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3.2.cournot Model PDF
3.2.cournot Model PDF
Cournot Model
Matilde Machado
1
3.2. Cournot Model
Assumptions:
All firms produce an homogenous product
The market price is therefore the result of
the total supply (same price for all firms)
Firms decide simultaneously how much to
produce
Quantity is the strategic variable. If OPEC was not a
cartel, then oil extraction would be a good example of Cournot competition.
?
Agricultural products? http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2010/DP0766.pdf
p*
MC D(p)
RD1(q2) =
Residual demand
q*1=
q2
R1(q2)
MR
Industrial Economics- Matilde Machado 3.2. Cournot Model 4
3.2. Cournot Model
Graphically (cont.):
q*1(q2)=R1(q2) is the optimal quantity as a
function of q2
Let’s take 2 extreme cases q2:
Case I: q2=0 ⇒RD1(p,0)=D(p) whole demand
⇓ Firm 1
should
q*1(0)=qM produce the
Monopolist’
s quantity
c
Residual
Demand qc
MR<MC⇒q*1=0
qc
MR
qc q2
Industrial Economics- Matilde Machado 3.2. Cournot Model 7
3.2. Cournot Model
q*1
E
45º
q*2 qM qc q2
Industrial Economics- Matilde Machado 3.2. Cournot Model 8
3.2. Cournot Model
Comparison between Cournot, Monopoly and
Perfect Competition
qM<qN<qc
q1
qc
q1+q2=qN
qM q1+q2=qc
qM q1+q2=qN qc q2
q1+q2=qM
∂Π1
FOC: = 0 ⇔ a − bq1 − bq2 − c − bq1 = 0
∂q1
⇔ 2bq1 = a − bq2 − c Reaction function of firm 1:
a − c q2 optimal quantity firm 1
⇔ q1 = − should produce given q2. If
2b 2 q2 changes, q1 changes as
Industrial Economics- Matilde Machado 3.2. Cournot Model well. 10
3.2. Cournot Model
We solve a similar problem for firm 2 and obtain a
system of 2 equations and 2 variables.
a − c q2
q1 = 2b − 2
q = a − c − q1
2 2b 2
If firms are symmetric, then
q1* = q2* = q* i.e. we impose that the eq. quantity is in the 45º line
a − c q *
a−c
⇒ q* = − ⇔ q* = = q1N = q2N
2b 2 3b
Solution of the
Symmetric
Industrial Economics- Matilde Machado 3.2. Cournot Model
equilibrium 11
3.2. Cournot Model
Solution of the Symmetric equilibrium
q1* = q2* = q*
a − c q *
a−c
⇒q =*
− ⇔q = *
= q1N = q2N
2b 2 3b
Total quantity and the market price are:
2 a−c
Q N = q1N + q2N =
3 b
2 a + 2c
p = a − bQ = a − ( a − c ) =
N N
3 3
p c
<
p N
< p M
c a +2c a +c
3 2
∂p c ∂p N ∂p M In perfect competition
> < prices increase 1-to-1 with
∂c
∂c ∂c costs.
=1 2 1
= =
3 2
n a − c n→∞ a − c
Q = nq =
N N
→ = qc
n +1 b b
n a−c a n n →∞
p = a − bQ = a − b
N N
= + c →c
n +1 b n +1 n +1
DWL
c
DWL = ( p N − p c )( Q c − Q N )
1
2
QN qc
1 1 n a − c n a−c
= a+ c − c − When the number of firms
2 n +1 n +1 b n +1 b converges to infinity, the
1 a−c
2 DWL converges to zero,
n →∞
= →0 which is the same as in
2b n + 1 Perfect Competition. The
DWL decreases faster than
either price or quantity (rate
of n2)
Industrial Economics- Matilde Machado 3.2. Cournot Model 16
3.2. Cournot Model
In the Asymmetric duopoly case with constant marginal
costs.
linear demand P(q1 + q2 ) = a − b(q1 + q2 )
c1 = MC of firm 1
c2 = MC of firm 2
a + c2 − 2c1 a − 2c2 + c1 2a − c2 − c1
Q* = q1* + q2* = + =
3b 3b 3b
2a − c2 − c1 a + c2 + c1
p* = a − b(q1* + q2* ) = a − =
3 3
3b
q2
↑c1 Shifts the reaction curve
of firm 1 to the left
E’
E
↑q*2 and ↓q*1
q1
Industrial Economics- Matilde Machado 3.2. Cournot Model 21
3.2. Cournot Model
Profits are:
Π1* = ( p* − c1 ) q1* = ( a − b(q1* + q2* ) − c1 ) q1* =
a + c2 − 2c1 ( a + c2 − 2c1 )
2
2a − c2 − c1
= a −b − c1 × =
3b 3b 9b
∂Π1
Increase with rival’s costs >0
∂c2
Symmetric to firm 2.
Industrial Economics- Matilde Machado 3.2. Cournot Model 22
3.2. Cournot Model
More generally… for any demand and cost function. There is a negative
externality between Cournot firms. Firms do not internalize the effect
that an increase in the quantity they produce has on the other firms.
That is when ↑qi the firm lowers the price to every firm in the market
(note that the good is homogenous). From the point of view of the
industry (i.e. of max the total profit) there will be excessive
production. Externality: firms only take into
account the effect of the price change
in their own output. Then their output
is higher than what would be optimal
Max Π i (qi , q j ) = qi P (Q) − Ci (qi ) from the industry’s point of view.
qi
∂Π i
CPO: =0⇔ qi P′(Q) + P (Q) − Ci′(qi ) = 0
∂qi
effect of the increase in quantity profitability of the
on the inframarginal units marginal unit