (1962),
738, note 5. Suarez' use of the pie exponenda technique
does tend to corroborate Alain of Lille's trenchant remark:
"Auctoritas cereum habet nasum, id est in diversum potest
flecti sensum." Ite fide cathollca. Book I, chap.30, PL 210,
col. 333.
198
abstraction of t h e ’intelligible species, and the other is
the abstraction of the common nature. Abstraction of the
intelligible species from phantasms is the work of the agent
intellect, but this in itself does not produce a universal
concept. On the contrary, it produces a spiritual species
which directly represents the material singular. The second
type of abstraction is accomplished by the possible intellect.
The possible intellect does this by considering the univer
sal nature without individuating f a c t o r s . ^
Suarez calls these two kinds of abstraction "formal
abstraction" and "universal abstraction" respectively. Ex
perience shows that these are the only types of abstraction
to be found in the intellect, and they are necessary and
sufficient for knowing things perfectly. Abstraction of the
universal is necessary for the establishment of the sciences,
formal abstraction is necessary in order to comprehend objects
perfectly and distinctly. These two abstractions are recip
rocally related, that is, they enhance and fortify each
other. Both stem from the power and immateriality of the
intellect, "for since the intellect is immaterial, it is
least subject to the materiality of the object, but conquers
^ " . . .c'ommuniter etiam asseritur hujusmodi abstrac-

tionem fieri virtute intellectus agentis producentis speciem
repraesentantem nudam per universalis naturam. Verum ex dic-
tis liquet intellectum agentem talem aliquam speciem non
producere. Ea ergo abstractio operatio est intellectus pos-
sibilis, qua naturam universalem considerat absque condi-
tionibus individuantibus, sic enim per actum ilium reprae-
sentatur natura, ut universalis, atque abstracta." Suarez,
199
H7
it, and spiritualizes it as much as possible."
This permits a further clarification of the rela
tion between nature, individuation, universality, and the
real and mental status of this triad. The nature, which the
intellect conceives as a universal, is found in things them-
sfelves, and even in reality that nature has a certain uni
versality which consists in the unity of the same nature

il8
existing discretely'in many individuals. The intellect
does not originate this sort of universality of the nature,
but only discovers it in knowledge. In reality, this "uni-
De Anima, Book Iv, chap. 3, no. 19. Cf. DM, Disp, VI, sect,
5 7 no. 9.
^7"Estque hoc loco notandum, abstractionem aliam
dici universalem, aliam formalem:.,.Praeter has vero abs-
tractiones nulla alia in intellectu reperitur, ut experien-
tia constat: fueruntque necessariae, et sufficientes ad res
perfecte cognoscendas, nam abstractio universalis fuit
necessaria ad adstruenda obiecta scientiarum perpetua: for-
malis quoque fuit necessaria ad perfecte comprehendendum
objectum, distinguendo omnia, quae illi conveniunt. Unde hae
duae abstractiones se invicem juvant, et sibi deserviunt;
utraque autem illarum ex virtute et immaterialitate intel
lectus provenit, quia enim intellectus immaterialis est,
minime subjicitur materialitati objecti, sed vincit illam,
et quantum fieri potest ipsum spiritualisat." Suarez, De
Anima, Book IV, chap. 3» no. 20.
^ " N o t a n d u m est, naturam, quae ab intellectu uni

versalis concipitur in rebus ipsis reperiri, et a parte rei
habere universalitatem quamdam, quae in unitate ejusdem
naturae in multis existentis sita est," Ibid., no. 21.
Suarez calls this the "physical universal11, in no. 22. In
no. 23, he says that the universal in this sense is not made
by the intellect, but it is a prerequisite of intellectual
knowledge of universals, and that it is real being, and
is intrinsic to things.
I
200
o * versal nature" does not exist abstracted from individuals.

o
It exists when the intellect makes it by knowing it abstrac
tly, that is, by knowing the nature alone, apart from indi
viduals. The nature so abstracted can be considered from
two aspects: the first is the essence, the second is the
abstract mode of being it has in the intellect. The first
of these is the nature itself, and it is known by the
intellect in a direct cognition, This is called the first
intention or the formal concept. The nature (which exists
outside the mind) so known is called the objective first

H9
intention or the objective concept.
Nature considered in the second sense, that is,
as an abstracted universal, does not exist in the real order,

CQ
since the nature in reality is not abstracted.-" It'is not
a second intention (logical relation) since beings of this
^ " . . . h a e c porro universalis natura a parte rei non

aubsistit abstracta ab individuis, imo existit facta parti
c u l a r s : intellectus autem cognoscit illam abstracte, cog-
noscendo scilicet solitariam, ac sine individuis, et in ea
quidem sic abstracta duo possunt considerari. Primum est
essentia: secundum modus essendi, quern in intellectu habet,
nimirum esse abstractum. Primum realiter datur in natura,
seu ipsa est natura, cognosciturque ab intellectu directa
cognitione, quae solet dici prima intentio, seu conceptus
fornalis: natura vero sic cognita prima intentio objectiva,
sive objectives conceptus." Ibid.. no. 21, For the Suarezian
distinction between "formal concept" and "objective concept"
see DM, Disp. II, sect. 1, no. 1. This is discussed briefly
supra, chap. V, note 15, pp. 111-112.
^ " S e c u n d u m autem non est quidem innnatura ipsa

realiter, quia natura, ut diximus, realiter non est abstrac
ta Suarez, De Anlm a. Book IV, chap. 3, no, 21, In no.
ft- 22 Suarez calls Hie abstracted universal the "metaphysical
universal." In no. 23, he says that the universal in this
sort exist only in the order of k n o w l e d g e . 5 1
Suarez continues:
since in the nature abstractly known these two

are found, namely the nature and its abstraction,
the intellect knows that nature in a direct
operation; however, through the power of Reflec
ting it does not halt in the cognition of the
nature, but proceeds beyond
to consider how it has that nature as known, and grasps it
devoid of every contraction.52 This seems to be very close
to the Scotistic notion that the nature may be known distin
ctly apart from singularity and universality. The nature
itself is neither singular nor universal, but simply the
nature. The intellect can grasp the nature in three ways
then: first as singular, according to its proper mode of
existence outside the mind, secondly, as nature (without
singularity or universality), and thirdly, as a universal,
sense comes about through:abstraction. It is not a relation

of reason, but the real nature itself as it exists in our
first knowledge of the object,
51 "...neque tamen est secunda intentio, seu relatio
rationis, quia ejusmodi entia non nisi dum cognoscuntur,
existunt:..," Ibid., no. 21. In no. 22 Suarez calls this the
"logical universal." This is also the "relative universal,"
the application of the metaphysical universal in predication.
In no. 23, he speaks of this "logical universal" as consis
ting in a relation of reason achieved through a reflex act,
or comparative knowledge. It exists only as a mental con
struct .
52",.,cum ergo in natura abstracte cognita duo ilia

reperiantur, natura videlicet, ejusque abstractio, intellec
tus directa operatione cognoscit naturam ipsam, per virtu-
tem autem reflectendi non slstit in ea directa cognitione
naturae, sed ultra procedit considerando modum, quae natura
ipsa habet, ut est cognita, deprehenditque nudatam omni
contractione,.." Ibid.. no. 21,
202
by reference to the various actual and possible possessors
of that nature. In grasping the nature stripped of allLcon-
traction, the intellect considers this lack of contraction
as if it were a sort of form of the nature, through which
the nature is related to the several things from which it
was divested or abstracted. "And this is called comparative
knowledge, or the formal second intention: but the known
nature, as such, is called the objective second intention.
When some say that the universal is made by abs
traction, and others maintain that the universal is formed
by comparative knowledge, they may both be correct and both

Ell
incorrect in different ways.-" if the proponents of the
first opinion mean only that the nature, by the fact that
it is abstracted, has some mode of universality that it does
not have in things, then they are correct. The nature as
conceived is both objective (i.e., is an object of knowledge)
and prescinds from its many inferiors, and it is a unity
that is common to many. Furthermore, the nature as abstracted
has a mode other than it has in things. It does not have the
mode of singularity (as it has in things), but it has rather
the mode of indifference and community. Finally,
53",,,ac nuditatem ipsam [omnis contractionis] quasi

formam quamdam talis naturae [intellectus] considerat, rati-
one cujus plura ipsa respicit, a quibus fuerat denudata, sive
abstracta. Atque haec vocatur notitia comparativa, seu secu-
nda intentio formalist natura vero, ut sic, cognita, appel-
latur secunda intentio objectiva." Ibid.
5l|Ibid., nos. 2 k and 25 .

203
Nature is made singular through contraction:

therefore when it is liberated from contraction,
it receives a mode of being contrary to singu
larity: therefore it is made universal in some
way: hence if the first opinion says only this,
it will be true, if the second denies it, it
will be false.55
If, however, the advocates of the first opinion
mean that the universal is formed through abstraction as
a full blown universal (i.e., according to the intention
55»Natura ut abstracta habet alium modum, quam in

rebus habeat, id est, non est singularitatis, sed potius
indifferentiae et communitatis:.... Natura per contrac-
tionem fit singularis: ergo dum a contractione liberatur,
accipit modum essendi contrarium singularitati: ergo fit
aliquo modo universalis: si ergo prima opinio hoc tantum
dicat, vera erit, si secunda idipsum neget, erit falsa."
Ibid., no. 25. Again, the relation between the principle
of individuation and human intellectual knowledge of
material singulars comes to the fore. At the risk of being
repetitious, it may be said once again that for St. Thomas,
the nature is contracted by being received in distinct
matter, and so when the nature is liberated from matter
through the work of the agent intellect, that nature is
immediately universalized, and hence the universal is
known intellectually first and directly, and the singu
lar is known intellectually in an indirect way. For Suarez,
on the other hand, the nature is not contracted solely by
matter, and so it is possible for the human intellect to
produce a spiritual species representing the material singu
lar. Suarez’ teaching on this may be projected to include
human intellectual knowledge of angels. Since for Suarez,
a thing is individuated by its whole entity, it would be
possible to have a concept of an individual angelic nature,
and since this known nature can acquire the mode of indif
ference and community through being known, it is also possi
ble to have a universal concept of angel. As has been seen,
Suarez holds that the difference between a singular and a
universal concept is the presence or absence of individua
ting conditions. Since a thing is not individuated solely
by matter, the absence of matter is not a sufficient cause
of universalization. Furthermore, matter is common, and so
it is also possible to have a universal concept of matter
(either in itself or as quantified). See supra. Chapter V,
pp. 122-123; and D M , Disp. V, sect. 2, no. 24;' sect. 3»
nos, 6 and o.
or relation of universality), they are wrong, since the uni
versal is formed by comparison. To deny this would involve
ignoring the difference between a real relation and a rela-

56
tion of reason. In this respect the second opinion is true.
A very delicate balance between a ‘number of factors
is involved here, Suarez holds that the material singular
is known directly by the intellect through a spiritual spe
cies which differs from the phantasm only in being entitati-

57
vely immaterial. This impressed intelligible species
enables the possible intellect to conceive the individual
nature together with its individuating factors, that is, a
singular concept is formed. This nature has a latent uni
versality based on the fact that many individuals have
specifically (but not numerically) the same nature. The
c6
J "Quod si prima opinio intelligat, secundam in-
tentionem, seu relationem universalitatis fieri per abstrac-
tionem, sine dubio falsa est, cum fiat per comparationem, et
in hoc verum habet secunda opinio, hocque negare esset ignor-
are differentiam inter relationem realem et rationis."
Suarez, De_ Anima. Book IV, chap. 3, no. 26.
K7
J In addition to the texts already cited, Suarez
mentions this again in another passage: "for the first spe
cies which is made by the intellect is altogether like the
phantasm in representation...therefore, the intelligible
species made by the agent intellect represents the same
thing and in the same way...since sensitive cognition is
the principle of intellective cognition, for it determines
the agent intellect to the production of a certain species:
therefore that is represented through the intelligible
species produced by the agent intellect, which was known
through the senses, and represented in the phantasm." Ibid.,
chap. 4, no. 1. And again: "the process of our intellect
in knowing seems to be that first...it receives a spiritual
species representing the very same sensible and material
thing which is represented in the phantasm..." Ibid..
no. 3.
205
J* possible intellect can prescind from the individuating con
ditions and engage in an absolute consideration of the nature
as such. This produces what Suarez calls the absolute or
metaphysical universal. The intellect can then reflect on
that nature and refer it to multiple inferiors in which it
is really found. Suarez calls this the relative or logical
universal, and the full meaning of universal is achieved

58
only in this last stage as a relation of reason. The im
portant point for the present discussion is not so much
Suarez1 theory of the formation of the universal, but the
close relation between his theory of individuation and his
teaching on huijan intellectual cognition of material singu
lars. His theory concerning the formation of univers&ls
flows naturally from his principle of individuation and
his insistence on direct human intellectual cognition of
material singulars.
On the question of the human intellect’s knowledge
of itself, of the soul, and of the things belonging to the
soul, Suarez follows St. Thomas strictly. That is, there is
no direct knowledge of these in themselves, but only through

59
their effects, after the fact, and reflexively,
58
J As he says in another place, universality arises
through the work of the intellect with a foundation in
reality. DM, Disp. VI, sect, 5, no. 1.
59
Since these are not material singulars, further
discussion of this point would not be relevant to the topic
of this dissertation. See Suarez, De Anlma. Book IV,
I- chap. 5, ill toto .
•*v
CHAPTER VIII
Reflections on Suarez’ Position
When one looks back over Suarez’ painstaking analy

sis of human intellectual knowledge of the material singular,
a number of implicit factors seem to emerge. There is no
dearth of explicit reasoning, but what Suarez takes for
granted is also of significance. It is obvious that Suarez
feels that it is necessary to reject the position of St.
Thomas and of the Thomistic School, as he understood it.
This dissertation would be incomplete without a treatment
of what Suarez has attempted to do, why he did so, and some
evaluation of what he actually accomplished. In this con
nection, it will be necessary to point out how Suarez dif
fers from the Thomistic school and to suggest some reasons
for this difference,
At present, only a few comments will be made, so
that an overall evaluation may be deferred to the final
chapter.
Suarez examines and rejects what he takes to be the
position of the Thomistic school, namely, that the human in
tellect cannot directly know the material singular. Suarez
insists that man does have a proper and direct intellectual
knowledge of the material singular. For Suarez, the object
of the intellect is whatever has entity, and since man en
counters only material singulars they must be the direct
and immediate objects of the intellect. These objects are
represented by the phantasm and the agent intellect repro
duces the intelligibility which is latent in the phantasm
by forming a spiritual species which it simultaneously im
plants in the possible intellect.
On the surface, this does not differ from the usual
Aristotelian explanation of concept formation. But when the
Suarezian theory of individuation is coupled with this, the
entire picture changes radically. According to Suarez, the
species produced by the agent intellect is nothing more nor
less than a spiritual representation of the same nature
that the phantasm represents in a material way. In the
light of Suarez’ contention that the principle of indivi
duation of every being is its whole entity and that matter
is not a sufficient principle of individuation, it follows
t
that the dematerializing aspect of abstraction will not
alter the singularity of the abstracted nature. Furthermore
since Suarez holds that individuality adds something real
to the nature, and thus there is a real union between them,
the abstracted nature will have to be singular in the first
instance of abstraction. In fact, any distinction between
the nature and its individuality will have to be a mental
distinction, since for Suarez, a real distinction requires
real separability. Suarez would consider it absurd to
maintain that either the nature or its individuality could
be separated and remain in existence without its correlative
Thus, when the agent intellect abstracts the nature, it
necessarily abstracts a singular nature. The chief differ
ence between the phantasm and the concept is that the for-
.J
mer is material and the latter is spiritual. The concept is
spiritual and singular, but what it represents is a material
singular.
Suarez appeals to experience to support his conten
tion that the human intellect knows the material singular
by means of a proper and distinct concept. The thorny is
sue of the singular judgment is a case in point. From
Suarez' point of view, it would be impossible for the in
tellect to join or separate the terms of a singular judg
ment without a proper and distinct knowledge of each term.
Another example from experience involves the intellectual
virtue of prudence. Since the exercise of this virtue often
involves material singulars, the intellect must have direct
knowledge of the material singular in order to make a pru
dential judgment.
Thus Suarez has tried to show that the human in
tellect does in fact know the material singular directly,
because it deals with the singular constantly, reasons about
it, makes decisions about it, and must take the singular into
account constantly in its activities. This is clear from
the observation of our own intellectual experience: Suarez
appeals directly to empirical evidence. The Intellect must
know what it deals with so constantly. In this respect,
of course, he does not directly oppose his adversaries,
since all agree that the intellect is somehow able to know
and deal with material singulars.
The precise point of difference is that Suarez in
sists that the human intellect knows the material singular
directly in itself. He establishes this by showing that the
intellect actually knows the singular first, and only by a
subsequent act of abstraction and comparison does the uni
versal emerge. Hence the intellect must know the singular
directly and in itself. Here again the proof is by appeal
to our psychological experience. We are aware of knowing
John before we know man. Once he has established the fact
that we know the singular directly in itself, he seems less
interested in demonstrating in detail just how this is done.
The intellect must have the power of disengaging the intel
ligibility of the singular from its accompanying material
ity in the phantasm. Since the individuality of a thing is
not a function of the matter alone but of the whole entity
of the singular, including its form, there is no metaphysi
cal obstacle to prevent grasping the singular intelligibility
even when the actual (but not intelligible) matter is left
behind.
What is the precise basis for Suarez' disagreement
with his opponents? Clearly there is a prior metaphysical
difference in the ontological root of individuation. But
how do the various epistemological analyses differ? Brief
ly, Suarez' argument runs thus: since we observe from psycho
logical introspection that we in fact know the singular first,
210
and then the universal, it follows as a metaphysical con

sequence that the intellect must know its singular object
directly in itself by its own intellectual act alone as dis
tinct from any prior act of sense or phantasm. This follows
from the general metaphysical position of Suarez on the na
ture of a real distinction (discussed at the end of Chapter
V), A real distinction is found only between two entities
or things such that each has its own reality in itself so
that at least theoretically they can without contradiction
be actually separated, and each be maintained in separate
existence from the other. Since the being of each is dis
tinct from the other, it follows that their proper acts are
likewise distinct and separable. And so, if, as all scho
lastics agreed, there is a real distinction between the in
tellect and the senses, Suarez will interpret this to mean
that the act of the intellect will be radically distinct
from the act of the sense and will follow upon the sense
act.
However, Suarez does not make this metaphysical
presupposition explicit in his argument for direct intel
lectual knowledge of the material singular. It is the im
plicit ground of possibility presumed throughout and only
occasionally hinted at. It is generally taken for granted,
but no less essential to the argument. If one did not ad
mit thi-s metaphysical doctrine of real distinction, the
conclusion of his argument would not necessarily follow,
and Suarez’ whole line of reasoning would be quite differ
ent .
This must be emphasized in order to isolate the
genuine point of divergence between Suarez and the Thomistic
position he is opposing. Suppose that a Thomist would admit
Suarez’ experiential evidence that we are in fact conscious
of first knowing the singular before the universal. The
Thomist might point out that the universal might be pro
duced first on the unconscious level, since it is granted
that the work of the agent intellect is carried out on the
unconscious level. More significantly, the Thomist might
hold that the act by which the intellect knows the singular
is not a simple act of the intellect alone, but a composite
one, a blend of intellect and phantasm in a single act ac
complished by two really distinct but metaphysically united
principles, each incomplete by itself and dependent on its
union with the other for its very being as this real act.
There might be a participation of sense in intellect or in
tellect in sense, with the lower serving as the quasi-instru-
ment of the higher in the unity of a single complex act.
Thus within the unity of man there would be no obstacle to
the interpenetration of the powers, so that one could speak
of an intellectualized sense power, for example. That is,
it is one thing to speak of the real distinction of the cog
nitive powers in that- one is not the other, but it is quite
another to foreclose the possibility of the coordinated and
integrated action of several of these powers simply on the
212
basis of their mutual non-identity.1
In his analysis Suarez never considers the possi

bility of this alternative solution, despite his usual tho
roughness and conscientious discussion of all significant
opinions. Apparently this simply did not occur to him as a
meaningful or intelligible possibility. This is understand
able, however, inasmuch as St. Thomas does not clarify this
aspect of his thought in the explicit discussion of human
2
intellectual knowledge of the material singular. Generally
speaking, Suarez focuses on the explicit treatment of a
topic in St. Thomas without searching out parallel passages
and underlying principles which may illuminate the main
treatment of a topic.
On the contrary, Suarez insists, for example, that
what the lower power can do, the higher power can do. Since
the senses know the material singular directly, then the in
tellect can also know it directly. Since there is a real
distinction between these powers, and given Suarez' meaning
of a real distinction, he cannot see how there can be a co
ordinated sensitivo-intellectual act. Suarez1 solution is
■^This aspect of the Thomistic position has been

considered in Chapter II of this dissertation, pp. 48-53.
Although St. Thomas was not always explicit on this point
in his esc professo treatment of intellectual knowledge of
the singular, this approach is certainly to be found in his
works and it has been clearly spelled out in the writings
of recent Thomists, especially Klubertanz and Mar£chal.
p
Cf., for example Summa Theologlae, I, q. 86, a. lc.
213
that the Intellect first acts so as to reproduce the singu

lar intelligible content of the phantasm. Suarez acknow
ledges the substantial unity of man: phantasm and intellect
exist in the same soul. There is an order and harmony be
tween the activities of these two powers, so that whenever
3
one of them operates so does the other. But there is a
real distinction between them, and thus no single act in
volving both powers together is possible. It is, then, im
portant to note that this unexpressed premise implicitly
commands the connection between his evidence and his con
clusion.
A similar instance of this occurs when Suarez dis
cusses the Thomistic teaching of the last practical judgment
of the intellect in human free choice. Suarez* position,
consistent with his understanding of the real distinction,
is that first the intellect posits the final act of free
choice. Intellect and will both have a part to play in the
production of the free act, but successively, not simul-
taneously. Suarez correctly understands the Thomistic
position to be that there is a mutual reciprocal causality
of intellect and will in different genera of causality, but
5
he cannot accept this approach. But Suarez cannot agree to
^Cf, p. 153 supra.

ii
Cf. William Norris Clarke, "The Motion of Human
Liberty in Suarez,” The Modern Schoolman, XIX (19^2),
5
"Dicunt tandem aliqui...illos duos actus esse sibi
214
a type of mutual reciprocal causality in different modes of

causality simultaneously. Hence for him, If a final result
requires the collaboration of two really distinct faculties,
then one must posit its act after the other, never together
with it to form a single undivided act.
The same underlying attitude commands the present
case of intellect and sense. It is not our concern here to
argue whether Suarez or St. Thomas is correct in his theory
of real distinction and reciprocal causality. It is merely
to expose the real issues commanding the divergent conclu
sions reached by these two thinkers.
One further obscurity remains. Suarez insists
throughout that the dematerializing process accomplished
by the agent intellect does not entail loss of singularity,
because matter is not the adequate and complete principle
of individuation. But abstraction does involve a complete
dematerialization. If this is so, then how can Suarez ac
count for intellectual knowledge of singular matter itself?
Granted that there is direct intellectual knowledge of the
material singular, does this involve only the singular na
ture, or is knowledge of its matter included? Suarez does
invicem causas in diversis generibus causarum, quia et

voluntas determinat intellectum, ut ita practice judicet,
et intellectus determinat voluntatem, ut velit talem rem.
Neque repugnat (inquiunt) ilia duo mutuo se antecedere et
subsequi, quia id fit in diversis generibus causarum.
Voluntas enim determinat intellectum efficienter, intellec
tus autem voluntatem finaliter. Sed haec doctrina mihi non
f" probaturj" Suarez, DM, Disp.XIX, sect, 6, no.5. Cf. Ibid.,
4>
nos. 6-8,
215
not directly deal with this aspect of the problem, but some
indication of his answer may be gleaned from what has been
said. First, Suarez seems to imply a distinction between
the entitative and cognitive status of matter. That is, the
material singular existing outside the mind (i.e., in its
entitative mode of existence) involves actual, physical
matter. The material singular existing in the knower (i.e.,
the intentional mode of existence) requires the recognition
of matter of another sort, intelligible matter. Since mat
ter is an intrinsic constituent of a material nature, a con
cept of that nature must include the notion of its matter.
Secondly, Suarez insists that there is no reason
why there cannot be a spiritual species which represents a
material singular nature. This species is spiritual in its
being, but its representative content is the same as that
of the phantasm. The intellect frees the intelligible
species from the conditions of matter from the standpoint
of its real being, but not with regard to the object it
represents. Thus, a material individual can be represented
in the intentional order by a species that is immaterial in
its being but not in its representative content. Hence some
direct knowledge of the individual’s singular matter is
possible and necessary.
Finally, since there is a real distinction between
the several cognitive powers, Suarez’ view of the real dis
tinction rules out the possibility of a composite act of
r
4> intellect and sense. A material thing cannot concur in a_
g
spiritual act. Thus, in order to know the material indivi
dual directly, the intellect would have to know its singular
matter.
Suarez does not explain exactly how the intellect
accomplishes this, but it seems to include the above three
considerations and the principle that what the lower cogni
tive power can do, the superior cognitive power can do.
The final chapter of this dissertation will consist
of an overall view of the development of this topic so as
to show what Suarez owes to his predecessors as well as
how and why he differs from them.
^Cf. Suarez, De_ Anima, Book IV, chpp, 3, no. 7.

CHAPTER IX
Conclusion
Suarez1 teaching on human intellectual knowledge of
material singulars is directly connected with his theory of

individuation. The link between these two doctrines has
been mentioned frequently in the preceding three chapters,
1
and it has also been noted by several others. Suarez holds
that man has.direct intellectual knowledge of the material
singular. This is possible, he says, because the agent in
tellect can form a spiritual species which represents the
material singular, and, given this singular spiritual spe
cies the possible intellect can form a concept which is
proper to that material singular. Suarez gives many argu
ments in favor of this position, such as, that it is not
impossible, that it is not incompatible with the spiritual
ity of the intellect, that singular judgments require it,
the superiority of the intellect over the senses, the tes
timony of experience, and so forth.
Suarez rejects what he considers to be the position
^For example: Tommaso M. Bartolomei, "La conoscenza

intelletuale del singolare corporeo e la funzione della cogi-
tiva," Dlvus Thom a s , LXI (1958), 169, "...e, partendo dal
principio di indiviiduazione, fonda su di esse la conoscenza
diretta del singolare." Jos£ Maria Alejandro, "Gnoseologia
de lo singular segtfn Suarez," Pensamiento, III (19*17), *113,
"Recu£rdese que la raiz metafisica del problema est£ en el
principio de individuacidn de singularidad: singular es
exactamente igual a infraespecifico."
of St. Thomas, and all other theories which hold that the
material singular is known intellectually only indirectly
or reflexively. In the second chapter of this dissertation
the relationship between St. Thomas' theory of individuation
and his teaching on human intellectual knowledge of material
singulars was emphasized. The purpose of that chapter was
not to settle the dispute about just what is in detail the
authentic teaching of St. Thomas or to interpret it in the
light of the development of contemporary Thomists, but ra
ther to sketch the broad outlines of the Angelic Doctor's
explicit teaching as accessible to Suarez, in order to pro
vide the immediate historical background for the latter's
own position. This applies as well to the discussion of
Scotus and Ockham in the third and fourth chapters. That
Suarez recognizes and assimilates the teachings of these
three thinkers where possible is evident, but it is equally
evident that his own position is original and unique. As
Maurer puts it: "...the true name for Suarez' doctrine of
universals is not Scotist, Thomist, or Ockhamist, but
2
Suarezian," This is true also of Suarez' teaching on in
dividuation and on human intellectual knowledge of material
singulars.
The originality of a philosopher's teaching is not
in itself a recommendation, but rather an indication that he
2Armand Augustine Maurer, Medieval Philosophy

(New York: Random House, 1962), p. 3 6 5 .
219
has seen, or thinks he has seen what others have either m is
sed or not clearly expressed. Many have paid tribute to the
truly massive erudition of Suarez, and even the most cursory
inspection of his works provides abundant evidence of this.
But Suarez is more than an erudite historian of philosophy,
he is primarily interested in the quest for truth— wherever
it may be found. This explains not only his alleged eclec
ticism but also his originality and creativity. As Copleston
has put it:
That Suarez was an eclectic in some sense seems
to me undeniable. He had an extremely extensive know
ledge of former philosophies, even if, as is only to
be expected, he was sometimes mistaken in his asser
tions or interpretations. And he could hardly possess
this knowledge without being influenced by the opinions
of the philosophers he studied. But this does not
mean that he accepted other p e op l e ’s opinions in an
uncritical manner. If, for example, he accepted the
opinion of Scotus and Ockham that there is a confused
intellectual intuition of the individual thing, which
logically precedes abstraction, he did so because he
thought that it was true.3
It is not the task of this dissertation to pass
judgment on any of the theories presented. To do this
adequately for even a single one would require both a treat-
% r e d e r i c k Copleston, A History of Philosophy.

Vol. Ill: Ockham to Suarez (Westminster. Maryland: The New
man Press,“I W T T , p. 375. Although he disagrees with Suarez’
metaphysics, Gilson acknowledges that: ”In fact, Suarez en
joys such a knowledge of mediaeval philosophy as to put to
shame any modern historian of mediaeval thought. On each
and every question he seems to know everybody and every
thing, .. .always willing to give everyone a chance, supremely
apt at summing up a case and, unfortunately, so anxious not
to hurt equity that a moderate verdict is most likely to be
considered a true verdict," Etienne Gilson, Being and Some
Philosophers (2d ed. rev.; Toronto: Pontifical Institute
of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 99.
220
ment equal In length to this whole dissertation (or more),

and an entirely different methodological approach. On the
contrary, an attempt has been made simply to present Suarez’
treatment of this topic with sufficient background from his
own and immediately antecedent systems to make his teaching
understandable. But in order to understand his position,
it must be recognized that there are certain at least appar
ent difficulties in the theory of St. Thomas, and whether it
was adequate or obscure, the later scholastics saw, or
thought they saw, weaknesses and deficiencies in his theory
on human intellectual knowledge of material singulars and .
the theory on which this depends, i.e., individuation.
Since these deficiencies seemed to them irreparable, the
later scholastics elaborated theories on both problems that
appeared more adequate to them. Suarez tried to resolve
the issue with fidelity to what he considered the valid in
sights of his predecessors. It has already been noted that
perhaps Suarez was not aware of the novelty of his solution
to these problems. Suarez is deeply concerned to establish
metaphysics on a firm foundation and to elaborate a solid
theory of knowledge, and to do both he must be faithful to
the real. Since outside the mind only individuals are real,
^"11 Suarez si preoccupa peculiarmente di dare in-

sieme una base reale alia Metafisica e di costruire una
Gnoseologia realistlea; due meriti indiscutibilij e, par-
tendo dal principio di individuazione, fonda su di esse la
cognoscenza diretta del singolare." Bartolomei, l oc. c i t .
(Italics in original)
221
5
he must begin with singulars.
St, Thomas explains that the material singular can

not be known directly by the human intellect since matter is
the principle of individuation and the process of human
knowledge involves a progressive dematerialization, and
matter cannot act directly on spirit. Consequently, if the
work of the agent intellect is to impress a spiritual spec
ies on the possible intellect, that species will be univer
sal in representation, and the universal is known first by
the human inte-lect. The unity of man permits a simultane
ous or subsequent (depending on o n e ’s interpretation of
Thomas) indirect intellectual grasp of the material singu
lar from which the universal idea was drawn.
Suarez, on the basis of a different theory of In
dividuation escapes the necessity of holding that the uni-
g
versal is known first by the human intellect. . This does
not mean, however, that according to Suarez universal con
cepts are pure mental constructs without extramental foun
dation. As has been seen, for Suarez, the production of
5
"El punto de partida es indudablemente exacto,
porque si la folosofâ del conocimiento es el clima ideo-
l<Sgico en que alienta y vive sistema, esa teoria no puede
nacer sino de una posicidn, a veces un simple gesto inte-
lectual, adoptado ante el ser, en su expresitfn mas exacta:
el singular." Jos£ Maria Alejandro, "Gnoseologia de lo
singular segtin Suarez," Pensamlento, III (1947), p. *103.
'^"Por el momento n<5tese que SCfarez sigue un pro-
ceso inverso al tomismo; no es el singular el aprehendido
en el universal, sino £ste en agu^l." Alejandro, "Gnoseo
logia...," Pensamlento, IV (1948), p. 142.
0
222
the universal involves two phases following the direct con

ceptualization of the singular. The intellect can strip the
conceived nature of its individuating notes to consider only
the nature in a precisive and absolute fashion. Suarez calls
this the abstract or absolute universal. But this is not a
universal in the full sense of the term. Following this ab
stractive act, the intellect can then refer the nature to
its various actual and possible inferiors. Suarez calls
this the relative or logical universal, and in this the
meaning of the universal is completed. But it is signifi
cant that for Suarez the universal has an objective founda
tion, that is, the singular nature outside the mind is a
"physical universal." In other words, the individual nature
(with the exception of the divine nature) is capable of
being multiplied, and so it is an inchoate or potential
universal.
Copleston notes a connection between Suarez’ doc
trine of participation involving the radical contingency or
utter dependence of finite beings on God and the Suarezian
theory of individuation. This can also be seen in the rela
tion between human intellectual knowledge of material singu
lars and the production of universal concepts. Copleston
mentions Suarez’ concern that his philosophy should be Christ
ian, "And if one regards his philosophical ideas in this
light, one can see a synthesis clearly emerging from the
7
mass of his pages." Copleston goes on to sketch the back-
ground in Aristotle’s "first unmoved mover," St. Augustine’s
introduction of the notion of creation, and St. T h om a s ’ a t
tempt to unite Aristotelianism and creationism.
Beneath, as it were, the Aristotelian distinction
of matter and form St. Thomas discerned the more fun
damental distinction of essence and existence, which
runs through all finite being. Act is limited by
potentiality, and existence, which stands to essence
as act to potentiality, is limited by essence. This
explains the finitude of creatures. Suarez, however,
was convinced that the utter dependence which logic
ally precedes any distinction of essence and existence
is itself the ultimate reason of finitude. There is
absolute being, God, and there is participated being.
Participation in this sense means total dependence
on the Creator. This total dependence or contingency
is the reason why the creature is limited or finite.
Suarez did not explain finitude and contingency in
terms of the distinction between existence and essence:
he explained this distinction, in the sense, that is,
in which he accepted it, in terms of a finitude which
is necessarily bound up with contingency.°
The same historian adds that among the many ideas in Suarez’
philosophy which follow from or are connected with his idea
of dependence or participation is the Suarezian theory of
individuation.
Further, finite being is multipliable in diverse species
and in a plurality of individuals in one species. And
in order to explain the multiplicity of individuals in
a species it is not necessary to introduce the idea
of matter as principle of individuation, with all the
remnants of ’unpurified’ Platonism attaching to that
Aristotelian idea.9
As has been observed in the Introduction to this
dissertation, there is a dearth of reliable scholarship on
^Copleston, ojd. c l t .. p. 376.

8Ibid., pp. 376-377.
9I bid.. p. 378.
the philosophy of Suarez, Among the historians of philo
sophy, only Copleston discusses him objectively and with
moderate completeness. Partisanship seems to dominate the
field, with some scholars showing an extreme aversion to
Suarez because of what they see as pernicious implications
of his doctrine, others stoutly defending Suarez with ob
vious conviction that Suarez is right and not at all danger-
10
ous,
For example, it is generally agreed that Suarez is
not a nominalist, although some see a tendency toward nomi
ll
nalism in his theory of knowledge. Others exonerate Sua-
Aduriz has expressed this situation rather well,

in his admonition that a theory of knowledge must be seen
in its historical context: "A1 tratar de interpretar una
teorla del conocimiento es, por consiguiente, imprescindi-
ble comenzar por situarla en su contorno histtfrico: de lo
contrario se corre el riesgo de orientar equivocadamente
sus ljfneas de fuerza con arreglo a esquemas que sdlo nues-
tras preoccupaciones actuales han hecho posibles.
Esta precauciSn es particularmente necessaria en el
caso de Francisco Suarez. Hecho sfmbolo de una escuela,
amigos y adversarios han discutido calurosa y abundamente
sobre el sentido de su filosofia. Algunas definiciones y
unos cuantos textos desglosados de la mole imponente de sus
obras, han sido ruidosamente esgrimidos para ’honorarle’ con
los epitetos mas extremos: representante aut^ntico de toda
la Escolasticaj responsable de la desegregaciin del Eecolas-
ticismo modernoj fiel continuador de Sto. TomCs; precursor
y maestro de Descartes; primer sistemazador de la metaffsica
escolistica; eclictico ahogado en el oc£ano de una erudiciin
mal digerida!” Joaquin Aduriz, "Para el estudio de la cri-
terologfa suareziana," Clencla y Fe, IV (19^8), pp. 20-21,
11For example, Bartolomei, o j d , c l t .» p. 171. "Da
tutto l'assieme si deduce che il Suarez si allontana dalla
posizione aristotelico-tomistica, sebbene egli ammetta
l ’esistenza d ell1intelletto agente e difenda il realismo
moderato e quindi il valore oggettlvo della scienza. Ma
l'azione dell'intelletto agente non si svolge sul fantasma
rez from the charge of nominalism completely.
come nella teoria di S, Tomraaso, bensl si restringe e limita

a imprimere spiritualmente nell'intelletto possibile gli
aspetti singolare e universal! che sono rappresentati nel
fantasma. Cessa, percô, la dlstlnzione reale tra Intel
letto agente e possibile e si proîla il grave pericolo di
confondere 1'intelletto col senso, di cadere cic^ nell'empi-
rismo, quantunque esplicitamente il Suarez rifiuti la sen-
tenza scotista e nominalista." In a footnote (49) on the
same page he speaks "di tendenza della dottrina suareziana
verso il nominalismo, non 'gicT di realtlij..." (Italics in
original.)
12
"A1 recorrer la historia, de la que podrfamos .
llamar ’moderna acusacion nominalista' contra el Doctor Exi-
mio vemos que arranca como de base fundamental de la posi-
cion gnoseol(fgica adoptada por el gran Doctor jesufta, ante
lo singular como infraespecffico....Mas las consecuencias a
que en esta acusacion se llega son totalmente falsas, pues
se derivan de un planteamiento tambi£n totalmente falso del
problema: se pretende identificar una gnoseologia que podrf
amos llamar 1dlrectlsmo crltlco' en relacitfn con lo singular
y concreto con la fiiosoffa nominalista, esencialmente agnos-
tica y antimetaflsica." Alejandro, "Gnoseologia...,"
Pensamiento. Ill (1947), 403-404. The judgment of De Vries,
though favorable to Suarez is more moderate: "Als Hauptgrund
fur den angeblichen Nominalismus des Suarez aber gilt seinen
Gegnern die Lehre von der direkten Erkenntnis des materiel-
len Einzelnen durch den menschlichen Verstand, Durch diese
Lehre, meint man, werde der Wesensunterschied zwischen Sinn
und Verstand aufgehoben, das Allgemeine entwertet, die Meta-
physik unmoglich gemacht. Suarez stelle sich damit auf den
Boden des Ockhamschen Nominalismus bzw. Konzeptualismus."
Josef de Vries, "Die Erkenntnislehre des Franz Suarez und der
Nominalismus," Scholastik, XX-XXIV (1949), 322. A few pages
later, de Vries says of Ockham, "Seine Lehre ist also keines-
wegs mit des Suarez identisch. Mur in der These, dass das
Einzelne erster Gegenstand auch des Verstandes ist, trifft
sich Suarez mit ihm," I bid., 333• (Italics in original.) In
his conclusion, de Vries again speaks of Suarez' teaching on
direct cognition of material singulars: "Diese ist, wie wir
sahen, so wenig nominalistisch, dass sie gerade im Gegenteil
den Kontakt des Allgemeinen mit der Wirklichkeit sichern
soil. Die Gefahr einer Entêrtung des Allgemeinen wird eben
nicht nur durch einseitige Uberbetonung der Erfahrung, son-
dern,ebenso durch ubergeistige Trennung des Gedanklich-All-
gemeinen vom erfahrungsmassig gegebenen realen Einzelnen
heraufbeschworen, Suarez hat sich in dieser schwierigen
Frage nach Kraften um einen Ausgleich bemuht, Auch wenn er
ihm nicht ganz gelungen ist, verdient er doch gewiss nicht
226
However, several difficulties remain in all of the
theories presented. While no attempt can be made here to
solve any of these problems, it may be profitable to discuss
several of these issues for whatever heuristic value they
may have. First, it must be admitted that there are diffi
culties in the theory of St. Thomas as he expressed it in
various texts. It has been pointed out in the second chap
ter of this dissertation that perhaps the only way out of
the difficulty is in the affirmation of the unity of man.
The Angelic Doctor does this frequently enough, but it is
not explicitly mentioned in the texts where he treats of
human intellectual knowledge of material singulars. In his
discussion of human intellectual cognition of material sin
gulars St. Thomas insists that there is no direct, properly
intellectual knowledge of material singulars. The impedi
ment is not, however, singularity but matter. St. Thomas
grants that man does have an indirect intellectual knowledge
of material singulars, and this is possible only through a
coordinated act of both the intellect and the sense powers.
In other words, as St. Thomas frequently insists, it is not
the intellect that knows nor the senses that know, but it is
13
man who knows by means of both intellect and senses. While
den Vorwurf des nominalismus.” Ibid., 3 ^ .

13
In the opinion of the present writer, man never
has in this life an isolated act of either the senses or
the intellect. That is, in man every cognitive act involves
v both the senses and the intellect. The senses are charged
► with the energizing influence of the intellect and the in-
& o
227
it is certainly necessary to distinguish the proper func
tions of the various powers of man, this is only a procedu
ral and pedagogical device. It is equally necessary to stress
the psychosomatic integration of all the operations of the
human synolon. It is true that St. Thomas says that the
various powers of man are really distinct from each other
and from the soul. This means only that they are non-iden
tical, ndb that they are really separate or separable.
But the later scholastics did not understand St.
Thomas in this light. For them, there are real difficulties

li*
and deficiencies in the Thomistic theory. The problem of
induction, for example, might be seen as a difficulty facing
the Thomistic theory. Scotus rejects St. Thomas explanation
tellect actively penetrates the sense powers with its pre

sence and sovereignty.
14
Perhaps Alejandro expresses the feeling of Scotus,
Ockham, and Suarez when he gives his own opinion: "La gnose-
ologla tomista adolece de una especial oscuridad que nubia
su primer paso: el conocimiento del singular, pero que tras-
ciende a toda ella; oscuridad, enti£ndase bien, no ldgica o
dial£ctica, sino gnoseoldgica;...una oscuridad que afecta a
la valoracitfn misma del contenido cognoscitivo; y esta valo-
racidn, revistase con las frases que se quiera y con las mas
complicadas teorlas, consiste en una prueba experimental d$l
contenido del conocimiento, poni^ndole en contacto intimo
con el ser; pero con el ser tal y como se nos representata:
concreto, real, singular.... Pues bien, las consecuencias
son claras: si todo conocimiento empieza en el sentido y el
conocimiento es por el ser, la piedra de toque de todo cono
cimiento ser£ el ser en su orlgen cognoscitivo, el sentido.
Mas si entre el sentido y el entendimiento se abre un foso,
cognoscitivamente insalvable, destruyendo asi la unldad
noseolSgica del sujeto cognoscente, el control cognoscitivo
fnlclal queda definitivamente alejado, y la valoracldh
gnoseoltfglca del conocimiento queda en posicidn desventajosa
ante el criticismo." Alejandro, "Gnoseologica...
Pensamlento, IV (1948), 137. (Italics in original.)
of human intellectual knowledge of material singulars not
only because of a different theory of individuation but also
because of a concern with the objectivity of knowledge and
because he thinks it impossible to establish metaphysics on
the basis of St. Thomas’ theory of knowledge. Ockham flatly
rejects any postulation of a species or intermediary between
mind and things.
Many other areas of disagreement between St. Thomas,
Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez on this topic could be pointed
out, but one of the less obvious stems from the implications
of the various theories of distinction held by these think
ers. That is, all (except Scotus) hold that there is a real
distinction between the senses and the intellect in man.
What each means by a real distinction makes a great differ
ence. The real distinction for St. Thomas is considerably
broader and more flexible in its applicability than it is
for the others. According to the Thomistic theory of dis
tinctions, a real distinction obtains between two things,
two principles, a substance and its accidents, and between
the several accidents of the same substance, and so forth.
The criterion of a real distinction is reciprocal non-iden
tity, that is, one is not the other. To be really distinct,
the components need not be actually separate or even separ
able. Thus a real distinction may exist even where there
is a real union, as, for example, in the members of a com
posite. Hence a real distinction does not preclude the

229
possibility of a mutual influx, contact, and interaction be
tween really distinct menmers.
Scotus' formal objective distinction has already
been touched on in the third chapter. Although it is un
clear whether he holds that there is a real distinction or
a formal objective distinction between the human intellect
and senses, the same problem faces not only Scotus but also
Ockham and Suarez. That is, how is it possible for senses
and intellect to work together as they must, given the type
of distinction between these powers that these three think
ers postulate? For Ockham and Suarez, a real distinction
means that the distinct members must either actually sepa
rate or be at least capable of being physically separated.
To some degree in Scotus and more certainly in
Ockham it is difficult to understand why the intellect needs
the senses at all. Their interesting doctrine of intuitive
intellectual cognition seems to make the senses superfluous.
In other words, on this basis it appears that the intellect
could bypass the senses altogether. Though it is true that
Scotus mentions that the dependence of the intellect on the
senses is either because of the divine decree in punishment
for original sin or for the harmony of the various human
powers, there seems to be no absolute reason for this.
Ockham, on the other hand, would hold that if there is such
a dependence, this is a sheer factual situation, and God
could have decided otherwise. Furthermore, if other opin-

ions of Ockham are applied to this problem, the above objec
tion emerges more clearly. Ockham will permit no interme
diary, not even a species, between the intellect and things.
God can always confer knowledge directly on our minds with
or without the corresponding things being present, although
He cannot give an intuitive cognition of a thing which is
not present or existent without the absence or non-existence
of that thing being included in the cognition.
Por Scotus and Ockham there is the additional dif
ficulty of the passivity of human cognitive powers. That
is, how can matter act on spirit? Things act on the senses
and intellect, and these powers are receptive rather than
active. This would seem to involve a violation of the prin
ciple that matter cannot act on spirit. It is true that
for Scotus the intellect is a co-cause of knowledge together
with the object, but this does not involve more than a re
sponse to the object, and it does not seem to answer the
problem.
Both St. Thomas and Suarez escape the above two
difficulties. Each holds that the nature of man is such
that the senses are the normal avenue of contact between
the human intellect and the world. Suarez often mentions
the role of the phantasm in the intellect's direct grasp of
the singular. For Suarez, as has been seen in the sixth
chapter, the agent intellect produces a singular spiritual
species which directly represents the individual represented

in the phantasm. The principal difference between this spe
cies and the phantasm is that the former is totally immater
ial or spiritual, and the latter is only partially immaterial.
Likewise, both St. Thomas and Suarez emphasize the
dual active-passive character of the human intellect. The
intellect is receptive, but this passivity of one phase of
the intellect is coupled with a permanently active phase of
the same intellect. The intellect itself is the prime cause
of its own knowledge, and the phantasm is only a necessary
condition, the materia circa quam for the intellect's
operation.
Finally, it may be said that the problem of human
intellectual knowledge of the material singular is still
unsolved. Whether the viewpoint adopted by Francis Suarez
is adequate in every respect remains an open question. The
definitive resolution of this issue was not envisioned in
this dissertation, which undertook only the more modest task
of presenting the teaching of Suarez in itself and as ari
sing out of several earlier developments. It is probably
not an exaggeration to say that the stumbling block of every
theory of knowledge is precisely the question of human in
tellectual knowledge of material singulars. An attempt has
been made here to give an exposition of Suarez' teaching on
this topic as fairly, completely, and objectively as

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V
George L. Stengren
B . A . , St. John's University
M.A., St. John's University
Human Intellectual Knowledge of the Material Singular
According to Francis Suarez
Dissertation directed by Rev. W. Norris Clarke, S.J., Ph.D.
This study investigates the tea ch ing of Suarez on
human intellectual knowledge of the material singular.
This problem engaged the attention of some o f the best minds
of the medieval era. Every theory of knowledge has to con
tend with this problem in some way. This question not only
has speculative interest, but especially in the case of
Suarez, there are cultural and social cross currents related
to it as well. The increasing interest in the individual in
late medieval and Renaissance thought gave this issue direc
tly practical consequences.
Although the problem of human intellectual know
ledge of the material singular originates in Aristotle, the
first clear, full, and extensive discussion of this question
occurs in St, Thomas. His position is that the material
singular is known only indirectly by the hu man intellect,
Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez hold that m a n has direct intel
lectual knowledge of the singular. Their reasons and spe
cific formulations differ, and the metaphysical implications
of their teachings also vary.
In the treatment of Suarez' position, it is first

necessary to give his theory of individuation. He considers
various points of view and concludes that neither matter
alone, nor form alone, nor the composite is sufficient as
a principle of individuation, but that a thing is an indi
vidual by reason of its whole entity.
Suarez' theory of distinctions is an important
implict controlling principle in the development of both
the theory of individuation and in his discussion of know
ledge of the singular. Since individuality adds something
real to the nature to constitute the concrete being, even
complete intellectual abstraction from all matter will
produce a concept which direbtly represents the singular
nature.
Thus Suarez maintains that man has direct intel
lectual knowledge of the material singular by producing a
spiritual species which corresponds to the material nature
of the singular.
The universal concept is formed subsequently and
on the basis of the singular concept. This involves an
abstraction of the nature prescinded from its individuality
and a comparative projection of that nature with reference
to its inferiors.
In conclusion, one may say that Suarez has elabor
ated an original theory on this topic that is at least
partially a creative synthesis of the theories of his
p r ede cessors.
VITA
George L. Stengren, son of the late Bernard and Mary
Ellen Stengren, was born January 12, 1928, In New York City.
He attended Xavier High School, New York City, and was gra
duated from Columbian Evening High School in June 1949.
He entered St. John's University in September 1949 and
received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in June 1955. In
September 1955 he was accepted as a graduate student in St.
John's University where he received the degree of Master of
Arts in June 1956. In September of 1956 he was accepted as
a graduate student in Fordham University.
During the summer of 1956 and the spring of 1959 he was
employed as a Lecturer in Philosophy at St. John's Univer
sity. In September of 1956 he was employed as an Instructor
in Philosophy at Iona College, New Rochelle, where he is now
an Assistant Professor 6f Philosophy, He has also been em
ployed as a Lecturer in Philosophy at Seton Hall University
during the spring of 1962, and at Hunter College in the Bronx
from September 1962 to the present.
He was granted a graduate assistantship as a graduate
student in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of St.
John's University in September 1955. He was granted a New
York State War Service Scholarship (1957-1961) as a graduate
student in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of
Fordham University, whereHle majored in the History of
Scholastic Thought under the mentorship of Professor
W. Norris Clarke, S.J.

Human Intellectual Knowledge Op The Material Singular According To Francis Suarez

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This d issertation has been 65—14,186

m icrofilm ed exactly a s receiv ed

STENGREN, G eorge L „ 1928-

Fordham U n iversity, P h.D ., 1965

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

A.B., St. John's University, '55

G raduate Sc h o o l of A rts a n d Sciences

This dissertation prepared under my direction by

____________ George L.-Stengren----------------------

has been accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the

Origin of the Problem in A r i s t o t l e .............

II. THE POSITION OF ST. THOMAS A Q U I N A S ............. . 1 9

The Principle of I n d i v i d u a t i o n .................. 20

III. THE POSITION OF JOHN DUNS S C O T U S .............. 54

Theory of Individuation ........................ 59

IV. THE POSITION OF WILLIAM OF O C K H A M ................ 85

V. SUAREZ ON INDIVIDUATION AND DISTINCTION . . . . 103

Enumeration and Discussion of the Positions

VI. HUMAN INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL SINGULARS

The Object of the I n t e l l e c t .................... 144

VII. PRODUCTION OF THE U N I V E R S A L ................ 174

Various Opinions Discussed and Analyzed

IX. CONCLUSION ....................

The problem of human Intellectual knowledge of the

material singular engaged the attention of some of the best

minds of the medieval period in philosophy. The resolution

of this problem is one of the chief stumbling blocks of

every theory of knowledge. Certainly the problem of univer-

sals is one of the central issues of medieval philosophy,

and so the discussion of cognition of singulars as an as­

pect of the problem of Universals has more than routine

speculative and practical value. The position taken by

Francis Suarez, one of the last of the medieval philoso­

prove significant if only from the viewpoint of its his­

torical interest. That the doctrine of Suarez on this

topic is important for its own sake as an epistemological

theory which represents an original synthesis of several

previous theories is one of the conclusions of this disser­

Apart from its importance from the standpoint of

epistemology, Suarez' position has cultural significance

as well. The years between the death of St. Thomas in 1274

and the birth of Suarez in 1548 had seen Europe torn in

many directions. The Reformation, the rise of nationalism,

the Church»State conflicts, had changed the face of Europe.

Pervading all this was a radically new recognition of the

Iberian Peninsula was less profoundly affected by all this

of his times. His concern with the importance of the indi­

vidual and the crucial issue of human freedom pervades the

calm, placid, and generally dispassionate pages of his

voluminous writings. Thus the cultural and social Issues

of his time are also reflected even in such areas as his

treatment of the metaphysical problem of individuation and

the eplstemologlcal problem of intellectual knowledge of

the material singular. That Suarez also did a great deal

to affect the subsequent development of modern European

philosophy has been noted by several astute historians of

Nevertheless, Suarez remains a badly neglected fig­

ure in the history of philosophy. There are very few

thorough and objective studies of Suarezlan thought. There

are a number of highly polemical tracts, some defending,

others excoriating Suarez. This situation explains, in

part, the relative lack of references to secondary sources

in the pages that follow. More than this negative reason,

and so the discussion of cognition of singulars as an as

Francis Suarez, one of the last of the medieval philoso

prove significant if only from the viewpoint of its his

previous theories is one of the conclusions of this disser

of his times. His concern with the importance of the indi

Nevertheless, Suarez remains a badly neglected fig

some treatment of the history of this problem and the ap

his discussion of knowledge of the singular, a brief dis

cussion of his notion of distinction is included. The im

problem of the universal originates in Aristotle, the char

problem, but only a summary of those theories on human in

Moreover, the adjustments made necessary by Aris

totle’s rejection of Plato's theory of subsistent forms log

actuality. Matter is opaque to the mind, passive, the prin