[G.R. No. 85915. January 17, 1990.
] matter specified in Article 212 (K) of the Labor Code and Section 1
PAGKAKAISA NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA TRIUMPH
INTERNATIONAL-UNITED LUMBER AND GENERAL WORKERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (PMTI-ULGWF), Petitioner, v. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA,
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND THE
CONFEDERATION OF FILIPINO WORKERS (CFW), PROGRESSIVE
EMPLOYEES UNION (PEU-TIPI), Respondents.
Godofredo R. Paceño, Jr. for Petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Triumph International
Phils. Inc.
Rogelio R. Udarbe for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAWS; BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; FINDING OF FACT
OF QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
ARE BINDING ON THE COURT. — In the determination of whether or
not the members of respondent union are managerial employees,
we accord due respect and, therefore, sustain the findings of fact
made by the public respondent pursuant to the time-honored rule
that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies like the Bureau of
Labor Relations which are supported by substantial evidence are
binding on us and entitled to great respect considering their
expertise in their respective fields. (see Phil. Airlines Employees
Asso. (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja, 162 SCRA 426 [1988]; Producers Bank
of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
76001, September 5, 1988; Salvador Lacorte v. Hon. Amado G.
Inciong, Et Al., G.R. No. 52034, September 27, 1988; Johnson and
Johnson Labor Union-FFW, Et. Al. v. Director of Labor Relations, G.R.
No. 76427, February 21, 1989; Teofila Arica, Et. Al. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, Et Al., G.R. No. 78210, February 28, 1989;
A.M. Oreta & Co. Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 74004, August 10, 1989). According to the Med-Arbiter, while
the functions, and we may add, the titles of the personnel sought to
be organized appear on paper to involve an apparent exercise of
managerial authority, the fact remains that none of them discharge
said functions. The petitioner has failed to show reversible error
insofar as this finding is concerned.
2. ID.; ID.; RULE IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE UNION
MEMBERS ARE RANK & FILE EMPLOYEES. — In ruling that the
members of respondent union are rank-and-file and not managerial
employees, the public respondent made the following findings: ". . .
(1) They do not have the power to lay down and execute
management policies as they are given ready policies merely to
execute and standard practices to observe; 2) they do not have the
power to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees but only to recommend for such actions as the
power rests upon the personnel manager; and 3) they do not have
the power to effectively recommend any managerial actions as their
recommendations have to pass through the department manager
for review, the personnel manager for attestation and the general
manager/president for final actions."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; TEST OF SUPERVISORY OR MANAGERIAL STATUS. — The
Court had explicitly explained in the case of Franklin Baker Company
of the Philippines v. Trajano, 157 SCRA 416 [1988] that: "The test of
‘supervisory or managerial status’ depends on whether a person
possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer in the
(m) of its Implementing Rules and whether such authority is not
merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment. Thus, where such recommendatory powers
as in the case at bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final
action by the department heads and other higher executives of the
company, the same, although present, are not effective and not an
exercise of independent judgment as required by law (National
Warehousing Corp. v. CIR, 7 SCRA 602-603 [1963])." The public
respondent, in its factual findings, found that the supervisory
employees sought to be represented by the respondent union are
not involved in policy-making and their recommendatory powers are
not even instantly effective since the same are still subject to review
by at least three managerial heads (department manager, personnel
manager and general manager) before final action can be taken.
Hence, it is evidently settled that the said employees do not possess
a managerial status. The fact that their work designations are either
managers or supervisors is of no moment considering that it is the
nature of their functions and not the said nomenclatures or titles of
their jobs which determines their statuses (see Engineering
Equipment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 133 SCRA
752 [1984] citing National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v.
NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766 [1964]).
4. ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; CONTRACT BAR RULE;
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Anent the correlative issue of
whether or not the contract-bar rule applies to the present case,
Rule V, Section 3, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Labor Code is written in plain and simple terms. It provides in
effect that if a collective bargaining agreement validly exists, a
petition for certification election can only be entertained within sixty
(60) days prior to the expiry date of said agreement. Respondent
union’s petition for certification election was filed on November 25,
1987. At the time of the filing of the said petition, a valid and
existing CBA was present between petitioner and Triumph
International. The CBA was effective up to September 24, 1989.
There is no doubt that the respondent union’s CBA constituted a bar
to the holding of the certification election as petitioned by the
respondent union with public Respondent. (see Associated Trade
Unions [ATU] v. Trajano, 162 SCRA 318 [1988], Federation of
Democratic Trade Union v. Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa, 156
SCRA 482 [1987]); Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]). The members of the
respondent union should wait for the proper time.
PAGKAKAISA NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA TRIUMPH
INTERNATIONAL-UNITED LUMBER AND GENERAL WORKERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (PMTI-ULGWF) vs.
PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS AND THE CONFEDERATION OF FILIPINO WORKERS
(CFW), PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES UNION (PEU-TIPI)
FACTS:
The petitioner is the recognized collective bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of Triumph International with which the
latter has a valid and existing collective bargaining agreement
effective up to September 24, 1989.
On November 25, 1987, a petition for certification election was filed
by the respondent union with the Department of Labor and
Employment.
On January 30, 1988, a motion to dismiss the petition for
certification election was filed by Triumph International on the
grounds that the respondent union cannot lawfully represent
managerial employees and that the petition cannot prosper by
virtue of the contract-bar rule. On the same grounds, the petitioner,
as intervenor, filed its opposition to the petition oil February 18,
1988.
On April 13, 1988, the Labor Arbiter issued an order granting the
petition for certification election and directing the holding of a
certification election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all monthly-paid administrative, technical,
confidential and supervisory employees of Triumph International.
On appeal, the public respondent on August 24, 1988 affirmed the
Labor Arbiter’s order.
On September 5, 1988, Triumph International filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the public respondent in a
resolution dated October 28, 1988.
HELD:
There is no evidence in the records which sufficiently distinguishes
and clearly separates the group of employees sought to be
represented by the private respondents into managerial and
supervisory on one hand or supervisory and rank-and-file on the
other. The respondents’ pleadings do not show the distinctions in
functions and responsibilities which differentiate the managers from
the supervisors and sets apart the rank-and-file from either the
managerial or supervisory groups. As a matter of fact, the formation
of a supervisor’s union was never before the Labor Arbiter and the
Bureau of Labor Relations and neither is the issue before us. We,
therefore, abide by the public respondent’s factual findings in the
absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the petitioner is the
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees
of Triumph International. A careful examination of the records of
this case reveals no evidence that rules out the commonality of
interests among the rank-and-file members of the petitioner and the
herein declared rank-and-file employees who are members of the
respondent union. Instead of forming another bargaining unit, the
law requires them to be members of the existing one. The ends of
unionism are better served if all the rank-and-file employees with
substantially the same interests and who invoke their right to self-
organization are part of a single unit so that they can deal with their
employer with just one and yet potent voice. The employees’
bargaining power with management is strengthened thereby.
Hence, the circumstances of this case impel us to disallow the
holding of a certification election among the workers sought to be
represented by the respondent union for want of proof that the
right of said workers to self-organization is being suppressed.
Once again we enunciate that the proliferation of unions in an
employer unit is discouraged as a matter of policy unless compelling
reasons exist which deny a certain and distinct class of employees
the right to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining.
Air Philippines Corporation vs BLR
G.R. No. 155395 June 22, 2006
Facts:
The case initially centered on the union registration of respondent
Air Philippines Flight Attendants Association (APFLAA), which was
issued a Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-3-2067-99 by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). APFLAA filed on 17
March 1999 a petition for certification election as the collective
bargaining representative of the flight attendants of APC. After the
Med-Arbiter rendered a ruling ordering the holding of a certification
election, such election was held on 5 August 1999, with majority of
the votes cast in favor of APFLAA.
On 25 November 1999, APC filed a Petition for De-Certification and
Cancellation of Union Registration against APFLAA with the DOLE.
APC alleged that APFLAA could not be registered as a labor
organization, as its composition consisted of "a mixture of
supervisory and rank-and-file flight attendants." Particularly, APC
alleged that flight attendants holding the position of "Lead Cabin
Attendant," which according to it is supervisory in character, were
among those who comprised APFLAA.
On 18 July 2001, the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR) Regional
Director Alex E. Maraan rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.
The DOLE-NCR held that Article 245 of the Labor Code, which states
that supervisory employees are not eligible for membership in labor
organizations of rank-and-file employees, does not provide a ground
for cancellation of union registration, which is instead governed by
Article 239 of the Labor Code. APC filed an MR/Appeal, BLR denied,
CA also denied an MR due to “defective proof of service”.
Issue: WON the presence of “supervisors” is a ground for
cancellation of union registration? NO
Held:
In its Petition for De-certification and Cancellation of Union
Registration, APC did not impute on APFLAA such misrepresentation
of the character necessitated under Article 239 (a) and (c) of the
Labor Code. APC merely argued that APFLAA was not qualified to
become a legitimate labor organization by reason of its mixed
composition of rank-and-file and supervisory employees; and that
APFLAA committed misrepresentation by making it appear that its
composition was composed purely of rank-and-file employees. Such
misrepresentation (if it can be called as such) as alleged by APC, is
not conformable to Article 239 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code. Indeed,
it appears from the record that APC instead devoted the bulk of its
arguments in establishing that supervisory employees comprised
part of the membership of APFLAA, a ground which is not sufficient
to cause the cancellation of union registration. And this is of course
all under the assumption that Lead Cabin Attendants are indeed
supervisory employees, a claim consistently denied by APFLAA and
which was not confirmed by either the DOLE-NCR or the BLR.
There may be remedies available to enforce the proscription set
forth in Article 245 of the Labor Code on supervisory employees
joining the union of rank-and-file employees. But consistent with
jurisprudence, the rule under Article 245 barring supervisory
employees from joining the union of rank-and-file employees is not
a ground for cancellation of union registration. Accordingly, we see
no error on the part of the DOLE-NCR and the BLR in having
dismissed APC’s petition, and thus no cause to compel the Court of
Appeals to disregard APC’s procedural errors and accept the petition
for certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF PHILIPPINES v. CRESENCIO B.
TRAJANO
Facts:
On April 23, 1984, private respondent Franklin Baker Brotherhood
Association-ATU filed a petition for certification election among the
office and technical employees of petitioner company with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI, Davao
City, docketed as LRD No. R-22, MED-ROXI-UR-28-84. Among other
things, it alleges that Franklin Baker Company of the Phils. Davao
Plant, had in its employ approximately ninety (90) regular technical
and office employees, which group is separate and distinct from the
regular rank and file employees and is excluded from the coverage
of existing Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Petitioner company did not object to the holding of such an election
but manifested that out of the ninety (90) employees sought to be
represented by the respondent union, seventy four (74) are
managerial employees while two (2) others are confidential
employees, hence, must be excluded from the certification election
and from the bargaining unit that may result from such election
(Rollo, p. 3).
Med-Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez issued an order
Accordingly, the petition is hereby granted and a certification
election among the office and technical employees of Franklin Baker
Company of the Philippines, Davao Plant is ordered within twenty
(20) days from receipt hereof. The choices shall be the following:
Franklin Baker Brotherhood Association-ATU
No Union
The representation officer assigned shall call the parties for a pre-
election conference at least five (5) days before the date of the
election to thresh out the mechanics of the election, the finalization
of the list of voters, the posting of notices and other relevant
matters.
The company's latest payroll shall be the basis for determining the
office and technical workers qualified to vote.
petitioner Company appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations,
docketed as BLR Case No. A-228-84, praying that the appealed order
be set aside and another be issued declaring the seventy four (74)
inspectors, foreman and supervisors as managerial employees.
During the pendency of the appeal, sixty one (61) of the employees
involved, filed a Motion to Withdraw the petition for certification
election praying therein for their exclusion from the Bargaining Unit
and for a categorical declaration that they are managerial
employees, as they are performing managerial functions (Rollo, P.
4).
public respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Cresencio B. Trajano
issued a Resolution affirming th order dated September 17, 1984,
Issue:
(1) whether or not subject employees are managerial
employees under the purview of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules; and (2) whether the Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations acted with abuse of discretion in
affirming the order of Mediator-Arbiter Conchita J.
Martinez.
Ruling:
There is no question that there are in the DAVAO Plant of petitioner
company approximately 90 regular technical and office employees
which form a unit, separate and distinct from the regular rank and
file employees and are excluded from the coverage of existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement; that said group of employees
organized themselves as Franklin Baker Brotherhood Association
(technical and office employees) and affiliated with the local chapter
of the Association of Trade Unions (ATU), a legitimate labor
organization with Registration Permit No. 8745 (Fed) LC and with
office located at the 3rd Floor of Antwell Bldg., Sta. Ana, Davao City;
that this group filed a Petition for Certification Election with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI, Davao
City; that petitioner company did not object to the holding of such
certification, but only sought the exclusion of inspectors, foremen
and supervisors, members of Franklin Baker Brotherhood
Association (technical and office employees) numbering 76 from the
certification election on the ground that they are managerial
employees.
A managerial employee is defined as one "who is vested with
powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management
policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such
managerial actions". (Reynolds Phil. Corp. v. Eslava, 137 SCRA
[1985], citing Sction 212 (K), Labor Code.
Also pertinent thereto is Section 1 (M) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations, which is practically a restatement of the above
provision of law.
To sustain its posture, that the inspectors, foremen and supervisors
numbering 76 are managerial employees, petitioner painstakingly
demonstrates that subject employees indeed participate in the
formulation and execution of company policies and regulations as to
the conduct of work in the plant, exercised the power to hire,
suspend or dismiss subordinate employees and effectively
recommend such action, by citing concrete cases, among which are:
(1) Mr. Ponciano Viola, a wet process inspector, who while in the
performance of his duty, found Mr. Enrique Asuncion, a trimmer
"forging", falsifying and simulating a company time card (timesheet)
resulting in payroll padding, immediately recommended the
dismissal of said erring employee, resulting in the latter's discharge.
(Employer's Memo, Rollo, p. 18); (2) Mr. Manuel Alipio, an opening
inspector, recommended for suspension Nut Operator Ephraim
Dumayos, who was caught in the act of surreptitiously transferring
to a co-worker's bin some whole nuts which act constitute a
violation of company policy; (3) Mr. Sofronio Abangan, a line
inspector, censured and thereafter recommended the suspension of
Mr. Romeo Fullante, for being remiss in the proper and accurate
counting of nuts; (4) Binleader Dionisio Agtang was required to
explain his inefficiency of Mr. Saturnino Bangkas, Bin Loading
Inspector; (5) for disobeying the orders of Bin Loading Inspector
Mauricio Lumanog's order, Macario Mante, Eduardo Adaptor,
Rodolfo Irene and George Rellanos were all recommended for
suspension which culminated in an investigation conducted by
Lumanog's higher bosses (Ibid., p. 20).
It has also been shown that subject employees have the power to
hire, as evidenced by the hiring of Rolando Asis, Roy Layson, Arcadio
Gaudicos and Felix Arciaga, upon the recommendation of Opening
Inspector Serafin Suelo, Processing Inspector Leonardo Velez and
Laureano C. Lim, Opening Inspector (Ibid., p. 21).
It will be noted, however, that in the performance of their duties
and functions and in the exercise of their recommendatory powers,
subject employees may only recommend, as the ultimate power to
hire, fire or suspend as the case may be, rests upon the plant
personnel manager.
The test of "supervisory" or "managerial status" depends on
whether a person possesses authority to act in the interest of his
employer in the matter specified in Article 212 (k) of the Labor Code
and Section 1 (m) of its Implementing Rules and whether such
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment. Thus, where such
recommendatory powers as in the case at bar, are subject to
evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and
other higher executives of the company, the same, although
present, are not effective and not an exercise of independent
judgment as required by law (National Warehousing Corp. v. CIR, 7
SCRA 602-603 [1963]).
Furthermore, in line with the ruling of this Court, subject employees
are not managerial employees because as borne by the records,
they do not participate in policy making but are given ready policies
to execute and standard practices to observe, thus having little
freedom of action (National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v.
NWSA Consolidated, L-18938, 11 SCRA 766 [1964].
Petitioner's contention that the Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in holding that the 76 employees are not managerial
employees and must be included in the certification election has no
basis in fact and in law. Neither is its contention that the use of the
words "and/or" categorically shows that performance of the
functions enumerated in the law qualifies an employee as a
managerial employee.
It is well settled that the findings of fact of the Ministry of Labor and
National Labor Relations Commission are entitled to great respect,
unless the findings of fact and the conclusions made therefrom, are
not supported by substantial evidence, or when there is grave abuse
of discretion committed by said public official (Kapisanan ng
Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes, et al. v. Camara Shoes, 2nd Heirs of
Santos Camara, et al., 111 SCRA 477 [1982]; International Hardwood
and Veneer Co. of the Philippines v. Leonardo, 117 SCRA 967 [1982];
Pan-Phil-Life, Inc. v. NLRC, 114 SCRA 866 [1982]; Pepsi-Cola Labor
Union-BF LU-TUPAS Local Chapter N-896 v. NLRC, 114 SCRA 930
[1982]; Egyptair v. NLRC, 148 SCRA 125 [1987]; RJL Martinez Fishing
Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 63550-51, 127 SCRA 455 [1984]; and Reyes
v. Phil. Duplicators, G.R. No. 54996, 109 SCRA 489 [1981].
By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant, such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent o lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law (G.R. No. 59880,
George Arguelles [Hda. Emma Arguelles v. Romeo Yang, etc.],
September 11, 1987).
Moreover, this Court has ruled that findings of administrative
agencies which have acquired expertise, like the Labor Ministry, are
accorded respect and finality (Special Events and Central Shipping
Office Workers Union v. San Miguel Corp., 122 SCRA 557 [1983] and
that the remedy of certiorari does not lie in the absence of any
showing of abuse or misuse of power properly vested in the Ministry
of Labor and Employment (Buiser v. Leogardo, Jr., 131 SCRA 151
[1984].
After a careful review of the records, no plausible reason could be
found to disturb the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of
the Ministry of Labor.
Even if We regard the employees concerned as "managerial
employees", they can still join the union of the rank and file
employees. They cannot however form their own exclusive union as
"managerial employees" (Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez,
144 SCRA 628).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED, and the assailed
resolution and orders are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
NATU v Republic
G. R. No. 93468, December 29, 1994
Facts of the Case:
Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election to
determine the exclusive bargaining agent of its supervisory
employees. The bank (Private respondent) moved to dismiss the
petition alleging that the supervisory employees are actually
managerial employees hence prohibited from joining unions. The
Med Arbiter granted the petition but the decision was modified by
the Sec. of Labor on the ground that the ff employees are deemed as
managerial and/or confidential employees and are therefore
ineligible to join or form labor unions (Dept. Managers, Asst.
Managers, branch Cashiers and Controllers).
ISSUE : W/N the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are
managerial and/or confidential employees hence ineligible to join or
assist the union of petitioner.
RULING:
The subject employees are supervisory and not managerial. As
provided under 212 of the Philippine Labor Code, a Managerial
employee is;
a) One vested with power to lay down and execute management
policies, or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees, and
b) One vested with both the power or prerogative.
Like Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers, Department
Managers do not possess the power to lay down policies nor to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. They occupy supervisory positions, charged with the
duty among others to "recommend proposals to improve and
streamline operations.
On one hand, a confidential employee is one entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or
care and protection of the employer's property.
Therefore only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers
of respondent bank who are deemed as confidential employees are
ineligible to join or assist petitioner NATU-Republic Planters Bank
Supervisors Chapter, or join, assist or form any other labor
organization
Doctrine of Necessary Implication
The disqualification of managerial employees from joining a union is
due to the evident conflict of interest as they are supposed to be on
the side of the management. As to confidential employees, their
disqualification is due to the undue advantage they possess.
Branch managers/Cashiers/Controllers are all considered
confidential employees and hence disqualified from joining a labor
organization. Do note that this is not applicable to all banks in
general.
Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc. v. Laguesma (2000)
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Bank is a duly-registered banking institution
with a branch in Mandaue City. Private respondent SRBI-APSOTEU-
TUCP (Union) is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the
Trade Unions Congress of the Philippines.
• The Union was granted Certificate of Registration No.
R0700-9310-UR-0064 by the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu. It later
filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory
employees of SRBI. The Union alleged:
o It was a duly registered labor organization;
o The Bank employed five (5) or more supervisory
employees;
o A majority of these employees supported the petition;
o There was no existing CBA between any union and the
Bank; and
o No certification election had been conducted in the past
12 months prior to the petition.
• Prior to the pre-certification election conference, the Bank
filed a motion to dismiss:
o Employees were managerial/confidential;
o ALU-TUCP, which represented the Union, was also
representing the rank-and-file employees of the Bank, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of unions (Atlas Lithographic Services v.
Laguesma).
• Med-Arbiter: Denied the MTD and scheduled inclusion-
exclusion proceedings.
• SOLE: Denied the Bank’s appeal for lack of merit; ordered
the conduct of a certification election.
• Med-Arbiter: Set the date for the election and identified
the voting employees (Cashier-Main, Cashier-Mandaue, Accountant-
Mandaue, Acting Chief of the Loans Department).
o The Bank filed an urgent motion to suspend proceedings.
Denied.
o MR was filed by the Bank. Med-Arbiter canceled the
scheduled certification election in order to address the Bank’s MR.
o MR denied. The Bank appealed to the SOLE.
• Meanwhile, the Bank also filed a petition for cancellation
of union registration before the DOLE Regional Office. It claimed that
the employees were managerial/confidential.
• DOLE Undersecretary: Denied the appeal for lack of merit
(from the decision of the Med-Arbiter).
o The Union was a legitimate labor organization.
o Until and unless a final order is issued cancelling APSOTEU-
TUCP’s registration certificate, it had the legal right to represent its
members for collective bargaining purposes.
o The question of whether the employees are
managerial/confidential should be threshed out in exclusion
proceedings.
o MR denied.
• Med-Arbiter: Scheduled the holding of a certification
election.
ISSUES + RULING:
Are the members of respondent Union managerial employees? NO.
• Art. 212 (m) defines managerial employees:
“’Managerial employee’ one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or
hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. ‘Supervisory employees’ are those who, in the interest
of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if
the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in
nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees
not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-
and-file employees for purposes of this Book.”
• To support its stance, petitioner Bank cites Tabacalera
Insurance v. NLRC, in which the Court held that a credit and
collection supervisor is a managerial employee. However, in that
case, the employee concerned had effective recommendatory
powers.
• In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show that the
employees in question were vested with similar powers.
o They do not possess effective recommendatory powers.
o Neither do they formulate and execute management
policies.
Are they confidential employees? NO.
• Confidential employees are whose who:
o Act or assist in a confidential capacity, in regard
o To persons who formulate, determine and effectuate
management policies [especially in the field of labor relations].
• Both criteria must be met.
• While Art. 245 does not prohibit confidential employees
from engaging in union activities, under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the disqualification of managerial employees equally
applies to confidential employees.
• When an employee does not have access to confidential
labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against
joining, forming, or assisting a union.
• While petitioner submitted detailed job descriptions of the
employees concerned to the effect that they handle sensitive data
and information, there was no proof offered to show that they had
access to confidential information specifically relating to labor
relations policies.
Did the DOLE Undersecretary commit grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the conduct of a certification election? NO.
• Petitioner Bank contends that the Union violated the
doctrine of separation of unions as both the supervisory and rank-
and-file employees are represented by ALU or TUCP.
• However, there is nothing in the records which supports
petitioner’s claim.
• While the Union was initially assisted by ALU during its
preliminary stages of organization, a local union maintains its
separate personality despite affiliation with a larger national
federation.
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.
TOYOTA MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION LABOR UNION v.
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION EMPLOYEES, GR No.
135806, 2002-08-08
Facts:
The assailed decision dismissed both the Petition for Certification
Election filed by respondent Toyota Motor Philippines Corp.
Employees and Workers Union (TMPCEWU) and the
Petition-in-Intervention filed by petitioner Toyota Motor Philippines
Corp. Labor Union (TMPCLU).
On 24 April 1997 respondent TMPCEWU filed a Petition for
Certification Election before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-
National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) seeking to represent the rank-
and-file employees of the manufacturing division from Levels 1 to 4
of Toyota
Motor Philippines Corp. (TMPC).
On 13 May 1997, while the case was pending hearing, petitioner
TMPCLU claiming to be the legitimate labor organization, filed a
Motion to Intervene with Opposition to the Certification Election
praying that it be allowed to intervene and, thereafter, the petition
by TMPCEWU... be denied for... lack of merit. It claimed that the
petition was premature due to an earlier resolution by the Secretary
of Labor ordering the conduct of a certification election among the
rank-and-file employees of TMPC represented by petitioner which
was the subject of certiorari... proceedings before the Supreme
Court and still awaiting final resolution at the time; and, that the
collective bargaining unit whic... which respondent TMPCEWU
sought to represent violated the "single or employer" unit policy
since it excluded the rank-and-file employees in the other... divisions
and departments in respondent TMPC.[1]
In its motion petitioner TMPCLU outlined the antecedent events
prior to the TMPCEWU's filing of its Petition for Certification Election
on 24 April 1997 thus -
(TMPCLU) filed a petition for certification election before Med-
Arbiter Paterno D. Adap,... Med-Arbiter Adap dismissed TMPCLU's
petition on the ground that the labor organization's membership
was composed of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in
violation of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, and that at the time of the
filing of its petition, TMCPLU... had not even acquired legal
personality yet;
On appeal, the Secretary of Labor, in a Resolution dated 9 November
1993 signed by Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, set aside
the Med-Arbiter's Order and directed the holding of a certification...
election among the regular rank-and-file employees of TMPC. In
setting... aside the assailed order, the Office of the Secretary argued
that:
Contrary to the allegation of herein respondent-appellee, petitioner-
appellant was already a legitimate labor organization at the time of
the filing of the petition on 26 November 1992. Records show that
on 24 November 1992 or two (2) days before the filing of the said
petition,... it was issued a certificate of registration.
Acting on TMPC's motion for reconsideration the Secretary of Labor
set aside his earlier resolution and ordered the remand of the case
to the Med-Arbiter concluding that the issues raised by TMPC both
on appeal and its motion for reconsideration were factual issues
requiring... further hearing and production of evidence;... he Med-
Arbiter on 28 September 1994 dismissed TMPCLU's petition for
certification election for failure of petitioner to acquire legal
personality at the time of the filing of the said petition;
The motion for reconsideration filed by TMPCLU before the
Secretary of Labor, which was treated as an appeal from the order of
the Med-Arbiter dated 28 September 1994, was granted and the
said order was set aside. In lieu thereof, a new order was issued
giving due course to... the petition and directing the conduct of a
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of TMPC;...
he Secretary of Labor, in his order dated 14 July 1995, denied for
lack of merit the motion for reconsideration filed by TMPC;
On 20 April 1996 the Secretary of Labor issued a new resolution
directing the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-
file employees of TMPC; and
TMPC lodged a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme
Court assailing the 20 April 1996 Resolution of the Secretary of
Labor; and on 19 February 1997, the Supreme Court[2] set aside the
assailed Resolution of the Secretary of Labor and... reinstated the
Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 28 September 1994. In its decision,
the Supreme Court ruled that since TMPCLU's membership list
contained the names of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory
employees in Level Five positions, "the union could not, prior to
purging... itself of its supervisory employee members, attain the
status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, it cannot
possess the requisite personality to file a petition for certification
election."
At the time respondent TMPCEWU filed its Petition for Certification
Election on 24 April 1997 the decision of the Supreme Court had not
ripened into a final and executory judgment. Thus petitioner invoked
as among the grounds for opposition thereto in its Motion to
Intervene with Opposition to the Petition for Certification Election
that the "pending proceeding before the Supreme Court may be said
to be a pre-judicial question which should be resolved first before
the instant petition can prosper."
TMPC also filed a similar comment on 9 June 1997. Hence, on 2 July
1997, the Med-Arbiter ordered the provisional dismissal of
TMPCEWU's Petition for Certification Election pending a final ruling
by the Supreme Court on the Petition for Certification Election.
On 3 June 1997 the decision of the Supreme Court dated 19
February 1997 became final and executory.
final and executory.
(a) it was representing only the rank-and-file employees;
(b) it... enjoys the support of the regular rank-and-file workers at
large in TMPC, an unorganized establishment, and not only among
the rank-and-file employees in the manufacturing division thereof;
(c) while respondent TMPCEWU professed itself as a legitimate labor
organization, there... was serious doubt on such claim inasmuch as
there was a pending petition for the cancellation of its certification
of registration on the ground of fraud;... d) respondent TMPCEWU's
representation of the rank-and-file employees, Levels 1 to 4, within
the manufacturing division... only to the exclusion of those in the
other departments and divisions violated the "single or employer"
unit policy
(e) the establishment of the proposed bargaining unit in the
manufacturing division composed of employees from Levels 1 to 4,
should respondent's petition be... allowed, would induce the
proliferation of unions in a single employer.
On 24 February 1998 the Med-Arbiter rendered a decision
dismissing for lack of merit TMPCEWU's Petition for Certification
Election, since it failed to include all rank-and-file employees from
Levels 1 to 4 in other departments of TMPC in violation of the "one-
union in... one-company" policy and likewise dismissing TMPCLU's
Petition-in-Intervention for lack of legal personality.[6] Anent the
issue on whether TMPCLU has the legal personality to file the
Petition-in-Intervention, the Med-Arbiter explained... thus
The uncontroverted fact in this case is that at the time intervenor
TMPCLU filed its application for registration and subsequently
thereafter was issued a certificate of registration on November 24,
1992 (Annex "A," Intervenor's petition-in-intervention), its union...
membership is (sic) composed of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees.
From this we could infer that the registration certificate issued by
the Department of Labor and Employment is void ab initio because
at the time of the issuance the constitution of intervenor union
TMPCLU is (sic) a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees... as per finding of fact of Med-Arbiter Paterno Adap in
his Order dated March 8, 1993
On 14 March 1998, dissatisfied with the unfavorable decision,
petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor contending that
contrary to the finding of the Med-Arbiter it had the legal
personality to intervene in the certification election proceedings as
shown by its
Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-11-996-92.
In a Resolution dated 5 June 1998, the Secretary of Labor justified
his affirmance of the Med-Arbiter's decision in this wise
On 10 August 1998 the Secretary issued an Order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration; hence, petitioner now
comes to us assailing the aforementioned Resolution and Order of
the Secretary of Labor arguing that -
In this regard, petitioner decries the decision of the Secretary of
Labor affirming that of the Med-Arbiter on the basis of the ruling in
the aforecited case. It must be stressed, according to petitioner, that
contrary to the interpretation given by the Med-Arbiter as...
affirmed by the Secretary of Labor, the Supreme Court's ruling that it
did not have legal personality was limited to the time when it filed
its Petition for Certification Election on 26 November 1992. Neither
did the Supreme Court, in that case, rule on the validity of the...
certificate of registration.
The truth of the matter is that with the purging completed, absent
any finding of the Supreme Court or any other court or tribunal
declaring the... invalidity of the certificate of registration, petitioner
possessed the legal personality when it filed its Petition-in-
Intervention... issue
This Court is called upon to resolve the issue... decision dated 28
September 1994, dismissed TMPCLU's
Petition for Certification Election on the basis of the following
factual findings:
Issues:
First. At the time it filed its Petition-in-Intervention on 30 October
1997 it was clothed with legal personality as a bona fide labor union.
Petitioner contended that when it filed the Motion to Intervene with
Opposition to the Petition for Certification Election... filed by
TMPCEWU and its Petition-in-Intervention, it did have a Certificate
of Registration No. NCR-UR-1199692 which was based on its
compliance with the requisites for union registration. Hence, it had
the legal personality when it filed the
Petition-in-Intervention and had all the rights as well as obligations
of a legitimate labor organization. There was therefore no necessity
for petitioner to register anew when it was already a registered
labor organization
Second. The Med-Arbiter had no authority to declare that
petitioner's certificate of registration was void ab initio in a
certification election proceeding; neither was the representation
proceedings before the Med-Arbiter the appropriate remedy to
ventilate such... issue.
To buttress its stance, petitioner drew attention to the fact that the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code of the Philippines, particularly
Book V, Rule 1, Sec. 1 (kk) thereof, and the Med-Arbiter's authority
were limited to hearing, conciliating, mediating and deciding...
representation cases, internal union and intra-union disputes.
Considering that the case before the Med-Arbiter was a Petition for
Certification Election by respondent TMPCEWU, the only task of the
Med-Arbiter was to determine the employees' choice of their
bargaining... representative, and nothing more.
Third. The Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota
Motor Corporation Philippines Labor Union and Secretary of Labor,
[8] limited the finding of petitioner's lack of personality only to the
time when it filed its Petition... for Certification Election.
it was erroneous for the Secretary to assume that inasmuch as
petitioner failed to purge itself of its supervisory employee-members
when it filed its previous Petition for Certification Election on 26
November 1992, it could... not have possessed the appropriate legal
personality when it filed its Petition-in-Intervention on 30 October
1997.
whether petitioner had legal personality on 30 October 1997 when it
filed its Petition-in-Intervention.
This Court is called upon to resolve the issue of whether petitioner
had legal personality on 30 October 1997 when it filed its Petition-in-
Intervention. Corollary thereto, should petitioner register anew
despite its alleged purging of the supervisory... employee-members
as directed by this Court in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v.
Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union[9] and the
issuance in its favor of a certificate of registration after it was found
to have violated Art. 245 of... the Labor Code?... should petitioner
register anew despite its alleged purging of the supervisory...
employee-members as directed by this Court in Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation
Labor Union[9] and the issuance in its favor of a certificate of
registration after it was found to have violated Art. 245 of... the
Labor Code?
Ruling:
On the first ground raised on appeal, it is true that the employer is a
mere by-stander during the conduct of a certification election. Prior
to the election, however, the employer is not precluded from
ascertaining the legitimacy of the union in order that it can be
assured... that the union it will be dealing with is a duly registered
labor organization which legally represents the bargaining unit
sought to be represented. There is therefore no error in allowing the
employer to question the status of appellant as in the case at bar.
On the second issue, it had earlier been finally ruled by the Supreme
Court (G.R. No 121084) involving herein employer and appellant that
since the bargaining unit of the rank-in-file which TMPCLU is seeking
to represent is a mixture of supervisory employees which is...
prohibited under Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended, the
union prior to purging itself of supervisory employees-members, had
not attained the status of a legitimate labor organization. Appellant
now simply asserts that it has purged its membership of supervisory
employees... and therefore is now a legitimate labor organization of
the rank-and-file employees. Appellant has not however shown that
it registered anew because admittedly some of its officers are
supervisory employees. The need to register anew is necessary and
the purging by itself of its... officers who are holding supervisory
position is imperative. One of the requirements for registration is
the submission of the list of officers. Under the circumstances
obtaining, appellant has not as yet attained the status of a legitimate
labor organization. It has therefore... no legal authority to oppose
the instant petition.
(T)he (in)controvertible fact is that petitioner could not have been
issued its Certificate of Registration on November 24, 1992 when it
applied for registration only on November 23, 1992 as shown by the
official receipt of payment of filing fee. As Enrique Nalus, Chief
LEO,... this office, would attest in his letter dated September 8, 1994
addressed to Mr. Porfirio T. Reyes, Industrial Relations Officer of
Respondent company, in response to a query posed by the latter, "it
is unlikely that an application for registration is approved on the
date that... it is filed or the day thereafter as the processing course
had to pass through routing, screening, and assignment, evaluation,
review and initialing, and approval/disapproval procedure, among
others, that a 30-day period is provided for under the Labor Code for
this purpose, let... alone opposition thereto by interested parties
which must be also given due course."
The foregoing discussion, therefore, renders entirely irrelevant the
technical issue raised as to whether or not respondent union was in
possession of the status of a legitimate labor organization at the
time of filing, when, as petitioner vigorously claims, the former
was... still at the stage of processing of its application for recognition
as a legitimate labor organization. The union's composition being in
violation of the Labor Code's prohibition of unions composed of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees, it could not possess the
requisite... personality to file for recognition as a legitimate labor
organization. In any case, the factual issue, albeit ignored by the
public respondent's assailed Resolution, was adequately threshed
out in the Med-Arbiter's September 28, 1994 Order (underscoring
supplied).
petitioner had no valid certificate of registration and therefore no
legal personality to file the Petition for
Certification Election and in the absence of any attempt on its part
to rectify the legal infirmity, likewise the disputed Petition-in-
Intervention.
We believe the procedural requirements to impugn the registration
by petitioner were more than adequately complied with as shown in
the 1997 case of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota
Motor
Philippines Corporation Labor Union.[14]
Principles:
if a labor organization's application for registration is vitiated by
falsification and serious irregularities, a labor organization should be
denied recognition as a legitimate... labor organization.
if a certificate of registration has been issued, the propriety of its
registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of
registration proceedings in accordance with Arts. 238 and 239 of the
Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its... petition for the
issuance of an order for certification election.
ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES
V.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA
GR No. 94716
FACTS:
Respondent Union of Concerned Employees of
the Court of Appeals (UCECA), a registered union filed a petition for
Certification Election with BLR alleging that the petitioner ACAE
which the incumbent bargaining representative, no longer enjoys
the support of the majority of the rank-and-file employees.
The UCECA alleged that there was a mass resignation of
ACAE members. ACAE filed a comment and/or opposition. It charged
the UCECA with misrepresentation, forgery, and perjury. In its reply
UCECA stated that its registry book was not smeared with fraud and
claimed that mistakes were only clerical errors.
The petitioner ACAE then filed a petition for cancellation
of Certificate of Registration of the UCECA on the ground of fraud
and misrepresentation in obtaining registration certificate and in
preparing its registry of book of members. UCECA filed a motion to
dismiss. The BLR ruled that cancellation proceeding is not a bar to
the holding of certification election. It granted the UCECA prayer for
a Certification Election. ACAE motion for reconsideration was
denied.
issue:
The first question that arises is the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Labor Relations to handle disputes among associations of employees
working for the judiciary.
Ruling:
There is no question that government employees may organize
provided the purposes behind such organization are legitimate.
No less than the Bill of Rights specifically identifies government
employees as having the right of self-organization. It provides:
xxx xxx xxx
"Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged." (Article III,
1987 Constitution)
In the provisions governing the Civil Service Commission, we find:
"Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees."
xxx xxx xxx
(Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) and (5), Constitution)
The article on Social Justice and Human Rights adds:
"Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work,
and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law." (Article XIII, Section 3, 1st and 2nd paragraphs)
xxx xxx xxx
The issue of what governs and who supervises unions of government
employees is of more than passing concern especially when those
who organize and hope to engage in certain forms of concerted
action are court employees.
Government personnel find themselves in an equivocal and
ambivalent position. They have a right but it is not clear to what
extent they may exercise it. Congress has not legislated as yet on the
complicated problems arising from unionism in government as
distinguished from unionism in the private sector. Obviously, the
same rules do not and cannot apply under the present state of the
law. A major re-ordering of government, notably its civil service laws
and budgetary and fiscal procedures would result if Congress, in
enacting the laws required by the constitutional provisions, gives
exactly the same rights and privileges to all workers in the public and
private sectors.
At present, the terms and conditions of employment in the
government service are governed by law, not by the relative
strengths of management and labor as they hammer out mutually
acceptable terms across the collective bargaining table.
Paradoxically, all the representatives of "labor" and "management"
in government are employees. At the same time, everybody forms
part of the "owner" of the enterprise, the sovereign people. The
qualifications and eligibilities of civil servants, their appointment and
promotion, standardization of salaries, disciplinary actions, fringe
benefits, and retirement gratuities, among others, are governed by
statutes, rules, and established principles which are the products of
decades of experience, not to mention borrowings from civil service
systems abroad.
The provisions of civil service law on the terms and conditions of
employment including the regulation of labor-management relations
in the government sector, unless Congress decides to amend or
repeal them, form part of the response to any requests or demands
of organized groups of government personnel. Any understanding
between the top officials of a government agency and the union
which represents the rank-and-file is subordinate to the law
governing the particular issue or situation.
We emphasize the above because in ascertaining what agency
should supervise certification elections in the public sector, we limit
the determination strictly to the question before us -- the holding of
certification elections. Jurisdiction over questions which may arise
after the certified bargaining representative flexes its muscles and
engages in concerted action will have to await the filing of more
appropriate cases and, hopefully, the enactment of applicable
legislation.
The Constitution provides that the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike, are guaranteed provided these are in
accordance with law. There is reference to the need for a law
governing the procedures incident to self-organization.
What is the law which governs certification elections in the Court of
Appeals?
The Solicitor General argues that the applicable law is Executive
Order No. 180 issued on June 1, 1987 entitled "Providing Guidelines
for the Exercise of the Right to Organize of Government Employees;
Creating a Public Sector Labor-Management Council; and for Other
Purposes."
The pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 180 are:
"SECTION 7. Government employees' organizations shall register
with the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor and
Employment. The application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations of the Department which shall process the same in
accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines
as amended. Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices
of the Department of Labor and Employment whish shall
immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor
Relations within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 8. Upon approval of the application, a registration
certification shall be issued to the organization recognizing it as a
legitimate employees' organization with the right to represent its
members and undertake activities to further and defend its interest.
The corresponding certificates of registration shall be jointly
approved by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and
Secretary of Labor and Employment.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 10. The duly registered employees' organization having the
support of the majority of the employees in the appropriate
organizational unit shall be designated as the sole and exclusive
representative of the employees.
SECTION 11. A duly registered employees' organization shall be
accorded voluntary recognition upon a showing that no other
employees' organization is registered or is seeking registration,
based on records of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and that the said
organization has the majority support of the rank-and-file
employees in the organizational unit.
SECTION 12. Where there are two or more duly registered
employees' organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the
Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of
a certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive
representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organization
unit." (Rollo, pp. 235-237)
GENARO BAUTISTA v. CA, GR NO. 123375, 2005-02-28
Facts:
On 07 May 1993, after a petition for election of officers of Kaisahan
at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (KKMK-MWSS) was filed by
Bonifacio De Guzman
(KKMK-MWSS) is hereby directed to immediately conduct an
election
The Labor Organizations Division, this Bureau, shall supervise the
conduct of said election
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the incumbent officers of
KKMK-MWSS, led by its President, Genaro Bautista, with the BLR,
but was denied by Perlita Bathan-Velasco on 08 July 1993.

An appeal was filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment where the order of the BLR was assailed as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction.
On 24 August 1993, an Order was issued by the Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, through Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma, part of which reads:
Records clearly show that the subject of the present controversy is
an intra union conflict involving an employee's organization in the
public sector created and registered pursuant to Executive Order No.
180. Consequently, this office (referring to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment) has no other recourse but to dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The then incumbent officers of KKMK-MWSS, represented by its
President, Genaro C. Bautista, filed a special civil action for certiorari
which was, however, dismissed.
Earlier, or on 25 November 1993, a Petition for Prohibition with
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction[8] was filed by
Genaro Bautista, et al., against Perlita Bathan-Velasco, Director,
Eugenia Fernandez, Med-Arbiter, and Johnny P.
Garcia, Chief, Labor Organizations Division, all of the BLR, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City, Branch 87. The petition
sought to enjoin the herein respondents from proceeding with the
election of officers of KKMK-MWSS scheduled on 02 December
1993, and to... permanently prohibit them from exercising
jurisdiction over the conduct of election of the officers of the KKMK-
MWSS.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals, dated 09 October 1995 and 08
January
1996, respectively. The court a quo, in said Decision, held that the
jurisdiction to determine the proper representative of employees in
the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System pertains to the
Department of Labor and Employment, more particularly to the
Bureau of
Labor Relations.
The Facts
On 07 May 1993, after a petition for election of officers of Kaisahan
at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (KKMK-MWSS) was filed by
Bonifacio De Guzman, former auditor of KKMK-MWSS, a Resolution
was issued by Perlita
Bathan-Velasco, in her capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), the decretal portion of which states:
Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby granted and the Kaisahan
at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (KKMK-MWSS) is hereby directed
to immediately conduct an election of the following union officers:
1. President,... 2. 1st Vice President, 3. 2nd Vice President, 4.
Executive Secretary, 5. Assistant Executive Secretary, 6. Treasurer, 7.
Assistant Treasurer, 8. Auditor, 9. Assistant Auditor, 10. Public
Relations Officer, 11. Twenty Three (23)
Directors, 12. Four Sergeants at Arms, and 13. Business Manager,
after the usual pre-election conferences.
The Labor Organizations Division, this Bureau, shall supervise the
conduct of said election.[3]
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the incumbent officers of
KKMK-MWSS, led by its President, Genaro Bautista, with the BLR,
but was denied by Perlita Bathan-Velasco on 08 July 1993.
An appeal was filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment where the order of the BLR was assailed as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction.[4]
On 24 August 1993, an Order was issued by the Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, through Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma, part of which reads:
Records clearly show that the subject of the present controversy is
an intra union conflict involving an employee's organization in the
public sector created and registered pursuant to Executive Order No.
180. Consequently, this office (referring to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment) has no other recourse but to dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
...
Wherefore, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Accordingly, let the entire records of this case be
returned to the Bureau of Labor Relations, for appropriate action.[5]
The then incumbent officers of KKMK-MWSS, represented by its
President, Genaro C. Bautista, filed a special civil action for certiorari
which was, however, dismissed. The Court, on 20 September 1993,
issued the following Resolution:
G.R. No. 111635 (Incumbent Officers of KKMK-MWSS represented by
its President Genaro C. Bautista v. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, in
his capacity as Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, Hon.
Perlita Bathan-Velasco, in her capacity as Officer-In-Charge of the
Bureau... of Labor Relations, Bonifacio De Guzman and 544 other
members of KKMK-MWSS). Acting on the special civil action for
certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for being
insufficient in form and... substance, and for want of a genuine
justiciable issue.
Petitioners claim to be incumbent officers of the Kaisahan at
Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa sa Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (KKMK-MWSS). However, they are not individually
named in the petition.
In the main, the petition argues that public respondents have no
jurisdiction over an intra-union dispute among government
employees, hence, cannot order a new election of officers. A cursory
reading of the Order of 24 August 1993 issued by respondent
Undersecretary reveals that... he agrees with this view. Thus
Records clearly show that the subject of the present controversy is
an intra-union conflict involving an employees organization in the
public sector created and registered pursuant to Executive Order No.
180. Consequently, this Office (referring to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment) has no other recourse but to dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
There is no valid issue therefore to be resolved in the instant
petition.[6]
This Resolution of the Court became final and executory on 27
October 1994 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
[7]
Earlier, or on 25 November 1993, a Petition for Prohibition with
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction[8] was filed by
Genaro Bautista, et al., against Perlita Bathan-Velasco, Director,
Eugenia Fernandez, Med-Arbiter, and Johnny P.
Garcia, Chief, Labor Organizations Division, all of the BLR, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City, Branch 87. The petition
sought to enjoin the herein respondents from proceeding with the
election of officers of KKMK-MWSS scheduled on 02 December
1993, and to... permanently prohibit them from exercising
jurisdiction over the conduct of election of the officers of the KKMK-
MWSS.
n 26 November 1993, the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 87, through
Judge Elsie Ligot Telan, issued a temporary restraining order
On 02 December 1993, the election of the officers of KKMK-MWSS
pushed through despite the issuance of the temporary restraining
order. Another Order was issued by Branch 87 on the same date
After the case was re-raffled to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City...
respondents, on 20 June 1994, filed a Reiteration of Motion to
Dismiss and Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[16] on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and that the injunction does not
anymore serve its purpose.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Bautista,... a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Restraining Order was filed before the Court of
Appeals by private respondents herein.[22] In it, the orders of
Branch 220 dated
27 December 1994 and 27 April 1995 were assailed for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals finding for the
private respondents, upholding that the BLR had jurisdiction over an
intra-union dispute
Issues:
whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over a case involving an
intra-union dispute (election of officers) of an employee's
organization in the public... sector (MWSS)
Stated in another way, does the BLR have jurisdiction to call for and
conduct the election of officers of an employee's association in the
public sector?
Ruling:
The authority of the BLR in assuming jurisdiction over a certification
election, or any inter-union or intra-union conflicts, is found in
Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Art. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of Labor
Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of
the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority
to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both...
parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management
relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural,
except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of...
collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of
grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases
before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties.
It is quite clear from this provision that BLR has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. An
intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor
union, and an inter-union controversy or dispute, one occurring or...
carried on between or among unions.[44] The subject of the case at
bar, which is the election of the officers and members of the board
of KMKK-MWSS, is, clearly, an intra-union conflict, being within or
inside a labor union. It is well within the powers of... the BLR to act
upon.
Executive Order No. 180 (1987),[45] particularly Section 16 thereof,
is completely lucid as to the settlement of disputes involving
government employees, viz:
SEC. 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever
applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints,
grievances and cases involving government employees.
ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS v. MINISTER OF LABOR
ALLIANCE OF GOV’T WORKERS v. MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT
Gutierrez Jr., J.
TOPIC/S: SCOPE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION;
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS NOW
INCLUDED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE; PURPOSE. — Under the present
Constitution, government-owned or controlled corporations are
specifically mentioned as embraced by the civil service (Section 1,
Article XII-B, Constitution). The inclusion of the clause "including
every government-owned or controlled corporation" in the 1973
amendments to the Constitution was a deliberate amendment for
an express purpose. There may be those who disagree with the
intent of the farmers of the amendment but because it is
fundamental law, we are all hound by it. The amendment was
intended to correct the situation where more favored employees of
the government could enjoy the benefits of two worlds. They were
protested by the laws governing government employment. They
could also engage in collective bargaining and join in strikes to
secure higher wages and fringe benefits which equally hardworking
employees engage in government functions could only envy but not
enjoy. It would not be fair to allow them to engage in concerted
activities to wring higher salaries or fringe benefits from
Government even as other civil service personnel such as the
hundreds of thousands of public school teachers. soldiers,
policemen, health personnel, and other government workers are
denied the right to engage similar activities.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS;
GOVERNMENT WORKERS HAVE NO RIGHT, TO STRIKE NOR TO TAKE
A MASS LEAVE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. — If, as is correctly
pointed out in the opinion of Justice Gutierrez, Jr., the scope of
government functions has expanded with the emphasis on the state
being a welfare or a service agency. petitioner labor unions, insofar
as they would assert rights ordinarily enjoyed by workers in private
firms. cannot be sustained. It seems clear to me that under the
Constitution there can be no right to strike by them nor to take a
mass leave which is a way of doing indirectly what is not legally
allowable.
3. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL CAN
PETITION GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES. — This
approach to my mind is reinforced by this other constitutional
provision; "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency.
subdivision. and instrumentality of the Government, including every
government-owned or, controlled corporation." That makes it
evident that the personnel of the government. including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, can
petition for redress of grievances or seek the improvement of their
working conditions and increase their wages.
4. ID.; ID.; TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYMENT AND THOSE IN PRIVATE SECTOR, DISTINGUISHED. —
To repeat, though, there can be no reliance on concerted labor
activities of employees in private firms. The opinion of the Court
speaks with clarity. Thus: "Since the terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law, government workers
cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private
sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle
behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace
cannot he secured through compulsion by law. Relations between
private employers and their employers rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws
and other labor and welfare legislation. the terms and conditions of
employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining."
5. ID.; ID.; WHO FIXES TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYMENT; HOW EFFECTED. — The distinction in the situation of
government employees and those employed in private firms is
emphasized in this manner: "In government employment, however,
it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and
conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements."
FACT/S:
Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered
labor federation while the other petitioners are its affiliate unions
with members from among the employees of the following offices,
schools, or government owned or controlled corporations.
According to them, PD 851 requires all employers to pay the 13th-
month pay to their employees with one sole exception found in
Section 2 which states that "(E)mployers already paying their
employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by
this Decree."
The petitioners contend that Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing PD 851 included other types of employers not
exempted by the decree. They state that nowhere in the decree is
the secretary, now Minister of Labor and Employment, authorized to
exempt other types of employers from the requirement.
Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851
provides:
"Section 3. Employers covered. — The Decree shall apply to all
employers except to:
b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, except those
corporations operating essentially as private subsidiaries of the
Government;
The petitioners assail this rule as ultra vires and void. Citing several
cases, petitioners argue that regulations adopted under legislative
authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. They
state that a legislative act cannot be amended by a rule and an
administrative officer cannot change the law. Section 3 is challenged
as a substantial modification by rule of a Presidential Decree and an
unlawful exercise of legislative power.|
ISSUE/S:
Whether the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and
instrumentalities of the Government, including government owned
or controlled corporations included among the "employers" under
PD 851 which are required to pay all their employees receiving a
basic salary of not more than P1,000.00 a month, a thirteenth (13th)
month pay not later than December 24 of every year, or not.
RULLING/S:
NO. THEY ARE NOT INCLUDED BECAUSE THEY ARE GOV’T
EMPLOYEES EMBRACED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE.
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms
and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law"
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and
Article 277, the LaborCode, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the
terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is
that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law.
Relations between private employers and their employees rest on
an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements
of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled
through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly
given delegated power, the administrative heads of government
which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and
regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.
Under the present Constitution, government-owned or controlled
corporations are specifically mentioned as embraced by the civil
service. (Section 1, Article XII-B, Constitution). The inclusion of the
clause "including every government-owned or controlled
corporation" in the 1973 amendments to the Constitution was a
deliberate amendment for an express purpose. There may be those
who disagree with the intent of the framers of the amendment but
because it is fundamental law, we are all bound by it. The
amendment was intended to correct the situation where more
favored employees of thegovernment could enjoy the benefits of
two worlds. They were protected by the laws governing government
employment. They could also engage in collective bargaining and
join in strikes to secure higher wages and fringe benefits which
equally hardworking employees engaged in governmentfunctions
could only envy but not enjoy.
Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines has implemented the 1973 Constitutional amendment. It
is categorical about the inclusion of personnel of government-
owned or controlled corporations in the civil service and their being
subject to civil service requirements: cdrep
SECTION 56. Government-owned or Controlled Corporations
Personnel. — All permanent personnel of government owned or
controlled corporations whose positions are now embraced in the
civil service shall continue in the service until they have been given a
chance to qualify in an appropriate examination, but in the
meantime, those who do not possess the appropriate civil service
eligibility shall not be promoted until they qualify in an appropriate
civil service examination. Services of temporary personnel may be
terminated any time.
Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations are now
part of the civil service. It would not be fair to allow them to engage
in concerted activities to wring higher salaries or fringe benefits
from Government even as other civil service personnel such as the
hundreds of thousands of public school teachers, soldiers,
policemen, health personnel, and other government workers are
denied the right to engage in similar activities.
To say that the words "all employers" in P.D. No. 851 includes the
Government and all its agencies, instrumentalities, and government-
owned or controlled corporations would also result in nightmarish
budgetary problems.
Baluyot v. Holganza
G.R. No. 136374, 9 February 2000
FACTS:
During a spot audit conducted by a team of auditors from the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) headquarters, a cash shortage
was discovered in the funds of its Bohol chapter. The chapter
administrator, Francisca S. Baluyot, was held accountable for the
shortage. Thereafter, private respondent Paul E. Holganza, as a
member of the board of directors of the Bohol chapter, filed an
affidavit-complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging
petitioner of malversation.
Public respondent issued an Order requiring petitioner to file her
counter-affidavit to the charges of malversation, with a warning that
her failure to comply would be construed as a waiver on her part to
refute the charges, and that the case would be resolved based on
the evidence on record. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit, raising
principally the defense that public respondent had no jurisdiction
over the controversy. She argued that the Ombudsman had
authority only over government-owned or controlled corporations,
which the PNRC was not.
ISSUE:
Whether the PNRC is a private voluntary organization.
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is
a government owned and controlled corporation, with an original
charter under Republic Act No. 95, as amended. The test to
determine whether a corporation is government owned or
controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own
charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation
under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government
Service Insurance System.
The PNRC was not “impliedly converted to a private corporation”
simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to
secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees
and other charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases for
its exclusive use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other
services and in its benefits and fund raising drives, and be allotted
one lottery draw a year by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
for the support of its disaster relief operation in addition to its
existing lottery draws for blood program.”
Clearly then, public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter,
pursuant to Section 13, of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known
as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", to wit:
"SEC. 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against officers or employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in ever
case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people.
BALTAZAR G. CAMPOREDONDO v. NLRC +
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed with the PNRC since 1980, and until his
early “retirement” on December 15, 1995. He was administrator of
the Surigao del Norte Chapter.
On July, 1995, a field auditor of thePNRC conducted an audit of the
books of account of the Surigao del Norte Chapter headed by
petitioner and found him short in the total sum of P109,000.00.
Dr. Celso Samson, Secretary General of the PNRC wrote petitioner
requiring him to restitute within seventy two hours from notice, the
totalsum of P135,927.78 representing cash shortage, technical
shortage and unremittedcollections.
Upon filing his early retirement, he wrote a letter to Dr. Samson
requesting for a re-audit by an independent auditor of his accounts.
However, Dr.Samson denied the request.
Because of denying his request petitioner filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal,
damages and underpayment of wages against the Philippine
National Red Cross and its keyofficials.
Respondent Philippine National Red Cross filed with the Surigao del
Norte provincial office, Department of Labor and Employment, a
motion todismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case because the PNRC is a government
corporation whose employees are members of the Government
Service Insurance System, and embraced within the Civil ServiceLaw
and regulations.
Petitioner filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss arguing that
there was between the PNRC and its duly appointed paid staff, an
employer-employee relationship governed by the Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction, finding that the Philippine National Red Cross is a
government corporation with anoriginal charter, having been
created by Republic Act No. 95.
Petitioner filed an appeal but the NLRC denied the petition and
upheld Labor arbiters decision that dismissed petitioner’s complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC for short) is a
government owned and controlled corporation or it has been
impliedly converted to a private organization?
HELD:
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government owned and
controlled corporation, with an original charter under Republic Act
No. 95, as amended. The test to determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it
created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by
incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special
charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and
its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government
Service Insurance System.
The PNRC was not "impliedly converted to a private corporation"
simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to
secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees
and other charges.
Having served in the Philippine National Red Cross for a number of
years since his initial employment, he must know that it is a
government corporation with its own charter and that he was
covered by compulsory membership in the Government Service
Insurance System, which is why he could apply, as he did, for "early"
retirement from the service under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or
Republic Act No. 1616.
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS v.
COA, GR No. 169752, 2007-09-25
Facts:
petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred
years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285,... The objects of the
petitioner,... shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted
upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands,
and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in... any
way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare
At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original
Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence
For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal
welfare and enforcing laws for the protection of animals, the
petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to
apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the
petitioner was to... share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and
collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto
Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the
privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of
animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 148
Sec. 2. The full amount of the fines collected for violation of the
laws against cruelty to animals and for the protection of animals,
shall accrue to the general fund of the Municipality where the
offense was committed.
President Manuel L. Quezon issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 6
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty Eight was
enacted depriving the agents of the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals of their power to arrest persons who have
violated... the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals thereby correcting
a serious defect in one of the laws existing in our statute books.
2003, an audit team from respondent Commission on Audit (COA)
visited the office of the petitioner to conduct an audit survey...
petitioner demurred on the ground that it was a private entity not
under the jurisdiction of COA
Issues:
The essential question before this Court is whether the petitioner
qualifies as a government agency that may be subject to audit by
respondent COA.
Petitioner argues: first,... it exercises no governmental functions
because these have been revoked by C.A. No. 148 and E.O.
No. 63... second, nowhere in its charter is it indicated that it is a
public corporation... if it were a government body, there would...
have been no need for the State to grant it tax exemptions under
Republic Act No. 1178, and the fact that it was so exempted
strengthens its position that it is a private institution
, the employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the
Social
Security System at the latter's initiative and not through the
Government Service Insurance System... seventh, no government
appointee or representative sits on the board of... trustees of the
petitioner;... respondents contend that since the petitioner is a
"body politic" created by virtue of a special legislation and endowed
with a governmental purpose, then, indubitably, the COA may audit
Ruling:
"charter test" cannot be applied... charter test" as it stands today
provides:
[T]he test to determine whether a corporation is government owned
or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own
charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation
under the general corporation law? Those with special... charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government
Service Insurance System... reading of petitioner's charter shows
that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the
State,... unlike government-owned and -controlled corporations. No
government representative sits on the board of trustees of the
petitioner
Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered
by the Social Security System at the latter's initiative, and not
through the Government Service Insurance System, which should be
the case if the employees are considered government employees.
This is another indication of petitioner's nature as a private entity
Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a "body
politic" because its primary purpose is to secure the protection and
welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good
The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public
interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a
public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private
although its charter contains provisions of... a public character,
incorporated solely for the public good
This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public
corporations, which are private corporations that render public
service, supply public wants,[21] or pursue other eleemosynary...
objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its
members, they are required by law to discharge functions for the
public benefit.
Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the
corporation cannot be taken as a safe guide
The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is
public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the
corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State
as the latter's own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying...
out its governmental functions, then that corporation is considered
public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces,
chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public
corporations. They are created by the State as its own device... and
agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works...
petition is GRANTED. Petitioner is DECLARED a private domestic
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
PSPCA VS. COA DIGEST
DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS
vs. COA. G.R. No. 169752 September 25, 2007
FACTS:
The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one
hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19,
1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it
was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal
propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2
of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted
upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands,
and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any
way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.
At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original
Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence. Act No.
1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of
the SEC.
For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal
welfare and enforcing laws for the protection of animals, the
petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to
apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the
petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and collected
through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.
Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the
privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of
animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148.
Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals is now an offense against
the State, penalized under our statutes, which the Government is
duty bound to enforce;
When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do
so, by the reason that they are a private entity and not under the
said commission. It argued that COA covers only government
entities. On the other hand the COA decided that it is a government
entity.
ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.
RULING:
YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter
test” cannot be applied. Essentially, the “charter test” provides that
the test to determine whether a corporation is government owned
or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own
charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation
under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, and are compulsory
members of the GSIS.
And since the “charter test” had been introduced by the 1935
Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test cannot apply to
the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285,
enacted on January 19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. All
statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation,
unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be
resolved against the retrospective effect.
Second, a reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not
subject to control or supervision by any agency of the State, unlike
GOCCs. No government representative sits on the board of trustees
of the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its
members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in
accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers
generally accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to
hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and so
forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner
shall be managed or operated by its officers “in accordance with its
by-laws in force.”
Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and
covered by the SSS at the latter’s initiative, and not through the
GSIS, which should be the case if the employees are considered
government employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s
nature as a private entity.
Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a “body
politic” because its primary purpose is to secure the protection and
welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good. This
argument, is not tenable. The fact that a certain juridical entity is
impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone,
make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may
be private although its charter contains provisions of a public
character, incorporated solely for the public good. This class of
corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which
are private corporations that render public service, supply public
wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely
organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required
by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of
these corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse, telegraph,
telephone, water supply corporations and transportation
companies. It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a
species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type
of service the former renders to the public: if it performs a public
service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.
Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the
corporation cannot be taken as a safe guide, for the fact is that
almost all corporations are nowadays created to promote the
interest, good, or convenience of the public. A bank, for example, is
a private corporation; yet, it is created for a public benefit. Private
schools and universities are likewise private corporations; and yet,
they are rendering public service. Private hospitals and wards are
charged with heavy social responsibilities. More so with all common
carriers. On the other hand, there may exist a public corporation
even if it is endowed with gifts or donations from private individuals.
The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is
public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the
corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State
as the latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying
out its governmental functions, then that corporation is considered
public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces,
chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public
corporations. They are created by the State as its own device and
agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works.
Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the
petitioner requires the latter to render periodic reports to the Civil
Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the President,
the petitioner is, therefore, a government instrumentality.
This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all
corporations owe their very existence and powers to the State, the
reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever
nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private
corporations—as creatures of the State, there is a reserved right in
the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to
determine whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the
reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the State
may see to it that its creature acted according to the powers and
functions conferred upon it.
VFP vs. Reyes
Facts: Petitioner Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) is a
corporate body organized under Republic Act No. 2640. Sometime
in August 2002, petitioner received a letter from Undersecretary of
the Department of National Defense (DND) to conduct Management
Audit of VFP pursuant to RA 2640, where it stated that VFP is under
the supervision and control of the Secretary of National Defense.
Petitioner complained about the broadness of audit and requested
suspension until issues are threshed out, which was subsequently
denied by DND. As a result, petitioner sought relief under Rule 65
assailing that it is a private non-government corporation.
Issue: Whether or not veterans federation created by law is a public
office, considering that it does not possess a portion of the sovereign
functions of the government and considering further that, it has no
budgetary appropriation from DBM and that its funds come from
membership dues.
Ruling: Yes, petitioner is a public corporation. In Laurel v. Desierto,
public office is defined as the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised for the benefit of the public.
In the instant case, the functions of VFP – the protection of
the interests of war veterans which promotes social justice and
reward patriotism – certainly fall within the category of sovereign
functions. The fact that VFP has no budgetary appropriation is only
a product of erroneous application of the law by public officers in
the DBM which will not bar subsequent correct application.
Hence, placing it under the control and supervision of DND
is proper.
Ruling:
Our ruling that petitioner is a public corporation is determinative of
whether or not we should grant petitioner's prayer to declare
Department Circular No. 04 void.
THE FATE OF DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 04
The definition of the power of control and supervision under Section
2 of the assailed Department Circular are synonymous with the
foregoing definitions
Consequently, and considering that petitioner is a public
corporation, the provisions of the assailed Department Circular No.
04 did not supplant nor modify the provisions of Republic Act No.
2640, thus not violating the settled rule that "all such
(administrative) issuances must not override, but must remain
consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply or
implement.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation.
Department Circular No. 04 is an internal regulation.
meant to regulate a public corporation under the control of DND,
and not the public in general.
They do not affect the substantial rights of any person
Even assuming that the assailed circular was not published, its
validity is not affected by such non-publication for the reason that its
provisions fall under two of the exceptions enumerated in Tañada.
Principles:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative... superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
GSIS VS NLRC G.R No. 157647
Facts:
Tomas Lanting, doing business under the name and style of Lanting
Security and Watchman Agency (LSWA) entered into a Security
Service Contract to provide security guards to the properties of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) at the contract rate of
P3,000.00 per guard per month.
During the effectivity of the contract, LSWA requested the GSIS for
an upward adjustment of the contract rate in view of Section 7 of
Wage Order No. 1 and Section 3 of Wage Order No. 2, which were
issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage
Rationalization Act.
Acting on the request of LSWA, the GSIS, through its Board of
Trustees and under Board Resolution No. 207, dated May 24, 1991,
approved the upward adjustments of the contract price from
P3,000.00 to P3,716.07 per guard, per month effective November 1,
1990 to January 7, 1991, and P4,200.00 effective January 8, 1991 to
May 31, 1991. LSWA assigned security guards Daniel Fanila, Hector
Moreno, Isauro Ferrer, Rubin Wilfredo, Jesus Delima Jr., Maria
Legaspi, Santiago Noto Jr., and Virgilio Soriano (hereafter
complainants) to guard one of GSIS's properties.
On March 15, 1993, GSIS terminated the Security Service Contract
with LSWA. All the complainants, except Virgilio Soriano, were
absorbed by the incoming security agency. On March 7, 1994,
complainants filed separate complaints against LSWA for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of labor standard
benefits from March 1991 to March 15, 1993. Virgilio Soriano also
complained of illegal dismissal.
In its Position Paper, LSWA alleged that complainants were estopped
from claiming that they were underpaid because they were
informed that the pay and benefits given to them were based on the
contract rate of P103.00 per eight hours of work or about P3,100.00
per month.
Issue: Whether GSIS is solidarily liable for payment of complainants-
respondnents' salary differentials.
Held: Yes. Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code provide:
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. — Whenever an employer
enters into contract with another person for the performance of the
former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's
subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions
of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the
wage of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer
shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or
subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work
performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that
he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
ART. 107 Indirect employer. — The provisions of the immediately
preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership,
association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts
with an independent contractor for the performance of any work,
task, job or project.
In this case, the GSIS cannot evade liability by claiming that it had
fully paid complainants' salaries by incorporating in the Security
Service Contract the salary rate increases mandated by Wage Order
Nos. 1 and 2 by increasing the contract price from P3,000.00 to
P3,176.07 per guard per month effective November 1, 1990 to
January 7, 1991, and P4,200.00 effective January 8, 1991 to May 31,
1991.
In Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 25 the Court explained the rationale for the joint and
several liability of the employer, thus:
The joint and several liability of the employer or principal was
enacted to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Code,
principally those on statutory minimum wage. The contractor or
subcontractor is made liable by virtue of his or her status as a direct
employer, and the principal as the indirect employer of the
contractor's employees. This liability facilitates, if not guarantees,
payment of the workers' compensation, thus, giving the workers
ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution. This is not
unduly burdensome to the employer. Should the indirect employer
be constrained to pay the workers, it can recover whatever amount
it had paid in accordance with the terms of the service contract
between itself and the contractor.
Thus, the Court does not agree with the GSIS's claim that a double
burden would be imposed upon the latter because it would be
paying twice for complainants' services. Such fears are unfounded.
Under Article 1217 of the Civil Code, if the GSIS should pay the
money claims of complainants, it has the right to recover from LSWA
whatever amount it has paid in accordance with the terms of the
service contract between the LSWA and the GSIS. Joint and solidary
liability is simply meant to assure aggrieved workers of immediate
and sufficient payment of what is due them. This is in line with the
policy of the State to protect and alleviate the plight of the working
class.
Social Security System, Petitioner vs. Commission on Audit,
Respondent
GR. NO. 210940, September 6, 2016
TOPIC: ALLOWANCES & BENEFITS
Facts:
On May 14, 1997, the SSC of the Social Security System
(SSS) approved Resolution No. 3604 granting a new compensation
package for its members, including medical benefits, rice allowance,
and a provident fund. These benefits were incorporated in the SSS
Manual on Personnel Policies, Rules and Regulations or commonly
known in the SSS as the "Blue Book." On September 22, 1999, the
SSC issued Resolution No. 7906 granting EME (Extraordinary
Miscellaneous Expenses) to its members at similar rates then given
to members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSJS). It
was not limited to, expenses incurred for meetings, seminars,
conferences, official entertainment, and public relations P4.49
million to cover the payment of EME. It also covered
the increase in EME of its Chairman to P750,000.00 per year, which
was the rate being given to his counterpart in the GSIS. On July 4,
2007, the Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate Government
Sector (LAO-CGS) of the COA issued ND No. SSS-2007-02(2004)
disallowing the total amount of P4,314,683.99, broken down as
follows: P 3,877,199.96 – EME, P 70,992.03 – Medical Benefits,
P 106,992.000 – Rice Benefits, P 259,500.00 – Provident Fund. In its
August 10, 2009 Decision, the COA-Legal Services Sector (COA-LSS)
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the SSS. Aggrieved,
the SSS appealed before the COA. In its January 30, 2013 decision,
the COA upheld the disallowance of the disbursements in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the SSC are entitles to the EME, medical
benefit, rice allowance and provident fund.
Notice of Disallowance No. SSS-2007-02 (2004).
 
Held:
WHEREFORE, the January 30, 2013 Decision and the
December 6, 2013 Resolution of the Commission on Audit is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the Social Security System
and its officers are absolved from refunding the amount covered by
Notice of Disallowance No. SSS-2007-02 (2004). the approving
officers had knowledge of facts or circumstances which would
render the disbursements illegal. Thus, they were bound to refund
the same for acting in bad faith. In contrast, the approving officers in
the case at bench need not refund the disallowed amount because
they acted in good faith. In Mendoza v. COA, the Court held that the
lack of a similar ruling is a basis of good faith. There has yet to be a
jurisprudence or ruling that the benefits which may be received by
members of the SSC are limited to those enumerated under Section
3(a) of the SS Law. To reiterate, good faith may be appreciated
because the approving officers were without knowledge of any
circumstance or information which would render the transaction
illegal or unconscientious. Neither could they be deemed to be
grossly negligent as they believed that they could disburse the said
amounts on the basis of the provisions of the SS Law.