DE JOYA vs.

JAIL OF BATANGAS,
Facts: Petitioner Norma De Joya was charged separately with violations of BP 22. When
arraigned in both cases, petitioner pleaded not guilty. While trial was going on, petitioner
jumped bail. No evidence was thereby adduced in her defense in any of the two cases. The
Court found the her guilty. Petitioner remained at large and no appeal was filed from any of
the said decisions. After five years, petitioner was finally arrested while she was applying for
an NBI clearance. She was forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail. Subsequently, she
filed an urgent motion with the MTC of Batangas City asking the court to apply SC Admin.
Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and to
order her release from detention. In an Order dated August 15, 2003, the trial court denied
the motion on three grounds: (a) its decision convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 had long become final and executory; hence, could no longer be amended to change the
penalty imposed therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively; and (c) the SC
Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but merely encourages trial court
judges to have a uniform imposition of fine. Petitioner thus filed a petition for habeas corpus
before the Supreme Court praying for her release from the Batangas City Jail on the claim
that her detention was illegal.

Issue: Is petitioner entitled to a writ habeas corpus?

Held: No. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of
habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.

In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of the
MTC of Batangas City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the
petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioners reliance of our ruling in Ordonez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to
benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is
misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC
Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit
her has no basis.

First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the
date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.

Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular
No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent
behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into
account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused whether
he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence and such other
circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to
be imposed.

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22. The pursuit of this purpose clearly
does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does
it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
PP vs. GONZALES

CASE DIGEST: CRIMINAL LAW

TOPIC: “Act” as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code; There must be shown an “act”
committed by appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that
produced his death. While the prosecution accuses and the two lower courts both found that
the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd, there was however, lack of proof
as to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that “act” as used in Article 3
of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as “any bodily movement tending to produce
some effect in the external world.” In this instance, there must be therefore be shown an “act”
committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim
that produced his death. Yet, even Huntoria admitted quite candidly that he did not see who
stabbed or hacked the victim. Thus, this principal witness did not say, because he could not,
whether the appellant indeed hacked or stabbed the victim. This lack of specificity then
makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code
previously discussed. CASE: People v. Custodio Gonzales DOCKET No: G.R. 80762, March
19, 1990 FACTS: In a previous decision in the Regional Trial Court, the Court found the
accused-appellants Gonzales et al. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Through their counsel, all the accused
filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s decision. However, during the pendency of
appeal, all accused-appellants except Custodio Gonzales Sr. withdrew their appeal and chose
instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the then Ministry now
Department of Justice Parole Division. Thus, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on
Gonzales’ appeal. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and indemnification of the heirs of Lloyd in the amount of P30,000.00.
***

CASE DIGEST: CRIMINAL LAW

The antecedent facts show that: At around 9pm on February 1981, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla Iloilo was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord Lloyd
Penacerrada and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding
the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared in blood, Paja
immediately ordered his nephew to take the spouses to the police authorities at their
municipal hall. Thus, an investigation was made behind the killing, and two days after the
said incident, Augusto appeared before the police station and voluntarily surrendered for
detention and protective custody for “having been involved” in the killing of Lloyd. He
requested that he be taken in the same headquarters where his wife Fausta was detained.
During arraignment, the spouses entered a plea of ‘not guilty’. Before trial however,
Huntoria, who claimed to have witnessed the killing, presented himself to Nanie Penacerrada
—the victim’s widow, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. *** A reinvestigation
was therefore conducted, and the prosecution’s case rested on Huntoria’s alleged eyewitness
account of the incident, who alleges to have seen the incident. The Court of Appeals affirmed
Huntoria’s testimony and found lone accused-appellant Custodio Gonzales guilty, who,
among all the accused-appellants, did not seek for parole before the Department of Justice.
*** ISSUE: On appeal, the issue raised in this case was whether or not Custodio Gonzales is
guilty of murder, based on Hustoria’s account where the prosecution’s case rested. COURT
RULING: The Supreme Court found that the prosecution’s stand is insufficient to convict
Custodio Gonzales guilty of the crime charged. 1.

The investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. During
investigation, there were conflicts as to where the scene of the crime was. While the sketch
indicated are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scenes of the
crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. Considering there were two
versions where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have
provided a definite clue as to which version was more credible. 2.

The police also failed to state the reason of Augusto Gonzales’ surrender. Further, Augusto
never mentioned the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim.

CASE DIGEST: CRIMINAL LAW

3.

Furthermore, the autopsy report would show that the killing would have been caused by two
or more bladed instrument, but opined that one bladed instrument is still possible. And
insofar as Dr. Rojas’ testimony was concerned, while Huntoria admitted that he saw six
persons taking turns in killing the victim, he however could not determine who among the six
accused did the stabbing and what particular weapon was used. Considering the abovesaid
facts, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred: a.)

By any person committing a felony (delitos) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended, b.)

By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishments or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. Further, Article 3 defines how felony is
committed—which is either by means of deceit (dolo) or by means of fault (culpa). Thus
there is deceit when the act performed is by deliberate intent, while there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. In this
case, while the prosecution accuses and the two lower courts both found that the appellant
has committed felony in Lloyd’s death, there is paucity of proof as to what act was
performed by the appellant. Yet, Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted candidly that he
failed to see who stabbed or hacked the victim. In fact, he does not even know what specific
act was performed in the killing. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the
test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, Huntoria’s credibility as
witness is tarnished by the fact that he only came out eight months since he allegedly saw the
incident. He also failed to explain satisfactorily the reason for his long delay in revealing
what he allegedly witnessed.

GONZALES vs. ABAYA

The nature of the military justice system
Coup d'etat vis-a-vis violation of the Articles of War
FACTS:

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments
on Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards and planted
explosive devices around the building. They then declared their withdrawal of support from
their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic.

After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an Information
for coup d’etat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time that they were tried at
court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the jurisdiction of the court
martial, contending that the RTC ordered that their act was not service-connected and that
their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of
coup d’etat.

ISSUE:
Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore cognizable by court
martial or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat cognizable by regular courts

RULING:

The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of
discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. Military law is
established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the
tranquility and security of the State in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and
security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace
and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. The administration of military
justice has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all
countries of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most
effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become
invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent
agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war.

The Court held that the offense is service-connected. xxx It bears stressing that the charge
against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to
defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused
dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their
professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the “service-
connected” nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the
service – imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in
character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the
stringent standard of military discipline.
US vs. BULL,
Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named

Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found
that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing
appropriate shelter and proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for
most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died while in transit.

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it said
that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it
say about ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.

Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship
while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance
of Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines
shall apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the
Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions
existed during the time the ship was within the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that
the same conditions existed when the ship settled from the foreign port and while it was on
the high seas,

In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of
two hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
(See PP vs. WONG CHENG, PP vs. LOOK CHAW & PP vs. AH SING)
Case Title: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that

urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of
Manila presented by the defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally
smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the
said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of
the city. In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction
of the lower court of the said crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the
case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.

Held:

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the
Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court
said that having the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it causes
such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the
demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.
Monday, 3 August 2015
CASE DIGEST: US vs Look Chow, 18 Phil 573
Case Title: US vs Look Chow, 18 Phil 573
Subject Matter: Applicability of the provisions of Art 2 of the Revised Penal
Code

Facts:

Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and internal
revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect
and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The defendant stated
freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with
the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as
his hold had already been searched several times for opium he ordered two other
chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus
delicti.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it
came from Hong Kong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in
Manila and Cebu.

Issue:

Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign
vessels stationed in its port.

Held:

Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere possession
of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime
triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered
as an extension of its own nationality. However, the same rule does not apply
when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present
case, a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime. Only the court established in the said place itself has
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.
Case Title: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived in the port
of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board and had
them in his possession during the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were found in the ashes
below the boiler of the steamer's engine by authorities who made a search upon anchoring on
the port of Cebu. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he
had purchased it in Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the
opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands is
criminally liable in the Philippines.
Held:

Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person who unlawfully imports
or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found
under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is
within the jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of illegal importation of
opium, unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.
(PP vs. SILVESTRE)
People vs. Silvestre and Atienza (Crim1)
People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza,
defendants-appellants.

En Banc

Villareal, December 14, 1931

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:
Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage
Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol,
Paombong, Bulacan
On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a
sworn complaint for adultery
After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president
of Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint
The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live
again in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)
On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the
justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case
The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Niño, in Paombong
About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz,
in Santo Niño and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some
nipa leaves)
Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home
of Nicolas
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were
gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house
because he was going to set fire to it
He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he
said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana
Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him
Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late
The fire destroyed about 48 houses
Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of
cadena temporal)
Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)
The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI
decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:
The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice
The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at least, of
reasonable doubt
Issue:
Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice
Holding:
No.
Ratio:
Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who
does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to
commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would
not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or
simultaneous actions.
In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an
agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are
simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged
or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the
alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation
required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent
Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana
Silvestre, who is acquitted.
PP vs. OANIS, July 27, 1943, GR No. 47722
People vs Oanis, 74 Phil 257
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

Criminal Case Digest:

Digested Cases

Facts: As a group taking the route to Rizal street, Chief of Police Antonio Z. Oanis
and his co-accused Corporal Alberto Galanta were under instructions to arrest Anselmo
Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered,
to get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, they went into a room and on
seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, simultaneously fired at him with their .
32 and .45 caliber revolvers, without firstmaking any reasonable inquiry as to his identity.
The victim turned out to be a
peaceful and innocent citizen, Serapio Tecson who upon autopsy, multiple
gunshot wounds were found on his body which caused his death.

The defendants alleged and appealed that in the honest performance of their official duties,
they acted in innocent mistake of fact.

Issue: Whether or not Chief of Police Oanis and Corporal Galanta were guilty of murder.

Ruling: New Rules of Court, Rule 109, Section 2 paragraph 2 provides, No
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the
person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for
his detention. As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed by
both was murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. Even if it were true
that the victim was the notorious criminal, the accused would not be justified in
killing him while the latter was sleeping. In apprehending even the most notorious
criminal, the law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive
from justice is determined to fight the officers of the law who are trying
PP vs. VILLACORTA DIEGO vs. CASTILLO
Diego v. Castillo

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673 August 11, 2004

Lessons Applicable: malice, bigamy

Laws Applicable: Article 204[7] RPC,

FACTS:
· January 9, 1965: Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., both
Filipinos, solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City
· February 15, 1978: Jorge filed a Decree of Divorce in Texas
· June 4, 1987: Crescencia Escoto using the name Lucena Escoto married Manuel P.
Diego before the Rev. Fr. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City
· The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal case of bigamy against Escoto
· RTC: Acquittal since state failed to prove guilt beyond whisper of a doubt and gave
credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent for
believing in good faith that her marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment
· An administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for Knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

ISSUE: W/N Castillo should be liable against Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

HELD: NO. Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is FINED P10,000 with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely
· The law requires that
o (a) the offender is a judge;
o (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
o (c) the judgment is unjust;
o (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust
· even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, he still cannot be
administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose
· As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
· Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
· error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes
ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action
US vs. AH CHONG, March 19, 1910, GR No. 5272
US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)
The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

En Banc

Carson, March 19, 1910

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts:

The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal
Province
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building
No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward
the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the
side of the building
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a
measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were
in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing
against it a chair
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened
by some trying to force open the door of the room
He called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room
The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate
Pascual
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds
Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident,
and had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that the door
and acquaint his companion with his identity
The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because
of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley
Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression
that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite the defendant's warnings
Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
(mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the
minimum penalty prescribed by law
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible
Holding:
No.
Ratio:
By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was
actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense),
but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true
state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he would be guilty of
homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness
in falling into his mistake as to the facts
RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.
PP vs. CAGOGO, GR No. 38511, October 6, 1933
Facts:

on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to
talk on the sidewalk

While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or
twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father, the man that
had been passing back and forth behind Yu Lon approached him from behind
and suddenly and... without warning struck him with his fist on the back
part of the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the
asphalt pavement; the lower part of his body fell on the sidewalk. His
assailant immediately ran away.

The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, where he
died... about midnight.

Issues:

it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all, should be punished in

accordance with article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, or for slight
physical injuries instead of murder.

Ruling:

Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that

criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; but in order that a person may be criminally... liable for a
felony different from that which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable
that the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a felony was
committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the
direct consequence of the... crime committed by the offender.

where death results as the direct consequence of the use of... illegal
violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the
injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal
aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the
law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the... natural
consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to
produce such consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of intention,
while it does not exempt from criminal liability, is taken into
consideration as an extenuating circumstance

There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon.

There is nothing to indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. It
was clearly the direct consequence of defendants felonious... act, and the
fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does not
relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a
mitigating circumstance... under the circumstances of this case the
defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death was the
direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the
head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a treacherous...
manner, he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did
not intend to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the
crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the presence of
the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Principles:

where death results as the direct consequence of the use of... illegal
violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the
injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal
aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the
law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the... natural
consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to
produce such consequences
US vs. VALDEZ , 41 Phil. 497)
US vs VALDEZ
US VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ
G.R No. L-16486 22 March 1921

FACTS: Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The
crew of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez and six others among who was the
deceased, Venancio Gargantel. During their work, the accused began to abuse the men with
offensive words. Gargantel complained, saying that it would be better if he would not insult
them. The accused took this as a display of insubordination, thus, he moved towards
Gargantel, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused
had attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter, evidently believing himself in great
and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be
seen no more.

As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by drowning, as a consequence of
having thrown himself into the water and upon seeing himself threatened and attacked by the
accused. The Judgment rendered against the accused. Having been convicted as the author of
the homicide, the accused alleged on appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of
inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio Gargantel.

HELD:

The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused, enunciated the following doctrine:
“ That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive
and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary
artery , occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that
person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled
his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the accused
forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal
wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to
cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the
very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the
act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the death of
the injured person was due to the act of the accused.”

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio
Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge
appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to
commit so great a wrong as that committed. ( Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)
(PP vs. ILLUSTRE, 54 Phil 594)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ILLUSTRE LLAGAS a.ka. NONOY LLAGAS 586
SCRA 707 (2009)

Absence of ill-motive to testify against the appellant, the straightforward and candid
testimony of a rape victim is sufficient to warrant conviction. Appellant Illustre Llagas was
accused of raping AAA, a waitress at a restaurant and karaoke bar in Baguio City. It was
alleged that Llagas and AAA agreed to meet because the latter was going to buy his
cellphone. Llagas however, told AAA that he left his charger at his house and suggested that
they go there to get it. He assured AAA that they would not be alone there. Upon arriving at
Llagas‘ house, AAA found that they were alone so she tried to leave but Llagas locked the
door. She insisted to leave but Llagas boxed her and threatened her with a kitchen knife when
she struggled. He succeeded in pulling her inside a room and did then and there raped her.
While she was crying, his cellphone rang, which gave AAA an opportunity to escape. Llagas
denied such accusation and claimed that he had sexual intercourse with her and that it
happened by mutual consent. The trial court found Llagas guilty of rape. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed the factual findings of the trial court, but modified the award of
moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Llagas committed the crime of rape by using force and intimidation

HELD:

In the main, Llagas submits in his Appellant‘s Brief filed before the appellate court that his
act of answering a phone call from his wife ―on the very same date and time that he was
allegedly raping [AAA] is more of an evidence of consensual sexual intercourse and not of
forced carnal knowledge.‖ Such change of theory on appeal can only be construed against his
innocence, however. For while before the trial court appellant denied having had sexual
intercourse with AAA on April 16, 2003, he admitted having done so but on February 28 or
29, 2003 and with AAA‘s consent. But even if the Court were to credit Llagas‘ change of
position when the case reached the appellate court, his citation of his having received his
wife‘s phone call as negating the use of force or intimidation is illogical, to say the least. For
it was, in fact, on account of his talking to his wife on the phone that AAA found the
opportunity to escape. AAA‘s vivid account, which was punctuated with her crying, of how
she was sexually assaulted by appellant clearly shows the total absence of consensual sex as
claimed by him. The trial and appellate courts found AAA‘s straightforward, candid, and
spontaneous testimony credible as it bears the hallmarks of a truthful witness, unflawed by
inconsistencies or contradictions. The credibility of a rape victim is augmented where, as
here, there is absolutely no evidence which even remotely suggests that she could have been
actuated by ill-motive to testify against appellant.
(PP vs. RODRIGUEZ)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLINGTON RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 211721, September 20, 2017
MARTIRES, J.:

Facts: The evidence for the prosecution is anchored solely on the testimony of Police
Officer I Escober alleging that at around 11:00 P.M .PO1 Escober was at the police
station preparing for the police operation called Oplan Bugaw for the purpose of
eliminating prostitution on Quezon Avenue. PO1 Escober, designated to pose as
customer, was accompanied by P02 Bereber as his backup, and P/lnsp. Lopez. While
parking their vehicles at the target area, PO1 Escober was flagged down by
Rodriguez who allegedly offered the sexual services of three (3) pickup girls. PO1
Escober readily gave Rodriguez the pre-marked ₱500.00 bill as payment. This
signaled his backup to enter the scene and aid in the arrest. PO1 Escober then
retrieved the pre-marked bill. Thereafter, the officers brought Rodriguez and the three
(3) pickup girls to the police station.

In his defense, Rodriguez denied that he had offered a girl for sexual purposes to
PO1 Escober.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of qualified trafficking in persons.

Ruling: No. Section 3(a)29 provides the elements of trafficking in persons: (1) the
recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipts of persons with or
without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders; (2) the
means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another; and (3) the purpose of
trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs.

In the instant case, only PO1 Escober testified as to the actual unfolding of
circumstances which led him to believe that Rodriguez was committing human
trafficking. The prosecution did not bother to present the testimonies of the alleged
victims. Their testimonies that they were sexually exploited against their will through
force, threat or other means of coercion are material to the cause of the prosecution.

Ratio Decidendi: The gravamen of the crime of human trafficking is not so much the
offer of a woman or child; it is the act of recruiting or using, with or without consent,
a fellow human being for sexual exploitation.

Gist: This is an appeal assailing from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed
appellant’s conviction for qualified trafficking in persons, in violation of Republic Act
No. 9208, otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
SEGURITAN vs. PP
Seguritan v. People

G.R. No. 172896 April 19, 2010

Lessons Applicable: intent

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
November 25,1995: Roño Seguritan y Jara alias Ranio was having a drinking session
with his uncles Lucrecio Seguritan (51 year old farmer), Melchor Panis and Baltazar
Panis, in the house of Manuel dela Cruz. Ranio was seated beside Lucrecio as he
claimed that Lucrecio’s carabao entered his farm and destroyed his crops which bun
the heated argument. As Lucrecio was about to stand up, he punched him twice
hitting him in the right and left temple causing him to fall face-up to the ground and
hit a hollow block which was being used as an improvised stove causing him to fall
face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block which was being used as an improvised
stove. Lucrecio rode a tricycle home. His wife noticed blood on his forehead so he
explained that he was stoned.
November 25,1995 9pm: Lucrecio’s wife and daughter noticed that his complexion
has darkened and foamy substance was coming out of his mouth as he slept. They
tried to revive Lucrecio but failed.
December 4, 1995: Lucrecio’s wife learned of the incident and requested the
assistance of the NBI. NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Vertido concluded that
Lucrecio’s cause of death was traumatic head injury
October 1, 1996: He was charged with Homicide
Ranio presented Joel Cabebe, the Assistant Registration Officer of Gonzaga,
Cagayan, and Dr. Corazon Flor, the Municipal Health Officer of Sta. Teresita,
Cagayan, to prove that Lucrecio died of a heart attack
RTC: homicide
CA: Affirmed
Ranio argued that he should be liable only for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide due to the absence of intent to kill Lucrecio

ISSUE: W/N Ranio is guilty of homicide even if there is no intent

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED. AFFIRMED penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum, to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum with MODIFICATION that petitioner is further ordered to pay P25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
When death resulted, even if there was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just
physical injuries, since with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law
looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the
aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
Unlawful act - punching Lucrecio
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused
US vs. MARASIGAN)
Us vs Marasigan Digest
Uploaded by blessaraynes

G.R. No. L-9426 August 15, 1914

THE UNITED STATES
vs.
FILOMENO MARASIGAN FACTS:
A
bout 4 o’clock of the afternoon of the 23d of January, 1913, Francisco Mendoza, while
engaged in
examining his sugar crop growing upon his lands in the barrio of Irucan, now called Calayan,
in the municipality of Taal, Batangas Province, was asked by the accused and his wife to
approach them.
On arriving near them the accused said to Mendoza: “Why is this line curved?” [indicating
the
division line between the lands of
the two.] “Let us make it straight.” Francisco replied saying: “Why do you want to make the
line straight? If you make the line straight, it will put certain logs and trees on your land.?”
To this the accused replied: “This is false.” Saying this he drew
his knife and struck at Mendoza. On attempting to ward off the blow Mendoza was cut in the
left hand. The accused continued the attack, whereupon Mendoza seized the accused by the
neck and the body and threw him down. While both were lying upon the ground the accused
still sought to strike Mendoza with his dagger. The latter seized the hand which held the
dagger and attempted to loosen his hold upon it. While they were thus fighting for the
possession of the knife, the wife of the accused came forward and
took the dagger from her husband’s hand, throwing it to one side. She then seized who after
various maneuvers, struck Mendoza a blow which knocked him senseless. As a result of the
fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the latter
being the most serious, the extensor tendor in one of the seven days at a cost of about P45,
but the middle finger of the left hand was rendered useless. The trial cour found the accused
criminally liable of the crime committed.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused should be given a new trial on the ground that if he should be
given another opportunity to present evidence that it was not the middle finger that was
disabled but the third finger instead.
Held:
It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the finger, the usefulness of which was
destroyed, was the middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the
left hand was rendered useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger it
was. Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the
finger could be restored by a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and
ordinary results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must
abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza. The judgment
appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

PP vs. MOLDES, GR No.42122, December 1, 1934)

VDA. DE BATACLAN vs. MEDINA, GRNo. L-10126, October 22, 1957)

(PP vs. MARCO, GR Nos. L-28324-5)
PP vs. VILLACORTA (GR No. 186412, September 7, 2011)
(ABELLANA vs. PP
G.R. No. 174654
Felixberto Abellana
v.
People & Spouses Alonto

FACTS:

An Information was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public
Document in connection with a Deed of Sale over a certain parcel of land owned by the
spouses Alonto. After trial in the RTC, the trial court found that petitioner had no intention to
defraud and that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did not
personally appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead
convicted petitioner of falsification of public document. The trial court sentenced petitioner
with imprisonment, ordered him to restore full ownership and possession of the land to Sps.
Alonto, and in case of his failure to do so, he shall pay Sps. Alonto the value of the
properties. He was further adjudged to pay damages and costs of suit to Sps. Alonto. On
appeal, CA acquitted petitioner as it opined that the conviction for an offense not alleged in
the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated petitioner’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Nevertheless, the imposition of the civil liability was sustained. Petitioner then filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, a Petition for Review on Certiorari
before the Court.

ISSUES:

1. W.O.N. petitioner could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal by the trial
court and the CA?

2. W.O.N. the alternative sentence imposed by the trial court to petitioner should be
sustained?

HELD:

1. No. It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When
the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in
the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In case of
exoneration of the accused, the civil liability may still arise when one, by reason of his own
act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for
petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed
had caused damage to the spouses. Based on the records of the case, Court found that the acts
allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
Moreover, the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence,
when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of
spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the
same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.

2. No. the Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit:
to institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them
actual and other kinds of damages. Sentences should not be in the alternative. There is
nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative. While a judge
has the discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the
alternative. He must fix positively and with certainty the particular penalty.

Wherefore, Petition granted.

VALENZUELA vs. PP, GR No. 1160188, June 21, 2007; Rule of VALENZUELA case is
similar to the ruling of ADIAO case)
(COLINARES vs. PP, GR No. 182748, December 13, 2011)
Facts:

Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two
years and four months of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prison
mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was
only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of
Appeals sustained the RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision,
petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled
to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his
offense probationable, which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that
under the Probation Law, no application for probation can be entertained once the accused
has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court, however,
found that Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide and not of frustrated homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court

Ruling:

Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his
case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation,
he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him
only liable for attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no
accused can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous
judgment of the RTC with no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.
PP vs. LAMAHANG
FACTS:

The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of
attempted robbery.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat
on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe accused in the act of
making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last
named street.
At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the
wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under
custody.
ISSUE:

WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery

RULING:

YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held
guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of
arresto mayor.

RATIONALE:
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. In the case of robbery, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take
possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the
instant case, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to
enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once
he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to
commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.

It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material
damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be
ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion
medio). The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense
which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained
from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of
injustice.

Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion that the fact under
consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling.
Against the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and former convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows that several final
judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor, the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
US vs. EDUAVE GR No. 12155, February 02, 1917
UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee vs. PROTASIO EDUAVE, defendant-appellant

FACTS:

Defendant was charged of the crime of rape resulting to the pregnancy of

Ms. X who happens to be the daughter of his paramour. Incensed, defendant
rushed to the girl and struck here from behind, in part at least, with a
sharp bolo producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to
the side 8 1/2 inches long and 2 inches deep severing all of the muscles
and tissues of that part.

There was no question that defendant was guilty. The only dilemma is the
precise crime of which he should be convicted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused should be convicted of frustrated murder.

RULING:

Yes, accused should be convicted of frustrated murder.

A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
prepetrator. (See Art 3, Revide Penal Code)

The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony

is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous
cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and
the moment all of the acts have been performed which should result in the
consummated crime. While in the former there is such intervention and the
offender does not arrive at the point of performing all the acts which
should produce the crime.

In case of an attempt, the offender never passes the subjective phase of

the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention
of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.

In case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase is completely passed.

Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while
he was passing throught he subjective phase. The crime, however, is not
consummated by reason of the causes independent of the will of the
offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime
did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control.
PP vs. DAGMAN, GR No. 23133
Case no. 10 The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Anastacio Dagman, et al G.R. No. L-
23133 August 20, 1925
Facts: on May 2, 1924, Elias Magbual, an employee of the hacienda La Esperanza, while in
the performance of his duties, was treacherous attacked by a crowd of person, probably about
forty in number and was nearly killed. The motive of the crime was that the persons who
harbored enmity against the Magbual had previously been dispossessed of portions of the
land by judicial order. The attack began by the crowd shouting "Avance" and with Magbual
attempting to escape. But a stone thrown by Anastasio Dagman hit Magbual in the breast,
and knocked him down. In this position, he was attacked by Luis Pacunla who wounded him
with a lance. Magbual made another attempt to flee only to fall again and to receive wounds
made by bolos and clubs wielded by the accused. Magbual escaped death from his
tormentors by the use of feigning death. The seven people involve, Luis Pacunla, Isabelo
Rebollido, Juan Otanan, Anastacio Dagman, Valentin Tabladillo, and Luciano Pacunla were
charged of the crime frustrated murder in the Court of First Instance in Nueva Ecija.
Issue:
Whether or not the murder should be regarded as frustrated or as an attempted murder.
1. Whether or not the accused had the intention to kill Magbual
2. whether or not that there was an argreement to kill Magbual and therefore in sentencing
all of the accused to the same penalty.
Held: The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the offenders performed all of
the acts of execution which should precede the felony as consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrators; in this instance, the playing possum by Magbual. There was also an intent upon
the part of the assailants to take the life of the person attacked, which intent may be gathered
from the circumstances surrounding the attack; in this instance, the nature of the wounds, the
cry of the accused, "Vamos a matarle," and their fingering the nose of Magbual to see if
respiration continued. As in frustrated murder the accused performs all of the acts which he
believes necessary to consummate the crime. Death, fails to follow for causes entirely apart
from his will. Inattempted murder the accused begins the commission of the crime by over
acts, but involuntarily desists from performing the other acts necessary to consummate the
crime, he being prevented from so doing by some cause outside of his own will.
PP vs. EVANGELIO, GR No. 181902, August 31, 2011
PEOPLE vs EVANGELIO656 SCRA 579Facts
On 3rd day of October 2001 the accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutuallyhelping each other, with intent to gain and armed with a handgun and deadly/bladed
weapons forciblyenter the inhabited house/residence of BBB and while inside, by means of
violence and intimidationusing said arms on the latter and the other occupants therein, and
without the consent of their ownersdid, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
take, and carry away from said residence thefollowing personal properties and on the
occasion of the said robbery and in the same house/residence,accused, by means of force and
intimidation and using the said handgun and deadly/bladed weapons,did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA, a 17-year-oldminor,
against her will and consent and at the time when the latter lost consciousness after her
headwas banged on the bathroom floor.
Issue
Whether the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
Held
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was also attendant in the present case.
Dwellingaggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended
party provided thatthe latter has not given provocation therefor. In this case, robbery with
violence was committed in thehouse of the victims without provocation on their part. In
robbery with violence and intimidation againstpersons, dwelling is aggravating because in
this class of robbery, the crime may be committed withoutthe necessity of trespassing the
sanctity of the offended party's house. It is considered an aggravatingcircumstance primarily
because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the human abode. He
who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends
him elsewhere.
(PP vs. ALETA, GR No. 179708, April 16, 2009)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v . MARCELO ALETA et al. 584 SCRA 578 (2009)

A witness’ testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to show
any dubious reason or improper motive against the accused, or why he should implicate the
accused in a serious offense. While the deceased Acob‘s mother Marina was at the
community center of Barangay Nagsurot, Burgos, Ilocos Norte, she heard a commotion at the
yard of Marcelo Aleta, et al. (the Aletas). Soon after returning home, she told Acob that there
was a quarrel at the Aletas‘ compound. Against his mother‘s pleas, Acob repaired to the
Aletas‘ compound. Marina followed and upon reaching appellants‘ compound, she saw her
nephew appellant Rogelio striking her son Acob twice at the left cheek and at the back of his
head with a piece of wood, causing Acob to fall on the ground. She thereafter saw Rogelio
striking Acob‘s father-in-law Duldulao twice on the face drawing his eyes to pop up, and
again on the head causing him to fall on the ground. Rogelio then ran towards the family
house whereupon Marina heard gunshots. Rogelio‘s brothers-co-appellants Jovito, Marlo and
Ferdinand and their father Marcelo at once began clubbing Acob and Duldulao with pieces of
wood, mainly on the face and head, as well as on different parts of their bodies. Even while
the victims were already lying prostrate on the ground, Marcelo, Jovito, Marlo, and
Ferdinand continued to hit them. And when Rogelio emerged from the house, he got another
piece of wood and again clubbed the victims. As found by Dr. Arturo G. Llabore, a medico-
legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation-Regional Office, San Fernando, La
Union who supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the bodies of Acob and Duldulao on
June 3, 1994, the two victims suffered multiple abrasions, lacerations, open wounds,
contusions and fractures on their face, head, scalp, arms, legs and thighs; that Acob‘s death
was due to ―hemorrhage, intercranial, severe, secondary to traumatic injuries, head‖ while
Duldulao‘s was due to ―hemorrhage, intercranial, severe, secondary to traumatic injuries,
head, multiple;‖ that both victims could have died within one (1) hour after the infliction of
the injuries; and that because of the severity and multiplicity of the injuries sustained, the
same could not have been inflicted by only one person. Ferdinand and Marlo interposed self-
defense and defense of relative, respectively. Additionally, Marlo invoked voluntary
surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Marcelo, Rogelio and Jovito invoked alibi. Crediting
the prosecution version, the trial court found the Aletas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder in both cases. The trial court held that although what triggered the incidents was
never explained, Acob and Duldulao died as a result of the attacks on them, qualified by
abuse of superior strength and cruelty. The Aletas moved for a reconsideration of the trial
court‘s decision which was denied. Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial and the appellate courts erred in giving full weight and credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

HELD:

As in most criminal cases, the present appeal hinges primarily on the issue of credibility of
witness and of testimony. As held in a number of cases, the trial court is best equipped to
make the assessment on said issue and, therefore, its factual findings are generally not
disturbed on appeal, unless: (1) the testimony is found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded;
(2) some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the
case was overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted; or (3) the trial judge gravely abused
his or her discretion. As held in a catena of cases and correctly applied by both lower courts,
Marina‘s positive identification of the Aletas as the assailants and her accounts of what
transpired during the incidents, which were corroborated on all material points by
prosecution witnesses Loreta Duldulao (Loreta) and Willie Duldulao (Willie), as well as the
findings of the medico-legal officer, carry greater weight than the Aletas‘ claims of self-
defense, defense of relative and alibi. More particularly, that Marina‘s narration was so
detailed all the more acquires greater weight and credibility against all defenses, especially
because it jibed with the autopsy findings. Respecting the defense‘s questioning of Loreta‘s
testimony that Willie had told her that Duldulao was already dead, but was later to claim that
on reaching the scene of the crime, Duldulao was still alive, lying on the ground and being
clubbed by Aleta, et al., the same deserves scant consideration. Far from being inconsistent,
the same is in sync with the other witnesses‘ claim and Marlo‘s own admission that Aleta, et
al. continued to club the two victims even as they lay motionless and helpless on the ground.
At any rate, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and
insignificant details, such as whether Duldulao was still alive or not, cannot destroy Loreta‘s
testimony. Minor inconsistencies in fact even guarantee truthfulness and candor. A witness‘
testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to show any dubious
reason or improper motive why he should testify falsely against the accused, or why he
should implicate the accused in a serious offense. That the prosecution witnesses are all
related by blood to the Aletas should a fortiori be credited, absent a showing that they had
motive to falsely accuse the Aletas.
(PP vs. AMODIA, GR No. 173791, April 7, 2009)

GR 173791 April 7, 2009 Peoplevs Pablo AmodiaFacts: The accused Pablo Amodia and
three others (Damaso Amodia, GeorgePalacio and Arnold Partosa) ganged up upon the
victim and stabbed him. Pablo
and Arnold held the victim’s hands,
George was behind the victim, whileDamaso stabbed the victim. The victim died of three
stab wounds.WON there was conspiracyWON there was abuse of superior strength1.

There was conspiracy between Pablo and the three other malefactors.Although there was no
evidence in the present case showing a prioragreement among Pablo, Arnold, George, and
Damaso, the following chainof events however show their commonality of purpose in killing
the victim:first, the accused surrounded the victim on all sides: Damaso at the front,
George at the victim’s rear, while Pablo and Arnold flanked the victim on
each side; second, Pablo then wrested the right arm of the victim andrestrained his
movement, while Arnold did the same to the left arm of thevictim; third, Geo
rge then hit the victim’s head with a piece of wood; and
 fourth, Damaso stabbed the victim three times.Conspiracy arises on the very instant the
plotters agree,
expressly orimpliedly
, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it Anaccused participates as a
conspirator if he or she has performed someovert act as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crimeplanned to be committed.
[101]
The overt act may consist of activeparticipation in the actual commission of the crime itself,
or it may consistof moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at thecommission
of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the otherco-conspirators.2.

In the present case, we find that there was abuse of superior strengthemployed by Pablo,
Arnold, George and Damaso in committing the killing.The evidence shows that the victim
was unarmed when he was attacked.In the attack, two assailants held his arms on either side,
while the other
two, on the victim’s front and back, each armed with a knife and a piece of
wood that they later used on the victim. There are no fixed and invariablerules in considering
abuse of superior strength or employing means toweaken the defense of the victim.[110]
Superiority does not always meannumerical superiority. Abuse of superiority depends upon
the relativestrength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the victim.[111] Abuse of superiority isdeterm
ined by the excess of the aggressor’s natural strength over that of
the victim, considering the position of both, and the employment of themeans to weaken the
defense, although not annulling it. The aggresor must have advantage of his natural strength
to ensure the commision of the crime.
(PP vs. MULIT, GR No. 181043, October 8, 2008)

PP vs. REYES
PP vs. BOKINGCO)
(GO TAN vs. SPS. TAN, GR No. 168852, September 30, 2008)
Sharica Mari Go-Tan vs. Spouses Perfecto and Juanita Tan
G.R. No. 168852
September 30, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO) against her husband,Steven, and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita
L. Tan (respondents) in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."

Respondents contend that they cannot be included in the charge since they are not among the
personalities liable as enumerated under the said law by virtue of “expresio unius est exclusion
alterius.”

Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of petitioner with regard to the inclusion of the respondent spouses.

A provision of the said law expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC (Section
47 of R.A. No. 9262), which allowed legal principles developed in the RPC may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. 9262.

Citing jurisprudence, the court held that the “principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that
the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy
may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal
design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators”.

Furthermore, Section 5 of R.A. 9262 recognizes the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another

The maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application in the case at bar since it
is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction” and not of universal application nor is it
conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent when not
plainly indicated.

However, proving conspiracy is a matter of evidence and can be best decided after fullblown trial
on the merits.