ABROGAR v.

COSMOS
ABROGAR vs. COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES INC.
G.R. No. 064749
March 15, 2017

Facts:

This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the death of a
participant in an organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on the route of the
race. The issues revolve on whether the organizer and the sponsor of the marathon were
guilty of negligence, and, if so, was their negligence the proximate cause of the death of the
participant; on whether the negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney was an
efficient intervening cause; on whether the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable to
the fatality; and on whether the heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss of earning
capacity of the latter who, being then a minor, had no gainful employment.

In the RTC decision dated May 10, 1991, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs-
spouses Romulo Abrogar and Erlinda Abrogar and against defendants Cosmos Bottling
Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc., ordering both defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
and deliver to the plaintiffs the amounts of Twenty Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and
Sixty Three Centavos (P28,061.63) as actual damages; One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as moral damages; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary
damages and Ten Percent (10%) of the total amount of One Hundred Seventy Eight
Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos (P178,061,63) or Seventeen
Thousand Eight Hundred Six Pesos and Sixteen Centavos (P17,806.16) as attorney's fees.
On the cross-claim of defendant Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., defendant Intergames,
Inc, is hereby ordered to reimburse to the former any and all amounts which may be
recovered by the plaintiffs from it by virtue of this Decision.

The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the
marathon had fallen short of the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as
called for by and appropriate under the circumstances; that the accident had happened
because of inadequate preparation and Intergames' failure to exercise due diligence; that
the respondents could not be excused from liability by hiding behind the waiver executed by
Rommel and the permission given to him by his parents because the waiver could only be
effective for risks inherent in the marathon, such as stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack
during the race, severe exhaustion and similar occurrences; that the liability of the
respondents towards the participants and third persons was solidary, because Cosmos, the
sponsor of the event, had been the principal mover of the event, and, as such, had derived
benefits from the marathon that in turn had carried responsibilities towards the participants
and the public; that the respondents' agreement to free Cosmos from any liability had been
an agreement binding only between them, and did not bind third persons; and that Cosmos
had a cause of action against Intergames for whatever could be recovered by the
petitioners from Cosmos.

All parties appealed to the CA. The petitioners contended that the RTC erred in not
awarding damages for loss of earning capacity on the part of Rommel for the reason that
such damages were not recoverable due to Rommel not yet having finished his schooling;
and that it would be premature to award such damages upon the assumption that he would
finish college and be gainfully employed. The CA reduced the issues to four, namely:

1. Whether or not appellant Intergames were negligent in its conduct of the 1st Pop Cola
Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 and if so, whether its negligence was the proximate
cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.

2. Whether or not appellant Cosmos can be held jointly and solidarity liable with appellant
Intergames for the death of Rommel Abrogar, assuming that appellant Intergames is found
to have been negligent in the conduct of the Pop Cola marathon and such negligence was
the proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.

3. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to be compensated for the "loss of
earning capacity" of their son Rommel.

4. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to the actual, moral, and exemplary
damages granted to them by the Trial Court. In its assailed judgment on March 10, 2004
and in view of the fact that both defendants are not liable for the death of Rommel Abrogar,
appellants-spouses are not entitled to actual, moral, exemplary damages as well as for the
"loss of earning capacity" of their son. The third and fourth issues are thus moot and
academic. UPON THE VIEW OF THIS CASE, THUS, the judgment appealed from must be,
as it hereby is, REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another entered DISMISSING the
complaint a quo. The appellants shall bear their respective costs.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that
respondent Intergames was not negligent considering that:

A. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the conduct of the marathon in that it did not block off from traffic the marathon route; and

B. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the number of marshal
during the marathon, were glaringly inadequate to prevent the happening of the injury to its
participants.

2. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that
the doctrine of assumption of risk finds application to the case at bar even though getting hit
or run over by a vehicle is not an inherent risk in a marathon race. Even assuming arguendo
that deceased Abrogar made such waiver as claimed, still there can be no valid waiver of
one's right to life and limb for being against public policy.

3. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision (and) in absolving
respondent Cosmos from liability to petitioners on the sole ground that respondent Cosmos'
contract with respondent Intergames contained a stipulation exempting the former from
liability.
4. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision and consequently
holding respondents free from liability, (and) in not awarding petitioners with actual, moral
and exemplary damages for the death of their child, Rommel Abrogar.

Held:

1. Yes. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it
consists of the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place. The
Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.

2. Yes. The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes himself
to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result
therefrom. It rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the defendant
of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk,
and whether the former has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial. In other words, it
is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a known and
appreciated risk; it may sometimes include acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's
negligence, but one does not ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not
know and appreciate. As a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the
concurrence of three elements, namely; the plaintiff must know that the risk is present;he
must further understand its nature; and his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary.
Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an effective form of express or implied
consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of risk. There is ample authority, cited
in Prosser, to the effect that a person does not comprehend the risk involved in a known
situation because of his youth, or lack of information or experience, and thus will not be
taken to consent to assume the risk. Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not
apply to bar recovery by the petitioners.

3. No. The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the race.
Cosmos did nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in the preparations for the
actual conduct of the race. This verity was expressly confirmed by Intergames, through
Castro, Jr.

4. Yes. Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is
not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant.
 ELCANO-ELCANO VS HILL-HILL

Doctrine:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.

FACTS:

Reginal Hill was married and a minor who was then still living in care of his father, Atty. Marvin Hill.  Reginald
Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his acts were
not criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistakes. The father of Agapito Elcano then filed a civil
action against Reginald and his father (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill
argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a
parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

Issues:

1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case.

2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding
the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and
getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married.

Ruling of the Court:

1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case. Firstly,
there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal case and a civil case. To find the accused guilty in
a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the basis of quasi-
delict does is independently instituted from a criminal act. As such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against
him.

2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill. Although parental authority is
terminated upon emancipation of the child, emancipation by marriage is not absolute, i.e. he can sue and be sued in
court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. As in the present case, killing someone else
contemplated judicial litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident
that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.
RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF
AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a
barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this
work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven
rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side
pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of
the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near
the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking
his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable

RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be
given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so
gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his
witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do
so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known
to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting
of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to
the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no
accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement
of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the
track and the sliding of the iron rails.

1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not
necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the
accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of

the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the
employer where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in
Philippine jurisprudence. 
Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.
G.R. No. L-12191, 14 October 1918

FACTS:

Jose Cangco was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company. He lived in the
pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company’s office in
the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company,
which entitled him to ride upon the company’s trains free of charge.

During his ride in the train he arose from his seat and makes his way to the exit
while the train is still on travel. When the train has proceeded a little farther Jose
Cangco step down into the cement platform but unfortunately step in to a sack of
watermelon, fell down and rolled under the platform and was drawn under the
moving car which resulting to his arm to be crashed and lacerated. He was rushed
to the hospital and sued the company and the employee who put the sack of
watermelon in the platform.

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’ clock on the dark night. It is that time of
the year that may we considered as season to harvest watermelon explaining why
there are sacks of watermelon in the platform. The plaintiff contends that it is the
negligence of the Manila Railroad Co. on why they let their employees put a
hindrance in the platform that may cause serious accident. The defendant answered
that it is the lack of diligence on behalf of the plaintiff alone on why he did not wait
for the train to stop before alighting the train.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the company is liable or there is a contributory negligence on behalf

of the plaintiff.

RULING:

There is no contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court

provides some test that may find the contributory negligence of a person. Was there
anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from
the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off
the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should
have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory
negligence.

Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot
of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and
agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while
the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as
there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.

Article 1173, first paragraph: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of that persons, of the time and of the place.
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Article 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply.

In the case the proximate cause of the accident is the lack of diligence of the
company to inform their employees to not put any hindrance in the platform like
sacks of watermelon. The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it,
by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering
and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was
direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that
the fault was morally imputable to defendant’s servants. Therefore, the company is
liable for damages against Cangco.