G.R. No.
175356               December 3, 2013
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT,
INC., Petitioners, 
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
When a party challeges the constitutionality of a law, the burden of proof rests
upon him.
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
2
by petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc.,
domestic corporations engaged in the business of providing funeral and burial
services, against public respondents Secretaries of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the Department of Finance (DOF).
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7432,  as amended by RA 9257,  and the implementing rules and regulations
3 4
issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as these allow business establishments
to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction.
Factual Antecedents
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens the
following privileges:
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be
entitled to the following:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments
relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar
lodging establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and
purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;
b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees
charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses,
carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;
c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided,
That their annual taxable income does not exceed the property level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year;
d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs
undertaken by the OSCA as part of its work;
e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s]
anywhere in the country, subject to guidelines to be issued by the
Department of Health, the Government Service Insurance System and
the Social Security System;
f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same
benefits and privileges given by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the
case may be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service.
On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued to
implement RA 7432. Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 provide:
Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS. – For purposes of these regulations: i. Tax Credit –
refers to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to a qualified
senior citizen by all establishments relative to their utilization of transportation
services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants, drugstores,
recreation centers, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals
and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement, which discount
shall be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for
income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or other
percentage tax purposes. x x x x Sec. 4. RECORDING/BOOKKEEPING
REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. – Private
establishments, i.e., transport services, hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants, recreation centers, drugstores, theaters, cinema
houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture[,]
leisure and amusement, giving 20% discounts to qualified senior citizens are
required to keep separate and accurate record[s] of sales made to senior
citizens, which shall include the name, identification number, gross
sales/receipts, discounts, dates of transactions and invoice number for every
transaction. The amount of 20% discount shall be deducted from the gross
income for income tax purposes and from gross sales of the business
enterprise concerned for purposes of the VAT and other percentage taxes.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation,  the 5
Court declared Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 as erroneous because
these contravene RA 7432,  thus:
6
RA 7432 specifically allows private establishments to claim as tax credit the
amount of discounts they grant. In turn, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations, issued pursuant thereto, provide the procedures for its availment.
To deny such credit, despite the plain mandate of the law and the regulations
carrying out that mandate, is indefensible. First, the definition given by
petitioner is erroneous. It refers to tax credit as the amount representing the 20
percent discount that "shall be deducted by the said establishments from their
gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-
added tax or other percentage tax purposes." In ordinary business language,
the tax credit represents the amount of such discount. However, the manner by
which the discount shall be credited against taxes has not been clarified by the
revenue regulations. By ordinary acceptation, a discount is an "abatement or
reduction made from the gross amount or value of anything." To be more
precise, it is in business parlance "a deduction or lowering of an amount of
money;" or "a reduction from the full amount or value of something, especially
a price." In business there are many kinds of discount, the most common of
which is that affecting the income statement or financial report upon which the
income tax is based.
xxxx
Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 2-94 define tax credit as
the 20 percent discount deductible from gross income for income tax purposes,
or from gross sales for VAT or other percentage tax purposes. In effect, the tax
credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales discount. This contrived
definition is improper, considering that the latter has to be deducted from gross
sales in order to compute the gross income in the income statement and
cannot be deducted again, even for purposes of computing the income tax.
When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit,
it means that the amount — when claimed — shall be treated as a reduction
from any tax liability, plain and simple. The option to avail of the tax credit
benefit depends upon the existence of a tax liability, but to limit the benefit to a
sales discount — which is not even identical to the discount privilege that is
granted by law — does not define it at all and serves no useful purpose. The
definition must, therefore, be stricken down.
Laws Not Amended by Regulations
Second, the law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. In fact, a regulation
that "operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity;"
it cannot prevail. It is a cardinal rule that courts "will and should respect the
contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers
whose duty it is to enforce it x x x." In the scheme of judicial tax administration,
the need for certainty and predictability in the implementation of tax laws is
crucial. Our tax authorities fill in the details that "Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide." The regulations these authorities issue
are relied upon by taxpayers, who are certain that these will be followed by the
courts. Courts, however, will not uphold these authorities’ interpretations when
clearly absurd, erroneous or improper. In the present case, the tax authorities
have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 a meaning
utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides. Their interpretation has muddled
x x x the intent of Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a sales
discount. The administrative agency issuing these regulations may not enlarge,
alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers; it cannot engraft
additional requirements not contemplated by the legislature.
In case of conflict, the law must prevail. A "regulation adopted pursuant to law
is law." Conversely, a regulation or any portion thereof not adopted pursuant to
law is no law and has neither the force nor the effect of law. 7
On February 26, 2004, RA 9257  amended certain provisions of RA 7432, to
8
wit:
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be
entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative
to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including
funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
xxxx
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h)
as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered:
Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from
gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided,
further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added
tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes
and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance issued
RR No. 4-2006, the pertinent provision of which provides:
SEC. 8. AVAILMENT BY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SALES DISCOUNTS AS
DEDUCTION FROM GROSS INCOME. – Establishments enumerated in
subparagraph (6) hereunder granting sales discounts to senior citizens on the
sale of goods and/or services specified thereunder are entitled to deduct the
said discount from gross income subject to the following conditions:
(1) Only that portion of the gross sales EXCLUSIVELY USED,
CONSUMED OR ENJOYED BY THE SENIOR CITIZEN shall be
eligible for the deductible sales discount.
(2) The gross selling price and the sales discount MUST BE
SEPARATELY INDICATED IN THE OFFICIAL RECEIPT OR SALES
INVOICE issued by the establishment for the sale of goods or services
to the senior citizen.
(3) Only the actual amount of the discount granted or a sales discount
not exceeding 20% of the gross selling price can be deducted from the
gross income, net of value added tax, if applicable, for income tax
purposes, and from gross sales or gross receipts of the business
enterprise concerned, for VAT or other percentage tax purposes.
(4) The discount can only be allowed as deduction from gross income
for the same taxable year that the discount is granted.
(5) The business establishment giving sales discounts to qualified
senior citizens is required to keep separate and accurate record[s] of
sales, which shall include the name of the senior citizen, TIN, OSCA
ID, gross sales/receipts, sales discount granted, [date] of [transaction]
and invoice number for every sale transaction to senior citizen.
(6) Only the following business establishments which granted sales
discount to senior citizens on their sale of goods and/or services may
claim the said discount granted as deduction from gross income,
namely:
xxxx
(i) Funeral parlors and similar establishments – The beneficiary or any person
who shall shoulder the funeral and burial expenses of the deceased senior
citizen shall claim the discount, such as casket, embalmment, cremation cost
and other related services for the senior citizen upon payment and
presentation of [his] death certificate.
The DSWD likewise issued its own Rules and Regulations Implementing RA
9257, to wit:
RULE VI DISCOUNTS AS TAX DEDUCTION OF ESTABLISHMENTS
Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. – The establishment may claim the
discounts granted under Rule V, Section 4 – Discounts for Establishments,
Section 9, Medical and Dental Services in Private Facilities and Sections 10
and 11 – Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction based on the net
cost of the goods sold or services rendered.
Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from
gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted; Provided,
further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added
tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes
and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended; Provided, finally, that the
implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue
Regulations to be issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
approved by the Department of Finance (DOF).
Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed the present
recourse, praying that Section 4 of RA 7432, as amended by RA 9257, and the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF be
declared unconstitutional insofar as these allow business establishments to
claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the
DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing the same; and that the tax
credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432
be reinstated.
 Issues distinctions between the two"  and that "eminent domain cannot be made less
18

supreme than police power." 19

Petitioners raise the following issues:

Petitioners further claim that the legislature, in amending RA 7432, relied on an
A. erroneous contemporaneous construction that prior payment of taxes is
required for tax credit.
20

WHETHER THE PETITION PRESENTS AN ACTUAL CASE OR

CONTROVERSY. Petitioners also contend that the tax deduction scheme violates Article XV,
Section 4  and Article XIII, Section 11 of the Constitution because it shifts the
21 22

B. State’s constitutional mandate or duty of improving the welfare of the elderly to

the private sector.
23

WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND X X X ITS

IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY Under the tax deduction scheme, the private sector shoulders 65% of the
PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO SENIOR discount because only 35%  of it is actually returned by the government.
24 25

CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY THE PRIVATE

ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 9 Consequently, the implementation of the tax deduction scheme prescribed
under Section 4 of RA 9257 affects the businesses of petitioners. 26

Petitioners’ Arguments
Thus, there exists an actual case or controversy of transcendental importance
Petitioners emphasize that they are not questioning the 20% discount granted which deserves judicious disposition on the merits by the highest court of the
to senior citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction land.27

scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations
issued by the DSWD and the DOF. 10 Respondents’ Arguments

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section Respondents, on the other hand, question the filing of the instant Petition
9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken directly with the Supreme Court as this disregards the hierarchy of courts. 28

for public use without just compensation." 11

They likewise assert that there is no justiciable controversy as petitioners failed

In support of their position, petitioners cite Central Luzon Drug to prove that the tax deduction treatment is not a "fair and full equivalent of the
Corporation,  where it was ruled that the 20% discount privilege constitutes
12 loss sustained" by them. 29

taking of private property for public use which requires the payment of just
compensation,  and Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. Department of Social
13
As to the constitutionality of RA 9257 and its implementing rules and
Welfare and Development,  where it was acknowledged that the tax deduction
14
regulations, respondents contend that petitioners failed to overturn its
scheme does not meet the definition of just compensation. 15
presumption of constitutionality. 30

Petitioners likewise seek a reversal of the ruling in Carlos Superdrug More important, respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a
Corporation  that the tax deduction scheme adopted by the government is
16
legitimate exercise of the State’s police power. 31

justified by police power.17

Our Ruling
They assert that "[a]lthough both police power and the power of eminent
domain have the general welfare for their object, there are still traditional The Petition lacks merit.
There exists an actual case or controversy.
We shall first resolve the procedural issue. When the constitutionality of a law
is put in issue, judicial review may be availed of only if the following requisites
concur: "(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence
of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the
[question of constitutionality]; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the [question of constitutionality] is the lis mota of
the case."32
In this case, petitioners are challenging the constitutionality of the tax
deduction scheme provided in RA 9257 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF. Respondents, however,
oppose the Petition on the ground that there is no actual case or controversy.
We do not agree with respondents. An actual case or controversy exists when
there is "a conflict of legal rights" or "an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution."
33
The Petition must therefore show that "the governmental act being challenged
has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it." 34
In this case, the tax deduction scheme challenged by petitioners has a direct
adverse effect on them. Thus, it cannot be denied that there exists an actual
case or controversy.
The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme
under RA 9257, as an exercise of police power of the State, has already
been settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
Petitioners posit that the resolution of this case lies in the determination of
whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of
police power or eminent domain. If it is police power, no just compensation is
warranted. But if it is eminent domain, the tax deduction scheme is
unconstitutional because it is not a peso for peso reimbursement of the 20%
discount given to senior citizens. Thus, it constitutes taking of private property
without payment of just compensation. At the outset, we note that this question
has been settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation. 35
In that case, we ruled:
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it
constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and
establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded
medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will
be justly compensated for the discount. Examining petitioners’ arguments, it is
apparent that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the
tax deduction scheme as a reimbursement mechanism for the twenty percent
(20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens. Based on the afore-stated
DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners
for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the
discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted
from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated otherwise,
it is an amount that is allowed by law to reduce the income prior to the
application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is due. Being a
tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso
basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the
treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private
establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the
coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it
not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a
forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or
benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would
ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The
word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does not offer full
reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the
definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of
whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of
citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. The Senior Citizens
Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to
nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their
improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our
society. The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as
set forth in the law itself.  Thus, the Act provides: SEC. 2. Republic Act No.
1âwphi1
7432 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives. — Pursuant to Article XV,
Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take care of its
elderly members while the State may design programs of social security for
them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies provides: "The State shall provide social justice in all phases of
national development." Further, Article XIII, Section 11, provides: "The State
shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children."
Consonant with these constitutional principles the following are the declared
policies of this Act:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of
the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership.
To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to
senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory
fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals,
and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic
land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of
medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the
twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is
not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been
described as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in
the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same." For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be
diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss
of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in
the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. Given these, it is
incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is
unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to
calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not
been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really
works greatly to their disadvantage. In treating the discount as a tax deduction,
petitioners insist that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF
Opinion, for every ₱1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners would give,
P0.68 will be shouldered by them as only P0.32 will be refunded by the
government by way of a tax deduction. To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos
Super Drug cited the anti-hypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an
example. According to the latter, it acquires Norvasc from the distributors at
₱37.57 per tablet, and retails it at ₱39.60 (or at a margin of 5%). If it grants a
20% discount to senior citizens or an amount equivalent to ₱7.92, then it would
have to sell Norvasc at ₱31.68 which translates to a loss from capital of ₱5.89
per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax deduction, only ₱2.53 per
tablet will be refunded and not the full amount of the discount which is ₱7.92.
In short, only 32% of the 20% discount will be reimbursed to the drugstores.
Petitioners’ computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement, the law
states that the cost of the discount shall be deducted from gross income, the
amount of income derived from all sources before deducting allowable
expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss
on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income
statement, showing an accounting of petitioners' sales, expenses, and net
profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of
the discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners
cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they
give the discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the
assumption that their customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the
32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount.
Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot
raise the prices of their medicines given the cutthroat nature of the players in
the industry. It is a business decision on the part of petitioners to peg the mark-
up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as alleged by
petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property
right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because
they cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to
competition. The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical
industry and the competitive pricing component of the business. While the
Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of
business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the
operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights
in the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the
Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws
and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of
contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as x x x reminder[s] that the
right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the
promotion of public good. Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens
program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other
private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed
in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the
purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without
sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the
continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to
petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.  (Bold in the
36
original; underline supplied)
We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is
a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
No compelling reason has been proffered to overturn, modify or abandon
the ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
Petitioners argue that we have previously ruled in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation  that the 20% discount is an exercise of the power of eminent
37
domain, thus, requiring the payment of just compensation. They urge us to re-
examine our ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation  which allegedly reversed
38
the ruling in Central Luzon Drug Corporation. 39
They also point out that Carlos Superdrug Corporation  recognized that the tax
40
deduction scheme under the assailed law does not provide for sufficient just
compensation. We agree with petitioners’ observation that there are
statements in Central Luzon Drug Corporation  describing the 20% discount as
41
an exercise of the power of eminent domain, viz.:
[T]he privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the
State, but rather from the private establishments concerned. Accordingly, the
tax credit benefit granted to these establishments can be deemed as their just
compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The
concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by
the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public
welfare, and public convenience. The discount privilege to which our senior
citizens are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which
these citizens belong. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and
formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments concerned, were it
not for RA 7432. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced
subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or
benefit. As a result of the 20 percent discount imposed by RA 7432,
respondent becomes entitled to a just compensation. This term refers not only
to the issuance of a tax credit certificate indicating the correct amount of the
discounts given, but also to the promptness in its release. Equivalent to the
payment of property taken by the State, such issuance — when not done
within a reasonable time from the grant of the discounts — cannot be
considered as just compensation. In effect, respondent is made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of its revenues while awaiting
actual receipt, through the certificate, of the equivalent amount it needs to cope
with the reduction in its revenues. Besides, the taxation power can also be
used as an implement for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Tax
measures are but "enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions"
and "clearly imposed for a public purpose." In recent years, the power to tax
has indeed become a most effective tool to realize social justice, public
welfare, and the equitable distribution of wealth. While it is a declared
commitment under Section 1 of RA 7432, social justice "cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution and laws
are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our
[C]onstitution [is] not intended to take away rights from a person and give them
to another who is not entitled thereto." For this reason, a just compensation for
income that is taken away from respondent becomes necessary. It is in the tax
credit that our legislators find support to realize social justice, and no
administrative body can alter that fact. To put it differently, a private
establishment that merely breaks even — without the discounts yet — will
surely start to incur losses because of such discounts. The same effect is
expected if its mark-up is less than 20 percent, and if all its sales come from
retail purchases by senior citizens. Aside from the observation we have
already raised earlier, it will also be grossly unfair to an establishment if the
discounts will be treated merely as deductions from either its gross income or
its gross sales.  Operating at a loss through no fault of its own, it will realize
1âwphi1
that the tax credit limitation under RR 2-94 is inutile, if not improper. Worse,
profit-generating businesses will be put in a better position if they avail
themselves of tax credits denied those that are losing, because no taxes are
due from the latter.  (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
42
The above was partly incorporated in our ruling in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation  when we stated preliminarily that—
43
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it
constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and
establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded
medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will
be justly compensated for the discount. Examining petitioners’ arguments, it is
apparent that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the
tax deduction scheme as a reimbursement mechanism for the twenty percent
(20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens. Based on the afore-stated
DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners
for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the
discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted
from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated otherwise,
it is an amount that is allowed by law to reduce the income prior to the
application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is due. Being a
tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso
basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the
treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private
establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the
coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it
not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a
forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or
benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would
ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The
word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does not offer full
reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the
definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of
whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of
citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. 44
This, notwithstanding, we went on to rule in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation  that the 20% discount and tax deduction scheme is a valid
45
exercise of the police power of the State. The present case, thus, affords an
opportunity for us to clarify the above-quoted statements in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation  and Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
46 47
First, we note that the above-quoted disquisition on eminent domain in Central
Luzon Drug Corporation  is obiter dicta and, thus, not binding precedent. As
48
stated earlier, in Central Luzon Drug Corporation,  we ruled that the BIR
49
acted ultra vires when it effectively treated the 20% discount as a tax
deduction, under Sections 2.i and 4 of RR No. 2-94, despite the clear wording
of the previous law that the same should be treated as a tax credit. We were,
therefore, not confronted in that case with the issue as to whether the 20%
discount is an exercise of police power or eminent domain. Second, although
we adverted to Central Luzon Drug Corporation  in our ruling in Carlos
50
Superdrug Corporation,  this referred only to preliminary matters. A fair
51
reading of Carlos Superdrug Corporation would show that we categorically
52
ruled therein that the 20% discount is a valid exercise of police power. Thus,
even if the current law, through its tax deduction scheme (which abandoned
the tax credit scheme under the previous law), does not provide for a peso for
peso reimbursement of the 20% discount given by private establishments, no
constitutional infirmity obtains because, being a valid exercise of police power,
payment of just compensation is not warranted. We have carefully reviewed
the basis of our ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation  and we find no cogent
53
reason to overturn, modify or abandon it. We also note that petitioners’
arguments are a mere reiteration of those raised and resolved in Carlos
Superdrug Corporation.  Thus, we sustain Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
54 55
Nonetheless, we deem it proper, in what follows, to amplify our explanation in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation  as to why the 20% discount is a valid exercise
56
of police power and why it may not, under the specific circumstances of this
case, be considered as an exercise of the power of eminent domain contrary to
the obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation. 57
Police power versus eminent domain.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the
use of liberty and property for public welfare.58
The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not
oppressive. 59
In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful
subject or objective and a lawful method of accomplishing the goal. 60
Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government." 61
The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare [as long as] the interference [is]
reasonable and not arbitrary." 62
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take
or appropriate private property for public use. 63
The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken
without due process of law and the payment of just compensation. 64
Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the
exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation,  or the use
65
of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted  to promote public
66
welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just
compensation is not required. Examples of these regulations are property
condemned for being noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a
building on the verge of collapse to be demolished for public safety, or
obscene materials to be destroyed in the interest of public morals)  as well as
67
zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes injurious to the
health, morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a city’s territory into
residential and industrial areas). 68
It has, thus, been observed that, in the exercise of police power (as
distinguished from eminent domain), although the regulation affects the right of
ownership, none of the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is
appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public. 69
On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property
interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose which
necessitates the payment of just compensation therefor. Normally, the title to
and possession of the property are transferred to the expropriating authority.
Examples include the acquisition of lands for the construction of public
highways as well as agricultural lands acquired by the government under the
agrarian reform law for redistribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries.
However, it is a settled rule that the acquisition of title or total destruction of the
property is not essential for "taking" under the power of eminent domain to be
present. 70
Examples of these include establishment of easements such as where the land
owner is perpetually deprived of his proprietary rights because of the hazards
posed by electric transmission lines constructed above his property  or the
71
compelled interconnection of the telephone system between the government
and a private company. 72
In these cases, although the private property owner is not divested of
ownership or possession, payment of just compensation is warranted because
of the burden placed on the property for the use or benefit of the public.
The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.
It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental
act is an exercise of police power or eminent domain. The very nature of police
power as elastic and responsive to various social conditions  as well as the
73
evolving meaning and scope of public use  and just compensation  in eminent
74 75
domain evinces that these are not static concepts. Because of the exigencies
of rapidly changing times, Congress may be compelled to adopt or experiment
with different measures to promote the general welfare which may not fall
squarely within the traditionally recognized categories of police power and
eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and
effects of the challenged governmental act and decide, on the basis thereof,
whether the act is the exercise of police power or eminent domain. Thus, we
now look at the nature and effects of the 20% discount to determine if it
constitutes an exercise of police power or eminent domain. The 20% discount
is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less
likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities,
and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It may not be
amiss to mention also that the discount serves to honor senior citizens who
presumably spent the productive years of their lives on contributing to the
development and progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice
of honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law. As to its nature and
effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private
establishments to price their products and services relative to a special class of
individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords preferential
concern. 76
In turn, this affects the amount of profits or income/gross sales that a private
establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other words, the subject
regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private
establishment. However, it does not purport to appropriate or burden specific
properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of private
establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that
matter, but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and
the amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private establishments
may derive from, senior citizens. The subject regulation may be said to be
similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of return
on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power
measures. 77
These laws generally regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued
with public interest in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or
unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate
of return on investment of these corporations considering that they have a
monopoly over the goods or services that they provide to the general public.
The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not
prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and
services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a given
establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the
degree material to the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be
properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory measures
which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its face,
therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure. The obiter in
Central Luzon Drug Corporation,  however, describes the 20% discount as an
78
exercise of the power of eminent domain and the tax credit, under the previous
law, equivalent to the amount of discount given as the just compensation
therefor. The reason is that (1) the discount would have formed part of the
gross sales of the establishment were it not for the law prescribing the 20%
discount, and (2) the permanent reduction in total revenues is a forced subsidy
corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. The
flaw in this reasoning is in its premise. It presupposes that the subject
regulation, which impacts the pricing and, hence, the profitability of a private
establishment, automatically amounts to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. If this were so, then all price and rate of return on investment
control laws would have to be invalidated because they impact, at some level,
the regulated establishment’s profits or income/gross sales, yet there is no
provision for payment of just compensation. It would also mean that overnment
cannot set price or rate of return on investment limits, which reduce the profits
or income/gross sales of private establishments, if no just compensation is
paid even if the measure is not confiscatory. The obiter is, thus, at odds with
the settled octrine that the State can employ police power measures to
regulate the pricing of goods and services, and, hence, the profitability of
business establishments in order to pursue legitimate State objectives for the
common good, provided that the regulation does not go too far as to amount to
"taking."
79
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,  we recognized that— x x x a taking also could
80
be found if government regulation of the use of property went "too far." When
regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking. No formula or rule can be devised to answer the
questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking. In Mahon,
Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as
well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation
constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The Court
asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by
public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the
public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those
few persons subject to the public action. 81
The impact or effect of a regulation, such as the one under consideration,
must, thus, be determined on a case-to-case basis. Whether that line between
permissible regulation under police power and "taking" under eminent domain
has been crossed must, under the specific circumstances of this case, be
subject to proof and the one assailing the constitutionality of the regulation
carries the heavy burden of proving that the measure is unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory. The time-honored rule is that the burden of proving
the unconstitutionality of a law rests upon the one assailing it and "the burden
becomes heavier when police power is at issue." 82
The 20% senior citizen discount has not been shown to be unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory.
In Alalayan v. National Power Corporation,  petitioners, who were franchise
83
holders of electric plants, challenged the validity of a law limiting their allowable
net profits to no more than 12% per annum of their investments plus two-
month operating expenses. In rejecting their plea, we ruled that, in an earlier
case, it was found that 12% is a reasonable rate of return and that petitioners
failed to prove that the aforesaid rate is confiscatory in view of the presumption
of constitutionality.
84
We adopted a similar line of reasoning in Carlos Superdrug Corporation  when 85
we ruled that petitioners therein failed to prove that the 20% discount is
arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as a
financial report, to establish the impact of the 20% discount on the overall
profitability of petitioners was presented in order to show that they would be
operating at a loss due to the subject regulation or that the continued
implementation of the law would be unconscionably detrimental to the
business operations of petitioners. In the case at bar, petitioners proceeded
with a hypothetical computation of the alleged loss that they will suffer similar
to what the petitioners in Carlos Superdrug Corporation  did. Petitioners went
86
directly to this Court without first establishing the factual bases of their claims.
Hence, the present recourse must, likewise, fail. Because all laws enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality, courts will uphold a law’s validity if any set of
facts may be conceived to sustain it. 87
On its face, we find that there are at least two conceivable bases to sustain the
subject regulation’s validity absent clear and convincing proof that it is
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Congress may have legitimately
concluded that business establishments have the capacity to absorb a
decrease in profits or income/gross sales due to the 20% discount without
substantially affecting the reasonable rate of return on their investments
considering (1) not all customers of a business establishment are senior
citizens and (2) the level of its profit margins on goods and services offered to
the general public. Concurrently, Congress may have, likewise, legitimately
concluded that the establishments, which will be required to extend the 20%
discount, have the capacity to revise their pricing strategy so that whatever
reduction in profits or income/gross sales that they may sustain because of
sales to senior citizens, can be recouped through higher mark-ups or from
other products not subject of discounts. As a result, the discounts resulting
from sales to senior citizens will not be confiscatory or unduly oppressive. In
sum, we sustain our ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation  that the 20%
88
senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme are valid exercises of police
power of the State absent a clear showing that it is arbitrary, oppressive or
confiscatory.
Conclusion
In closing, we note that petitioners hypothesize, consistent with our previous
ratiocinations, that the discount will force establishments to raise their prices in
order to compensate for its impact on overall profits or income/gross sales.
The general public, or those not belonging to the senior citizen class, are, thus,
made to effectively shoulder the subsidy for senior citizens. This, in petitioners’
view, is unfair.
As already mentioned, Congress may be reasonably assumed to have
foreseen this eventuality. But, more importantly, this goes into the wisdom,
efficacy and expediency of the subject law which is not proper for judicial
review. In a way, this law pursues its social equity objective in a non-traditional
manner unlike past and existing direct subsidy programs of the government for
the poor and marginalized sectors of our society. Verily, Congress must be
given sufficient leeway in formulating welfare legislations given the enormous
challenges that the government faces relative to, among others, resource
adequacy and administrative capability in implementing social reform
measures which aim to protect and uphold the interests of those most
vulnerable in our society. In the process, the individual, who enjoys the rights,
benefits and privileges of living in a democratic polity, must bear his share in
supporting measures intended for the common good. This is only fair. In fine,
without the requisite showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, the validity of the assailed law must be sustained.
Refutation of the Dissent
The main points of Justice Carpio’s Dissent may be summarized as follows: (1)
the discussion on eminent domain in Central Luzon Drug Corporation  is 89
not obiter dicta ; (2) allowable taking, in police power, is limited to property that
is destroyed or placed outside the commerce of man for public welfare; (3) the
amount of mandatory discount is private property within the ambit of Article III,
Section 9  of the Constitution; and (4) the permanent reduction in a private
90
establishment’s total revenue, arising from the mandatory discount, is a taking
of private property for public use or benefit, hence, an exercise of the power of
eminent domain requiring the payment of just compensation. I We maintain
that the discussion on eminent domain in Central Luzon Drug Corporation  is 91
obiter dicta. As previously discussed, in Central Luzon Drug Corporation,  the 92
BIR, pursuant to Sections 2.i and 4 of RR No. 2-94, treated the senior citizen
discount in the previous law, RA 7432, as a tax deduction instead of a tax
credit despite the clear provision in that law which stated –
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be
entitled to the following:
a) The grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to utilization of transportation services,
hotels and similar lodging establishment, restaurants and
recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the
country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the
cost as tax credit; (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court ruled that the subject revenue regulation violated the law, viz:
The 20 percent discount required by the law to be given to senior citizens is a
tax credit, not merely a tax deduction from the gross income or gross sale of
the establishment concerned. A tax credit is used by a private establishment
only after the tax has been computed; a tax deduction, before the tax is
computed. RA 7432 unconditionally grants a tax credit to all covered entities.
Thus, the provisions of the revenue regulation that withdraw or modify such
grant are void. Basic is the rule that administrative regulations cannot amend
or revoke the law.93
As can be readily seen, the discussion on eminent domain was not necessary
in order to arrive at this conclusion. All that was needed was to point out that
the revenue regulation contravened the law which it sought to implement. And,
precisely, this was done in Central Luzon Drug Corporation  by comparing the
94
wording of the previous law vis-à-vis the revenue regulation; employing the
rules of statutory construction; and applying the settled principle that a
regulation cannot amend the law it seeks to implement. A close reading of
Central Luzon Drug Corporation  would show that the Court went on to state
95
that the tax credit "can be deemed" as just compensation only to explain why
the previous law provides for a tax credit instead of a tax deduction. The Court
surmised that the tax credit was a form of just compensation given to the
establishments covered by the 20% discount. However, the reason why the
previous law provided for a tax credit and not a tax deduction was not
necessary to resolve the issue as to whether the revenue regulation
contravenes the law. Hence, the discussion on eminent domain is obiter dicta.
A court, in resolving cases before it, may look into the possible purposes or
reasons that impelled the enactment of a particular statute or legal provision.
However, statements made relative thereto are not always necessary in
resolving the actual controversies presented before it. This was the case in
Central Luzon Drug Corporation resulting in that unfortunate statement that
96
the tax credit "can be deemed" as just compensation. This, in turn, led to the
erroneous conclusion, by deductive reasoning, that the 20% discount is an
exercise of the power of eminent domain. The Dissent essentially adopts this
theory and reasoning which, as will be shown below, is contrary to settled
principles in police power and eminent domain analysis. II The Dissent
discusses at length the doctrine on "taking" in police power which occurs when
private property is destroyed or placed outside the commerce of man. Indeed,
there is a whole class of police power measures which justify the destruction of
private property in order to preserve public health, morals, safety or welfare. As
earlier mentioned, these would include a building on the verge of collapse or
confiscated obscene materials as well as those mentioned by the Dissent with
regard to property used in violating a criminal statute or one which constitutes
a nuisance. In such cases, no compensation is required. However, it is equally
true that there is another class of police power measures which do not involve
the destruction of private property but merely regulate its use. The minimum
wage law, zoning ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the operation
of motels and hotels, laws limiting the working hours to eight, and the like
would fall under this category. The examples cited by the Dissent, likewise, fall
under this category: Article 157 of the Labor Code, Sections 19 and 18 of the
Social Security Law, and Section 7 of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. These laws
merely regulate or, to use the term of the Dissent, burden the conduct of the
affairs of business establishments. In such cases, payment of just
compensation is not required because they fall within the sphere of permissible
police power measures. The senior citizen discount law falls under this latter
category. III The Dissent proceeds from the theory that the permanent
reduction of profits or income/gross sales, due to the 20% discount, is a
"taking" of private property for public purpose without payment of just
compensation. At the outset, it must be emphasized that petitioners never
presented any evidence to establish that they were forced to suffer enormous
losses or operate at a loss due to the effects of the assailed law. They came
directly to this Court and provided a hypothetical computation of the loss they
would allegedly suffer due to the operation of the assailed law. The central
premise of the Dissent’s argument that the 20% discount results in a
permanent reduction in profits or income/gross sales, or forces a business
establishment to operate at a loss is, thus, wholly unsupported by competent
evidence. To be sure, the Court can invalidate a law which, on its face, is
arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory.97
But this is not the case here.
In the case at bar, evidence is indispensable before a determination of a
constitutional violation can be made because of the following reasons. First,
the assailed law, by imposing the senior citizen discount, does not take any of
the properties used by a business establishment like, say, the land on which a
manufacturing plant is constructed or the equipment being used to produce
goods or services. Second, rather than taking specific properties of a business
establishment, the senior citizen discount law merely regulates the prices of
the goods or services being sold to senior citizens by mandating a 20%
discount. Thus, if a product is sold at ₱10.00 to the general public, then it shall
be sold at ₱8.00 ( i.e., ₱10.00 less 20%) to senior citizens. Note that the law
does not impose at what specific price the product shall be sold, only that a
20% discount shall be given to senior citizens based on the price set by the
business establishment. A business establishment is, thus, free to adjust the
prices of the goods or services it provides to the general public. Accordingly, it
can increase the price of the above product to ₱20.00 but is required to sell it
at ₱16.00 (i.e. , ₱20.00 less 20%) to senior citizens. Third, because the law
impacts the prices of the goods or services of a particular establishment
relative to its sales to senior citizens, its profits or income/gross sales are
affected. The extent of the impact would, however, depend on the profit margin
of the business establishment on a particular good or service. If a product
costs ₱5.00 to produce and is sold at ₱10.00, then the profit  is ₱5.00  or a
98 99
profit margin  of 50%.
100 101
Under the assailed law, the aforesaid product would have to be sold at ₱8.00
to senior citizens yet the business would still earn ₱3.00  or a 30%  profit
102 103
margin. On the other hand, if the product costs ₱9.00 to produce and is
required to be sold at ₱8.00 to senior citizens, then the business would
experience a loss of ₱1.00. 104
But note that since not all customers of a business establishment are senior
citizens, the business establishment may continue to earn ₱1.00 from non-
senior citizens which, in turn, can offset any loss arising from sales to senior
citizens.
Fourth, when the law imposes the 20% discount in favor of senior citizens, it
does not prevent the business establishment from revising its pricing strategy.
By revising its pricing strategy, a business establishment can recoup any
reduction of profits or income/gross sales which would otherwise arise from the
giving of the 20% discount. To illustrate, suppose A has two customers: X, a
senior citizen, and Y, a non-senior citizen. Prior to the law, A sells his products
at ₱10.00 a piece to X and Y resulting in income/gross sales of ₱20.00
(₱10.00 + ₱10.00). With the passage of the law, A must now sell his product to
X at ₱8.00 (i.e., ₱10.00 less 20%) so that his income/gross sales would be
₱18.00 (₱8.00 + ₱10.00) or lower by ₱2.00. To prevent this from happening, A
decides to increase the price of his products to ₱11.11 per piece. Thus, he
sells his product to X at ₱8.89 (i.e. , ₱11.11 less 20%) and to Y at ₱11.11. As a
result, his income/gross sales would still be ₱20.00  (₱8.89 + ₱11.11). The
105
capacity, then, of business establishments to revise their pricing strategy
makes it possible for them not to suffer any reduction in profits or income/gross
sales, or, in the alternative, mitigate the reduction of their profits or
income/gross sales even after the passage of the law. In other words, business
establishments have the capacity to adjust their prices so that they may remain
profitable even under the operation of the assailed law.
The Dissent, however, states that – The explanation by the majority that
private establishments can always increase their prices to recover the
mandatory discount will only encourage private establishments to adjust their
prices upwards to the prejudice of customers who do not enjoy the 20%
discount. It was likewise suggested that if a company increases its prices,
despite the application of the 20% discount, the establishment becomes more
profitable than it was before the implementation of R.A. 7432. Such an
economic justification is self-defeating, for more consumers will suffer from the
price increase than will benefit from the 20% discount. Even then, such ability
to increase prices cannot legally validate a violation of the eminent domain
clause.106
But, if it is possible that the business establishment, by adjusting its prices, will
suffer no reduction in its profits or income/gross sales (or suffer some
reduction but continue to operate profitably) despite giving the discount, what
would be the basis to strike down the law? If it is possible that the business
establishment, by adjusting its prices, will not be unduly burdened, how can
there be a finding that the assailed law is an unconstitutional exercise of police
power or eminent domain? That there may be a burden placed on business
establishments or the consuming public as a result of the operation of the
assailed law is not, by itself, a ground to declare it unconstitutional for this goes
into the wisdom and expediency of the law.
The cost of most, if not all, regulatory measures of the government on
business establishments is ultimately passed on to the consumers but that, by
itself, does not justify the wholesale nullification of these measures. It is a basic
postulate of our democratic system of government that the Constitution is a
social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to
the State for the common good. 107
All persons may be burdened by regulatory measures intended for the
common good or to serve some important governmental interest, such as
protecting or improving the welfare of a special class of people for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern. Indubitably, the one assailing the law
has the heavy burden of proving that the regulation is unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory, or has gone "too far" as to amount to a "taking."
Yet, here, the Dissent would have this Court nullify the law without any proof of
such nature.
Further, this Court is not the proper forum to debate the economic theories or
realities that impelled Congress to shift from the tax credit to the tax deduction
scheme. It is not within our power or competence to judge which scheme is
more or less burdensome to business establishments or the consuming public
and, thereafter, to choose which scheme the State should use or pursue. The
shift from the tax credit to tax deduction scheme is a policy determination by
Congress and the Court will respect it for as long as there is no showing, as
here, that the subject regulation has transgressed constitutional limitations.
Unavoidably, the lack of evidence constrains the Dissent to rely on speculative
and hypothetical argumentation when it states that the 20% discount is a
significant amount and not a minimal loss (which erroneously assumes that the
discount automatically results in a loss when it is possible that the profit margin
is greater than 20% and/or the pricing strategy can be revised to prevent or
mitigate any reduction in profits or income/gross sales as illustrated
above),  and not all private establishments make a 20% profit margin (which
108
conversely implies that there are those who make more and, thus, would not
be greatly affected by this regulation).
109
In fine, because of the possible scenarios discussed above, we cannot assume
that the 20% discount results in a permanent reduction in profits or
income/gross sales, much less that business establishments are forced to
operate at a loss under the assailed law. And, even if we gratuitously assume
that the 20% discount results in some degree of reduction in profits or
income/gross sales, we cannot assume that such reduction is arbitrary,
oppressive or confiscatory. To repeat, there is no actual proof to back up this
claim, and it could be that the loss suffered by a business establishment was
occasioned through its fault or negligence in not adapting to the effects of the
assailed law. The law uniformly applies to all business establishments covered
thereunder. There is, therefore, no unjust discrimination as the aforesaid
business establishments are faced with the same constraints. The necessity of
proof is all the more pertinent in this case because, as similarly observed by
Justice Velasco in his Concurring Opinion, the law has been in operation for
over nine years now. However, the grim picture painted by petitioners on the
unconscionable losses to be indiscriminately suffered by business
establishments, which should have led to the closure of numerous business
establishments, has not come to pass. Verily, we cannot invalidate the
assailed law based on assumptions and conjectures. Without adequate proof,
the presumption of constitutionality must prevail. IV At this juncture, we note
that the Dissent modified its original arguments by including a new paragraph,
to wit:
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution speaks of private property without
any distinction. It does not state that there should be profit before the taking of
property is subject to just compensation. The private property referred to for
purposes of taking could be inherited, donated, purchased, mortgaged, or as in
this case, part of the gross sales of private establishments. They are all private
property and any taking should be attended by corresponding payment of just
compensation. The 20% discount granted to senior citizens belong to private
establishments, whether these establishments make a profit or suffer a loss. In
fact, the 20% discount applies to non-profit establishments like country, social,
or golf clubs which are open to the public and not only for exclusive
membership. The issue of profit or loss to the establishments is immaterial. 110
Two things may be said of this argument. First, it contradicts the rest of the
arguments of the Dissent. After it states that the issue of profit or loss is
immaterial, the Dissent proceeds to argue that the 20% discount is not a
minimal loss  and that the 20% discount forces business establishments to
111
operate at a loss.112
Even the obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation,  which the Dissent
113
essentially adopts and relies on, is premised on the permanent reduction of
total revenues and the loss that business establishments will be forced to
suffer in arguing that the 20% discount constitutes a "taking" under the power
of eminent domain. Thus, when the Dissent now argues that the issue of profit
or loss is immaterial, it contradicts itself because it later argues, in order to
justify that there is a "taking" under the power of eminent domain in this case,
that the 20% discount forces business establishments to suffer a significant
loss or to operate at a loss. Second, this argument suffers from the same flaw
as the Dissent's original arguments. It is an erroneous characterization of the
20% discount. According to the Dissent, the 20% discount is part of the gross
sales and, hence, private property belonging to business establishments.
However, as previously discussed, the 20% discount is not private property
actually owned and/or used by the business establishment. It should be
distinguished from properties like lands or buildings actually used in the
operation of a business establishment which, if appropriated for public use,
would amount to a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. Instead, the
20% discount is a regulatory measure which impacts the pricing and, hence,
the profitability of business establishments. At the time the discount is
imposed, no particular property of the business establishment can be said to
be "taken." That is, the State does not acquire or take anything from the
business establishment in the way that it takes a piece of private land to build a
public road. While the 20% discount may form part of the potential profits or
income/gross sales  of the business establishment, as similarly characterized
114
by Justice Bersamin in his Concurring Opinion, potential profits or
income/gross sales are not private property, specifically cash or money,
already belonging to the business establishment. They are a mere expectancy
because they are potential fruits of the successful conduct of the business.
Prior to the sale of goods or services, a business establishment may be
subject to State regulations, such as the 20% senior citizen discount, which
may impact the level or amount of profits or income/gross sales that can be
generated by such establishment. For this reason, the validity of the discount is
to be determined based on its overall effects on the operations of the business
establishment.
Again, as previously discussed, the 20% discount does not automatically result
in a 20% reduction in profits, or, to align it with the term used by the Dissent,
the 20% discount does not mean that a 20% reduction in gross sales
necessarily results. Because (1) the profit margin of a product is not
necessarily less than 20%, (2) not all customers of a business establishment
are senior citizens, and (3) the establishment may revise its pricing strategy,
such reduction in profits or income/gross sales may be prevented or, in the
alternative, mitigated so that the business establishment continues to operate
profitably. Thus, even if we gratuitously assume that some degree of reduction
in profits or income/gross sales occurs because of the 20% discount, it does
not follow that the regulation is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory
because the business establishment may make the necessary adjustments to
continue to operate profitably. No evidence was presented by petitioners to
show otherwise. In fact, no evidence was presented by petitioners at all.
Justice Leonen, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, characterizes
"profits" (or income/gross sales) as an inchoate right. Another way to view it,
as stated by Justice Velasco in his Concurring Opinion, is that the business
establishment merely has a right to profits. The Constitution adverts to it as the
right of an enterprise to a reasonable return on investment. 115
Undeniably, this right, like any other right, may be regulated under the police
power of the State to achieve important governmental objectives like protecting
the interests and improving the welfare of senior citizens. It should be noted
though that potential profits or income/gross sales are relevant in police power
and eminent domain analyses because they may, in appropriate cases, serve
as an indicia when a regulation has gone "too far" as to amount to a "taking"
under the power of eminent domain. When the deprivation or reduction of
profits or income/gross sales is shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory, then the challenged governmental regulation may be nullified for
being a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. In such a case, it is not
profits or income/gross sales which are actually taken and appropriated for
public use. Rather, when the regulation causes an establishment to incur
losses in an unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory manner, what is actually
taken is capital and the right of the business establishment to a reasonable
return on investment. If the business losses are not halted because of the
continued operation of the regulation, this eventually leads to the destruction of
the business and the total loss of the capital invested therein. But, again,
petitioners in this case failed to prove that the subject regulation is
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory.
V.
The Dissent further argues that we erroneously used price and rate of return
on investment control laws to justify the senior citizen discount law. According
to the Dissent, only profits from industries imbued with public interest may be
regulated because this is a condition of their franchises. Profits of
establishments without franchises cannot be regulated permanently because
there is no law regulating their profits. The Dissent concludes that the
permanent reduction of total revenues or gross sales of business
establishments without franchises is a taking of private property under the
power of eminent domain. In making this argument, it is unfortunate that the
Dissent quotes only a portion of the ponencia – The subject regulation may be
said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate
of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police
power measures. These laws generally regulate public utilities or
industries/enterprises imbued with public interest in order to protect consumers
from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by
controlling the rate of return on investment of these corporations considering
that they have a monopoly over the goods or services that they provide to the
general public. The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount
does not prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their
goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a
given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. x x x 116
The above paragraph, in full, states –
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws
which are traditionally regarded as police power measures. These laws
generally regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with public
interest in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing
as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of return on
investment of these corporations considering that they have a monopoly over
the goods or services that they provide to the general public. The subject
regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not prevent the
establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services,
and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a given establishment
but only to the class of senior citizens.
Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this case, the 20%
discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of price
regulatory measures which affects the profitability of establishments subjected
thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The point of this paragraph is to simply show that the State has, in the past,
regulated prices and profits of business establishments. In other words, this
type of regulatory measures is traditionally recognized as police power
measures so that the senior citizen discount may be considered as a police
power measure as well. What is more, the substantial distinctions between
price and rate of return on investment control laws vis-à-vis the senior citizen
discount law provide greater reason to uphold the validity of the senior citizen
discount law. As previously discussed, the ability to adjust prices allows the
establishment subject to the senior citizen discount to prevent or mitigate any
reduction of profits or income/gross sales arising from the giving of the
discount. In contrast, establishments subject to price and rate of return on
investment control laws cannot adjust prices accordingly. Certainly, there is no
intention to say that price and rate of return on investment control laws are the
justification for the senior citizen discount law. Not at all. The justification for
the senior citizen discount law is the plenary powers of Congress. The
legislative power to regulate business establishments is broad and covers a
wide array of areas and subjects. It is well within Congress’ legislative powers
to regulate the profits or income/gross sales of industries and enterprises, even
those without franchises. For what are franchises but mere legislative
enactments? There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Congress from
regulating the profits or income/gross sales of industries and enterprises
without franchises. On the contrary, the social justice provisions of the
Constitution enjoin the State to regulate the "acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition" of property and its increments. 117
This may cover the regulation of profits or income/gross sales of all
businesses, without qualification, to attain the objective of diffusing wealth in
order to protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity. 118
Thus, under the social justice policy of the Constitution, business
establishments may be compelled to contribute to uplifting the plight of
vulnerable or marginalized groups in our society provided that the regulation is
not arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory, or is not in breach of some specific
constitutional limitation. When the Dissent, therefore, states that the "profits of
private establishments which are non-franchisees cannot be regulated
permanently, and there is no such law regulating their profits permanently,"  it
119
is assuming what it ought to prove. First, there are laws which, in effect,
permanently regulate profits or income/gross sales of establishments without
franchises, and RA 9257 is one such law. And, second, Congress can regulate
such profits or income/gross sales because, as previously noted, there is
nothing in the Constitution to prevent it from doing so. Here, again, it must be
emphasized that petitioners failed to present any proof to show that the effects
of the assailed law on their operations has been unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory. The permanent regulation of profits or income/gross sales of
business establishments, even those without franchises, is not as uncommon
as the Dissent depicts it to be. For instance, the minimum wage law allows the
State to set the minimum wage of employees in a given region or geographical
area. Because of the added labor costs arising from the minimum wage, a
permanent reduction of profits or income/gross sales would result, assuming
that the employer does not increase the prices of his goods or services. To
illustrate, suppose it costs a company ₱5.00 to produce a product and it sells
the same at ₱10.00 with a 50% profit margin. Later, the State increases the
minimum wage. As a result, the company incurs greater labor costs so that it
now costs ₱7.00 to produce the same product. The profit per product of the
company would be reduced to ₱3.00 with a profit margin of 30%. The net
effect would be the same as in the earlier example of granting a 20% senior
citizen discount. As can be seen, the minimum wage law could, likewise, lead
to a permanent reduction of profits. Does this mean that the minimum wage
law should, likewise, be declared unconstitutional on the mere plea that it
results in a permanent reduction of profits? Taking it a step further, suppose
the company decides to increase the price of its product in order to offset the
effects of the increase in labor cost; does this mean that the minimum wage
law, following the reasoning of the Dissent, is unconstitutional because the
consuming public is effectively made to subsidize the wage of a group of
laborers, i.e., minimum wage earners? The same reasoning can be adopted
relative to the examples cited by the Dissent which, according to it, are valid
police power regulations. Article 157 of the Labor Code, Sections 19 and 18 of
the Social Security Law, and Section 7 of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law would
effectively increase the labor cost of a business establishment.  This would, in
1âwphi1
turn, be integrated as part of the cost of its goods or services. Again, if the
establishment does not increase its prices, the net effect would be a
permanent reduction in its profits or income/gross sales. Following the
reasoning of the Dissent that "any form of permanent taking of private property
(including profits or income/gross sales)  is an exercise of eminent domain
120
that requires the State to pay just compensation,"  then these statutory
121
provisions would, likewise, have to be declared unconstitutional. It does not
matter that these benefits are deemed part of the employees’ legislated wages
because the net effect is the same, that is, it leads to higher labor costs and a implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to
permanent reduction in the profits or income/gross sales of the business petitioners, the Court will refrain form quashing a legislative act.
125

establishments. 122

In conclusion, we maintain that the correct rule in determining whether the

The point then is this – most, if not all, regulatory measures imposed by the
State on business establishments impact, at some level, the latter’s prices
and/or profits or income/gross sales. 123
subject regulatory measure has amounted to a "taking" under the power of
eminent domain is the one laid down in Alalayan v. National Power
Corporation  and followed in Carlos Superdurg Corporation  consistent with
126 127

If the Court were to sustain the Dissent’s theory, then a wholesale nullification
of such measures would inevitably result. The police power of the State and
the social justice provisions of the Constitution would, thus, be rendered
nugatory. There is nothing sacrosanct about profits or income/gross sales.
This, we made clear in Carlos Superdrug Corporation: 124
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of
earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the
absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
long standing principles in police power and eminent domain analysis. Thus,
the deprivation or reduction of profits or income. Gross sales must be clearly
shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Under the specific
circumstances of this case, such determination can only be made upon the
presentation of competent proof which petitioners failed to do. A law, which
has been in operation for many years and promotes the welfare of a group
accorded special concern by the Constitution, cannot and should not be
summarily invalidated on a mere allegation that it reduces the profits or
income/gross sales of business establishments.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

xxxx MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and
the competitive pricing component of the business. While the Constitution WE CONCUR:
protects property rights petitioners must the realities of business and the State,
in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. Chief Justice

Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the
See Dissenting Opinion Please See Concurring Opinion
Constitution provides the percept for the protection of property, various laws
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of
Associate Justice Associate Justice
contracts and public utilities, continously serve as a reminder for the promotion
of public good. I certify that J. De Castro Left her
vote concurring my ponencia of
No Part
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the J. Del Castillo
ARTURO D. BRION
support imparted by petitioners and the other private establishments TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
Associate Justice
concerned. This being the case, the means employed in invoking the active CASTRO
participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective Associate Justice
of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued I certify that J. Peralta left his With Concurring Opinion
vote concurring my ponencia of LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
 J. Del Castillo President Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which
Associate Justice were confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jefferson’s
inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marbury’s, were
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA
Associate Justice Associate Justice undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court,
Associate Justice Associate Justice requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
BERNABE Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.  As the President
See separate concurring opinion signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the appointment
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN has been made, and Marbury has a right to the commission.  Given
Associate Justice that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver
Marbury’s commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to
review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of the
MARBURY v MADISON law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the
government “to do a particular thing therein specified,” mandamus is
the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court.  To issue
Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term
mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original
appointee of President John Adams (President Adams) to a justice of
action, which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of
the peace position in the District of Columbia, brought suit against
jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.
President Thomas Jefferson’s (President Jefferson) Secretary of
State, James Madison, seeking delivery of his commission.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States

G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
(Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to review executive
actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has limited PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and
jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United States A. GONZALES, petitioners, 
Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the vs.
Congress. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management;
HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing
G.R. No. 113174 August 19, 1994
President Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the
judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist
appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by
RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine Senate, NEPTALI A. Roco, Buñag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for petitioners Raul S. Roco,
GONZALES, Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Philippine Neptali A. Gonzales and Edgardo Angara.
Senate, and EDGARDO J. ANGARA, as President and Chief Executive of
the Philippine Senate, all of whom also sue as taxpayers, in their own Ceferino Padua Law Office fro intervenor Lawyers Against Monopoly and
behalf and in representation of Senators HEHERSON ALVAREZ, Poverty (Lamp).
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, JOSE D. LINA, JR.,
ERNESTO F. HERRERA, BLAS F. OPLE, JOHN H. OSMENA, GLORIA  
MACAPAGAL- ARROYO, VICENTE C. SOTTO III, ARTURO M.
TOLENTINO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and
QUIASON, J.:
FREDDIE N. WEBB, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND Once again this Court is called upon to rule on the conflicting claims of
MANAGEMENT, and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE COMMISSION authority between the Legislative and the Executive in the clash of the powers
ON AUDIT, impleaded herein as an unwilling  of the purse and the sword. Providing the focus for the contest between the
co-petitioner, respondents. President and the Congress over control of the national budget are the four
cases at bench. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned
taxpayers on the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly
G.R. No. 113766 August 19, 1994
exceeded their respective authorities, and by several Senators on the claim
that the President has committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto power.
Senate and as taxpayers, and FREEDOM FROM DEBT
COALITION, petitioners, 
I
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994),
of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17,
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and THE 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It
also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the
"pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating
G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994
budgets.
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed
Senate and as taxpayers, petitioners, 
by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for
vs.
consideration and approval.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and THE same to have become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE,
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
Ramon R. Gonzales for petitioners in G.R. No. 113105.
(GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Eddie Tamondong for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 113766 & 113888.
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he
imposed certain conditions.
No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.
In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia
and Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to
declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide
Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of
Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for
Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of
the P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of  Court declined to grant said provisional reliefs on the time- honored principle of
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90, 104-105)
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of the Senate led by Senate President
Edgardo J. Angara, Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chairman of the
Committee on Finance, and Senator Raul S. Roco, sought the issuance of the
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary,
the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and the National
Treasurer.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the
constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the
GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed
Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges
(SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service.
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. Romulo and Wigberto Tañada (a co-
petitioner in G.R. No. 113174), together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition,
a non-stock domestic corporation, sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management, the National Treasurer, and the
COA.
Petitioners Tañada and Romulo sued as members of the Philippine Senate
and taxpayers, while petitioner Freedom from Debt Coalition sued as a
taxpayer. They challenge the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the
special provision in the appropriations for debt service and the automatic
appropriation of funds therefor.
In G.R. No. 11388, Senators Tañada and Romulo sought the issuance of the
writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No.
113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto
on four special provision added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the
implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the
National Housing Authority (NHA).
Petitioners also sought the issuance of temporary restraining orders to enjoin
respondents Secretary of Budget and Management, National Treasurer and
COA from enforcing the questioned provisions of the GAA of 1994, but the
according the presumption of validity to statutes and the presumption of
regularity to official acts.
In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four
petitions, the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and
former Associate Justice Irene Cortes to submit their respective memoranda
as Amicus curiae, which they graciously did.
II
Locus Standi
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence
of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case (Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA
392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in
G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other
petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not
have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized
in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators,
comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a
petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The
filing of the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on
February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows:
Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in
the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with
the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and
General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other
Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has
been recognized (United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384,
391 [1976]; Notes: Congressional Access To The Federal Courts, 90 Harvard
Law Review 1632 [1977]).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the
Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was
not authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in 
G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the
purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases
becomes a preliminary issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of
the presidential veto and the conditions for the implementation of some items
in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for
that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto
or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the
authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an
impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature
arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]).
To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939];
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a
case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or
individual Senators as such having a substantial interest in the
question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was the
requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be
futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the
domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if
the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that
could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the
corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator
has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office
(Memorandum, p. 14).
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art.
VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential
veto is based on policy or political considerations but not when the veto is
claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to
draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the
bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
III
G.R. No. 113105
1. Countrywide Development Fund
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Countrywide Development Fund of
P2,977,000,000.00 to "be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to
qualified beneficiaries." Said Article provides:
COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND
 For Fund requirements of countrywide  after the beginning of each quarter upon submission of the list
development projects P 2,977,000,000
———————
New Appropriations, by Purpose
Current Operating Expenditures
A. PURPOSE
Personal Maintenance Capital Total
Services and Other Outlays
Operating
Expenses
1. For Countrywide
Developments Projects P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000
P2,977,000,000
TOTAL NEW
APPROPRIATIONS P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000
P2,977,000,000
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated
shall be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
computers and other priority projects and activities, and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by
officials concerned according to the following allocations:
Representatives, P12,500,000 each; Senators, P18,000,000
each; Vice-President, P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, the said
credit facilities shall be constituted as a revolving fund to be
administered by a government financial institution (GFI) as a
trust fund for lending operations. Prior years releases to local
government units and national government agencies for this
purpose shall be turned over to the government financial
institution which shall be the sole administrator of credit
facilities released from this fund.
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of
Advice of Allotments and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to
the assigned implementing agency not later than five (5) days
of projects and activities by the officials concerned.
2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The Department of Budget
and Management shall submit within thirty (30) days after the
end of each quarter a report to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the
releases made from this Fund. The report shall include the
listing of the projects, locations, implementing agencies and the
endorsing officials (GAA of 1994, p. 1245).
Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose
and identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide
Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power,
since said power in an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They
argue that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the
making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given
to the Congress by the Constitution (Rollo, pp. 78- 86).
Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as "the
power of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the
President. The President may propose the budget, but still the final say on the
matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or
activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be.
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority
projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries . . ." It was
Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation.
Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves
implementation of the priority projects specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify
projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of
1994, the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted
by the members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for
which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they
are in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the
proposed projects qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the President who Other Compensation
shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the
members of Congress are merely recommendatory.  

The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of Step Increments 1,073
particular projects or activities under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 3,731
imaginative as it is innovative. Compensation Insurance Premiums 1,579
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 1,184
The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its Medicare Premiums 888
interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities and politics Bonus and Cash Gift 14,791
attendant to the operation of the political branches of government. Prior to the Terminal Leave Benefits 2,000
GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the Personnel Economic Relief Allowance 10,266
constituents of the members of Congress, with the members close to the Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 11,130
Congressional leadership or who hold cards for "horse-trading," getting more Others 57,173
than their less favored colleagues. The members of Congress also had to ————
reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power to Total Other Compensation 103,815
cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or Senator. ————
01 Total Personal Services 264,032
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is =======
also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the
President and their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given
each project. 02 Traveling Expenses 32,841
03 Communication Services 7,666
2. Realignment of Operating Expenses 04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 1,220
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 318
Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the Senate is P472,000,000.00 06 Transportation Services 128
of which P464,447,000.00 is appropriated for current operating expenditures, 07 Supplies and Materials 20,189
while the appropriation for the House of Representatives is P1,171,924,000.00 08 Rents 24,584
of which P1,165,297,000.00 is appropriated for current operating expenditures 14 Water/Illumination and Power 6,561
(GAA of 1994, pp. 2, 4, 9, 12). 15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 3,270
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 2,225
The 1994 operating expenditures for the Senate are as follows: 18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 9,360
23 Advertising and Publication
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,325
Personal Services
29 Other Services 89,778
————
Salaries, Permanent 153,347 Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 200,415
Salaries/Wage, Contractual/Emergency 6,870 ————
———— Total Current Operating Expenditures 464,447
Total Salaries and Wages 160,217 =======
=======
 (GAA of 1994, pp. 3-4) 07 Supplies and Materials 55,248
10 Grants/Subsidies/Contributions 940
The 1994 operating expenditures for the House of Representatives are as 14 Water/Illumination and Power 14,458
follows: 15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 325
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 7,236
Personal Services 18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 14,474
20 Anti-Insurgency/Contingency Emergency Expenses 9,400
23 Advertising and Publication 242
Salaries, Permanent 261,557
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,420
Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 143,643
29 Other Services 284,209
————
————
Total Salaries and Wages 405,200
Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 557,234
=======
————
Total Current Operating Expenditures 1,165,297
Other Compensation =======

Step Increments 4,312 (GAA of 1994, pp. 11-12)

Honoraria and Commutable
Allowances 4,764
The Special Provision Applicable to the Congress of the Philippines provides:
Compensation Insurance
Premiums 1,159
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 5,231 4. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. A
Medicare Premiums 2,281 member of Congress may realign his allocation for operational
expenses to any other expenses category provide the total of
Bonus and Cash Gift 35,669 said allocation is not exceeded. (GAA of 1994, p. 14).
Terminal Leave Benefits 29
Personnel Economic Relief The appropriation for operating expenditures for each House is further divided
Allowance 21,150 into expenditures for salaries, personal services, other compensation benefits,
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 maintenance expenses and other operating expenses. In turn, each member of
Others 106,140 Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditure a proportionate share of
———— the appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he does not spend for
Total Other Compensation 202,863 one items of expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer his
———— allocation in said item to another item of expense.
01 Total Personal Services 608,063
======= Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to
realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution. Said section provides:
02 Traveling Expenses 139,611
03 Communication Services 22,514 No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 5,116 appropriations: however, the President, the President of the
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 1,863 Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
06 Transportation Services 178 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
 Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives the power to
augment items in an appropriation act for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their appropriations, whenever there is a law authorizing such
augmentation.
The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of
Congress is authorized by Section 16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of
1994, which provides:
Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the
Philippines, no change or modification shall be made in the
expenditure items authorized in this Act and other appropriation
laws unless in cases 
of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized
under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution (GAA of
1994, p. 1273).
Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones
authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the
members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best
position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are
savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other
items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of
approval, these two officials will have to see to it that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of
expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of augmenting the items of
expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made.
3. Highest Priority for Debt Service
While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article
XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the
Department of Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress
cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-
94) because under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the
highest funding. They invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which provides:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to
education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.
This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991),
where this Court held that Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is
merely directory, thus:
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign the highest
budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching
will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available
talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the
hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power
to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for
education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the
public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the
General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6381), is the highest
budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This is a
clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate
according highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not
without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
 enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from
the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and
to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially,
the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds
and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed
as unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 113105
G.R. No. 113174
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling
The Congress added a Special Provision to Article XLVIII (Appropriations for
Debt Service) of the GAA of 1994 which provides:
Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall
be used for payment of principal and interest of foreign and
domestic indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any payment in
excess of the amount herein appropriated shall be subject to
the approval of the President of the Philippines with the
concurrence of the Congress of the
Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this
fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board
of Liquidators.
2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
and the Department of Finance shall submit a quarterly report
of actual foreign and domestic debt service payments to the
House Committee on Appropriations and Senate Finance
Committee within one (1) month after each quarter (GAA of
1944, pp. 1266).
The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation for debt service in said Article. According to
the President's Veto Message:
IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT SERVICE
I would like to emphasize that I concur fully with the desire of
Congress to reduce the debt burden by decreasing the
appropriation for debt service as well as the inclusion of the
Special Provision quoted below. Nevertheless, I believe that
this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the
1994 GAA. This must be addressed by revising our debt policy
by way of innovative and comprehensive debt reduction
programs conceptualized within the ambit of the Medium-Term
Philippine Development Plan.
Appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the
Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as
reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No.
292, the Administrative Code of 1987. I wish to emphasize that
the constitutionality of such automatic provisions on debt
servicing has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of
"Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon.
Guillermo N. Carague, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget
and Management, et al.," G.R. No. 94571, dated April 22,
1991.
I am, therefore vetoing the following special provision for the
reason that the GAA is not the appropriate legislative measure
to amend the provisions of the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. No.
1177 and E.O. No. 292:
Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized
herein shall be used for payment of principal
and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness: PROVIDED, That any payment
in excess of the amount herein appropriated
shall be subject to the approval of the President
of the Philippines with the concurrence of the
Congress of the
Philippines: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no
case shall this fund be used to pay for the
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators (GAA of 1994, p. 1290).
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the
appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire amount of
P86,323,438.00 for said purpose (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 93-98; Rollo,
G.R. No. 113174, pp. 16-18). The Solicitor General counterposed that the
Special Provision did not relate to the item of appropriation for debt service and
could therefore be the subject of an item veto (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-
60; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 72-82).
This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig,
Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In that case, the issue was stated by the Court,
thus:
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the
President of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section
55  Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a
FY '89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the
1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional
and without effect.
The Court re-stated the issue, just so there would not be any misunderstanding
about it, thus:
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President
exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto "provisions"
of an Appropriations Bill?
The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which are similar to those invoked in the
present case, are stated as follows:
In essence, petitioners' cause is anchored on the following
grounds: (1) the President's line-veto power as regards
appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she
vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are
provisions; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not
carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for
that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in
Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be
provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested
with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of
that power.
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the
President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire
bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto
but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that
any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI,
provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to
some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not
relate to the entire bill.
The Court went one step further and ruled that even assuming arguendo that
"provisions" are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense
of the term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as
"items" for the purpose of the President's veto power.
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that
Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation
for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount
appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds other
than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of
1991.
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt
payment policy. As held by the Court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws
should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a
veto, the same as it will presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress
(Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz, 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the
legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes
as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI on the
Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department
in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the
presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the
validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not
merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to
the general veto power is the power given to the President to veto any
particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art.
VI,  an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation
Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is
limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a
separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive,  to be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act of the Philippines passed
by the U.S. Congress on August 29, 1916. The concept was adopted from
some State Constitutions.
Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting provisions, including
conditions, restrictions and limitations, to items in appropriations bills, the
Constitutional Convention added the following sentence to Section 20(2),
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution:
. . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affect one or more
items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision
without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to
which it relates . . . .
In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President was empowered to veto
separately not only items in an appropriations bill but also "provisions".
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain the aforementioned sentence added
to Section 11(2) of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, it included the following
provision:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation
to which it relates (Art. VI, Sec. 25[2]).
In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that sentence of Section
16(2) of the 1935 Constitution in the 1987 Constitution should not be
interpreted to mean the disallowance of the power of the President to veto a
"provision".
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in
therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates,"
it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or
which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered
"an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also
provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because
clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are
matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate
enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that
Congress cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate the exercise of
powers of the President given by the Constitution for that would be an
unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative.
The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry
v. Edwards, supra., thus:
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp
constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither can
the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional
powers conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state
by including in a general appropriation bill matters more
properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor's
constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation . . .
cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures
in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to
 choose between approving unacceptable substantive
legislation or vetoing "items" of expenditures essential to the
operation of government. The legislature cannot by location of
a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it
circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive
legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that
they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of
appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to
impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-
equal branch of government in contravention of the separation
of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow the
legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the
Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of substantive
legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on
the Constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid
this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such
provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of the
Governor's item veto power over general appropriation bills.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner
as to encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof
"logrolling measures", special interest provisions which could
not succeed if separately enacted, or "riders", substantive
pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage
without veto . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the Special
Provision on the ceiling for debt payment is valid, the President cannot
automatically appropriate funds for debt payment without complying with the
conditions for automatic appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as
amended by P.D. No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by
the Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No. 1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766,
pp. 9-15).
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not faithfully execute the
laws. The writ of prohibition will not issue on the fear that official actions will be
done in contravention of the laws.
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provision of the
item on debt service, including the provisions that the appropriation authorized
in said item "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign
and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay
for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisions
are germane to and have a direct connection with the item on debt service.
Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how the money
shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said provisos,
being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item
veto of said provisions is void.
We reiterate, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, that we are sustaining
the veto of the Special Provision of the item on debt service only with respect
to the proviso therein requiring that "any payment in excess of the amount
herein, appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines . . ."
G.R. NO. 113174
G.R. NO. 113766
G.R. NO. 11388
1. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUC's.
In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC's), the President
vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds. The Special Provisions vetoed
are the following:
(H. 7) West Visayas State University
Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned by the University
subject to Section 13 of the special provisions applicable to all
State Universities and Colleges shall be equally shared by the
University and the University Hospital (GAA of 1994, p. 395).
xxx xxx xxx
(J. 3) Leyte State College
Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC House and Human
Resources Development Center (HRDC). The income of Leyte
 State College derived from the operation of its LSC House and
HRDC shall be constituted into a Revolving Fund to be
deposited in an authorized government depository bank for the
operational expenses of these projects/services. The net
income of the Revolving Fund at the end of the year shall be
remitted to the National Treasury and shall accrue to the
General Fund. The implementing guidelines shall be issued by
the Department of Budget and Management (GAA of 1994, p.
415).
The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to all SUC's are the following:
12. Use of Income from Extension Services. State Universities
and Colleges are authorized to use their income from their
extension services. Subject to the approval of the Board of
Regents and the approval of a special budget pursuant to Sec.
35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.  Philippines, Section 44, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, s.
No. 292, such income shall be utilized solely for faculty
development, instructional materials and work study program
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).
xxx xxx xxx
13. Income of State Universities and Colleges. The income of
State Universities and Colleges derived from tuition fees and
other sources as may be imposed by governing boards other
than those accruing to revolving funds created under LOI Nos.
872 and 1026 and those authorized to be recorded as trust
receipts pursuant to Section 40, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No.
292 shall be deposited with the National Treasury and recorded
as a Special Account in the General Fund pursuant to P.D. No.
1234 and P.D. No. 1437 for the use of the institution, subject to
Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No.
292L PROVIDED, That disbursements from the Special
Account shall not exceed the amount actually earned and
deposited: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a cash advance on
such income may be allowed State half of income actually
realized during the preceding year and this cash advance shall
be charged against income actually earned during the budget
year: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That in no case shall such
funds be used to create positions, nor for payment of salaries,
wages or allowances, except as may be specifically approved
by the Department of Budge and Management for income-
producing activities, or to purchase equipment or books,
without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines
pursuant to Letter of Implementation No. 29.
All collections of the State Universities and Colleges for fees,
charges and receipts intended for private recipient units,
including private foundations affiliated with these institutions
shall be duly acknowledged with official receipts and deposited
as a trust receipt before said income shall be subject to Section
35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).
The President gave his reason for the veto thus:
Pursuant to Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the
1987 and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, all income
earned by all Government offices and agencies shall accrue to
the General Fund of the Government in line with the One Fund
Policy enunciated by Section 29 (1), Article VI and Section 22,
Article VII of the Constitution. Likewise, the creation and
establishment of revolving funds shall be authorized by
substantive law pursuant to Section 66 of the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines and Section 45, Chapter 5,
Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned provisions of the
Constitution and existing law, I have noted the proliferation of
special provisions authorizing the use of agency income as well
as the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds.
I would like to underscore the facts that such income were
already considered as integral part of the revenue and
financing sources of the National Expenditure Program which I
previously submitted to Congress. Hence, the grant of new
special provisions authorizing the use of agency income and
the establishment of revolving funds over and above the
agency appropriations authorized in this Act shall effectively
reduce the financing sources of the 1994 GAA and, at the
same time, increase the level of expenditures of some
agencies beyond the well-coordinated, rationalized levels for
 such agencies. This corresponding increases the overall deficit
of the National Government (Veto Message, p. 3).
Petitioners claim that the President acted with grave abuse of discretion when
he disallowed by his veto the "use of income" and the creation of "revolving
fund" by the Western Visayas State University and Leyte State Colleges when
he allowed other government offices, like the National Stud Farm, to use their
income for their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 15-16).
There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special
provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If
some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a
revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such
practices as exceptions to the "one-fund policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the
National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange
Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management's
Procurement Service).
2. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for
road maintenance.
In the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways, the
President vetoed the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2, specifying
the 30% maximum ration of works to be contracted for the maintenance of
national roads and bridges. The said paragraph reads as follows:
2. Release and Use of Road Maintenance Funds. Funds
allotted for the maintenance and repair of roads which are
provided in this Act for the Department of Public Works and
Highways shall be released to the respective Engineering
District, subject to such rules and regulations as may be
prescribed by the Department of Budget and Management.
Maintenance funds for roads and bridges shall be exempt from
budgetary reserve.
Of the amount herein appropriated for the maintenance of
national roads and bridges, a maximum of thirty percent (30%)
shall be contracted out in accordance with guidelines to be
issued by the Department of Public Works and Highways. The
balance shall be used for maintenance by force account.
Five percent (5%) of the total road maintenance fund
appropriated herein to be applied across the board to the
allocation of each region shall be set aside for the maintenance
of roads which may be converted to or taken over as national
roads during the current year and the same shall be released
to the central office of the said department for eventual 
sub-allotment to the concerned region and
district: PROVIDED, That any balance of the said five percent
(5%) shall be restored to the regions on a pro-rata basis for the
maintenance of existing national roads.
No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead expenses
shall be made, except as authorized by law or upon direction of
the President 
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786; Emphasis supplied).
The President gave the following reason for the veto:
While I am cognizant of the well-intended desire of Congress to
impose certain restrictions contained in some special
provisions, I am equally aware that many programs, projects
and activities of agencies would require some degree of
flexibility to ensure their successful implementation and
therefore risk their completion. Furthermore, not only could
these restrictions and limitations derail and impede program
implementation but they may also result in a breach of
contractual obligations.
D.1.a. A study conducted by the Infrastructure Agencies show
that for practical intent and purposes, maintenance by contract
could be undertaken to an optimum of seventy percent (70%)
and the remaining thirty percent (30%) by force account.
Moreover, the policy of maximizing implementation through
contract maintenance is a covenant of the Road and Road
Transport Program Loan from the Asian Development Bank
(ADB Loan No. 1047-PHI-1990) and Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund (OECF Loan No. PH-C17-199). The same is
a covenant under the World Bank (IBRD) Loan for the Highway
Management Project (IBRD Loan 
No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.
 In the light of the foregoing and considering the policy of the
government to encourage and maximize private sector
participation in the regular repair and maintenance of
infrastructure facilities, I am directly vetoing the underlined
second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (Veto Message, p. 11).
The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the divergence
in policy of Congress and the President. While Congress expressly laid down
the condition that only 30% of the total appropriation for road maintenance
should be contracted out, the President, on the basis of a comprehensive
study, believed that contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of
70% would be more efficient, economical and practical.
The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can
be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specified how the said item shall be
expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions,
conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately
from the items to which they relate so long as they are "appropriate" in the
budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
The Solicitor General was hard put in justifying the veto of this special
provision. He merely argued that the provision is a complete turnabout from an
entrenched practice of the government to maximize contract maintenance
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 85-86). That is not a ground to veto a provision
separate from the item to which it refers.
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the
DPWH is therefore unconstitutional.
3. Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP.
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the
President vetoed the special provision on the purchase by the AFP of
medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675). The
vetoed provision reads:
12. Purchase of Medicines. The purchase of medicines by all
Armed Forces of the Philippines units, hospitals and clinics
shall strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the
National Drug Policy of the Department of Health (GAA of
1994, p. 748).
According to the President, while it is desirable to subject the purchase of
medicines to a standard formulary, "it is believed more prudent to provide for a
transition period for its adoption and smooth implementation in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the
AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug
Policy of the Department of Health is an "appropriate" provision. it is a mere
advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an existing law, the Generics
Act of 1988, that requires "the extensive use of drugs with generic names
through a rational system of procurement and distribution." The President
believes that it is more prudent to provide for a transition period for the smooth
implementation of the law in the case of purchases by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, as implied by Section 11 (Education Drive) of the law itself. This
belief, however, cannot justify his veto of the provision on the purchase of
medicines by the AFP.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on
purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by
the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics
Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
4. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
military equipment.
In the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, the President vetoed the
underlined proviso of Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund," which
requires the prior approval of Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provisions 
No. 3 on the "Specific Prohibition":
2. Use of the Fund. Of the amount herein appropriated, priority
shall be given for the acquisition of AFP assets necessary for
protecting marine, mineral, forest and other resources within
Philippine territorial borders and its economic zone, detection,
prevention or deterrence of air or surface intrusions and to
 support diplomatic moves aimed at preserving national dignity,
sovereignty and patrimony: PROVIDED, That the said
modernization fund shall not be released until a Table of
Organization and Equipment for FY 1994-2000 is submitted to
and approved by Congress.
3. Specific Prohibition. The said Modernization Fund shall not
be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes,
18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers
(GAA of 1994, p. 747).
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and
prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual
obligations, and if allowed, "shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP
Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to
modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
Petitioners claim that Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" and Special
Provision No. 3 are conditions or limitations related to the item on the AFP
modernization plan.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military
equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the "congressional or
legislative veto." By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means
whereby the legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a
statute. It is a form of legislative control in the implementation of particular
executive actions. The form may be either negative, that is requiring
disapproval of the executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the
executive action. This device represents a significant attempt by Congress to
move from oversight of the executive to shared administration (Dixon, The
Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash, 
56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]).
A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of
separation of powers.
However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of
the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and
3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Any
provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions
Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her memorandum as Amicus Curiae:
"What Congress cannot do directly by law it cannot do indirectly by attaching
conditions to the exercise of that power (of the President as Commander-in-
Chief) through provisions in the appropriation law."
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization
Funds for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which
have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional
prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art.
III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
5. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the President
vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the
AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. The vetoed provision reads:
2. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, to
use savings in the appropriations provided herein to augment
the pension fund being managed by the AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System as provided under Sections 2(a)
and 3 of P.D. No. 361 (GAA of 1994, 
p. 746).
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits
should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the
purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover,
he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated
in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution (Veto Message, pp. 7-8).
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision on AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund
is a condition or limitation which is so intertwined with the item of appropriation
that it could not be separated therefrom.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to
augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement
and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the
Article VI of the Constitution.
Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out of  Petitioners claim that the Congress has required the deactivation of the
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While
Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to augment
items in the general appropriations law for the executive branch, such right
must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.
6. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's.
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU's, including the payment
of separation benefits but it added the following Special Provision:
1. CAFGU Compensation and Separation Benefit. The
appropriation authorized herein shall be used for the
compensation of CAFGU's including the payment of their
separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year subsistence
allowance for the 11,000 members who will be deactivated in
1994. The Chief of Staff, AFP, shall, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate policies and
procedures for the payment of separation benefit (GAA of
1994, p. 740).
The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this
Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior
Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A.. No. 6758. He gave
the following reasons for imposing the condition:
I am well cognizant of the laudable intention of Congress in
proposing the amendment of Special Provision No. 1 of the
CAFGU. However, it is premature at this point in time of our
peace process to earmark and declare through special
provision the actual number of CAFGU members to be
deactivated in CY 1994. I understand that the number to be
deactivated would largely depend on the result or degree of
success of the on-going peace initiatives which are not yet
precisely determinable today. I have desisted, therefore, to
directly veto said provisions because this would mean the loss
of the entire special provision to the prejudice of its beneficient
provisions. I therefore declare that the actual implementation of
this special provision shall be subject to prior Presidential
approval pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 1597 and 
R.A. No. 6758 (Veto Message, p. 13).
CAFGU's when it appropriated the money for payment of the separation pay of
the members of thereof. The President, however, directed that the deactivation
should be done in accordance to his timetable, taking into consideration the
peace and order situation in the affected localities.
Petitioners complain that the directive of the President was tantamount to an
administrative embargo of the congressional will to implement the
Constitution's command to dissolve the CAFGU's (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, 
p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the President cannot
impair or withhold expenditures authorized and appropriated by Congress
when neither the Appropriations Act nor other legislation authorize such
impounding (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 15-16).
The Solicitor General contends that it is the President, as Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who should determine when the
services of the CAFGU's are no longer needed (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, 
pp. 92-95.).
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to
impound is put in issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for
whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure
to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of
Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1973]).
Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once
Congress has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an appropriations
act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the President to implement the
project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President has no
discretion on the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to
faithfully execute the laws.
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an appropriation item, the
President in effect exercises a veto power that is not expressly granted by the
Constitution. As a matter of fact, the Constitution does not say anything about
impounding. The source of the Executive authority must be found elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of
the authority of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to
him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power
drawn from the President's role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful
Execution Clause which ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners
herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the
President desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public
interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management
of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to
expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law
(Notes: Presidential Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political
Realities, 61 Georgetown Law Journal 1295 [1973]; Notes; Protecting the
Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, 82 Yale Law Journal
1686 [1973).
We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special
Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the
right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU
members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention
must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades
the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the
creation of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an
appropriations act cannot  procedures and policies as provided for under
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A.
No. 6758.
7. Condition on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc.
(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR,
the Congress added the following provisions:
The Judiciary
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any
savings in the appropriations for the Supreme Court and the
Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court to augment any item of the Court's
appropriations for (a) printing of decisions and publication of
"Philippine Reports"; (b) Commutable terminal leaves of
Justices and other personnel of the Supreme Court and
payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled
thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A.;
(c) repair, maintenance, improvement and other operating
expenses of the courts' libraries, including purchase of books
and periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and improvement
of printing equipment; (e) necessary expenses for the
employment of temporary employees, contractual and casual
employees, for judicial administration; (f) maintenance and
improvement of the Court's Electronic Data 
Processing System; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief
Justice, attendance in international conferences and conduct of
training programs; (h) commutable transportation and
representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices,
Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and
other Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed
by law; and (i) compensation of attorney-de-
officio: PROVIDED, That as mandated by LOI No. 489 any
increase in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual
 
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws (GAA of 1994, p. 1128;
Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Audit
xxx xxx xxx
5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Audit
is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, to use savings for the payment
of fringe benefits as may be authorized by law for officials and
personnel of the Commission (GAA of 1994, p. 1161;
Emphasis supplied).
 xxx xxx xxx
Office of the Ombudsman
xxx xxx xxx
6. Augmentation of Items in the appropriation of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is hereby authorized,
subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations to augment items of appropriation in the Office of
the Ombudsman from savings in other items of appropriation
actually released, for: (a) printing and/or publication of
decisions, resolutions, training and information materials; (b)
repair, maintenance and improvement of OMB Central and
Area/Sectoral facilities; (c) purchase of books, journals,
periodicals and equipment;  established principle on compensation standardization (Veto
(d) payment of commutable representation and transportation
allowances of officials and employees who by reason of their
positions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits as may be
authorized specifically by law for officials and personnel of
OMB pursuant to Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution;
and (e) for other official purposes subject to accounting and
auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1174;
Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Human Rights
xxx xxx xxx
1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) is hereby authorized, subject to
appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to
augment any item of appropriation in the office of the CHR from
savings in other items of appropriations actually released, for:
(a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, training
materials and educational publications; (b) repair, maintenance
and improvement of Commission's central and regional
facilities; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and
equipment, (d) payment of commutable representation and
transportation allowances of officials and employees who by
reason of their positions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits,
as may be authorized by law for officials and personnel of
CHR, subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations
(GAA of 1994, p. 1178; Emphasis supplied).
In his Veto Message, the President expressed his approval of the conditions
included in the GAA of 1994. He noted that:
The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional
injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitution which states that "no elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law." I am,
therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall
maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-
Message, p. 10).
Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman,
the COA and the CHR.
In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the
GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely
highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation
can only be given pursuant to law.
In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the
disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such
statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
(b) In the appropriation for the COA, the President imposed the condition that
the implementation of the budget of the COA be subject to "the guidelines to
be issued by the President."
The provisions subject to said condition reads:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Revolving Fund. The income of the Commission on Audit
derived from sources authorized by the Government Auditing
 Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not exceeding Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000) shall be constituted into a
revolving fund which shall be used for maintenance, operating
and other incidental expenses to enhance audit services and
audit-related activities. The fund shall be deposited in an
authorized government depository ban, and withdrawals
therefrom shall be made in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law and implementing rules and
regulations: PROVIDED,That any interests earned on such
deposit shall be remitted at the end of each quarter to the
national Treasury and shall accrue to the General
Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER, That the Commission on Audit
shall submit to the Department of Budget and Management a
quarterly report of income and expenditures of said revolving
fund (GAA of 1994, pp. 1160-1161).
The President cited the "imperative need to rationalize" the implementation,
applicability and operation of use of income and revolving funds. The Veto
Message stated:
. . . I have observed that there are old and long existing special
provisions authorizing the use of income and the creation of
revolving funds. As a rule, such authorizations should be
discouraged. However, I take it that these authorizations have
legal/statutory basis aside from being already a vested right to
the agencies concerned which should not be jeopardized
through the Veto Message. There is, however, imperative need
to rationalize their implementation, applicability and operation.
Thus, in order to substantiate the purpose and intention of said
provisions, I hereby declare that the operationalization of the
following provisions during budget implementation shall be
subject to the guidelines to be issued by the
President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to
Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act (Veto
Message, p. 6; Emphasis Supplied.)
(c) In the appropriation for the DPWH, the President imposed the condition that
in the implementation of DPWH projects, the administrative and engineering
overhead of 5% and 3% "shall be subject to the necessary administrative
guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing laws." The
condition was imposed because the provision "needs further study" according
to the President.
The following provision was made subject to said condition:
9. Engineering and Administrative Overhead. Not more than
five percent (5%) of the amount for infrastructure project
released by the Department of Budget and Management shall
be deducted by DPWH for administrative overhead, detailed
engineering and construction supervision, testing and quality
control, and the like, thus insuring that at least ninety-five
percent (95%) of the released fund is available for direct
implementation of the project. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That
for school buildings, health centers, day-care centers and
barangay halls, the deductible amount shall not exceed three
percent (3%).
Violation of, or non-compliance with, this provision shall subject
the government official or employee concerned to
administrative, civil and/or criminal sanction under Sections 43
and 80, Book VI of E.O. 
No. 292 (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
(d) In the appropriation for the National Housing Authority (NHA), the President
imposed the condition that allocations for specific projects shall be released
and disbursed "in accordance with the housing program of the government,
subject to prior Executive approval."
The provision subject to the said condition reads:
3. Allocations for Specified Projects. The following allocations
for the specified projects shall be set aside for corollary works
and used exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation and
construction of buildings, roads, pathwalks, drainage,
waterworks systems, facilities and amenities in the
area: PROVIDED, That any road to be constructed or
rehabilitated shall conform with the specifications and
standards set by the Department of Public Works and
Highways for such kind of road: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
savings that may be available in the future shall be used for
road repair, rehabilitation and construction:
 (1) Maharlika Village Road —
Not less than P5,000,000
(2) Tenement Housing Project
(Taguig) — Not less than
P3,000,000
(3) Bagong Lipunan
Condominium Project (Taguig)
— Not less than P2,000,000
4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount appropriated for the
implementation of various projects in resettlement areas,
Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P7,500,000)
shall be allocated to the Dasmariñas Bagong Bayan
resettlement area, Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) to the
Carmona Relocation Center Area (Gen. Mariano Alvarez) and
Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) to the Bulihan Sites and
Services, all of which will be for the cementing of roads in
accordance with DPWH standards.
5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An allocation of Eight Million
Pesos (P8,000,000) shall be set aside for the asphalting of
seven (7) kilometer main road of Sapang Palay, San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan  followed our decision in Gonzales? How can we say that Congress has abused
(GAA of 1994, p. 1216).
The President imposed the conditions: (a) that the "operationalization" of the
special provision on revolving funds of the COA "shall be subject to guidelines
to be issued by the President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5,  Article 8 of the Civil Code of Philippines, provides:
Book VI of E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to
Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act" (Rollo, G.R.  Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
No. 113174, pp. 5,7-8); (b) that the implementation of Special Provision No. 9
of the DPWH on the mandatory retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts
released by said Department "be subject to the necessary administrative
guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing law" (Rollo,
G.R. No. 113888; pp. 10, 14-16); and (c) that the appropriations authorized for
the NHA can be released only "in accordance with the housing program of the
government subject to prior Executive approval" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp.
10-11;  same authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA
14-16).
The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere reminders that the
implementation of the items on which the said conditions were imposed,
should be done in accordance with existing laws, regulations or policies. They
did not add anything to what was already in place at the time of the approval of
the GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures
shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it
cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. The issuance
of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by Congress
is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that the
laws are faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Gil
67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the
power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law
(Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to
be embodied in the guidelines.
IV
Petitioners chose to avail of the special civil actions but those remedies can be
used only when respondents have acted "without or in excess" of jurisdiction,
or "with grave abuse of discretion," (Revised Rules of Court, 
Rule 65, Section 2). How can we begrudge the President for vetoing the
Special Provision on the appropriation for debt payment when he merely
its discretion when it appropriated a bigger sum for debt payment than the
amount appropriated for education, when it merely followed our dictum
in Guingona?
constitution shall from a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
The Court's interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of its
enactment since the court's interpretation merely establishes the contemporary
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect (People v.
Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the Supreme Court assume the
141 [1985]).
Even if Guingona and Gonzales are considered hard cases that make bad
laws and should be reversed, such reversal cannot nullify prior acts done in
reliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect to  I do not see how this can be done without doing violence to the
(1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment
of the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund
therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of
foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to
pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and (2) G.R.
No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the
second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for
the Department of Public Works and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786);
and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far
as it re-affirms the Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452).
Sec. 27(2), Art. VI of the Constitution states:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item
or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto
shall not effect the item or items to which he does not object.
In my dissenting opinion in Gonzalez, I stated that:
The majority opinion positions the veto questioned in this case
within the scope of Section 27(2) [Article VI of the Constitution].
constitutional design. The distinction between an item-veto and
a provision veto has been traditionally recognized in
constitutional litigation and budgetary practice. As stated by Mr.
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court
in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410-416:
. . . An item of an appropriation bill obviously
means an item which in itself is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general
provisions of law which happens to be put into
an appropriation bill . . .
When the Constitution in Section 27(2) empowers the
President to veto any particular item or items in the
appropriation act, it does not 
confer — in fact, it excludes — the power to veto any particular
provision or provisions in said act.
In an earlier case, Sarmiento v. Mison, et al., 156 SCRA 549,
this court referred to its duty to construe the Constitution, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative would
want it construed, but in accordance with what it says and
provides. When the Constitution states that the President has
the power to veto any particular item or items in the
appropriation act, this must be taken as a component of that
delicate balance of power between the executive and
legislative, so that, for this Court to construe Sec. 27(2) of the
Constitution as also empowering the President to veto any
particular provision or provisions in the appropriations act, is to
load the scale in favor of the executive, at the expense of that
delicate balance of power.
I therefore disagree with the majority's pronouncements which would validate
the veto by the President of specific provisions in the appropriations act based
on the contention that such are "inappropriate provisions." Even assuming, for
the sake of argument, that a provision in the appropriations act is
"inappropriate" from the Presidential standpoint, it is still a provision, not
an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto power of the
Executive.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur on the points so well expounded by a most respected colleague, Mr.
Justice Camilo D. Quiason. I should like to highlight a bit, however, that part of
the ponencia dealing on the Countrywide Development Fund or, so commonly
referred to as, the infamous "pork barrel".
I agree that it lies with Congress to determine in an appropriation act the
activities and the projects that are desirable and may thus be funded. Once,
however, such identification and the corresponding appropriation therefore is
done, the legislative act is completed and it ends there. Thereafter, the
Executive is behooved, with exclusive responsibility and authority, to see to it
that the legislative will is properly carried out. I cannot subscribe to another
theory invoked by some quarters that, in so implementing the law, the
Executive does so only by way of delegation. Congress neither may delegate
what it does not have nor may encroach on the powers of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch.
Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not as the individuals that
comprise it, in any action or decision that can bind it, or be said to have been
done by it, under its constitutional authority. Even assuming that overseeing
the laws it enacts continues to be a legislative process, one that I find difficult
to accept, it is Congress itself, not any of its members, that must exercise that
function.
I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the
President and his colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of their
own respective cosntituents. I see no legal obstacle, however, in their making,
just like anyone else, the proper recommendations to albeit not necessarily
conclusive on, the President for the purpose. Neother would it be objectionable
for Congrss, by law, to appropriate funds for specific projects as it may be
minded; to give that authoriy, however, to the individual members of Congress
in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionality impermissible.
 
# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far
as it re-affirms the Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452).
Sec. 27(2), Art. VI of the Constitution states:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item
or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto
shall not effect the item or items to which he does not object.
In my dissenting opinion in Gonzalez, I stated that:
The majority opinion positions the veto questioned in this case
within the scope of Section 27(2) [Article VI of the Constitution].
I do not see how this can be done without doing violence to the
constitutional design. The distinction between an item-veto and
a provision veto has been traditionally recognized in
constitutional litigation and budgetary practice. As stated by Mr.
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court
in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410-416:
. . . An item of an appropriation bill obviously
means an item which in itself is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general
provisions of law which happens to be put into
an appropriation bill . . .
When the Constitution in Section 27(2) empowers the
President to veto any particular item or items in the
appropriation act, it does not 
confer — in fact, it excludes — the power to veto any particular
provision or provisions in said act.
In an earlier case, Sarmiento v. Mison, et al., 156 SCRA 549,
this court referred to its duty to construe the Constitution, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative would
want it construed, but in accordance with what it says and
provides. When the Constitution states that the President has
the power to veto any particular item or items in the
appropriation act, this must be taken as a component of that
 delicate balance of power between the executive and
legislative, so that, for this Court to construe Sec. 27(2) of the
Constitution as also empowering the President to veto any
particular provision or provisions in the appropriations act, is to
load the scale in favor of the executive, at the expense of that
delicate balance of power.
I therefore disagree with the majority's pronouncements which would validate
the veto by the President of specific provisions in the appropriations act based
on the contention that such are "inappropriate provisions." Even assuming, for
the sake of argument, that a provision in the appropriations act is
"inappropriate" from the Presidential standpoint, it is still a provision, not
an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto power of the
Executive.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur on the points so well expounded by a most respected colleague, Mr.
Justice Camilo D. Quiason. I should like to highlight a bit, however, that part of
the ponencia dealing on the Countrywide Development Fund or, so commonly
referred to as, the infamous "pork barrel".
I agree that it lies with Congress to determine in an appropriation act the
activities and the projects that are desirable and may thus be funded. Once,
however, such identification and the corresponding appropriation therefore is
done, the legislative act is completed and it ends there. Thereafter, the
Executive is behooved, with exclusive responsibility and authority, to see to it
that the legislative will is properly carried out. I cannot subscribe to another
theory invoked by some quarters that, in so implementing the law, the
Executive does so only by way of delegation. Congress neither may delegate
what it does not have nor may encroach on the powers of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch.
Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not as the individuals that
comprise it, in any action or decision that can bind it, or be said to have been
done by it, under its constitutional authority. Even assuming that overseeing
the laws it enacts continues to be a legislative process, one that I find difficult
to accept, it is Congress itself, not any of its members, that must exercise that
function.
I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the
President and his colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of their
own respective constituents. I see no legal obstacle, however, in their making,
just like anyone else, the proper recommendations to, albeit not necessarily
conclusive on, the President for the purpose. Neither would it be objectionable
for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may
be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of
Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally
impermissible.
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR.
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as
SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented
by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, Petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE
PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former
Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner, 
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY
FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth." 1 Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 3  provides
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions  taken under Rule 65 of the Rules
2
of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due
to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the
system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the
constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English
origin.  Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of
3
rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who
would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their
hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed
master.  This practice was later compared to the actions of American
4
legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their
districts.  While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork
5
barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home
the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents.  In a more
6
technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to
bring money to a representative's district. Some scholars on the subject
7
further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.
8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as
lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature,  although, as will be later discussed, its usage would
9
evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,  or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered  as
10 11
the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the
Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated
therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval.
12
that the sums appropriated for certain public works
projects  "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a
13
joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. "The committee from each House may also
authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made
by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."  Also, in
14
the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that
the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or
of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of
said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of
appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented  that post-enactment
15
legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund
release and realignment to the area of project identification.
During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was
modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects
was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law
carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress,
they ‘being the representatives of the people, either on their
own account or by consultation with local officials or civil
leaders.‘"  During this period, the pork barrel process
16
commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and
individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects.
Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s
allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get
is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The
amount was then integrated into the administration bill
prepared by the Department of Public Works and
Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of
Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it
was signed into law by the President – the Public Works
 Act.  In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly
17
ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of
Representatives and the Senate. 18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently
discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era
when "one man controlled the legislature,"  the reprieve was
19
only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already
introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA)
called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP)
under the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units".
Based on reports,  it was under the SLDP that the practice of
20
giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with
each assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter,
assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to
the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the
said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry
of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks
to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s
locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional Pork
Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only
public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also
"soft projects",  or non-public works projects such as those
21
which would fall under the categories of, among others,
education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the
restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork
Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development
Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were
created with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240
Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in
the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been
documented  that the clamor raised by the Senators and the
23
Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of
the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was
integrated into the 1990 GAA  with an initial funding of ₱2.3
24
Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority
community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,  CDF funds25
were, with the approval of the President, to be released directly
to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of
the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs
from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations
of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the
identification of projects, it has been reported  that by 1992,
26
Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF
funds, while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without
any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any
kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as
roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as
textbooks, medicines, and scholarships. 27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,  the GAA explicitly stated that
28
the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission
of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others,
individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article
included an allocation for the Vice-President.  As such,
29
Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF
funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20
Million.
In 1994,  1995,  and 1996,  the GAAs contained the same
30 31 32
provisions on project identification and fund release as found in
the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports
to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the
funds.33
Under the 1997  CDF Article, Members of Congress and the
34
Vice-President, in consultation with the implementing agency
concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50%
of projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations
which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and
 the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the
Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the
case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months
thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list,
which would be published by the DBM,  "shall be the basis for
35
the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein
shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein
required."
The following year, or in 1998,  the foregoing provisions
36
regarding the required lists and endorsements were
reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was
no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of
CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional
Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork
Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA
(called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to
perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda.  It has been
37
articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the
budgets of executive departments, they were not easily
identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the
lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget
officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM,
purportedly knew about the insertions.  Examples of these CIs
38
are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building
Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works
Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.  The
39
allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be
made upon prior consultation with the representative of the
legislative district concerned.”  Similarly, the legislators had the
40
power to direct how, where and when these appropriations
were to be spent. 41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,  the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by
42
three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security
Program Fund,"  the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program
43
Fund," and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
44
Program Fund,"  all of which contained a special provision
45
requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for
the release of the funds.
It was in the year 2000  that the "Priority Development
46
Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The
requirement of "prior consultation with the respective
Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly
released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly
stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of
funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the
sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal
services and other personnel benefits.  The succeeding PDAF
47
provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment  of 48
the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 2002  PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it
49
merely contained a single special provision ordering the
release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or
local government unit concerned, without further qualifications.
The following year, 2003,  the same single provision was
50
present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express
authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003
budgets of the Department of Public Works and
Highways  (DPWH) and the DepEd  required prior consultation
51 52
with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation
delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004,
the 2003 GAA was re-enacted. 53
In 2005,  the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be
54
used "to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point
agenda of the national government and shall be released
directly to the implementing agencies." It also introduced the
program menu concept,  which is essentially a list of general
55
programs and implementing agencies from which a particular
PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying
authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted  in 2006 and hence,
56
operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program
 menu concept was consistently integrated into the
2007,  2008,  2009,  and 2010  GAAs.
57 58 59 60
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with
respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and
identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the
PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd
School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its
predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the
concerned Member of Congress anent certain aspects of
61
project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which
allowed formal participation of non-governmental organizations
(NGO) in the implementation of government projects were
introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect
to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law,
encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated
that "the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million
allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings
shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for
its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and
proven track records in the construction of public school
buildings x x x."  The same allocation was made available to
62
NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd
Budget.  Also, it was in 2007 that the Government
63
Procurement Policy Board  (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-
64
2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007),
amending the implementing rules and regulations  of RA 65
9184,  the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as
66
a form of negotiated procurement,  the procedure whereby the
67
Procuring Entity (the implementing agency) may enter into a
68
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an
appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be
specifically contracted out to NGOs." 69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF
Articles, the 2011  PDAF Article included an express statement
70
on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and
the Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million
each, broken down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30
Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each
Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million
allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a
provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the
qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same
provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health,
Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local
Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy,
and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with
the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same
implementing unit and same project category as the original
project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has
not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c)
the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned. 71
In the 2012  and 2013  PDAF Articles, it is stated that the
72 73
"identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries
shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by
each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x."
However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator
who would choose and identify the project from the said priority
list.
74
Provisions on legislator allocations  as well as fund
75
realignment  were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF
76
Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was
pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In
addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical
capability to implement the projects.  Legislators were also
77
allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative
district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the
legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the
Speaker of the House.  Finally, any realignment of PDAF
78
funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well
as requests for release of funds, were all required to be
 favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases
and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that
the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the
President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund
under Section 8  of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,  issued by then
80 81
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special
fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous
energy resources vital to economic growth.  Due to the energy-related
82
activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in
Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",  the 83
special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as
Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under
Section 12, Title IV  of PD 1869,  or the Charter of the Philippine
84 85
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was
similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years
after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on
October 31, 1985,  amending Section 12  of the former law. As it
86 87
stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR. 88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased
tremendously,  owing in no small part to previous Presidents who
89
reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional
support.  It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the
90
79
"Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo
Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the
huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets
of legislators in the form of kickbacks."  He said that "the kickbacks
91
were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and
ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each
project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting,
concreting, and construction of school buildings."  "Other sources of
92
kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds intended for
medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail
became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of
August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted
pig."  "The publication of the stories, including those about
93
congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6
Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage." 94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the
nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary
support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress,"
the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10
years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers
and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."  The
96
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet
Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an
entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate
recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money
was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.  Thus, after its
97
investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers
for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other
officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the
of the NGOs set up by Napoles. 98
Funds were transferred.

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the ● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the
results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of
99
absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.
legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years
of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine ● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and
the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various regulations.
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)  by the DBM, the
100

application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the ● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of
appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned- seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156
and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).  The total releases covered by
101
Billion were either found questionable, or submitted
the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole
VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and or in part their utilization of the Funds.
VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during
the audit period.  Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its
102

● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing

Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development
agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the projects
Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local
were not compliant with law.
Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as
follows:
103

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at

least ₱900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
number of legislators significantly exceeded their respective
has gone into a dummy NGO."  According to incumbent CoA
104

allocations.
Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is,
as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report"
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative on the Malampaya Funds. 105

districts of sponsoring members of the Lower House.

● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount
appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots
without these having been turned over to the government.
● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies
without the latter‘s endorsement and without considering their
mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to
implement projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not
undertaken by the implementing agencies themselves but by
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and
the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the
Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in
these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of
the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S.
Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President
and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to
enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever
form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto.  The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
106
208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L.
Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and
Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork
Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013
which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund,  be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
107
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a
TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary
Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent
Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease
any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court
order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a)
"the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and
VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project
or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds,
including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from
the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity
and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."  Also,
108
they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all
presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited
to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR."  The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.
109 110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno
(Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition),
seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President
Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of
Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified
and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the
executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the
Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication
and the National Economic Development Authority.  The Nepomuceno
111
Petition was docketed as UDK-14951. 112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a)
consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on the
consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining
the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons
acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to
Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of
"financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government‖ under the same provision; and (d) setting the
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the
lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and
medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and
that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing
petitioners to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to
the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply
dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et
al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October
2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines
to be observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8,
2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases,
incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was
directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the
DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and completely answer
questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its
implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae
and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter,
the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a
period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties
subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the
following are the main issues for the Court‘s resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an
actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated
petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have
legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez"  (Philconsa) and Decision dated April
114
24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty
v. Secretary of Budget and Management"  (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the
115
issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-
delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability;
(e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,  relating to the
116
Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In
addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the
present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry,  namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy
117
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.  Of
118
these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important and,
119
therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case
or controversy.  This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
120
Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an
actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.  In other
121
words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."  Related to the
122
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness,"
meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for
adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of
the challenged action."  "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional
123
issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions." 124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and
justiciable controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the
antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel
System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their
utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund
– are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these
public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related
thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by
respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits.  Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘
125
proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor
diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared
towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a
distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the
President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the
issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government
has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either
by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through
a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following
exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and
the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments: 126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the
law,  correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
127
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General
Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case,
for example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws but in
the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure
that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your
Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the
project, he has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate,
and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative
Code  x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President
128
believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the
specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the reported
irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of
the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was
just exercising precisely the duty ….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are
anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But,
does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases.
Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional,
correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF.
(Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates
that "the moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide
cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of
petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with
respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of
legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of
the interests involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of
public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly
presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount
public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when
the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the
coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers,
and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the
reported abuses of the PDAF"  demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse
130
which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding
that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made
by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,  a recent case wherein the Court upheld
131
the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was
emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious
in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the
people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA,
not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when
the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning
its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and
justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the
CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the
practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As
disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that
thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection
with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice
Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these
would eventually find their way to the courts.  Accordingly, there is a
132
compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised
herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the
expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more
importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should
be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition
that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional
imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.  The relevance of the issues
133
before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for
2014."  The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations
134
throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘
claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."  In
135
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,  the government had already backtracked
136
on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but
evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re-
emerging."  The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the
137
myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent,
if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and
hence, must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government."  Essentially, the foregoing
138
limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the
classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, applies when there is found, among
139
others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast
against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the
best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in
response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the
Court not to impose a solution at this stage." 140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political
but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question
refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure."  The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork
141
Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system
along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary
the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer:
"The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,  the expanded
142
concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the
political question doctrine was explained as follows: 143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this
court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the
judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed
against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts
are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not
just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or
the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution."  To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the
144
reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by
constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it
is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not
arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but,
in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional
grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great branch
of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a
holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons,
the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is
injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute
or ordinance, he has no standing." 145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as
citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the
coffers of the National Treasury."  Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the
146
requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System"
under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is
undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law,  as in these cases.
147
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing
requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as
matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
or of paramount public interest."  The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the
148
Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems
failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"  amplifies, in addition to the
149
matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein.
Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute.  All told, petitioners have sufficient locus
150
standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta
et movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past precedents and
do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles
which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to
subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of
these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a
judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second
actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.  This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since
151
Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against
the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for
a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality –
and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to
present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct
releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them
according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to
demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such,
the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to
every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the
standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons,
the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are
concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The
principle, entrenched under Article 8  of the Civil Code, evokes the general
152
rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same,
even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.
153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork
Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To
properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power
given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and
activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on
executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation
of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not
involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only
function given to the Congress by the Constitution."  In deference to the
154
foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one,
under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse,"
belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power
to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it
can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the
proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a
limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the
propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with
each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as
(b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular
CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project
identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may
be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a
wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled
with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against
a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of
the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress
to propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority
is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been constitutionally
lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen.
If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power
of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then
it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not
its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the
prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised
after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied
in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely
recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums
up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for
Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be
minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress
in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the
Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter,
among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous
ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification
authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies
which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is
"imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the
recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (Abakada) has effectively
155
overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in
view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies
and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section
of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a
procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In
fine, stare decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it
must first define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel,"
and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the
Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum
public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine
its distribution as political largesse."  They assert that the following elements
156
make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the
appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and
broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the
guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either
vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit
a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the
political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage
benefits.  They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two
157
(2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative)
Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF;  and, second, the Presidential (or
158
Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and
the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993. 159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and
legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body
of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through
the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2)
kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind
of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or
collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain
aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures
and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears
under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a
post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective
power;  and
160
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind
of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the
manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,  the Court shall delimit the
161
use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the
substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation
of the three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of
Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,  it means that the
162
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government."  To the legislative branch of government, through
163
Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
164
government, through the President,  belongs the power to enforce laws; and
165
to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,  belongs the power to
166
interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional
design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere."  Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe
167
the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the
judiciary has no power to make or execute the law."  The principle of
168
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem
from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped,
would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches
or the citizenry.  To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded
169
by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent
action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would
result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-
interest assertions of another or others. 170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle
when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another.
US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers
may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere
impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned
function";  and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch
171
assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."  In other
172
words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a)
interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to
the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague  (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget
173
execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and
accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related
activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle.  This is rooted in the
174
principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.  Thus, unless the
175
Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively
exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the
national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation
law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any
of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national
budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the
Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the
picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President.
Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by
the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury
except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and
passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end
and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget
begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the
Executive." 176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada
where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."  It must be clarified,
177
however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its
oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must
be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing
legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis
and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of
executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada: 178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny
and investigation.  In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to
1âwphi1
the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and
the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant
to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among
others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities
between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators
to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the
GAA is passed."  They state that the findings and recommendations in the
179
CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of
legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers."  Further, they point out that
180
the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition
that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if
they actually dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has
not been violated since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control
the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the
legislators‘ proposals.  They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the
182
constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify
projects so long as such proposal and identification are recommendatory."  As 183
such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF
Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in
the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,  prior consultations  or
185 186
program menus  – have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority
187
to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional
Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of
legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of
Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision
4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature
which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to
identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general
program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that
the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed,
submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared
and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make
his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF
projects outside his district for as long as the representative of the district
concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that
PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators"  and
188
thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects
identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4
requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing special
provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded
post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been
accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators
to participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is
contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for
release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under
Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be";
while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is
184
contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4  which explicitly state s,
189
among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which
authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways,
Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry  x x x to approve
190

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project
realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received
by the individual legislator?
from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of xxxx
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done
aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for and then there is no identification.
individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the
separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically xxxx
articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law was implemented without the identification by the individual legislator?
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.  That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory
191
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I
in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to have no specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to
repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the
Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.
which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the
same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the
same falters altogether. xxxx

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to
substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only
of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the
statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted
that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement
before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process: 192
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we
were replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able to
get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that
sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the
PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in
that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to
project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized? wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of
the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto,
informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the
proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and
have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been
substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2)
Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had
seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive
nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how
they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been
using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also
been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In
fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one
section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense,
we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether
through formal measures written into the law or informal practices
institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be
deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,  legislative power shall be
194
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the
same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.  Based
195
on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body,
and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may
constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies
the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized
exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local
governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely
local matters;  and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority
196
of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix
197
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government. 198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a
restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the
limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual
operation (contingent rule-making). The conceptual treatment and limitations
199
of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v. Maceren  as 200
follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of
the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation
of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation"
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as
it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators,
violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled
in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.  That the power to appropriate must be
201
exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To
understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor  (Bengzon), held that the power of
202
appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which
they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2)
acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however,
allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power,
the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification
feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept
separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. 203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the
President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff
bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President,
wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as
specified under the Constitution.  As stated in Abakada, the final step in the
204
law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval.
Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication." 205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check
on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that: 206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make
the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval
of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The
questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same
as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be
a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of
the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive
department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he
may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must
find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not
be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise
interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor
of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases
supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy
goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,  impose fiscal restrictions on
207
the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary
process.  In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US
208
Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check
upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the
effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good,
which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it
is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the
passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design." 209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that
there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as
defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details,
the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case
of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,  the US Supreme
210
Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a
specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which
happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that
the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain
"specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which
provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an
item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a
specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as
a "line-item."  This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its
211
definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the
President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation,
the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being
appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would
then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to
item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly
apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that
each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose
for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as
Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have
several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice
considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating
expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently
specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special
purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the
constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on
singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it
must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires
that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the
National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for
public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which
merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of
funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual
purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple
purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-
item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would
then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if
he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire
appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it
may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability
issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to
determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual
purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the
integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would,
in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of
non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the
PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects
after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item
later on."  Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President
212
mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that
"Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless." 213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution
envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing
economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially
address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They
argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum
appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded. 214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations
and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based
on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without
veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly
point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between
(a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.
215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the
2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then
operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized.
In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a
mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e.,
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of
historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup
connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of
the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of
item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has,
as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant
data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization
of said Funds."  Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line
216
budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per
implementing agency." 217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF
Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to
be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree
of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat
what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the
matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends. 218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders
Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point
out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial
interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them
"from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."  They also claim that
219
the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-
perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the
power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well,
accelerate the decisions of senators.‘"220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder
that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions
only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the
parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability,  hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are
221
designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure
of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. As
mentioned in Abakada,  congressional oversight may be performed either
222
through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and
the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;  or (b)
223
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has
an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are
given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it
difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,
who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that
this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment
authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would
allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork
Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the
use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed
based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational
proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the
former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment,
this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly
concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an
improper subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight
and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public
accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians
who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate
themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution  which states that:
225
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not
self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this
respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or
executive action.  Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which
226
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must
defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be
largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork
Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article
II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as
follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,  otherwise known as the "Local
227
Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had
been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be
given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local
government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and
offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government
units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy
of the State to empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and
ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national
economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v.
Intermediate Appellate Court: 228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the
Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the
needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political
subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson,
"Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one
derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their
inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with
a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body
politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national
government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and
inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not
only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the
Constitution.  (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
229
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel
goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows
district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments
in utilizing public funds for local development.  The Court agrees with
230
petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal"
and that "it is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more
than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority
to be given each project."  Drawing strength from this pronouncement,
231
previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small
projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and
link the national development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well
as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.  Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on
232
the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned
that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal,
which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that
the LGU concerned cannot afford. 233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent
defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making
equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF
and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators
have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a
highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some
years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are
anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make
equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal
funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the
sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction."  Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are
234
essentially geared towards managing local affairs,  their programs, policies
235
and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except
only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused
by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by
petitioners in the following wise:
236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council
and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution.
Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination
efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local
matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article
as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed
unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now
turns to the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869
(now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release
of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of
PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of
PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof
only created a Special Fund incidental thereto.  In similar regard, petitioners
237
argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the
allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary
and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise
and Powers of PAGCOR.  In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that
238
such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart
a determinate or determinable  amount of money and (b) allocates the same
240
for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount
and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which
means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and
hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to
appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an
appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be
gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.: 241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law,"
such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as
well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the
present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well
as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in
annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of
laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for
specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation
measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears
from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272),
whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund
applicable to the designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in
the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public
funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the
purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the
appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for
a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a
particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes
apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an
"appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including
receipts from service contracts and agreements such as application and
processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all
money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations,
fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the
government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service
contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and
exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used
to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent
as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the
aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and
shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
242
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then
be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund
comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development
Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%)
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also
a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be
properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional
provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment
measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.
These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for
enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is
passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real
appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion
allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations
made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of
the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an
"appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes
individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle
as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President
"unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be
used."  Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle
243
of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer
only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government." 244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular
public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation
law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates
rule-making authority to the Executive  either for the purpose of (a) filling up
245
the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-
making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred
to as contingent rule-making.  There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure
246
that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate.
The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the
"sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.  To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
247
delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented. 248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only
to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to –
things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned,  is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource
249
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states
a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory
reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for such other
purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government;  and, 250
third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for
non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting
respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government."  Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the
251
completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible
from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless
be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be
underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government," remains legally effective and
subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned
phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it
should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of
PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus
moots the parties‘ submissions on the same.  Nevertheless, since the
252
amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current parameters
of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds
that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes
which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him
carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he
may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of
"priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President
without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a
project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its
lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system,
especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges,
sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as economic
and residential development."  In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority
253
infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional
since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it
lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System
unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context of its pronouncements
made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary
and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP
from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or
activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"
(PDAF Use Schedule/List);  and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum,
254
discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds
and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x
x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto"  (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded
255
on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is
to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission: 256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose
the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot
be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot
be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being
discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a
proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the
public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus
in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the
ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.  (Valmonte), it has been
257
clarified that the right to information does not include the right to compel the
preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it
was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty
of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The
pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted: 258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto,
are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act
must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November
29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27,
1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty
on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature
of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a
"a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and
Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or
administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to
furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said
information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA
has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition
before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any
official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the
Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public
concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are
properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests
of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer on this score,
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA,
may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘
plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny
them, or the general public, access to official documents which are already
existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any
valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be
proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for
mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein,
it nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter,
subject, however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.: 259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may
promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that
damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with
the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right
of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383,
387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done
by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by
petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure
clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum,
discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the
Executive‘s Social Funds." 260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a
matter which is generally left to the prerogative of the political branches of
government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their
prayer on this score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the
DBM to the concept of released funds. In response to the Court‘s September
10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for
the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September
27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a
Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and
such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the
issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements
thereto effected by the agencies concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued
implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first,
covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the
implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of
the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as
release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation
[(NCA)]."  As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated
261
SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers
"unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO has
been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF
funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because
they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a
reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM. 262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the
present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared
herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into
a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of
the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently
enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must,
nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution of the
current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or
not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is
promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM
Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental
reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released"
under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its
website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations
not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose
indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to
compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval
or clearance by competent authority." 263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the
existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the
SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds
beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be
withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of
funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the
issuance of the NCA,  which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As
264
may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the
Oral Arguments: 265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the
SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the
agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is
already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the
amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor,
is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks
to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects covered by
the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances
that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as
funds which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement
of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without
any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s
promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of
the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be
disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing
of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya
Funds which have been obligated but not released – meaning, those merely
covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and
(b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12
of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the
Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the
general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their
corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b)
all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of
the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative
or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to
obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As
explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San
Roque Power Corporation,  the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that
266
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final
say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of
time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that
may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality
of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication."  "In the language of an American Supreme Court
267
decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the
chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the
Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators
to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital
areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation
of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are
able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly
violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has
created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and,
in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has
diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a
stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they
may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired
public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national
officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ;
and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate
funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he
may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of
"priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed
the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious
unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out
should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or
form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting
as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally
endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look
forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time
of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes
that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor
bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the
Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray
from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the
constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares
as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the
previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions,
which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized
into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various
post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the
areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification,
fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional
oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to
legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect,
which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the
sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is
hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the
remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous
years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this
Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but
only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not,
are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent
injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be
utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation,
the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive
Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to
provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or
detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of
these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of
public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited
but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid
statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper
mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to
pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds
subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same
is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government
to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly
prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible
criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful
disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
See Concurring Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
See Concurring Opinion NO PART
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
I concur and also join the I join the Opinion of Justice
concurring opinion of Justice Carpio, subject to my Concurring
 constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
Carpio. executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
& Dissenting Opinion.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
Associate Justice
Associate Justice every statute and contract. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the
subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative
Associate Justice Associate Justice of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate
I join the concurring opinion of J. the Constitution lose their reason for being.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO A.T. Carpio of the ponencia
3. ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED SELF-EXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING.
Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD — In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than
Associate Justice non-self-executing . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
Associate Justice Associate Justice provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES implementing statute. (Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10)
Associate Justice Associate Justice
4. ID.; ID.; SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS; LEGISLATURE NOT PRECLUDED FROM
ENACTING LAWS ENFORCING PROVISIONS. — Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second
See Concurring Opinion par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not
Associate Justice precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long
as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left
to the legislature without the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. The
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997.] omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a
right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, Petitioner, v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, Respondents. harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make
it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
SYLLABUS
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PROVISION MAY BE SELF-EXECUTING IN ONE PART AND NON-
SELF-EXECUTING IN ANOTHER. — Respondents also argue that the non-self-
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DEFINED. — A constitution is a system of executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and
different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in
administered. the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-
2. ID.; ID.; DEEMED WRITTEN IN EVERY STATUTE AND CONTRACT. — Under the executing in another.
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
6. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION ON PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS, SELF-EXECUTING. — Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there
is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES THE NATIONAL, RESOURCES AND CULTURAL, HERITAGE.
— When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, EMBRACED THEREIN; FILIPINO
FIRST POLICY PROVISION, APPLICABLE IN SALES OF HOTEL STOCKS. — For more
than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
9. ID.; STATE; SALE BY THE GSIS OF 51% OF ITS SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL CORP.,
A STATE ACTION, SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND. — In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered
"state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a"
public function", (2) when the government is so-significantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and. (3) when
the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
10. ID.; CONSTITUTION; WHEN THE CONSTITUTION ADDRESSES THE STATE, IT
REFERS TO BOTH PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT. — When the Constitution addresses
the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of
the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power —
legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to
the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among
others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
11. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; SALE
OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION BY THE GSIS; FILIPINOS ALLOWED
TO MATCH THE BID OF FOREIGN ENTITY. — In the instant case, where a foreign firm
submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to
match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this
may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
12. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FOREIGN BIDDERS WITHOUT CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST GSIS BEFORE ACCEPTANCE OF BID. — The argument of respondents that
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since
petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the
bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the
qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the
case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding
because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid
offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to
compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched
the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of
petitioner’s matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
13. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, CERTIORARI; FAILURE OF THE GSIS TO EXECUTE
CORRESPONDING DOCUMENTS WHERE PETITIONER HAD MATCHED THE BID PRICE
BY FOREIGN BIDDER, A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Since petitioner has
already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block
of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect
the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
14. ID.; SUPREME COURT; DUTY BOUND TO MAKE SURE THAT CONTRACTS DO NOT
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAWS. — While it is no business of the Court
to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of
whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they
do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never
shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.
Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a
free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to
draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.
PADILLA, J., concurring opinion: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION, CONSTRUED. — A
study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" originated,
would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive
expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept
embracing not only the natural resources of the country but practically everything
that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as well as the
intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted
that the framers did not stop with conservation. They knew that conservation alone
does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved only through development as
a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but also
the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony. Moreover, the concept of national
patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural resources but
also to the cultural heritage of our race. There is no doubt in my mind that the
Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such deserves
constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This
institution has played an important role in our nation’s history, having been the
venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the
Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and
others.
2. ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL, PART OF OUR NATIONAL PATRIMONY. — There is no
doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony
and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit
from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation’s
history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and
as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state,
dignitaries. celebrities, and others.
3. ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; APPLIED TO SALES OF SHARE
OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL. — "Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be
meaningful, must refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or
tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the existing order." In the field
of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national patrimony,
preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the
higher bid of a non-Filipino, the preference shall not operate only when the bids of
the qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should
undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should
give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-
Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at
all. While government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their
thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors
to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us
Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved.
In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves
creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels.
This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel
Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the
Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and
cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., separate opinion: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION GIVING
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, SELF-EXECUTORY. — The provision in our
fundamental law which provides that" (i)n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos" is self-executory. The provision verily does not
need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set
of rules.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PATRIMONY INCLUDES CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE COUNTRY;
MANILA HOTEL, EMBRACED THEREIN. — The term "patrimony" does not merely refer
to the country’s natural resources but also to its cultural heritage. A "historical
landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now
indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM; SALE OF
ITS SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, AN ACT OF THE STATE;
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE COMPLIED WITH. — The act of the
Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which derives
its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered
an act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.
4. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; DOES NOT REFER TO ALLOWING QUALIFIED FILIPINOS TO
MATCH FOREIGN BID. — On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to
qualified Filipinos" I find it somewhat difficult to take the same path traversed by the
forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before us, the only
meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to
match the foreign bid for, as a practical matter, I cannot see any bid that literally
calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The
magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the competing bids
to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the
right of preference.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; FILIPINO BIDDERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO EQUAL BID OF
FOREIGN FIRM IN SALE OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION. — I take the
view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the
constitutional mandate that" [i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"
is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm
Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila
Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino or Philippine
corporation can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or
concession given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national or corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System,
if petitioner and the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority
[would be given] to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC," so that
if petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian corporation
for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only
in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that
preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it
winner but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in terms of price per share"
before it is awarded the shares of stocks. That, to me, is what "preference to
qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos
whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION; MANILA HOTEL,
EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF; SALE OF ITS STOCKS SHOULD BE
LIMITED TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. — Section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution
pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain — "The State
shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy, effectively controlled
by Filipinos." (Sec. 19), Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified
Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the 1987 Constitution Commission
proceedings. The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history
and spirit of the Malolos Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973
Constitution. I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are
not legislated and is the product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is
actually a product of growth and acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is
the spirit and soul of a people. The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and
heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to historic events (too numerous
to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years. The history of the Manila
Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction,
where profit subverts the cherished historical values of our people. The Filipino
should be first under his Constitution and in his own land.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; AS A RULE PROVISIONS THEREOF ARE SELF-
EXECUTING. — A Constitution provides the guiding policies and principles upon which
is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government. As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced
without further legislative action. Some of its provisions, however, can be
implemented only through appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not
self-executing. Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-
executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The
reason is not difficult to discern For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily
ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding
rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional
inaction should not suffocate them.
2. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTING WHERE IT MERELY
ANNOUNCES A POLICY AND EMPOWERS THE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT LAWS TO
CARRY THE POLICY INTO EFFECT. — Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a
constitutional provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy and
its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy
shall be carried into effect.
3. ID.; ID.; FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12 NOT SELF-EXECUTING.
— The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the
country to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per cent of whose capital stock is
owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws that will encourage
the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In
checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to give preference
to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the national
economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate
foreign investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities. The first
paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a
categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in
certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and
operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises.
4. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS UNDER
PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12, SELF-EXECUTING. — The
second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the
State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our
government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy
and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not
merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as
granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving
preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our
national economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the
State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its
implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional
and it is now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus
self-executing.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, PART OF THE NATIONAL
PATRIMONY. — The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of
the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national
patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that the
Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to
Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but
also to the cultural heritage of our race. By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel
falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment
to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony.
6. ID.; STATE; GSIS, EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF. — The third issue
is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A
look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled
corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of
government employees and the government. The funds are held in trust for a distinct
purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. They are to be used to finance the
retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the
administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS. Excess funds, however, are
allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the
employees. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public
corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public
purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission and the
Commission on Audit. As a state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound
to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution especially those designed to
promote the general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First
policy which the people elevated as a constitutional command.
7. ID.; CONSTITUTION; PROVISIONS THEREOF DEEMED INCLUDED IN ALL
LEGISLATIONS AND ALL STATE ACTIONS. — The constitutional command to enforce
the Filipino First policy is addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence,
the word "laws" should not be understood as limited to legislations but all state
actions which include applicable rules and regulations adopted by agencies and
instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-making power.
8. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; STATE
NOT PROHIBITED FROM GRANTING RIGHTS TO FOREIGN FIRM IN THE ABSENCE OF
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. — In the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not
prohibited from granting these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the
act will promote the weal of the nation.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The right of preference of petitioner arises
only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, and
petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder, should be preferred. It is with deep regret
that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. Petitioner’s submission must be supported by the rules but even if
we examine the rules inside-out a thousand times, they can not justify the claimed
right. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any
reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded the block of shares . . ." No reason
has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It deserves the award as a
matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified
Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not
grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our sympathies may be with petitioner but the
court has no power to extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as
defined by the rules. We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we
differ with the wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we
must uphold the grant for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only
when a State action amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in and
strike down the denial as unconstitutional.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; PARTY ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
WINNING BID OF FOREIGN FIRM FROM BEING AWARE OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF THE BIDDINGS IT AGREED TO RESPECT. — I submit that
petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner
was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and
regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid
after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that
foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to
repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules
when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners’ stance will
wreak havoc on the essence of bidding.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate dissenting opinion: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION; PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; LOSING FILIPINO NOT GIVEN RIGHT TO EQUAL THE
HIGHEST FOREIGN BID. — The majority contends the Constitution should be
interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino
bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win.
However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of
rights . . . covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no law defining
the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing
Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the
absence of such empowering law, the majority’s strained interpretation, I
respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes
bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win.
Only in the Philippines! Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial
legislation is short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term
Filipino interests. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the
"Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the constitutional preference for the
"qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids are equal. In this manner,
we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without being unfair to
the foreigner. In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino
only when the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner
clearly posted the highest score.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, 1 is invoked by petitioner in its bid to
acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the
historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily,
they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony
covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning
bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise
and/or an international marketing/ reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October
23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other
type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel . . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/
OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained." 3 
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner
and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent
GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
manager’s check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs.
Renong Berhad . . . . 5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner
came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it
was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments
with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as
amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy
of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power
and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and
purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business
of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the
tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any
transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the
term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies. 7 
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian
firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders
that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 8 
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s). . . . Thus, for the said
provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under
which business may be done." 9 
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall
under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in
its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second
paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while
petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have
transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel
fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State. chanrobles
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land
upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares
of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it
right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1, of the bidding rules which
provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the
privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if
for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the
submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could
still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the
exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail
since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical
manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no
clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty
to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance
and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. 11 Under
the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles.
Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of
the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. 13 
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of
laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into
one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it
has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give
the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. 15 
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986
Constitutional Commission —
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to "QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis
Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos
as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the
word "QUALIFIED?" 
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens?  and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
"QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital,
qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (Emphasis
supplied by respondents).
MR RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes. 16  judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without the self-executing
nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation
to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a
penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is
not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is
that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par.,
of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the
first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in
the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can
only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order
to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision
may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19  Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930’s. It was the site of
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are
merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing
enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21
the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building, 23 the
promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance 26 refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27
and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the
promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the
youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not
very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which
legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding
the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by
its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
34 explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only
to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also
refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop
not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental
ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to
the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it
immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and
official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36 
MR. DAVIDE.
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart
and Memory of a City. 37 During World War II the hotel was converted by the The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a
Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together
with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950’s MR. MONSOD.
and 1960’s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost
every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped At least 60 percent, Madam President.
numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and
ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d’etat where an aspirant for MR. DAVIDE.
vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.
Is that the intention?
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with MR MONSOD.
public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the only be 100-percent Filipino.
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and MR. DAVIDE.
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer only to
cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38  MR. MONSOD.

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our We agree, Madam President. 39 
Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos.
This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission — x           x           x

THE PRESIDENT.
MR. RODRIGO.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. DAVIDE.
MR. NOLLEDO.
I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the
amendment would consist in substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
following: "CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here,
CITIZENS." cralaw virtua1aw library
as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also
Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40 
x          x          x
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. MONSOD. MR. FOZ.

Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his
question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it amendment so that I can ask a question.
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO.
"IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." cralaw virtua1aw library
MR. FOZ.
In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO.
Obviously.
MR. FOZ.
If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the
Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO.
The answer is "yes." cralaw virtua1aw library
MR. FOZ.
Thank you. 41  Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo
continues —
MR NOLLEDO.
Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." This embodies the so-called "Filipino
First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of
concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42  This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding
the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —
"Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic
concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy. . . . This provision was
never found in previous Constitutions. . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of
credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering
and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent
or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive
and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to
be made between a "qualified foreigner" and a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be
chosen over the former." cralaw virtua1aw library
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by
respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by
respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference
here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management
expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel
company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully
operate the Manila Hotel. 44 
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that
the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is
quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision — by the
government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to
renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the
provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have
juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot
simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further
enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its
own understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the
sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress,
or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by
a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates. 45 
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State,
not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality.
MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through
respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct
from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1)
when the activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so-
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action."
Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS,
is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command. 46 

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to
the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three
(3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three
(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet
the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall
only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet,
nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the
1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the
bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by
respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts
must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the
Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 47 Certainly, the
constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even
the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage
foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to
be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must
consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore
desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a
foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and
foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale
only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid
tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already
preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate,
petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not
have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier
bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent
disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner’s matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless
perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group
is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences
to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus
we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so
than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to
award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian
firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the
1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but
primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian
of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of
upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth
emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much
less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages
and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference
for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position
of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by
Chief Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility
of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism
for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court’s First Division against
the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements
were published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction "again demonstrates
that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here."
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether
they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not
violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that
duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48  51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and
preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take
precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will
always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all,
there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond
judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49  Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and
republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all
government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the
people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept.
Protection of foreign investments, while laudable, is merely a policy. It cannot
override the demands of nationalism. 50  I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to
be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking
about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a
historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history
of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states
would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the
dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the
Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has
become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur; a
most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia
— to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the
Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in
whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation’s soul for some pieces of
foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from
a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel — and all that it
stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the
nation’s cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how
much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in
the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and
simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution.
cralaw virtua1aw library And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the
sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00
per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED
concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
expound a bit more on the concept of national patrimony as including within its
scope and meaning institutions such as the Manila Hotel.
It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony"
over which qualified Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The
Constitutional provision on point states: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x       x       x
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." 1 
Petitioner’s argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national
patrimony" consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in
our territory (Article 1) consisting of land, sea, and air. 2 A study of the 1935
Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" originated, would show that
its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive expression "Patrimony of
the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only the
natural resources of the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino
people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual
assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop
with conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and
that this may be achieved only through development as a correlative factor to assure
to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of
their national patrimony. 3 
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to
our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. 4  I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr.
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our
national patrimony and, as such deserves constitutional protection as to who shall
own it and benefit from its operation. This institution has played an important role in
our nation’s history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving
as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of
state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. 5  enabling law or a set of rules.
It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos.
As President Manuel L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of
our country, but we should do so with an eye to the welfare of the future
generations. In other words, the leaders of today are the trustees of the patrimony
of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos was the
intent of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in
debating the need for nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one
expounded that we should "put more teeth into our laws, and; not make the
nationalization of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary legislation but
of constitutional enactment." 6 To quote further: "Let not our children be mere
tenants and trespassers in their own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them
what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens and encumbrances." 7  Justice Puno. In the particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it
Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be
meaningful, must refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or
tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the existing order." In the field
of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national patrimony,
preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the
higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of
the qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should
undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should
give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-
Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at
all.
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign
investments in our country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade
and investment in the country. While government agencies, including the courts
should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and even
attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude
ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity,
culture and heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign
investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the
Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels This should not stop us from retaining
51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos.
This would be in keeping with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our
national patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of
Filipinos.
VITUG, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Justice Reynato S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that" (i)n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" 1 is self-executory. The provision
verily does not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an
Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country’s natural
resources but also to its cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words
of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of
Philippine heritage.
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government
entity which derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC
should be considered an act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.
On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it
somewhat difficult to take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of
seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as
a practical matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be
at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the bids is such that it
becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone,
under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.
It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great
disappointment, a letdown that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of
the proper rules of bidding along with the peculiar constitutional implications of the
proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at times is seen to,
instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequacies which create the perception that
it even takes on non-justiciable controversies. chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the Petition.
MENDOZA, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce
the constitutional mandate that" [i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"
1 is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm
Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila
Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino or Philippine
corporation can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or
concession given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national or corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System,
if petitioner and the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority
[would be given] to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC," 2 so
that if petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian
corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation.
Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is
the highest bidder, that preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is
mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks. 3 That, to me, is
what "preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by
favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 4 to a 1947 statute giving
"preference to Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls." 5 This Court
upheld the cancellation of existing leases covering market stalls occupied by persons
who were not Filipinos and the award thereafter of the stalls to qualified Filipino
vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado v.
De la Fuente, 6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed
pursuant to the statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market
stalls and granting preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licenses for
the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo, 7 the preference granted
under the statute was held to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the
same stalls occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even if there were
available other stalls as good as those occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is
applicable whenever there is a conflict of interest between Filipino applicants and
aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the right to preference
immediately arises." 8  volume of logic."cralaw virtua1aw library
Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began
only in the 1970s in America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative
action and reverse discrimination programs designed to remedy past discrimination
against colored people in such areas as employment, contracting and licensing. 9
Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy, there are situations in which the only
way to place Filipinos in control of the national economy as contemplated in the
Constitution 10 is to give them preferential treatment where they can at least stand
on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign
retaliation or deprive the country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We
are dealing here not with common trades or common means of livelihood which are
open to aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of government property, which is
like the grant of government largess or benefits. In the words of Art. XII, sec. 10, we
are dealing here with "rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment
to our citizens. That at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila
Hotel is a business owned by the Government. It is being privatized. Privatization
should result in the relinquishment of the business in favor of private individuals and
groups who are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.
Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we
would be trading competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the
Malaysian firm are qualified, having hurdled the pre-qualification process. 12 It is
only the result of the public bidding that is sought to be modified by enabling
petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.
Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to
match the highest bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all the Filipino
entity would then do would be not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after
it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest bid, make an offer
matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on public
bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is minimum bid required (P36.67 per
share for a range of 9 to 15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be
considered. On the other hand, if the Filipino entity, after passing the pre-
qualification process, does not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to match the
highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who
have "validly submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has
no basis in fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
TORRES, JR., J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are
confronted in the case at bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am
driven so to speak on the side of history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that
in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of history is worth a
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a
historical and cultural aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus,
forming part of the "patrimony of the nation." cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides : chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x           x           x
"In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national goals and priorities." cralaw virtua1aw library
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same
Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain
— The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of
"The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy, effectively
controlled by Filipinos." (Sec. 19).
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the
highlights in the 1987 Constitution Commission proceedings, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MR. NOLLEDO.
The Amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here,
as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also
Filipino-controlled entities fully controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III, Records of the
Constitutional, p. 608)
MR. MONSOD.
We also wanted to add, as Commissioner Villegas said, this committee and this body
already approved what is known as the Filipino First policy which was suggested by
Commissioner de Castro. So that it is now in our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 225).
Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:
"MR. NOLLEDO.
In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
MR. FOZ.
In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and the
Filipinos enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise shall be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO.
Obviously.
MR. FOZ.
If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the
Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO.
The answer is "yes" (Vol. III p. 616, Records of the Constitutional Commission).
the Malolos Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions.
That we have not reneged on this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the
earliest cases, this Court said —
"The ‘nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. . .
. It cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit
underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or
unconstitutional (Ichong, Et. Al. v. Hernandez, Et Al., 101 Phil. 1155)." cralaw virtua1aw library
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated
and is the product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product
of growth and acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of
a people.
The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila
Hotel is witness to historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our
history for almost 84 years.
As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single
instances of the legal largesse which have given rise to the controversy, as I believe
that has been exhaustively discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point
that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a
purely business transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical values of
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph our people.
As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition
which, in the words of philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga, (tradition) is "more of a
river than a stone, it keeps flowing, and one must view the flow in both directions. If
you look towards the hill from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of
forceful currents that push the river or people towards the future; if you look the
other way, you progress." cralaw virtua1aw library
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of
tradition. Let us not jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our
colonial history.
I grant, of course, that men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who
suspects that he makes mistakes." On this note, I say that if I have to make a
mistake, I would rather err upholding the belief that the Filipino is first under his
Constitution and in his own land.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
PUNO, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a domestic corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) from selling the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to qualifications: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the second paragraph of section
10, Article XII of the Constitution. a. Proven management expertise in the hotel industry; or

Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole
owner of the Manila Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel
Corporation. Manila Hotel was included in the privatization program of the
government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buyers 30% to 51% of its
shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel
Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares
offered for sale was increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning
bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner" of the GSIS was required to "provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel."
1 The proposal was approved by respondent Committee on Privatization.
b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board representation) in another hotel company;
or
c. Overall management and marketing expertise to successfully operate the Manila
Hotel.
Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide access to the
requisite management expertise and/or international marketing/reservation system
for The Manila Hotel.
x           x           x

In July 1995, a conference was held where pre-qualification documents and the
bidding rules were furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
domestic corporation, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as
operator, pre-qualified. 2  x           x           x

The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Pre-
qualification and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE

"I. INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS 1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:
The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration Office between
9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in Section III.
Each set of documents consists of the following:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC
First — Pass the prequalification process; Privatization

Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares; b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila Hotel Corporation

Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later c. Letter of Invitation to the Prequalification and Bidding Conference
than October 23, 1995.
x           x           x
x          x          x

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

IV. GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION
A. PARTIES WHO MAY APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION
The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing reservation, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the
GSIS is inviting to the prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation,
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of the following
A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The Manila Hotel on the date
specified in Section III to allow the Applicant to seek clarifications and further
information regarding the guidelines and procedures. Only those who purchased the
prequalification documents will be allowed in this conference. Attendance to this
conference is strongly advised, although the Applicant will not be penalized if it does
not attend.
5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

The Applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification documents (1 original set
plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working
days within the period specified in Section III.
F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with the assistance of the TEC based
on the Information Package and other information available to the PBAC.
2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the evaluation will consider the
overall qualifications of the group, taking into account the contribution of each
member to the venture
3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the results of the PBAC evaluation will be
final.
4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the criteria set forth below: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. Business management expertise, track record, and experience
b. Financial capability
c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic plan for the Manila Hotel
5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may deem appropriate.
6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding — ITT Sheraton,
Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels International Inc., consortium of RCBC
Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in the Public Bidding without having to
undergo the prequalification process again.
G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will
be posted at the Registration Office at the date specified in Section III.
2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by a member whose
qualification was a material consideration for being included in the shortlist is a
ground for disqualification of the Applicant.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING
A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING
All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to participate in the
Public Bidding.
B. BLOCK OF SHARES
A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hundred Thousand
(15,300,000) shares of stock, representing Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent
(30%-51%) of the issued and outstanding shares of MHC, will be offered in the
Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qualified Bidders will have the option of determining
the number of shares within the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract
bidders with different preferences and objectives for the operation and management
of The Manila Hotel.
C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS
1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum bid required on a
price per share basis for the Block of Shares is Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven
Centavos (P36.67).
2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.
3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the minimum required
will not considered.
D. TRANSFER COSTS
x           x           x
E. OFFICIAL BID FORM
1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a copy of which is
attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be properly accomplished in all
details; improper accomplishment may be a sufficient basis for disqualification.
2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the Official Bid Form,
which will indicate the offered purchase price, in a sealed envelope marked
"OFFICIAL BID." cralaw virtua1aw library
F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be submitted along with
the bid in a separate envelop marked "SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS" : chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH)
If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the Qualified Bidder
should submit a Board resolution which adequately authorizes such representative to
bid for and in behalf of the corporation with full authority to perform such acts
necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each member of the
Consortium/Joint Venture should submit a Board resolution authorizing one of its
members and such member’s representative to make the bid on behalf of the group
with full authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified
Bidder.
2. BID SECURITY
a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos (P33,000.00), in
Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form of: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
i. Manager’s check or unconditional demand draft payable to the "Government
Service Insurance System" and issued by a reputable banking institution duly
licensed to do business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or
ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable banking institution acceptable to
the GSIS.
b. The GSIS will reject a bid if : chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
i. The bid does not have a Bid Security; or
ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less than the required amount
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager’s check or unconditional demand
draft, the interest earned on the Bid Security will be for the account of GSIS.
d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner, the Bid
Security will be applied as the downpayment on the Qualified Bidder’s offered
purchase price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned immediately after the
Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not declared the Highest Bidder.
f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the Highest Bidder is
unable to negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other types of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.
g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor of GSIS if the
Highest Bidder, after negotiating and executing the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other types of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel, fails or
refuses to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS not later than October
23, 1995; or
ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price not later than October 23, 1995;
or
iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for any other reason.
G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS
1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the following location: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
New GSIS Headquarters Building 
Financial Center, Reclamation Area 
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila
2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bidding to accept any
and all bids and supporting requirements. Representatives from the Commission on
Audit and COP will be invited to witness the proceedings.
3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid Form. The
accomplished Official Bid Form should be submitted in a sealed envelope marked
"OFFICIAL BID." cralaw virtua1aw library
4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents in another sealed
envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" 
a. Written Authority Bid
b. Bid Security
5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS" must be submitted simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM
and 2:00 PM, Philippine Standard Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No bid
shall be accepted after the closing time. Opened or tampered bids shall not be
accepted.
6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submission of the two sealed
envelopes. The actual time of submission will also be indicated by the Secretariat on
the face of the two envelopes.
7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in the corresponding
bid boxes provided for the purpose. These boxes will be in full view of the invited
public.
H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS
1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bidding, the PBAC will
open all sealed envelopes marked "SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" for screening,
evaluation and acceptance. Those who submitted incomplete/insufficient documents
or document/s which is/are not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be
disqualified. The envelope containing their Official Bid Form will be immediately
returned to the disqualified bidders.
2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened at 3:00 PM. The
name of the bidder and the amount of its bid price will be read publicly as the
envelopes are opened.

3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will formally announce
the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.
4. The highest bid will be determined on a price per share basis. In the event of a tie
wherein two or more bids have the same equivalent price per share, priority will be
given to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC.
5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed period; or
b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and acceptable to the PBAC.
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October
23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares
and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International Marketing/ Reservation System Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel. If
the Highest Bidder is intending to provide only financial support to The Manila Hotel,
a separate institution may enter into the aforementioned contract/s with GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS, a copy of which will be distributed to each of the Qualified Bidder after the
prequalification process is completed.
2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management Contract for The
Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the management fee structure that GSIS/MHC
are prepared to accept in the Management Contract are as follows :
a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross revenues.(1)
b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating profit (1) after deducting
undistributed overhead expenses and the basic management fee.
c. Fixed component of the international marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum
of 2.0% of gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant should indicate in its Information
Package if it is wishes to charge this fee.
Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.
The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters for the hotel
management fees to facilitate the negotiations with the Highest Bidder for the
Management Contract after the Public Bidding.
A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The Manila Hotel should
determine whether or not the management fee structure above is acceptable before
submitting their prequalification documents to GSIS.
J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS
may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share.
2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will be in accordance
with the equivalent price per share of their respective bids in the Public Bidding, i.e.
first and second priority will be given to the Qualified Bidders that submitted the
second and third highest bids on the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library following conditions are met: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23,
1995; and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP/OGCC are obtained.
I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES
1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later than October 23, 1995, the offered
purchase price for the Block of Shares after deducting the Bid Security applied as
downpayment.
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager’s Check or unconditional
Demand Draft, payable to the "Government Service Insurance System," issued by a
reputable banking institution licensed to do business in the Philippines and
acceptable to GSIS.
M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all applications, waive
any formality therein, or accept such application as maybe considered most
advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS similarly reserves the right to require the
submission of any additional information from the Applicant as the PBAC may deem
necessary.
2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding prior to
acceptance of the bids and call for a new public bidding under amended rules, and
without any liability whatsoever to any or all the Qualified Bidders, except the
obligation to return the Bid Security.
3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the prequalification/bidding
conference, the deadline for the submission of the prequalification documents, the
date of the Public Bidding or other pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar
days prior to the respective deadlines/target dates.
4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it has on the Block
of Shares.
5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidders, except the Bid
Security, may be returned upon request.
6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public Bidding is final. The
Qualified Bidders, by participating in the Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed
to accept and abide by these results.
7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless from any liability, suit or allegation
arising out of the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidders who have participated in the
Public Bidding." 3  Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the
The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded
P41.00 per share for 15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share
also for 15,300,000 shares. The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder
and immediately returned petitioner’s bid security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering
to match the bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to
itself citing the second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It
sent a manager’s check for thirty-three million pesos (P33,000,000.00) as bid
security.
Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms
and conditions of the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel,
refused to entertain petitioner’s request.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order
on October 18, 1995.
Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the
Constitution 4 on the "National Economy and Patrimony" which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x       x       x
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
x       x       x"  liberty and the protection of property. 17 The same treatment is accorded to
The vital issues can be summed up as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into
effect;
(2) Assuming section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing, whether the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to
petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation.
guiding policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and
general framework of the law and government. 5 As a rule, its provisions are
deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further legislative action. 6
Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws
enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a
hard row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law
oftentimes submerged in its language. A searching inquiry should be made to find
out if the provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a
definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and enforcement. 7 The
inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in
question. 8 
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, 9
rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not
difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified
by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that
legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional inaction
should not suffocate them. 12 
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on
arrests, searches and seizures, 13 the rights of a person under custodial
investigation, 14 the rights of an accused, 15 and the privilege against self-
incrimination. 16 It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life,
constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use
without just compensation. 18 
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-
executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the
Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into effect. 19
Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our Constitution entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed as mere
statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions of
Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education
Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of
judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the discretion of
Congress though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their
policy content. 24  self-executing.
Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities."
The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the
country 25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per cent 26 of whose capital
stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws that will
encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned
enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to
give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the
national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to
regulate foreign investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a
categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in
certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and
operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is
clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right by means of legislation.
Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from section 3, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution. 27 The provision in the 1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the
landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 28 where we upheld the discretionary
authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of investments. 29 By reenacting the
1973 provision, the first paragraph of section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to
nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipinos.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the
State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our
government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy
and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not
merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as
granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving
preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our
national economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the
State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its
implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional
and it is now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration
of Principles and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that" [T]he State shall
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos." It engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy in our fundamental law
and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its enforcement by the whole
State without any pause or a half-pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel
Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of
the Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same
view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not
only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. 30 By
this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional
provision giving preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights
cralaw virtua1aw library involving our national patrimony. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history
and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond
pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on
July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular Government for
Americans living in, or passing through, Manila while travelling to the Orient.
Indigenous materials and Filipino craftsmanship were utilized in its construction. For
sometime, it was exclusively used by American and Caucasian travelers and served
as the "official guesthouse" of the American Insular Government for visiting foreign
dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth
period. When the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters and
lodging for the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the
Intramuros that the Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of Manila.
After the war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents
and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and
sports celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international
conventions and conferences. In the local scene, it was the venue of historic
meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped and
continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international hotel and
travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity.
These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.
The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant
to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony.
Republic Act No 486, "he Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely
provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural property may be classified a
"national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property." 32 Approved on June
18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and
cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure and cultural
property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation." cralaw virtua1aw library
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the
respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned
and controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly
contributions of government employees and the government. 33 The funds are held
in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. 34 They are
to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the
employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS. 35 Excess
funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the
benefit of the employees. 36 It is thus contended that the GSIS’ investment in the
Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the
contemplation of section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is
essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter
to serve a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service
Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As a state-owned and controlled
corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution
especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the people. One of these
policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constitutional
command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of the phrase "qualified
Filipinos" and their "preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their
contents. This is as it ought to be for a Constitution only lays down flexible policies
and principles which can be bent to meet today’s manifest needs and tomorrow’s
unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a living
constitution.
Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner
Nolledo brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He
explained that present and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its
interpretation, viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x       x       x
THE PRESIDENT.
What is the suggestion of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"  premise that the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is
MR. RODRIGO.
No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against
aliens over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO.
Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because
the existing laws or the prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which
business may be done, for example, qualifications on capital, qualifications or the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera.
MR. RODRIGO.
It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO.
Yes.
MR. RODRIGO.
If we say, "PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as giving
preference to qualified Filipinos as against Filipinos who are not qualified.
MR. NOLLEDO.
Madam President, that was the intention of the proponents. The committee has
accepted the amendment.
x       x       x" 
As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First
policy is addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws"
should not be understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include
applicable rules and regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the
State in the exercise of their rule-making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules
and regulations set forth the, standards to measure the qualifications of bidders
Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriously disputed that petitioner qualified to
bid as did Renong Berhad. 39 
Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should
have accorded petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the
purchase of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after
losing the bid, this right of preference gives it a second chance to match the highest
bid of Renong Berhad.
With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner’s submission. I prescind from the
pro-Filipino but not anti-alien. It is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It
is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely bar aliens in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.
Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting
these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal
of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution,
the stellar task of our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between
two desiderata — first, the need to develop our economy and patrimony with the
help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our economy
controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define the
degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for
the right to serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be
adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In fine, the
right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time
dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the
greater the degree of the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice versa.
Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of
this privilege at any given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our
constitutional scheme, the right primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking
department of our government, other branches of government, and all their agencies
and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the limits
of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the
degree of this right of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving
the national economy and judicial duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down
acts of the State that violate the policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right.
Consequently, we must turn to the rules and regulations of respondents Committee
on Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is
entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look at the rules and
regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential right to be
accorded a qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be
read to mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for
paragraph 2, Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules
and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics which demand that we interpret
rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of
petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things
stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder, should be preferred.
It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right
to match the bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner’s submission must be supported by
the rules but even if we examine the rules inside-out a thousand times, they can not
justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises
only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded the block of
shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It
qualified as a bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the
highest bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this
decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did
not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid
of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our
sympathies may be with petitioner but the court has no power to extend the latitude
and longitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. The parameters of
the right of preference depend on a galaxy of facts and factors whose determination
belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of the State. We
are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of
their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for
as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action
amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the
denial as unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong
Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that
the rules and regulations do not provide that qualified Filipino bidder can match the
winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to
foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner
cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be
allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If
sustained, petitioners’ stance will wreak havoc on the essence of bidding. Our laws,
rules and regulations require highest bidding to raise as much funds as possible for
the government to maximize its capacity to deliver essential services to our people.
This is a duty that must be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a
bidding contest and the rules are carefully written to attain this objective. Among
others, bidders are prequalified to insure their financial capability. The bidding is
secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the parties. This objective
will be undermined if we grant petitioner the privilege to know the winning bid and a
chance to match it. For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to
strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.
We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist
Don Claro M. Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino
is to be an alien in his own land. The Constitution has embodied Recto’s counsel as a
state policy and our decision should be in sync with this policy. But while the Filipino
First policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong
an alien. Our policy makers can write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the
Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a foreigner after writing the laws and the
rules. After the laws are written, they must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and
foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution protects all against
unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigners.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno, may I just add: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a
bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to
equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10
(2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . . . covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." The
majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such
preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his
bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law,
the majority’s strained interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes
unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no
Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!
2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is short-
sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. It
encourages other countries — in the guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed
retaliation — to discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by authorizing their
own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino enterprises
solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain
unchallenged by their nationals. The majority’s thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos
as pariahs in the global marketplace with absolutely no chance of winning any
bidding outside our country. Even authoritarian regimes and hermit kingdoms have
long ago found out that unfairness, greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the
long-term, self-destructing.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto others what you do not want others
to do unto you.
3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy
of the Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be
allowed only where all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead
without self-destructing him and without being unfair to the foreigner.
In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the
scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted
the highest score.
[G.R. No. 101370. September 2, 1993.]
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
and ARTURO D. DADUFALZA, in his capacity as COA Director, Technical
Services Office, Respondents.
Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Foreign loans usually obligate the debtor country to hire expatriate consultants. This
part of the package makes these loans more onerous. The petition at bar assails the
disallowance by the respondent COA of a contract extending the services of a foreign
consultant on the ground that his work could well be performed by Filipinos. It
cannot succeed. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
There are no uncertainties on the facts of the case. Our government forged an
agreement on financial cooperation with the Republic of Germany. On April 10, 1981,
a Loan and Project Agreement was executed between the Republic of the Philippines
as "Borrower" and the National Housing Authority (NHA) as "Project Sponsor" on the
one hand, and the Kreditanstalt Fur Weideraufbau (KFW) on the other hand, for
Urban Housing Dagat-Dagatan Project II A/B. 1 The agreement empowered the NHA
and the KFW to determine the details of the project as well as the goods and services
to be financed from the loan. They hired the services of Engineer Brian W. Murdoch
of Kinhill Pty. Ltd. (Kinhill), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
Australia.
In 1987, the KFW proposed to extend the contract of Engr. Murdoch for another
year. The NHA Board of Directors approved only a 3-month extension, from March 9
to June 9, 1987. 2 It also directed its management to make representations with
KFW to replace Engr. Murdoch with a local consultant after June 9, 1987 if the
project would still be unfinished. The 3-month consultancy contract was submitted to
the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) for approval. 3 On April 1,
1987, NEDA approved the contract with the following observations: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This Office has no objection to the approval of the contract. His (NHA-General
Manager) attention is called however on the previous observations made by this
Office in the review of previous extension of services of Engr. Murdoch that Engr.
Murdoch has been the consultant of NHA since August 1978 or about 8 years now
and that considering the relatively simple supervision work required for the finishing
stages of the Dagat-Dagatan Project, NHA should have considered hiring local
consultant. It is expected that this extension of services of Engr. Murdoch is the last
and that NHA shall make representations with KFW to substitute a qualified local
consultant for Engr. Murdoch after expiration of the contract if a consultant for the
project is still necessary." cralaw virtua1aw library
On April 10, 1987, NHA and Kinhill executed the consultancy contract (original)
covering the months of March 9 to June 9, 1987. It involved the amount of US
$30,800.00 (foreign cost) and P123,690.00 (local cost).
The 3-month contract, however, did not satisfy KFW. It wanted a 12-month contract.
In June 1987, it got what it wanted. NHA and Kinhill signed a First Supplemental
Contract. It extended the consultancy contract for nine (9) more months from June
9, 1987 to March 8, 1988. Its total cost was US $85,500.00 (foreign cost) and
P332,850.00 (local cost).
The Urban Housing Dagat-Dagatan Project II was not completed as scheduled. On
December 15, 1987, a request was made for an extension of the Loan Agreement for
another year. KFW agreed provided the consultancy contract with Kinhill would be
extended until the end of December 1988. NHA did not appear to have much choice.
On May 8, 1988, it signed a Second Supplemental Contract extending the contract of
Kinhill for another eight (8) months, from April 4 to December 4, 1988. Its total cost
was US $78,500.00 (foreign) and P315,000.00 (local). chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The Loan Agreement was supposed to have expired on December 4, 1988.
Nonetheless, there was another request for its extension for a period of six (6)
months. KFW had no objection but again conditioned its approval on the extension of
the consultancy services of Kinhill also for a period of six (6) months. This resulted in
the signing on February 23, 1987 of the Third Supplemental Contract which extended
Kinhill’s consultancy services from January 4 to July 3, 1989. Its cost was US
$58,200.00 (foreign) and P250,000.00 (local).
NHA’s legal difficulties started when the Third Supplemental Contract was reviewed
in post audit by the Technical Services Office (TSO). The contract was disallowed in
view of the following findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This has reference to the review of the Third Supplemental Contract dated February
23, 1989 involving the amount of US$58,200.00 (foreign cost) plus P250,000.00
(local cost) in the contract amount and covering an extension of six (6) months
issued in favor of Kinhill Pty. Ltd. relative to the Consulting Services for Technical
Assistance to National Housing Authority (NHA) under the Kreditanstalt Fuer
Wiederaufbau (KFW) Loan for Dagat-Dagatan Project.
"Please be informed that the Consultant’s monthly rate was established as
reasonable, however, the review conducted disclosed the following observations:
a. Based on submitted documents, it was noted that this supplemental contract has
no approval from KFW and the Secretary of Public Works and Highways as required
in Article III, Paragraph 3.02 of the contract and Section 3 of Executive Order No.
164 dated May 5, 1987.
b. The output requirements are not specified and there is no PERT/CPM 4 Network
Diagram or equivalent program of work, thus there is no clear basis for NHA’s
evaluation of the consultant’s accomplishment for purposes of payment. (Note:
Appendix "AA" only reflects objectives).
c. There is no contract provision for liquidated damages in case of delay in project
completion attributed to direct fault of the consultant.
"In addition we reiterate our opinion that the KFW components of the Dagat-Dagatan
Project involves simple design and construction procedures and it being in its
finishing stage, requires simple engineering advisory services that can be undertaken
by NHA or DPWH in-house technical staff or at the most a local consultant. However,
perusal of the documents submitted showed NHA was compelled to continue the
consultancy services of Kinhill, otherwise, NHA cannot get reimbursement from the
KFW loan to pay their contractors. (underscoring supplied).
"It was also noted that in this supplemental contract the Management did not take
into consideration the results of our review made on the previous contracts contained
in our Memorandum dated September 7, 1988.
"In view of the above observation, it is recommended that the contract be disallowed
in audit.
"Likewise, it is informed that the review of the selection and the manner of award
and the evaluation concerning all reimburseable direct expense of the consultant are
left with the Auditor.
"Attention is invited to the attached Consultancy Contract Review dated April 11,
1989, which is self-explanatory.
"sgd. EDITHA A. DE LA CRUZ
Assistant Commissioner
Officer-in-Charge
Technical Services Office" 
On November 26, 1990, NHA requested for reconsideration. It offered the following
explanations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ISSUE NO. 1. — This Supplemental Contract has no approval from KFW and the
Secretary of the Public Works and Highways.
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"ANSWER: 1.1. — On KFW approval, attached for your reference is a copy of KFW
telex of no objection, dated December 22, 1988 "EXHIBIT A." The reply, action of
KFW is usually communicated thru telex. Perusal of all previous consultancy
contracts would support this. Furthermore, let it be informed that it was KFW’s
requirement why this consultancy Contract was engaged despite our earlier
manifestation that we hire local consultants "EXHIBIT B." cralaw virtua1aw library
1.2 — On the approval by the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways . . . the Third Supplemental Agreement was approved by the NHA Board
under Resolution No. 1231 5 of March 13, 1987 (sic) "EXHIBIT C." cralaw virtua1aw library
It may be pointed out at this juncture, that the main reason why the consultancy had
to be extended was due to the delay in the completion of the KFW-Funded River
Bank Improvement Works, which was directly implemented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways, hence, the presence of the foreign consultant was with
the knowledge and acquiescence of the DPWH.
"ISSUE NO. 2. — The output requirements are not specified . . . or equivalent
program of work . . .thus there is no clear basis for . . . payment.
"ANSWER: In the original Consultancy Contract, as well as the First and the Second
Supplemental Contract Agreements, the main basis for determining the consultant’s
responsibility have been defined in the Terms of Reference which specified the
technical assistance to be provided by the Consultant to the National Housing
Authority under the KFW Loan Agreement, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Assistance to the National Housing Authority for the Dagat-Dagatan Project in the
form of engineering designs, contract documentation, project programming,
supervision and monitoring procedures, evaluation and concurrence on contractor’s
billings and institutional arrangements with regards associated agencies. In addition,
responsibility will include all associated functions necessary for the timely and
satisfactory completion of the revetment works along the river banks in which the
Department of Public Works and Highways is the responsible agency.
In this respect, since it is a prerequisite that all billings to be processed for payment
to the contractors have to be certified by the consultant, it is the direct responsibility
of the consultant to monitor, the consultant to monitor, verify and evaluate all the
aspects of the project implementation for contracts funded by KFW Loan. This
process will assure the NHA and KFW that disbursement are effected only to cover
works accomplishment in accordance with plans and specifications. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"ISSUE NO. 3 — There is no contract provision for liquidated damages in case of
delay in project completion attributed to the fault of the consultant.
"ANSWER: We reiterate in full our previous explanation for this particular
observation: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is confirmed that there is no contract provision for liquidated damages. However,
there is a contract provision for termination for default or for convenience of NHA.
Further, considering that the contract has already expired and there has been no
record of consultant’s faults or delays in the project implementation, the required
provision on liquidated damages has become moot and academic." cralaw virtua1aw library
"With respect to your opinion that the KFW components of the Dagat-Dagatan
involve simple design and construction procedures, etc., let this be of record that we
are 100% in accord with your observation. However, the hiring of an expartriate
consultant is mandated under the Loan Agreement to which NHA must adhere to,
unless otherwise authorized." (Italics ours).
On February 28, 1991, TSO Director Arthur Dadufalza denied the reconsideration. He
opined: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Although not stated in the contract that there is no need for the approval of the
DPWH Secretary, Section 3 of Executive Order No. 164 dated May 5, 1987 requires
the said approval.
"2. The consultant’s responsibility which they mentioned, as specified in the Terms of
Reference was general. The output requirements are not specified and there is no
PERT/CPM Network Diagram or equivalent program of work, hence, we still believed
that there is still no basis for NHA’s evaluation of the consultant’s accomplishments
for purposes of payment.
"3. It was confirmed by NHA that there is really no contract provision for liquidated
damages. It so happened that the contract has expired and there has been no record
of consultant’s fault or delay, thus, the required provision may be considered moot
and academic. However, it is recommended that for future projects, the provisions
should be specified/stipulated.
"4. The main reason for the disallowance is that there is no more need for a foreign
consultant in the final project stage since the remaining work components of the
Dagat-Dagatan Project which involved simple design and construction procedure and
it being in the finishing stage, required simple advisory services that can be
undertaken by NHA or DPWH in-house technical staff or at the most, a local
consultant. The findings was further reinforced by the statements of the NEDA in the
attached 1st Indorsement dated April 1, 1987 . . . bearing on its no objection to the
approval of the original contract: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x       x       x." cralaw virtua1aw library
"The NHA agreed and is 100% in accord with the observation. However, we do not
find in the documents/records submitted that NHA has made stronger representation
with the KFW for the hiring of a local consultant (or at all) as required by the NEDA."
(Italics ours).
On May 15, 1991, the COA, in its Decision No. 1895, affirmed Director Dadufalza’s
findings except as regards the lack of provision for liquidated damages which was
considered moot and academic.
NHA filed the instant petition for certiorari where it raises the following issues: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a. Whether or not the COA acted beyond its constitutionally granted powers by
disallowing a duly entered contract, valid, regular, with all the formalities of law.
"b. Corollary to the above, is whether or not COA acted beyond its constitutionally
granted powers by disallowing a contract on the basis of its self-proclaimed and
considered defects on the contract not otherwise provided for in its sets of
regulations promulgated pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution.
"c. Whether or not COA, by virtue of the powers granted to it under the Constitution,
substitute its own judgment or disposition in lieu of the decision of the management
or governing body of government entities." cralaw virtua1aw library
The petition lacks merit.
The power of the Commission on Audit to audit and examine government
expenditures is enshrined in Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
viz.: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty
to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivision, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, or on a post audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions,
and offices that have been granted the fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; . . ."
virtua1aw library
cralaw

The Constitution also granted to COA the power to "promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties." 6  speaks for itself.
Pursuant to the said constitutional mandate, COA promulgated Circular No. 88-55-A
dated September 8, 1985 defining the term "unnecessary" expenditures, viz.:
"The term pertains to expenditures which could not pass the test of prudence or the
diligence of a good father of a family, thereby denoting non-responsiveness to the
exigencies of the service. Unnecessary expenditures are those not supportive of the
implementation of the objectives and mission of the agency relative to the nature of
its operation. This would also include incurrence of expenditure not dictated by the
demands of good government, and those the utility of which cannot be ascertained
at a specific time. An expenditure that is not essential or that which can be
dispensed with without loss or damage to property is considered unnecessary. The
mission and thrust of the agency incurring the expenditures must be considered in
determining whether or not an expenditure is necessary." (Italics ours).
In Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. COA, 7 We recognized the authority of COA to disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable (IUEEU)
expenditures. We ruled: "Since the COA is responsible for the enforcement of the
rules and regulations, it goes without saying that failure to comply with them is a
ground for disapproving the payment of the proposed expenditure." cralaw virtua1aw library
There can be no dispute on the proposition that the continued extension of the
services of Engr. Murdoch as a foreign consultant constitutes at the very least an
unnecessary expense.
Crystal clear from the records is that the nature of the terminal phase of the Dagat-
Dagatan project does not require the expertise of a foreign consultant. As early as
April 1, 1987, the necessity of extending the services of Engr. Murdoch has been
questioned by NEDA "considering the relatively simple supervision work required for
the final stages of the project." 8 This observation was echoed by COA in its post
audit review of the First and Second Supplemental Contracts, 9 viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In addition, it is our opinion that the KFW components of the Dagat-Dagatan Project
involves simple design and construction procedures, and it being in its finishing
stage, requires simple advisory services that can be undertaken by NHA or DPWH in-
house technical staff or at the most a local consultant. Hence, the NHA should have
made stronger representations with the KFW for the hiring of a local consultant (or
none at all) as required by NEDA." cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner itself has taken the position that the services of Engr. Murdoch can be
dispensed with and can well be done by Filipinos. In 1987, petitioner’s Board already
directed its management to make representations with KFW to replace Engr.
Murdoch with a Filipino consultant if the project would still be unfinished. Again, in its
memorandum dated November 26, 1990, petitioner categorically admitted that the
KFW components of the Dagat-dagatan Project involved simple designs and
construction procedures which could easily be handled by a local consultant. Despite
all these admissions, petitioner proceeded to extend the unnecessary services of
Engr. Murdoch as it consummated the disputed Third Supplemental Contract. The
amount of money that was spent for the unnecessary services of Engr. Murdoch
chanrobles law library
Petitioner argues that the renewal of the loan agreement with the KFW would have
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph been jeopardized if it did not agree to the extension of the services of Engr.
Murdoch. The short answer to this argument is that the imperative necessity to
comply with the command of our Constitution prohibiting unnecessary expenses of
public funds is beyond compromise. No amount of the almighty dollar can justify
anybody, especially foreigners, to mangle the mandates of our fundamental law. The
postulates of our Constitution are not mere platitudes which we should honor only in
rhetorics but not in reality. In fine, the power to contract a foreign loan does not
carry with it the authority to bargain away the ideals of our Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Vitug, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 104768               July 21, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and
ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) dated 18 November 1991
1 
and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed
petitioner’s Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated
items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the
reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of
this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing
petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA
Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1
("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth
of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power
"(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and
carry out the purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the
active service or retired.
2
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings
and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The
relevant part of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot
located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a
house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square
meters.
The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly
at ₱700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the
premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC
Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of
CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could
not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use
by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the
raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on
3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command,
Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed
that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually
goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in
Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth
Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a
person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four
(4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no
visible means of income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly
a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the
military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the
consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of
income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these money
because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the
affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money
would have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for
scrutiny and analysis by the Board’s consultant. Although the amount of
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed
that respondent has an unexplained wealth of ₱104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against
respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of
₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be
prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired
Property."3
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic
Act No. 1379 ("RA No. 1379")  against Ramas.
4
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines
("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant.
The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as
co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential
agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist
at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended
Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other
income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his
public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate
of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos." 5
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous
inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA
No. 1379. The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of
6 
respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas
contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000, which was not out of proportion
to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion
in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items
confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her
employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November
1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine
Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial, the court set the case for trial on the merits on
7 
9-11 November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its
lack of preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents
to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in
order "to charge the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as
having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x." 8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded
with petitioner’s presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for
leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file the amended
complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of the
amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing
complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had
been pending in court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of
the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner
manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of other
witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated
its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already
presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully
acquired the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for
over a year mainly because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner
would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case had
long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for
presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to
present further evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further
evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence, the
Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however,
hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private
respondents might take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to
trial because it had no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of
justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an
appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that
failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v.
Migrino. The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to
9 
investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held
without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended
Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise
dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon.
Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A.
No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is
also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in
connection herewith.
SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint
Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following
grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the
rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and10 
Republic v. Migrino which involve the same issues.
11 
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal
cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima
facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR
FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF
CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY
CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT
RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED
AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE
COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE
FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v.
 SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189
SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and
Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to this
case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived by respondents
with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim;
and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper
considering that they were filed after commencement of the
presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before
the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its
case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY,
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO
WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS
EVIDENCE. 12
The Court’s Ruling
First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in
Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino.
13  14
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to
investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and
Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired. The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary
15 
recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be
taken based on its findings. The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board
16 
pursuant to the PCGG’s power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the
purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to
wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the
President in regard to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President
may assign to the Commission from time to time.
x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two
categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel
who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former
President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate
or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft
17 
and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. 18
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ case
to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas’ case should fall under the first category of
AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him.
Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former
President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas’ position enabled him to receive
orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a
subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the
sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a
"subordinate" as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a
showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos.
Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show
what is contemplated within the term ‘subordinate.’ The Whereas Clauses of
EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and
close associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former
President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any
interest or participation.’
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-
‘[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of
a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed
in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things
of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co,
Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on
Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].’
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a
close association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the
immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the
close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government
official or employee during the administration of former President Marcos.
There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the
rank of Major General does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former
19 
President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG
has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of
former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him.
Such close association is manifested either by Ramas’ complicity with former
President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed
President or by former President Marcos’ acquiescence in Ramas’ own
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioner’s attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not
convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution
in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation
pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner
asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its
jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that
Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former President. However, the same
AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins
with such statement, it ends with the following recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be
prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired
Property."20
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private
respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of
violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments
proves fatal to petitioner’s case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and
limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such
specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint
do not show that the properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by
him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner
merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that
these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate
income without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close
association with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the
AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his
wealth because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie
evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth
by virtue of his close association or relation with former President
Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not
fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of
the law creating the same and the objective of the investigation which was, as
stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a; (Emphasis supplied)
21 
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie
showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of
former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1 clearly
22 
premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was
not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court outlined the cases that fall under the
23 
jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14, 14-A:
24  25  26
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation
with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority
of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly
or through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority and influence, connections
or relationships; and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the
acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a)
of Executive Order No. 1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not
otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, require a previous
authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and
prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1.
Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and
other duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and
city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his
assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and
prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25
February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the
authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor
General. The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770")
27 
vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25
February 1986. 28
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this
case despite the absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a
"subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with
the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to
investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1
and its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and
even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019
and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas’ case to the
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of
ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and
cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos.
3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the
case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper
prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government
be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.
Petitioner’s argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the
filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with
counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no
jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative
or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGG’s powers are specific and
limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole
task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a
29 
case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to
investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon
as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was
decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed
their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that
the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. Thus,
30 
we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is
vested by law and not by the parties to an action. 31
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the
PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still
conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if
warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan. The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA
32  as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already
No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel. 33
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case
before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we
find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the
presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years
before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint
on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989.
Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this
sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its
evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even
before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13
April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. The motion sought "to
34 
charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioner’s
evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired
by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioner’s
evidence since petitioner did not state when it would file the amended
complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the
presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving
petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its
evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the
matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above
events because this case has been ready for trial for over a year and much of
the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the government to produce on
scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly
upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the
presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court
has been held to task in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as
this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such
in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month
pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff
Republic.35
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a
preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as
mandated by RA No. 1379. The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to
36 
conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request
and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However,
on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the
preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the
Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the
presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar
as the status of the case is concerned x x x." Still on the date set, petitioner
37 
failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-
Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case
38 
already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were
to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for
failure to complete the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave
petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence.
The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner’s delays and yet petitioner ended
the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which
would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute the case against private respondents. This alone
would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case
before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties
confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized and therefore
inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioner’s
case since these properties comprise most of petitioner’s evidence against
private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case
against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s
residence a search warrant captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaano’s cousins
witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The
raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines;
40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications
equipment, cash consisting of ₱2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land
titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team
conducted the search and seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the
successful EDSA revolution." Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
39  and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973
government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people." Petitioner asserts
40 
that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973
Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal
search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights
had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from
Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their
seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated
in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA
Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution." The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
41 
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty
obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the
Philippines, assumed under international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound
by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is,
after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24
March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution);
and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the
interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to
individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during
the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent
Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during
the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill
of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during
the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato
S. Puno: 42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it"
or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." In
Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which
"occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a
new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself."
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and
more popularly known as the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people
tore themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the
unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as
"an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or
effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a
general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such
change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It
has been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people
of the state" and from there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to
reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the
existing constitution."
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due
to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution
had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential
election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s
Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state
evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the
administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the
Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in
effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative
during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by
the Philippine Commission on Good Government ("PCGG") before the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct
the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive
issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and
seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly
question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because
there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption
of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the
sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom
Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of
43 
Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the
sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the
due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom
Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity
of sequestration orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to
the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it
should be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority
of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional approbation and
sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve
the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the
leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the
people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." And
as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders
under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were
fully aware that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights.
Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific language
recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse by
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the
arguments in defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salonga’s lecture in the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On
the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is
traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister
Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On
the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters
are the results and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG
should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or
exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM
for special protection? The answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand
the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection, for
exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but
let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for,
and let me elaborate and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the
CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of
the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We
cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same time
ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of
Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law. The New Society word
for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we
get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained.
The committee report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights
for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may even
extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice.
What the committee report is asking for is that we should allow the new
government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners
of the vice begin to think that they have a vested right to its practice, and they
will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way
of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties
is an argument that is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian
like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another
staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing
and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer,
placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search
and seizure clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account to us and we
will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private
safe."
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the
hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the
ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the
due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something
positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to
the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will
survive and grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the values
enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is
to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report and allow the new
Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has
two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument — that
what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the
law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even
without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only
one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me
conclude with what another Christian replied when asked to toy around with
the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of
law for my nation’s safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit
of law for our nation’s sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the
amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the
Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 26, Article
44 
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware
that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due
process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force
during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting
sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all
sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during
the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant
and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government,
assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant
to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires
each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
45 
Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government
had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its
Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration
as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on
the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
46 
international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.
47 
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government
could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration
is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court
considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law
laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not
repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the
1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government
could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its
treaty obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986
that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject
to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and
orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution. The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation
48 
by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers
entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives
and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers
did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government.
The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it.
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to
be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the
warrant. As admitted by petitioner’s witnesses, the raiding team confiscated
items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for
weapons. What else, aside from the weapons, were seized from the house of
Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US
dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also
seized other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed
that the reason why they also brought the other items not included in the
search warrant was because the money and other jewelries were contained in
attaché cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think three (3)
vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attaché cases and the steel safes were
containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out that they
contained money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason
why your team seized this money instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him
decided to bring along also the money because at that time it was already dark
and they felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be
suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor. 49
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was
applied before the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of
five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU
elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any
other properties or contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for
instance, the communications equipment and money. However, I did not
include that in the application for search warrant considering that we have not
established concrete evidence about that. So when…
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that
only weapons were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor. 50
xxx
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle
M-16 and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with
the fiscal’s office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscal’s office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a
Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search
warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to
bring along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it
was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not really know their
reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken because
they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.
xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also
included in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was
discovered to be contained in attaché cases.  These attaché cases were
1âwphi1
suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the
course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader
also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will just
leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by
your raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not
include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the
raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe
these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The
raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that
these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly,
52 
the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from
53 
whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is
the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to
Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March
1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the
Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna,
JJ., concur. 
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. I concur with Mr. Justice Vitug in his concurring
opinion. 
Puno and Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion 
Panganiban, J., in the result. 
Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official leave. 
Ynares-Santiago, J., in the result. I concur in the separate opinion of J.
Reynato Puno. 
Tinga, J., separate opinion reserved.
51
Footnotes
Composed of Justices Regino Hermosisima, Jr., Francis Garchitorena
1 
and Cipriano del Rosario.
2 
Republic v. Migrino, G.R. No. 89483, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 289.
 Records of the Sandiganbayan [hereinafter Records], pp. 53-55.
3 
Vice Chief of Staff, AFP Lt. General (0-9)

"An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found
4 
Commander of Major Services, AFP Maj. General (0-8)
to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee
and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor." xxx.

Records, p. 14.
5 
Records, pp. 54-55.
20 

Ibid., p.16.
6 
Rollo, p. 27.
21 

Ibid., p. 166.
7 
"WHEREAS, vast resources of the government have been
22 

amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his

Ibid., p. 286.
8 
immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and
abroad;
Supra, note 2.
9 

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to recover all ill-gotten

10 
G.R. No. 94595, 26 February 1991, 194 SCRA 474. wealth;

11 
Supra, note 2. xxx"

12 
Rollo, p. 21. Supra, note 10.
23 

13 
Supra, note 10. "Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally
24 

Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Marcos, Mrs. Imelda

14 
Supra, note 2. Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates,
Dummies, Agents or Nominees" dated 12 March 1986.
15 
Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2.
"Defining the Jurisdiction over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of
25 

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos,

16 
Supra, note 2.
Members of their Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates,
and/or Business Associates, Dummies, Agents and Nominees" dated 7
17 
Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2. May 1986.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 115906, 29 September 1994,

18 
"Amending Executive Order No. 14" dated 18 August 1986.
26 

237 SCRA 242.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90529, 16 August 1991, 200
27 

Presidential Decree No. 1769 "Amending PD 360 dated December

19 
SCRA 667.
30, 1973 adjusting the authorized grades in the command and staff
structure of the AFP" dated 12 January 1981. The ranking is as follows:
Section 15 (11), RA No. 6770.
28 

Chief of Staff, AFP General (0-10)

Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2.
29 
30 
Cudia v. CA, 348 Phil. 190 (1998). See also Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15 and G.R.
No. 146738, 3 April 2001, 356 SCRA 108; Mun. of San Juan,
Monsanto v. Zerna, G.R. No. 142501, 7 December 2001, 371 SCRA
31  Metro Manila v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 220 (1997).
664; Republic v. Estipular, G.R. No. 136588, 20 July 2000, 336 SCRA
333. A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA, 29 June 1992, 210 SCRA 589.
42 

32 
Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2. No. L-75885, 27 May 1987, 150 SCRA 181.
43 

Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Gov’t., G.R. Nos.

33 
Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
44 

92319-20, 2 October 1990, 190 SCRA 226.

Sec. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders
34 
Records, p. 285. under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not
35 
Records, p. 347. more than eighteen months after the ratification of this
Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by
36 
Ibid., p. 346. the President, the Congress may extend said period.

37 
Ibid., p. 395. A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon
showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the
sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered
38 
Ibid., p. 422.
with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification
of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or
39 
Rollo, p. 34. proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification.
For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or
40 
Ibid. proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the
issuance thereof.
Proclamation No. 3, "Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the
41 

Philippines," provides: The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically

lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein
WHEREAS, the new government under President Corazon C. provided.
Aquino was installed through a direct exercise of the power of
the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces Among the rights of individuals recognized in the Covenant are: (1)
45 

of the Philippines; No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life [Article 6(1)]; (2) No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in treatment or punishment. [Article 7]; (3) Everyone has the right to
defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
amended; arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on
such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are
xxx. (Emphasis supplied) established by law. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release [Article 9(1 & 3)]; (4) Anyone who is
arrested shall be informed, at the time of the arrest, of the reasons for
his arrest and shall be promptly informed of the charges against him
[Article 9(2)]; (5) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his residence. Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country [Article 12(1, 2 & 3)]; (6) Everyone charged with
a criminal offense shall have the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law [Article 14(2)]; (7) Everyone shall have
the right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion [Article 18(1)];
(8) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression [Article 19(1 &
2)]; (9) The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized [Article 21];
(10) Everyone shall have the right of freedom of association with others
[Article 22(1)]; (11) All persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law
[Article 26].
Andreu v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 347 (1951);
46 
Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 256 (1951);
Borovsky v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 107 (1951); Mejoff
v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951).
Among the rights enshrined in the Declaration are: (1) Everyone has
47 
the right to own property alone or in association with others [Article
17(1)]; (2) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives [Article
21(1)]; (3) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection
against unemployment [Article 23(1)].
Section 1, Article I of the Provisional Constitution provides: "The
48  Constitution)."1 The majority holds that the Bill of Rights was not operative,
provisions of xxx ARTICLE IV (Bill of Rights) xxx of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, remain in force and effect and are hereby
adopted in totoas part of this provisional Constitution." (Emphasis
supplied)
49 
TSN, 18 April 1989, pp. 115-117.
50 
Ibid., pp. 136-138.
51 
Ibid., pp. 144-146.
Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless
52 
search and seizure have been judicially formulated as follows: (1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver
by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search
and seizure. (People v. Que Ming Kha, G.R. No. 133265, 31 May
2002; Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, 15 January
2002; People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, 5 September 1997, 278
SCRA 561).
People v. Lim, G.R. No. 141699, 7 August 2002; Del Rosario v.
53 
People, G.R. No. 142295, 31 May 2001, 358 SCRA 373.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
While I concur in the result of the ponencia of Mr. Justice Carpio, the ruling on
whether or not private respondent Dimaano could invoke her rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and to the exclusion of evidence resulting
therefrom compels this humble opinion. The ponencia states that "(t)he correct
issue is whether the Bill of Rights was operative during the interregnum from
February 26, 1986 (the day Corazon C. Aquino took her oath as President) to
March 24, 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Freedom
thus private respondent Dimaano cannot invoke the right against unreasonable
search and seizure and the exclusionary right as her house was searched and
her properties were seized during the interregnum or on March 3, 1986. My
disagreement is not with the ruling that the Bill of Rights was not operative at
that time, but with the conclusion that the private respondent has lost and
cannot invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the
exclusionary right. Using a different lens in viewing the problem at hand, I
respectfully submit that the crucial issue for resolution is whether she can
invoke these rights in the absence of a constitution under the extraordinary
circumstances after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. The question boggles the
intellect, and is interesting, to say the least, perhaps even to those not half-
interested in the law. But the question of whether the Filipinos were bereft of
fundamental rights during the one month interregnum is not as perplexing as
the question of whether the world was without a God in the three days that
God the Son descended into the dead before He rose to life. Nature abhors a
vacuum and so does the law.
I. Prologue
The ponencia suggests that the Constitution, the Bill of Rights in particular, is
the only source of rights, hence in its absence, private respondent Dimaano
cannot invoke her rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to the
exclusion of evidence obtained therefrom. Pushing the ponencia’s line of
reasoning to the extreme will result in the conclusion that during the one month
interregnum, the people lost their constitutionally guaranteed rights to life,
liberty and property and the revolutionary government was not bound by the
strictures of due process of law. Even before appealing to history and
philosophy, reason shouts otherwise.
The ponencia recognized the EDSA Revolution as a "successful
revolution"2 that installed the Aquino government. There is no right to revolt in
the 1973 Constitution, in force prior to February 23-25, 1986. Nonetheless, it is
widely accepted that under natural law, the right of revolution is an inherent
right of the people. Thus, we justified the creation of a new legal order after the
1986 EDSA Revolution, viz:
"From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as
‘an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or
effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a
general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such
change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable.’ (H.
Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law II, 4th edition, 1927) It has
been said that ‘the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of
the state’ and from there is derived ‘the right of the people to abolish, to reform
and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing
constitution.’ (‘Political Rights as Political Questions, The Paradox of Luther v.
Borden’, 100 Harvard Law Review 1125, 1133 [1987])"3
It is my considered view that under this same natural law, private respondent
Dimaano has a right against unreasonable search and seizure and to exclude
evidence obtained as a consequence of such illegal act. To explain my thesis, I
will first lay down the relevant law before applying it to the facts of the case at
bar. Tracking down the elusive law that will govern the case at bar will take us
to the labyrinths of philosophy and history. To be sure, the difficulty of the case
at bar lies less in the application of the law, but more in finding the applicable
law. I shall take up the challenge even if the route takes negotiating, but
without trespassing, on political and religious thickets.
II. Natural Law and Natural Rights
As early as the Greek civilization, man has alluded to a higher, natural
standard or law to which a state and its laws must conform. Sophocles
unmistakably articulates this in his poignant literary piece, Antigone. In this
mid-fifth century Athenian tragedy, a civil war divided two brothers, one died
defending Thebes, and the other, Polyneices, died attacking it. The king
forbade Polyneices’ burial, commanding instead that his body be left to be
devoured by beasts. But according to Greek religious ideas, only a burial -even
a token one with a handful of earth- could give repose to his soul. Moved by
piety, Polyneices’ sister, Antigone, disobeyed the command of the king and
buried the body. She was arrested. Brought before the king who asks her if
she knew of his command and why she disobeyed, Antigone replies:
". . .These laws were not ordained of Zeus, 
And she who sits enthroned with gods below, 
Justice, enacted not these human laws. 
Nor did I deem that thou, a mortal man, 
Couldst by a breath annul and override 
The immutable unwritten laws of heaven. 
They were not born today nor yesterday;
They die not; and none knoweth whence they sprang."4
Antigone was condemned to be buried alive for violating the order of the king.5
Aristotle also wrote in his Nicomachean Ethics: "Of political justice part is
natural, part legal – natural, that which everywhere has the same force and
does not exist by people’s thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally
indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a
prisoner’s ransom shall be mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be
sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular
cases, . . ."6 Aristotle states that "(p)articular law is that which each community
lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly
unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as every one
to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men,
even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this
that Sophocles’ Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of
Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was just
by nature."7
Later, the Roman orator Cicero wrote of natural law in the first century B.C. in
this wise:
"True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application,
unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts
from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or
prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the
wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal
any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from
its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for
an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome
and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and
unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and at all times, and there will be
one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law,
its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from
himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will
suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered
punishment."8
This allusion to an eternal, higher, and universal natural law continues from
classical antiquity to this day. The face of natural law, however, has changed
throughout the classical, medieval, modern, and contemporary periods of
history.
In the medieval times, shortly after 1139, Gratian published the Decretum, a
collection and reconciliation of the canon laws in force, which distinguished
between divine or natural law and human law. Similar to the writings of the
earliest Church Fathers, he related this natural law to the Decalogue and to
Christ’s commandment of love of one’s neighbor. "The law of nature is that
which is contained in the Law and the Gospel, by which everyone is
commanded to do unto others as he would wish to be done unto him, and is
prohibited from doing unto others that which he would be unwilling to be done
unto himself."9 This natural law precedes in time and rank all things, such that
statutes whether ecclesiastical or secular, if contrary to law, were to be held
null and void.10
The following century saw a shift from a natural law concept that was
revelation-centered to a concept related to man’s reason and what was
discoverable by it, under the influence of Aristotle’s writings which were coming
to be known in the West. William of Auxerre acknowledged the human capacity
to recognize good and evil and God’s will, and made reason the criterion of
natural law. Natural law was thus id quod naturalis ratio sine omni
deliberatione aut sine magna dictat esse faciendum or "that which natural
reason, without much or even any need of reflection, tells us what we must
do."11 Similarly, Alexander of Hales saw human reason as the basis for
recognizing natural law12and St. Bonaventure wrote that what natural reason
commands is called the natural law.13 By the thirteenth century, natural law was
understood as the law of right reason, coinciding with the biblical law but not
derived from it.14
Of all the medieval philosophers, the Italian St. Thomas Aquinas is indisputably
regarded as the most important proponent of traditional natural law theory. He
created a comprehensive and organized synthesis of the natural law theory
which rests on both the classical (in particular, Aristotelian philosophy) and
Christian foundation, i.e., on reason and revelation.15 His version of the natural
law theory rests on his vision of the universe as governed by a single, self-
consistent and overarching system of law under the direction and authority of
God as the supreme lawgiver and judge.16 Aquinas defined law as "an
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the
community, and promulgated."17 There are four kinds of laws in his natural law
theory: eternal, natural, human, and divine.
First, eternal law. To Aquinas, a law is a dictate of practical reason (which
provides practical directions on how one ought to act as opposed to
"speculative reason" which provides propositional knowledge of the way things
are) emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect
community.18 Presupposing that Divine Providence rules the universe, and
Divine Providence governs by divine reason, then the rational guidance of
things in God the Ruler of the universe has the nature of a law. And since the
divine reason’s conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, this
kind of law is called eternal law.19 In other words, eternal law is that law which
is a "dictate" of God’s reason. It is the external aspect of God’s perfect wisdom,
or His wisdom applied to His creation.20 Eternal law consists of those principles
of action that God implanted in creation to enable each thing to perform its
proper function in the overall order of the universe. The proper function of a
thing determines what is good and bad for it: the good consists of performing
its function while the bad consists of failing to perform it.21
Then, natural law. This consists of principles of eternal law which are specific
to human beings as rational creatures. Aquinas explains that law, as a rule and
measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, it can be in him that
rules and measures; and in another way, in that which is ruled and measured
since a thing is ruled and measured in so far as it partakes of the rule or
measure. Thus, since all things governed by Divine Providence are regulated
and measured by the eternal law, then all things partake of or participate to a
certain extent in the eternal law; they receive from it certain inclinations
towards their proper actions and ends. Being rational, however, the
participation of a human being in the Divine Providence, is most excellent
because he participates in providence itself, providing for himself and others.
He participates in eternal reason itself and through this, he possesses a
natural inclination to right action and right end. This participation of the rational
creature in the eternal law is called natural law. Hence, the psalmist says: "The
light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us, thus implying that the light
of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what is evil, which is
the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the
Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the
rational creature’s participation in the eternal law."22 In a few words, the
"natural law is a rule of reason, promulgated by God in man’s nature, whereby
man can discern how he should act."23
Through natural reason, we are able to distinguish between right and wrong;
through free will, we are able to choose what is right. When we do so, we
participate more fully in the eternal law rather than being merely led blindly to
our proper end. We are able to choose that end and make our compliance with
eternal law an act of self-direction. In this manner, the law becomes in us a
rule and measure and no longer a rule and measure imposed from an external
source.24 The question that comes to the fore then is what is this end to which
natural law directs rational creatures?
The first self-evident principle of natural law is that "good is to be pursued and
done, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based
upon this, so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s
good (or evil) belongs to the precept of the natural law as something to be
done or avoided."25 Because good is to be sought and evil avoided, and good
is that which is in accord with the nature of a given creature or the performance
of a creature’s proper function, then the important question to answer is what is
human nature or the proper function of man. Those to which man has a natural
inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as good and must thus be
pursued, while their opposites are evil which must be avoided.26 Aquinas
identifies the basic inclinations of man as follows:
"1. To seek the good, including his highest good, which is eternal
happiness with God.27
2. To preserve himself in existence.
3. To preserve the species - that is, to unite sexually.
4. To live in community with other men.
5. To use his intellect and will - that is, to know the truth and to make
his own decision."28
As living creatures, we have an interest in self-preservation; as animals, in
procreation; and as rational creatures, in living in society and exercising our
intellectual and spiritual capacities in the pursuit of knowledge."29 God put
these inclinations in human nature to help man achieve his final end of eternal
happiness. With an understanding of these inclinations in our human nature,
we can determine by practical reason what is good for us and what is bad.30 In
this sense, natural law is an ordinance of reason.31 Proceeding from these
inclinations, we can apply the natural law by deduction, thus: good should be
done; this action is good; this action should therefore be done.32 Concretely, it
is good for humans to live peaceably with one another in society, thus this
dictates the prohibition of actions such as killing and stealing that harm
society.33
From the precepts of natural law, human reason needs to proceed to the more
particular determinations or specialized regulations to declare what is required
in particular cases considering society’s specific circumstances. These
particular determinations, arrived at by human reason, are called human laws
(Aquinas’ positive law). They are necessary to clarify the demands of natural
law. Aquinas identifies two ways by which something may be derived from
natural law: first, like in science, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from
principles; and second, as in the arts, general forms are particularized as to
details like the craftsman determining the general form of a house to a
particular shape.34 Thus, according to Aquinas, some things are derived from
natural law by way of conclusion (such as "one must not kill" may be derived
as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man") while
some are derived by way of determination (such as the law of nature has it that
the evildoer should be punished, but that he be punished in this or that way is
not directly by natural law but is a derived determination of it).35 Aquinas says
that both these modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those
things derived as a conclusion are contained in human law not as emanating
therefrom exclusively, but having some force also from the natural law. But
those things which are derived in the second manner have no other force than
that of human law.36
Finally, there is divine law which is given by God, i.e., the Old Testament and
the New Testament. This is necessary to direct human life for four reasons.
First, through law, man is directed to proper actions towards his proper end.
This end, which is eternal happiness and salvation, is not proportionate to his
natural human power, making it necessary for him to be directed not just by
natural and human law but by divinely given law. Secondly, because of
uncertainty in human judgment, different people form different judgments on
human acts, resulting in different and even contrary laws. So that man may
know for certain what he ought to do and avoid, it was necessary for man to be
directed in his proper acts by a God-given law for it is certain that such law
cannot err. Thirdly, human law can only judge the external actions of persons.
However, perfection of virtue consists in man conducting himself right in both
his external acts and in his interior motives. The divine law thus supervenes to
see and judge both dimensions. Fourthly, because human law cannot punish
or forbid all evils, since in aiming to do away with all evils it would do away with
many good things and would hinder the advancement of the common good
necessary for human development, divine law is needed.37 For example, if
human law forbade backbiting gossip, in order to enforce such a law, privacy
and trust that is necessary between spouses and friends would be severely
restricted. Because the price paid to enforce the law would outweigh the
benefits, gossiping ought to be left to God to be judged and punished. Thus,
with divine law, no evil would remain unforbidden and unpunished.38
Aquinas’ traditional natural law theory has been advocated, recast and
restated by other scholars up to the contemporary period.39 But clearly, what
has had a pervading and lasting impact on the Western philosophy of law and
government, particularly on that of the United States of America which heavily
influenced the Philippine system of government and constitution, is the modern
natural law theory.
In the traditional natural law theory, among which was Aquinas’, the emphasis
was placed on moral duties of man -both rulers and subjects- rather than on
rights of the individual citizen. Nevertheless, from this medieval theoretical
background developed modern natural law theories associated with the
gradual development in Europe of modern secular territorial state. These
theories increasingly veered away from medieval theological trappings40 and
gave particular emphasis to the individual and his natural rights.41
One far-reaching school of thought on natural rights emerged with the political
philosophy of the English man, John Locke. In the traditional natural law theory
such as Aquinas’, the monarchy was not altogether disfavored because as
Aquinas says, "the rule of one man is more useful than the rule of the many" to
achieve "the unity of peace."42Quite different from Aquinas, Locke emphasized
that in any form of government, "ultimate sovereignty rested in the people and
all legitimate government was based on the consent of the governed."43 His
political theory was used to justify resistance to Charles II over the right of
succession to the English throne and the Whig Revolution of 1688-89 by which
James II was dethroned and replaced by William and Mary under terms which
weakened the power of the crown and strengthened the power of the
Parliament.44
Locke explained his political theory in his major work, Second Treatise of
Government, originally published in 1690,45 where he adopted the modern view
that human beings enjoyed natural rights in the state of nature, before the
formation of civil or political society. In this state of nature, it is self-evident that
all persons are naturally in a "state of perfect freedom to order their actions,
and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the
bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of
any other man."46Likewise, in the state of nature, it was self-evident that all
persons were in a state of equality, "wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more
evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born
to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should
also be equal one amongst another without subordination or
subjection . . ."47 Locke quickly added, however, that though all persons are in
a state of liberty, it is not a state of license for the "state of nature has a law of
nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life health, liberty, or
possessions. . ."48 Locke also alludes to an "omnipotent, and infinitely wise
maker" whose "workmanship they (mankind) are, made to last during his (the
maker’s) . . .pleasure."49 In other words, through reason, with which human
beings arrive at the law of nature prescribing certain moral conduct, each
person can realize that he has a natural right and duty to ensure his own
survival and well-being in the world and a related duty to respect the same
right in others, and preserve mankind.50 Through reason, human beings are
capable of recognizing the need to treat others as free, independent and equal
as all individuals are equally concerned with ensuring their own lives, liberties
and properties.51 In this state of nature, the execution of the law of nature is
placed in the hands of every individual who has a right to punish transgressors
of the law of nature to an extent that will hinder its violation.52 It may be
gathered from Locke’s political theory that the rights to life, health, liberty and
property are natural rights, hence each individual has a right to be free from
violent death, from arbitrary restrictions of his person and from theft of his
property.53 In addition, every individual has a natural right to defend oneself
from and punish those who violate the law of nature.
But although the state of nature is somewhat of an Eden before the fall, there
are two harsh "inconveniences" in it, as Locke puts them, which adversely
affect the exercise of natural rights. First, natural law being an unwritten code
of moral conduct, it might sometimes be ignored if the personal interests of
certain individuals are involved. Second, without any written laws, and without
any established judges or magistrates, persons may be judges in their own
cases and self-love might make them partial to their side. On the other hand, ill
nature, passion and revenge might make them too harsh to the other side.
Hence, "nothing but confusion and disorder will follow."54 These circumstances
make it necessary to establish and enter a civil society by mutual agreement
among the people in the state of nature, i.e., based on a social contract
founded on trust and consent. Locke writes:
"The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts
on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite
into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst
another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties (used in the broad sense,
referring to life, liberty and property) and a greater security against any, that
are not of it."55
This collective agreement then culminated in the establishment of a civil
government.
Three important consequences of Locke’s theory on the origin of civil
government and its significance to the natural rights of individual subjects
should be noted. First, since it was the precariousness of the individual’s
enjoyment of his natural and equal right to life, liberty, and property that
justified the establishment of civil government, then the "central, overriding
purpose of civil government was to protect and preserve the individual’s
natural rights. For just as the formation by individuals of civil or political society
had arisen from their desire to ‘unite for the mutual Preservation of their Lives,
Liberties and Estates, which I (Locke) call by the general name, Property,’56 so,
too, did the same motive underlie - in the second stage of the social contract -
their collective decision to institute civil government."57 Locke thus maintains,
again using the term "property" in the broad sense, that, "(t)he great and chief
end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves
under government, is the preservation of their property."58 Secondly, the central
purpose that has brought a civil government into existence, i.e., the protection
of the individual’s natural rights, sets firm limits on the political authority of the
civil government. A government that violates the natural rights of its subjects
has betrayed their trust, vested in it when it was first established, thereby
undermining its own authority and losing its claim to the subjects’ obedience.
Third and finally, individual subjects have a right of last resort to collectively
resist or rebel against and overthrow a government that has failed to discharge
its duty of protecting the people’s natural rights and has instead abused its
powers by acting in an arbitrary or tyrannical manner. The overthrow of
government, however, does not lead to dissolution of civil society which came
into being before the establishment of civil government.59
Locke’s ideas, along with other modern natural law and natural rights theories,
have had a profound impact on American political and legal thought. American
law professor Philip Hamburger observes that American natural law scholars
generally agree "that natural law consisted of reasoning about humans in the
state of nature (or absence of government)" and tend "to emphasize that they
were reasoning from the equal freedom of humans and the need of humans to
preserve themselves."60 As individuals are equally free, they did not have the
right to infringe the equal rights of others; even self-preservation typically
required individuals to cooperate so as to avoid doing unto others what they
would not have others do unto them.61 With Locke’s theory of natural law as
foundation, these American scholars agree on the well-known analysis of how
individuals preserved their liberty by forming government, i.e., that in order to
address the insecurity and precariousness of one’s life, liberty and property in
the state of nature, individuals, in accordance with the principle of self-
preservation, gave up a portion of their natural liberty to civil government to
enable it "to preserve the residue."62 "People must cede to [government] some
of their natural rights, in order to vest it with powers."63 That individuals "give up
a part of their natural rights to secure the rest" in the modern natural law sense
is said to be "an old hackneyed and well known principle"64 thus:
"That Man, on entering into civil society, of necessity, sacrifices a part of his
natural liberty, has been pretty universally taken for granted by writers on
government. They seem, in general, not to have admitted a doubt of the truth
of the proposition. One feels as though it was treading on forbidden ground, to
attempt a refutation of what has been advanced by a Locke, a Bacari[a], and
some other writers and statesmen."65
But, while Locke’s theory showed the necessity of civil society and
government, it was careful to assert and protect the individual’s rights against
government invasion, thus implying a theory of limited government that both
restricted the role of the state to protect the individual’s fundamental natural
rights to life, liberty and property and prohibited the state, on moral grounds,
from violating those rights.66 The natural rights theory, which is the
characteristic American interpretation of natural law, serves as the foundation
of the well-entrenched concept of limited government in the United States. It
provides the theoretical basis of the formulation of limits on political authority
vis-à-vis the superior right of the individual which the government should
preserve.67
Locke’s ideas undoubtedly influenced Thomas Jefferson, the eminent
statesman and "philosopher of the (American) revolution and of the first
constitutional order which free men were permitted to establish."68 Jefferson
espoused Locke’s theory that man is free in the state of nature. But while
Locke limited the authority of the state with the doctrine of natural rights,
Jefferson’s originality was in his use of this doctrine as basis for a fundamental
law or constitution established by the people.69 To obviate the danger that the
government would limit natural liberty more than necessary to afford protection
to the governed, thereby becoming a threat to the very natural liberty it was
designed to protect, people had to stipulate in their constitution which natural
rights they sacrificed and which not, as it was important for them to retain
those portions of their natural liberty that were inalienable, that facilitated the
preservation of freedom, or that simply did not need to be sacrificed.70 Two
ideas are therefore fundamental in the constitution: one is the regulation of the
form of government and the other, the securing of the liberties of the
people.71 Thus, the American Constitution may be understood as comprising
three elements. First, it creates the structure and authority of a republican form
of government; second, it provides a division of powers among the different
parts of the national government and the checks and balances of these
powers; and third, it inhibits government’s power vis-à-vis the rights of
individuals, rights existent and potential, patent and latent. These three parts
have one prime objective: to uphold the liberty of the people.72
But while the constitution guarantees and protects the fundamental rights of
the people, it should be stressed that it does not create them. As held by many
of the American Revolution patriots, "liberties do not result from charters;
charters rather are in the nature of declarations of pre-existing rights."73 John
Adams, one of the patriots, claimed that natural rights are founded "in the
frame of human nature, rooted in the constitution of the intellect and moral
world."74 Thus, it is said of natural rights vis-à-vis the constitution:
". . . (t)hey exist before constitutions and independently of them. Constitutions
enumerate such rights and provide against their deprivation or infringement,
but do not create them. It is supposed that all power, all rights, and all authority
are vested in the people before they form or adopt a constitution. By such an
instrument, they create a government, and define and limit the powers which
the constitution is to secure and the government respect. But they do not
thereby invest the citizens of the commonwealth with any natural rights that
they did not before possess."75 (emphasis supplied)
A constitution is described as follows:
"A Constitution is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private
rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government; it is
not the cause, but consequence, of personal and political freedom; it grants no
rights to the people, but is the creature of their power, the instrument of their
convenience. Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and
powers which they possessed before the Constitution was made, it is but the
framework of the political government, and necessarily based upon the
preexisting condition of laws, rights, habits and modes of thought. There is
nothing primitive in it; it is all derived from a known source. It presupposes an
organized society, law, order, propriety, personal freedom, a love of political
liberty, and enough of cultivated intelligence to know how to guard against the
encroachments of tyranny."76 (emphasis supplied)
That Locke’s modern natural law and rights theory was influential to those who
framed and ratified the United States constitution and served as its theoretical
foundation is undeniable.77 In a letter in which George Washington formally
submitted the Constitution to Congress in September 1787, he spoke of the
difficulties of drafting the document in words borrowed from the standard
eighteenth-century natural rights analysis:
"Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve
the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and
circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw
with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and
those which may be reserved . . . ."78(emphasis supplied)
Natural law is thus to be understood not as a residual source of constitutional
rights but instead, as the reasoning that implied the necessity to sacrifice
natural liberty to government in a written constitution. Natural law and natural
rights were concepts that explained and justified written constitutions.79
With the establishment of civil government and a constitution, there arises a
conceptual distinction between natural rights and civil rights, difficult though to
define their scope and delineation. It has been proposed that natural rights are
those rights that "appertain to man in right of his existence."80 These were
fundamental rights endowed by God upon human beings, "all those rights of
acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not
injurious to the natural rights of others."81 On the other hand, civil rights are
those that "appertain to man in right of his being a member of society."82 These
rights, however, are derived from the natural rights of individuals since:
"Man did not enter into society to become worse off than he was before, nor to
have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights better secured.
His natural rights are the foundation of all his rights."83
Civil rights, in this sense, were those natural rights – particularly rights to
security and protection – which by themselves, individuals could not safeguard,
rather requiring the collective support of civil society and government. Thus, it
is said:
"Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the
individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all
cases, sufficiently competent."84
The distinction between natural and civil rights is "between that class of natural
rights which man retains after entering into society, and those which he throws
into the common stock as a member of society."85 The natural rights retained
by the individuals after entering civil society were "all the intellectual rights, or
rights of the mind,"86i.e., the rights to freedom of thought, to freedom of
religious belief and to freedom of expression in its various forms. The individual
could exercise these rights without government assistance, but government
has the role of protecting these natural rights from interference by others and
of desisting from itself infringing such rights. Government should also enable
individuals to exercise more effectively the natural rights they had exchanged
for civil rights –like the rights to security and protection - when they entered
into civil society.87
American natural law scholars in the 1780s and early 1790s occasionally
specified which rights were natural and which were not. On the Lockean
assumption that the state of nature was a condition in which all humans were
equally free from subjugation to one another and had no common superior,
American scholars tended to agree that natural liberty was the freedom of
individuals in the state of nature.88 Natural rights were understood to be simply
a portion of this undifferentiated natural liberty and were often broadly
categorized as the rights to life, liberty, and property; or life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. More specifically, they identified as natural rights the free
exercise of religion, freedom of conscience,89 freedom of speech and press,
right to self-defense, right to bear arms, right to assemble and right to one’s
reputation.90 In contrast, certain other rights, such as habeas corpus and jury
rights, do not exist in the state of nature, but exist only under the laws of civil
government or the constitution because they are essential for restraining
government.91 They are called civil rights not only in the sense that they are
protected by constitutions or other laws, but also in the sense that they are
acquired rights which can only exist under civil government.92
In his Constitutional Law, Black states that natural rights may be used to
describe those rights which belong to man by virtue of his nature and depend
upon his personality. "His existence as an individual human being, clothed with
certain attributes, invested with certain capacities, adapted to certain kind of
life, and possessing a certain moral and physical nature, entitles him, without
the aid of law, to such rights as are necessary to enable him to continue his
existence, develop his faculties, pursue and achieve his destiny."93 An example
of a natural right is the right to life. In an organized society, natural rights must
be protected by law, "and although they owe to the law neither their existence
nor their sacredness, yet they are effective only when recognized and
sanctioned by law."94 Civil rights include natural rights as they are taken into
the sphere of law. However, there are civil rights which are not natural rights
such as the right of trial by jury. This right is not founded in the nature of man,
nor does it depend on personality, but it falls under the definition of civil rights
which are the rights secured by the constitution to all its citizens or inhabitants
not connected with the organization or administration of government which
belong to the domain of political rights. "Natural rights are the same all the
world over, though they may not be given the fullest recognition under all
governments. Civil rights which are not natural rights will vary in different states
or countries."95
From the foregoing definitions and distinctions, we can gather that the
inclusions in and exclusions from the scope of natural rights and civil rights are
not well-defined. This is understandable because these definitions are derived
from the nature of man which, in its profundity, depth, and fluidity, cannot
simply and completely be grasped and categorized. Thus, phrases such as
"rights appertain(ing) to man in right of his existence", or "rights which are a
portion of man’s undifferentiated natural liberty, broadly categorized as the
rights to life, liberty, and property; or life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness",
or "rights that belong to man by virtue of his nature and depend upon his
personality" serve as guideposts in identifying a natural right. Nevertheless,
although the definitions of natural right and civil right are not uniform and exact,
we can derive from the foregoing definitions that natural rights exist prior to
constitutions, and may be contained in and guaranteed by them. Once these
natural rights enter the constitutional or statutory sphere, they likewise acquire
the character of civil rights in the broad sense (as opposed to civil rights
distinguished from political rights), without being stripped of their nature as
natural rights. There are, however, civil rights which are not natural rights but
are merely created and protected by the constitution or other law such as the
right to a jury trial.
Long after Locke conceived of his ideas of natural rights, civil society, and civil
government, his concept of natural rights continued to flourish in the modern
and contemporary period. About a hundred years after the Treatise of
Government, Locke’s natural law and rights theory was restated by the
eighteenth-century political thinker and activist, Thomas Paine. He wrote his
classic text, The Rights of Man, Part 1 where he argued that the central
purpose of all governments was to protect the natural and imprescriptible rights
of man. Citing the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
Citizens, Paine identified these rights as the right to liberty, property, security
and resistance of oppression. All other civil and political rights - such as to
limits on government, to freedom to choose a government, to freedom of
speech, and to fair taxation - were derived from those fundamental natural
rights.96
Paine inspired and actively assisted the American Revolution and defended
the French Revolution. His views were echoed by the authors of the American
and the French declarations that accompanied these democratic
revolutions.97 The American Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, the
revolutionary manifesto of the thirteen newly-independent states of America
that were formerly colonies of Britain, reads:
"We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from
the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such
Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."98 (emphasis supplied)
His phrase "rights of man" was used in the 1789 French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of Citizens, proclaimed by the French Constituent Assembly
in August 1789, viz:
"The representatives of the French people, constituted in a National Assembly,
considering that ignorance, oblivion or contempt of the Rights of Man are the
only causes of public misfortunes and of the corruption of governments, have
resolved to lay down in a solemn Declaration, the natural, inalienable and
sacred Rights of Man, in order that this Declaration, being always before all the
members of the Social Body, should constantly remind them of their Rights
and their Duties. . ."99 (emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, the phrase "rights of man" gradually replaced "natural rights" in the
latter period of the eighteenth century, thus removing the theological
assumptions of medieval natural law theories. After the American and French
Revolutions, the doctrine of the rights of man became embodied not only in
succinct declarations of rights, but also in new constitutions which emphasized
the need to uphold the natural rights of the individual citizen against other
individuals and particularly against the state itself.100
Considerable criticism was, however, hurled against natural law and natural
rights theories, especially by the logical positivist thinkers, as these theories
were not empirically verifiable. Nevertheless, the concept of natural rights or
rights of man regained force and influence in the 1940s because of the
growing awareness of the wide scale violation of such rights perpetrated by the
Nazi dictatorship in Germany. The British leader Winston Churchill and the
American leader Franklin Roosevelt stated in the preface of their Atlantic
Charter in 1942 that "complete victory over their enemies is essential to decent
life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights
and justice, in their own land as well as in other lands." (emphasis supplied)
This time, natural right was recast in the idea of "human rights" which belong to
every human being by virtue of his or her humanity. The idea superseded the
traditional concept of rights based on notions of God-given natural law and of
social contract. Instead, the refurbished idea of "human rights" was based on
the assumption that each individual person was entitled to an equal degree of
respect as a human being.101
With this historical backdrop, the United Nations Organization published in
1948 its Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a systematic
attempt to secure universal recognition of a whole gamut of human rights. The
Declaration affirmed the importance of civil and political rights such as the
rights to life, liberty, property; equality before the law; privacy; a fair trial;
freedom of speech and assembly, of movement, of religion, of participation in
government directly or indirectly; the right to political asylum, and the absolute
right not to be tortured. Aside from these, but more controversially, it affirmed
the importance of social and economic rights.102 The UDHR is not a treaty and
its provisions are not binding law, but it is a compromise of conflicting
ideological, philosophical, political, economic, social and juridical ideas which
resulted from the collective effort of 58 states on matters generally considered
desirable and imperative. It may be viewed as a "blending (of) the deepest
convictions and ideals of different civilizations into one universal expression of
faith in the rights of man."103
On December 16, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Rights providing for the mechanism
of checking state compliance to the international human rights instruments
such as through a reportorial requirement among governments. These treaties
entered into force on March 23, 1976104 and are binding as international law
upon governments subscribing to them. Although admittedly, there will be
differences in interpreting particular statements of rights and freedoms in these
United Nations instruments "in the light of varied cultures and historical
traditions, the basis of the covenants is a common agreement on the
fundamental objective of the dignity and worth of the human person. Such
agreement is implied in adherence to the (United Nations) Charter and
corresponds to the universal urge for freedom and dignity which strives for
expression, despite varying degrees of culture and civilization and despite the
countervailing forces of repression and authoritarianism."105
Human rights and fundamental freedoms were affirmed by the United Nations
Organization in the different instruments embodying these rights not just as a
solemn protest against the Nazi-fascist method of government, but also as a
recognition that the "security of individual rights, like the security of national
rights, was a necessary requisite to a peaceful and stable world
order."106 Moskowitz wrote:
"The legitimate concern of the world community with human rights and
fundamental freedoms stems in large part from the close relation they bear to
the peace and stability of the world. World War II and its antecedents, as well
as contemporary events, clearly demonstrate the peril inherent in the doctrine
which accepts the state as the sole arbiter in questions pertaining to the rights
and freedoms of the citizen. The absolute power exercised by a government
over its citizens is not only a source of disorder in the international community;
it can no longer be accepted as the only guaranty of orderly social existence at
home. But orderly social existence is ultimately a matter which rests in the
hands of the citizen. Unless the citizen can assert his human rights and
fundamental freedoms against his own government under the protection of the
international community, he remains at the mercy of the superior power."107
Similar to natural rights and civil rights, human rights as the refurbished idea of
natural right in the 1940s, eludes definition. The usual definition that it is the
right which inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity seemingly begs
the question. Without doubt, there are certain rights and freedoms so
fundamental as to be inherent and natural such as the integrity of the person
and equality of persons before the law which should be guaranteed by all
constitutions of all civilized countries and effectively protected by their laws.108 It
is nearly universally agreed that some of those rights are religious toleration, a
general right to dissent, and freedom from arbitrary punishment.109 It is not
necessarily the case, however, that what the law guarantees as a human right
in one country should also be guaranteed by law in all other countries. Some
human rights might be considered fundamental in some countries, but not in
others. For example, trial by jury which we have earlier cited as an example of
a civil right which is not a natural right, is a basic human right in the United
States protected by its constitution, but not so in Philippine
jurisdiction.110 Similar to natural rights, the definition of human rights is derived
from human nature, thus understandably not exact. The definition that it is a
"right which inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity", however, can
serve as a guideline to identify human rights. It seems though that the concept
of human rights is broadest as it encompasses a human person’s natural rights
(e.g., religious freedom) and civil rights created by law (e.g. right to trial by
jury).
In sum, natural law and natural rights are not relic theories for academic
discussion, but have had considerable application and influence. Natural law
and natural rights theories have played an important role in the Declaration of
Independence, the Abolition (anti-slavery) movement, and parts of the modern
Civil Rights movement.111 In charging Nazi and Japanese leaders with "crimes
against humanity" at the end of the Second World War, Allied tribunals in 1945
invoked the traditional concept of natural law to override the defense that those
charged had only been obeying the laws of the regimes they
served.112 Likewise, natural law, albeit called by another name such as
"substantive due process" which is grounded on reason and fairness, has
served as legal standard for international law, centuries of development in the
English common law, and certain aspects of American constitutional law.113 In
controversies involving the Bill of Rights, the natural law standards of
"reasonableness" and "fairness" or "justified on balance" are used. Questions
such as these are common: "Does this form of government involvement with
religion endanger religious liberty in a way that seems unfair to some group?
Does permitting this restriction on speech open the door to government abuse
of political opponents? Does this police investigative practice interfere with
citizens’ legitimate interests in privacy and security?"114 Undeniably, natural law
and natural rights theories have carved their niche in the legal and political
arena.
III. Natural Law and Natural Rights  administration of government. They include the rights to property, marriage,
in Philippine Cases and the Constitution  equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined,
A. Traces of Natural Law and  civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a
Natural Rights Theory in Supreme Court Cases
Although the natural law and natural rights foundation is not articulated, some
Philippine cases have made reference to natural law and rights without raising
controversy. For example, in People v. Asas,115 the Court admonished courts to
consider cautiously an admission or confession of guilt especially when it is
alleged to have been obtained by intimidation and force. The Court said:
"(w)ithal, aversion of man against forced self-affliction is a matter of Natural
Law."116 In People v. Agbot,117 we did not uphold lack of instruction as an
excuse for killing because we recognized the "offense of taking one’s life being
forbidden by natural law and therefore within instinctive knowledge and feeling
of every human being not deprived of reason."118 In Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. v.
Diocares, et al.,119 Chief Justice Fernando acknowledged the influence of
natural law in stressing that the element of a promise is the basis of contracts.
In Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,120 the Court
invoked the doctrine of estoppel which we have repeatedly pronounced is
predicated on, and has its origin in equity, which broadly defined, is justice
according to natural law. In Yu Con v. Ipil, et al.,121 we recognized the
application of natural law in maritime commerce.
The Court has also identified in several cases certain natural rights such as the
right to liberty,122 the right of expatriation,123 the right of parents over their
children which provides basis for a parent’s visitorial rights over his illegitimate
children,124 and the right to the fruits of one’s industry.125
In Simon, Jr. et al. v. Commission on Human Rights,126 the Court defined
human rights, civil rights, and political rights. In doing so, we considered the
United Nations instruments to which the Philippines is a signatory, namely the
UDHR which we have ruled in several cases as binding upon the
Philippines,127 the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Still, we observed that "human
rights" is so generic a term that at best, its definition is inconclusive. But the
term "human rights" is closely identified to the "universally accepted traits and
attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his
inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life,"128 i.e.,
the individual’s social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations.129 On the
other hand, we defined civil rights as referring to:
". . . those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a
wider sense, to all inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action."130
Guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable
searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt are also identified as civil
rights.131 The Court’s definition of civil rights was made in light of their
distinction from political rights which refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the
rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.132
To distill whether or not the Court’s reference to natural law and natural rights
finds basis in a natural law tradition that has influenced Philippine law and
government, we turn to Philippine constitutional law history.
B. History of the Philippine Constitution
and the Bill of Rights
During the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, Filipinos ardently fought for
their fundamental rights. The Propaganda Movement spearheaded by our
national hero Jose Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar, and Graciano Lopez-Jaena
demanded assimilation of the Philippines by Spain, and the extension to
Filipinos of rights enjoyed by Spaniards under the Spanish Constitution such
as the inviolability of person and property, specifically freedom from arbitrary
action by officialdom particularly by the Guardia Civil and from arbitrary
detention and banishment of citizens. They clamored for their right to liberty of
conscience, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of association,
freedom of worship, freedom to choose a profession, the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances, and the right to an opportunity for
education. They raised the roof for an end to the abuses of religious
corporations.133
With the Propaganda Movement having apparently failed to bring about
effective reforms, Andres Bonifacio founded in 1892 the secret society of the
Katipunan to serve as the military arm of the secessionist movement whose
principal aim was to create an independent Filipino nation by armed
revolution.134 While preparing for separation from Spain, representatives of the
movement engaged in various constitutional projects that would reflect the
longings and aspirations of the Filipino people. On May 31, 1897, a republican
government was established in Biak-na-Bato, followed on November 1, 1897
by the unanimous adoption of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, popularly known as the Constitution of Biak-na-Bato, by the
revolution’s representatives. The document was an almost exact copy of the
Cuban Constitution of Jimaguayu,135 except for four articles which its authors
Felix Ferrer and Isabelo Artacho added. These four articles formed the
constitution’s Bill of Rights and protected, among others, religious liberty, the
right of association, freedom of the press, freedom from imprisonment except
by virtue of an order issued by a competent court, and freedom from
deprivation of property or domicile except by virtue of judgment passed by a
competent court of authority.136
The Biak-na-Bato Constitution was projected to have a life-span of two years,
after which a final constitution would be drafted. Two months after it was
adopted, however, the Pact of Biak-na-Bato was signed whereby the Filipino
military leaders agreed to cease fighting against the Spaniards and guaranteed
peace for at least three years, in exchange for monetary indemnity for the
Filipino men in arms and for promised reforms. Likewise, General Emilio
Aguinaldo, who by then had become the military leader after Bonifacio’s death,
agreed to leave the Philippines with other Filipino leaders. They left for
Hongkong in December 1897.
A few months later, the Spanish-American war broke out in April 1898. Upon
encouragement of American officials, Aguinaldo came back to the Philippines
and set up a temporary dictatorial government with himself as dictator. In June
1898, the dictatorship was terminated and Aguinaldo became the President of
the Revolutionary Government.137 By this time, the relations between the
American troops and the Filipino forces had become precarious as it became
more evident that the Americans planned to stay. In September 1898, the
Revolutionary Congress was inaugurated whose primary goal was to formulate
and promulgate a Constitution. The fruit of their efforts was the Malolos
Constitution which, as admitted by Felipe Calderon who drafted it, was based
on the constitutions of South American Republics138 while the Bill of Rights was
substantially a copy of the Spanish Constitution.139 The Bill of Rights included
among others, freedom of religion, freedom from arbitrary arrests and
imprisonment, security of the domicile and of papers and effects against
arbitrary searches and seizures, inviolability of correspondence, due process in
criminal prosecutions, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and right
of peaceful petition for the redress of grievances. Its Article 28 stated that
"(t)he enumeration of the rights granted in this title does not imply the
prohibition of any others not expressly stated."140 This suggests that natural law
was the source of these rights.141 The Malolos Constitution was short-lived. It
went into effect in January 1899, about two months before the ratification of the
Treaty of Paris transferring sovereignty over the Islands to the United States.
Within a month after the constitution’s promulgation, war with the United States
began and the Republic survived for only about ten months. On March 23,
1901, American forces captured Aguinaldo and a week later, he took his oath
of allegiance to the United States.142
In the early months of the war against the United States, American President
McKinley sent the First Philippine Commission headed by Jacob Gould
Schurman to assess the Philippine situation. On February 2, 1900, in its report
to the President, the Commission stated that the Filipino people wanted above
all a "guarantee of those fundamental human rights which Americans hold to
be the natural and inalienable birthright of the individual but which under
Spanish domination in the Philippines had been shamefully invaded and
ruthlessly trampled upon."143(emphasis supplied) In response to this, President
McKinley, in his Instruction of April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine
Commission, provided an authorization and guide for the establishment of a
civil government in the Philippines and stated that "(u)pon every division and
branch of the government of the Philippines . . . must be imposed these
inviolable rules . . ." These "inviolable rules" were almost literal reproductions
of the First to Ninth and the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, with the addition of the prohibition of bills of attainder and ex post
facto laws in Article 1, Section 9 of said Constitution. The "inviolable rules" or
Bill of Rights provided, among others, that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled to be a witness against
himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Scholars
have characterized the Instruction as the "Magna Charta of the Philippines"
and as a "worthy rival of the Laws of the Indies."144
The "inviolable rules" of the Instruction were re-enacted almost exactly in the
Philippine Bill of 1902,145 an act which temporarily provided for the
administration of the affairs of the civil government in the Philippine
Islands,146 and in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916,147 otherwise known as
the Jones Law, which was an act to declare the purpose of the people of the
United States as to the future of the Philippine Islands and to provide an
autonomous government for it.148 These three organic acts - the Instruction, the
Philippine Bill of 1902, and the Jones Law - extended the guarantees of the
American Bill of Rights to the Philippines. In Kepner v. United States,149 Justice
Day prescribed the methodology for applying these "inviolable rules" to the
Philippines, viz: "(t)hese principles were not taken from the Spanish law; they
were carefully collated from our own Constitution, and embody almost verbatim
the safeguards of that instrument for the protection of life and liberty."150 Thus,
the "inviolable rules" should be applied in the sense "which has been placed
upon them in construing the instrument from which they were
taken."151(emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, the Philippine Independence Law, popularly known as the Tydings-
McDuffie Law of 1934, was enacted. It guaranteed independence to the
Philippines and authorized the drafting of a Philippine Constitution. The law
provided that the government should be republican in form and the
Constitution to be drafted should contain a Bill of Rights.152 Thus, the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 was convened. In drafting the Constitution,
the Convention preferred to be generally conservative on the belief that to be
stable and permanent, the Constitution must be anchored on the experience of
the people, "providing for institutions which were the natural outgrowths of the
national life."153 As the people already had a political organization buttressed by
national traditions, the Constitution was to sanctify these institutions tested by
time and the Filipino people’s experience and to confirm the practical and
substantial rights of the people. Thus, the institutions and philosophy adopted
in the Constitution drew substantially from the organic acts which had
governed the Filipinos for more than thirty years, more particularly the Jones
Law of 1916. In the absence of Philippine precedents, the Convention
considered precedents of American origin that might be suitable to our
substantially American political system and to the Filipino psychology and
traditions.154 Thus, in the words of Claro M. Recto, President of the
Constitutional Convention, the 1935 Constitution was "frankly an imitation of
the American charter."155
Aside from the heavy American influence, the Constitution also bore traces of
the Malolos Constitution, the German Constitution, the Constitution of the
Republic of Spain, the Mexican Constitution, and the Constitutions of several
South American countries, and the English unwritten constitution. Though the
Tydings-McDuffie law mandated a republican constitution and the inclusion of
a Bill of Rights, with or without such mandate, the Constitution would have
nevertheless been republican because the Filipinos were satisfied with their
experience of a republican government; a Bill of Rights would have
nonetheless been also included because the people had been accustomed to
the role of a Bill of Rights in the past organic acts.156
The Bill of Rights in the 1935 Constitution was reproduced largely from the
report of the Convention’s committee on bill of rights. The report was mostly a
copy of the Bill of Rights in the Jones Law, which in turn was borrowed from
the American constitution. Other provisions in the report drew from the Malolos
Constitution and the constitutions of the Republic of Spain, Italy and Japan.
There was a conscious effort to retain the phraseology of the well-known
provisions of the Jones Law because of the jurisprudence that had built around
them. The Convention insistently avoided including provisions in the Bill of
Rights not tested in the Filipino experience.157 Thus, upon submission of its
draft bill of rights to the President of the Convention, the committee on bill of
rights stated:
"Adoption and adaptation have been the relatively facile work of your
committee in the formulation of a bill or declaration of rights to be incorporated
in the Constitution of the Philippine Islands. No attempt has been made to
incorporate new or radical changes. . .
The enumeration of individual rights in the present organic law (Acts of
Congress of July 1, 1902, August 29, 1916) is considered ample,
comprehensive and precise enough to safeguard the rights and immunities of
Filipino citizens against abuses or encroachments of the Government, its
powers or agents. . .
Modifications or changes in phraseology have been avoided, wherever
possible. This is because the principles must remain couched in a
language expressive of their historical background, nature, extent and
limitations, as construed and expounded by the great statesmen and
jurists that have vitalized them."158(emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution was approved by the Convention on February 8, 1935
and signed on February 19, 1935. On March 23, 1935, United States President
Roosevelt affixed his signature on the Constitution. By an overwhelming
majority, the Filipino voters ratified it on May 14, 1935.159
Then dawned the decade of the 60s. There grew a clamor to revise the 1935
charter for it to be more responsive to the problems of the country, specifically
in the socio-economic arena and to the sources of threats to the security of the
Republic identified by then President Marcos. In 1970, delegates to the
Constitution Convention were elected, and they convened on June 1, 1971. In
their deliberations, "the spirit of moderation prevailed, and the . . . Constitution
was hardly notable for its novelty, much less a radical departure from our
constitutional tradition."160Our rights in the 1935 Constitution were reaffirmed
and the government to which we have been accustomed was instituted, albeit
taking on a parliamentary rather than presidential form.161
The Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution had minimal difference from its
counterpart in the 1935 Constitution. Previously, there were 21 paragraphs in
one section, now there were twenty-three. The two rights added were the
recognition of the people’s right to access to official records and documents
and the right to speedy disposition of cases. To the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, a second paragraph was added that evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.162
The 1973 Constitution went into effect on January 17, 1973 and remained the
fundamental law until President Corazon Aquino rose to power in defiance of
the 1973 charter and upon the "direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people"163 in the EDSA Revolution of February 23-25, 1986. On February 25,
1986, she issued Proclamation No. 1 recognizing that "sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them" and that she
and Vice President Salvador Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the
will of the Filipino people."164 The old legal order, constitution and enactments
alike, was overthrown by the new administration.165 A month thenceforth,
President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3, "Declaring National Policy to
Implement the Reforms Mandated by the People, Protecting their Basic Rights,
Adopting a Provisional Constitution, and Providing for an Orderly Transition to
Government under a New Constitution." The Provisional Constitution,
otherwise known as the "Freedom Constitution" adopted certain provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, including the Bill of Rights which was adopted in toto,
and provided for the adoption of a new constitution within 60 days from the
date of Proclamation No. 3.166
Pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, the 1986 Constitutional Commission
drafted the 1987 Constitution which was ratified and became effective on
February 2, 1987.167 As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, it retained a
republican system of government, but emphasized and created more channels
for the exercise of the sovereignty of the people through recall, initiative,
referendum and plebiscite.168 Because of the wide-scale violation of human
rights during the dictatorship, the 1987 Constitution contains a Bill of Rights
which more jealously safeguards the people’s "fundamental liberties in the
essence of a constitutional democracy", in the words of ConCom delegate Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J.169 It declares in its state policies that "(t)he state values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights."170 In addition, it has a separate Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, under which, the Commission on Human Rights was created.171
Considering the American model and origin of the Philippine constitution, it is
not surprising that Filipino jurists and legal scholars define and explain the
nature of the Philippine constitution in similar terms that American
constitutional law scholars explain their constitution. Chief Justice Fernando,
citing Laski, wrote about the basic purpose of a civil society and government,
viz:
"The basic purpose of a State, namely to assure the happiness and welfare of
its citizens is kept foremost in mind. To paraphrase Laski, it is not an end in
itself but only a means to an end, the individuals composing it in their separate
and identifiable capacities having rights which must be respected. It is their
happiness then, and not its interest, that is the criterion by which its behavior is
to be judged; and it is their welfare, and not the force at its command, that sets
the limits to the authority it is entitled to exercise."172 (emphasis supplied)
Citing Hamilton, he also defines a constitution along the lines of the natural law
theory as "a law for the government, safeguarding (not creating) individual
rights, set down in writing."173 (emphasis supplied) This view is accepted by
Tañada and Fernando who wrote that the constitution "is a written instrument
organizing the government, distributing its powers and safeguarding the rights
of the people."174 Chief Justice Fernando also quoted Schwartz that "a
constitution is seen as an organic instrument, under which governmental
powers are both conferred and circumscribed. Such stress upon both grant
and limitation of authority is fundamental in American theory. ‘The office and
purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental
activity.’"175 Malcolm and Laurel define it according to Justice Miller’s definition
in his opus on the American Constitution176 published in 1893 as "the written
instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established,
limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the
several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the
body politic."177 The constitution exists to assure that in the government’s
discharge of its functions, the "dignity that is the birthright of every human
being is duly safeguarded."178
Clearly then, at the core of constitutionalism is a strong concern for individual
rights179 as in the modern period natural law theories. Justice Laurel as
delegate to the 1934 Constitutional Convention declared in a major address
before the Convention:
"There is no constitution, worthy of the name, without a bill or declaration of
rights. (It is) the palladium of the people’s liberties and immunities, so that their
persons, homes, their peace, their livelihood, their happiness and their
freedom may be safe and secure from an ambitious ruler, an envious neighbor,
or a grasping state."180
As Chairman of the Committee on the Declaration of Rights, he stated:
"The history of the world is the history of man and his arduous struggle for
liberty. . . . It is the history of those brave and able souls who, in the ages that
are past, have labored, fought and bled that the government of the lash - that
symbol of slavery and despotism - might endure no more. It is the history of
those great self-sacrificing men who lived and suffered in an age of cruelty,
pain and desolation, so that every man might stand, under the protection of
great rights and privileges, the equal of every other man."181
Being substantially a copy of the American Bill of Rights, the history of our Bill
of Rights dates back to the roots of the American Bill of Rights. The latter is a
charter of the individual’s liberties and a limitation upon the power of the
state182 which traces its roots to the English Magna Carta of 1215, a first in
English history for a written instrument to be secured from a sovereign ruler by
the bulk of the politically articulate community that intended to lay down binding
rules of law that the ruler himself may not violate. "In Magna Carta is to be
found the germ of the root principle that there are fundamental individual rights
that the State -sovereign though it is - may not infringe."183(emphasis supplied)
In Sales v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,184 quoting Allado v. Diokno,185 this Court ruled
that the Bill of Rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights, viz:
"The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and
discriminatory use of political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the
preservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty and security
against invasion by the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities."186 (emphasis supplied)
We need, however, to fine tune this pronouncement of the Court, considering
that certain rights in our Bill of Rights, for example habeas corpus, have been
identified not as a natural right, but a civil right created by law. Likewise, the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures has been identified in Simon
as a civil right, without expounding however what civil right meant therein -
whether a natural right existing before the constitution and protected by it, thus
acquiring the status of a civil right; or a right created merely by law and non-
existent in the absence of law. To understand the nature of the right against
unreasonable search and seizure and the corollary right to exclusion of
evidence obtained therefrom, we turn a heedful eye on the history, concept
and purpose of these guarantees.
IV. History of the Guarantee against 
Unreasonable Search and Seizure and the 
Right to Exclusion of Illegally Seized Evidence 
in the United States and in the Philippines
The origin of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure in the
Philippine constitutions can be traced back to hundreds of years ago in a land
distant from the Philippines. Needless to say, the right is well-entrenched in
history.
The power to search in England was first used as an instrument to oppress
objectionable publications.187 Not too long after the printing press was
developed, seditious and libelous publications became a concern of the
Crown, and a broad search and seizure power developed to suppress these
publications.188 General warrants were regularly issued that gave all kinds of
people the power to enter and seize at their discretion under the authority of
the Crown to enforce publication licensing statutes.189 In 1634, the ultimate
ignominy in the use of general warrants came when the early "great illuminary
of the common law,"190 and most influential of the Crown’s opponents,191 Sir
Edward Coke, while on his death bed, was subjected to a ransacking search
and the manuscripts of his Institutes were seized and carried away as
seditious and libelous publications.192
The power to issue general warrants and seize publications grew. They were
also used to search for and seize smuggled goods.193 The developing common
law tried to impose limits on the broad power to search to no avail. In his
History of the Pleas of Crown, Chief Justice Hale stated unequivocally that
general warrants were void and that warrants must be used on "probable
cause" and with particularity.194 Member of Parliament, William Pitt, made his
memorable and oft-quoted speech against the unrestrained power to search:
"The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail - its roof may shake - the wind may blow through it - the
storm may enter - the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter;
all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement."195
Nevertheless, legislation authorizing general warrants continued to be
passed.196
In the 16th century, writs of assistance, called as such because they
commanded all officers of the Crown to participate in their execution,197 were
also common. These writs authorized searches and seizures for enforcement
of import duty laws.198 The "same powers and authorities" and the "like
assistance" that officials had in England were given to American customs
officers when parliament extended the customs laws to the colonies. The
abuse in the writs of assistance was not only that they were general, but they
were not returnable and once issued, lasted six months past the life of the
sovereign.199
These writs caused profound resentment in the colonies.200 They were
predominantly used in Massachusetts, the largest port in the colonies201 and
the seat of the American revolution. When the writs expired six months after
the death of George II in October 1760,202 sixty-three Boston merchants who
were opposed to the writs retained James Otis, Jr. to petition the Superior
Court for a hearing on the question of whether new writs should be
issued.203 Otis used the opportunity to denounce England’s whole policy to the
colonies and on general warrants.204 He pronounced the writs of assistance as
"the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty
and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law
book" since they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty
officer."205 Otis was a visionary and apparently made the first argument for
judicial review and nullifying of a statute exceeding the legislature’s power
under the Constitution and "natural law."206 This famous debate in February
1761 in Boston was "perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the
resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country. ‘Then and
there,’ said John Adams, ‘then and there was the first scene of the first act of
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born.’"207 But the Superior Court nevertheless held that the
writs could be issued.208
Once the customs officials had the writs, however, they had great difficulty
enforcing the customs laws owing to rampant smuggling and mob resistance
from the citizenry.209 The revolution had begun. The Declaration of
Independence followed. The use of general warrants and writs of assistance in
enforcing customs and tax laws was one of the causes of the American
Revolution.210
Back in England, shortly after the Boston debate, John Wilkes, a member of
Parliament, anonymously published the North Briton, a series of pamphlets
criticizing the policies of the British government.211 In 1763, one pamphlet was
very bold in denouncing the government. Thus, the Secretary of the State
issued a general warrant to "search for the authors, printers, and publishers of
[the] seditious and treasonable paper."212 Pursuant to the warrant, Wilkes’
house was searched and his papers were indiscriminately seized. He sued the
perpetrators and obtained a judgment for damages. The warrant was
pronounced illegal "as totally subversive of the liberty" and "person and
property of every man in this kingdom."213
Seeing Wilkes’ success, John Entick filed an action for trespass for the search
and seizure of his papers under a warrant issued earlier than Wilkes’. This
became the case of Entick v. Carrington,214 considered a landmark of the law of
search and seizure and called a familiar "monument of English
freedom".215 Lord Camden, the judge, held that the general warrant for Entick’s
papers was invalid. Having described the power claimed by the Secretary of
the State for issuing general search warrants, and the manner in which they
were executed, Lord Camden spoke these immortalized words, viz:
"Such is the power and therefore one would naturally expect that the law to
warrant it should be clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant. If it is law, it
will be found in our books; if it is not to be found there, it is not law.
The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their property.
That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it
has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the
whole. The cases where this right of property is set aside by positive law are
various. Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes, etc., are all of this
description, wherein every man by common consent gives up that right for the
sake of justice and the general good. By the laws of England, every invasion of
private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot
upon my ground without my license but he is liable to an action though the
damage be nothing; which is proved by every declaration in trespass where
the defendant is called upon to answer for bruising the grass and even
treading upon the soil. If he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way of
justification that some positive law has justified or excused him. . . If no such
excuse can be found or produced, the silence of the books is an authority
against the defendant and the plaintiff must have judgment. . ."216 (emphasis
supplied)
The experience of the colonies on the writs of assistance which spurred the
Boston debate and the Entick case which was a "monument of freedom" that
every American statesman knew during the revolutionary and formative period
of America, could be confidently asserted to have been "in the minds of those
who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered
as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and
seizures."217
The American experience with the writs of assistance and the Entick case
were considered by the United States Supreme Court in the first major case to
discuss the scope of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search
and seizure in the 1885 case of Boyd v. United States, supra, where the court
ruled, viz:
"The principles laid down in this opinion (Entick v. Carrington, supra) affect the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the
concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious
circumstances; they apply to all invasions, on the part of the Government and
its employees, of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not
the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes
the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense; it is the invasion
of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord
Camden’s judgment."218(emphasis supplied)
In another landmark case of 1914, Weeks v. United States,219 the Court, citing
Adams v. New York,220 reiterated that the Fourth Amendment was intended to
secure the citizen in person and property against the unlawful invasion of the
sanctity of his home by officers of the law, acting under legislative or judicial
sanction.
With this genesis of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and
the jurisprudence that had built around it, the Fourth Amendment guarantee
was extended by the United States to the Filipinos in succinct terms in
President McKinley’s Instruction of April 7, 1900, viz:
". . . that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated."221
This provision in the Instruction was re-enacted in Section 5 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, this time with a provision on warrants, viz:
"That the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated.
x x x           x x x          x x x
That no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized."222
The above provisions were reproduced verbatim in the Jones Law of 1916.
Then came the 1935 Constitution which provides in Article IV, Section 1(3), viz:
"Section 1(3). The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Initially, the Constitutional Convention’s committee on bill of rights proposed an
exact copy of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in their
draft, viz:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."223
During the debates of the Convention, however, Delegate Vicente Francisco
proposed to amend the provision by inserting the phrase "to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witness he may produce" in lieu of "supported by oath or affirmation." His
proposal was based on Section 98 of General Order No. 58 or the Code of
Criminal Procedure then in force in the Philippines which provided that: "(t)he
judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath
or affirmation the complainant and any witness he may produce and take their
deposition in writing."224 The amendment was accepted as it was a remedy
against the evils pointed out in the debates, brought about by the issuance of
warrants, many of which were in blank, upon mere affidavits on facts which
were generally found afterwards to be false.225
When the Convention patterned the 1935 Constitution’s guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures after the Fourth Amendment, the
Convention made specific reference to the Boyd case and traced the history of
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure back to the issuance
of general warrants and writs of assistance in England and the American
colonies.226 From the Boyd case, it may be derived that our own Constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is an almost
exact copy of the Fourth Amendment, seeks to protect rights to security of
person and property as well as privacy in one’s home and possessions.
Almost 40 years after the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, the provision on
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was amended in Article
IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge,
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
Noticeably, there were three modifications of the 1935 counterpart, namely: (1)
the clause was made applicable to searches and seizures "of whatever nature
and for any purpose"; (2) the provision on warrants was expressly made
applicable to both "search warrant or warrant of arrest"; and (3) probable
cause was made determinable not only by a judge, but also by "such other
officer as may be authorized by law."227 But the concept and purpose of the
right remained substantially the same.
As a corollary to the above provision on searches and seizures, the
exclusionary rule made its maiden appearance in Article IV, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution, viz:
"Section 4 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and
order require otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
That evidence obtained in violation of the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures is inadmissible was an adoption of the Court’s ruling in
the 1967 case of Stonehill v. Diokno.228
Sections 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution were adopted in toto in Article I,
Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution which took effect on March 25, 1986,
viz:
"Section 1. The provision of . . . ARTICLE IV (Bill of Rights) . . . of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, remain in force and effect and are hereby adopted
in toto as part of this Provisional Constitution."229
Thereafter, pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, the 1987 Constitution was
drafted and ratified on February 2, 1987. Sections 2 and 3, Article III thereof
provide:
"Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Section 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The significant modification of Section 2 is that probable cause may be
determined only by a judge and no longer by "such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law." This was a reversion to the counterpart provision in
the 1935 Constitution.
Parenthetically, in the international arena, the UDHR provides a similar
protection in Article 12, viz:
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks."
The ICCPR similarly protects this human right in Article 17, viz:
"1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to protection of the law against such interference or
attacks."
In the United States, jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment continued to
grow from the Boyd case. The United States Supreme Court has held that the
focal concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the individual from
arbitrary and oppressive official conduct.230 It also protects the privacies of life
and the sanctity of the person from such interference.231 In later cases, there
has been a shift in focus: it has been held that the principal purpose of the
guarantee is the protection of privacy rather than property, "[f]or the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."232 The tests that have more recently
been formulated in interpeting the provision focus on privacy rather than
intrusion of property such as the "constitutionally protected area" test in the
1961 case of Silverman v. United States233 and the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" standard in Katz v. United States234 which held that the privacy of
communication in a public telephone booth comes under the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.
Despite the shift in focus of the Fourth Amendment in American jurisdiction,
the essence of this right in Philippine jurisdiction has consistently been
understood as respect for one’s personality, property, home, and privacy. Chief
Justice Fernando explains, viz:
"It is deference to one’s personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could
be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area,
primarily one’s home, but not necessarily excluding an office or a hotel room.
(Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be regarded
is a man’s prerogative to choose who is allowed entry in his residence, for him
to retreat from the cares and pressures, even at times the oppressiveness of
the outside world, where he can truly be himself with his family. In that haven
of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall
be welcome but likewise in the objects he wants around him. There the state,
however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. (Cf. Cooley: ‘Near in importance to exemption from any
arbitrary control of the person is that maxim of the common law which secures
to the citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the government,
and protection in person, property, and papers against even the process of the
law, except in specified cases. The maxim that ‘every man’s house is his
castle,’ is made part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of
high value to the citizen.’ (1 Constitutional Limitations, pp. 610-611 [1927]) In
the language of Justice Laurel, this provision is ‘intended to bulwark individual
security, home, and legitimate possessions’ (Rodriquez v. Vollamiel, 65 Phil.
230, 239 (1937). Laurel con.) Thus is protected ‘his personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.’ There is to be no invasion
‘on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s
home and the privacies of life.’ (Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630
[1886])"235 (emphasis supplied)
As early as 1904, the Court has affirmed the sanctity and privacy of the home
in United States v. Arceo,236 viz:
"The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the
individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized
nations. No one can enter into the home of another without the consent of its
owners or occupants.
The privacy of the home - the place of abode, the place where man with
his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife
and children unmolested by anyone, even the king, except in rare cases -
has always been regarded by civilized nations as one of the most sacred
personal rights to whom men are entitled. Both the common and the civil
law guaranteed to man the right to absolute protection to the privacy of his
home. The king was powerful; he was clothed with majesty; his will was the
law, but, with few exceptions, the humblest citizen or subject might shut the
door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion
into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly
prerogatives. . .
‘A man’s house is his castle,’ has become a maxim among the civilized
peoples of the earth. His protection therein has become a matter of
constitutional protection in England, America, and Spain, as well as in other
countries.
x x x           x x x          x x x
So jealously did the people of England regard this right to enjoy, unmolested,
the privacy of their houses, that they might even take the life of the unlawful
intruder, if it be nighttime. This was also the sentiment of the Romans
expressed by Tully: ‘Quid enim sanctius quid omni religione munitius, quam
domus uniuscu jusque civium.’ "237(emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterated this in the 1911 case of United States v. De Los Reyes, et
al.,238 to demonstrate the uncompromising regard placed upon the privacy of
the home that cannot be violated by unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
"In the case of McClurg vs. Brenton (123 Iowa, 368), the court, speaking of the
right of an officer to enter a private house to search for the stolen goods, said:
‘The right of the citizen to occupy and enjoy his home, however mean or
humble, free from arbitrary invasion and search, has for centuries been
protected with the most solicitous care by every court in the English-speaking
world, from Magna Charta down to the present, and is embodied in every bill of
rights defining the limits of governmental power in our own republic.
‘The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low degree, gives
him no more right than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break in
upon the privacy of a home and subject its occupants to the indignity of a
search for the evidence of crime, without a legal warrant procured for that
purpose. No amount of incriminating evidence, whatever its source, will supply
the place of such warrant. At the closed door of the home, be it palace or
hovel, even blood-hounds must wait till the law, by authoritative process, bids it
open. . .’"239 (emphasis supplied)
It is not only respect for personality, privacy and property, but to the very
dignity of the human being that lies at the heart of the provision.
There is also public interest involved in the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure. The respect that government accords its people helps it
elicit allegiance and loyalty of its citizens. Chief Justice Fernando writes about
the right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as to privacy of
communication in this wise:
"These rights, on their face, impart meaning and vitality to that liberty which in
a constitutional regime is a man’s birth-right. There is the recognition of the
area of privacy normally beyond the power of government to intrude. Full and
unimpaired respect to that extent is accorded his personality. He is free from
the prying eyes of public officials. He is let alone, a prerogative even more
valued when the agencies of publicity manifest less and less diffidence in
impertinent and unwelcome inquiry into one’s person, his home, wherever he
may be minded to stay, his possessions, his communication. Moreover, in
addition to the individual interest, there is a public interest that is likewise
served by these constitutional safeguards. They make it easier for state
authority to enlist the loyalty and allegiance of its citizens, with the unimpaired
deference to one’s dignity and standing as a human being, not only to his
person as such but to things that may be considered necessary appurtenances
to a decent existence. A government that thus recognizes such limits and is
careful not to trespass on what is the domain subject to his sole control is likely
to prove more stable and enduring."240 (emphasis supplied)
In the 1967 case of Stonehill, et al. v. Diokno,241 this Court affirmed the sanctity
of the home and the privacy of communication and correspondence, viz:
"To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted - to
outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels
that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means."242 (emphasis
supplied)
Even after the 1961 Silverman and 1967 Katz cases in the United States,
which emphasized protection of privacy rather than property as the principal
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, this Court declared the avowed purposes
of the guarantee in the 1981 case of People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX,
Quezon City,243 viz:
"The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and
property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of
the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against
such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v.
Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to
the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every
individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol.
2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental
right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed
absolute as nothing is closer to a man’s soul than the serenity of his
privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference
allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons."244 (emphasis supplied)
Even if it were conceded that privacy and not property is the focus of the
guarantee as shown by the growing American jurisprudence, this Court has
upheld the right to privacy and its central place in a limited government such as
the Philippines’, viz:
"The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: ‘The concept of
limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection
of this private sector - protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of
the individual- has become increasingly important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of technological age - industrialization, urbanization,
and organization - operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion
to it. In modern times, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society.’"245 (emphasis supplied)
The right to privacy discussed in Justice Douglas’ dissent in the Hayden case
is illuminating. We quote it at length, viz:
"Judge Learned Hand stated a part of the philosophy of the Fourth
Amendment in United States v. Poller, 43 F2d 911, 914: ‘[I]t is only fair to
observe that the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search
itself, that invasion of a man’s privacy which consists in rummaging about
among his effects to secure evidence against him. If the search is permitted at
all, perhaps it does not make so much difference what is taken away, since the
officers will ordinarily not be interested in what does not incriminate, and there
can be no sound policy in protecting what does.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The constitutional philosophy is, I think, clear. The personal effects and
possessions of the individual (all contraband and the like excepted) are
sacrosanct from prying eyes, from the long arm of the law, from any
rummaging by police. Privacy involves the choice of the individual to
disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what he
possesses. The article may be nondescript work of art, a manuscript of a
book, a personal account book, a diary, invoices, personal clothing, jewelry, or
whatnot. Those who wrote the Bill of Rights believed that every individual
needs both to communicate with others and to keep his affairs to
himself. That dual aspect of privacy means that the individual should
have the freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when
he will share his secrets with others and decide the extent of the sharing
(footnote omitted). This is his prerogative not the States’. The Framers,
who were as knowledgeable as we, knew what police surveillance meant and
how the practice of rummaging through one’s personal effects could destroy
freedom.
x x x           x x x          x x x
I would . . . leave with the individual the choice of opening his private
effects (apart from contraband and the like) to the police and keeping
their contents as secret and their integrity inviolate. The existence of that
choice is the very essence of the right of privacy.’"246 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Griswold v. Connecticut,247 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the right to marital privacy and ruled that lawmakers could not make the use of
contraceptives a crime and sanction the search of marital bedrooms, viz:
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms
for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions."248 (emphasis supplied)
In relation to the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, private
respondent Dimaano likewise claims a right to the exclusionary rule, i.e., that
evidence obtained from an unreasonable search cannot be used in evidence
against her. To determine whether this right is available to her, we again
examine the history, concept, and purpose of this right in both the American
and Philippine jurisdictions.
The exclusionary rule has had an uneven history in both the United States and
Philippine jurisdictions. In common law, the illegal seizure of evidence did not
affect its admissibility because of the view that physical evidence was the
same however it was obtained. As distinguished from a coerced confession,
the illegal seizure did not impeach the authenticity or reliability of physical
evidence. This view prevailed in American jurisdiction until the Supreme Court
ruled in the 1914 Weeks case that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment was inadmissible in federal court as it amounted to theft by agents
of the government. This came to be known as the exclusionary rule and was
believed to deter federal law enforcers from violating the Fourth Amendment.
In 1949, the Fourth Amendment was incorporated into the Due Process Clause
under the Fourteenth Amendment249 and made applicable in the state system
in Wolf v. Colorado,250 but the Court rejected to incorporate the exclusionary
rule. At the time Wolf was decided, 17 states followed the Weeks doctrine
while 30 states did not.251 The Court reasoned:
"We cannot brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence of
such conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by way
of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence. There
are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by the
federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under State or
local authority. The public opinion of a community can far more effectively be
exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible to
the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to
bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country."252
This difference in treatment on the federal and state level of evidence obtained
illegally resulted in the "silver platter" doctrine. State law enforcement agents
would provide federal officers with illegally seized evidence, which was then
admissible in federal court because, as with illegally seized evidence by private
citizens, federal officers were not implicated in obtaining it. Thus, it was said
that state law enforcers served up the evidence in federal cases in "silver
platter." This pernicious practice was stopped with the United States Supreme
Court’s 1960 decision, Elkins v. United States.253 Twelve years after Wolf, the
United States Supreme Court reversed Wolf and incorporated the exclusionary
rule in the state system in Mapp v. Ohio254 because other means of controlling
illegal police behavior had failed.255 We quote at length the Mapp ruling as it
had a significant influence in the exclusionary rule in Philippine jurisdiction, viz:
". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf’s constitutional documentation of
the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen
years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining
open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same
unlawful conduct. . .
Since the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it is used
against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the
Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be a ‘form of words’, valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to permit this Court’s high regard as freedom ‘implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.’ At that time that the Court held in Wolf that
the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause,
the cases of this court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal
officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized
in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf ‘stoutly adhered’ to that proposition.
The right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against the
States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon
which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under
the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches - state or federal - it was logically and constitutionally necessary that
the exclusion doctrine - an essential part of the right to privacy - be also
insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could
not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege,
namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to
give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right
but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court
itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter - to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only available way - by
removing the incentive to disregard it.’ (Elkins v. United States, 364 US at 217)
x x x           x x x          x x x
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest. (Cf. Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 6 L ed 2d post, p. 1127)
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because
it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights
secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable
at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth,
gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees
him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is
entitled, and to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice."256 (emphasis supplied)
It is said that the exclusionary rule has three purposes. The major and most
often invoked is the deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures as
stated in Elkins v. United States257 and quoted in Mapp: "(t)he rule is calculated
to prevent, not repair. Its purpose is to deter – to compel respect for
constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way – by removing the
incentive to disregard it."258 Second is the "imperative of judicial integrity", i.e.,
that the courts do not become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a
Constitution they are sworn to uphold . . . by permitting unhindered
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. . . A ruling admitting evidence
in a criminal trial . . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which
produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds
the constitutional imprimatur."259 Third is the more recent purpose pronounced
by some members of the United States Supreme Court which is that "of
assuring the people – all potential victims of unlawful government conduct –
that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing
the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government."260 The focus of
concern here is not the police but the public. This third purpose is implicit in the
Mapp declaration that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional
evidence."261
In Philippine jurisdiction, the Court has likewise swung from one position to the
other on the exclusionary rule. In the 1920 case of Uy Kheytin v. Villareal,262 the
Court citing Boyd, ruled that "seizure or compulsory production of a man’s
private papers to be used against him" was tantamount to self-incrimination
and was therefore "unreasonable search and seizure." This was a proscription
against "fishing expeditions." The Court restrained the prosecution from using
the books as evidence. Five years later or in 1925, we held in People v.
Carlos263 that although the Boyd and Silverthorne Lumber Co. and Silverthorne
v. United States264 cases are authorities for the doctrine that documents
obtained by illegal searches were inadmissible in evidence in criminal cases,
Weeks modified this doctrine by adding that the illegality of the search and
seizure should have initially been directly litigated and established by a pre-trial
motion for the return of the things seized. As this condition was not met, the
illegality of the seizure was not deemed an obstacle to admissibility. The
subject evidence was nevertheless excluded, however, for being hearsay.
Thereafter, in 1932, the Court did not uphold the defense of self-incrimination
when "fraudulent books, invoices and records" that had been seized were
presented in evidence in People v. Rubio.265 The Court gave three reasons: (1)
the public has an interest in the proper regulation of the party’s books; (2) the
books belonged to a corporation of which the party was merely a manager;
and (3) the warrants were not issued to fish for evidence but to seize
"instruments used in the violation of [internal revenue] laws" and "to further
prevent the perpetration of fraud."266
The exclusionary rule applied in Uy Kheytin was reaffirmed seventeen years
thence in the 1937 case of Alvarez v. Court of First Instance267 decided under
the 1935 Constitution. The Court ruled that the seizure of books and
documents for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case
against the possessor thereof is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable and the presentation of evidence offensive of the provision
against self-incrimination. At the close of the Second World War, however, the
Court, in Alvero v. Dizon,268again admitted in evidence documents seized by
United States military officers without a search warrant in a prosecution by the
Philippine Government for treason. The Court reasoned that this was in accord
with the Laws and Customs of War and that the seizure was incidental to an
arrest and thus legal. The issue of self-incrimination was not addressed at all
and instead, the Court pronounced that even if the seizure had been illegal,
the evidence would nevertheless be admissible following jurisprudence in the
United States that evidence illegally obtained by state officers or private
persons may be used by federal officers.269
Then came Moncado v. People’s Court270 in 1948. The Court made a
categorical declaration that "it is established doctrine in the Philippines that the
admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means used for
obtaining it." It condemned the "pernicious influence" of Boyd and totally
rejected the doctrine in Weeks as "subversive of evidentiary rules in Philippine
jurisdiction." The ponencia declared that the prosecution of those guilty of
violating the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was adequate
protection for the people. Thus it became settled jurisprudence that illegally
obtained evidence was admissible if found to be relevant to the case271until the
1967 landmark decision of Stonehill v. Diokno272 which overturned the
Moncado rule. The Court held in Stonehill, viz:
". . . Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion
that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position
was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be
allowed to go free merely ‘because the constable has blundered,’ (People v.
Defore, 140 NE 585) upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained (Wolf v. Colorado, 93 L.Ed. 1782),
such as common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those
assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment,
resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal
remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach
and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures."273
The Court then quoted the portion of the Mapp case which we have quoted at
length above in affirming that the exclusionary rule is part and parcel of the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Stonehill ruling was
incorporated in Article 4, Section 4(2) of the 1973 Constitution and carried over
to Article 3, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
V. Application of the Natural Law 
Culled from History and Philosophy: 
Are the Rights Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure 
and to the Exclusion of Illegally Seized Evidence Natural Rights 
which Private Respondent Dimaano Can Invoke?
In answering this question, Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in the
Griswold case serves as a helpful guidepost to determine whether a right is so
fundamental that the people cannot be deprived of it without undermining the
tenets of civil society and government, viz:
"In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to
decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must
look to the ‘traditions and [collective] conscience of our people’ to determine
whether a principle is ‘so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.’
(Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). The inquiry is
whether a right involved ‘is of such character that it cannot be denied without
violating those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions.’ . . . Powell v. State of Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)"274 (emphasis supplied)
In deciding a case, invoking natural law as solely a matter of the judge’s
personal preference, invites criticism that the decision is a performative
contradiction and thus self-defeating. Critics would point out that while the
decision invokes natural law that abhors arbitrariness, that same decision is
tainted with what it abhors as it stands on the judge’s subjective and arbitrary
choice of a school of legal thought. Just as one judge will fight tooth and nail to
defend the natural law philosophy, another judge will match his fervor in
defending a contrary philosophy he espouses. However, invoking natural law
because the history, tradition and moral fiber of a people indubitably show
adherence to it is an altogether different story, for ultimately, in our political and
legal tradition, the people are the source of all government authority, and the
courts are their creation. While it may be argued that the choice of a school of
legal thought is a matter of opinion, history is a fact against which one cannot
argue - and it would not be turning somersault with history to say that the
American Declaration of Independence and the consequent adoption of a
constitution stood on a modern natural law theory foundation as this is
"universally taken for granted by writers on government."275 It is also well-
settled in Philippine history that the American system of government and
constitution were adopted by our 1935 Constitutional Convention as a model of
our own republican system of government and constitution. In the words of
Claro M. Recto, President of the Convention, the 1935 Constitution is "frankly
an imitation of the American Constitution." Undeniably therefore, modern
natural law theory, specifically Locke’s natural rights theory, was used by the
Founding Fathers of the American constitutional democracy and later also
used by the Filipinos.276 Although the 1935 Constitution was revised in 1973,
minimal modifications were introduced in the 1973 Constitution which was in
force prior to the EDSA Revolution. Therefore, it could confidently be asserted
that the spirit and letter of the 1935 Constitution, at least insofar as the system
of government and the Bill of Rights were concerned, still prevailed at the time
of the EDSA Revolution. Even the 1987 Constitution ratified less than a year
from the EDSA Revolution retained the basic provisions of the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions on the system of government and the Bill of Rights, with the
significant difference that it emphasized respect for and protection of human
rights and stressed that sovereignty resided in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.
Two facts are easily discernible from our constitutional history. First, the
Filipinos are a freedom-loving race with high regard for their fundamental and
natural rights. No amount of subjugation or suppression, by rulers with the
same color as the Filipinos’ skin or otherwise, could obliterate their longing and
aspiration to enjoy these rights. Without the people’s consent to submit their
natural rights to the ruler,277 these rights cannot forever be quelled, for like
water seeking its own course and level, they will find their place in the life of
the individual and of the nation; natural right, as part of nature, will take its own
course. Thus, the Filipinos fought for and demanded these rights from the
Spanish and American colonizers, and in fairly recent history, from an
authoritarian ruler. They wrote these rights in stone in every constitution they
crafted starting from the 1899 Malolos Constitution. Second, although Filipinos
have given democracy its own Filipino face, it is undeniable that our political
and legal institutions are American in origin. The Filipinos adopted the
republican form of government that the Americans introduced and the Bill of
Rights they extended to our islands, and were the keystones that kept the body
politic intact. These institutions sat well with the Filipinos who had long yearned
for participation in government and were jealous of their fundamental and
natural rights. Undergirding these institutions was the modern natural law
theory which stressed natural rights in free, independent and equal individuals
who banded together to form government for the protection of their natural
rights to life, liberty and property. The sole purpose of government is to
promote, protect and preserve these rights. And when government not only
defaults in its duty but itself violates the very rights it was established to
protect, it forfeits its authority to demand obedience of the governed and could
be replaced with one to which the people consent. The Filipino people
exercised this highest of rights in the EDSA Revolution of February 1986.
I will not endeavor to identify every natural right that the Filipinos fought for in
EDSA. The case at bar merely calls us to determine whether two particular
rights - the rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to the
exclusion of evidence obtained therefrom - have the force and effect of natural
rights which private respondent Dimaano can invoke against the government.
I shall first deal with the right against unreasonable search and seizure. On
February 25, 1986, the new president, Corazon Aquino, issued Proclamation
No. 1 where she declared that she and the vice president were taking power in
the name and by the will of the Filipino people and pledged "to do justice to the
numerous victims of human rights violations."278 It is implicit from this pledge
that the new government recognized and respected human rights. Thus, at the
time of the search on March 3, 1986, it may be asserted that the government
had the duty, by its own pledge, to uphold human rights. This presidential
issuance was what came closest to a positive law guaranteeing human rights
without enumerating them. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a positive law
granting private respondent Dimaano the right against unreasonable search
and seizure at the time her house was raided, I respectfully submit that she
can invoke her natural right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a core right implicit in the
natural right to life, liberty and property. Our well-settled jurisprudence that the
right against unreasonable search and seizure protects the people’s rights to
security of person and property, to the sanctity of the home, and to privacy is a
recognition of this proposition. The life to which each person has a right is not
a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated
by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his
person and property. The ideal of security in life and property dates back even
earlier than the modern philosophers and the American and French
revolutions, but pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of
man’s existence, thus it has been described, viz:
"The right to personal security emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It
includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and
it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are
necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and
lawful desires of the individual."279
The individual in the state of nature surrendered a portion of his
undifferentiated liberty and agreed to the establishment of a government to
guarantee his natural rights, including the right to security of person and
property, which he could not guarantee by himself. Similarly, the natural right
to liberty includes the right of a person to decide whether to express himself
and communicate to the public or to keep his affairs to himself and enjoy his
privacy. Justice Douglas reminds us of the indispensability of privacy in the
Hayden case, thus: "Those who wrote the Bill of Rights believed that every
individual needs both to communicate with others and to keep his affairs to
himself." A natural right to liberty indubitably includes the freedom to determine
when and how an individual will share the private part of his being and the
extent of his sharing. And when he chooses to express himself, the natural
right to liberty demands that he should be given the liberty to be truly himself
with his family in his home, his haven of refuge where he can "retreat from the
cares and pressures, even at times the oppressiveness of the outside world,"
to borrow the memorable words of Chief Justice Fernando. For truly, the
drapes of a man’s castle are but an extension of the drapes on his body that
cover the essentials. In unreasonable searches and seizures, the prying eyes
and the invasive hands of the government prevent the individual from enjoying
his freedom to keep to himself and to act undisturbed within his zone of
privacy. Finally, indispensable to the natural right to property is the right to
one’s possessions. Property is a product of one’s toil and might be considered
an expression and extension of oneself. It is what an individual deems
necessary to the enjoyment of his life. With unreasonable searches and
seizures, one’s property stands in danger of being rummaged through and
taken away. In sum, as pointed out in De Los Reyes, persons are subjected to
indignity by an unreasonable search and seizure because at bottom, it is a
violation of a person’s natural right to life, liberty and property. It is this natural
right which sets man apart from other beings, which gives him the dignity of a
human being.
It is understandable why Filipinos demanded that every organic law in their
history guarantee the protection of their natural right against unreasonable
search and seizure and why the UDHR treated this right as a human right. It is
a right inherent in the right to life, liberty and property; it is a right
"appertain(ing) to man in right of his existence", a right that "belongs to man by
virtue of his nature and depends upon his personality", and not merely a civil
right created and protected by positive law. The right to protect oneself against
unreasonable search and seizure, being a right indispensable to the right to
life, liberty and property, may be derived as a conclusion from what Aquinas
identifies as man’s natural inclination to self-preservation and self-
actualization. Man preserves himself by leading a secure life enjoying his
liberty and actualizes himself as a rational and social being in choosing to
freely express himself and associate with others as well as by keeping to and
knowing himself. For after all, a reflective grasp of what it means to be human
and how one should go about performing the functions proper to his human
nature can only be done by the rational person himself in the confines of his
private space. Only he himself in his own quiet time can examine his life
knowing that an unexamined life is not worth living.
Every organic law the Filipinos established (the Malolos, 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions) and embraced (the Instruction, Philippine Bill of 1902, and Jones
Law) in the last century included a provision guaranteeing the people’s right
against unreasonable search and seizure because the people ranked this right
as fundamental and natural. Indeed, so fundamental and natural is this right
that the demand for it spurred the American revolution against the English
Crown. It resulted in the Declaration of Independence and the subsequent
establishment of the American Constitution about 200 years ago in 1789. A
revolution is staged only for the most fundamental of reasons - such as the
violation of fundamental and natural rights - for prudence dictates that
"governments long established should not be changed for light and transient
reasons."280
Considering that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a natural
right, the government cannot claim that private respondent Dimaano is not
entitled to the right for the reason alone that there was no constitution granting
the right at the time the search was conducted. This right of the private
respondent precedes the constitution, and does not depend on positive law. It
is part of natural rights. A violation of this right along with other rights stirred
Filipinos to revolutions. It is the restoration of the Filipinos’ natural rights that
justified the establishment of the Aquino government and the writing of the
1987 Constitution. I submit that even in the absence of a constitution, private
respondent Dimaano had a fundamental and natural right against
unreasonable search and seizure under natural law.
We now come to the right to the exclusion of evidence illegally seized. From
Stonehill quoting Mapp, we can distill that the exclusionary rule in both the
Philippine and American jurisdictions is a freedom "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" for it is a necessary part of the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which in turn is "an essential part of the
right to privacy" that the Constitution protects. If the exclusionary rule were not
adopted, it would be to "grant the right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment." Thus, the
inevitable conclusion is that the exclusionary rule is likewise a natural right that
private respondent Dimaano can invoke even in the absence of a constitution
guaranteeing such right.
To be sure, the status of the exclusionary right as a natural right is admittedly
not as indisputable as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
which is firmly supported by philosophy and deeply entrenched in history. On a
lower tier, arguments have been raised on the constitutional status of the
exclusionary right. Some assert, on the basis of United States v.
Calandra,281 that it is only a "judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."282 Along the same line,
others contend that the right against unreasonable search and seizure merely
requires some effective remedy, and thus Congress may abolish or limit the
exclusionary right if it could replace it with other remedies of a comparable or
greater deterrent effect. But these contentions have merit only if it is conceded
that the exclusionary rule is merely an optional remedy for the purpose of
deterrence.283
Those who defend the constitutional status of the exclusionary right, however,
assert that there is nothing in Weeks that says that it is a remedy284 or a
manner of deterring police officers.285 In Mapp, while the court discredited other
means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment cited in Wolf, the thrust of the
opinion was broader. Justice Clarke opined that "no man is to be convicted on
unconstitutional evidence"286 and held that "the exclusionary rule is an essential
part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."287
Formulated in the Aquinian concept of human law, the debate is whether the
exclusionary right is the first kind of human law which may be derived as a
conclusion from the natural law precept that one should do no harm to another
man, in the same way that conclusions are derived from scientific principles, in
which case the exclusionary right has force from natural law and does not
depend on positive law for its creation; or if it is the second kind of human law
which is derived by way of determination of natural law, in the same way that a
carpenter determines the shape of a house, such that it is merely a judicially or
legislatively chosen remedy or deterrent, in which case the right only has force
insofar as positive law creates and protects it.
In holding that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a
fundamental and natural right, we were aided by philosophy and history. In the
case of the exclusionary right, philosophy can also come to the exclusionary
right’s aid, along the lines of Justice Clarke’s proposition in the Mapp case that
no man shall be convicted on unconstitutional evidence. Similarly, the
government shall not be allowed to convict a man on evidence obtained in
violation of a natural right (against unreasonable search and seizure) for the
protection of which, government and the law were established. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction the brazen violation of natural rights and allow
law enforcers to act with more temerity than a thief in the night for they can
disturb one’s privacy, trespass one’s abode, and steal one’s property with
impunity. This, in turn, would erode the people’s trust in government.
Unlike in the right against unreasonable search and seizure, however, history
cannot come to the aid of the exclusionary right. Compared to the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, the exclusionary right is still in its infancy
stage in Philippine jurisdiction, having been etched only in the 1973
Constitution after the 1967 Stonehill ruling which finally laid to rest the debate
on whether illegally seized evidence should be excluded. In the United States,
the exclusionary right’s genesis dates back only to the 1885 Boyd case on the
federal level, and to the 1961 Mapp case in the state level. The long period of
non-recognition of the exclusionary right has not caused an upheaval, much
less a revolution, in both the Philippine and American jurisdictions. Likewise,
the UDHR, a response to violation of human rights in a particular period in
world history, did not include the exclusionary right. It cannot confidently be
asserted therefore that history can attest to its natural right status. Without the
strength of history and with philosophy alone left as a leg to stand on, the
exclusionary right’s status as a fundamental and natural right stands on
unstable ground. Thus, the conclusion that it can be invoked even in the
absence of a constitution also rests on shifting sands.
Be that as it may, the exclusionary right is available to private respondent
Dimaano as she invoked it when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The AFP Board issued its resolution on
Ramas’ unexplained wealth only on July 27, 1987. The PCGG’s petition for
forfeiture against Ramas was filed on August 1, 1987 and was later amended
to name the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff and to add private
respondent Dimaano as co-defendant. Following the petitioner’s stance upheld
by the majority that the exclusionary right is a creation of the Constitution, then
it could be invoked as a constitutional right on or after the Freedom
Constitution took effect on March 25, 1986 and later, when the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987.
VI. Epilogue
The Filipino people have fought revolutions, by the power of the pen, the
strength of the sword and the might of prayer to claim and reclaim their
fundamental rights. They set these rights in stone in every constitution they
established. I cannot believe and so hold that the Filipinos during that one
month from February 25 to March 24, 1986 were stripped naked of all their
rights, including their natural rights as human beings. With the extraordinary
circumstances before, during and after the EDSA Revolution, the Filipinos
simply found themselves without a constitution, but certainly not without
fundamental rights. In that brief one month, they retrieved their liberties and
enjoyed them in their rawest essence, having just been freed from the claws of
an authoritarian regime. They walked through history with bare feet, unshod by
a constitution, but with an armor of rights guaranteed by the philosophy and
history of their constitutional tradition. Those natural rights inhere in man and
need not be granted by a piece of paper.
To reiterate, the right against unreasonable search and seizure which private
respondent Dimaano invokes is among the sacred rights fought for by the
Filipinos in the 1986 EDSA Revolution. It will be a profanity to deny her the
right after the fight had been won. It does not matter whether she believed in
the righteousness of the EDSA Revolution or she contributed to its cause as
an alleged ally of the dictator, for as a human being, she has a natural right to
life, liberty and property which she can exercise regardless of existing or non-
existing laws and irrespective of the will or lack of will of governments.
I wish to stress that I am not making the duty of the Court unbearably difficult
by taking it to task every time a right is claimed before it to determine whether
it is a natural right which the government cannot diminish or defeat by any kind
of positive law or action. The Court need not always twice measure a law or
action, first utilizing the constitution and second using natural law as a
yardstick. However, the 1986 EDSA Revolution was extraordinary, one that
borders the miraculous. It was the first revolution of its kind in Philippine
history, and perhaps even in the history of this planet. Fittingly, this separate
opinion is the first of its kind in this Court, where history and philosophy are
invoked not as aids in the interpretation of a positive law, but to recognize a
right not written in a papyrus but inheres in man as man. The unnaturalness of
the 1986 EDSA revolution cannot dilute nor defeat the natural rights of man,
rights that antedate constitutions, rights that have been the beacon lights of the
law since the Greek civilization. Without respect for natural rights, man cannot
rise to the full height of his humanity.
I concur in the result.
G.R. No. 160261             November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, 
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioners-in-intervention, 
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,  INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO
LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO
LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO
NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO
MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO,
FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN,
ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III,
AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG,
ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO,
HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR
PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO
TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO,
JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES,
DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO,
DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV
BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO,
CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR.,
JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN,
RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA,
JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN
CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA
PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C.
LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
 
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO,
JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG,
DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO,
DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY
SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON.
SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR.
MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON.
REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D.
CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P.
NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR
THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,  THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,  MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS,
JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, 
vs.
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN
OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY.
MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R.
POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED
BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE
ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS
G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.],
CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature,
scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at
times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches.
This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the
judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a
few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court
unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in
adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is
ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that
part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has
been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each
of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,
intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the
good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
 Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded. INITIATING BAR AGAINST
IMPEACHMENT INITIATION OF
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed IMPEACHMENT
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall Section 2. Mode PROCEEDINGS
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall of Initiating AGAINST THE
forthwith proceed. Impeachment. – SAME OFFICIAL
Impeachment
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same shall be initiated Section 16.
official more than once within a period of one year. only by a verified – Impeachment
complaint for Proceedings
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment filed Deemed Initiated. –
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on by any Member of In cases where a
oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the the House of Member of the House
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No Representatives files a verified
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all or by any citizen complaint of
the Members of the Senate. upon a resolution impeachment or a
of endorsement by citizen files a verified
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than any Member complaint that is
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the thereof or by a endorsed by a
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless verified complaint Member of the House
be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to or resolution of through a resolution
law. impeachment filed of endorsement
by at least one- against an
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to third (1/3) of all impeachable officer,
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and the Members of impeachment
underscoring supplied) the House. proceedings against
such official are
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th deemed initiated on
Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of the day the
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on Committee on Justice
November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment finds that the verified
Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between complaint and/or
these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following resolution against
tabulation: such official, as the
case may be, is
sufficient in
11TH 12TH CONGRESS substance, or on the
CONGRESS NEW RULES date the House votes
RULES to overturn or affirm
RULE II RULE V the finding of the said
Committee that the
 against the same
verified complaint period of one (1) official. (Italics in the
and/or resolution, as year. original; emphasis
the case may be, is and underscoring
not sufficient in supplied)
substance.
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
In cases where a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
verified complaint or a directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
resolution of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
impeachment is filed Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
or endorsed, as the
case may be, by at On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
least one-third (1/3) of complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
the Members of the Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of
House, impeachment the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The
proceedings are complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
deemed initiated at Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House
the time of the filing Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
of such verified Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
complaint or
resolution of Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
impeachment with Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
the Secretary resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
General. included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred
to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
  Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
RULE V Section 17. Bar shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
Against Initiation Of referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution
BAR AGAINST Impeachment shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session
IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – days from receipt thereof.
Within a period of one
Section (1) year from the date The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
14. Scope of impeachment impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same
Bar. – No proceedings are on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the
impeachment deemed initiated as Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary
proceedings shall provided in Section 16 in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
be initiated hereof, no
against the same impeachment Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
official more than proceedings, as such, complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
once within the can be initiated voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article
XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he
has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the
issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an
impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been
violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the
House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and
Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this
Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of
the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it
off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which
are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin
respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental
importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a
writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing
any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for
the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against
the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang,
as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as
it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial
on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the
cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second
impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an
order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting,
approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint,
and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and
Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they
have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme
Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and
pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and
void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking
cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment
complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its
prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on
the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members
are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen,
taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition,
which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a
member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in
their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it
is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the
Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al.,
in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit
filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf
of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and
that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint
and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the
fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino,
alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation
of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance
with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate
and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint
due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his
petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time
they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any
legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to
disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.
Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the
subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing
and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is
founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF)
was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does
not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in
his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action
and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the
issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve
matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House
of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the
Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null
and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be
prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the
first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to
prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,
which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition
bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No.
260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice
of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and
is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because
the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected
above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the
Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28,
2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court
rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed
him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution
of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require
respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00
a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In
addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the
status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to
refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives
through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of
special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives,
which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to
initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and
Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings
and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant
to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved
to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require
respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned,
the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding
that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was
presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the
petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and
160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October
28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this
Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the
petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and
to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No.
160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were
admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney
Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues
outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-
vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising
from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions
presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has
sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue
of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the
substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in
seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by
Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article
VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited,
has established a republican government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in
the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels,for then the distribution
of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions
of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if
not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of
our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the
proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those
only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
 constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in
the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts
to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political
law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the
executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom
or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,  judicial review is indeed an
31
integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock
of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. x x x And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among
the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To
him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or
instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into
its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction"
of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following
excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
 deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other
matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because
the government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to
pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was
not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in
effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial
law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court
must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled
principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando,
declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for
its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution
is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of
law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to
a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is
to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking
through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting
 it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice
Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others.When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court
affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered
and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made
to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution
from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and
jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from
the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character.
Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole
power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of
judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings
are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et.
al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities,
principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus,
they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it
disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the
only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and
difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on
the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in
cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support
the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial
review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process.
Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon
the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling
within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as
Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because
they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged.
In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary
in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as
expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty,
and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives
the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and
the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship
on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the
judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils
of judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did
not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language
of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity
of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond
the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial
review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona,
Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held
that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of
the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for
being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.
Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House
of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that
although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 66 it
ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of
a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence
that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to
it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of
judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject
to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and
will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are
subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus
curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same
opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule
exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights
by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for
ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts
will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and
the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the
latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth
regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it
from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest
has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that
standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings,
 is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff
is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties
can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating
to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether
he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the
petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief
Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own
rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class
suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were
supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators
when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this
Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about
to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to
most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to
the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the
outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does
not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions
shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It,
therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests
of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved
in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the
class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that
not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent
issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as
a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as
citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No.
160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other
assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues
raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean
that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner
Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus
have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case,
they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save
for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing,
and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been
interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court
to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking
their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious
scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied
with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of
whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is
valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to
intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the
limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with
Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction
as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate
which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of
Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and
to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion
to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied
for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
 x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that
the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in
public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for
a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on
the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with
the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been
carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional
act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v.
Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions
are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga
opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at
this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He
thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be
exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law
who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to
encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their
signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the
Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to
the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are
transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their
constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI
of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their
injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or
both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that,
as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate
is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise,
as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted
Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a
body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any
rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of
cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind
the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of
judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature
of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it
found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was
ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and
took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a
political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to
refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application
on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the
usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major
branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the
executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its
decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience
which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other
powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will
proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence,
certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the
defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well,
since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this
situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who
are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the
Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of
Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September
22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious
reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So
that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media
hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish
any story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated,
but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under
mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971
Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by
September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely
agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon
the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of
them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the
unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives
of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for
about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to
the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President
issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of
some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public
concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on
the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held
sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our
colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the
draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling
effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President
suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that
he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January
10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum
were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the
supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what
was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the
barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were
released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the
referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the
holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being
heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to
the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of
the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately
after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the
session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the
Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the
1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note
that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but
none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective
places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged
referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big
difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another
group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the
only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set
up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because
the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to
settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed
by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a
husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties
as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as
such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot
force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband.
There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that
to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to
human dignity."
 Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical
questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme
Court has, also another important function. The powers of
government are generally considered divided into three branches:
the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.
Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given
law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of
the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice
Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but
judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also
in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems
to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But
there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the
government had authority or had abused its authority to the
extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a
political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided
by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the
political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define
what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says,
"judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition
that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
arising from the political question doctrine.
 MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that
truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty,
a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called
the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect
of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by
virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP
College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction
over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the
present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene
Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 107 through Justice Teodoro
Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the
1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does
away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court
ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of
these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been
no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide
some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.112(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are
not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept
of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice
into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement
of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly,
any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public
trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better
way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the
issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible.
Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which
the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted
and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until
a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No.
6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over
a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving
a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by
the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among
other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly
resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which
Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be
unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of
the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of
said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative
inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts
of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact
that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which
would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative
inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus,
as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill
of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et.
al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint
was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3
(4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial
by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives
signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy
the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the
"verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution
are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of
Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of
the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro
and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically
become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at
least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee
on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
 Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred
to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution
shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session
days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined
that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76
or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution
of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified
impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra,
does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as
the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact
that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262,
have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment
complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the
instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the
original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other
petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for
the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said
intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et.
al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently,
they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as
they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground
that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of
judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here
is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the
impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has
a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of
the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before
this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be
shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More
than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which
may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a
dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no
other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had
been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the
matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and,
as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to
the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence
that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied
contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to
render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to
be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking
in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had
already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In
that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from
the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of
them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would
have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members
whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This
Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution
of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in
the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's
competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be
not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to
perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect,
six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed,
such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections
when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be
at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated
to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such
situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the
fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices
and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting
in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the
Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in
the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as
such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members
alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a
majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself
of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if
that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the
jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court,
the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the
deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very
heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to
abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the
original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the
"seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a
party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as
to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the
Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision
of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed
because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint
of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the
many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right.
Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild
v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a
citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the
federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided
(citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required
by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial
restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress
the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in
judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating
and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of
this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the
diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the
judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated
by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional
crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in
all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just
because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive
act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed
upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only
juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself
constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least
quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in
the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted
which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the
coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and
not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of
government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental
law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the
doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice.
If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were
allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise
of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and
ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues
that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not
violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that
the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is
the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean
"to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution
provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3
of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
"initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice
of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on
November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act
of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the
word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do,
to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform
or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and
that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The
end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The
middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the
initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee
on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is
"deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking
into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would
need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee
a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been
furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience
as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed
before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the
impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the
Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the
report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the
Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that
we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the
floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is
actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by
the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If
we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the
body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates
it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that
score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these
words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been
bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the
U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on
the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal,
but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the
approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the
substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the
Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this
provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete
 the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and
the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the
phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole
section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE
ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as
the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really
starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution
to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a
matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on
line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third
of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way.
It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam
President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring
supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and
accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that
"the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to
settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the
vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the
filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of
the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is
Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means
to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action
to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the
word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis
supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in
the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the
term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must
be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the
House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the
Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all
cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is
made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive
at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from
the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not
in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the
filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of
the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the
resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all
the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared
and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an
impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is
successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated
when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the
end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely
the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on
the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was
deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his
explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the
meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution
is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it;
and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not
abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs
of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term
"to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with
Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral
or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the
rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could
not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3
(5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their
personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances
of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court
likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are
so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more
about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions.
There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the
1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of
Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power
to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is
premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate
its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules
cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then
it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either
House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what
constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice)
Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis
in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to
a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v.
Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held
that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all
matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the
same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed
that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into
the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over
he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as
a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the
US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of
this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its
rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker,
the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the
House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the
journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members
voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of
a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the
Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence
of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own
volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters
for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of
power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to
the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to
say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more
just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other
body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found
to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint;
(2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be
defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1,
Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in
the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the
US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court
is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to
deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of
this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of
government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or
wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this
Court against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected
by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts
of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the
capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This
provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which
taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to
abort abuses in government. x x x
 xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially
determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is
a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by
not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration
to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls
us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the
rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last
bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this
new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this
exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching
the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant
petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the
Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as
basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed,
the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing
more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be
exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does
not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of
Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes
several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama,
conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two
weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to
articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on
the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or
against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with
their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various
sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and
denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy
in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any
perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment
had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued
to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the
House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject
respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to
speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was
made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-
justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any
move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already
explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for
its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over
an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation
of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue
of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation
of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or
problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of
action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy,
is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved
on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings
initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert
judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.
Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the
executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the
beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of
law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of
the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this
Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members'
interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief
Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long
held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal
rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court
has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever
stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or
speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to
the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in
these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved
when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the
validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the
Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the
judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this
entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as
likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case,
which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the
law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience
to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality
other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the
law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the
Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody
else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station
in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to
test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide.
Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search
for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But
though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers
in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this
crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve
differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate
concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion
of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.
G.R. No. 191002               April 20, 2010
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,  MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191032
JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner, 
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191057
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner, 
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE
CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, Petitioner,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191149
JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner, 
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V.
TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS; MARLOU B.
UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR
CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY.
ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in his own personal capacity as a
ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO;
BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.;
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND
GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY)
SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG
NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN
(ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-
ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
(LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL
UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN
EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN
MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA
ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA;
BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA.
VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE
JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
JR.;Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191342
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and
ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBPGovernor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners,  2010; and
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191420
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, 
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No.
191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R.
No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R.
No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs
the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates
to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17,
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to
the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto
in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Motions for Reconsideration
Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and
Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342), and Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No.
191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del
Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera;
Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the
Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B.
Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P.
Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also
filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
whose belated intervention was allowed.
We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for
reconsideration, in the aforegiven order:
Soriano
1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of
whether or not the power to designate the Chief Justice belonged to
the Supreme Court en banc.
2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it
sought a mere declaratory judgment and did not involve a justiciable
controversy.
3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations.
The mere fact that the Chief Justice sits as ex officio head of the JBC
should not prevail over the more compelling state interest for him to
participate as a Member of the Court.
Tolentino and Inting
1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an
interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban
on midnight appointments.
2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made
distinctions and has created exemptions when none exists.
3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in
Article VIII, because it limits an executive, not a judicial, power.
4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is
superfluous, and is powerless to vary the terms of the clear prohibition.
5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice
Regalado. Thereby, the Court has raised the Constitution to the level of
a venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its framers as to
be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that
ratified it.
6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.
7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal
standing to question the illegal composition of the JBC.
Philippine Bar Association
1. The Court’s strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the
basic principle that the Court should not formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than what is required by the precise facts of
the case.
2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward,
the only duty of the Court is to apply it. The provision expressly and
clearly provides a general limitation on the appointing power of the
President in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position
in the Government without any qualification and distinction.
3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional
safeguard against midnight appointments.
4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the
prohibition against midnight appointments, and the creation of the JBC.
It is not within the authority of the Court to prefer one over the other, for
the Court’s duty is to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the
Court likes them to be.
5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of
statutory construction in interpreting the Constitution.
6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section
headings, despite precedents on statutory construction holding that
such headings carried very little weight.
7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight
appointments, and the only exception is that on temporary
appointments to executive positions.
8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings
for the nomination of the candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by
the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a view to
submitting the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on
or before May 17, 2010. The Constitution grants the Court only the
power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the
JBC what to do, how to do it, or when to do it, especially in the
absence of a real and justiciable case assailing any specific action or
inaction of the JBC.
9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has
indulged in speculations.
10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the
Court’s directing the JBC to comply with the decision constitutes a
culpable violation of the Constitution and the commission of an election
offense.
11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a
doctrine unanimously formulated by the Court en banc.
12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief
Justice whenever the incumbent is indisposed. Thus, the appointment
of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary.
13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to
arrest any attempt to prolong the outgoing President’s powers by
means of proxies. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint
the next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power
beyond her term of office.
IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.
1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution applies to appointments to the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent
reason exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela
pronouncement.
2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential
appointments to the Constitutional Commissions and the JBC with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. Its phrase "other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough
proof that the limitation on the appointing power of the President
extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14, Section 15,
and Section 16 of Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in
the Executive and Judicial Branches of the Government.
3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred
the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in all cases.
Lim
1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Court’s exercise
of judicial review.
2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court and to other appointments
to the Judiciary.
3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the
safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII against midnight
appointments in the Judiciary.
Corvera
1. The Court’s exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the
Constitutional ban on midnight appointments is based on an
interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal language of the
Constitution.
2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover
appointments in both the Executive and Judicial Departments. The
application of the principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would
have obviated dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the
provisions of the Constitution. If there is any ambiguity in Section 15,
Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political
partisanship in all branches of the Government, should have controlled.
3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation
based on compartmentalization and physical arrangement, especially
considering that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the
framers of the Constitution should yield to the plain and unequivocal
language of the Constitution.
5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is
reasonable and in accord with the Constitution.
 BAYAN, et al.
1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC,
because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. The
issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the
office of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself
has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list of nominees to the
President.
2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and
compelling than the opinion of Justice Regalado.
3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1),
Article VIII, the Court has violated the principle of ut magis valeat quam
pereat (which mandates that the Constitution should be interpreted as
a whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as
to fully give effect to all). There is no conflict between the provisions;
they complement each other.
4. The form and structure of the Constitution’s titles, chapters, sections,
and draftsmanship carry little weight in statutory construction. The clear
and plain language of Section 15, Article VII precludes interpretation.
Tan, Jr.
1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or
controversy. The clash of legal rights and interests in the present case
are merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with certainty, no actual
vacancy in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred.
2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in
the Court and the Judiciary runs in conflict with long standing principles
and doctrines of statutory construction. The provision admits only one
exception, temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus,
the Court should not distinguish, because the law itself makes no
distinction.
3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to
cover the members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more weight to the
opinion of Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in
Valenzuela was unwarranted.
4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article
VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill any vacancy lasts until August 15,
2010, or a month and a half after the end of the ban. The next
President has roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent
President (i.e., 44 days) within which to scrutinize and study the
qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than
enough opportunity to examine the nominees without haste and
political uncertainty.
1avvphi1
5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under
Section 4(1), Article VIII is suspended.
6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on
or before May 17, 2010. The directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable
violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election offense.
7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief
Justice, because the Court sits en banc, even when it acts as the sole
judge of all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications
of the President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the
Court can validly comprise the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
WTLOP
1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the
list of nominees for Chief Justice to the President on or before May 17,
2010, and to continue its proceedings for the nomination of the
candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the
JBC a deadline not provided by law or the Constitution; exercised
control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and lacked sufficient
votes to reverse Valenzuela.
2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic
principle of statutory construction to the effect that the literal meaning
of the law must be applied when it is clear and unambiguous; and that
we should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish.
3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering
that the Judiciary Act of 1948 already provides that the power and
duties of the office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice in
case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice.
Ubano
1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal,
needs no interpretation
2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to
the organization and arrangement of its provisions.
3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15,
Article VII and the pertinent records of the Constitutional Commission
are clear and unambiguous.
4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of
nominees to the President by May 17, 2010 at the latest, because no
specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even
before the vacancy has occurred.
Boiser
1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on
midnight appointments is the temporary appointment to an executive
position. The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the framers
of the Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing
Chief Executive to make appointments.
2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on
midnight appointments makes the appointee beholden to the outgoing
Chief Executive, and compromises the independence of the Chief
Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential.
3. The Court’s reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient
reason violates the principle of stare decisis.
Bello, et al.
1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of
appointments an outgoing President is prohibited from making within
the prescribed period. Plain textual reading and the records of the
Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight
appointments extends to judicial appointments.
2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The
subordinate subject to oversight must first act not in accord with
prescribed rules before the act can be redone to conform to the
prescribed rules.
3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC,
because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy.
Pimentel
1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable,
rational, and conformable to the general intent of the Constitution as a
limitation to the powers of Government and as a bastion for the
protection of the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly
conflicting provisions of the Constitution, the interpretation should
always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant
of authority to its representatives.
2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a
manner totally repugnant to republican constitutional democracy, and
is tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution without
proper authority.
Comments
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in
their respective comments, thus:
OSG
1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of
its nominees for the position of Chief Justice.
2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief
Justice.
 3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.
4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of
the Judiciary from the ban on midnight appointments. 1awph!1
5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by
the parties as well as other related matters.
JBC
1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for
prematurity, because the JBC has not yet decided at the time the
petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the power to
appoint the new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to
interview the candidates, has not submitted a short list to the
President.
2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC
short list is necessary for the President to appoint a Chief Justice
should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis. The
statement undermines the independence of the JBC.
3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord
with its constitutional mandate and its implementing rules and
regulations.
For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his
comment even if the OSG and the JBC were the only ones the Court has
required to do so. He states that the motions for reconsideration were directed
at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. His
comment asserts:
1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already
resolved by the decision and the separate opinion.
2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Court’s power of
supervision over the JBC as provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, as distinguished from the Court’s adjudicatory power
under Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial
review are not required, which was why Valenzuela was docketed as
an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take
a position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing
authority, it has effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its
power of supervision over the JBC.
3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article
VIII is to amend the Constitution.
4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
quoted in the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales, as well as in some of
the motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15, Article
VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on
nepotism).
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters
being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the
decision of March 17, 2010.
Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of
clarification and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or
abandoning Valenzuela.1
The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled.
It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed
of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court
and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in
question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The
decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts,
because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and
for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid
down. 2
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called
upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to
them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher
courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind
each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the
innate authority to rule according to its best lights.4
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled
by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not
obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-
examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict
and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make
law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is not a common-law system;
hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial
pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a
subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the
court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be
applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of
convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or
abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the
Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem
to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority
of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid
down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.7
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence
that the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the
records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15,
Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a
provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show
that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and
justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his
or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the
proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any
further complication,"8 such that the final version of the second paragraph of
Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to
wit:
Section 13. xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article
VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court
either ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently
contravening their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction.
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of
the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that
the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is self-
contradiction at its worst.
Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to read into Section
4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban
under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the
silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the
omission, for doing so would generally constitute an encroachment upon the
field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9
should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no
words can be interpolated in them.9Interpolation of words is unnecessary,
because the law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with
the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new words may alter the
thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is
clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word or words,
interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent is
in the language of the law itself.10
Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could Associate Justice
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition WE CONCUR:
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely REYNATO S. PUNO
in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals Chief Justice
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Members of the Supreme Court. Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any Associate Justice Associate Justice
unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
Final Word NACHURA CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were
Associate Justice Associate Justice
appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to
her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the Associate Justice Associate Justice
merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and
condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. Associate Justice
None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members
composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago CERTIFICATION
from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were
mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.
REYNATO S. PUNO
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality. Chief Justice

SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 83896             February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,  may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
G.R. No. 83815             February 22, 1991
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T.
REYES, petitioners,  secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department holds
vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS
DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING, as
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN,
JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources; VICENTE V.
JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, as Secretary of
Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment;
LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as
Secretary of National Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press
Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and
Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and
Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry;
JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A.
BENGZON, as Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of
Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as
Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the
National Economic Development Authority, respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for
petitioners in 83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 19881 and are being resolved jointly
as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon
C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his
position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department
positions in the government and government corporations and receive
the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation
shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils
or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two
positions other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in
government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3)
of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members
of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit
subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution,  which provides as follows:
2
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public
respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the other public officials
enumerated in the list attached to the petitions as Annex "C" in G.R. No.
83815  and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 83896  from holding any other office or
3 4
employment during their tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of
the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary
restraining order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist from
holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positions other
than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any
salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges and the like
appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling public respondents
to return, reimburse or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may
have received from such positions.
Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that
notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-executing" provision of the
1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, construing
Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered
on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987,  declaring that Cabinet
5
members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold
other public office, including membership in the boards of government
corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of
the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law;
or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions; and that
on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987
or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated
Executive Order No. 284. 6
Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No.
73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together" Section
13, Article VII and the general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2),
Article I-XB. This "strained linkage" between the two provisions, each
addressed to a distinct and separate group of public officers –– one, the
President and her official family, and the other, public servants in general ––
allegedly "abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive, and mandatory
constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the
President, the Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
and subalterns, who are the leaders of government expected to lead by
example."  Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2)  provides:
7 8
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ Opinion No. 73,
series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified by DOJ Opinion No. 129,
series of 1987  and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988,  being the first
9 10
official construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of Section
13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of the Constitution,
involving the same subject of appointments or designations of an appointive
executive official to positions other than his primary position, is "reasonably
valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated
pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional.
It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion
No. 155, series of 1988 construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as
not applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which, although not so
designated as ex-officio are allowed by the primary functions of the public
official, but only to the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or
necessarily included in the position of the public official concerned (disparate
positions).
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by
petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13,
Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to
petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1)
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par.
(2), Article I-XB on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and
employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply
and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to
the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-President,
the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants from holding dual
or multiple positions in the Government admits of certain exceptions. The
disagreement between petitioners and public respondents lies on the
constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that because of the
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of
Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in
the case of the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of the
Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary
of Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand,
maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in
Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB
insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive
officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy
reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation
or their subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying
the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in
construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 11
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various
government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative powers in
this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant
to his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created
agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations
created by presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances
where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were designated to head
or sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries, emoluments,
per diems, allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these
instrumentalities have remained up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led
to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme
for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in
government was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang
Pambansa.  This condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the
12
Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on:
Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations, Self-Governing Boards and
Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in
Governing Boards of Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations as of
December 31, 1983."
Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety and morality
in government service were the data contained therein that Roberto V. Ongpin
was a member of the governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental
agencies, instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-three
(23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15);
Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C.
Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B. Ancheta and Jose A. Roño of twelve (12)
each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of eleven
(11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Peña of ten (10) each. 13
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of
discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in
consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986
Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people successfully
unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution
the provisions under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not
correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices
and employment. In fact, as keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz
during the deliberations in these cases, one of the strongest selling points of
the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its ratification was the assurance
given by its proponents that the scandalous practice of Cabinet members
holding multiple positions in the government and collecting unconscionably
excessive compensation therefrom would be discontinued.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-XB
already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided
in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the
constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article
VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain
public officials or employees from holding other offices or employment. Under
Section 13, Article VI, "(N)o Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government . . .". Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed
forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a
civilian position in the Government,including government-owned or controlled
corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B,
relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other
office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the
government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which
states that "(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure." In the
latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the
phrase "in the Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his
official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private
office or employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These
sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or
employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in
general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and
to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the
President and his official family was also succinctly articulated by
Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted
during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry between
the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the General Provisions and the
anticipated report on the Executive Department. Commissioner Foz
Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the President and the
members of the Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore,
more cheeks and restraints on them are called for because there is more
possibility of abuse in their case."
14
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold
other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad
exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To
construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would
render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the
framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with
respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their
tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the
exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the
distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the
high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant
Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank
immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any
other office or position in the government during their tenure.
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render
certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This observation applies
particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed
to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but
who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is
absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII
has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB would render meaningless
the specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to
become a member of the Cabinet,  and to act as President without
15
relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not nave been
chosen or fails to qualify.  Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by
16
interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par.
(1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13,
Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must
Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision
of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered
alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes
of the instrument.  Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
17
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution  and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
18
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. 19
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory. 20
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or
employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended
to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive
and unequivocal negation.  The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
21
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President
being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article
VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars.
(2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officiomember of
the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under
Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required  by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that
22
these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials.  To characterize these posts otherwise would lead
23
to absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines
cannot chair the National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order
No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive
Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have
no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be prohibited.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of Trustees of
the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), both of which are attached to his
department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither can his
Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary
Board.  Neither can their respective undersecretaries and assistant
24
secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower
ranking employees in providing policy direction in the areas of money, banking
and credit. 25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd
consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of
government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the
impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should
be avoided. 26
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted
as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-
officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by
virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely,
not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to
the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office."  An ex-officio member of a board is
27
one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment.  To illustrate, by express provision of law, the
28
Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officioChairman of
the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority,  and the Light Rail Transit
29
Authority.30
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio position
in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board,  thus: "An
31
examination of section 2 of the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for
the chairman and members of the Board to qualify they need only be
If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely
related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of
a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any
other office" prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be the Press
Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions which confer
on the cabinet official management functions and/or monetary compensation,
such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President,
Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with
those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of their
special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive offices is a
practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the
demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the
different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious
tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and
general welfare and delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent with
the power vested on the President and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices and to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.  Without these additional duties
35

designated by the respective department heads. With the exception of the
representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to be
designated they must already be holding positions in the offices mentioned in
the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a previous appointment in
the Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the act, be designated a representative
from that office. The same is true with respect to the representatives from the
other offices. No new appointments are necessary. This is as it should be,
because the representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board
in addition to those already performed under their original appointments."
The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of
importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term is not
restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural.  The additional duties
33
and functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the
governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by their primary
functions, they would be supervision, thereby deprived of the means for control
and resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions
may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the
32
1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the
primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an
ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor.

must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's
primary functions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's
primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as
members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority  and
the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that
these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached
34
to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance
attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he
is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his
principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come
under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is
not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per
them or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By
whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by
the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the proposal of
Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B,
originally found as Section 3 of the General Provisions, the exception "unless
required by the functions of his position,"  express reference to certain high-
36
ranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet were
made.  Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople, Commissioner
37
Monsod pointed out that there are instances when although not required by
current law, membership of certain high-ranking executive officials in other
offices and corporations is necessary by reason of said officials' primary
functions. The example given by Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of
Trade and Industry. 38
While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may be used
as authority for saying that additional functions and duties flowing from the
primary functions of the official may be imposed upon him without offending
the constitutional prohibition under consideration, it cannot, however, be taken
as authority for saying that this exception is by virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of
Article I-XB. This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place in the
plenary session of September 27, 1986. Under consideration then was Section
3 of Committee Resolution No. 531 which was the proposed article on General
Provisions.  At that time, the article on the Civil Service Commission had been
39
approved on third reading on July 22, 1986,  while the article on the Executive
40
Department, containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had also
been earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986.  It was only after
41
the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and "styling" by the
Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became
Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and reworded "Unless otherwise allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position. . . ."
What was clearly being discussed then were general principles which would
serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of specific constitutional
provisions on the matter. What was primarily at issue and approved on that
occasion was the adoption of the qualified and delimited phrase "primary
functions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule covering all
appointive public officials. Had the Constitutional Commission intended to
dilute the specific prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, it could have re-
worded said Section 13 to conform to the wider exceptions provided in then
Section 3 of the proposed general Provisions, later placed as Section 7, par.
(2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission.
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the President and
his official family is by reason of the legal principles governing additional
functions and duties of public officials rather than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2,
Article IX-B At any rate, we have made it clear that only the additional functions
and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by the primary functions may
be considered as not constituting "any other office."
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when
other guides fail  as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
42
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
1âwphi1
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face."  The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
43
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof. 44
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in
the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet
members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's
manifest intent and the people' understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No.
284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number
of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions
in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that will
result from a strict application of the prohibition mandated under Section 13,
Article VII on the operations of the Government, considering that Cabinet
members would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity, by
reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified in
this decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without
additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to other offices
or employment held by virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or
directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical consequences are
more apparent than real. Being head of an executive department is no mean
job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized
knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a
department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his
duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental offices
or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention
and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in
haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from this
concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage
of our national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any,
that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and
taking in more than what he can handle.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court hereby
orders respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government  Luis Santos,
45
Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo
R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately
relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, the petitions have
become moot and academic as they are no longer occupying the positions
complained of.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual
services rendered.  It has been held that "in cases where there is no de
46
jure,officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the
office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary,
fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is,
undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the
public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed
from all liability to pay any one for such services.  Any per diem, allowances or
47
other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services
rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are
GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is
accordingly set aside.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento and Griño-Aquino, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. 167324               July 17, 2007
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH
INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES UNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ALLIANCE OF HEALTH WORKERS, INC.,
HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, COUNCIL FOR HEALTH
DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY
MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC., PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF
SANITARY ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA,
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG
MGA MARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE
G. GALANG, DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES, EDUARDO P.
GALOPE, REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUÑATA, EDGARDO J.
DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND REMEGIO S.
MERCADO, Petitioners, 
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M. DAYRIT, SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision,1 promulgated by the Court of Appeals on 26 November
2004, denying a petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform
Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH);
and Executive Order No. 102, "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of
the Department of Health," which was issued by then President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada on 24 May 1999.
Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before
the Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the Supreme Court, in a
Resolution dated 29 August 2001, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action.
HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)
In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the
HSRA Technical Working Group after a series of workshops and analyses with
inputs from several consultants, program managers and technical staff
possessing the adequate expertise and experience in the health sector. It
provided for five general areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to
government hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority public health programs;
(3) promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective
performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and
(5) expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP).2
Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of
government hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the
corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The said provision under the
HSRA reads:
Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. Government hospitals must
be allowed to collect socialized user fees so they can reduce the dependence
on direct subsidies from the government. Their critical capacities like
diagnostic equipment, laboratory facilities and medical staff capability must be
upgraded to effectively exercise fiscal autonomy. Such investment must be
cognizant of complimentary capacity provided by public-private networks.
Moreover such capacities will allow government hospitals to supplement
priority public health programs. Appropriate institutional arrangement must be
introduced such as allowing them autonomy towards converting them into
government corporations without compromising their social responsibilities. As
a result, government hospitals are expected to be more competitive and
responsive to health needs.
Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by
the DOH, dated 5 January 2001, entitled "Guidelines and Procedure in the
Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to
Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January
2001;"3 and Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH, entitled "Policies and
Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals
in Government Health Facilities,"4 dated 9 January 2001, for imposing an
added burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for medicine and
medical services.5
Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had
resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to
economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is
void for being in violation of the following constitutional provisions:6
ART. III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
law.
ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment of all the people of the blessings of democracy.
ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that
will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote
full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for
all.
ART II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being x x x.
ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of
the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:
xxxx
(2) the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.
xxxx
ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe
and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions,
and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable
them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
ART II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
ART XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable
cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free
medical care to paupers.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 102, entitled "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health," which provided for the changes in the roles, functions,
and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order,
the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services
to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a
result of the devolution of basic services to local government units. The
provisions for the streamlining of the DOH and the deployment of DOH
personnel to regional offices and hospitals read:
Sec. 4. Preparation of a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan. In view of the
functional and operational redirection in the DOH, and to effect efficiency and
effectiveness in its activities, the Department shall prepare a Rationalization
and Streamlining Plan (RSP) which shall be the basis of the intended changes.
The RSP shall contain the following:
a) the specific shift in policy directions, functions, programs and
activities/strategies;
b) the structural and organizational shift, stating the specific functions
and activities by organizational unit and the relationship of each units;
c) the staffing shift, highlighting and itemizing the existing filled and
unfilled positions; and
d) the resource allocation shift, specifying the effects of the streamline
set-up on the agency budgetary allocation and indicating where
possible, savings have been generated.
The RSP shall [be] submitted to the Department of Budget and Management
for approval before the corresponding shifts shall be affected (sic) by the DOH
Secretary.
Sec. 5. Redeployment of Personnel. The redeployment of officials and other
personnel on the basis of the approved RSP shall not result in diminution in
rank and compensation of existing personnel. It shall take into account all
pertinent Civil Service laws and rules.
Section 6. Funding. The financial resources needed to implement the
Rationalization and Streamlining Plan shall be taken from funds available in
the DOH, provided that the total requirements for the implementation of the
revised staffing pattern shall not exceed available funds for Personnel
Services.
Section 7. Separation Benefits. Personnel who opt to be separated from the
service as a consequence of the implementation of this Executive Order shall
be entitled to the benefits under existing laws. In the case of those who are not
covered by existing laws, they shall be entitled to separation benefits
equivalent to one month basic salary for every year of service or proportionate
share thereof in addition to the terminal fee benefits to which he/she is entitled
under existing laws.
Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local
Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution
to the local government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific
health-related functions and responsibilities.7
Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which
effects the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the
exercise of its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is
void, having been issued in excess of the President’s authority.8
Moreover, petitioners averred that the implementation of the Rationalization
and Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in accordance with law. The RSP was
allegedly implemented even before the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) approved it. They also maintained that the Office of the
President should have issued an administrative order to carry out the
streamlining, but that it failed to do so.9
Furthermore, petitioners Elsa O. Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G.
Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael,
Alfredo U. Bacuñata and Edgardo J. Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed
the validity of Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to
lose their jobs, and that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of
having to travel a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other
DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.10
Petitioners also pointed out several errors in the implementation of the RSP.
Certain employees allegedly suffered diminution of compensation,11 while
others were supposedly assigned to positions for which they were neither
qualified nor suited.12 In addition, new employees were purportedly hired by the
DOH and appointed to positions for which they were not qualified, despite the
fact that the objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on costs.13 It
was also averred that DOH employees were deployed or transferred even
during the three-month period before the national and local elections in May
2001,14 in violation of Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as
"Magna Carta for Public Health Workers."15 Petitioners, however, failed to
identify the DOH employees referred to above, much less include them as
parties to the petition.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural
defects, which proved fatal: 1) Petitioners failed to show capacity or authority
to sign the certification of non-forum shopping and the verification; 2)
Petitioners failed to show any particularized interest for bringing the suit, nor
any direct or personal injury sustained or were in the immediate danger of
sustaining; 3) the Petition, brought before the Supreme Court on 15 August
1999, was filed out of time, or beyond 60 days from the time the reorganization
methods were implemented in 2000; and 4) certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus will not lie where the President, in issuing the assailed Executive
Order, was not acting as a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
In resolving the substantial issues of the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15,
18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and
Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or
indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s
right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions
of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners’ assertion that
Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be
made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about
the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the
political department.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that the President was empowered
to issue Executive Order No. 102, in accordance with Section 17 Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. It also declared that the DOH did not implement
Executive Order No. 102 in bad faith or with grave abuse of discretion, as
alleged by the petitioners, as the DOH issued Department Circular No. 275-C,
Series of 2000, which created the different committees tasked with the
implementation of the RSP, only after both the DBM and Presidential
Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) approved the RSP on 8 July
2000 and 17 July 2000, respectively. 1avvphi1
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision rendered on 26 November 2004, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated 7 March 2005.
Hence, the present petition, where the following issues are raised:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST
ERROR IN RULING THAT ANY QUESTION ON THE WISDOM AND
EFFICACY OF THE HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA IS NOT A
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE ARE NOT JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST
ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT THAT
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102 IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE FILIPINO
IS LIKEWISE NOT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SAID ORDER; AND
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST
ERROR IN UPHOLDING TECHNICALITIES OVER AND ABOVE THE
ISSUES OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE RAISED IN THE
PETITION BELOW. 16
The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.
Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter
to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the
Constitution.17 They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income
generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15
and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII;
and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies
allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical
services. This contention is unfounded.
As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-
executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if
they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can
be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress.18 However, some provisions
have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
In Tanada v. Angara,19 the Court specifically set apart the sections found under
Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such
broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and
state policies." x x x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used
by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,20 this Court
declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII;
and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing
provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,21 the Court referred to Section
1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions,
which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other
constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise
to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights.22
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken
from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15
and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-
executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara.23
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA
supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are
embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no
allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with
the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional
guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the
relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the
HSRA.
In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1
and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the protection of working
women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the
adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the
Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection,
including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as
non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation24 and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,25 they are mere
statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives
addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the
remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may
be manifested in their votes.
The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in
the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission26 :
x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to
guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization
of the ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The
espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad
and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the
parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent
legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to
approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners’ bare allegations that
it violates the general principles expressed in the non self-executing provisions
they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause of action to an
alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic considerations of
due process and the limitations of judicial power.27
Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No. 102 is void on the ground that it
was issued by the President in excess of his authority. They maintain that the
structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of legislative
functions, which the President usurped when he issued Executive Order No.
102.28 This line of argument is without basis.
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by
executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government
entities under the Executive Department.29 This is also sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he president
shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." Section
31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System,
by abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments or Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other Departments or agencies.
In Domingo v. Zamora,30 this Court explained the rationale behind the
President’s continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the
President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of
the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office "to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency." To remain effective and efficient, it must
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the
Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of
the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it.31 The agencies
under the Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II
of the Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.—The agencies under
the Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship
of the President, those under the supervision and control of the President,
those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those
attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that are not
placed by law or order creating them under any specific department.
(Emphasis provided.)
Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines
the term "agency of the government" as follows:
Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein.
Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated
under Book IV of the Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional
distribution of the work of the President.32 Indubitably, the DOH is an agency
which is under the supervision and control of the President and, thus, part of
the Office of the President. Consequently, Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of
the Administrative Code, granting the President the continued authority to
reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the DOH.
The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise
recognized in general appropriations laws. As early as 1993, Sections 48 and
62 of Republic Act No. 7645, the "General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1993," already contained a provision stating that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities Within the Executive
Branch.—The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are
hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer
essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down,
phased out, or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x x.
Actual scaling down, phasing out, or abolition of activities shall be effected
pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the
President. (Emphasis provided.)
Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Changes. Unless otherwise created by
law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or
changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in
their respective organizational structures and be funded form appropriations by
this Act.
Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was issued, "The General
Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1999" (Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to
the President the power to make any changes in any of the key positions and
organizational units in the executive department thus:
Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by
the President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational
units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the
President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in
issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the President’s
constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the
provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and
consistently affirmed by this Court.
Petitioners also pointed out several flaws in the implementation of Executive
Order No. 102, particularly the RSP. However, these contentions are without
merit and are insufficient to invalidate the executive order.
The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the DBM approved it. The
facts show otherwise. It was only after the DBM approved the Notice of
Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action on 8 July 2000,33 and after the
Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) issued on 17 July
2000 Memorandum Circular No. 62,34approving the RSP, that then DOH
Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez issued on 28 July 2000 Department Circular
No. 275-C, Series of 2000,35 creating the different committees to implement the
RSP.
Petitioners also maintain that the Office of the President should have issued an
administrative order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so.
Such objection cannot be given any weight considering that the acts of the
DOH Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be the acts
of the President. The members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the
disposition of the President since they are merely his alter egos.36 Thus, their
acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved by the President, presumptively acts of the
President.37 Significantly, the acts of the DOH Secretary were clearly
authorized by the President, who, thru the PCEG, issued the aforementioned
Memorandum Circular No. 62, sanctioning the implementation of the RSP.
Petitioners Elsa Odonzo Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang,
Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U.
Bacuñata, and Edgardo Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of
Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs,
and that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to
travel a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH
employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.
In several cases, this Court regarded reorganizations of government units or
departments as valid, for so long as they are pursued in good faith—that is, for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.38 On the other
hand, if the reorganization is done for the purpose of defeating security of
tenure or for ill-motivated political purposes, any abolition of position would be
invalid. None of these circumstances are applicable since none of the
petitioners were removed from public service, nor did they identify any action
taken by the DOH that would unquestionably result in their dismissal. The
reorganization that was pursued in the present case was made in good faith.
The RSP was clearly designed to improve the efficiency of the department and
to implement the provisions of the Local Government Code on the devolution
of health services to local governments. While this Court recognizes the
inconvenience suffered by public servants in their deployment to distant areas,
the executive department’s finding of a need to make health services available
to these areas and to make delivery of health services more efficient and more
compelling is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary, a determination which is
well within its authority. In all, this Court finds petitioners’ contentions to be
insufficient to invalidate Executive Order No. 102.
Without identifying the DOH employees concerned, much less including them
as parties to the petition, petitioners went on identifying several errors in the
implementation of Executive Order No. 102. First, they alleged that unidentified
DOH employees suffered from a diminution of compensation by virtue of the
provision on Salaries and Benefits found in Department Circular No. 312,
Series of 2000, issued on 23 October 2000, which reads:
2. Any employee who was matched to a position with lower salary grade (SG)
shall not suffer a reduction in salary except where his/her current salary is
higher than the maximum step of the SG of the new position, in which case
he/she shall be paid the salary corresponding to the maximum step of the SG
of the new position. RATA shall no longer be received, if employee was
matched to a Non-Division Chief Position.
Incidentally, the petition shows that none of the petitioners, who are working in
the DOH, were entitled to receive RATA at the time the petition was filed. Nor
was it alleged that they suffered any diminution of compensation. Secondly, it
was claimed that certain unnamed DOH employees were matched with
unidentified positions for which they were supposedly neither qualified nor
suited. New employees, again unnamed and not included as parties, were
hired by the DOH and appointed to unidentified positions for which they were
purportedly not qualified, despite the fact that the objective of the ongoing
streamlining was to cut back on costs. Lastly, unspecified DOH employees
were deployed or transferred during the three-month period before the national
and local elections in May 2001, in violation of Section 2 of the Republic Act
No. 7305, also known as "Magna Carta for Public Health Workers."
Petitioners’ allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for
the Court to pass upon. The persons involved are not identified, details of their
appointments and transfers – such as position, salary grade, and the date they
were appointed - are not given; and the circumstances which attended the
alleged violations are not specified.
Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the
petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious
legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees
concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular
No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers
are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative
Order No. 94, series of 2000;39 and if the appeal is meritorious, such
appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No.
102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are
not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or
misabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its
general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its
effects in a particular case.40
In a number of cases,41 the Court upheld the standing of citizens who filed
suits, wherein the "transcendental importance" of the constitutional question
justified the granting of relief. In spite of these rulings, the Court, in Domingo v.
Carague,42 dismissed the petition when petitioners therein failed to show any
present substantial interest. It demonstrated how even in the cases in which
the Court declared that the matter of the case was of transcendental Associate Justice
importance, the petitioners must be able to assert substantial interest. Present
substantial interest, which will enable a party to question the validity of the law, MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-
RENATO C. CORONA
requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
enforcement.43 It is distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, Associate Justice
subordinate, or inconsequential interest.44
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
In the same way, the Court, in Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of Associate Justice Associate Justice
the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,45ruled that a citizen is allowed to raise a DANTE O. TINGA CANCIO C. GARCIA
constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered Associate Justice Associate Justice
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. This case likewise NACHURA
Associate Justice
stressed that the rule on constitutional questions which are of transcendental Associate Justice
importance cannot be invoked where a party’s substantive claim is without
merit. Thus, a party’s standing is determined by the substantive merit of his
CERTIFICATION
case or a preliminary estimate thereof. After a careful scrutiny of the
petitioners’ substantive claims, this Court finds that the petitioners miserably
failed to show any merit to their claims. Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court
AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26
November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as REYNATO S. PUNO
valid. No costs. Chief Justice

SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in
Associate Justice behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners, 
WE CONCUR:
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO
REYNATO S. PUNO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
Chief Justice ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
CONSUELO YNARES- HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Government, Respondents.
SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
x---------------------------------x
ANGELINA SANDOVAL- ANTONIO T. CARPIO
GUTIERREZ Associate Justice
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI],
represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses
Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A.
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. &
Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista,
Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco &
Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco,
Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan
Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z.
Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor &
Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children,
Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor &
Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho,
Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses
Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi
Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho &
Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child
Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children
Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro,
Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,  vs.
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development,
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-
Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B.
Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE
FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as
member of the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE
R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd.,
ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I.
YAP,Petitioners, 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education
and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE
APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,  B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON.
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO,
DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA.
ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein
represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his
own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C.
Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan,
Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr.,
Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,  Philippines, Respondent.
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO,
Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T.
DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively
known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY
G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE
NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known
as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA
F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino
posterity, Petitioners, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma
Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN
B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I.
GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON
CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA,
ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI
CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,  ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B.
LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS
and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,  fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS
ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-
SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,  closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess
his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good." 1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence
as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger,
illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared
towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every
member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people
and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the
main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and
policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is
substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is
the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that
merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to
adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then
willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most
vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of (6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by Eduardo Olaguer
15

population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,  in their
16

society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates  to 2

sticker campaigns,  from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings

3
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by the Philippine
17

organized by members of the clergy  - the clash between the seemingly

4
Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,  and several others  in their capacities
18 19

antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to
withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise (8) Petition,  filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several
20

known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 others,  in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
21

(RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by spouses Francisco
22

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers
from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions
and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities
as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F.
Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar
(Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by Pro-Life Philippines
23

Foundation Inc.  and several others,  in their capacities as citizens and
24 25

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by spouses Attys.

5
taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar
James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal (Pro-Life);
capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their
minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a
(11) Petition for Prohibition,  filed by Millennium Saint Foundation,
26

domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

Inc.,  Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera,
27

and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers

(2) Petition for Prohibition,  filed by the Alliance for the Family
6
and members of the Bar (MSF);
Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche  and several others  in their personal capacities
7 8

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by John Walter B. Juat
28

as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);

and several others,  in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
29

(3) Petition for Certiorari,  filed by the Task Force for Family and Life
9

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by Couples for Christ
30

Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and

Foundation, Inc. and several others, in their capacities as citizens
31

taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(CFC);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by Serve Life Cagayan
10

(14) Petition for Prohibition  filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and

32

De Oro City, Inc.,  Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,  a domestic, privately-

11 12

Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers

owned educational institution, and several others,  in their capacities
13

(Tillah); and
as citizens (Serve Life);
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,  filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his
33

(5) Petition,  filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a

14

capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

citizen (Bugarin);
 (16) Petition-In-Intervention,  filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B
34
UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. 35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems. 36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners
contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and
correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is
against their religious beliefs and convictions.
38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the RH Law (RH-IRR),  provides that skilled health professionals who are
39
public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital
staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors. 40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory
sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their
religious beliefs.
41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present
danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of
the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under
the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by
PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would
mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the
practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is
claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment
and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the
type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law. 46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right
to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their
own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what
kind of services they shall offer."  It ignores the management prerogative
47
inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance
with their own discretion and judgment.
 • The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to
explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The
petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions
owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer
their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service
or procedure. 48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family
protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon
their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their
beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue
between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on
matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it
is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives. 50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of
legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is
non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL). 51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under
Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law. 53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government
Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
{ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive
health measures at the local government level and the ARMM,
infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the
Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054. 54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective
comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law.
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the
petitions in behalf of the respondents,  Congressman Edcel C.
55
Lagman,  former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral,
56
Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,  the Filipino Catholic
57
Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),  Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,  and
58 59
Atty. Joan De Venecia  also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in
60
conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S.
Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene. 61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the
petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that
1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet
ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question
the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the
Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and
twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of
the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the
parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the
oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013,
the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was
ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several
questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale,
dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back
as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to
Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs
and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they
could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."
65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,  approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions
66
relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and
devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical
product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to
any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on
Population, which recognized that the population problem should be
considered as the principal element for long-term economic development,
enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate
population growth.  Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved
67
on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on
Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. "
The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad
educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples
desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be
further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos
issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,  dated December 8, 1972, which,
68
among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made
"available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all
Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to
one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive
health.  Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely
69
choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its
adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on
Population and Development.  Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted
70
R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others,
mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and
programs for women, including family planning and sex education. 71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept
on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27
million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million
in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.  The executive and the
72
legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the
problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family
planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples'
right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH
Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full
range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH
Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make
effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population
control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates
the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is
mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante -
the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."  It
73
explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives
per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729,
the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a
prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable
and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies -
the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay
officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible
using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all 8] Involuntary Servitude
forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by
ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range 9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
of family planning methods, devices and supplies. 74

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

ISSUES
DISCUSSION
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the
Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues: Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing
rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy. I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
The Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts
3] Facial Challenge that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and
respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a
4] Locus Standi product of a majoritarian democratic process"  and "characterized by an
75

inordinate amount of transparency."  The OSG posits that the authority of the
76

5] Declaratory Relief Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since
the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies
6] One Subject/One Title Rule and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with
Congress.  It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern
77

Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,  the remedies of certiorari and

78

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.
79

1] Right to Life
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot
2] Right to Health prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to
the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure. 80

4] The Family
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its
exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
6] Due Process branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government,
7] Equal Protection which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. 81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines;  (b) the executive power shall be
82
vested in the President of the Philippines;  and (c) the judicial power shall be
83
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.  The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
84
lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of
separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of
the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of
government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and
caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or
political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.  In order to address this, the
87
Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-
equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the
same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited
and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the
legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse
of discretion.  Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom,
88
justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.  The Court must
89
demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of
review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of
legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier
point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative
and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their
respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it
has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.  This is in line
90
with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,  the Court has unequivocally declared that
91
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied
in Macalintal v. COMELEC,  Aldaba v. COMELEC,  Magallona v. Ermita,  and
92 93 94
countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of
the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of
intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.
95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have
the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional
violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review
is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any
actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented.  They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet
97
concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.  In short, it is
98
contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.  The rule is that
99
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. 100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness.  A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
101
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before
a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,  where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of
103
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was
argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there
was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners'
and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of
the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists
and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter
NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the
subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its
face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a
First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the
First Amendment.  These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and
106
the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.  After all, the fundamental right to religious
107
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which
one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has
been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court
has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,  it
108
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.  The
109
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in
the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.  Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
110
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged
that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed,
to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their
respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the
petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and
applied against them,  and the government has yet to distribute reproductive
111
health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite
locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act.  It requires a personal stake in the
113
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that
one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation
of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of
the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the
court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing. 115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,  the Court held that in
117
cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed
to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,  ordinary citizens and
118
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected
by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not
have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being
of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is
an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the
public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for
the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression
and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues
of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division
among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court
adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the
mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a
life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when
rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do
so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.  Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for
120
injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the
case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that
it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,  prescribing the one
122
subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population
control measure. 123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth
or population control measure,  and that the concepts of "responsible
124
parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are
inseparable. 125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court
sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law
is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to
save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the
need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with
access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and
methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce
the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-
natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the
dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent
pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the
RH Law.  Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are
126
related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.  As earlier explained,
127
"the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care
including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the
Magna Carta for Women." 128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In
Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis
Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as
not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that
both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the
human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development,
the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education
and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed
of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act."
129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving
"sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to
the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health
of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed
legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient;
thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford
protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient"
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies,
medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they
operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.
131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the
petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes
natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.
132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be
used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the
agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and
supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.
133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They
contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law
emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services,
methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the
public.
134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that
contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law
was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with
the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it
is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination
and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined
as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of
one's right to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO
show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law
specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the
implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed. 136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to
life.
137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law,
is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular
law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of
men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section
1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods
in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No.
4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution
of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,  to the promotion
138
of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,  and the ratification of numerous
139
international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote
population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-
term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's
rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus,
aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine
national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone
principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."  As141
will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection
expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at
this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation,
however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could
express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception.
This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak
of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen
because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the
scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is
synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.  On the142
other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the
"implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus. 143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should
be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of
Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum
- from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule
of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable
sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of
becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in
a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human
life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,  it was written:
147
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already
has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,  Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US
148
Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in
the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or
cited, as a baby or a child. 149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the
Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of
"fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is
fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.
150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning
of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first
question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically
categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this
upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within.
Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell
division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no
question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes."
At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As
this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes
of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is
found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is
human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude
that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it
must be human life. Its nature is human. 151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and
not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human
life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described
by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond
the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from
the moment of conception." 152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection
under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of
writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to
the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define
when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now
determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There
can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point.
Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed
right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the
egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine
whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not
because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting
of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process
is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What
happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the
fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is
proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called
abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned
under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state
whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and
based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered
abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the
Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both
the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is,
upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It
is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit
Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life
begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact,
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of
whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which
should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is
even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded
that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157

ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,

contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the Atty. Noche:
female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible. Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution: Justice Bersamin:

x x x           x x x          x x x There is no life.

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro- Atty. Noche:
life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but
also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free So, there is no life to be protected.
world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of
the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I
Justice Bersamin:
raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question
again for a categorical answer. To be protected.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the Atty. Noche:
moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to
certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in Under Section 12, yes.
time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Justice Bersamin:
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be
preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped. So you have no objection to condoms?

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some Atty. Noche:
contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg
which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say Not under Section 12, Article II.
"from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized. Justice Bersamin:

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization. Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 156

Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor,
but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation.
Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as
"the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon
enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote." 159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a
zygote from which the embryo develops." 160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),  used by
161
medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human
person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the
sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human
development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells
during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence
of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a
secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the
haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes
to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid
cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being." 162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology  mirror the same position.
163
They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical
landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct
human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes
present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the
diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo
now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a
"Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and
therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that
PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this
stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred
from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never
licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology
and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and
after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis
where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal,
or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically
well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent
with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral,
political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical
parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism
and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by
Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.  According to him, "fertilization
165
and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous."  Citing a letter of the WHO,
166
he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized
ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that
pregnancy can be medically detected." 167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or
scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability
of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.  Implantation has
168
been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control
in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law
but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization
of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the
uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based
divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and
abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in
the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of
the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever
passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme
Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and
actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself
clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that
embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should
be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. 170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of
the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms
shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods,
facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-
being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes
sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to
decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number,
spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning
reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual
health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health
rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any
law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting
abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient
as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from
the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not
only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce
abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH
Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The
conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or
device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively
above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized
ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind),
the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that
protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized
ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the
moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the
mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from
the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug
or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the
fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the
Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier.
And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that
is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the
law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty
as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or
device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be
present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be
used. 171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-
abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of
Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on
the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is
consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section
that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by
any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that
will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR
gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient.
The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms
shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as
follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven
modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or
artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized
ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb
in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and
recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. 172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are
well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily,"
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR  must be struck down for being ultra
173
vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of
the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law
and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of
the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in
the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered
as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here,
the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the
approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their
fail-safe mechanism. 174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that
these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the
definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared
policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be
included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that
do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the
secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line
with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the
validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would
effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution." 175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied
in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines
and supplies of all national hospitals. Citing various studies on the matter, the
176
petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who
never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of
contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of
combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk
of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and
an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.  Given the definition of
177
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)  and (w)  of the
178 179
RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to
ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is
not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle
and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of
women. 181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this
regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the
right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide
for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach
to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development,
and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for
their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration
into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-
executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of
the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.  In Manila Prince
182
Hotel v. GSIS,  it was stated:
183
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI,
do not question contraception and contraceptives per se.  In fact, ALFI prays
184
that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a
prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained. 185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave
intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away
with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the
effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive
drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public
that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly
explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same
cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation,
and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No.
5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not
repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent
with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive
drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in
full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to
sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any
contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is
by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion
which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of
the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent
introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose
of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this
Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an
imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921
provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No
medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall
be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to
the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital
pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and
other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will
lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not,
is completely unwarranted and baseless.  [Emphases in the Original.
186
Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the
RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The
DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family
planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all
appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement
and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on,
among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to
space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and
monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it
must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and
ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed
drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected
by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury,
illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.
187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been
submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await
its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it
being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the
public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at
this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional
yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-
abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be
construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and
approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine
whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and
non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply
from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a
determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not
covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of
their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives,
whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners
who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things
dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is
gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms
true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human
life."
188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives,
arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the
guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious
beliefs. 189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address
religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes
upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able
to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring
the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do
without violating his/her religious beliefs.
190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is
recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient
seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other
individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in
public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not
recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend
that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider
is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service
providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will
violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the
law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos.
Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex
education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents
encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to
refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider
infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic
teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State,
the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither
harm nor injury to the public.
193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest
to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency,
risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights
of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human
development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions
according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of
responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify
the impairment of religious freedom. 194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-
be couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and
to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it
contravenes their religious beliefs.  As the assailed law dangles the threat of
195
penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its
provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide,
support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not
provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or
artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.  They point out
196
that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing
accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure
maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the
social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,  and that what the law
197
only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to
reproductive health.  They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
198
guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be
compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should
be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right
to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality
of the RH Law.  In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
200
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the
Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this
on the entire citizenry. 201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one
hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the
citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that
the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3)
is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without
unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as
the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact.
203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the
respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for
would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object
to any information received on account of their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are
completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural
family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic
hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the
changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years
and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It
is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and
backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in
practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups
to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is
tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-
believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the
present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order
to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their
spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by
tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it
means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far
as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.  Moreover, in
205
recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards
religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers
in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State
would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle
of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6
of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect.  Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the
1âwphi1
church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot
favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of
the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred
over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term
"church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or
any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations
collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample
barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the
Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article
VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or
to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two
guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups."  Essentially, it prohibits the
206
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support
or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.  Under this part of religious freedom
207
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.  Explaining the concept of religious
208
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union  wrote:
209
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any
religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures
the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost
amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each
man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as
he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct.
1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general
law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals,
the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless
the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of
individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for
religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence
individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that
the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to
believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however
strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the
State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is
"subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the
Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly
decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)  where it was stated
214
"that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive,
is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."  In
215
the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person's or institution's religion."  "What is sought under the theory of
216
accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral
law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether
by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling
state interest test is proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test is the
218
notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it
should be subject to strict scrutiny.  In Escritor, it was written:
219
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits.
Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible
Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not
employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on
religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established
institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate
and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least
restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German
went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case
of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the
maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which
employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test
involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in
cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German
cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established
institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited
by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the
"compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test
was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society,
Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and
"grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from
having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the
present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests:
some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-
reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary.
However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to
religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position
in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human
rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the
Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire
constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid
of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of
interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore
not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over
the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a
heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to
batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious
liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest"
serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording
protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in
Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end,
the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the
state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be
preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine
whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of
modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the
Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."  The
220
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood
only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court
stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and
religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can
be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious
freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right
to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant
thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias,
to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern
methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and
effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also
provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning,
especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to
have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the health,
particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and
in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions.
[Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family
planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and
cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various
human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and
people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious
sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and
population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the
priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond
to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared
responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life
aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use
of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of
using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of
benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government
can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the
government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply
because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious
beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's. 221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health
manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment
Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23
and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a
medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by
government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with
the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom
would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than
strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right
to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that
an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him
into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while
the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The
scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose
religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once
the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an
act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner
Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience. 222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is,
however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers
complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or
offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do
directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the
offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with
the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and
conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to
individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for
simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to
utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.  While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through
223
informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct
or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.
224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of
individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide
access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures
and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the
religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt
from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled
to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the
principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise
of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of
Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and
Clyde Health Board,  that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors
225
under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required
to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.  The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined
226
according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this
would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty." 227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle
was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be
against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such
institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under
Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down
for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)
(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of
information regarding programs and services and in the performance of
reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service
providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the
Executive Secretary  it was stressed:
228
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess
his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good." 10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour
to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation
or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a
constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its
disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive
health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal
health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The
conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious
belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they
should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection
accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private
sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one
acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in
the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills,
whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by
oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in
occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such
concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press,
assembly and petition, and freedom of association. 229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is
stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal
protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is
any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on
page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the
freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed
this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the
IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not
thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH
Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial,
city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged
with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who
can be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be
considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against
the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must
prevail.
230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the
respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate
a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their
choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the
obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the
objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in
vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling
state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's
right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the
oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The
Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the
compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious
objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling
State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This
is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation
by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients. 231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the
free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also
means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And
this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is
prevented from acting according to one's belief. 233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of
an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a
couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children
refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides
to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or
whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the
burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and
occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health
matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement
of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed
to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which
could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also,
the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show
that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least
intrusive means.  Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only
234
be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector
is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves
the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the
State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious
objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other
practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with
open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to
perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the
last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to
ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as
they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or
"The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as
"The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation
to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. -
The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive,
and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a
woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality
and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health
services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the
rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of
women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to
address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of
family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education
and health services without prejudice to the primary right and
duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers
like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-
related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women
and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
 comprehensive health services that include psychosocial,
therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance
towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual
dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing
years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health
problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle
activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and
projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall
provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate
information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health
in government education and training programs, with due regard to the
following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth and the development of moral character
and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of
morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of
character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human
dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods
including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the
compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of
thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."  He, however,
235
failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable
sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported
that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008,   although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such
236
revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths
constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social
healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a
measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in
exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set
forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced
to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting
to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the
oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral
clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
not contemplate an emergency." 237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is
impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the
RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect
wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never
justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of
the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try
to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the
mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct
harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of
the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable.
Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is
never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures
endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the
religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever Section 3. The State shall defend:
burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been
more than justified considering the life he would be able to save. The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
Family Planning Seminars
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15  as a condition for the
239
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and
issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable other conditions prejudicial to their development;
exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed
provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and
mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who
receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population
not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to
growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social
reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide
institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the
on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise
deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof The Family and Spousal Consent
violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
family rather than promote its solidarity and total development. 240

The following acts are prohibited:

The Court cannot but agree.
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is
the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to
the family. (2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures
on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of
the following persons in the following instances:
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of
disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
[Emphasis supplied]
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal
litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues
family and shall be protected by the State.
intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the
Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to
found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is
shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is
equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making.
By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure,
and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a
wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and
endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution. 241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter
which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would
reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the
number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to
undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as
one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally
guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown
any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny
together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No.
9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women
shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations,
including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children.
Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a
shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law
should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to
decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of
marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of
spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to
privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,  where the Court, speaking
243
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is
fully deserving of constitutional protection."  Marje adopted the ruling of the
244
US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,  where Justice William O.
245
Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons.
Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples.
Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the
minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services,
whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents
or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor
is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from
the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even
if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just
because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care,
advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say
that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not
promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that
"the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government."  In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
247
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of
parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of
the State.  [Emphases supplied]
248
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of
the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract
of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of
parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can
justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in
the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse
under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services,
on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern
family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the
acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the
second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her
own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of
the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make
informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones'
health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be
allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their
parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise
parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in
life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures.
In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It
should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate
medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right
to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)  should be
249
struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only
in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save
for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this
right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof,
mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions
effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education
even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.  Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical
250
data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and
breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the
"feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth. 251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of
the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium
of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue,
the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it
places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of
parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in
the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of
the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.  Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-
253
appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination;
sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of
gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional
changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible
teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and
that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself
provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity
and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that
the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather
than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive
health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-
teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it
could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the
petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection
to their participation in the reproductive health education program provided
under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their
religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed
before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus
violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section
23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service
provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts
hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health
service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under
Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under
Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and
providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect
information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.  Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are
255
vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning
alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part
of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every
part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health
care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care
institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness,
disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical
and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of
medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has
undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and
who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after
having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health
(DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the
law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of
confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give
reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures.
Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right
to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive
health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes
health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide
incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For
ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or
intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full
range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with
a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree
with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with
the truth.   On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or
257
deliberateness that is intentional.  Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l),
258
they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give
their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is
acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not
barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs
and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the
need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the
RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles  and definition of terms  of the law.
259 260
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law
renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,  the Court had the occasion to
261
expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of
the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of
due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice
and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide
for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis
of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst
itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those
of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make
for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include
or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification
will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary
that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all
those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that
an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as
that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the
non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must
be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those
that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied;
citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which
recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged
by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of
the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach
to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the
use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may
have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge
couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly
humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks
to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it
to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate
attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction
sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates
the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that
Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government
health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono
reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude
because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in
Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the
manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out
that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of
medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued
with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal
profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened
with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this
power includes the power of Congress  to prescribe the qualifications for the
263
practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public
health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude
connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of
coercion and compulsion.  A reading of the assailed provision, however,
265
reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-
accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they
wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render
pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary
incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate
state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be
emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as
long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render
reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the
Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only
have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render
such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that
health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated
with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711
reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an
office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department
of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary
and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the
rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of
health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the
implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of
health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity,
purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to
serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-
check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug
outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as
determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior
to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy,
purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers,
exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users
of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably
indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any
person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified
complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA
Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist
order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60)
days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of
any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all
concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a
requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the
FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law.
Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food
and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle
of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure
public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe
includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is
clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that
are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance
with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice,  as follows:
267
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the
interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH
Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs)
under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon
the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services
and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
 (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the
functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved
to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient
and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x
x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon
them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of
the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.  Thus:
268
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public
works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered
under this Section, except in those cases where the local government
unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government
is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it
has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU.  A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
269
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it. 270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to
the establishment of health care facilities,  the hiring of skilled health
271
professionals,  or the training of barangay health workers,  it will be the
272 273
national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation.
Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say
when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the
law which can be construed as making the availability of these services
mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law
amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the
autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not
infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A.
No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to
justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region,
refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government.
These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers
that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner,
be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation
that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy
granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they
now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between
the national and the regional governments.  Except for the express and
274
implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be
restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects
which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,  suffice it
276
to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding
or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law
enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is
not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity
to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body.
Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights
espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in
the actual law of the past or present.  Unless, a natural right has been
277
transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,  the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
278
explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural
law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving
rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking
away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available
to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it
seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices,
and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some
sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious
group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society.
Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As
such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and
harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape
the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial
issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if
population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's
wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long
run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program
generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of
their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These
young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped
them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now
trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our
Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young
able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed
down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be
able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate
would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State
should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law
against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the
Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its
duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not
the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a
given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the
wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative
branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation
that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to
enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as
always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out
the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and
existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is
therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of
saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body. 281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation
and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health
laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as
entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365),
the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women
or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions
of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-
coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the 7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR
Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL: far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty 8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who Constitution.
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s; The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as
extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare constitutional.
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of SO ORDERED.
his or her religious beliefs.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR Associate Justice
insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo WE CONCUR:
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
Tingnan ang aking opinyong
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat
insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
surgical procedures. Chief Justice

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare See Concurring Opinion
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. Associate Justice
8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or With Separate concurring opinion See: Separate Concurring
one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE Opinion
beliefs; CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do Associate Justice Associate Justice
any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; See Concurring and dissenting See Concurring Opinion
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
 Associate Justice Associate Justice On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No.
6558. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
Associate Justice Associate Justice on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions,
denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated
See Concurring and Dissenting February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35)
See concurring and dissenting Opinion others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or
BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS- are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
Associate Justice BERNABE political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained
Associate Justice his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

See Separate dissent In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to
Associate Justice opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
(14) G.R. No. 161872             April 13, 2004
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,  Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision,
however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco
and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had
parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who
can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political
parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended
the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of
the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal
qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national
campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership,
he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of
not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications
of candidates since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his
program of government.
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.
Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring
"equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a
constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to
seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution
neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which
suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,2 and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.3 The disregard
of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.4
An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that
the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section
26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office
and prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario
Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word
"broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the
word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:
I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO"
because what is important would be equal access to the opportunity. If
you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government
would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to
accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the
meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order
that we should not mandate the State to make the government the
number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be
necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to
access to it, I change the word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public
office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the
framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy
objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be
regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as
operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are
not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.8 Words and
phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.
Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights
may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office
may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No.
645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the
COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel
a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as
long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by
any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the
burdens which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452
dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has to be
accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section
26, Article II of the Constitution is misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run
for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that
its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end,
the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of
time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties
should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated
electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to
alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper.
Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of
inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the
United States Supreme Court held:
 [T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some
preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing
the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot –
the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even
frustration of the democratic [process].11
The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it
promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the study
Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in
the COMELEC’s Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case
of candidates for national positions because the election process
becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national
campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in
the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the
Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government.
For the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes,
an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY MILLION PESOS (₱450,000,000.00).
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to
continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the
prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by
allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws
provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers
in every polling place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even the
receipt of electoral contributions.15Moreover, there are election rules and
regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of
candidates in a given election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy
becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona
fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would
actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies
which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body
would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It
would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the
State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song
goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are
cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible
elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that
distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by
the Constitution with the administration of elections16 and endowed with
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the
promotion of free, orderly and honest elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution
guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The determination of bona
fidecandidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is,
satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.
Now, the needed factual premises.
However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper
application in the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this
Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the
COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in
determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court
from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily
take into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its
decisions.
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents
purportedly evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency.
Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the
reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor
General appended any document to their respective Comments.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both
legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this
Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in
order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner’s aspiration and
offer to serve in the government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a
hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.
As to petitioner’s attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of
candidacy, suffice it to say that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a
certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to
show that the candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position
aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001
is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to
determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and
report its findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug*, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 91649             May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES
MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,  In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition
seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals,
public policy and order, and because —
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to
impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding
paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to
impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and
the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to
have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and
13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the
present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing
lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws
of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD
1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created
by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise
under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and
maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known
floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success
for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and
socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for
PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to
enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following
declared policy —
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore
authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain
the following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and
conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled,
administered and supervised by the Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and
recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football,
lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation
including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate
sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic
projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and
sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs,
Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create
recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the
country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally
eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally
prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos
without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the
Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed,
amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue,
next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989
alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National
Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's
income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition,
PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or
in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private
associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the
present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2
Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees
in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four
Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege
that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and
public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative
of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running
counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and
Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1
(Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV
of the 1987 Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny
and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the
exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate
function which belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v.
Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal
and coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the
time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is
presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its
constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or
timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter,
has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should
not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the
offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court
thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the —
. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases
where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are
involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one
 who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the
challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute
and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194
N.W. 2nd534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59
SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970];
Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs
of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens
Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162
SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning
the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in
keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in
the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the
petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is
in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court
to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only
an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The
Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and
ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if
we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the
exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive
issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the
prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it
in the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v.
Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is
not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of
Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming
the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe
its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is
inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental
attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions
of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to
it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a
power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660,
708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell &
Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to
meet the agencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate
and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was
subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one
corporate entity — the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government
but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the
cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and
subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of
the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of
PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and
corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City
of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D.
1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise
holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well
as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind
or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and
collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form
or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation,
except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or
earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this
franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National
Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or
assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or
collected by any municipal, provincial or national government authority
(Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent
right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v.
Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643).
Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power
or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62).
Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent
power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983
ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of
Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the
power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general
legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5
SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress
can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long
been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate
gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by
P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
authority of chartered cities and other local governments to issue
license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and
establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of
gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and
establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of
gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper
application and verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or
permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or
collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or
permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with
an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the
National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD
1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a
Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers,
authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and
Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under
the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of
 Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term,
structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of
the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to
original incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The
latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by
a mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the
federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed.
579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over
local governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to
the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that
way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States
(Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state
or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a
way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or
even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau,
Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable
activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v.
Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to
destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to
wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution
will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the
1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its
own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other
charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such
taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government. (emphasis supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to
"limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
"operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of
the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore
be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply
means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission,
pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a
nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control
of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the
government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can
only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it
cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system
can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of
government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated
to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom.
It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v.
Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with
gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to
retain it or delegate it to local governments.
 As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or
express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local
corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express
grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are
inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App.
107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in
re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480,
as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while
most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners'
posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of
the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may
be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is
not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law
does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego,
G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require
situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though
they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative
of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact
that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A.
306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as
amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are
prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one,
unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have
been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean
that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the
same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as
evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned
is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid
down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona,
249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the
Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free
enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this
Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the
government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to
Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare
what the law is and not what the law should be.  Under our system of
1âwphi1
government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of government and of the people themselves as the
repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA
256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and
Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not
necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether
public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this
is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality
Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of
principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning
a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.
 In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They
were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If
the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the
articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate
could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82
SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the
grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v.
Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration.
Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners
to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is
therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation
considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise,
privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and
educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 —
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No.
137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption of validity and
constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not
overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in
the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute.
This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how
the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the
Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners
have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of
the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly
addressed to this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally
pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political
departments of government: the President and the Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is
precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness
necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his
family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the
mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental
control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the
same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the
antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same
consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink,
exercise, work, and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. Justice
Paras. This means that I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the
prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling
properly pertain to "state policy." It is, therefore, the political departments of
government, namely, the legislative and the executive that should decide on
what government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full
responsibility to the people for such policy.
The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the wisdom, morality or
expediency of policies adopted by the political departments of government in
areas which fall within their authority, except only when such policies pose a
clear and present danger to the life, liberty or property of the individual. This
case does not involve such a factual situation.
However, I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any
form. It demeans the human personality, destroys self-confidence and
eviscerates one's self-respect, which in the long run will corrode whatever is
left of the Filipino moral character. Gambling has wrecked and will continue to
wreck families and homes; it is an antithesis to individual reliance and reliability
as well as personal industry which are the touchstones of real economic
progress and national development.
THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized. G.R. No. 209135

The revenues realized by the government out of "legalized" gambling will, in
the long run, be more than offset and negated by the irreparable damage to
the people's moral values.
Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against
"illegal gambling" is fatally flawed and becomes untenable when it itself
engages in the very activity it seeks to eradicate.
AUGUSTO L. SY JUCO JR., Ph.D., Petitioner, 
vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND HON. FRANKLIN
MAGTUNAO DRILON, IN HIS CAP A CITY AS THE SENATE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

One can go through the Court's decision today and mentally replace the x-----------------------x
activity referred to therein as gambling, which is legal only because it is
authorized by law and run by the government, with the activity known G.R. No. 209136
as prostitution. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be
authorized by law, franchised, and "regulated" by the government, in return for
MANUELITO R. LUNA, Petitioner, 
the substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable
vs.
projects, such as infrastructure and social amelioration? The question, I
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS HEAD
believe, answers itself. I submit that the sooner the legislative department
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND
outlaws all forms of gambling, as a fundamental state policy, and the sooner
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
the executive implements such policy, the better it will be for the nation.
AS ALTER EGO OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209287               July 1, 2014
G.R. No. 209155
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG
ATTY. JOSE MALV AR VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioner, 
MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF
vs.
THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.;
KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN,
AND THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B.
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS
ABAD, Respondents.
ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE;
RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K.
DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. x-----------------------x
CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA,
CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,  G.R. No. 209164
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
REPRESENTED BY DEAN FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, BENJAMIN E.
DIOKNO AND LEONOR M. BRIONES, Petitioners,  AUTHORITY (CUENHA); MANUEL BACLAGON, FOR HIMSELF AND AS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND/OR HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209260
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioner, 
vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT (DBM),Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209442
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA; BISHOP REUBEN MABANTE
AND REV. JOSE L. GONZALEZ,Petitioners, 
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON; THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.; THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.;
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, REPRESENTED
BY SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD; THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY CESAR V. PURISIMA; AND THE
BUREAU OF TREASURY, REPRESENTED BY ROSALIA V. DE
LEON, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209517
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADV AN CEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS 1ST
VICE PRESIDENT, SANTIAGO DASMARINAS, JR.; ROSALINDA
NARTATES, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE
CONSOLIDATED UNION OF EMPLOYEES NATIONAL HOUSING
PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT CENTRAL OFFICE (SWEAP-DSWD CO); ANTONIA
PASCUAL, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(DAREA); ALBERT MAGALANG, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF
THE ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT BUREAU EMPLOYEES UNION
(EMBEU); AND MARCIAL ARABA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF
THE KAPISANAN PARA SA KAGALINGAN NG MGA KAW ANI NG MMDA
(KKKMMDA), Petitioners, 
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO Ill, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
AND HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209569
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC),
REPRESENTED BY DANTE L. JIMENEZ,Petitioner, 
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of
the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC)
No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) implementing the DAP.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed by
the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this
provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from
programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of
the President exercising his constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the
1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the
appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the Government. But
the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations of
transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.
Antecedents
What has precipitated the controversy?
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including
himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50 Million each as "incentive" for
voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM
issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of
Spending Acceleration Program,  explaining that the funds released to the
1 pork barrel – "an appropriation of government spending meant for localized
Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp
up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had
been released to the Senators based on their letters of request for funding; and
that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made
because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending
after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic
product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the funds under the DAP were
usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel
Services;  (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased
2
from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that
had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website  that the DAP releases had
3
been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from
unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the
pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel
Services  appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased
4
appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero
based budgeting findings;  and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments
5
also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to
the agencies of the National Government.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of
savings,  namely: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
6
granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his office in the
general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for
Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations),
Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and
2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of
savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings.
As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal
bases the special provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of
2011, 2012 and 2013.
The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM
brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and
made this present controversy inevitable. That the issues against the DAP
came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over Congressional
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s
district"  – excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel controversy.
7
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances
relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other, as follows: G.R. No.
209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136 (Luna), on October 7,
2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas),  on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209164
8
(PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on October 16,
2013; G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), on October 17, 2013; G.R. No. 209442
(Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE), on
November6, 2013; and G.R. No. 209569 (VACC), on November 8, 2013.
In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Court’s attention
NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of
Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No.
541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and
offices with low levels of obligations, both for continuing and current allotments.
In due time, the respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues
raised and joined.
Issues
Under the Advisory issued on November 14, 2013, the presentations of the
parties during the oral arguments were limited to the following, to wit:
Procedural Issue:
A. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies
to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other
executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP. Subsumed in this issue
are whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the
standing of petitioners.
Substantive Issues:
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances
allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution insofar as:
(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings"
as the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of
the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;
(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or
programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive
Department; and
(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in
the GAAs.
D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the
system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public accountability
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it authorizes the release of
funds upon the request of legislators.
E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a temporary
restraining order to restrain the implementation of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and
all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
In its Consolidated Comment, the OSG raised the matter of unprogrammed
funds in order to support its argument regarding the President’s power to
spend. During the oral arguments, the propriety of releasing unprogrammed
funds to support projects under the DAP was considerably discussed. The
petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica)
dwelled on unprogrammed funds in their respective memoranda. Hence, an
additional issue for the oral arguments is stated as follows:
F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was in
accord with the GAAs.
During the oral arguments held on November 19, 2013, the Court directed Sec.
Abad to submit a list of savings brought under the DAP that had been sourced
from (a) completed programs; (b) discontinued or abandoned programs; (c)
unpaid appropriations for compensation; (d) a certified copy of the President’s
directive dated June 27, 2012 referred to in NBC No. 541; and (e) all circulars
or orders issued in relation to the DAP.
9
In compliance, the OSG submitted several documents, as follows:
(1) A certified copy of the Memorandum for the President dated June
25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized
Balances and their Realignment); 10
(2) Circulars and orders, which the respondents identified as related to
the DAP, namely:
a. NBC No. 528 dated January 3, 2011 (Guidelines on the
Release of Funds for FY 2011);
b. NBC No. 535 dated December 29, 2011 (Guidelines on the
Release of Funds for FY 2012);
 c. NBC No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 (Adoption of Operational
Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated
Allotments as of June 30, 2012);
d. NBC No. 545 dated January 2, 2013 (Guidelines on the
Release of Funds for FY 2013);
e. DBM Circular Letter No. 2004-2 dated January 26, 2004
(Budgetary Treatment of Commitments/Obligations of the
National Government);
f. COA-DBM Joint Circular No. 2013-1 dated March 15, 2013
(Revised Guidelines on the Submission of Quarterly
Accountability Reports on Appropriations, Allotments,
Obligations and Disbursements);
g. NBC No. 440 dated January 30, 1995 (Adoption of a
Simplified Fund Release System in the Government).
(3) A breakdown of the sources of savings, including savings from
discontinued projects and unpaid appropriations for compensation from
2011 to 2013
On January 28, 2014, the OSG, to comply with the Resolution issued on
January 21, 2014 directing the respondents to submit the documents not yet
submitted in compliance with the directives of the Court or its Members,
submitted several evidence packets to aid the Court in understanding the
factual bases of the DAP, to wit:
(1) First Evidence Packet  – containing seven memoranda issued by
11
the DBM through Sec. Abad, inclusive of annexes, listing in detail the
116 DAP identified projects approved and duly signed by the
President, as follows:
a. Memorandum for the President dated October 12, 2011 (FY
2011 Proposed Disbursement Acceleration Program (Projects
and Sources of Funds);
b. Memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011
(Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized
Balances and its Realignment);
c. Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012
(Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized
Balances and their Realignment);
d. Memorandum for the President dated September 4, 2012
(Release of funds for other priority projects and expenditures of
the Government);
e. Memorandum for the President dated December 19, 2012
(Proposed Priority Projects and Expenditures of the
Government);
f. Memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013
(Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized
Balances and their Realignment to Fund the Quarterly
Disbursement Acceleration Program); and
g. Memorandum for the President dated September 25, 2013
(Funding for the Task Force Pablo Rehabilitation Plan).
(2) Second Evidence Packet  – consisting of 15 applications of the
12
DAP, with their corresponding Special Allotment Release Orders
(SAROs) and appropriation covers;
(3) Third Evidence Packet  – containing a list and descriptions of 12
13
projects under the DAP;
(4) Fourth Evidence Packet  – identifying the DAP-related portions of
14
the Annual Financial Report (AFR) of the Commission on Audit for
2011 and 2012;
(5) Fifth Evidence Packet  – containing a letter of Department of
15
Transportation and Communications(DOTC) Sec. Joseph Abaya
addressed to Sec. Abad recommending the withdrawal of funds from
his agency, inclusive of annexes; and
(6) Sixth Evidence Packet  – a print-out of the Solicitor General’s visual
16
presentation for the January 28, 2014 oral arguments.
On February 5, 2014,  the OSG forwarded the Seventh Evidence
17
G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE) Certiorari and Prohibition
Packet,  which listed the sources of funds brought under the DAP, the uses of
18

G.R. No. 209569 (VACC) Certiorari and Prohibition

such funds per project or activity pursuant to DAP, and the legal bases thereof.

On February 14, 2014, the OSG submitted another set of documents in further The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for
compliance with the Resolution dated January 28, 2014, viz: adjudication in the absence of adverse claims between the parties;  that the
19

petitioners lacked legal standing to sue because no allegations were made to

the effect that they had suffered any injury as a result of the adoption of the
(1) Certified copies of the certifications issued by the Bureau of Treasury to the
DAP and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being taxpayers did not
effect that the revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets for
immediately confer upon the petitioners the legal standing to sue considering
the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, including collections arising from sources not
that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the issuance of NBC No.
considered in the original revenue targets, which certifications were required
541 were not in the exercise of the taxing or spending power of
for the release of the unprogrammed funds as provided in Special Provision
Congress;  and that even if the petitioners had suffered injury, there were
20
No. 1 of Article XLV, Article XVI, and Article XLV of the 2011, 2012 and 2013
plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law available to
GAAs; and (2) A report on releases of savings of the Executive Department for
them, like assailing the regularity of the DAP and related issuances before the
the use of the Constitutional Commissions and other branches of the
Commission on Audit (COA) or in the trial courts. 21
Government, as well as the fund releases to the Senate and the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC).
The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition
are not proper actions for directly assailing the constitutionality and validity of
RULING
the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other executive issuances implementing the
DAP. 22

I.
Procedural Issue:
a) The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies
All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include
applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or
temporary restraining orders. More specifically, the nature of the petitions is
individually set forth hereunder, to wit:
Certiorari, Prohibition and
In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no
authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or controversy
the resolution of which requires the determination of the constitutional
question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a court of
law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or any act of the Government
when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a
reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the President in violation of the
principle of separation of powers; and that, in the absence of a pending case or
controversy involving the DAP and NBC No. 541, any decision herein could
amount to a mere advisory opinion that no court can validly render. 23

G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco)

Mandamus
The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations
G.R. No. 209136 (Luna) Certiorariand Prohibition
that the petitioners can question either in the trial courts or in the COA; that if
G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas) Certiorariand Prohibition the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of the trial courts or of the
G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA) Certiorariand Prohibition COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts by petition for review on
certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil action
G.R. No. 209260 (IBP) Prohibition
for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. 24

G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) Certiorari
The respondents’ arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are
bereft of merit.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court, Congress
concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its
creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the repositories of
judicial power.  However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the
25
rest being created by Congress in its exercise of the legislative power.
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby
expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its
traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were
legally demandable and enforceable.
The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under the
1987 Constitution were laid out during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion (a former
Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the proposed provisions
on the Judiciary, where he said:–
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle
actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his
wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell
your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with
them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to
her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory
to human dignity." This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section
1 provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable…
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical
questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has,
also, another important function. The powers of government are generally
considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is
valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words,
the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgmenton matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question. (Bold emphasis
supplied)26
Upon interpellation by Commissioner Nolledo, Commissioner Concepcion
clarified the scope of judicial power in the following manner:–
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x
The second paragraph of Section 1 states: "Judicial power includes the duty of
courts of justice to settle actual controversies…" The term "actual
controversies" according to the Commissioner should refer to questions which
are political in nature and, therefore, the courts should not refuse to decide
those political questions. But do I understand it right that this is restrictive or
only an example? I know there are cases which are not actual yet the court
can assume jurisdiction. An example is the petition for declaratory relief.
May I ask the Commissioner’s opinion about that?
MR. CONCEPCION. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to grant
declaratory judgments.
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial
power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts
as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had
abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction,
that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide. 27
Our previous Constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power of
judicial review and the great responsibility of the Judiciary in maintaining the
allocation of powers among the three great branches of Government. Speaking
for the Court in Angara v. Electoral Commission,  Justice Jose P. Laurel
28
intoned:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several department and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
xxxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself
has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other department; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. x x x 29
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government may be determined under the Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but
the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system
are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company: 30
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of
certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King’s Bench, commanding
agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending
before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ
would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record
whether the inferior court’s judgment was rendered without authority. The
errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a
substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If
the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and
corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which
the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not
proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to
review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the
same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the
exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying
down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court
may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose,
viz:
 xxxx
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant
the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means
either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when
such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted
in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 31
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction,
certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective
remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and
is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court
itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future
action, and is directed to the court itself.  The Court expounded on the nature
32
and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association,
Inc. v. Defensor: 33
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued
in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary
writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without
or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against
judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower
court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief
against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where
there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which
such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an
IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action
which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case, petitioners’ allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to
perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately
be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary
restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by
a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized
by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.
34
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and
undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is
not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was
properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby
entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the
obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed
legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the
republican system of checks and balances. 35
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the
Court has become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not
now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial power in order to review and
determine, with authority, the limitations on the Chief Executive’s spending
power.
b) Requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review were
complied with
The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following,
namely: (1) there must bean actual case or justiciable controversy before the
Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the
person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very
litis mota of the case.
36
The first requisite demands that there be an actual case calling for the exercise
of judicial power by the Court.  An actual case or controversy, in the words of
37
Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa: 38
x x x is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "[t]here must be
a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case
or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions
raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."
"Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions."
An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The
incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the
DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between
legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness
considering that the challenged executive acts were already being
implemented by the DBM, and there are averments by the petitioners that such
implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and
expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been
allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on account of such challenged
executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for
adjudication by the Court.
It is true that Sec. Abad manifested during the January 28, 2014 oral
arguments that the DAP as a program had been meanwhile discontinued
because it had fully served its purpose, saying: "In conclusion, Your Honors,
may I inform the Court that because the DAP has already fully served its
purpose, the Administration’s economic managers have recommended its
termination to the President. x x x."39
The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP as a
program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the challenges to
the DAP’s constitutionality, viz:
DAP as a program, no longer exists, thereby mooting these present cases
brought to challenge its constitutionality. Any constitutional challenge should
no longer be at the level of the program, which is now extinct, but at the level
of its prior applications or the specific disbursements under the now defunct
policy. We challenge the petitioners to pick and choose which among the 116
DAP projects they wish to nullify, the full details we will have provided by
February 5. We urge this Court to be cautious in limiting the constitutional
authority of the President and the Legislature to respond to the dynamic needs
of the country and the evolving demands of governance, lest we end up
straight jacketing our elected representatives in ways not consistent with our
constitutional structure and democratic principles.40
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.41
The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a
supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the
Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases
being rendered moot and academic by supervening events, like: (1) when
there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a
situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3)
when the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) when the case
was capable of repetition yet evading review. 42
Assuming that the petitioners’ several submissions against the DAP were
ultimately sustained by the Court here, these cases would definitely come
under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from exercising
its power of judicial review.
Did the petitioners have the legal standing to sue?
Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."  The concept of
43
legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed in De Castro v.
Judicial and Bar Council,  where the Court said:
44
In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the
determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present
need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any
official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of
public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore,
that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc.:
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about
to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the
direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action had
locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the
validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was
followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’
Association v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix,
and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere
procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized
the approach when the cases had "transcendental importance." Some notable
controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed
to be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided
to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far reaching
implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The
liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in
several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic
organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or validity of
laws, regulations, and rulings.
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a
supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on
the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such
petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against
as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that
he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public
right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or
taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue may
appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless
equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, the Court aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdiction snow allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer"
standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v.
Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different
category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is
affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the
mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme
Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right,
however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty,
of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued
and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to
taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his
injury cannot be denied." 45
The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc.  that "[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law
46
because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest."
Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have
invoked their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring that the issuance and
implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances involved the illegal
disbursements of public funds, have an interest in preventing the further
dissipation of public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and
G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also assert their right as citizens to sue for the
enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitations on the political
branches of the Government. 47
On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its
legal standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues.  Luna, the petitioner
48
in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a lawyer. The IBP, the
petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed duty to work for the rule
of law and of paramount importance of the question in this action, not to
mention its civic duty as the official association of all lawyers in this country."49
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established
sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi
on each of them.
In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the
Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether appropriated by
Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of transcendental
importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the
determination of such important issues call for the Court’s exercise of its broad
and wise discretion "to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment
to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised." 50
II.
Substantive Issues
1.
Overview of the Budget System
An understanding of the Budget System of the Philippines will aid the Court in
properly appreciating and justly resolving the substantive issues.
a) Origin of the Budget System
The term "budget" originated from the Middle English word bouget that had
derived from the Latin word bulga (which means bag or purse). 51
In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act)
defined "budget" as the financial program of the National Government for a
designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of estimated receipts and
expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to be effective based
on the results of operations during the preceding fiscal years. The term was
given a different meaning under Republic Act No. 992 (Revised Budget Act) by
describing the budget as the delineation of the services and products, or
benefits that would accrue to the public together with the estimated unit cost of
each type of service, product or benefit.  For a forthright definition, budget
52
should simply be identified as the financial plan of the Government,  or "the
53
master plan of government." 54
The concept of budgeting has not been the product of recent economies. In
reality, financing public goals and activities was an idea that existed from the
creation of the State.  To protect the people, the territory and sovereignty of
55
the State, its government must perform vital functions that required public
expenditures. At the beginning, enormous public expenditures were spent for
war activities, preservation of peace and order, security, administration of
justice, religion, and supply of limited goods and services.  In order to finance
56
those expenditures, the State raised revenues through taxes and
impositions.  Thus, budgeting became necessary to allocate public revenues
57
for specific government functions.  The State’s budgeting mechanism
58
eventually developed through the years with the growing functions of its
government and changes in its market economy.
The Philippine Budget System has been greatly influenced by western public
financial institutions. This is because of the country’s past as a colony
successively of Spain and the United States for a long period of time. Many
aspects of the country’s public fiscal administration, including its Budget
System, have been naturally patterned after the practices and experiences of
the western public financial institutions. At any rate, the Philippine Budget
System is presently guided by two principal objectives that are vital to the
development of a progressive democratic government, namely: (1) to carry on
all government activities under a comprehensive fiscal plan developed,
authorized and executed in accordance with the Constitution, prevailing
statutes and the principles of sound public management; and (2) to provide for
the periodic review and disclosure of the budgetary status of the Government
in such detail so that persons entrusted by law with the responsibility as well as
the enlightened citizenry can determine the adequacy of the budget actions
taken, authorized or proposed, as well as the true financial position of the
Government. 59
b) Evolution of the Philippine Budget System
The budget process in the Philippines evolved from the early years of the
American Regime up to the passage of the Jones Law in 1916. A Budget
Office was created within the Department of Finance by the Jones Law to
discharge the budgeting function, and was given the responsibility to assist in
the preparation of an executive budget for submission to the Philippine
Legislature.60
As early as under the 1935 Constitution, a budget policy and a budget
procedure were established, and subsequently strengthened through the
enactment of laws and executive acts.  EO No. 25, issued by President
61
Manuel L. Quezon on April 25, 1936, created the Budget Commission to serve
as the agency that carried out the President’s responsibility of preparing the
budget.  CA No. 246, the first budget law, went into effect on January 1, 1938
62
and established the Philippine budget process. The law also provided a line-
item budget as the framework of the Government’s budgeting system,  with
63
emphasis on the observance of a "balanced budget" to tie up proposed
expenditures with existing revenues.
CA No. 246 governed the budget process until the passage on June 4, 1954 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 992,whereby Congress introduced performance-
budgeting to give importance to functions, projects and activities in terms of
expected results.  RA No. 992 also enhanced the role of the Budget
64
Commission as the fiscal arm of the Government. 65
The 1973 Constitution and various presidential decrees directed a series of
budgetary reforms that culminated in the enactment of PD No. 1177 that
President Marcos issued on July30, 1977, and of PD No. 1405, issued on June
11, 1978. The latter decree converted the Budget Commission into the Ministry
of Budget, and gave its head the rank of a Cabinet member.
The Ministry of Budget was later renamed the Office of Budget and
Management (OBM) under EO No. 711. The OBM became the DBM pursuant
to EO No. 292 effective on November 24, 1989.
c) The Philippine Budget Cycle 66
Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget
Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4)
Accountability. Each phase is distinctly separate from the others but they
overlap in the implementation of the budget during the budget year.
c.1.Budget Preparation 67
The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a
Budget Call by the DBM. The Budget Call contains budget parameters earlier
set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as
policy guidelines and procedures to aid government agencies in the
preparation and submission of their budget proposals. The Budget Call is of
two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call, which is addressed to all
agencies, including state universities and colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget
Call, which is addressed to all government-owned and -controlled corporations
(GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs).
Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and
agencies submit their respective Agency Budget Proposals to the DBM. To
boost citizen participation, the current administration has tasked the various
departments and agencies to partner with civil society organizations and other
citizen-stakeholders in the preparation of the Agency Budget Proposals, which
proposals are then presented before a technical panel of the DBM in
scheduled budget hearings wherein the various departments and agencies are
given the opportunity to defend their budget proposals. DBM bureaus
thereafter review the Agency Budget Proposals and come up with
recommendations for the Executive Review Board, comprised by the DBM
Secretary and the DBM’s senior officials. The discussions of the Executive
Review Board cover the prioritization of programs and their corresponding
support vis-à-vis the priority agenda of the National Government, and their
implementation.
The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the
National Expenditure Program (NEP)and a Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of spending for
each department and agency by program, activity or project (PAP), and is
submitted in the form of a proposed GAA. The Details of Selected Programs
and Projects is the more detailed disaggregation of key PAPs in the NEP,
especially those in line with the National Government’s development plan. The
Staffing Summary provides the staffing complement of each department and
agency, including the number of positions and amounts allocated.
The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by the DBM and the DBCC to the
President and the Cabinet for further refinements or reprioritization. Once the
NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and the Cabinet, the DBM
prepares the budget documents for submission to Congress. The budget
documents consist of: (1) the President’s Budget Message, through which the
President explains the policy framework and budget priorities; (2) the BESF,
mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution,  which contains the
68
macroeconomic assumptions, public sector context, breakdown of the
expenditures and funding sources for the fiscal year and the two previous
years; and (3) the NEP.
Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two categories,
supreme power. Under the first aspect, the State could hold property and
engage in trade, thereby deriving what is called its quasi private income or
revenues, and which "peculiarly belonged to the sovereign." Under the second
aspect, the State could collect by imposing charges on the revenues of its
subjects in the form of taxes.79

specifically: (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current operating

expenditures. Capital expenditures are the expenses whose usefulness lasts
for more than one year, and which add to the assets of the Government,
including investments in the capital of government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.  Current operating expenditures are the
69
purchases of goods and services in current consumption the benefit of which
does not extend beyond the fiscal year.  The two components of current
70
expenditures are those for personal services (PS), and those for maintenance
and other operating expenses(MOOE).
In the Philippines, public revenues are generally derived from the following
sources, to wit: (1) tax revenues(i.e., compulsory contributions to finance
government activities); 80 (2) capital revenues(i.e., proceeds from sales of
fixed capital assets or scrap thereof and public domain, and gains on such
sales like sale of public lands, buildings and other structures, equipment, and
other properties recorded as fixed assets); 81 (3) grants(i.e., voluntary
contributions and aids given to the Government for its operation on specific
purposes in the form of money and/or materials, and do not require any
monetary commitment on the part of the recipient);  (4) extraordinary
82

Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to their functions into: income(i.e., repayment of loans and advances made by government
(1) economic development expenditures (i.e., expenditures on agriculture and corporations and local governments and the receipts and shares in income of
natural resources, transportation and communications, commerce and the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and other receipts);  and (5) public
83

industry, and other economic development efforts);  (2) social services or

71 borrowings(i.e., proceeds of repayable obligations generally with interest from
social development expenditures (i.e., government outlay on education, public domestic and foreign creditors of the Government in general, including the
health and medicare, labor and welfare and others);  (3) general government
72 National Government and its political subdivisions). 84

or general public services expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the general

government, legislative services, the administration of justice, and for pensions More specifically, public revenues are classified as follows: 85

and gratuities);  (4) national defense expenditures (i.e., sub-divided into

73

national security expenditures and expenditures for the maintenance of peace General Income Specific Income
and order);  and (5) public debt.
74 75
1. Subsidy Income from 1. Income Taxes
National 2. Property Taxes
Public expenditures may further be classified according to the nature of funds, Government 3. Taxes on Goods and
i.e., general fund, special fund or bond fund. 76
2. Subsidy from Central Office Services
3. Subsidy from Regional  4. Taxes on International Trade
On the other hand, public revenues complement public expenditures and cover Office/Staff Bureaus and
all income or receipts of the government treasury used to support government
4. Income from Government  Transactions
expenditures. 77

Services 5. Other Taxes 6.Fines and

5. Income from Government  Penalties-Tax Revenue
Classical economist Adam Smith categorized public revenues based on two
Business Operations 7. Other Specific Income
principal sources, stating: "The revenue which must defray…the necessary
expenses of government may be drawn either, first from some fund which 6. Sales Revenue
peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and which is 7. Rent Income
independent of the revenue of the people, or, secondly, from the revenue of 8. Insurance Income
the people."  Adam Smith’s classification relied on the two aspects of the
78
9. Dividend Income
nature of the State: first, the State as a juristic person with an artificial 10. Interest Income
personality, and, second, the State as a sovereign or entity possessing
 11. Sale of Confiscated Goods proposed amendments to the GAB to the plenary of the Senate only after the
and House of Representatives has formally transmitted its version to the Senate.
Properties The Senate version of the GAB is likewise approved on Third Reading. 89

12. Foreign Exchange

(FOREX) The House of Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel each to
Gains sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the purpose of discussing and
13. Miscellaneous Operating harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their versions of the GAB. The
and "harmonized" version of the GAB is next presented to the President for
Service Income approval.  The President reviews the GAB, and prepares the Veto Message
90

14. Fines and Penalties- where budget items are subjected to direct veto,  or are identified for
91

Government conditional implementation.

Services and Business
Operations If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
15. Income from Grants and GAB for the ensuing fiscal year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal year shall be
Donations deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the GAB is
passed by the Congress. 92

c.3. Budget Execution 93

c.2. Budget Legislation 86

The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time
Congress receives the President’s Budget, which is inclusive of the NEPand
the BESF, up to the President’s approval of the GAA. This phase is also known
as the Budget Authorization Phase, and involves the significant participation of
the Legislative through its deliberations.
Initially, the President’s Budget is assigned to the House of Representatives’
Appropriations Committee on First Reading. The Appropriations Committee
and its various Sub-Committees schedule and conduct budget hearings to
examine the PAPs of the departments and agencies. Thereafter, the House of
Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GAB). 87
With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the implementation
of the budget. The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the function of the
DBM, which is tasked to perform the following procedures, namely: (1) to issue
the programs and guidelines for the release of funds; (2) to prepare an
Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to
issue disbursement authorities.
The implementation of the GAA is directed by the guidelines issued by the
DBM. Prior to this, the various departments and agencies are required to
submit Budget Execution Documents(BED) to outline their plans and
performance targets by laying down the physical and financial plan, the
monthly cash program, the estimate of monthly income, and the list of
obligations that are not yet due and demandable.

The GABis sponsored, presented and defended by the House of
Representatives’ Appropriations Committee and Sub-Committees in plenary
session. As with other laws, the GAB is approved on Third Reading before the
House of Representatives’ version is transmitted to the Senate. 88
Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP)and a
Cash Release Program (CRP).The ARP sets a limit for allotments issued in
general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the monthly, quarterly and
annual disbursement levels.

After transmission, the Senate conducts its own committee hearings on the Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations, are issued by
GAB. To expedite proceedings, the Senate may conduct its committee the DBM. Allotments are lesser in scope than appropriations, in that the latter
hearings simultaneously with the House of Representatives’ deliberations. The embrace the general legislative authority to spend. Allotments may be released
Senate’s Finance Committee and its Sub-Committees may submit the
in two forms – through a comprehensive Agency Budget Matrix (ABM),  or,94
individually, by SARO. 95
Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become authorized to incur
obligations  on behalf of the Government in order to implement their PAPs.
96
Obligations may be incurred in various ways, like hiring of personnel, entering
into contracts for the supply of goods and services, and using utilities.
In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a
disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment of the
obligations. A cash or disbursement authority that is periodically issued is
referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA),  which issuance is based
97
upon an agency’s submission of its Monthly Cash Program and other required
documents. The NCA specifies the maximum amount of cash that can be
withdrawn from a government servicing bank for the period indicated. Apart
from the NCA, the DBM may issue a Non-Cash Availment Authority(NCAA) to
authorize non-cash disbursements, or a Cash Disbursement Ceiling(CDC) for
departments with overseas operations to allow the use of income collected by
their foreign posts for their operating requirements.
Actual disbursement or spending of government funds terminates the Budget
Execution Phase and is usually accomplished through the Modified
Disbursement Scheme under which disbursements chargeable against the
National Treasury are coursed through the government servicing banks.
c.4. Accountability 98
Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle because it ensures
that the government funds have been effectively and efficiently utilized to
achieve the State’s socio-economic goals. It also allows the DBM to assess the
performance of agencies during the fiscal year for the purpose of implementing
reforms and establishing new policies.
An agency’s accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1)
performance targets and outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3)
review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted by the Commission on
Audit(COA).
2.
Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan
a. DAP was a program designed to
promote economic growth
Policy is always a part of every budget and fiscal decision of any
Administration.  The national budget the Executive prepares and presents to
99
Congress represents the Administration’s "blueprint for public policy" and
reflects the Government’s goals and strategies.  As such, the national budget
100
becomes a tangible representation of the programs of the Government in
monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs and services for which specific
amounts of public funds are proposed and allocated.  Embodied in every
101
national budget is government spending. 102
When he assumed office in the middle of 2010, President Aquino made
efficiency and transparency in government spending a significant focus of his
Administration. Yet, although such focus resulted in an improved fiscal deficit
of 0.5% in the gross domestic product (GDP) from January to July of 2011, it
also unfortunately decelerated government project implementation and
payment schedules.  The World Bank observed that the Philippines’ economic
103
growth could be reduced, and potential growth could be weakened should the
Government continue with its underspending and fail to address the large
deficiencies in infrastructure.  The economic situation prevailing in the middle
104
of 2011 thus paved the way for the development and implementation of the
DAP as a stimulus package intended to fast-track public spending and to push
economic growth by investing on high-impact budgetary PAPs to be funded
from the "savings" generated during the year as well as from unprogrammed
funds.  In that respect, the DAP was the product of "plain executive policy-
105
making" to stimulate the economy by way of accelerated spending. The 106
Administration would thereby accelerate government spending by: (1)
streamlining the implementation process through the clustering of
infrastructure projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) and the Department of Education (DepEd),and (2) front loading PPP-
related projects  due for implementation in the following year.
107 108
Did the stimulus package work?
The March 2012 report of the World Bank,  released after the initial
109
implementation of the DAP, revealed that the DAP was partially successful.
The disbursements under the DAP contributed 1.3 percentage points to GDP
growth by the fourth quarter of 2011.  The continued implementation of the
110
DAP strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure spending
rebounded from a 29% contraction to a 34% growth as of September 2013. 111
The DAP thus proved to be a demonstration that expenditure was a policy (In
instrument that the Government could use to direct the economies towards million
growth and development.  The Government, by spending on public
112
Php)
infrastructure, would signify its commitment of ensuring profitability for
prospective investors.  The PAPs funded under the DAP were chosen for this
113
FY 2011 30,000 Unreleased Declare as
reason based on their: (1) multiplier impact on the economy and infrastructure Unreleased Personnel savings and
development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3) translation into Personal Services (PS) approve/
disbursements. 114
Services (PS) appropriations authorize its
Appropriation which use
b. History of the implementation of s will lapse at for the 2011
the DAP, and sources of funds the end of Disburseme
under the DAP FY 2011 but nt
may be Acceleration
How the Administration’s economic managers conceptualized and developed pooled as Program
the DAP, and finally presented it to the President remains unknown because savings and
the relevant documents appear to be scarce. realigned for
priority
programs that
The earliest available document relating to the genesis of the DAP was the
require
memorandum of October 12,2011 from Sec. Abad seeking the approval of the
immediate
President to implement the proposed DAP. The memorandum, which
funding
contained a list of the funding sources for ₱72.11 billion and of the proposed
priority projects to be funded,  reads:
115
FY 2011 482 Unreleased  
Unreleased appropriations
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Appropriation (slow
s moving
xxxx projects and
programs for
SUBJECT: FY 2011 PROPOSED DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION discontinuanc
PROGRAM (PROJECTS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS) e)
FY 2010 12,336 Supported by Approve and
DATE: OCTOBER 12, 2011 Unprogramme the GFI authorize its
d Dividends use
Mr. President, this is to formally confirm your approval of the Disbursement Fund for the 2011
Acceleration Program totaling ₱72.11 billion. We are already working with all Disburseme
the agencies concerned for the immediate execution of the projects therein. nt
Acceleration
A. Fund Sources for the Acceleration Program Program
FY 2010 21,544 Unreleased With prior
Fund Amoun Action Carryover appropriations approval
Description Appropriation (slow from
Sources t Requested
moving the
 projects and President in and 2
programs for November 2. NHA: 11,050
discontinuanc 2010
e) and to declare as 450
a. Resettlement of North
savings from savings and Triangle residents to
Zero-based with 500
Camarin A7
Budgeting authority to 10,000
b. Housing for BFP/BJMP
Initiative use c. On-site development for
for priority 100
families living
projects along dangerous
FY 2011 7,748 FY 2011 For d. Relocation sites for informal
Budget Agency information settlers
items for Budget items along Iloilo River and its
realignment that can tributaries
be realigned 3. PHIL. HEART CENTER: 357
within the Upgrading of
agency to ageing physical plant and
fund new fast medical equipment
disbursing
projects 4. CREDIT INFO CORP: 75
DPWH-3.981 Establishment of
Billion centralized credit information
DA – 2.497 system
Billion 5. PIDS: purchase of land to 100
DOT – 1.000 relocate the PIDS
Billion office and building construction
DepEd – 270
Million 6. HGC: Equity infusion for credit 400
insurance
TOTAL 72.110     and mortgage guaranty
operations of HGC
B. Projects in the Disbursement Acceleration Program 7. PHIC: Obligations incurred 1,496
(premium
(Descriptions of projects attached as Annex A) subsidy for indigent families) in
January-June
2010, booked for payment in
GOCCs and GFIs Jul[y] – Dec
Agency/Project Allotment 2010. The delay in payment is
(SARO and NCA Release) (in Million due to the
Php) delay in the certification of the
LGU
1. LRTA: Rehabilitation of LRT 1 1,868
counterpart. Without it, the NG is synchronized with
obliged to GFMIS
pay the full amount. activities)
8. Philpost: Purchase of 644 14. COA: IT
foreclosed property. infrastructure    
Payment of Mandatory program and hiring of 144 144
Obligations, (GSIS, additional litigational
PhilHealth, ECC), Franking experts
Privilege
15. DND-PAF: On
9. BSP: First equity infusion out 10,000 Base Housing    
of Php 40B Facilities and 30 30
capitalization under the BSP Law Communication
Equipment
10. PCMC: Capital and 280
Equipment Renovation 16. DA: 2,959 2,223
a. Irrigation, FMRs
11. LCOP: 105
and    
a. Pediatric Pulmonary Program
35 Integrated    
b. Bio-regenerative Technology
Community Based 1,629 1,629
Program 70
Multi-Species
(Stem-Cell Research – subject to
Hatchery and 919 183
legal
Aquasilvi
review and presentation)
Farming
12. TIDCORP: NG Equity 570 b. Mindanao Rural
infusion Development Project
TOTAL 26,945 c. NIA Agno River
Integrated 411 411
Irrigation Project
NGAs/LGUs
17. DAR: 1,293 1,293
Agency/Project Allotmen a. Agrarian Reform
t Cash Communities Project 1,293 132
(SARO) Requireme 2 5,432
(In nt b. Landowners
Million (NCA) Compensation
Php)
18. DBM: Conduct of
13. DOF-BIR: National    
NPSTAR     Survey of 625 625
centralization of data     Farmers/Fisherfolks/I
processing and     ps
others (To be 758 758
19. DOJ: Operating
requirements     agreement with the
of 50 investigation 11 11 CISS and
agents and SGS
15 state attorneys
24. OEO-FDCP:
20. DOT: Establishment of    
Preservation of the 25 25 the National Film    
Cine Archive and 20 20
Corregidor Complex local cinematheques,
and other
21. OPAPP: Activities
local activities
for Peace    
Process (PAMANA-     25. DPWH: Various
Project     infrastructure 5,500 5,500
details: budget     projects
breakdown, 1,819 1,819
26.
implementation plan,
DepEd/ERDT/DOST:    
and
Thin 270 270
conditions on fund
Client Cloud
release
Computing
attached as Annex B)
Project
22. DOST 425 425
27. DOH: Hiring of
a. Establishment of
nurses and 294 294
National    
midwives
Meterological and 275 275
Climate 28. TESDA: Training
Center     Program in    
b. Enhancement of     partnership with BPO 1,100 1,100
Doppler     industry
Radar Network for 190 190 and other sectors
National
29. DILG:
Weather Watch,
Performance    
Accurate
Challenge    
Forecasting and
Fund (People    
Flood Early
Empowered 250 50
Warning
Community Driven
23. DOF-BOC: To Development with
settle the     DSWD and
principal obligations     NAPC)
with    
30. ARMM:
PDIC consistent with 2,800 2,800
Comprehensive 8,592 8,592
the
Peace
 and Development (Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III
Intervention
OCT 12, 2011
31. DOTC-MRT:
Purchase of 4,500 -
The memorandum of October 12, 2011 was followed by another memorandum
additional MRT cars
for the President dated December 12, 2011  requesting omnibus authority to
116

32. LGU Support 6,500 6,500 consolidate the savings and unutilized balances for fiscal year 2011. Pertinent
Fund portions of the memorandum of December 12, 2011 read:
33. Various Other 6,500 6,500
Local Projects MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

34. Development xxxx

Assistance to the 750 750
Province of Quezon
SUBJECT: Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and
TOTAL 45,165 44,000 its Realignment

C. Summary DATE: December 12, 2011

This is to respectfully request for the grant of Omnibus Authority to consolidate

  Fund
savings/unutilized balances in FY 2011 corresponding to completed or
Sources Allotment Cash
discontinued projects which may be pooled to fund additional projects or
Identifie s Requiremen
expenditures.
d for for ts for
Approva Release Release in
l FY In addition, Mr. President, this measure will allow us to undertake projects
(In 2011 even if their implementation carries over to 2012 without necessarily impacting
Million on our budget deficit cap next year.
Php)
BACKGROUND
Total 72,110 72,110 70,895
GOCCs 26,895 26,895 1.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews
conducted on the agencies’ operations, particularly on the
NGAs/LGU 45,165 44,000
implementation of their projects/activities, including expenses
s
incurred in undertaking the same, have identified savings out of
the 2011 General Appropriations Act. Said savings correspond
For His Excellency’s Consideration to completed or discontinued projects under certain
departments/agencies which may be pooled, for the following:
(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD
1.1 to provide for new activities which have not been
[/] APPROVED anticipated during preparation of the budget;

[ ] DISAPPROVED
 1.2 to augment additional requirements of on-going
priority projects; and
1.3 to provide for deficiencies under the Special
Purpose Funds, e.g., PDAF, Calamity Fund, Contingent
Fund
1.4 to cover for the modifications of the original
allotment class allocation as a result of on-going priority
projects and implementation of new activities
2.0 x x x x
2.1 x x x
2.2 x x x
ON THE UTILIZATION OF POOLED SAVINGS
3.0 It may be recalled that the President approved our request
for omnibus authority to pool savings/unutilized balances in FY
2010 last November 25, 2010.
4.0 It is understood that in the utilization of the pooled savings,
the DBM shall secure the corresponding approval/confirmation
of the President. Furthermore, it is assured that the proposed
realignments shall be within the authorized Expenditure level.
5.0 Relative thereto, we have identified some expenditure
items that may be sourced from the said pooled appropriations
in FY 2010 that will expire on December 31, 2011 and
appropriations in FY 2011 that may be declared as savings to
fund additional expenditures.
5.1 The 2010 Continuing Appropriations (pooled
savings) is proposed to be spent for the projects that
we have identified to be immediate actual
disbursements considering that this same fund source
will expire on December 31, 2011.
5.2 With respect to the proposed expenditure items to
be funded from the FY 2011 Unreleased
Appropriations, most of these are the same projects for
which the DBM is directed by the Office of the
President, thru the Executive Secretary, to source
funds.
6.0 Among others, the following are such proposed additional
projects that have been chosen given their multiplier impact on
economy and infrastructure development, their beneficial effect
on the poor, and their translation into disbursements. Please
note that we have classified the list of proposed projects as
follows:
7.0 x x x
FOR THE PRESIDENT’S APPROVAL
8.0 Foregoing considered, may we respectfully request for the
President’s approval for the following:
8.1 Grant of omnibus authority to consolidate FY 2011
savings/unutilized balances and its realignment; and
8.2 The proposed additional projects identified for
funding.
For His Excellency’s consideration and approval.
(Sgd.)
[/] APPROVED
[ ] DISAPPROVED
(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III
DEC 21, 2011
Substantially identical requests for authority to pool savings and to fund
proposed projects were contained in various other memoranda from Sec. Abad
dated June 25, 2012,  September 4, 2012,  December 19, 2012,  May 20,
117 118 119
2013,  and September 25, 2013.  The President apparently approved all the
120 121
requests, withholding approval only of the proposed projects contained in the
June 25, 2012 memorandum, as borne out by his marginal note therein to the
effect that the proposed projects should still be "subject to further
discussions."122
In order to implement the June25, 2012 memorandum, Sec. Abad issued NBC
No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of
Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012),  reproduced herein as
123
follows:
NATIONAL BUDGET CIRCULAR No. 541
July 18, 2012
TO: All Heads of Departments/Agencies/State Universities and Colleges and
other Offices of the National Government, Budget and Planning Officers;
Heads of Accounting Units and All Others Concerned
SUBJECT : Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of
Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012
1.0 Rationale
The DBM, as mandated by Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987), periodically reviews and evaluates the departments/agencies’
efficiency and effectiveness in utilizing budgeted funds for the delivery of
services and production of goods, consistent with the government priorities.
In the event that a measure is necessary to further improve the operational
efficiency of the government, the President is authorized to suspend or stop
further use of funds allotted for any agency or expenditure authorized in the
General Appropriations Act. Withdrawal and pooling of unutilized allotment
releases can be effected by DBM based on authority of the President, as
mandated under Sections 38 and 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of EO 292.
For the first five months of 2012, the National Government has not met its
spending targets. In order to accelerate spending and sustain the fiscal targets
during the year, expenditure measures have to be implemented to optimize the
utilization of available resources.
Departments/agencies have registered low spending levels, in terms of
obligations and disbursements per initial review of their 2012 performance. To
enhance agencies’ performance, the DBM conducts continuous consultation
meetings and/or send call-up letters, requesting them to identify slow-moving
programs/projects and the factors/issues affecting their performance (both
pertaining to internal systems and those which are outside the agencies’
spheres of control). Also, they are asked to formulate strategies and
improvement plans for the rest of 2012.
Notwithstanding these initiatives, some departments/agencies have continued
to post low obligation levels as of end of first semester, thus resulting to
substantial unobligated allotments.
In line with this, the President, per directive dated June 27, 2012 authorized
the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels of
obligations as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and current allotments.
This measure will allow the maximum utilization of available allotments to fund
and undertake other priority expenditures of the national government.
2.0 Purpose
2.1 To provide the conditions and parameters on the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies as of June 30,
2012 to fund priority and/or fast-moving programs/projects of
the national government;
2.2 To prescribe the reports and documents to be used as
bases on the withdrawal of said unobligated allotments; and
2.3 To provide guidelines in the utilization or reallocation of the
withdrawn allotments.
3.0 Coverage
3.1 These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments as of June 30, 2012 of all national government
agencies (NGAs) charged against FY 2011 Continuing
Appropriation (R.A. No.10147) and FY 2012 Current
Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:
3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);
 3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
(MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and
projects, as well as capitalized MOOE; and
3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized
pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies
concerned based on their updated/validated list of
pensioners.
3.2 The withdrawal of unobligated allotments may cover the
identified programs, projects and activities of the
departments/agencies reflected in the DBM list shown as
Annex A or specific programs and projects as may be identified
by the agencies.
4.0 Exemption
These guidelines shall not apply to the following:
4.1 NGAs
4.1.1 Constitutional Offices/Fiscal Autonomy Group,
granted fiscal autonomy under the Philippine
Constitution; and
4.1.2 State Universities and Colleges, adopting the
Normative Funding allocation scheme i.e., distribution
of a predetermined budget ceiling.
4.2 Fund Sources
4.2.1 Personal Services other than pension benefits;
4.2.2 MOOE items earmarked for specific purposes or
subject to realignment conditions per General
Provisions of the GAA:
• Confidential and Intelligence Fund;
• Savings from Traveling, Communication,
Transportation and Delivery, Repair and
Maintenance, Supplies and Materials and Utility
which shall be used for the grant of Collective
Negotiation Agreement incentive benefit;
• Savings from mandatory expenditures which
can be realigned only in the last quarter after
taking into consideration the agency’s full year
requirements, i.e., Petroleum, Oil and
Lubricants, Water, Illumination, Power Services,
Telephone, other Communication Services and
Rent.
4.2.3 Foreign-Assisted Projects (loan proceeds and
peso counterpart);
4.2.4 Special Purpose Funds such as: E-Government
Fund, International Commitments Fund, PAMANA,
Priority Development Assistance Fund, Calamity Fund,
Budgetary Support to GOCCs and Allocation to LGUs,
among others;
4.2.5 Quick Response Funds; and
4.2.6 Automatic Appropriations i.e., Retirement Life
Insurance Premium and Special Accounts in the
General Fund.
5.0 Guidelines
5.1 National government agencies shall continue to undertake
procurement activities notwithstanding the implementation of
the policy of withdrawal of unobligated allotments until the end
of the third quarter, FY 2012. Even without the allotments, the
agency shall proceed in undertaking the procurement
processes (i.e., procurement planning up to the conduct of
bidding but short of awarding of contract) pursuant to GPPB
Circular Nos. 02-2008 and 01-2009 and DBM Circular Letter
No. 2010-9.
5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated
allotments that shall be withdrawn, all
departments/agencies/operating units (OUs) shall submit to
DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following budget
accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;
• Statement of Allotments, Obligations and Balances
(SAOB);
• Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and
• Physical Report of Operations.
5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under
item 5.2 of this Circular, the agency’s latest report available
shall be used by DBM as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The
DBM shall compute/approximate the agency’s obligation level
as of June 30 to derive its unobligated allotments as of same
period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual
obligations of P 800M then the June 30 obligation level shall
approximate to ₱1,600 M (i.e., ₱800 M x 2 quarters).
5.4 All released allotments in FY 2011 charged against R.A.
No. 10147 which remained unobligated as of June 30, 2012
shall be immediately considered for withdrawal. This policy is
based on the following considerations:
5.4.1 The departments/agencies’ approved priority
programs and projects are assumed to be
implementation-ready and doable during the given
fiscal year; and
5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover
appropriations may imply that the agency has a slower-
than-programmed implementation capacity or agency
tends to implement projects within a two-year
timeframe.
5.5. Consistent with the President’s directive, the DBM shall,
based on evaluation of the reports cited above and results of
consultations with the departments/agencies, withdraw the
unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 through issuance of
negative Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs).
5.6 DBM shall prepare and submit to the President, a report on
the magnitude of withdrawn allotments. The report shall
highlight the agencies which failed to submit the June 30
reports required under this Circular.
5.7 The withdrawn allotments may be:
5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of
the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the
allotments were withdrawn;
5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other
existing programs and projects of the agency/OU; or
5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects
of any agency and to fund priority programs and
projects not considered in the 2012 budget but
expected to be started or implemented during the
current year.
5.8 For items 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 above, agencies/OUs concerned
may submit to DBM a Special Budget Request (SBR),
supported with the following:
5.8.1 Physical and Financial Plan (PFP);
5.8.2 Monthly Cash Program (MCP); and
5.8.3 Proof that the project/activity has started the
procurement processes i.e., Proof of Posting and/or
Advertisement of the Invitation to Bid.
5.9 The deadline for submission of request/s pertaining to
these categories shall be until the end of the third quarter i.e.,
September 30, 2012. After said cut-off date, the withdrawn
allotments shall be pooled and form part of the overall savings
of the national government.
5.10 Utilization of the consolidated withdrawn allotments for
other priority programs and projects as cited under item 5.7.3
of this Circular, shall be subject to approval of the President.
 Based on the approval of the President, DBM shall issue the
SARO to cover the approved priority expenditures subject to
submission by the agency/OU concerned of the SBR and
supported with PFP and MCP.
5.11 It is understood that all releases to be made out of the
withdrawn allotments (both 2011 and 2012 unobligated
allotments) shall be within the approved Expenditure Program
level of the national government for the current year. The
SAROs to be issued shall properly disclose the appropriation
source of the release to determine the extent of allotment
validity, as follows:
• For charges under R.A. 10147 – allotments shall be
valid up to December 31, 2012; and
• For charges under R.A. 10155 – allotments shall be
valid up to December 31, 2013.
5.12 Timely compliance with the submission of existing BARs
and other reportorial requirements is reiterated for monitoring
purposes.
6.0 Effectivity
This circular shall take effect immediately.
(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD
Secretary
As can be seen, NBC No. 541 specified that the unobligated allotments of all
agencies and departments as of June 30, 2012 that were charged against the
continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2011 and the 2012 GAA (R.A. No.
10155) were subject to withdrawal through the issuance of negative SAROs,
but such allotments could be either: (1) reissued for the original PAPs of the
concerned agencies from which they were withdrawn; or (2) realigned to cover
additional funding for other existing PAPs of the concerned agencies; or (3)
used to augment existing PAPs of any agency and to fund priority PAPs not
considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented in
2012. Financing the other priority PAPs was made subject to the approval of
the President. Note here that NBC No. 541 used terminologies like
"realignment" and "augmentation" in the application of the withdrawn
unobligated allotments.
Taken together, all the issuances showed how the DAP was to be
implemented and funded, that is — (1) by declaring "savings" coming from the
various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments
and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed
funds; and (3) applying the "savings" and unprogrammed funds to augment
existing PAPs or to support other priority PAPs.
c. DAP was not an appropriation
measure; hence, no appropriation
law was required to adopt or to
implement it
Petitioners Syjuco, Luna, Villegas and PHILCONSA state that Congress did
not enact a law to establish the DAP, or to authorize the disbursement and
release of public funds to implement the DAP. Villegas, PHILCONSA, IBP,
Araullo, and COURAGE observe that the appropriations funded under the DAP
were not included in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs. To petitioners IBP,
Araullo, and COURAGE, the DAP, being actually an appropriation that set
aside public funds for public use, should require an enabling law for its validity.
VACC maintains that the DAP, because it involved huge allocations that were
separate and distinct from the GAAs, circumvented and duplicated the GAAs
without congressional authorization and control.
The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and
implemented the DAP violated the mandate of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the adoption and
implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an
appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing
spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of the
President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed.
We agree with the OSG’s position.
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the
economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption
and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main
actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to
faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to
legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but
would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed,
appropriation was the act by which Congress "designates a particular fund, or
sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the
public treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental
expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense."  As pointed out in
124
Gonzales v. Raquiza:  ‘"In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined ‘as
125
nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution
that money may be paid out of the Treasury,’ while appropriation made by law
refers to ‘the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use
a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its
creditors.’"
126
On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute
the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt
the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation.  He could adopt a
127
plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the
PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the
DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not
involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already
set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such
actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under
Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
3.
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments under the DAP
were not savings, and the use of such
appropriations contravened Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Notwithstanding our appreciation of the DAP as a plan or strategy validly
adopted by the Executive to ramp up spending to accelerate economic growth,
the challenges posed by the petitioners constrain us to dissect the mechanics
of the actual execution of the DAP. The management and utilization of the
public wealth inevitably demands a most careful scrutiny of whether the
Executive’s implementation of the DAP was consistent with the Constitution,
the relevant GAAs and other existing laws.
a. Although executive discretion
and flexibility are necessary in
the execution of the budget, any
transfer of appropriated funds
should conform to Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution
We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all
issues and needs that may come into play once the budget reaches its
execution stage. Executive discretion is necessary at that stage to achieve a
sound fiscal administration and assure effective budget implementation. The
heads of offices, particularly the President, require flexibility in their operations
under performance budgeting to enable them to make whatever adjustments
are needed to meet established work goals under changing conditions.  In 128
particular, the power to transfer funds can give the President the flexibility to
meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient
implementation of the PAPs set by Congress in the GAA.
Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating
funds pursuant to the GAAs, particularly when the funds are grouped to form
129
lump sum accounts.  It is assumed that the agencies of the Government enjoy
130
more flexibility when the GAAs provide broader appropriation items.  This131
flexibility comes in the form of policies that the Executive may adopt during the
budget execution phase. The DAP – as a strategy to improve the country’s
economic position – was one policy that the President decided to carry out in
order to fulfill his mandate under the GAAs.
Denying to the Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would be
counterproductive. In Presidential Spending Power,  Prof. Louis Fisher, an
132
American constitutional scholar whose specialties have included budget policy,
has justified extending discretionary authority to the Executive thusly:
[T]he impulse to deny discretionary authority altogether should be resisted.
There are many number of reasons why obligations and outlays by
administrators may have to differ from appropriations by legislators.
Appropriations are made many months, and sometimes years, in advance of
expenditures. Congress acts with imperfect knowledge in trying to legislate in
fields that are highly technical and constantly undergoing change. New
circumstances will develop to make obsolete and mistaken the decisions
reached by Congress at the appropriation stage. It is not practicable for
Congress to adjust to each new development by passing separate
supplemental appropriation bills. Were Congress to control expenditures by
confining administrators to narrow statutory details, it would perhaps protect its
power of the purse but it would not protect the purse itself. The realities and
complexities of public policy require executive discretion for the sound
management of public funds.
xxxx
x x x The expenditure process, by its very nature, requires substantial
discretion for administrators. They need to exercise judgment and take
responsibility for their actions, but those actions ought to be directed toward
executing congressional, not administrative policy. Let there be discretion, but
channel it and use it to satisfy the programs and priorities established by
Congress.
In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds
within their respective offices, the Constitution itself ensures the fiscal
autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of
powers among the three main branches of the Government. The Court has
recognized this, and emphasized so in Bengzon v. Drilon,  viz:
133
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative
not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards
the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which
the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to
another within the Executive has not been the mere offshoot of established
usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of the
American Governors-General.  Act No. 1902 (An Act authorizing the
134
Governor-General to direct any unexpended balances of appropriations be
returned to the general fund of the Insular Treasury and to transfer from the
general fund moneys which have been returned thereto), passed on May 18,
1909 by the First Philippine Legislature,  was the first enabling law that
135
granted statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The authority was
without any limitation, for the Act explicitly empowered the Governor-General
to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau or office
to another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally been appropriated
for that bureau or office.
From 1916 until 1920, the appropriations laws set a cap on the amounts of
funds that could be transferred, thereby limiting the power to transfer funds.
Only 10% of the amounts appropriated for contingent or miscellaneous
expenses could be transferred to a bureau or office, and the transferred funds
were to be used to cover deficiencies in the appropriations also for
miscellaneous expenses of said bureau or office.
In 1921, the ceiling on the amounts of funds to be transferred from items under
miscellaneous expenses to any other item of a certain bureau or office was
removed.
During the Commonwealth period, the power of the President to transfer funds
continued to be governed by the GAAs despite the enactment of the
Constitution in 1935. It is notable that the 1935 Constitution did not include a
provision on the power to transfer funds. At any rate, a shift in the extent of the
President’s power to transfer funds was again experienced during this era, with
the President being given more flexibility in implementing the budget. The
GAAs provided that the power to transfer all or portions of the appropriations in
the Executive Department could be made in the "interest of the public, as the
President may determine." 136
In its time, the 1971 Constitutional Convention wanted to curtail the President’s
seemingly unbounded discretion in transferring funds.  Its Committee on the
137
Budget and Appropriation proposed to prohibit the transfer of funds among the
separate branches of the Government and the independent constitutional
bodies, but to allow instead their respective heads to augment items of
appropriations from savings in their respective budgets under certain
limitations.  The clear intention of the Convention was to further restrict, not to
138
liberalize, the power to transfer appropriations.  Thus, the Committee on the
139
Budget and Appropriation initially considered setting stringent limitations on the
power to augment, and suggested that the augmentation of an item of
appropriation could be made "by not more than ten percent if the original item
of appropriation to be augmented does not exceed one million pesos, or by not
more than five percent if the original item of appropriation to be augmented
exceeds one million pesos."  But two members of the Committee objected to
140
the ₱1,000,000.00 threshold, saying that the amount was arbitrary and might
not be reasonable in the future. The Committee agreed to eliminate the
₱1,000,000.00 threshold, and settled on the ten percent limitation. 141
In the end, the ten percent limitation was discarded during the plenary of the
Convention, which adopted the following final version under Section 16, Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
The 1973 Constitution explicitly and categorically prohibited the transfer of
funds from one item to another, unless Congress enacted a law authorizing the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional omissions to transfer funds for the
purpose of augmenting any item from savings in another item in the GAA of
their respective offices. The leeway was limited to augmentation only, and was
further constricted by the condition that the funds to be transferred should
come from savings from another item in the appropriation of the office.
142
On July 30, 1977, President Marcos issued PD No. 1177, providing in its
Section 44 that:
Section 44. Authority to Approve Fund Transfers. The President shall have the
authority to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which are included
in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project, or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.
The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation
of the Executive Department in the General Appropriations Act, from savings in
the appropriations of another department, bureau, office or agency within the
Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 16 (5) of
the Constitution.
In Demetria v. Alba, however, the Court struck down the first paragraph of
Section 44 for contravening Section 16(5)of the 1973 Constitution, ruling:
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege
granted under said Section 16. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or
not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer
is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
143
It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the ratification by
the people of the 1987 Constitution, whose Section 25(5) of Article VI is
identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
Section 25. x x x
xxxx
5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
xxxx
The foregoing history makes it evident that the Constitutional Commission
included Section 25(5), supra, to keep a tight rein on the exercise of the power
to transfer funds appropriated by Congress by the President and the other high
officials of the Government named therein. The Court stated in Nazareth v.
Villar:
144
In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule
should still be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is
the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for
the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI
of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
appropriations to augmentany item in the GAA for their respective offices from
the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain
language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s
posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable.
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer
savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably
construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections:
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the
general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The
exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions.
Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but
the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to
the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all
others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to
inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something
from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the
scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an
exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases
not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence,
any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the
exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in
many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is
limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.
Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5), supra, in the context of a
limitation on the President’s discretion over the appropriations during the
Budget Execution Phase.
b. Requisites for the valid transfer of
appropriated funds under Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra,
must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the
transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices.
b.1. First Requisite–GAAs of 2011 and
2012 lacked valid provisions to
authorize transfers of funds under
the DAP; hence, transfers under the
DAP were unconstitutional
Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution,
must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is
the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs
should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.
Did the GAAs expressly authorize the transfer of funds?
In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high
officials the authority to transfer funds was Section 59, as follows:
Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in
this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit:
Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in
this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In fact, the foregoing provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs were cited by the
DBM as justification for the use of savings under the DAP. 145
A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of
2011 and 2012 were textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the
phrase "for their respective offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. The
impact of the phrase "for their respective offices" was to authorize only
transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the
transfer was to an item of appropriation within the Executive). The provisions
carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the effect
was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of
funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged
to an office outside the Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs
contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions
cannot be used to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive
to another branch, or to a constitutional commission.
Apparently realizing the problem, Congress inserted the omitted phrase in the
counterpart provision in the 2013 GAA, to wit:
Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their
respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the
current year in any item of their respective appropriations.
Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section
25(5), supra, existed, there still remained two other requisites to be met,
namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were savings from
appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer must be for
the purpose of augmenting an item of appropriation within the respective
offices.
b.2. Second Requisite – There were
no savings from which funds
could be sourced for the DAP
Were the funds used in the DAP actually savings?
The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP — the unreleased
appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments — were not actual
savings within the context of Section 25(5), supra, and the relevant provisions
of the GAAs. Belgica argues that "savings" should be understood to refer to
the excess money after the items that needed to be funded have been funded,
or those that needed to be paid have been paid pursuant to the budget.  The
146
petitioners posit that there could be savings only when the PAPs for which the
funds had been appropriated were actually implemented and completed, or
finally discontinued or abandoned. They insist that savings could not be
realized with certainty in the middle of the fiscal year; and that the funds for
"slow-moving" PAPs could not be considered as savings because such PAPs
had not actually been abandoned or discontinued yet.  They stress that NBC
147
No. 541, by allowing the withdrawn funds to be reissued to the "original
program or project from which it was withdrawn," conceded that the PAPs from
which the supposed savings were taken had not been completed, abandoned
or discontinued. 148
The OSG represents that "savings" were "appropriations balances," being the
difference between the appropriation authorized by Congress and the actual
amount allotted for the appropriation; that the definition of "savings" in the
GAAs set only the parameters for determining when savings occurred; that it
was still the President (as well as the other officers vested by the Constitution
with the authority to augment) who ultimately determined when savings
actually existed because savings could be determined only during the stage of
budget execution; that the President must be given a wide discretion to
accomplish his tasks; and that the withdrawn unobligated allotments were
savings inasmuch as they were clearly "portions or balances of any
programmed appropriation…free from any obligation or encumbrances which
are (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is
authorized…"
We partially find for the petitioners.
In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in
mind. The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the purse.
Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to fund; and the
amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second principle is that the
Executive, as the department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is
expected to faithfully execute the GAA and to spend the budget in accordance
with the provisions of the GAA.  The Executive is expected to faithfully
149
implement the PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and to limit the
expenditures within the allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for
which augmentation is authorized, subject to the conditions provided by law.
The third principle is that in making the President’s power to augment
operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in
budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its own power of the
purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive. But Congress
does not thereby allow the Executive to override its authority over the purse as
to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth principle is
that savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes something that is real or
substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as opposed to something
that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical.
150
The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly against
expanding the scope of the power to augment. It is then indubitable that the
power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the funds
had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had
ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized. This
interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly transgressing Congress’
power of the purse.
The definition of "savings" in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013,
reflected this interpretation and made it operational, viz:
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this
Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after
the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or
purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations
balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to
vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from
appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures
resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to
meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services
approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
The three instances listed in the GAAs’ aforequoted definition were a sure
indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose of the
appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no
longer existent.
The phrase "free from any obligation or encumbrance" in the definition of
savings in the GAAs conveyed the notion that the appropriation was at that
stage when the appropriation was already obligated and the appropriation was
already released. This interpretation was reinforced by the enumeration of the
three instances for savings to arise, which showed that the appropriation
referred to had reached the agency level. It could not be otherwise,
considering that only when the appropriation had reached the agency level
could it be determined whether (a) the PAP for which the appropriation had
been authorized was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b)
there were vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; or (c) the
required or planned targets, programs and services were realized at a lesser
cost because of the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems
and efficiencies.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from
"pooling of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services
appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased
appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued projects per Zero-
Based Budgeting findings."
The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the
treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings.
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere
description of the status of the items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not
yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be generated.
Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has already been an
allotment or authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority. This
means that the DBM has issued either an ABM (for those not needing
clearance), or a SARO (for those needing clearance), and consequently an
NCA, NCAA or CDC, as the case may be. Appropriations remain unreleased,
for instance, because of noncompliance with documentary requirements (like
the Special Budget Request), or simply because of the unavailability of funds.
But the appropriations do not actually reach the agencies to which they were
allocated under the GAAs, and have remained with the DBM technically
speaking. Ergo, unreleased appropriations refer to appropriations with
allotments but without disbursement authority.
For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the
statutory definition of savings, would seriously undercut the congressional
power of the purse, because such appropriations had not even reached and
been used by the agency concerned vis-à-vis the PAPs for which Congress
had allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in its plantilla
and did not receive an allotment and NCA for such vacancies, appropriations
for such positions, although unreleased, may already constitute savings for
that agency under the second instance.
Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part
of the definition of "savings" in the GAA, that is, as "portions or balances of any
programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or
encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further qualified by the
three enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such,
unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately declared as savings
without first determining whether any of the three instances existed. This
signified that the DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded
the definition of savings under the GAAs.
Justice Carpio has validly observed in his Separate Concurring Opinion that
MOOE appropriations are deemed divided into twelve monthly allocations
within the fiscal year; hence, savings could be generated monthly from the
excess or unused MOOE appropriations other than the Mandatory
Expenditures and Expenditures for Business-type Activities because of the
physical impossibility to obligate and spend such funds as MOOE for a period
that already lapsed. Following this observation, MOOE for future months are
not savings and cannot be transferred.
The DBM’s Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (which
became the basis of NBC No. 541) stated:
ON THE AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW UNOBLIGATED ALLOTMENTS
5.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on
the agencies’ operations, particularly on the implementation of their
projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking the
same, have been continuously calling the attention of all National
Government agencies (NGAs) with low levels of obligations as of end
of the first quarter to speedup the implementation of their programs
and projects in the second quarter.
6.0 Said reminders were made in a series of consultation meetings
with the concerned agencies and with call-up letters sent.
7.0 Despite said reminders and the availability of funds at the
department’s disposal, the level of financial performance of some
departments registered below program, with the targeted
obligations/disbursements for the first semester still not being met.
8.0 In order to maximize the use of the available allotment, all
unobligated balances as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and
current allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving
programs/projects.
9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be
based on the list of slow moving projects to be identified by the
agencies and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.
It is apparent from the foregoing text that the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments would be based on whether the allotments pertained to slow-moving
projects, or not. However, NBC No. 541 did not set in clear terms the criteria
for the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, viz:
3.1. These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments as of June 30, 2012 ofall national government agencies
(NGAs) charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No.
10147) and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155),
pertaining to:
3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);
3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE)
related to the implementation of programs and projects, as well
as capitalized MOOE; and
3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension
benefits declared as savings by the agencies concerned based
on their undated/validated list of pensioners.
A perusal of its various provisions reveals that NBC No. 541 targeted the
"withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels of
obligations"  "to fund priority and/or fast-moving programs/projects."  But the
151 152
fact that the withdrawn allotments could be "[r]eissued for the original
programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the
allotments were withdrawn"  supported the conclusion that the PAPs had not
153
yet been finally discontinued or abandoned. Thus, the purpose for which the
withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet fulfilled, or did not yet
cease to exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings impossible.
Worse, NBC No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released
allotments in 2011 charged against the 2011 GAA that had remained
unobligated based on the following considerations, to wit:
 5.4.1 The departments/agencies’ approved priority programs and
projects are assumed to be implementation-ready and doable during
the given fiscal year; and
5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may
imply that the agency has a slower-than-programmed implementation
capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a two-year
timeframe.
Such withdrawals pursuant to NBC No. 541, the circular that affected the
unobligated allotments for continuing and current appropriations as of June 30,
2012, disregarded the 2-year period of availability of the appropriations for
MOOE and capital outlay extended under Section 65, General Provisions of
the 2011 GAA, viz:
Section 65. Availability of Appropriations. — Appropriations for MOOE and
capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be available for release and
obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions
applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after the end of the
year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That appropriations
for MOOE and capital outlays under R.A. No. 9970 shall be made available up
to the end of FY 2011: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a report on these
releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations.
and Section 63 General Provisions of the 2012 GAA, viz:
Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. — Appropriations for MOOE and
capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be available for release and
obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions
applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after the end of the
year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That a report on
these releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations, either in printed form or
by way of electronic document. 154
Thus, another alleged area of constitutional infirmity was that the DAP and its
relevant issuances shortened the period of availability of the appropriations for
MOOE and capital outlays.
Congress provided a one-year period of availability of the funds for all
allotment classes in the 2013 GAA (R.A. No. 10352), to wit:
Section 63. Availability of Appropriations.— All appropriations authorized in this
Act shall be available for release and obligation for the purposes specified, and
under the same special provisions applicable thereto, until the end of FY 2013:
PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be
submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on
Appropriations, either in printed form or by way of electronic document.
Yet, in his memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013, Sec. Abad
sought omnibus authority to consolidate savings and unutilized balances to
fund the DAP on a quarterly basis, viz:
7.0 If the level of financial performance of some department will
register below program, even with the availability of funds at their
disposal, the targeted obligations/disbursements for each quarter will
not be met. It is important to note that these funds will lapse at the end
of the fiscal year if these remain unobligated.
8.0 To maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated
balances at the end of every quarter, both for continuing and current
allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving
programs/projects.
9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be
based on the list of slow moving projects to be identified by the
agencies and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.
The validity period of the affected appropriations, already given the brief Lifes
pan of one year, was further shortened to only a quarter of a year under the
DBM’s memorandum dated May 20, 2013.
The petitioners accuse the respondents of forcing the generation of savings in
order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending. They aver that
the respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments in the middle of the
fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing appropriations
under the GAAs. 155
The respondents belie the accusation, insisting that the unobligated allotments
were being withdrawn upon the instance of the implementing agencies based
on their own assessment that they could not obligate those allotments
pursuant to the President’s directive for them to spend their appropriations as
quickly as they could in order to ramp up the economy. 156
We agree with the petitioners.
Contrary to the respondents’ insistence, the withdrawals were upon the
initiative of the DBM itself. The text of NBC No. 541 bears this out, to wit:
5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that
shall be withdrawn, all departments/agencies/operating units (OUs) shall
submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following budget accountability
reports as of June 30, 2012;
• Statement of Allotments, Obligation and Balances (SAOB);
• Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and
• Physical Report of Operations.
5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this
Circular, the agency’s latest report available shall be used by DBM as basis for
withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall compute/approximate the agency’s
obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated allotments as of same
period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P
800M then the June 30 obligation level shall approximate to ₱1,600 M (i.e.,
₱800 M x 2 quarters).
The petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and transfer
of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased appropriations; and
that the unbridled withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of
appropriated funds were akin to the impoundment of appropriations that could
be allowed only in case of "unmanageable national government budget deficit"
under the GAAs,  thus violating the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and
157
2013 prohibiting the retention or deduction of allotments. 158
In contrast, the respondents emphasize that NBC No. 541 adopted a spending,
not saving, policy as a last-ditch effort of the Executive to push agencies into
actually spending their appropriations; that such policy did not amount to an
impoundment scheme, because impoundment referred to the decision of the
Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or ideological reasons; and that
the withdrawal of allotments under NBC No. 541 was made pursuant to
Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code, by which the
President was granted the authority to suspend or otherwise stop further
expenditure of funds allotted to any agency whenever in his judgment the
public interest so required.
The assertions of the petitioners are upheld. The withdrawal and transfer of
unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased appropriations were
invalid for being bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such withdrawal of
unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds cannot be
considered as impoundment.
According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:  "Impoundment
159
refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made
available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of
any type." Impoundment under the GAA is understood to mean the retention or
deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in
case of unmanageable National Government budget deficit, to wit:
Section 66. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No
appropriations authorized under this Act shall be impounded through retention
or deduction, unless in accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued
by the DBM: PROVIDED, That all the funds appropriated for the purposes,
programs, projects and activities authorized under this Act, except those
covered under the Unprogrammed Fund, shall be released pursuant to Section
33 (3), Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Section 67. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or
deduction of appropriations authorized in this Act shall be effected only in
cases where there is an unmanageable national government budget deficit.
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this section shall
be construed to mean that (i) the actual national government budget deficit has
exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target
deficit as indicated in the FY 2011 Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President and
approved by Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, or
(ii) there are clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of such
condition, as determined by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee
and approved by the President.
The 2012 and 2013 GAAs contained similar provisions.
The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be
regarded as impoundment because it entailed only the transfer of funds, not
the retention or deduction of appropriations.
Nor could Section 68 of the 2011 GAA (and the similar provisions of the 2012
and 2013 GAAs) be applicable. They uniformly stated:
Section 68. Prohibition Against Retention/Deduction of Allotment. Fund
releases from appropriations provided in this Act shall be transmitted intact or
in full to the office or agency concerned. No retention or deduction as reserves
or overhead shall be made, except as authorized by law, or upon direction of
the President of the Philippines. The COA shall ensure compliance with this
provision to the extent that sub-allotments by agencies to their subordinate
offices are in conformity with the release documents issued by the DBM.
The provision obviously pertained to the retention or deduction of allotments
upon their release from the DBM, which was a different matter altogether. The
Court should not expand the meaning of the provision by applying it to the
withdrawal of allotments.
The respondents rely on Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative
Code of 1987 to justify the withdrawal of unobligated allotments. But the
provision authorized only the suspension or stoppage of further expenditures,
not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, to wit:
Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations.- Except as otherwise
provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the
public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office
concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of
funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the
General Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations used
for permanent officials and employees.
Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in
accordance with Section 38, supra, but instead transferred the funds to other
PAPs.
It is relevant to remind at this juncture that the balances of appropriations that
remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal year were to be reverted to the
General Fund.  This was the mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of
1âwphi1
the Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 28. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing
Appropriations.- Unexpended balances of appropriations authorized in the
General Appropriation Act shall revert to the unappropriated surplus of the
General Fund at the end of the fiscal year and shall not thereafter be available
for expenditure except by subsequent legislative enactment: Provided, that
appropriations for capital outlays shall remain valid until fully spent or reverted:
provided, further, that continuing appropriations for current operating
expenditures may be specifically recommended and approved as such in
support of projects whose effective implementation calls for multi-year
expenditure commitments: provided, finally, that the President may authorize
the use of savings realized by an agency during given year to meet non-
recurring expenditures in a subsequent year.
The balances of continuing appropriations shall be reviewed as part of the
annual budget preparation process and the preparation process and the
President may approve upon recommendation of the Secretary, the reversion
of funds no longer needed in connection with the activities funded by said
continuing appropriations.
The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased
appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the
fiscal year.
b.3. Third Requisite – No funds from
savings could be transferred under
the DAP to augment deficient items
not provided in the GAA
The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the
transfer should be "to augment an item in the general appropriations law for
the respective offices." The term "augment" means to enlarge or increase in
size, amount, or degree. 160
The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that
the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be deficient, to wit: –
x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or
project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent
evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall
a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded by augmentation from
savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.
In other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be
deficient before it could be augmented from savings. Note is taken of the fact
that the 2013 GAA already made this quite clear, thus:
Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their
respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the
current year in any item of their respective appropriations.
(ix) ₱6.5 billion augmentation of LGU internal revenue allotments
(x) ₱5 billion for crucial projects like tourism road construction under
the Department of Tourism and the Department of Public Works and
Highways;
(xi) ₱1.8 billion for the DAR-DPWH Tulay ng Pangulo;
(xii) ₱1.96 billion for the DOH-DPWH rehabilitation of regional health
units; and

As of 2013, a total of ₱144.4 billion worth of PAPs were implemented through (xiii) ₱4 billion for the DepEd-PPP school infrastructure projects. 166

the DAP. 161

Of this amount ₱82.5 billion were released in 2011 and ₱54.8 billion in
2012.  Sec. Abad has reported that 9% of the total DAP releases were applied
162
to the PAPs identified by the legislators. 163
In refutation, the OSG argues that a total of 116 DAP-financed PAPs were
implemented, had appropriation covers, and could properly be accounted for
because the funds were released following and pursuant to the standard
practices adopted by the DBM.  In support of its argument, the OSG has
167

submitted seven evidence packets containing memoranda, SAROs, and other

The petitioners disagree, however, and insist that the DAP supported the pertinent documents relative to the implementation and fund transfers under
following PAPs that had not been covered with appropriations in the respective the DAP.168

GAAs, namely:
(i) ₱1.5 billion for the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army;
(ii) ₱1.8 billion for the Moro National Liberation Front;
(iii) ₱700 million for assistance to Quezon Province; 164
(iv) ₱50 million to ₱100 (million) each to certain senators;
Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence
packets, we conclude that the "savings" pooled under the DAP were allocated
to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs.
For example, the SARO issued on December 22, 2011 for the highly vaunted
Disaster Risk, Exposure, Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM) project under
the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) covered the amount of
165 ₱1.6 Billion,  broken down as follows:
169

(v) ₱10 billion for the relocation of families living along dangerous APPROPRIATION PARTICULARS AMOUNT
zones under the National Housing Authority; CODE AUTHORIZED
A.03.a.01.a Generation of new
(vi) ₱10 billion and ₱20 billion equity infusion under the Bangko
knowledge and
Sentral;
technologies and
research
(vii) ₱5.4 billion landowners’ compensation under the Department of capability building P 43,504,024
Agrarian Reform; in priority areas 1,164,517,589
identified as 391,978,387
(viii) ₱8.6 billion for the ARMM comprehensive peace and development strategic to P
program;
 National 1,600,000,000 Developmen
Development t
Personnel
Services Aside from this transfer under the DAP to the DREAM project exceeding by
Maintenance and almost 300% the appropriation by Congress for the program Generation of
Other Operating new knowledge and technologies and research capability building in priority
Expenses  areas identified as strategic to National Development, the Executive allotted
Capital Outlays funds for personnel services and capital outlays. The Executive thereby
substituted its will to that of Congress. Worse, the Executive had not earlier
the pertinent provision of the 2011 GAA (R.A. No. 10147) showed that proposed any amount for personnel services and capital outlays in the NEP
Congress had appropriated only ₱537,910,000 for MOOE, but nothing for that became the basis of the 2011 GAA. 170

personnel services and capital outlays, to wit:

It is worth stressing in this connection that the failure of the GAAs to set aside
Personnel Maintenance Capital TOTAL any amounts for an expense category sufficiently indicated that Congress
Services and Other Outlays purposely did not see fit to fund, much less implement, the PAP concerned.
Operating This indication becomes clearer when even the President himself did not
Expenditures recommend in the NEP to fund the PAP. The consequence was that any PAP
requiring expenditure that did not receive any appropriation under the GAAs
III. Operations could only be a new PAP, any funding for which would go beyond the authority
a. Funding 177,406,00 1,887,365,00 49,090,00 2,113,861,00 laid down by Congress in enacting the GAAs. That happened in some
Assistance to 0 0 0 0 instances under the DAP.
Science
and Technology In relation to the December 22, 2011 SARO issued to the Philippine Council for
Activities Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology Research and Development
1. Central Office 1,554,238,00 1,554,238,00 (DOST-PCIEETRD)  for Establishment of the Advanced Failure Analysis
171

0 0 Laboratory, which reads:

a. 537,910,000 537,910,000
Generation APPROPRIATION PARTICULARS AMOUNT
of new CODE AUTHORIZED
knowledge Development,
and integration and
technologies coordination of the
and National Research
research System for
A.02.a
capability Industry, Energy
building in and Emerging
priority Technology and
areas Related Fields
identified as Capital Outlays P 300,000,000
strategic to
National
the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not
correspond to the program specified in the GAA, whose particulars were
Research and Management Services(inclusive of the following activities: (1)
Technological and Economic Assessment for Industry, Energy and Utilities; (2)
Dissemination of Science and Technology Information; and (3) Management of
PCIERD Information System for Industry, Energy and Utilities. Even assuming
that Development, integration and coordination of the National Research
System for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology and Related Fields–
the particulars stated in the SARO – could fall under the broad program
description of Research and Management Services– as appearing in the
SARO, it would nonetheless remain a new activity by reason of its not being
specifically stated in the GAA. As such, the DBM, sans legislative
authorization, could not validly fund and implement such PAP under the DAP.
In defending the disbursements, however, the OSG contends that the
Executive enjoyed sound discretion in implementing the budget given the
generality in the language and the broad policy objectives identified under the
GAAs;  and that the President enjoyed unlimited authority to spend the initial
172
appropriations under his authority to declare and utilize savings,  and in
173
keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws.
Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend
in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which included the
GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the
President to substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to
remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend
pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the
power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in the
Executive.  Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive
174
unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers. 175
Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its
power of the purse whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget proposal
submitted by the Executive.  Its power of the purse is touted as the very
176
foundation of its institutional strength,  and underpins "all other legislative
177
decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and
executive branches of government."  Such enormous power encompasses the
178
capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds,
and to spend the money.  Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the
179
purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public money
should be spent.
It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final
say on matters of appropriations. For this purpose, appropriation involves two
180
governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that
all monies received from whatever source by any part of the government are
public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting
expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization." To conform
181
with the governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition
by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either public or private
funds.  Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an
182
increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for
another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both appropriations will
thereby be violated.
b.4 Third Requisite – Cross-border
augmentations from savings were
prohibited by the Constitution
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any
item in the GAA "for their respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has
delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one
office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of
augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds
cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers
to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect
to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the
Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional
Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.
Did any cross-border transfers or augmentations transpire?
During the oral arguments on January 28, 2014, Sec. Abad admitted making
some cross-border augmentations, to wit:
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Alright, the whole time that you have been Secretary of Department of Budget
and Management, did the Executive Department ever redirect any part of
savings of the National Government under your control cross border to another
department?
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, in the Memos that we submitted to you, such an instance, Your Honor
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Can you tell me two instances? I don’t recall having read your material.
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, the first instance had to do with a request from the House of
Representatives. They started building their e-library in 2010 and they had a
budget for about 207 Million but they lack about 43 Million to complete its 250
Million requirements. Prior to that, the COA, in an audit observation informed
the Speaker that they had to continue with that construction otherwise the
whole building, as well as the equipments therein may suffer from serious
deterioration. And at that time, since the budget of the House of
Representatives was not enough to complete 250 Million, they wrote to the
President requesting for an augmentation of that particular item, which was
granted, Your Honor. The second instance in the Memos is a request from the
Commission on Audit. At the time they were pushing very strongly the good
governance programs of the government and therefore, part of that is a
requirement to conduct audits as well as review financial reports of many
agencies. And in the performance of that function, the Commission on Audit
needed information technology equipment as well as hire consultants and
litigators to help them with their audit work and for that they requested funds
from the Executive and the President saw that it was important for the
Commission to be provided with those IT equipments and litigators and
consultants and the request was granted, Your Honor.
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
These cross border examples, cross border augmentations were not supported
by appropriations…
SECRETARY ABAD:
They were, we were augmenting existing items within their… (interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
No, appropriations before you augmented because this is a cross border and
the tenor or text of the Constitution is quite clear as far as I am concerned. It
says here, "The power to augment may only be made to increase any item in
the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices." Did you not feel
constricted by this provision?
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, as the Constitution provides, the prohibition we felt was on the transfer of
appropriations, Your Honor. What we thought we did was to transfer savings
which was needed by the Commission to address deficiency in an existing item
in both the Commission as well as in the House of Representatives; that’s how
we saw…(interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
So your position as Secretary of Budget is that you could do that?
SECRETARY ABAD:
In an extreme instances because…(interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
No, no, in all instances, extreme or not extreme, you could do that, that’s your
feeling.
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, in that particular situation when the request was made by the
Commission and the House of Representatives, we felt that we needed to
respond because we felt…(interrupted). 183
The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to ₱143,700,000.00 and
₱250,000,000.00 were transferred under the DAP respectively to the
COA  and the House of Representatives.  Those transfers of funds, which
184 185
constituted cross-border augmentations for being from the Executive to the
COA and the House of Representatives, are graphed as follows: 186
 The cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please, is not an application of the
AMOUNT DAP. What were these cross-border transfers? They are transfers of savings
(In thousand as defined in the various General Appropriations Act. So, that makes it similar
pesos) to the DAP, the use of savings. There was a cross-border which appears to be
DATE
in violation of Section 25, paragraph 5 of Article VI, in the sense that the border
OFFICE PURPOSE RELEAS Reser Releas
was crossed. But never has it been claimed that the purpose was to augment a
ED ve es deficient item in another department of the government or agency of the
Impos government. The cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please, were in the
ed nature of [aid] rather than augmentations. Here is a government entity
Commission IT Infrastructure 11/11/11   143,70 separate and independent from the Executive Department solely in need of
on Program and 0 public funds. The President is there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. He’s in
Audit hiring of additional charge of the whole operation although six or seven heads of government
litigation experts offices are given the power to augment. Only the President stationed there and
Congress – Completion of the 07/23/12 207,03 250,00 in effect in-charge and has the responsibility for the failure of any part of the
House of construction of 4 0 government. You have election, for one reason or another, the money is not
Representati the Legislative (Savin enough to hold election. There would be chaos if no money is given as an aid,
ves Library and gs of not to augment, but as an aid to a department like COA. The President is
Archives HOR) responsible in a way that the other heads, given the power to augment, are
Building/Congress not. So, he cannot very well allow this, if Your Honor please. 189

ional e-library
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The respondents further stated in their memorandum that the President "made
available" to the "Commission on Elections the savings of his department upon May I move to another point, maybe just briefly. I am curious that the position
[its] request for funds…"  This was another instance of a cross-border
187
now, I think, of government is that some transfers of savings is now considered
augmentation. to be, if I’m not mistaken, aid not augmentation. Am I correct in my hearing of
your argument?
The respondents justified all the cross-border transfers thusly:
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
99. The Constitution does not prevent the President from transferring savings
of his department to another department upon the latter’s request, provided it That’s our submission, if Your Honor, please.
is the recipient department that uses such funds to augment its own
appropriation. In such a case, the President merely gives the other department JUSTICE LEONEN:
access to public funds but he cannot dictate how they shall be applied by that
department whose fiscal autonomy is guaranteed by the Constitution. 188 May I know, Justice, where can we situate this in the text of the Constitution?
Where do we actually derive the concepts that transfers of appropriation from
In the oral arguments held on February 18, 2014, Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, one branch to the other or what happened in DAP can be considered a said?
representing Congress, announced a different characterization of the cross- What particular text in the Constitution can we situate this?
border transfers of funds as in the nature of "aid" instead of "augmentation,"
viz: HONORABLE MENDOZA:

HONORABLE MENDOZA:
There is no particular provision or statutory provision for that matter, if Your
Honor please. It is drawn from the fact that the Executive is the executive in-
charge of the success of the government.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, the residual powers labelled in Marcos v. Manglapus would be the basis
for this theory of the government?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
Yes, if Your Honor, please.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
A while ago, Justice Carpio mentioned that the remedy is might be to go to
Congress. That there are opportunities and there have been opportunities of
the President to actually go to Congress and ask for supplemental budgets?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
If there is time to do that, I would say yes.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of
funds, the plain text of Section 25(5), supra, disallowing cross border transfers
was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid,
were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.
4.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed
funds despite the original revenue targets
not having been exceeded was invalid
Funding under the DAP were also sourced from unprogrammed funds
provided in the GAAs for 2011, 2012,and 2013. The respondents stress,
however, that the unprogrammed funds were not brought under the DAP as
savings, but as separate sources of funds; and that, consequently, the release
and use of unprogrammed funds were not subject to the restrictions under
Section 25(5), supra.
The documents contained in the Evidence Packets by the OSG have
confirmed that the unprogrammed funds were treated as separate sources of
funds. Even so, the release and use of the unprogrammed funds were still
subject to restrictions, for, to start with, the GAAs precisely specified the
instances when the unprogrammed funds could be released and the purposes
for which they could be used.

JUSTICE LEONEN: The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of the unprogrammed
funds was that the revenue collections must exceed revenue targets; and that
So, the theory of aid rather than augmentation applies in extra-ordinary the release of the unprogrammed funds was illegal because such condition
situation? was not met. 191

HONORABLE MENDOZA: The respondents disagree, holding that the release and use of the
unprogrammed funds under the DAP were in accordance with the pertinent
Very extra-ordinary situations. provisions of the GAAs. In particular, the DBM avers that the unprogrammed
funds could be availed of when any of the following three instances occur, to
JUSTICE LEONEN: wit: (1) the revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets proposed
in the BESFs submitted by the President to Congress; (2) new revenues were
But Counsel, this would be new doctrine, in case? collected or realized from sources not originally considered in the BESFs; or(3)
newly-approved loans for foreign assisted projects were secured, or when
conditions were triggered for other sources of funds, such as perfected loan
HONORABLE MENDOZA: agreements for foreign-assisted projects.  This view of the DBM was adopted
192

by all the respondents in their Consolidated Comment. 193

Yes, if Your Honor please. 190

The BESFs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 uniformly defined "unprogrammed
appropriations" as appropriations that provided standby authority to incur
additional agency obligations for priority PAPs when revenue collections
exceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds are generated.  Contrary
194
to the DBM’s averment that there were three instances when unprogrammed
funds could be released, the BESFs envisioned only two instances. The third
mentioned by the DBM – the collection of new revenues from sources not
originally considered in the BESFs – was not included. This meant that the
collection of additional revenues from new sources did not warrant the release
of the unprogrammed funds. Hence, even if the revenues not considered in the
BESFs were collected or generated, the basic condition that the revenue
collections should exceed the revenue targets must still be complied with in
order to justify the release of the unprogrammed funds.
The view that there were only two instances when the unprogrammed funds
could be released was bolstered by the following texts of the Special
Provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs, to wit:
2011 GAA
1. Release of Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only
when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted by
the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII
of the Constitution, including savings generated from programmed
appropriations for the year: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources
not considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to cover
releases from appropriations in this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in
case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a
perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the
issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds: PROVIDED,
FURTHERMORE, That if there are savings generated from the programmed
appropriations for the first two quarters of the year, the DBM may, subject to
the approval of the President, release the pertinent appropriations under the
Unprogrammed Fund corresponding to only fifty percent (50%) of the said
savings net of revenue shortfall: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the release of the
balance of the total savings from programmed appropriations for the year shall
be subject to fiscal programming and approval of the President.
2012 GAA
1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only
when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted by
the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII
of the Constitution: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources not
considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to cover
releases from appropriations in this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in
case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a
perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the
issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.
As can be noted, the provisos in both provisions to the effect that "collections
arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets
may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund" gave the
authority to use such additional revenues for appropriations funded from the
unprogrammed funds. They did not at all waive compliance with the basic
requirement that revenue collections must still exceed the original revenue
targets.
In contrast, the texts of the provisos with regard to additional revenues
generated from newly-approved foreign loans were clear to the effect that the
perfected loan agreement would be in itself "sufficient basis" for the issuance
of a SARO to release the funds but only to the extent of the amount of the
loan. In such instance, the revenue collections need not exceed the revenue
targets to warrant the release of the loan proceeds, and the mere perfection of
the loan agreement would suffice.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that under these provisions of the GAAs
the additional revenues from sources not considered in the BESFs must be
taken into account in determining if the revenue collections exceeded the
revenue targets. The text of the relevant provision of the 2013 GAA, which was
substantially similar to those of the GAAs for 2011 and 2012, already made
this explicit, thus:
1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only
when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted by
the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII
of the Constitution, including collections arising from sources not considered in
the aforesaid original revenue target, as certified by the BTr: PROVIDED, That
in case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of
a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the
issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.
Consequently, that there were additional revenues from sources not
considered in the revenue target would not be enough. The total revenue
collections must still exceed the original revenue targets to justify the release Interest on Bond Holdings
of the unprogrammed funds (other than those from newly-approved foreign
loans). Guarantee Fee
Gain on Foreign Exchange
The present controversy on the unprogrammed funds was rooted in the correct NG Income Collected by BTr
interpretation of the phrase "revenue collections should exceed the original
revenue targets." The petitioners take the phrase to mean that the total Dividends on Stocks
revenue collections must exceed the total revenue target stated in the BESF, NG Share from Airport Terminal Fee
but the respondents understand the phrase to refer only to the collections for NG Share from PAGCOR Income
each source of revenue as enumerated in the BESF, with the condition being NG Share from MIAA Profit
deemed complied with once the revenue collections from a particular source
already exceeded the stated target. Privatization
Foreign Grants
The BESF provided for the following sources of revenue, with the
corresponding revenue target stated for each source of revenue, to wit: Thus, when the Court required the respondents to submit a certification from
the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) to the effect that the revenue collections had
TAX REVENUES exceeded the original revenue targets,  they complied by submitting
195

certifications from the BTr and Department of Finance (DOF) pertaining to only
Taxes on Net Income and Profits one identified source of revenue – the dividends from the shares of stock held
Taxes on Property by the Government in government-owned and controlled corporations.
Taxes on Domestic Goods and Services
To justify the release of the unprogrammed funds for 2011, the OSG presented
General Sales, Turnover or VAT the certification dated March 4, 2011 issued by DOF Undersecretary Gil S.
Selected Excises on Goods Beltran, as follows:

Selected Taxes on Services This is to certify that under the Budget for Expenditures and Sources of
Taxes on the Use of Goods or Property or Permission to Perform Financing for 2011, the programmed income from dividends from shares of
Activities stock in government-owned and controlled corporations is 5.5 billion.
Other Taxes
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions This is to certify further that based on the records of the Bureau of Treasury,
the National Government has recorded dividend income amounting to ₱23.8
NON-TAX REVENUES billion as of 31 January 2011.196

Fees and Charges For 2012, the OSG submitted the certification dated April 26, 2012 issued by
BTR Income National Treasurer Roberto B. Tan, viz:

Government Services This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National
Interest on NG Deposits Government for the period January to March 2012 amounted to ₱19.419 billion
Interest on Advances to Government Corporations compared to the full year program of ₱5.5 billion for 2012.197

Income from Investments

And, finally, for 2013, the OSG presented the certification dated July 3, 2013
issued by National Treasurer Rosalia V. De Leon, to wit:
This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National
Government for the period January to May 2013 amounted to ₱12.438 billion
compared to the full year program of ₱10.0  billion for 2013.
198
Moreover, the National Government accounted for the sale of the right to build
and operate the NAIA expressway amounting to ₱11.0 billion in June 2013. 199
The certifications reflected that by collecting dividends amounting to ₱23.8
billion in 2011, ₱19.419 billion in 2012, and ₱12.438 billion in 2013 the BTr had
exceeded only the ₱5.5 billion in target revenues in the form of dividends from
stocks in each of 2011 and 2012, and only the ₱10 billion in target revenues in
the form of dividends from stocks in 2013.
However, the requirement that revenue collections exceed the original revenue
targets was to be construed in light of the purpose for which the
unprogrammed funds were incorporated in the GAAs as standby
appropriations to support additional expenditures for certain priority PAPs
should the revenue collections exceed the resource targets assumed in the
budget or when additional foreign project loan proceeds were realized. The
unprogrammed funds were included in the GAAs to provide ready cover so as
not to delay the implementation of the PAPs should new or additional revenue
sources be realized during the year.  Given the tenor of the certifications, the
200
unprogrammed funds were thus not yet supported by the corresponding
resources. 201
The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to address the funding
requirements of the proposed programmed appropriations. In contrast, the
unprogrammed funds, as standby appropriations, were to be released only
when there were revenues in excess of what the programmed appropriations
required. As such, the revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not
individually; otherwise, we would be dealing with artificial revenue surpluses.
The requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue target should
be understood to mean that the revenue collections must exceed the total of
the revenue targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to release the
unprogrammed funds simply because there was an excess revenue as to one
source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure because
it would disregard the budget plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention
of the Government’s surplus budget policy. 202
We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the respondents’ view.
5.
Equal protection, checks and balances,
and public accountability challenges
The DAP is further challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the
system of checks and balances, and the principle of public accountability.
With respect to the challenge against the DAP under the Equal Protection
Clause,  Luna argues that the implementation of the DAP was "unfair as it
203
[was] selective" because the funds released under the DAP was not made
available to all the legislators, with some of them refusing to avail themselves
of the DAP funds, and others being unaware of the availability of such funds.
Thus, the DAP practised "undue favoritism" in favor of select legislators in
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.
Similarly, COURAGE contends that the DAP violated the Equal Protection
Clause because no reasonable classification was used in distributing the funds
under the DAP; and that the Senators who supposedly availed themselves of
said funds were differently treated as to the amounts they respectively
received.
Anent the petitioners’ theory that the DAP violated the system of checks and
balances, Luna submits that the grant of the funds under the DAP to some
legislators forced their silence about the issues and anomalies surrounding the
DAP. Meanwhile, Belgica stresses that the DAP, by allowing the legislators to
identify PAPs, authorized them to take part in the implementation and
execution of the GAAs, a function that exclusively belonged to the Executive;
that such situation constituted undue and unjustified legislative encroachment
in the functions of the Executive; and that the President arrogated unto himself
the power of appropriation vested in Congress because NBC No. 541
authorized the use of the funds under the DAP for PAPs not considered in the
2012 budget.
Finally, the petitioners insist that the DAP was repugnant to the principle of
public accountability enshrined in the Constitution,  because the legislators
204
relinquished the power of appropriation to the Executive, and exhibited a
reluctance to inquire into the legality of the DAP.
The OSG counters the challenges, stating that the supposed discrimination in
the release of funds under the DAP could be raised only by the affected
Members of Congress themselves, and if the challenge based on the violation
of the Equal Protection Clause was really against the constitutionality of the
DAP, the arguments of the petitioners should be directed to the entitlement of
the legislators to the funds, not to the proposition that all of the legislators
should have been given such entitlement.
The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause,
which focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks
factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and Congressmen
being unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about
some of them having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with
relevant data. Also, the claim that the Executive discriminated against some
legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not
of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The
denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by
parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be
the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases
of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such
affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the
denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their
situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently, the Court was not
put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection. To
have the Court do so despite the inadequacy of the showing of factual and
legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the outcome would not
do justice to those for whose supposed benefit the claim of denial of equal
protection has been made.
The argument that the release of funds under the DAP effectively stayed the
hands of the legislators from conducting congressional inquiries into the
legality and propriety of the DAP is speculative. That deficiency eliminated any
need to consider and resolve the argument, for it is fundamental that
speculation would not support any proper judicial determination of an issue
simply because nothing concrete can thereby be gained. In order to sustain
their constitutional challenges against official acts of the Government, the
petitioners must discharge the basic burden of proving that the constitutional
infirmities actually existed.  Simply put, guesswork and speculation cannot
205
overcome the presumption of the constitutionality of the assailed executive act.
We do not need to discuss whether or not the DAP and its implementation
through the various circulars and memoranda of the DBM transgressed the
system of checks and balances in place in our constitutional system. Our
earlier expositions on the DAP and its implementing issuances infringing the
doctrine of separation of powers effectively addressed this particular concern.
Anent the principle of public accountability being transgressed because the
adoption and implementation of the DAP constituted an assumption by the
Executive of Congress’ power of appropriation, we have already held that the
DAP and its implementing issuances were policies and acts that the Executive
could properly adopt and do in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that
they sought to implement strategies to ramp up or accelerate the economy of
the country.
6.
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable
After declaring the DAP and its implementing issuances constitutionally infirm,
we must now deal with the consequences of the declaration.
Article 7 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being unconstitutional
cannot give rise to any right or obligation.  However, the generality of the rule
206
makes us ponder whether rigidly applying the rule may at times be
impracticable or wasteful. Should we not recognize the need to except from the
rigid application of the rule the instances in which the void law or executive act
produced an almost irreversible result?
The need is answered by the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine, definitely
not a novel one, has been exhaustively explained in De Agbayani v. Philippine
National Bank: 207
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional
act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise
suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties.
Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the
fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and
purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: ‘When the
courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern.’ Administrative or executive acts, orders
and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the
Constitution. It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being
supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms
cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may
not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have
been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary,
in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and
respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their
positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard
be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in
operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned
with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is
the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative
or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be
no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence
of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official.’"
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive
act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect.  But its use must be subjected to
208
great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an
unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of
equity and fair play.  It applies only to cases where extraordinary
209
circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met
the stringent conditions that will permit its application.
We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and
implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity
and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related
issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.
To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional
executive act. The term executive act is broad enough to include any and all
acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi legislative and quasi-
judicial in nature. The Court held so in Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council: 210
Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the
operative fact doctrine should be limited to statutes and rules and regulations
issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that
of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature. Thus, the minority
concludes that the phrase ‘executive act’ used in the case of De Agbayani v.
Philippine National Bank refers only to acts, orders, and rules and regulations
that have the force and effect of law. The minority also made mention of the
Concurring Opinion of Justice Enrique Fernando in Municipality of Malabang v.
Benito, where it was supposedly made explicit that the operative fact doctrine
applies to executive acts, which are ultimately quasi-legislative in nature.
We disagree. For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of
Malabang case elaborates what ‘executive act’ mean. Moreover, while orders,
rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have
fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence,
the phrase ‘executive act’ does not have such specific definition under existing
laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by the minority, nowhere can it
be found that the term ‘executive act’ is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily,
the term ‘executive act’ is broad enough to encompass decisions of
administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department which are
subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.
A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma (Elma) as
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) which was declared
unconstitutional by this Court in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma. In said
case, this Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of Elma to these offices
is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since
these are incompatible offices. Notably, the appointment of Elma as Chairman
of the PCGG and as CPLC is, without a question, an executive act. Prior to the
declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive act, certain acts or
transactions were made in good faith and in reliance of the appointment of
Elma which cannot just be set aside or invalidated by its subsequent
invalidation.
In Tan v. Barrios, this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine, held that
despite the invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians,
certain operative facts must be acknowledged to have existed so as not to
trample upon the rights of the accused therein. Relevant thereto, in Olaguer v.
Military Commission No. 34, it was ruled that ‘military tribunals pertain to the
Executive Department of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of
the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as
Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy
and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his
authorized military representatives.’
Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and
regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same
status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.
Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine
only to executive issuances like orders and rules and regulations, said principle
can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or
the agencies under the executive department. This doctrine, in the interest of
justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass
said decisions of the executive branch. In keeping with the demands of equity,
the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that
resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-
legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch
which were later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such acts and
consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and
fairness.
Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies
has to be complied with because it has the force and effect of law, springing
from the powers of the President under the Constitution and existing laws.
Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may have produced acts
and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must
be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be
applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the
PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,  the 211
Court likewise declared that "for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must
be a ‘legislative or executive measure,’ meaning a law or executive issuance."
Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine did not apply to a
mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, viz:
Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the
Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the
Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect. This,
in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a rule or
ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good
faith. A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not
suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and
consistently applied. An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or
ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be availed of only by
those with informal contacts with the government agency.
It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the
DAP and its related issuances were executive acts.  The DAP itself, as a
1avvphi1
policy, transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the
Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various memoranda
and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments
made available to the different agencies and departments was consistently
applied throughout the entire Executive. With the Executive, through the DBM,
being in charge of the third phase of the budget cycle – the budget execution
phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by virtue of
his primary responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national
economy towards growth and development. This is simply because savings
could and should be determined only during the budget execution phase.
As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of
savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were not covered in
the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to
augment items pertaining to other departments of the Government in clear
violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP
unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an
operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds
of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the
doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it
and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo everything that they
had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be
enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be
beyond debate that the implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably positive
results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To count the
positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public
infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless,
hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the doctrine of operative fact to
the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy results by
destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness.
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations, the
doctrine of operative fact does not always apply, and is not always the
consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked
only in situations where the nullification of the effects of what used to be a valid
law would result in inequity and injustice; but where no such result would
212
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing
agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments
and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal
year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings
contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to
augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not
covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite
the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue
collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the
conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional law is totally ineffective should MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
apply. Chief Justice

In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can I join the Concurring and
apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries See Dissenting Opinion Dissenting Opinion of J. Del
relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, ANTONIO T. CARPIO Castillo
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, Associate Justice
civil, administrative and other liabilities.
No part:
See: Separate Opinion
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and TERSITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the CASTRO
Associate Justice
Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and Associate Justice
related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Pls. see separate concurring and
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation Associate Justice dissenting opinion
of powers, namely: MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
 Deputies Ombudsman, respectively, and all these positions are vacant. 1
Associate Justice
The Petition
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice Petitioner, who claims to be a taxpayer, a concerned Filipino citizen, and a member
of the Bar, invokes the jurisprudence laid down by the Court in Funa v. Villar,2 in
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES asserting that he has locus standi to file the instant petition. He avers that he is
Associate Justice Associate Justice seeking the correction of a recurring statutory wrong and a declaration from the
Court that the positions held by the respondents are vacant. 3
Pls. see Separate Concurring
See separate concurring opinion
Opinion Respondents are the incumbent officials of the Office of the
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. Ombudsman, viz: Conchita Carpio Morales, Ombudsman (Ombudsman
ESTELA M. PERLAS-
LEONEN Morales); Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Overall Deputy Ombudsman; Gerard Abeto
BERNABE
Associate Justice Mosquera, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; Paul Elmer M. Clemente as Deputy
Associate Justice Ombudsman for Visayas; Rodolfo M. Elman, Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao; and
Cyril Enguerra Ramos, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. 4
CERTIFICATION Petitioner maintains that the constitutional issue raised in his petition is of
transcendental importance since this Court's ruling will finally determine the correct
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in term and tenure of the Ombudsman and his deputies and settle the matter as to the
consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770. He alleges that Sec. 8(3), in relation
court. to Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides that in case of a vacancy at the Office of
the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or permanent disability of the
incumbent Ombudsman and his deputies, the newly appointed Ombudsman and his
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO deputies shall be appointed to a full term of seven (7) years, is constitutionally infirm
Chief Justice as it contravenes Sec. 11 in relation to Secs. 8 and 10 of Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution. He avers that like all constitutionally created positions, i.e., President,
Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and Members of
EN BANC
the Civil Service Commission (CSC),  the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and
the Commission on Audit (COA), the successor to the positions of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018 and deputies should serve only the unexpired term of the predecessor. Hence,
petitioner insists that the incumbent Ombudsman and deputies have been
REY NATHANIEL C. IFURUNG, Petitioner, v. HON. CONCHITA C. CARPIO overstaying in their present positions for more than two years considering that their
MORALES IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. MELCHOR ARTHUR terms have expired on 1 February 2015. "To allow them to stay in the said positions
H. CARANDANG, HON. GERARD ABETO MOSQUERA, HON. PAUL ELMER M. one day longer constitutes a continuing affront to the 1987 Constitution, unduly clips
CLEMENTE, HON. RODOLFO M. ELMAN, HON. CYRIL ENGUERRA RAMOS IN presidential prerogatives, and deprives the nation of the services of legitimate
THEIR CAPACITIES AS DEPUTIES OMBUDSMAN, AND THE OFFICE OF THE Ombudsman and Deputies Ombudsman."5
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
To fortify his position, petitioner states that the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution during its 26 July 1986 discussion was to constitutionalize the Office of
DECISION
the Ombudsman, i.e., by granting it autonomy and independence the same as and
equal to those of the other constitutionally created offices and positions. That in the
MARTIRES, J.: process of constitutionalizing the Office of the Ombudsman, the framers ensured its
stature and clout as a constitutional body like the COMELEC, the COA, the CSC, and
Through this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Rey Nathaniel C. the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), viz:  by creating the office and giving it
Ifurung (petitioner), in propria persona,  seeks a declaration from the Court that: (a) fiscal autonomy and independence thus making it a constitutionally created office; by
Section (Sec.)  8(3) in relation to Sec. 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, also known providing the qualifications, disqualifications, manner of appointment, cessation, and
as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, is unconstitutional for being an outright removal from office; and by specifying the salary, positional rank, term of office,
transgression of Sec. 11, in relation to Secs. 8 and 10 of Article (Art.)  XI of the 1987 powers, functions, and duties thereof; thereby making the Ombudsman and the
Constitution; and (b) all individual respondents as de facto Ombudsman and deputies constitutionally created positions. He claims that the intention of the
framers was evident in Secs. 5 to 14, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution. 6
3rd     10 Oct.    
According to the petitioner, with the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, President Simeon V. 2 Feb. 2002 Not Resignation 
Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino),  on 24 July 1987, issued pursuant to Sec. Marcelo      2001   to  applicable 
6,7 Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2438 creating the
Office of the Ombudsman. On 17 November 1989, R.A. No. 6770 was approved.   to  Nov.
Considering that the intent of the framers of the Constitution was that the position of 1 Feb. 2005
the Ombudsman and the deputies shall have the same status as the three
constitutional commissions, the limitations as to the latter's term of office shall Ma. Merceditas 2008 Not
likewise apply to the Ombudsman and the deputies. Hence, petitioner maintains that Navarro- Not applicable
the grant of a full term to an Ombudsman's successor, when the vacancy in the 1 Dec.
Gutierrez applicable
office is for a cause other than the expiration of term, is an outright non-observance
of the intent of the framers and Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution. 9 2005
to 
Petitioner insists that in Gaminde v. COA (Gaminde),10 the Court en banc has
determined that the starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the 1 Feb.
constitutional commissions is uniformly set on 2 February 1987. He maintains as 2008
regards the appointment of Conrado M. Vasquez as first Ombudsman in May 1988,
the seven-year term which was supposed to start on 2 February 1987 and culminate 4th      
seven (7) years thereafter, was not complied with.11 Ma. Merceditas 2 Feb. 2 Feb. 2 Feb. Resignation 
The petitioner presented the following table: 12 Navarro- 2008 2008  2008 
Gutierrez    to  to to 
                
1 Feb.   6 May 6 May
2015 2011 2011 Not
OMBUDSMAN 7- ACTUAL DE FACTO  CESSATION  Conchita applicable
YEAR    TENURE SERVICE OF SERVICE Carpio Morales 25 July   Not
TERM 2011 applicable
1st to 
Conrado M. 2 Feb. May 2 Feb. Supposed 1 Feb.
Vasquez 1987 1988  1994  expiration of 2015
  to  to  to    term 5th 2 Feb.
1 Feb. May 1995 May 1995 Conchita  2 2015  2 Feb. Not
1994 Carpio Morales Feb. to 2015 applicable
2nd 2015 present   to 
Aniano A. 2 Feb. 4 Aug. 2 Feb. Supposed to present
Desierto 1994  1995  2001 expiration of 1 Feb.
to to   to    term 2022
 1   3 Aug. 3 Aug.
Feb. 2002 2002 Petitioner states that it can be gleaned from the above data that the explicit seven-
2001 year term for the Ombudsman and the deputies has neither been followed nor
complied with.13

Petitioner claims that Ombudsman Morales should have ceased to hold office on 1
February 2015 considering that the unexpired term of the supposed fourth seven-
year term ended on that date; thus, Ombudsman Morales has been holding the
position in a de facto capacity since 2 February 2015 up to the present. This
observation, petitioner claims, holds true with the other respondent deputies. 14
Petitioner posits that the "recurrence of this cycle of noncompliance and
nonobservance of the intent of the framers and the explicit provision of the 1987
Philippine Constitution is an outright affront to the fundamental law of the land and,
if it remains unchecked, will create a cycle of non-compliance with and
nonobservance of what the Constitution provides." 15
Petitioner argues that the Office of the Ombudsman is not sui generis; thus, what
applies and holds true for all the other constitutionally created offices and positions
should also apply to this office. The Ombudsman cannot be an exception, to the rule
set by the 1987 Constitution, i.e., to serve for the unexpired term, so much so that
each uncompleted term creates a fresh term for the appointed Ombudsman.
Petitioner speculates that such fresh term of seven years could effectively deprive an
incoming President the power and opportunity to appoint an Ombudsman. Thus the
term of the Ombudsman will be subject to political maneuverings such that the
outgoing President can divest the next President of the prerogative to appoint. If the
unexpired term is the policy, every President can appoint an Ombudsman. 16
Petitioner cites the ruling in Tañada v. Angara17  (Tañada)  and Imbong v.
Ochoa18  (Imbong) to justify his position that he availed of the appropriate remedies
of certiorari and prohibition in the instant case.19
Asserting that the present petition involves the resolution of a constitutional issue
which affects the very fabric and integrity of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner
pleads for the exemption from the observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts in
view of the transcendental importance of this constitutional issue. [20
The Comment of the Respondents
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), claim that petitioner
failed to appreciate the verba legis approach to constitutional construction; and that,
instead, petitioner resorted to an interpretation that was not only self-serving but
also devoid of basis and reason.21
Respondents aver that Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution is clear that the term
of the Ombudsman and the Deputies shall be seven years without reappointment
without distinction on the cause of filling the vacancy. According to the respondents,
to follow petitioner's interpretation would lead to a distinction not found in the law
between: (1) the term of the Ombudsman and the deputies who succeeded a
predecessor who finished a full term of seven years; and (2) the term of the
Ombudsman and the deputies who merely succeeded the predecessor who did not
finish the full term of seven years.22
Respondents state that unlike Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, the term of
office of the constitutionally created offices provides that a successor who is
appointed to any vacancy shall only serve the unexpired term of the successor. 23
To disprove the petitioner's assertion that the distinction as to the term of office of
constitutionally created offices applies to the Ombudsman and his Deputies,
respondents explain that there are other offices created by the
Constitution, viz: Supreme Court, Judicial and Bar Council (JBC),  Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET),  House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), judges of lower
courts, elective local officials, and the CHR, among others, where such distinction
does not apply.24
Respondents allege that the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution reveal
their intent to grant the Ombudsman and his deputies the same rank and salary as
the Chair and members of the Constitutional Commissions but not by the staggered
term.25
Respondents contend that the ruling in Gaminde  where the rotational system of
appointment of the CSC chairperson and the commissioners was crucial to the
determination of the start of Commissioner Gaminde's term, does not apply to the
Office of the Ombudsman where there are no seven-five-three-year rotational
intervals for the appointment. Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman is not a
commission composed of a chairperson and several commissioners; thus, whether
the term of the first Ombudsman began on 2 February 1987 would be immaterial
because the succeeding Ombudsman shall have a fresh seven-year term. 26
Respondents maintain that the present petition seeks to unseat respondents from
public office; thus, the Tañada  and Imbong  rulings on which petitioner anchors his
petition would not apply since these cases do not involve an attack on a public
officer's title. Moreover, the present petition, which involves a collateral attack on the
respondents' title, should be dismissed for being an improper remedy. Respondents
emphasize that the proper remedy would have been a petition for quo
warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court to be initiated by the Solicitor General
or public prosecutor when directed by the President of the Philippines. 27
ISSUES
I.
Whether Section 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is unconstitutional for being violative of
Section 11 in relation to Sections 8 and 10, Article XI of the 1987 Philippine
constitution and applicable jurisprudence.
II.
Whether the instant petition is the proper remedy.
III.

Whether this Honorable Court has jurisdiction.
OUR RULING
To properly resolve this petition, it would be better to dwell foremost on the issue of
whether petitioner has availed of the proper vehicle to obtain the relief he pleads the
Court.
A petition for certiorari is the  truths without the world's believing him. This falsehood of the tongue leads to that of
proper remedy to challenge the  the heart and in time depraves all its good dispositions." Mental dishonesty and
constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of  moral mischief breed all that integrity is not.
R.A. No. 6770.
To justify his claim that a petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy
to assail the validity of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner cites the ruling
in Tañada and Imbong that "certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no plain, speedy, or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
To counter petitioner's justification and to prove that quo warranto  was the proper
remedy in this case
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL
JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner, v. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, Respondent.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Whoever walks in integrity and with moral character
  walks securely, but he who takes crooked way will be
discovered and punished.
   
  - The Holy Bible, Proverbs 10:9 (AMP)
Integrity has, at all times, been stressed to be one of the required qualifications of
judge. It is not new concept in the vocation of administering and dispensing justice.
In the early 1600's, Francis Bacon, philosopher, statesman, and jurist, in his "Essay
LVI: Of Judicature" said "[a]bove all things, integrity is the Judge's portion and
proper virtue." Neither is integrity complex concept necessitating esoteric
philosophical disquisitions to be understood. Simply, it is qualification of being
honest, truthful, and having steadfast adherence to moral and ethical
principles.1 Integrity connotes being consistent doing the right thing in accordance
with the law and ethical standards everytime. Hence, every judicial officer in any
society is required to comply, not only with the laws and legislations, but with codes
and canons of conduct and ethical standards as well, without derogation. As Thomas
Jefferson remarked, "it is of great importance to set resolution, never not to be
shaken, never to tell an untruth. There is no vice so mean, so pitiful, so contemptible
and he who permits himself to tell lie once, finds it much easier to do it second and
third time, till at length it becomes habitual, he tells lies without attending to it, and
In our jurisdiction, one cannot be qualified to be member of the Judiciary, lacking
such mandatory requirement of "proven integrity". Inevitably, an appointee to the
position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court must be the exemplar of honesty,
probity and integrity. The purpose of this requirement is self-evident as the Chief
Justice heads the Judiciary and adjudicates cases as member of the Court that "has
the last word on what the law is."2 Together with other Justices, the Chief Justice
also disciplines members of the Bar for misconduct. The significance of probity and
integrity as requirement for appointment to the Judiciary is underscored by the fact
that such qualifications are not explicitly required of the President, the Vice-President
or the Members of Congress under the Constitution. The Constitution, thus, demands
in no uncertain terms that the Chief Justice be the embodiment of moral and ethical
principles. He or she must be of unquestionable character, possessed of moral
authority to demand obedience to the law and to impose rule of conduct. Indeed,
one who exacts compliance with the law and ethical standards should be their
foremost adherent.
No one is above the law and the Constitution, not even Chief Justice who took an
oath to protect and defend the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. The Court
in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,3 says it tritely "the Chief Justice is
not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court." 4 All public officers
whether in the Executive, Legislative or Judicial departments are bound to follow the
law. If public officer violates the law, he or she shall suffer punishment, sanctions
and adverse consequences. The obligatory force of the law is necessary because
once we allow exceptions, concessions, waiver, suspension or non application to
those who do not want to follow the law, nobody else will obey the law.
In this unprecedented case for quo warranto against the incumbent Chief Justice, the
Republic entreats this Court to declare Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (respondent)
ineligible to hold the highest post in the Judiciary for failing to. regularly disclose her
assets, liabilities and net worth as member of the career service prior to her
appointment as an Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice, of the Supreme
Court, in violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft Law, and the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The Republic accordingly
seeks the nullification of respondent's appointment, asserting that her failure to file
the required disclosures and her failure to submit the same to the Judicial and Bar
Council show that she is not possessed of "proven integrity" demanded of every
Yea
aspirant to the Judiciary. rs
The Case Legal 199 20 14 Various Legal Executive
Counsel 4 08 yrs. agencies of various Secretari
Invoking the Court's original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
government internatio es Alberto
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General Office of the nal trade Romulo,
(OSG) filed the present Petition 5 for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo President, and Eduardo
warranto to declare as void respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude respondent therefrom. Office of the investme Ermita
Solicitor nt law in and
The Antecedents General, WTO Leandro
From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, or spanning period of 20 years, respondent Manila (Geneva), Mendoza,
served as member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law International ICSID Chief
(U.P. or U.P. College of Law), initially as temporary faculty member (from November
1986 to December 31, 1991) and thereafter, as permanent faculty member until her
Airport (Washing Presidenti
resignation therefrom on June 1, 2006.6 As regular faculty member, respondent was Authority, ton, DC). al Legal
paid by the month by U.P.7 Department ICC-ICA Counsel
Based on the records of the U.P. Human Resources Development Office (U.P. of (Singapor Avelino
HRD0),8 respondent was on official leave from the U.P. College of Law for the Agriculture, e, Paris) Cruz and
following periods:
Department and in Mercedita
June 1, 2000 - May 31, 2001 of Trade and bilateral s
June 1, 2001 - May 31, 2002 Industry, dispute Gutierrez;
November 1, 2003 - October 31, 2004 WTO-AFTA resolution Solicitor
Commission, mechanis Generals
June 1, 2004 - February 10, 2005
Philippine ms Alfredo
November 1, 2004 - October 31, 2005 Coconut Benipayo,
February 11, 2005 - May 31, 2006 Authority Antonio
Nachura
November 15, 2005 - May 31, 2006
While being employed at the U.P. College of Law, or from October 2003 to 2006,
and
respondent was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two Agnes
international arbitrations: (a) PIATCO v. Republic of the Philippines and MIAA; and Devanade
(b) Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the
Philippines (PIATCO cases).9 ra, MIAA
General
The Personal Data Sheet (PDS) accomplished under oath by respondent further
details, among others, the following engagements/services rendered by her for
Manager
various government agencies:10 Alfonso
Position Fro To No. Department/ Nature of Superviso Cusi,
m of Agency work r Sen.
 2009, the respondent submitted her application for the position of Associate Justice
Edgardo of the Supreme Court in July 2010.
Angara,
Sec. In support of her application as Associate Justice, respondent submitted to the Office
of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council
Salvador (JBC) her SALN for the year 2006.26 This SALN for 2006 bears no stamp received by
Escudero, the U.P. HRDO and was signed on July 27, 2010.27According to respondent, the JBC
considered her nomination for the position of Associate Justice as that of private
Underser practitioner and not as government employee.28 Only recently, in letter29 to the ORSN
etary dated February 2, 2018, likewise attached to her Ad
Cautelam Manifestation/Submission, respondent would explain that such SALN was
Thomas really intended to be her SALN as of July 27, 2010.30 Respondent further explained
Aquino, during the Oral Arguments that she merely downloaded the SALN form and forgot to
Amb. Lilia erase the year "2006" printed thereon and that she was not required by the ORSN to
submit subscribed SALN.31
Bautista
Thus, as the certifications executed by the U.P. HRDO, the Ombudsman and the
Deputy       Commissione Legal and Acting ORSN of the JBC stand, the only SALNs available on record and filed by respondent
Commissi r on Human Administr Chairman were those for the calendar years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,
oner Rights (UP ative & Comm. 1997, 1998, and 2002 or eleven (11) SALNs filed in her 20-year government service
in U.P. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal
Diliman, Abelardo counsel for the Republic. Neither was there SALN filed when she resigned from U.P.
Commonweal Aportader College of Law as of June 1, 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government
service as of August 16, 2010.
th Ave., QC, a (TEL:
TEL:928- 687- In tabular form, respondent's inclusive years in government employment vis-a-
7098) 7571) vis the SALNs filed by her and available on record are as follows:
Incidentally, the U.P. HRDO certified that there was no record on respondent's 201 As faculty member of
file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. 11 Her engagement the U.P. College of
as legal counsel for the Republic continued until 2009.12
Law:
Despite having been employed at the U.P. College of Law from November 1986 to
SALN actually
June 1, 2006, the record of the U.P. HRDO only contains the Statement of Assets, SALN ought
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for Year filed by
1985,13 1990,14 1991,15 1993,16 1994,17 1995,18 1996,19 1997,20 and 2002,21 filed by to be filed
respondent
respondent. On the other hand, the records of the Central Records Division of the
Office of the Ombudsman yields that there is no SALN filed by respondent for SALN as of
calendar years 1999 to 2009 except for the SALN ending December 1998 which was
November SALN ending
subscribed only in August 2003 and transmitted by the U.P. HRDO to the November 1986
Ombudsman only on December 16, 2003.22 Belatedly, in respondent's Ad Cautelam 1986 (entry December 31, 1985
Manifestation/Submission, she attached copy of her SALN for 198923 which she
supposedly sourced from the "filing cabinets" 24 or "drawers of U.P."25 Similarly,
SALN)
despite having been employed as legal counsel of various government agencies from -no record of SALN as
2003 to 2009, there is likewise no showing that she filed her SALNs for these years,
except for the SALN ending December 31, 2009 which was unsubscribed and filed November 1986 (entry
before the Office of the Clerk of Court only on June 22, 2012. SALN)-
After having served as professor at the U.P. College of Law until 2006, and thereafter SALN ending
1987 -no record-
as practitioner in various outfits including as legal counsel for the Republic until December 31,
 1986 SALN ending
SALN ending
SALN ending 1997 December 31,
December 31, 1996
1988 December 31, -no record- 1996
1987 SALN ending
SALN ending
SALN ending 1998 December 31,
December 31, 1997
1989 December 31, -no record- 1997
1988 SALN ending
SALN ending December 31, 1998
SALN ending
December 31, 1989 (filed with the
1999 December 31,
SALN ending (sourced by Ombudsman on
1998
1990 December 31, respondent from December 16,
1989 one of the "filing 2003)
cabinets" or SALN ending
"drawers" of U.P.) 2000 December 31, -no record-
SALN ending 1999
SALN ending
1991 December 31, SALN ending
December 31, 1990
1990 2001 December 31, -no record-
SALN ending 2000
SALN ending
1992 December 31, SALN ending
December 31, 1991
1991 2002 December 31, -no record-
SALN ending 2001
1993 December 31, -no record- SALN ending
SALN ending
1992 2003 December31,
December 31, 2002
SALN ending 2002
SALN ending
1994 December 31, SALN ending
December 31, 1993
1993 2004 December 31, -no record-
SALN ending 2003
SALN ending
1995 December 31, SALN ending
December 31, 1994
1994 2005 December 31, -no record-
SALN ending 2004
SALN ending
1996 December 31, SALN ending
December 31, 1995 2006 -no record-
1995 December 31,
 When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC
2005 announced32 the opening for application and recommendation of the position of Chief
SALN as of -no record of SALN Justice. During the 2012 deliberations for the position of the Chief Justice, the
members of the JBC En Banc were Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (Justice
June 1, 2006 June 1, 2006 as of June 1, 2006 Peralta) as Acting ex officio Chairman; Undersecretary Michael Frederick L. Musngi
(exit SALN) (exit SALN) as ex officio member vice Leila M. De Lima; Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Representative Niel Tupas as ex officio members representing the Congress; Justice
Alleged break in Regino C. Hermosisima Jr. as regular member representing the retired Supreme
Court Justices; Justice Aurora Santiago Lagman as regular member representing the
government service Private Sector; Atty. Maria Milagros N. Fernan-Cayosa as regular member
from June 2, 2006 representing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and Atty. Jose V. Mejia as regular
until August 15, member representing the academe. The JBC Executive Committee (Execom) was
composed of the JBC Regular Members and assisted by the Office of the Executive
2009 but was Officer (OEO) headed by Atty. Annaliza S. Ty-Capacite (Atty. Capacite).
engaged legal
The JBC announcement was preceded by an En Banc meeting held on June 4, 2012
counsel for the wherein the JBC agreed to require the applicants for the Chief Justice position to
Republic from submit, instead of the usual submission of the SALNs for the last two years of public
June2, 2006 to service, all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011 for those in government
service.33 However, for the other judicial vacancies, the JBC required the submission
2009. of only two SALNs.34 Accordingly, in the Announcement35 published on June 5, 2012,
the JBC specifically directed the candidates for the Chief Justice post to submit, in
SALN ending addition to the usual documentary requirements, the following:
December 31, 2009 (1) Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth (SALN):
but filed with the
a. for those in the government: all previous SALNs (up to
Office of the Clerk
SALN as of 31 December 2011)
Court En Banc only
August 16,
August 16, 2010 on June 22, 2012 b. for those from the private sector: SALN as of 31 December
2010 (re-entry 2011
and unsubscribed
SALN)
(2) Waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and foreign bank
-no record of SALN accounts under the Bank Secrecy Law and Foreign Currency Deposits
as August 16, 2010 Act.36 (Emphasis ours)

(re-entry SALN)- The JBC announcement further provided that "applicants with incomplete or out-of-
date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
SALN ending SALN ending nomination."37
2011 December 31, December 31, 2010 Nevertheless, the JBC En Banc subsequently agreed to extend the deadline for the
2010 but unsubscribed filing of applications or recommendations to July 2, 2012 and the submission of the
other documentary requirements to July 17, 2012.38
SALN ending
SALN ending
2012 December 31, On June 25, 2012, the JBC En Banc resolved not to require the incumbent Supreme
December 31, 2011 Court Justices who are candidates for the Chief Justice position to submit other
2011 documentary requirements, particularly the required clearances. Instead, the JBC En
A month after, or on August 13, 2010, respondent was appointed by then President Banc required the incumbent Justices to submit only the SALNs, bank waiver,
Benigno C. Aquino III (President Aquino III) as Associate Justice, and on August 16, medical certificate, laboratory results and the PDS.
2010, respondent took her oath of office as such.
On July 2, 2012, respondent accepted several nominations from the legal and the
evangelical community for the position of Chief Justice and in support of her
nomination, respondent submitted to the ORSN her SALNs for the years
2009,39 2010,40 and 2011.41 Respondent also executed waiver of confidentiality 42 of
her local and foreign bank accounts.43
On July 6, 2012, or even before the deadline of the submission of the documentary
requirements on July 17, 2012, the JBC En Banc came up with long list of the
candidates totaling twenty-two (22), respondent included, and scheduled the public
interview of said candidates on July 24-27, 2012.44
On July 20, 2012, the JBC in its Special En Banc Meeting,45 deliberated on the
candidates for the position of Chief Justice with incomplete documentary
requirements. In particular, the JBC examined the list of candidates and their
compliance with the required submission of SALNs. The minutes of the JBC
deliberation reveal as follows:
xxxx
The Executive Officer asked for clarification, particularly with respect to SALNs,
whether five (5) SALNs would constitute substantial compliance if the candidate has
been in the government service for twenty (20) years.
The Council examined the list with regard to the SALNs, particularly the candidates
coming from the government, and identified who among them would be considered
to have substantially complied:
1. Justice Arturo D. Brion has substantially complied
2. Justice Antonio Carpio has substantially complied
3. Secretary Leila M. De Lima has substantially complied
4. Chairperson Teresita J. Herbosa has complied
5. Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza has complied
6. Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro has substantially complied
7. Dean Raul C. Pangalangan
The Executive Officer informed the Council that Dean Pangalangan lacks five (5)
SALNs. She was informed that he could not obtain them from the U.P., but he is
trying to get from the Civil Service Commission.
Justice Lagman moved that the SALNs of Dean Pangalangan be considered as
substantial compliance.
8. Congressman Rufus B. Rodriguez
Justice Peralta said that as per the report, Congressman Rodriguez did not submit
even one SALN. He commented that he may not be interested although he accepted
his nomination.
The Executive Officer informed the Council that he is abroad. He was notified through
email, as his secretary would not give his contact number.
9. Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento has lacking SALNs
10. Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
The Executive Officer informed the Council that she had not submitted her
SALNs for period of ten (10) years, that is, from 1986 to 2006.
Senator Escudero mentioned that Justice Sereno was his professor at U.P.
and that they were required to submit SALNs during those years.
11. Judge Manuel OJ Siayngco has complied Atty. Cayosa mentioned that Judge
Siayngco has to submit certificate of exemption because judges are also required to
comply with that requirement.
12. Dean Amado D. Valdez has lacking requirements
13. Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. has complied
14. Atty. Vicente R. Velasquez has lacking requirements
15. Dean Cesar L. Villanueva has lacking requirements
16. Atty. Ronaldo B. Zamora has lacking SALNs and MCLE cert.
x x x.46 (Emphasis ours)
Because there were several candidates with incomplete documentary requirements,
the JBC En Banc agreed to again extend the deadline for the submission of the
lacking requirements to July 23, 2012 and that the determination of whether
candidate has substantially complied with the requirements be delegated to the
Execom. It also appears that the JBC En Banc further agreed that the candidates
who fail to complete the requirements on said date are to be excluded from the list
of candidates to be interviewed and considered for nomination, unless they would be
included if in the determination of the Execom he or she has substantially complied. 47
Thus, on July 20, 2012, the ORSN, through its then Chief Atty. Richard Pascual (Atty.
Pascual), inquired as to respondent's SALNs for the years 1995, 1996, 1997 and
1999.48 During the Congressional hearings on impeachment, Atty. Pascual would
later on testify that he asked respondent to submit her SALNs from 1996 to 2006, or
spanning period of 10 years.49 During the Oral Arguments, respondent would
maintain that Atty. Pascual only required her to submit her SALNs from 1995-1999
and did not ask for her more recent SALNs. Either way, the years requested from
respondent are within the period (1986 to 2006) covered by her employment with
the U.P. College of Law.
In response, the respondent, in the afternoon of July 23, 2012, transmitted letter 50 of
even date to the JBC, which stated:
xxxx
As had noted in my Personal Data Sheet, after my resignation from government
service in 2006, as professor at the University of the Philippines, I became full-time
private practitioner. Hence, when I was nominated for the position of Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court in 2010, my nomination was considered as that of
private practitioner, and not as government employee. Thus, the requirements
imposed on me in connection with the consideration of my name, were those
imposed on nominees from the private sector, and my earlier-terminated
government service, did not control nor dominate the kind of requirements imposed
on me.
Considering that most of my government records in the academe are more than
fifteen years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files.
In any case, the University of the Philippines has already cleared me of all
academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and
from administrative charges as of 01 June 2006. Since it is the ministerial duty of the
Head of the Office to ensure that the SALNs of its personnel are properly filed and
accomplished (CSC Resolution No. 060231 dated 01 February 2006 and CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 10-2006 dated 17 April 2006), this clearance can be taken
as an assurance that my previous government employer considered the SALN
requirements to have been met copy of the Clearance dated 19 September 2011
issued by the University of the Philippine is hereby attached.
In the 05 June 2012 Announcement, the Judicial and Bar Council imposed the
requirement of submitting all previous SALNs for those in the government. As
pointed out earlier, my service in government is not continuous. The period of my
private practice between my service in the University of the Philippines ending in
2006 and my appointment to the Supreme Court in 2010 presents break in
government service. Hence, in compliance with the documentary requirements for
my candidacy as Chief Justice, submitted only the SALNs from end of 2009 up to 31
December 2011, since am considered to have been returned to public office and
rendered government service anew from the time of my appointment as Associate
Justice on 16 August 2010.
Considering that have been previously cleared from all administrative responsibilities
and accountabilities from my entire earlier truncated government service, may kindly
request that the requirements that need to comply with, be similarly viewed as that
from private sector, before my appointment to the Government again 2010 as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
x x x x51
The letter dated July 23, 2012 was received by the Office of the Administrative and
Financial Services (OAFS) and copies thereof were received by the offices of the JBC
regular members, the ORSN and the OEO.52 The letter, however, was neither
examined by the JBC regular members nor was it deliberated upon either by the
JBC En Banc or the Execom.53 Although the determination of whether candidate has
substantially complied with the documentary requirements was delegated to the
Execom, the latter could not produce any minutes of the meeting or record that the
members thereof deliberated on the July 23, 2012 letter of respondent. 54
On the scheduled date of the interview on July 24, 2012, despite respondent's
submission of only SALNs, Atty. Pascual prepared Report Re: Documentary
Requirements and SALN of candidates for the Position of Chief Justice of the
Philippines55 wherein respondent was listed as applicant No. 14 with an opposite
annotation that she had "COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS" and note stating "Letter
7/23/12 considering that her government records in the academe are more than 15
years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files."
The JBC then proceeded to interview the candidates, including respondent who was
interviewed on July 27, 2012. On August 6, 2012, the ORSN prepared list of the 20
candidates, respondent included, vis-a-vis their SALN submissions. Opposite
respondent's name was an enumeration of the SALNs she submitted, i.e., 2009,
2010 and 2011 and an excerpt from her July 23, 2012 letter that "considering that
[respondent's] government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files." On August 13, 2012,
the JBC voted on who would be included in the short list and on the same day,
transmitted to the President its nominations56 for the position of Chief Justice, as
follows:
1. Carpio, Antonio T.
2. Abad, Roberto A.
3. Brion, Arturo D.
4. Jardeleza, Francis H.
5. Sereno, Maria Lourdes P.A.
6. Zamora, Ronalda B.
7. Leonardo-De Castro, Teresita J.
8. Villanueva, Cesar L.
A month after respondent's acceptance of her nomination, or on August 24, 2012,
respondent was appointed by then President Aquino III as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
On August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as Chief Justice,
an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon (Atty. Gadon) against
respondent with the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives (House
Committee on Justice) for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high
crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged that respondent
failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs.
The impeachment complaint was endorsed by several members of the House and,
thereafter, was found to be sufficient in form and substance. The respondent filed
her answer to the impeachment complaint. After the filing of the reply and the
rejoinder, the House Committee on Justice conducted several hearings on the
determination of probable cause, the last of which was held on February 27, 2018. 57
During these hearings, it was revealed that respondent purportedly failed to file her
SALNs while she was member of the faculty of the U.P. College of Law and that she
filed her SALN only for the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. During the hearing on
February 7, 2018 of the House Committee on Justice, Justice Peralta, as resource
person being then the acting ex officio Chairman of the JBC, further claimed that
during the JBC deliberations in 2012, he was not made aware that respondent
submitted incomplete SALNs nor that respondent's letter dated July 23, 2012 to the
JBC was ever deliberated upon.58 This was confirmed by Atty. Fernan-Cayosa;59 by
Atty. Capacite, who emphasized that based on the rubber stamp received, only the
offices of the JBC regular members, the ORSN and the OEO were furnished copies of
the letter;60 and by Atty. Pascual on the basis of the transmittal-letter. 61
The foregoing sworn declarations made during the hearings before the House
Committee on Justice spawned two relevant incidents: one, the proposal of the
House Committee for this Court to investigate on the proceedings of the JBC relative
to the nomination of respondent as Chief Justice which is now presently docketed as
A.M. No. 17-11-12 and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC; and two, the Letter62 dated February
21, 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting that the latter, in
representation of the Republic, initiate quo warranto proceeding against respondent.
Thus, the present petition.
The Case for the Republic
The Republic, through the OSG, claims that an action for quo warranto is the proper
remedy to question the validity of respondent's appointment. It alleges that the
instant petition is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under
Section 11, Rule 66,63 of the Rules of Court since respondent's transgressions only
came to light during the proceedings of the House Committee on Justice on the
allegations of the impeachment complaint filed against her. Alternatively, the
Republic claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring quo warranto petition
under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi.
In justifying resort to petition for quo warranto, the Republic argues that quo
warranto is available as remedy even as against impeachable officers, like
respondent. The Republic argues that petition for quo warranto is different from the
impeachment proceedings because the writ of quo warranto is being sought to
question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses
her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust
while in office.64 Citing the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and
the cases of Funa v. Chairman Villar65 and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,66 the
Republic argues that quo warranto may be resorted to even against impeachable
officers and that the respondent's assumption of the position as Chief Justice under
the color of an executive appointment is public wrong correctible by quo warranto.
The Republic seeks to oust respondent from her position as Chief Justice on the
ground that the latter failed to show that she is person of proven integrity which is
an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section
7(3),67 Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the Republic, because respondent
failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity
remains unproven. The Republic posits that the JBC's ostensible nomination of
respondent does not extinguish the fact that the latter failed to comply with the
SALN requirement as the filing thereof remains to be constitutional and statutory
requirement.68
In sum, the Republic contends that respondent's failure to submit her SALNs as
required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being candidate for the
position of Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs, respondent has not proven her integrity
which is requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that since
respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity,
she has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.
The Case for the Respondent
Being circumspect in the examination of every pleading and document on record,
this Court observes that, initially, the Comment Ad Cautelam dated March 16, 2018
filed before Us was neither signed by the respondent herself nor verified to have
been read by her and attested by her that the allegations therein are true and
correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic records. This Court is not
unaware that under the Rules of Court, specifically Section 4, Rule 7, not all
pleadings need to be under oath, verified, or accompanied by an affidavit. In fact,
the rules on quo warranto do not require the filing of such comment, but pursuant to
the dictates of the fundamental right of due process and also the desire of this Court
to dispose of this case judiciously, impartially, and objectively, this Court gave the
respondent the opportunity to be heard and oppose the allegations in the petition by
requiring her to file comment thereto. Thus, this Court anticipated response from the
respondent to take such opportunity to settle the uncertainty of her nomination and
appointment through her comment to the petition. What was received by this Court,
however, was an unverified Comment repudiating the Court's jurisdiction, merely
signed by counsel, who appeared to be representing the respondent.
Wary of the legal implications of such unverified pleading, i.e. possible refutation of
the allegations stated therein and repudiation of the signing counsel's authority to
represent, this Court in its April 3, 2018 Resolution69 set as condition for the conduct
of Oral Arguments prayed for by respondent, that the latter affirm and verify under
oath the truth and veracity of the allegations in the Comment Ad Cautelam filed by
counsel supposedly on her behalf.
In an Ad Cautelam Partial Compliance/Manifestation dated April 5, 2018, respondent
affirmed and verified under oath the truth and veracity of the allegations in the said
Comment Ad Cautelam through Verification dated April 6, 2018 attached therein.
In the said Comment Ad Cautelam, respondent argues that, on the strength of
Section 2,70 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and the cases of Mayor Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan,71Cuenco v. Hon. Fernan,72In Re: First Indorsement from Hon.
Gonzales,73 and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against Senior Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio,74 the Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by
impeachment. Respondent contends that the use of the phrase "may be removed
from office" in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not signify that Members
of the Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
According to respondent, the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to
create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by
impeachment and not otherwise.
It is likewise the argument of respondent that since petition for quo warranto may be
filed before the RTC, such would result to conundrum because judge of lower court
would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative supervision
over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections and
11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the Supreme Court disciplinary
and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof. She theorizes
that if Member of the Supreme Court can be ousted through quo warranto initiated
by the OSG, the Congress' "check" on the Supreme Court through impeachment
would be rendered inutile.
Respondent argues that the present petition is time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66
provides that petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the
"cause of ouster" and not from the "discovery" of the disqualification. Respondent
contends that the supposed "failure" to file the required SALNs allegedly took place
for several years from 1986 to 2006, thus, the "cause of ouster" existed even before
the respondent was appointed as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012. Therefore, as
early as her appointment, the Republic, through the OSG, already had cause of
action to seek her ouster. Even assuming that the one-year prescriptive period may
be counted from the Republic's "discovery" of the disqualification, the petition would
still be time-barred since the Republic would have made such "discovery" through
U.P., considering that the U.P. HRDO is required to submit list of employees who
failed to file their SALNs.
Respondent avers that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs
because as public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office
was regular. According to respondent, the Republic failed to overcome this
presumption as the documents relied upon by it, i.e., certifications from the U.P.
HRDO and the Ombudsman, do not categorically state that respondent failed to file
her SALNs. On the contrary, respondent points out that the U.P. HRDO had certified
that she had been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges as of June
1, 2006 and that there was no pending administrative charge against her.
It is likewise the contention of respondent that public officers without pay or those
who do not receive compensation are not required to file SALN. Thus, respondent
argues that for the periods that she was on official leave without pay, she was
actually not required to file any SALN for the inclusive years. She adds that to
require the submission of SALNs as an absolute requirement is to expand the
qualifications provided for under the Constitution.
Nonetheless, respondent represents that she continues to recover and retrieve her
missing SALNs and will present them before the Senate sitting as the Impeachment
Tribunal and not to this Court considering her objections to the latter's exercise of
jurisdiction.
Respondent also stresses that the failure to file SALNs or to submit the same to the
JBC has no bearing on one's integrity. The submission of SALNs was simply among
the additional documents which the JBC had required of the applicants for the
position of Chief Justice. It is respondent's position that the non-filing of SALN is not
ground for disqualification unless the same was already the subject of pending
criminal or administrative case or if the applicant had already been finally convicted
for criminal offense involving said failure to file SALNs. In this case, respondent
points out that the JBC was made aware as early as July 20, 2012 that respondent
had not submitted to the JBC her SALNs as U.P. professor and yet none of them
invoked Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the "integrity rule."
Respondent likewise contends that the issue of whether an applicant for the position
of Chief Justice is person of "proven integrity" is question "constitutionally committed
to the JBC" and is therefore political question which only the JBC could answer, and it
did so in the affirmative when it included respondent's name in the shortlist of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice.
The Republic's Reply
In refuting respondent's arguments, the Republic justifies its resort to the
unconventional method of quo warranto. The Republic cites the cases of Estrada v.
Desierto75 and Lawyers League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver Lozano v.
President Corazon Aquino et al.76 where this Court took cognizance of petition
for quo warranto to oust an impeachable official. It reiterates its argument that it
seeks respondent's ouster, not on account of commission of impeachable offenses,
but because of her ineligibility to assume the position of Chief Justice.
The Republic maintains that the phrase "may be removed from office" in Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the Supreme Court may be
removed through modes other than impeachment and disagrees with respondent's
interpretation that the word "may" qualifies only the penalty imposable after the
impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. The Republic claims that respondent's
interpretation would lead to an absurd situation in the event that the Senate imposes
lesser penalty, like suspension of the President, which would result in vacancy in the
position not intended by the Constitution. This is because vacancy in the Office of the
President occurs only in case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation, in which event the Vice-President shall become the President to serve
the unexpired term.
Invoking the verba legis principle in statutory construction, the Republic claims that
Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not expressly prohibit resort to other
means to remove impeachable officers in position.
Contrary to respondent's claim that this Court has no disciplinary authority over its
incumbent members, the Republic cites Section 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which
created permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate
complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of
the Supreme Court. The Republic points out that such Ethics Committee conducted
the investigation in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC77 and A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC.78
Meanwhile, in support of its claim that the petition is not time-barred, the Republic
explains that the State has continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of
its sovereign powers are qualified. It argues that the one-year period provided under
Section 11 of Rule 66 merely applies to individuals who are claiming rights to public
office, and not to the State. To consider the instant petition as time-barred, the
Republic argues, is to force the State to spend its resources in favor of an unqualified
person.
Further, the Republic claims that even if it be assumed that the one year period
applies against the State, it cannot be deemed to have been notified of respondent's
failure to file her SALNs. It argues that it has no statutory obligation to monitor
compliance of government employees other than its own. It alleges that SALNs are
not published, hence it has no feasible way of taking cognizance of respondent's
failure to file SALN.
In any case, the Republic claims that the unique circumstances of the instant case
behoove this Court to be liberal in interpreting the one-year reglementary period.
As to the question on jurisdiction, the Republic contends that the Supreme Court is
clothed with the authority to determine respondent's qualifications and eligibility to
hold the position of the Chief Justice. It argues that the determination of this issue is
not political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation
of the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
Going to the fundamental issue of respondent's eligibility to hold the position of Chief
Justice, the Republic reiterates that respondent failed to comply with the
requirement of submitting SALNs and thus has failed to prove her integrity. Further,
the Republic cites respondent's gross misrepresentation in stating that her reason for
non-submission of SALNs was because she could no longer retrieve all of such
SALNs. According to the Republic, respondent's allegation seems to imply that she
did file her SALNs when the Certifications from the U.P. and the Ombudsman state
otherwise.
The Republic posits that respondent's lack of integrity is further bolstered by her
failure to disclose to the JBC that she failed to file her SALN 11 times during her
tenure as U.P. Law Professor.
Integrity, the Republic claims, is simply faithful adherence to the law, and the filing
of SALN is qualification implied from the requirement of integrity. The filing of SALN
is not an additional requirement unduly imposed on applicants to positions in the
Judiciary. When respondent failed to file her SALN, she did not comply with the
Constitution, laws and appropriate codes of conduct. There is no need to allege or
prove graft and corruption in order to prove an aspiring magistrate's lack of integrity.
Finally, the Republic contends that the presumption of regularity cannot be applied in
respondent's favor. The Republic claims that such presumption attaches only to
official acts and not to all acts of officials. The presumption, according to the
Republic, applies only to official acts specified by law as an official duty or to function
attached to public position. In this case, the filing of SALN is neither an official duty
nor function attached to position of U.P. College of Law Professor. In any case, the
Republic claims that it has successfully disputed such presumption through the
Certifications it presented from U.P. and the Ombudsman.
The Republic's Memorandum
In addition to the arguments put forth by the Republic in the Petition and the Reply,
the Republic further justified its non-inclusion of the JBC in the instant petition. It
contends that since the petition only disputes the respondent's eligibility to become
the Chief Justice, the Solicitor General correctly instituted the quo warranto petition
only against respondent.
Insisting on respondent's lack of integrity, the Republic argues that respondent had
the legal obligation to disclose to the JBC that she failed to file her SALNs at least 11
times, citing the case of OCA v. Judge Estacion Jr.79
The Republic also argues that respondent's claim of good faith is not defense.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 301980 and R.A. No. 671381 are special laws and are thus
governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial. Thus, her act of blaming the Review and Compliance
Committee of U.P. for its failure to inform her that she had no SALNs on file does not
exonerate her. The Republic further notes that respondent resorted to the fallacy
of tu quoque a diversionary tactic by using the fault of others to justify one's own
fault.
Believing in the strength of its case, the Republic underscores its contention that the
respondent was not able to dispute the evidence put forth by the Republic that she
failed to religiously file her SALNs throughout her entire stint in the government. The
Republic claims that it is futile for respondent to merely allege during the Oral
Arguments that she filed her SALNs and will produce them before the Senate.
Respondent's admissions during the Oral Arguments, together with the U.P. HRDO's
certification, prove that she did not religiously file her SALNs as required by law.
As to the applicability of this Court's ruling in Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada,
Jr.,82 the Republic argues that the case is not on all fours with the instant petition.
The Doblada ruling, according to the OSG, did not involve issues on qualifications to
public office unlike the present petition. Second, unlike in Doblada, respondent in
this case failed to offer any countervailing evidence to disprove the Certifications by
the U.P. HRDO and the Ombudsman. Lastly, the statement in Doblada relied upon by
the respondent is mere dictum. The issue therein is centered on Doblada's
unexplained wealth. Furthermore, Dobladawas decided only in 2005 or after
respondent violated the legal requirement on the filing of SALNs.
The Respondent's Memorandum
Respondent insists that she can be removed from office only through impeachment.
In addition to the arguments raised in her Comment Ad Cautelam, respondent
asserts that impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain high-
ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent
them from performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of
government. Such purpose, according to respondent, would be defeated if Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution would not be construed as providing an exclusive
means for the removal of impeachable officers. Respondent argues that it would be
absurd for the framers of the Constitution to provide very cumbersome process for
removing said officers only to allow less difficult means to achieve the same purpose.
Respondent contends that the Republic, in citing the 2010 PET Rules and the cases
of Estrada v. Desierto83 and Lawyers League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver
Lozano v. President Corazon Aquino et al.,84 erroneously lumps together the Chief
Justice, the President and the Vice-President, simply because they are all
impeachable officers. Respondent argues that there are substantial distinctions
between the President and Vice-President on the one hand, and Members of the
Supreme Court on the other: first, unlike Section 4, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President, there is no
similar provision with respect to the other impeachable officials, i.e., the Members of
this Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commission or the Ombudsman; and
second, the President and Vice-President are elected officials while the other
impeachable officers are appointive officials.
Respondent also argues that there is not single pronouncement in Funa v. Chairman
Villar,85 and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera86 (by way of ruling or obiter dictum) to the
effect that an impeachable officer may be ousted through writ of quo warranto, and
that both cases were not even for quo warranto.
Respondent maintains that whether respondent was person of "proven integrity"
when she applied for the position of Chief Justice is political question outside the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, which only the JBC and the President as the
appointing authority could determine. She avers that the application of the political
question doctrine is not confined to the President or Congress, as the Republic
supposedly argues, but extends to other government departments or officers
exercising discretionary powers, such as the JBC which uses its wisdom and
discretion in determining whether an applicant to the Judiciary is person of "proven"
integrity.
Respondent also contends that absent any challenge to her nomination and
appointment on the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC and
the President, her appointment can no longer be questioned.
Respondent reiterates that the instant petition is time-barred. She argues that the
Republic cannot rely on Agcaoili v. Suguitan87 because it mentioned the
principle nullum temus occurit regi or "no time runs against the king" only in
passing, as the "general rule concerning limitation of action in quo
warrantoproceedings." She avers that Agcaoili is in fact authority for the principle
that prescription will definitely run against the State if the rule or statute clearly so
provides.
Respondent avers that she complied with the SALN laws as Professor of the U.P.
College of Law and that the law presumes regularity in the filing of SALNs. According
to respondent, that at least 11 of her SALNs have been found tends to prove pattern
of filing, rather than non-filing.
Respondent argues that the burden of proof in quo warranto proceedings falls on the
party who brings the action and that based on Doblada, the Republic failed to
discharge this burden. Respondent claims that the records of the U.P. HRDO are
incomplete and unreliable and there was no categorical statement in its Certification
that she failed to file her SALNs for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1999,
2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Further, she avers that the records of the
Office of the Ombudsman are even more incomplete and unreliable, thus, any
certification from said office would likewise be insufficient to prove that she failed to
file 11 of her SALNs while she was U.P. Professor.
Respondent contends that she has actually presented preponderant evidence that
she filed her SALNs. She avers that she has recovered 11 of her U.P. SALNs and she
has direct proof that she executed at least 12 SALNs as U.P. Professor. She stresses
that the U.P. HRDO has thrice "cleared" her of all administrative responsibilities and
administrative charges.
Respondent also claims that she was not even required to file SALN from 1986 to
1991 because her status and appointment then was merely temporary. According to
her, the fact that she served as counsel for the Republic for the PIATCO cases in
2004, 2005 and 2006 does not negate her defense that under the law, she was not
required to file her SALNs for the years when she was on leave and was not receiving
compensation arising from public office (i.e., 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2006).
Respondent's Memorandum also sought to address certain matters raised during the
Oral Arguments.
As to where her SALNs are, respondent avers that some of her SALNs were in fact
found in the records of the U.P. HRDO, and she was able to retrieve copies of some
of her SALNs from the U.P. Law Center. Without prejudice to her jurisdictional
objections, she attached them to the Memorandum. She argues that the fact that the
SALNs for certain years are missing cannot give rise to the inference that they were
not filed. She points out that U.P. was only required to keep the SALNs for period of
ten (10) years after receipt of the statement, after which the SALN may be
destroyed.
In explaining her statement before the JBC that her SALNs were irretrievable,
respondent avers that she honestly could not retrieve copies from U.P. over the
course of weekend given to her to complete her missing documentary requirements.
She declares that she did not keep copies of her SALNs and she was not required to
do so by law.
Respondent asserts that her 2009 SALN was not belatedly filed. She explains that
her 2009 SALN is an entry SALN which she originally filed on September 16, 2010
within thirty (30) days after her assumption of office as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court. According to her, the revised 2009 SALN which has the annotation
"revised as of 22 June 2012," is revised version executed in June 2012 to more
accurately reflect the acquisition cost of certain assets declared in 2010.
With respect to the purported 2006 SALN, respondent avers that it was not the SALN
required by RA 6713, but mere statement of her assets which the JBC requested as
tool to determine her assets for comparison with her income tax returns. She
explains that she merely happened to use downloadable SALN form which she filled
up and dated as of the time of its writing, i.e., July 27, 2010. She claims that she
never misrepresented the same to be her 2006 exit SALN from U.P. According to her,
she in fact considers her 2006 SALN as one of the missing SALNs she is still trying to
locate.
Respondent claims that she could not recall all the circumstances why her 1998
SALN was executed only in 2003 which, according to her, was reasonable since it
happened 15 years ago. She claims that there is no law prohibiting her from
submitting the same, and the fact that the SALN was filed serves the purpose of the
law and negates any intention to hide unexplained wealth.
It is also respondent's position that the omission of her husband's signature on her
2011 SALN was inadvertent and was not an offense. According to her, it could not
adversely impact on her integrity absent any allegation or finding that she acquired
ill-gotten wealth. She argues that the Civil Service Commission's Guidelines which
require the signature of the spouse who is not public officer, was promulgated only in
January 2013.
With regard to the jewelry she acquired from 1986 to 1991 which were supposedly
declared in her 1991 SALN but were undeclared in her 1990 SALN, respondent avers
that these assets were actually declared in her 1985 and 1989 SALNs, and they were
consistently declared in all her subsequent SALNs beginning 1991. According to
respondent, she should not be faulted for her inadvertent omission to declare such
assets in her 1990 SALN as her declaration of the same thereafter is consistent with
good faith and cured whatever error there may have been in her 1990 SALN. She
argues that said assets were not manifestly disproportionate to her lawful income
and even as U.P. Professor, she could have afforded to purchase jewelry worth
Php15,000.00 over span of six (6) years.
Finally, respondent argues that it is an "unreasonable and oppressive" interpretation
of the law to reckon her entry SALN as Associate Justice of the Court from the date
of her appointment (August 16, 2010) and not from Decembr 31, 2009 when it was
actually filed. Respondent contends that R.A. No. 6713 only requires that the SALN
be filed "within thirty days after assumption of office" a directive she supposedly
complied with. She argues that while the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 6713 state that the SALN should be reckoned from the first day of service,
the law provides for review and compliance procedure which requires that reporting
individual first be informed and provided an opportunity to take necessary corrective
action should there be any error in her SALN. Respondent avers that she did not
receive any notice or compliance order informing her that her entry SALN was
erroneous, and she was not directed to take the necessary corrective action.
The Respondent's Reply/Supplement to Memorandum
At the close of the Oral Argument, granted upon respondent's Ad Cautelam motion,
the Court specifically required the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within non-extendible period of ten (10) days, after which, the petition shall be
submitted for decision. Notwithstanding such clear directive from the Court, and
even without being required to, respondent moves (again Ad Cautelam) for the
inclusion of her Reply/Supplement to her memorandum filed beyond the period
granted by the Court to the parties. The belated filing of said Reply/Supplement in
disregard of the Court's directive merits its non-admission. Nevertheless, as the
Court remains circumspect of the pleadings submitted by the parties and in
accordance with the dictates of due process and fair play, respondent's
Reply/Supplement to her Memorandum, albeit filed Ad Cautelam, is admitted.
Respondent raises two points in her Reply/Supplement: first, the new matter of tax
fraud allegedly committed by her; and second, the forumshopping allegedly
committed by the Republic.
Respondent sought to address the inclusion of the charge of tax fraud allegedly
committed by her relative to the fees she received in the PIATCO cases which
respondent argues to have been raised by the Republic only in its memorandum.
Respondent denies having concealed or under declared her income in the PIATCO
cases. She further points out that the Summary and the Powerpoint presentation
prepared by BIR Deputy Commissioner Gtiballa and which were attached to the
Republic's memorandum were incomplete, inaccurate and merely preliminary. In any
case, respondent avers that BIR Deputy Commissioner Guballa himself found that
respondent had "substantially declared all income (legal fees) from the PIATCO case
in her ITRs from years 2004 to 2009 BUT there were certain discrepancies." 88
Respondent also accuses the Republic of having committed deliberate forum-
shopping in filing the action for quo warranto even when the impeachment
proceeding was already pending before the House of Representatives. Contending
that all the elements of forum-shopping are present, respondent points to the (1)
identity of parties between the quo warranto action and the impeachment case
inasmuch as the House Committee on Justice is also part of the Government; (2)
identity of causes of action considering that the quo warranto case is based on
respondent's alleged lack of proven integrity for failure to file all her SALNs when she
was teaching at the U.P. College of Law and for concealing her true income and
evasion of taxes which were the same attacks on her eligibility and qualifications as
enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment; and (3) identity in the relief sought as
both the quo warranto and the impeachment sought her removal from the Office of
the Chief Justice.
The Motions for Intervention
Through Joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Comment-In-
Intervention, movant-intervenors composed of (1) former CEO of PAG-IBIG Fund,
Zorayda Amelia Capistrano Alonzo, (2) peace human rights advocate Remedios Mapa
Suplido, (3) urban poor advocate Alicia Gentolia Murphy, (4) Chairperson of
Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahang Magsasaka (PAKISAMA) Noland Merida
Penas, (5) Fr. Roberto Reyes, and (6) poet, feminist youth advocate Reyanne Joy P.
Librado (Capistrano, et al.,) seek to intervene in the present petition as citizens and
taxpayers.
The comment-in-intervention is virtual echo of the arguments raised in respondent's
comment that quo warranto is an improper remedy against impeachable officials who
may be removed only by impeachment and that the application of the PET rules are
limited only to the President and Vice-President' who are elective, and not
appointive, officials. Movant-intervenors similarly argue that the petition is already
time-barred as the cause of action arose upon respondent's appointment as Chief
Justice on August 24, 2012 or almost six (6) years ago.
Capistrano et al. argue that it is not incumbent upon respondent to prove to the JBC
that she possessed the integrity required by the Constitution for members of the
Judiciary; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for the post
fell upon the JBC. They also posit that nowhere in the Constitution is the submission
of all prior SALNs required; instead, what is required is that all aspiring justices of
the Court must have the imprimatur of the JBC, the best proof of which is person's
inclusion in the shortlist.
Capistrano et al. persuade that respondent's explanation that her government
records in the academe for 15 years are irretrievable is reasonable and that
respondent did not mislead the JBC. On the contrary, they claim that the JBC
accepted her explanation when it deemed respondent as qualified. In doing so, they
conclude, that the JBC determined that she possessed the integrity as required by
the Constitution.
A few hours after the filing of the Capistrano et. al.'s Comment-in-Intervention,
another set of intervenors composed of: (1) BAYAN MUNA Representative (Rep.)
Carlos Isagani Zarate; (2) ACT Teachers Partylist Rep. Antonio Tinio Francisca
Castro; (3) GABRIELA Women's Party Rep. Emerenciana De Jesus Arlene Brosas; (3)
ANAKPAWIS Partylist Rep. Ariel Casilao; (5) KABATAAN Partylist Rep. Sarah Jane
Elago; (6) Convenors and members of Movement Against Tyranny (MAT), namely:
Francisco A. Alcuaz, Bonifacio P. Ilagan, Col. George A. Rabusa (Ret.); (7) Former
Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag; (8) Bishop Broderick S. Pabillo, D.D.; (9) Secretary
Gen. of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) Renato M. Reyes, Jr.; (10) Member
of MDD Youth (an Affiliate of Aksyon Demokratiko) Kaye Ann Legaspi; and (11)
Secretary General of National Union of People's Lawyers Atty. Ephraim B. Cortez
(Zarate, et al.,) filed Motion for Leave to File Motion to Intervene and Opposition-in
Intervention, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. They claim that as citizens
and taxpayers, they have legal interest in the matter of respondent's ouster or
removal.
Zarate et al. raise the similar argument that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
may only be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust and that it is only the Congress who has the power
to remove the Chief Justice through the exclusive mode of impeachment.
They further argue that the issue of respondent's non-submission of complete
SALNs, without more, does not have the effect of putting to question her integrity as
she did not conceal her SALNs. They argue that the qualification of having "proven
integrity" is standard subject to the discretion of, first, the JBC who submits the list
of qualified candidates; and second, of the President, who will select among the
shortlist whom to appoint as Chief Justice.
Movant-Intervenor Rene A.V. Saguisag subsequently filed Supplement to Motion for
Leave to File Motion to Intervene and Opposition-in-Intervention CumPetition to
Recuse seeking the inhibition of unnamed Members of this Court who "may have
prematurely thrown their weight on the other side, actually or perceptually" on the
ground that respondent is entitled to an impartial arbiter.
As well, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed its Motion for Leave to File
and to Admit Attached Opposition-in-Intervention as an organization of all Philippine
lawyers, having the fundamental duty to uphold the Constitution and an interest in
ensuring the validity of the appointments to the Judiciary. The IBP's arguments
reflect the arguments of the respondent and the other movant-intervenors that
the quo warranto petition is time-barred and is unavailable against an impeachable
officer. The IBP further argues that the determination of whether respondent is of
"proven integrity" belongs to the JBC and which question the Court cannot inquire
into without violating the separation of powers. It is likewise the contention of the
IBP that the petition is fatally flawed since the JBC never required the submission of
respondent's SALNs from 2001 to 2006.
Also seeking to intervene in the instant petition, Senators Leila M. De Lima (Senator
De Lima) and Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Senator Trillanes) as citizens, taxpayers, and
senators of the Republic, filed Motion to Intervene and Admit Attached Opposition-
In-Intervention (Ad Cautelam) on April 4, 2018.
In the said Motion, Senators De Lima and Trillanes assert that they possess clear
legal interest, both personal and official, in the subject matter of the Republic's
petition to oust the Chief justice on the ground that she does not possess the
constitutional requirement of integrity. According to Senators De Lima and Trillanes,
they have the right and duty to uphold the Constitution and to oppose government
actions that are clearly and patently unconstitutional. It is also Senators De Lima and
Trillanes' theory that the instant quo warranto case is aimed to deprive the Senate of
its jurisdiction as the impeachment tribunal. They argue that their mandated duty as
judges in the possible impeachment trial of the Chief Justice will be pre-emptect and
negated if the quo warranto petition will be granted. Their claimed legal interest in
their intervention in and opposition to the petition for quo warranto is mainly
anchored upon their duty and prerogatives as Senatorsjudges in an impeachment
trial and to protect the institution of impeachment as mode of enforcing
accountability.
Senators De Lima and Trillanes' Opposition-In-Intervention is mere reiteration of the
respondent's argument that this Court has no jurisdiction over petition for quo
warranto against an impeachable officer. They argue that the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is, by express provision of the Consitution, removable from office
exclusively by impeachment. They also aver that the ground raised in the petition
for quo warranto lack of integrity for failing to submit one's SALN is part of the
allegations in the impeachment case being heard in the House of Representatives.
Thus, they argue that the use of an identical ground in quo warranto proceeding
directly undermines the jurisdiction of the Senate to hear and decide impeachment
cases and the prerogative of the senators to try the same.
Senators De Lima and Trillanes also advance the argument that the Constitution
identifies and enumerates only three qualifications for appointment to the Supreme
Court: (1) natural born citizenship; (2) age, i.e., at least forty years; and (3) an
experience of at least 15 years either as judge of lower court or in the practice of law
in the Philippines. They assert that the filing of SALN, taking of psychological or
physical examination, and similar requirements, are merely discretionary
administrative requirements for consideration of the JBC, not Constitutional
requirements, hence, can be waived, removed entirely, or adjusted by the JBC in the
exercise of its discretion. According to the said movantintervenors, Section 7(3),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states that, "[a] Member of the Judiciary
must be person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence", does
not speak of objective constitutional qualifications, but only of subjective
characteristics of judge. They, therefore, contend that "qualifications" such as
citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while "characteristics" such as
competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective
considerations.
Corollarily, Senators De Lima and Trillanes argue that the subjective considerations
are not susceptible to analysis with tools of legal doctrine. Hence, questions on this
matter are for the consideration of political institutions under the Constitution, i.e.,
the JBC and the President (prior to appointment) and the House of Representatives
and the Senate (after appointment).
The Motions for Inhibition
By way of separately filed motions, respondent seeks affirmative relief, in the form of
the inhibition of five (5) Justices of the Court, the jurisdiction of which she questions
and assails. Respondent prays for the inhibition of Associate Justices Lucas P.
Bersamin, Diosdado M. Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza, Noel Gimenez Tijam, and
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro from hearing and deciding the present petition.
In common, respondent imputes actual bias on said Justices for having testified
before the House Committee on Justice on the impeachment complaint. In particular,
respondent considered Justice Bersamin's allusion to respondent as "dictator" and his
personal resentment about the supposed withdrawal of the privilege previously
enjoyed by the members of the Court to recommend nominees to vacant positions in
the Judiciary, as evidence of actual bias.
Justice Peralta's inhibition, on the other hand, is being sought because as then
Acting ex officio Chairperson of the JBC when respondent was nominated for
appointment as Chief Justice, he would have personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings and for having served as material
witness in the matter in controversy.
Justice Jardeleza's inhibition is sought on the ground that his testimony before the
House Committee on Justice reveals that he harbors ill feelings towards respondent
on account of the latter's challenge to his integrity during the nomination process for
the Associate Justice position vice Justice Roberto A. Abad which he characterized as
"inhumane".
Respondent seeks the inhibition of Justice Tijam based on the latter's statement as
quoted in Manila Times article to the effect that if respondent continues to ignore and
to refuse to participate in the impeachment process, she is clearly liable for culpable
violation of the Constitution.
Respondent likewise made mention that Justice Tijam and Justice Bersamin wore
touch of red during the "Red Monday" protest on March 12, 2018 wherein judges and
court employees reportedly called  on respondent to make the supreme sacrifice and
resign.
Respondent also calls for the inhibition of Justice De Castro for having allegedly
prejudged the issue as regards the validity of respondent's nomination and
appointment in 2012 when Justice De Castro testified under oath during the House
Committee on Justice hearings that respondent should have been disqualified from
the shortlist on account of the SALNs she allegedly failed to submit.
At the last minute, respondent also seeks to disqualify Justice Samuel R. Martires for
his purported insinuations during the Oral Arguments questioning her "mental" or
"psychological" fitness on the basis of her belief that God is "the source of everything
in (her) life."89
Respondent also prays that the Ad Cautelam Respectful Motions for Inhibitions of
Associate Justices Peralta, Leonardo-De Castro, Jardeleza, Tijam, Bersamin and
Martires be resolved by the Court En Banc, without the participation of the Justices
she seeks to disqualify.
The Issues
From the arguments raised by the parties and the issues as delineated in the
Advisory governing the special Oral Arguments by way of accommodation to
respondent, the paramount issues to be resolved by the Court are:
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant
petition for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and
against whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of
Representatives;
2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription;
3. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:
a. Whether the determination of candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the
character of political question outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;
b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and
required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether
the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as
Chief Justice;

c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by
the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the
nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;
d. In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the
President cured such ineligibility.
4. Whether respondent is de jure or de facto officer.
The Ruling of the Court
Preliminary Issues
Intervention is an ancillary remedy restricted in purpose and in time
Intervention is remedy by which third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes litigant therein for certain purpose: to enable the third party
to protect or preserve right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. 90
Nevertheless, the remedy of intervention is not matter of right but rests on the
sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal
interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result as
spelled out under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Sec. 1. Who may intervene. A person who has legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is
so situated as to be adversely affected by distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in
separate proceeding.
Each of the movant-intervenors in this case seek to intervene as citizens and
taxpayers, whose claimed interest to justify their intervention is their "sense of
patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine
Constitution". The movant-intervenors further assert "public right" to intervene in the
instant case by virtue of its "transcendental importance for the Filipino people as
whole". Apart from such naked allegations, movant-intervenors failed to establish to
the Court's satisfaction the required legal interest. Our jurisprudence is well-settled
on the matter:
Intervention is not matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when
the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute
authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies person to
intervene is his possession of legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as
qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of direct and
immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the
direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and
material, concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or
sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and
remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. x x x.91 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, herein movant-intervenors' sentiments, no matter how noble, do not, in any
way, come within the purview of the concept of "legal interest" contemplated under
the Rules to justify the allowance of intervention. Movant-intervenors failed to show
any legal interest of such nature that they will "either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation of the judgment". Even the IBP's assertion of their "fundamental duty to
uphold the Constitution, advocate for the rule of law, and safeguard the
administration of justice", being the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, will
not suffice. Admittedly, their interest is merely out of "sentimental desire" to uphold
the rule of law. Meanwhile, Senators De Lima and Trillanes' claimed legal interest is
mainly grounded upon their would be participation in the impeachment trial as
Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the
impeachment court. Nevertheless, the fact remains that as of the moment, such
interest is still contingent on the filing of the articles of impeachment before the
Senate. It bears stressing that the interest contemplated by law must be actual,
substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant.92
Indeed, if every person, not parties to the action but assert their desire to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution, were allowed to intervene, proceedings would
become unnecessarily complicated, expensive, and interminable.93
Emphatically, quo warranto proceeding is an action by the government against
individuals unlawfully holding an office. Section 1, Rule 66 provides:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of
public office, position or franchise may be commenced by verified petition brought in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office,
position or franchise;
(b) public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as corporation within the Philippines without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
The remedy of quo warranto is vested in the people, and not in any private individual
or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as public question of
governmental legitimacy and not merely private quarrel among rival claimants. 94
Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell,95 historically traced the nature of quo
warranto proceedings as crime which could only be prosecuted in the name of the
King by his duly authorized law officers. In time, the criminal features of quo
warranto proceedings were modified and as such, the writ came to be used as means
to determine which of two claimants was entitled to an office and to order the ouster
and the payment of fine against the usurper. This quasi-criminal nature of quo
warranto proceedings was adopted in some American states. she questions and assails. Specifically, respondent prays for the inhibition of
Nonetheless, Newman explains that the Code of the District of Colombia, which was Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin, Diosdado M. Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza, Noel
the venue of the case, continues to treat usurpation of office as public wrong which Gimenez Tijam, Teresita J. LeonardoDe Castro and Samuel R. Martires fundamentally
can be corrected only by proceeding in the name of the government itself. Thus: on the ground of actual bias for having commonly testified before the House
In sense in very important sense every citizen and every taxpayer is interested in Committee on Justice on the impeachment case.
the enforcement of law, in the administration of law, and in having only qualified
officers execute the law. But that general interest is not private, but public interest. As for Justice Samuel R. Martires, respondent concludes Justice Martires' manifested
Being such, it is to be represented by the Attorney General or the District Attorney, actual bias based on his statements during the Oral Arguments which purportedly
who are expected by themselves or those they authorize to institute quo tended to question respondent's mental and psychological fitness.
warrantoproceedings against usurpers in the same way that they are expected to
institute proceedings against any other violator of the law. That general public In particular, respondent seeks the inhibition of Justice Tijam based on the latter's
interest is not sufficient to authorize private citizen to institute such proceedings, for, statement as quoted in Manila Times article to the effect that if respondent continues
if it was, then every citizen and every taxpayer would have the same interest and to ignore and to refuse to participate in the impeachment process, she is clearly
the same right to institute such proceedings, and public officer might, from the liable for culpable violation of the Constitution.
beginning to the end of his term, be harassed with proceedings to try his title.
Respondent cites the article entitled, "Appear in Congress or vialate Constitution,"
The only time that an individual, in his own name, may bring an action for quo
dated December 4, 2017, where Justice Tijam was purportedly quoted to have said:
warranto is when such individual has claim over the position in question. Section of
Impeachment is constitutional process and mandate enshrined in the Constitution.
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:
Justices took an oath to defend, preserve, protect the Constitution. If Chief Justice
Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. A person claiming to
Sereno continues to ignore and continues to refuse to participate in the
be entitled to public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
impeachment process, ergo, she is clearly liable for culpable violation of the
another may bring an action therefor in his own name.
Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
In this case, the movants-intervenors are neither individuals claiming to be entitled
Respondent claims that the aforesaid statements of Justice Tijam are indicative of his
to the questioned position nor are they the ones charged with the usurpation thereof.
stance that there may be ground to impeach and remove respondent from office,
which is also the objective of the quo warranto petition against her.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the movants-intervenors, in their
respective Motions, presented nothing more than mere reiteration of respondent's
Ultimately, the cause for inhibition simmers to the question of whether, in so
allegations and arguments in her Comment.
appearing and testifying before the House Committee on Justice, the Members of the
Court are precluded from hearing and deciding the instant petition for quo warranto.
For these reasons, the Court, in its Resolution96 dated April 3, 2018, resolved to deny
To this, the Court answers in the negative.
the motions for intervention respectively filed by Capistrano et al., and Zarate et al.,
and to note the IBP's intervention. For similar reasons, the Court resolves to deny
Jurisprudence recognizes the right of litigants to seek disqualification of judges.
the motion for intervention of Senators De Lima and Trillanes.
Indeed, elementary due process requires hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. "A judge has both the duty of rendering just decision and the
No basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the
duty of doing it in manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to
case
his integrity."97
The instant petition comes at the heels of the recently-concluded hearings on the
However, the right of party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of judge who
determination of probable cause in the impeachment complaint against respondent
does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in
before the House Committee on Justice. Several Members of the Court, both
handling the case must be balanced with the latter's sacred duty to decide cases
incumbent and retired, were invited, under pain of contempt, to serve as resource
without fear of repression. The movant must therefore prove the ground of bias and
persons. Those Members who were present at the Committee hearings were armed
prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify judge from participating in
with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members are to
particular trial. "[W]hile it is settled principle that opinions formed in the course of
testify only on matters within their personal knowledge and insofar as material and
judicial proceedings, based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the
relevant to the issues being heard. For lack of particularity, the Court supposes that
judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge." 98
the attendance of some of its Members in the House Committee hearings is the basis
of movant-intervenor Saguisag's motion to recuse.
A circumspect reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the Manila Times article
reveals that the manifest intent of the statements was only to prod respondent to
On the other hand, respondent was more emphatic when she sought affirmative
observe and respect the constitutional process of impeachment, and to exemplify the
relief, in the form of the inhibition of six (6) Justices, of the Court, whose jurisdiction
ideals of public accountability, thus:
He added that he wanted to encourage Sereno to show up at the Congress
hearings "to respect and participate in the impeachment (process), and to
defend herself and protect the institution."
Sereno, he said, should be role model when it comes to respecting the
Constitution.
"Impeachment is not an invention of politicians. It was drafted by the framers of the
Constitution. Media, which propagates the myth that impeachment is numbers game,
hence, is political and arbitrary, fails to emphasize the fact that the rule of the
majority is the essence of democracy," the magistrate stressed.
Tijam believes that the impeachment process against Sereno is not an attack on the
high court or the Judiciary because the Supreme Court does not consist of the chief
justice alone.
"Impeachment is [neither] an assault on the Judiciary nor an infringement on the
independence of the Judiciary, because it is enshrined in the Constitution.
Parenthetically, when the SC strikes down acts of Congress and acts of the President
and the Executive Department for being unlawful and unconstitutional, the SC is not
assaulting the independence of Congress and the Executive Department because the
expanded power of judicial review is enshrined in the Constitution," Tijam pointed
out.
Sereno, he said, should be role model when it comes to respecting the
Constitution.99 (Emphasis ours)
Notably, respondent conveniently and casually invoked only portion of the article
which suited her objective of imputing bias against Justice Tijam.
As, to the act of wearing red tie which purportedly establishes Justices Tijam and
Bersamin's prejudice against her, the argument is baseless and unfair. There is no
basis, whether in logic or in law, to establish connection between piece of clothing
and magistrate's performance of adjudicatory functions. Absent compelling proof to
the contrary, the red piece of clothing was merely coincidental and should not be
deemed sufficient ground to disqualify them.
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Sps. Dy Hong Pi, et al.,100 this Court
explained that:
[T]he second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1,101 does not give judges unfettered
discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing case. The inhibition must be for
just and valid causes, and in this regard, We have noted that the mere imputation of
bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is
without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or
partiality. Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice
or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross
and patent as to produce an ,ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice. 102 (Citations
omitted)
In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As
to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some of the Associate Justices participated
in the hearings of the Committee on Justice determining probable cause for the
impeachment of respondent does not make them disqualified to hear the instant
petition. Their appearance thereat was in deference to the House of Representatives
whose constitutional duty to investigate the impeachment complaint filed against
respondent could not be doubted. Their appearance was with the prior consent of the
Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters that the Court
set for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing, should be carefully viewed
within this context, and should not be hastily interpreted as an adverse attack
against respondent.
In fact, Justice Tijam, in his Sworn Statement103 submitted to the House Committee
on Justice, clearly identified the purpose of his attendance thereat:
2. In reply, sent letter to Representative Umali on November 24, 2017, informing
him that inasmuch as the issue involved actions of the Supreme Court En Banc, I
deemed it proper to first secure its approval before participating in the
House Committee hearing.
3. On November 28, 2017, the Supreme Court En Banc gave clearance for Justices
who have been invited by the House Committee on Justice to testify in connection
with the impeachment complaint, to give testimony on administrative matters if they
so wish. The Court's Resolution in this regard states that the authority was
granted "only because the proceedings before the Committee on Justice of
the House of Representatives constitute part of the impeachment process
under Section 3, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution."
A copy of the Court's Resolution is hereto attached as Annex "A."
4. am submitting this Sworn Statement to the House Committee on Justice as my
testimony in relation to A.M. No. 17-06-02-SC, based on my best recollection of
events relating to said matter and available records. shall, however, be willing to
give further testimony should the House Committee find it appropriate to propound
questions thereon at the December 11, 2017 Committee hearing, subject to
applicable limitations under law and relevant rules.
5. I will appear and give testimony before the House Committee on Justice
not as witness for the complainant, but to honor the Committee's
invitation to shed light on A.M. No. 17-06-02-SC and to accord due respect to
the Constitutionally established process of impeachment. (Emphasis ours)
Likewise, the Justices, including Justice Tijam, who appeared during the House
Committee on Justice hearings, refused to form any conclusion or to answer the
uniform query as to whether respondent's acts constitute impeachable offenses, as it
was not theirs to decide but function properly belonging to the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court.104 Evidently, no bias and prejudice on the part of the Justices
could be inferred therein.
A judge may decide, "in the exercise of his sound discretion," to recuse himself from
case for just or valid reasons. The phrase just or valid reasons, as the second
requisite for voluntary inhibition, must be taken to mean -
x x x causes which, though not strictly falling within those enumerated in the first made, the petition for quo warranto has not been filed; thus, such statement cannot
paragraph, are akin or analogous thereto. In determining what causes are just, amount to prejudgment of the case.
judges must keep in mind that next to importance to the duty of rendering righteous
judgment is that of doing it in such manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness Furthermore, according to Justice Peralta, while he was then the Acting Ex
and integrity of the judge. For it is an accepted axiom that every litigant, including Officio Chairperson of the JBC at the time of respondent's application for the position
the state, in criminal cases, is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an of Chief Justice, he had no personal knowledge of the disputed facts concerning the
impartial judge, and the law intends that no judge shall preside in any case in which proceedings, specifically the matters considered by the members of the JBC in
he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent. 105 preparing the shortlist of nominees. He explained that it was the ORSN of the JBC
which was tasked to determine completeness of the applicants' documentary
Respondent's call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on distortions of
requirements, including the SALNs.
the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as
sworn witnesses in the proceedings of the House Committee on Justice.
As for Justice Martires' statements during the Oral Arguments, this Court does not
view them as indication of actual bias or prejudice against respondent. Our review of
Justice Bersamin's statement that "Ang Supreme Court ay hindi po maaring mag
the record reveals that Justice Martires' did not refer to respondent as the object of
function kung isa ay diktador," is clearly hypothetical statement, an observation on
his statements, as follows:
what would the Court be if any of its Members were to act dictatorially.
JUSTICE MARTIRES :
Likewise, the Court cannot ascribe bias in Justice Bersamin's remark that he was
Solicitor Calida, would you agree with me na lahat ng taong may dibdib ay may kaba
offended by respondent's attitude in ignoring the collegiality of the Supreme Court
sa dibdib? At lahat ng taong may ulo ay may katok sa ulo.
when she withdrew the Justices' "privilege" to recommend nominees to fill vacancies
in the Supreme Court. It would be presumptuous to equate this statement to
SOLICITOR GENERAL CALIDA: 
personal resentment as respondent regards it. There has always been high degree of
professionalism among the Members of the Court in both their personal and official
Yes, Your Honor, agree.
dealings with each other. It cannot also be denied that the statement reflected
natural sentiment towards decision reached and imposed by member of collegial
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
body without consultation or consensus.
Now would you consider it mental illness (sic) when person always invokes God as
Meanwhile, respondent's allegation of actual bias and partiality against Justice
the source of his strength? The source of his inspiration? The source of happiness?
Peralta is negated by his testimony during the January 15, 2018 hearing of the
The source of everything in life? Is that mental illness.
House Committee on Justice, where he stated that he has been very supportive of
the Judiciary reforms introduced by respondent as the Chief Justice, even if she
SOLICITOR GENERAL CALIDA: 
suspects that he is one of those behind her impeachment.
Not necessarily, Your Honor.
Justice Peralta's testimony before the House Committee on Justice also contradicts
respondent's allegation that Justice Peralta's apparent bias arose from his belief that
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
respondent caused the exclusion of his wife, Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice
Fernanda Lampas Peralta, from the list of applications for the position of CA Presiding
So, I'm just making follow-up to the question that Justice Velasco earlier asked. So,
Justice. Justice Peralta has made it clear during the February 12, 2018 Congressional
would you agree with me that the psychiatrist made wrong evaluation with respect
hearing that he has already moved on from said issue and that the purpose of his
to the psychiatric report of the Chief Justice?106
testimony was merely to protect prospective applicants to the Judiciary.
Neither are We prepared to conclude that Justice Martires' statements were based on
Justice Peralta's testimony during the Congressional hearing that "had (he) been an extraneous source, other than what what he has learned or encountered over the
informed of (the) letter dated July 23, 2012 and certificate of clearance, (he) could course of the instant proceedings. There is nothing in the interpellation, nor in
have immediately objected to the selection of the Chief Justice for voting because Justice Martires' statements that he has read the psychiatric report, nor has read
this is very clear deviation from existing rules that if member of the Judiciary would newspaper accounts tackling the same. He merely asked the OSG if he has read the
like...or...a candidate would like to apply for Chief Justice, then she or he is same, and his opinion regarding it.
mandated to submit the SALNs," is clearly a' hypothetical statement, which will not
necessarily result in the disqualification of respondent from nomination. It was also Contrary to respondent's contentions, Justice Martires has not suggested that she
expressed in line with his functions as then Acting Chairperson of the JBC, tasked suffers from some mental or psychological illness. At most, his questions and
with determining the constitutional and statutory eligibility of applicants for the statements were merely hypothetical in nature, which do not even constitute as an
position of Chief Justice. It bears stressing, too, that at the time said statement was opinion against respondent. Certainly, to impute actual bias based on such brief
discourse with respect to hypothetical matters is conjectural and highly speculative.
"Allegations and perceptions of bias from the mere tenor and language of judge is
insufficient to show prejudgment."107
In the same vein, insinuations that the Justices of the Supreme Court are towing the
line of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte in entertaining the quo warrantopetition must
be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and discordance
between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one,
except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the
Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the Solicitor General who
has supposedly met consistent litigation success before the Supreme Court shall
likewise automatically and positively be received in the present quo warranto action.
That the Court spares the Solicitor General the rod is easily dispelled by the Court's
firm orders in G.R. Nos. 234359 and 234484 concerning alleged extra legal killings a
case directly concerning the actuations of the executive department to provide the
Court with documents relative to the Oplan Tokhang operations and by uninamous
vote, rebuked the Solicitor General's plea for reconsideration. Suffice to say that the
Court decides based on the merits of case and not on the actors or the supposed
benefactors involved.
Absent strong and compelling evidence establishing actual bias and partiality on the
part of the Justices whose recusal was sought, respondent's motions for inhibition
must perforce fail. Mere conjectures and speculations cannot justify the inhibition of
Judge or Justice from judicial matter. The presumption that the judge will undertake
his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without
fear or favor, should not be abandoned without clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.
In Dimo Realty Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan,108 We held:
"[B]ias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of
judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of
partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be presumed, especially if
weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of office require them
to administer justice without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and
the rich."109 (Citation omitted)
The Court has pointedly observed in Pimentel v. Hon. Salanga:110
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have natural and alluring
appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make
speculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather
judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for party litigant
happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not
as yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not
thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would
show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what
respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in case before
him. We have had occasion to rule in criminal case that charge made before
trial that party "will not be given fair, impartial and just hearing" is
"premature." Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against
judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice "without
respect to prison and do equal right to the poor and the rich." To disqualify or
not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is matter of
conscience.111 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
The Court has consequently counseled that no Judge or Justice who is not legally
disqualified should evade the duty and responsibility to sit in the adjudication of any
controversy without committing dereliction of duty for which he or she may be held
accountable. Towards that end, the Court has aptly reminded:
To take or not to take cognizance of case, does not depend upon the discretion of
judge not legally disqualified to sit in given case. It is his duty not to sit in its trial
and decision if legally disqualified; but if the judge is not disqualified, it is matter of
official duty for him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot
shirk the responsibility without the risk of being called upon to account for his
dereliction.112
It is timely to be reminded, too, that the Supreme Court is collegial judicial body
whose every Member has solemnly and individually sworn to dispense and
administer justice to every litigant. As collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates
without fear or favor. The only things that the Supreme Court collectively focuses its
attention to in every case are the merits thereof, and the arguments of the parties
on the issues submitted for consideration and deliberation. Only thereby may the
solemn individual oath of the Members to do justice be obeyed.
In line with the foregoing, We deem it baseless, not to mention problematic, the
respondent's prayer that the matter of inhibition of the six Associate Justices be
decided by the remaining members of the Court En Banc. The respondent herself
was cognizant that the prevailing rule allows challenged Justices to participate in the
deliberations on the matter of their disqualification. Moreover, exclusion from the
deliberations due to delicadeza or sense of decency, partakes of ground apt for
voluntary inhibition. It bears to be reminded that voluntary inhibition, leaves to the
sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in case for other just and
valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.113 Indeed, the best person to
determine the propriety of sitting in case rests with the magistrate sought to be
disqualified. Moreover, to compel the remaining members to decide on the
challenged member's fitness to resolve the case is to give them authority to review
the propriety of acts of their colleagues, scenario which can undermine the
independence of each of the members of the High Court.
In the En Banc case of Jurado Co. v. Hongkong Bank,114 the Court elucidated that
challenge to the competency of judge may admit two constructions: first, the
magistrate decides for himself the question of his competency and when he does so,
his decision therein is conclusive and the other Members of the Court have no voice
in it; and second, the challenged magistrate sits with the Court and decides the
challenge as collegial body. It was in Jurado that the Court adopted the second view
as the proper approach when challenge is poised on the competency of sitting
magistrate, that is, the Court, together withthe challenged magistrate, decides.
Jurado further expressly excluded possible third construction wherein the Court
decides the challenge but without the participation of the challenged member on the
ground that such construction would place power on party to halt the proceedings by
the simple expedient of challenging majority of the Justices. The Court sees no
reason to deviate from its standing practice of resolving competency challenges as
collegial body without excluding the challenged Member from participating therein.

Accordingly, the Court resolves to DENY respondent's motion to exclude Associate
Justices Peralta, Leonardo-De Castro, Jardeleza, Tijam, Bersamin, and Martires in the
resolution of the separate motions' for inhibition against the said Associate Justices.
Likewise, the Court resolves to DENY the said separate motions for inhibition.
Substantive Issues
I.
The Court has Jurisdiction over the instant Petition for Quo Warranto
The petition challenges respondent's right and title to the position of Chief Justice.
The Republic avers that respondent unlawfully holds her office because in failing to
regularly declare her assets, liabilities and net worth as member of the career service
prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice, of the
Court, she cannot be said to possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded
of every aspiring member of the Judiciary. The Republic thus prays that respondent's
appointment as Chief Justice be declared void. Respondent counters that, as an
impeachable officer, she may only be removed through impeachment by the Senate
sitting as an impeachment court.
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court
shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary
writs, including quo warranto.
Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an
action for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the
Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme
Court.
While the hierarchy of courts serves as general determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitions for the extraordinary writs, cl.irect invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. 115 In the
instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo
warranto questions the qualification of no less than Member of the Court. The issue
of whether person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office
is matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it
obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy public position. 116
The instant petition is case of transcendental importance
While traditionally, the principle of transcendental importance applies as an
exception to the rule requiring locus standi before the Courts can exercise its judicial
power of review, the same principle nevertheless, finds application in this case as it
is without doubt that the State maintains an interest on the issue of the legality of
the Chief Justice's appointment.
Further, it is apparent that the instant petition is one of first impression and of
paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and
appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are
being scrutinized through an action for quo warranto. The Court's action on the
present petition has far-reaching implications, and it is paramount that the Court
make definitive pronouncements on the issues herein presented for the guidance of
the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. Thus, the questions herein
presented merit serious consideration from the Court and should not be trifled on.
Policy and ethical considerations likewise behoove this Court to rule on the issues put
forth by the parties. This Court has always been vigilant advocate in ensuring that its
members and employees continuously possess the highest ideals of integrity,
honesty, and uprightness. More than professional competence, this Court is
cognizant of the reality that the strength of Our institution depends on the
confidence reposed on Us by the public. As can be gleaned from Our recent
decisions, this Court has not hesitated from disciplining its members whether they be
judges, Justices or regular court employees. This case should not therefore be
treated merely with kid gloves because it involves the highest official of the judicial
branch of the government. On the contrary, this is an opportune time for this Court
to exact accountability by examining whether there has been strict compliance with
the legal and procedural requirements in the appointment of its Members.
Respondent, however, pounds on the fact that as member of the Supreme Court, she
is an impeachable officer. As such, respondent argues that quo warranto proceeding,
which may result in her ouster, cannot be lodged against her, especially when there
is an impending impeachment case against her.
This argument is misplaced.
The origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are
materially different
While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public
official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment
proceedings are political in nature, while an action for quo warranto is judicial or
proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.
To lend proper context, We briefly recount the origin and nature of impeachment
proceedings and quo warranto petition:
Impeachment
Historians trace the origin of impeachment as far as the 5th century in ancient
Greece in process called eisangelia.117 The grounds for impeachment include treason,
conspiracy against the democracy, betrayal of strategic posts or expeditionary forces
and corruption and deception.118
Its, modem form, however, appears to be inspired by the British parliamentary
system of impeachment. Though both public and private officials can be the subject
of the process, the British system of impeachment is largely similar to the current
procedure in that it is undertaken in both Houses of the Parliament. The House of
Commons determines when an impeachment should be instituted. If the grounds,
normally for treason and other high crimes and misdemeanor, are deemed sufficient,
the House of Commons prosecutes the individual before the House of Lords. 119
While impeachment was availed for "high crimes and misdemeanors", it would
appear that the phrase was applied to variety of acts which can arguably amount to
breach of the public's confidence, such as advising the King to grant liberties and
privileges to certain persons to the hindrance of the due execution of the laws,
procuring offices for persons who were unfit, and unworthy of them and squandering
away the public treasure, browbeating witnesses and commenting on their
credibility, cursing and drinking to excess, thereby bringing the highest scandal on
the public justice of the kingdom, and failure to conduct himself on the most
distinguished principles of good faith, equity, moderation, and mildness. 120
While heavily influenced by the British concept of impeachment, the United States of
America made significant modifications from its British counterpart. Fundamentally,
the framers of the United States visualized the process as means to hold accountable
its public officials, as can be gleaned from their basic law:
The President, Vice-President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, treason, Bribery, or
other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.121
Other noted differences from the British process of impeachment include limiting and
specifying the grounds to "treason, Bribery, or other High Criines and
Misdemeanors", and punishing the offender with removal and disqualification to hold
public office instead of death, forfeiture of property and corruption of blood. 122
In the Philippines, the earliest record of impeachment in our laws is from the 1935
Constitution.123 Compared to the US Constitution, it would appear that the drafters of
the 1935 Constitution further modified the process by making impeachment
applicable only to the highest officials of the country; providing "culpable violation of
the Constitution" as an additional ground, and requiring two-thirds vote of the House
of Representatives to impeach and three-fourths vote of the Senate to convict.
As currently worded, our 1987 Constitution, in addition to those stated in the 1935
basic law, provided another additional ground to impeach highranking public officials:
"betrayal of public trust". Commissioner Rustico De los Reyes of the 1986
Constitutional Commission explained this ground as "catch-all phrase to include all
acts which are not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render
the officer unfit to continue in office. It includes betrayal of public interest,
inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by
malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of public
interest and which tend to bring the office into disrepute." 124
From the foregoing, it is apparent that although the concept of impeachment has
undergone various modifications to suit different jurisdictions and government forms,
the consensus seems to be that it is essentially political process meant to vindicate
the violation of the public's trust. Buckner Melton, in his book The First
Impeachment: The Constitutions Framers and the Case of Senator William Blount,
succintly opined:
Practically all who have written on the subject agree that impeachment involves
protection of public interest, incorporating public law element, much like criminal
proceeding....[I]mpeachment is process instigated by the government, or some
branch thereof, against person who has somehow harmed the government or the
community. The process, moreover, is adversarial in nature and resembles, to that
extent, judicial trial. 125
Quo warranto
The oft-cited origin of quo warranto was the reign of King Edward of England who
questioned the local barons and lords who held lands or title under questionable
authority. After his return from his crusade in Palestine, he discovered that England
had fallen because of ineffective central administration by his predecessor, King
Henry III.126 The inevitable result was that the barons, whose relations with the King
were governed on paper by Magna Carta, assumed to themselves whatever power
the King's officers had neglected. Thus, King Edward deemed it wise to inquire as to
what right the barons exercised any power that deviated in the slightest from normal
type of feudalism that the King had in mind. The theory is that certain rights
are regalia and can be exercised only upon showing of actual grants from the King or
his predecessor. Verily, King Edward's purpose was to catalogue the rights,
properties and possessions of the kingdom in his efforts to restore the same.
In the Philippines, the remedies against usurpers of public office appeared in the
1900s, through Act No. 190.127 Section 197 of the Act provides for provision
comparable to Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 197. Usurpation of an Office or Franchise A civil action may be brought in the
name of the Government of the Philippine Islands:
1. Against person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises public civil office or franchise within the Philippine Islands,
or an office in corporation created by the authority of the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
2. Against public civil officer who does or suffers an act which, by the
provisions of law, works forfeiture of his office;
3. Against an association of persons who act as corporation within the
Philippine Islands, without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act.
Based from the foregoing, it appears that impeachment is proceeding exercised by
the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the
trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the
public officer's fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto,
involves judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or
appointment of public official based on predetermined rules.
Quo warranto and impeachment can proceed independently and
simultaneously
Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and impeachment
may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1)
jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations.
The term "quo warranto" is Latin for "by what authority."128 Therefore, as the name
suggests, quo warranto is writ of inquiry.129 It detennines whether an individual has
the legal right to hold the public office he or she occupies. 130
In review, Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:
Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of public
office, position or franchise may be commenced by verified petition brought in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office,
position or franchise;
(b) public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as corporation within the Philippines without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
Thus, quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or
title to the contested public office or to oust the holder from its enjoyment. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined
is the eligibility of the candidates elected, while in quo warranto proceedings
referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the
appointment.
The title to public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo
warranto proceedings. In the past, the Court held that title to public office cannot be
assailed even through mandamus or motion to annul or set aside order.131 That quo
warranto is the proper legal vehicle to directly attack title to public office likewise
precludes the filing of petition for prohibition for purposes of inquiring into the
validity of the appointment of public officer. Thus, in Nacionalista Party v. De
Vera,132 the Court held:
"[T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or
other judicial officers, cannot be treated as substitute for quo warranto or be
rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of the writ. If there is court,
judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right to act cannot be
questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of judicial office, the
person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through writ of prohibition commanding the
alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature
prohibition is an improper remedy by which to determine the title to an office." 133
As earlier discussed, an action for quo warranto may be commenced by the Solicitor
General or public prosecutor, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 134
That usurpation of public office is treated as public wrong and carries with it public
interest in our jurisdiction is clear when Section 1, Rule 66 provides that where the
action is for the usurpation of public office, position or franchise, it shall be
commenced by verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines through the Solicitor General or public prosecutor. 135
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General, in the exercise of sound discretion, may suspend
or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and
valid reasons. Upon receipt of case certified to him, the Solicitor General may start
the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may choose
not to file the case at all. The Solicitor General is given permissible latitude within his
legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national
interest and the government policy on the matter at hand. 136
The instance when an individual is allowed to commence an action for quo
warranto in his own name is when such person is claiming to be entitled to public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 137Feliciano v.
Villasin138 reiterates the basic principle enunciated in Acosta v. Flor139that for quo
warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show no less than
clear right to the contested office.
In case of usurpation of public office, when the respondent is found guilty of
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising public office, position or
franchise, the judgment shall include the following:
(a) the respondent shall be ousted and excluded from the office;
(b) the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, shall recover his costs; and
(c) such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public
office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. 140
The remedies available in quo warranto judgment do not include correction or
reversal of acts taken under the ostensible authority of an office or franchise.
Judgment is limited to ouster or forfeiture and may not be imposed retroactively
upon prior exercise of official or corporate duties. 141
Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive remedies and may
even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper
does not prevent the State from commencing quo warranto proceeding.142
Respondent's Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam specifically
tackled the objection to the petition on the ground of forum shopping: Essentially,
respondent points out that the inclusion of the matter on tax fraud, which will further
be discussed below, is already covered by Article of the Articles of Impeachment.
Hence, respondent argues, among others, that the petition should be dismissed on
the ground of forum shopping.
Forum shopping is the act of litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another.143 Forum shopping originated as concept in private
international law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the
forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to
secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid
overcrowded dockets, or to select more friendly venue.144 At present, our jurisdiction
has recognized several ways to commit forum shopping, to wit: (1) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous
case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia);
(2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res
judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with
different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also
either litis pendentia or res judicata).145
We have already settled that the test for determining existence of forum shopping is
as follows:
To determine whether party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
whether final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise
stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more)
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
reliefs sought.146 (Emphasis ours)
Litis pendentia is Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously
referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As ground for
the dismissal of civil action, it refers to the situation where two actions are pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Litis
pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties,
or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.147
On the other hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars subsequent case when the
following requisites are satisfied: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered
by court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is
judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is between the first and the second
actions identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 148
Ultimately, what is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants
by party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility
of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues. 149
Guided by the foregoing, there can be no forum shopping in this case despite the
pendency of the impeachment proceedings before the House of Representatives,
contrary to respondent's position.
The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo
warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or
exercising of public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an
impeachable offense. Stated in different manner, the crux of the controversy in
this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not respondent
legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in
the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent's prosecution for
certain impeachable offenses. To be sure, respondent is not being prosecuted herein
for such impeachable offenses enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment. Instead,
the resolution of this case shall be based on established facts and related laws.
Simply put, while respondent's title to hold public office is the issue in quo
warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that respondent legally
holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being
whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from
office.
Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Under the Rules
on quo warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or
unlawfully holding or exercising public office, x x x, judgment shall be rendered that
such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, x x x."150 In short,
respondent in quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding
public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment,
conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the
respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. 151 It is not legally
possible to impeach or remove person from an office that he/she, in the first place,
does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.
In the said Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam, respondent
advanced the argument that the "impeachment proceeding" is different from the
"impeachment case", the former refers to the filing of the complaint before the
Committee on Justice while the latter refers to the proceedings before the Senate.
Citing Francisco v. House of Representatives, respondent posits that the
"impeachment proceeding" against her is already pending upon the filing of the
verified complaint before the House Committee on Justice albeit the "impeachment
case" has not yet started as the Articles of Impeachment has not yet been filed with
the Senate. Hence, in view of such proceeding before the Committee on Justice, the
filing of the instant petition constitutes forum shopping.
The difference between the "impeachment proceeding" and the "impeachment case"
correctly cited by the respondent, bolsters the conclusion that there can be no forum
shopping. Indeed, the "impeachment proceeding" before the House Committee on
Justice is not the "impeachment case" proper. The impeachment case is yet to be
initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the
moment, there is no pending impeachment case against the respondent.
The House Committee on Justice's determination of probable cause on whether the
impeachment against the respondent should go on trial before the Senate is akin to
the prosecutor's determination of probable cause during the  preliminary 
investigation in criminal  case. In preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused; he does not exercise adjudication
nor rule-making functions. The process is merely inquisitorial and is merely means of
discovering if person may be reasonably charged with crime. It is not trial of the case
on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof.152 As such, during the preliminary investigation before the prosecutor,
there is no pending case to speak of yet. In fact, jurisprudence states that the
preliminary investigation stage is not part of the trial. 153
Thus, at the time of the filing of this petition, there is no pending impeachment case
that would bar the quo warrranto petition on the ground of forum shopping.
In fine, forum shopping and litis pendentia are not present and final decision in one
will not strictly constitute as res judicata to the other. judgment in quo
warranto case determines the respondent's constitutional or legal authority to
perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays
claim;154 meanwhile judgment in an impeachment proceeding pertain to respondent's
"fitness for public office."155
Considering the legal basis and nature of an action for quo waranto, this Court
cannot shirk from resolving the instant controversy in view of the fact that
respondent is an impeachable officer and/or in view of the possibility of an
impeachment trial against respondent.
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or
invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office
Respondent anchors her position that she can be removed from office only by
impeachment on the Court's ruling in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,156Cuenco v.
Fernan,157 In Re Gonzales,158Jarque v. Desierto159 and Marcoleta v. Borra.160 It should
be stressed, however, that none of these cases concerned the validity of an
impeachable officer's appointment. Lecaroz involved criminal charge against mayor
before the Sandiganbayan, while the rest were disbarment cases filed against
impeachable officers principally for acts done during their tenure in public office.
Whether the impeachable officer unlawfully held his office or whether his
appointment was void was not an issue raised before the Court. The principle laid
down in said cases is to the effect that during their incumbency, impeachable officers
cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of
removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for
their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not
extend to actions assailing the public officer's title or right to the office he or she
occupies. The ruling therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that quo
warranto action can never be filed against an impeachable officer. In issuing such
pronouncement, the Court is presumed to have been aware of its power to issue
writs of quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or
petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-
President, both of whom are impeachable officers. Following respondent's theory that
an impeachable officer can be removed only through impeachment means that
President or Vice-President against whom an election protest has been filed can
demand for the dismissal of the protest on the ground that it can potentially cause
his/her removal from office through mode other than by impeachment. To sustain
respondent's position is to render election protests under the PET Rules nugatory.
The Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since fraud and
irregularities in elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of the people as
reflected in their votes must be determined and respected. The Court could not,
therefore, have unwittingly curtailed its own judicial power by prohibiting quo
warranto proceedings against impeachable officers.
Further, the PET Rules provide that petition for quo warranto, contesting the election
of the President or Vice-President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines, may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the
election concerned within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the
winner.161 Despite disloyalty to the Republic being crime against public
order162 defined and penalized under the penal code, and thus may likewise be
treated as "other high crimes,"163 constituting an impeachable offense, quo
warranto as remedy to remove the erring President or Vice-President is nevertheless
made expressly available.
In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of quo
warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases
of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. MacapagalArroyo,164 the Court took
cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition filed against
respondent therein who, at the time of the filing of the petition, had taken an oath
and assumed the Office of the President. Petitioner therein prayed for judgment
confinning him to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken
her oath and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity. In
fact, in the said cases, there was not even claim that respondent therein was
disqualified from holding office and  accordingly challenged respondent's status as de
jure 14th President of the Republic. By entertaining the quo warranto petition, the
Court in fact determined whether then President Estrada has put an end to his official
status by his alleged act of resignation.
Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not
foreclose quo warranto action against impeachable officers. The provision reads:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis ours)
It is settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is
plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 165
The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction,
denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect. 166We have
consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of mere possibility, an opportunity
or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with right or faculty which he account of disability or any reasonable cause not proper ground for action by the
has the option to exercise.167 An option to remove by impeachment admits of an Houses of Congress.
alternative mode of effecting the removal.
Neither can the Court accept respondent's argument that the term "may" in Section
2, Article XI qualifies only the penalty imposable at the conclusion of the
On this score, Burke Shartel in his work Federal Judges: Appointment, Supervision,
impeachment trial, such that conviction may result in lesser penalties like censure or
and Removal: Some Possibilities under the Constitution,168 makes an interesting and
reprimand. Section 3(7), Article XI of the Constitution specifies the penalty of
valid observation on parallel provision on impeachment under the U.S. Constitution
"removal from office" and "disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of
from which ours was heavily patterned:
the Philippines" in impeachment cases.169 There is nothing in the said provision that
x x x it is not reasonable to spell out of the express provisiOn for impeachment, an
deliberately vests authority on the impeachment court to impose penalties lower
intention or purpose of the framers to create an exclusive remedy. The common
than those expressly mentioned. Also, respondent has not shown that such was
canon for interpreting legislation, expresio unius excusio est alterius has no proper
authority was intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution. The ultimate penalty
application to an express provision for one of several common-law remedies. The
of removal is imposed owing to the serious nature of the impeachable offenses. This
express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as tacit
Court had occasion to rule:
prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear
account for this express provision. The main purpose of the framers of the
provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking
Constitution in providing for impeachment was to supply legislative check on the
through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek
other departments of our government, and particularly on the chief executive.
Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, that:
Without an express provision, impeachment would have been impliedly prohibited by
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent
the doctrine of separation of powers. If this legislative check was desired, reservation
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to
in express words was essential. Another reason for the express provisions on this
which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the
subject was that the framers of the Constitution did not wish to make the executive
constitutional provisions themselves. 170 (Emphasis supplied)
and judicial officers of our government completely dependent on Congress. They
wanted to confer only limited power of removal, and the desired limitations on the To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are
power to impeach had to be explicitly stated. These two reasons explain the outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible
presence in the Constitution of the express provisions for impeachment; it is not defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot
necessary to resort to any supposed intent to establish an exclusive method of otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding.
removal in order to account for them. On the contrary, logic and sound policy
demand that the Congressional power be construed to be concurrent, not an The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of
exclusive, power of removal. impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the
appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for
We hold, therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows
instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices
the institution of quo warranto action against an impeachable officer. After all, quo
where Bar membership is qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to
warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The
be member of the Bar. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds for
former questions the validity of public officer's appointment while the latter indicts
impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of
him for the so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office
his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it Such would result in
he holds.
permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key
positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully
Further, that the enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made absolute, that is,
removed from office through impeachment. This could not have been the intent of
only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not
the framers of the Constitution.
equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be complete statement
of the causes of removal from office. Shartel, above cited, eloquently incites as
We must always put in mind that public office is public trust. 171 Thus, the people
follows:
have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed to public' office. To
x x x. There is no indication in the debates of the Convention that the framers of the
construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as proscribing quo warranto petition
Constitution intended at this point to make complete statement of causes of removal
is to deprive the State of remedy to correct "public wrong" arising from defective or
from office. The emphasis was on the causes for which Congress might remove
void appointments. Equity will not suffer wrong to be without remedy. Ubi jus ibi
executive and judicial officers, not on causes of removal as such. x x x How then can
remedium. Where there is right, there must be remedy.172
the causes of removal by impeachment be construed as recital of the causes for
which judges may be removed? It is especially hard to see why the express provision
As respondent herself previously opined in one case: "Reason is the foundation of all
for impeachment limited legislative method of removing all civil officers for serious
legal interpretation, including that of constitutional interpretation. And the most
misconduct should be construed to forbid removal of judges by judicial action on
powerful tool of reason is reflecting on the essence of things." 173

The essence of quo warranto is to protect the body politic from the usurpation of
public office and to ensure that government authority is entrusted only to qualified
individuals. Reason therefore dictates that quo warranto should be an available
remedy to question the legality of appointments especially of impeachable officers
considering that they occupy some of the highest-ranking offices in the land and are
capable of wielding vast power and influence on matters of law and policy.
At this juncture, it would be apt to dissuade and allay the fear that ruling on the
availability of quo warranto would allow the Solicitor General to "wield sword over
our collective heads, over all our individual heads, and on that basis, impair the
integrity of the Couas court."174
Such view, while not improbable, betrays fallacious and cynical view of the
competence and professionalism of the Solicitor General and the members, of this
Court. It presupposes that members of this Court are law offenders. It also proceeds
from the premise that the Solicitor General is the Executive's pawn in its perceived
quest for "more friendly" Court. Verily, fear, particularly if unfounded, should not
override settled presumptions of good faith and regularity in the performance of
official duties. This Court, absent compelling proof to the contrary, has no basis to
doubt the independence and autonomy of the Solicitor General. 175 It is worthwhile to
note that while the Solicitor General has prerogative in the institution of an action
for quo warranto, its exercise of such discretion is nevertheless subject to the Court's
review. In Topacio v. Ong,176 this Court explained:
In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down
the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons.
Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez, the Court ruled:
Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in
choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon prosecution already
started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or
compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other
party. Abandonment of case, however, does not mean that the Solicitor
General may just drop it without any legal and valid reasons, for the
discretion given him is not unlimited. Its exercise must be, not only within the
parameters set by law but with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal.
Upon receipt of case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in
the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the
appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do
everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national
interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. (Emphasis
ours)
Neither should it be forgotten that the Solicitor General is an officer of the Court,
tasked "to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes;" therefore, he may be enjoined in the same manner that special prosecutor
was sought enjoined by this Court from committing any act which may tend to
"obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice." 177 Either
way, in the event that quo warranto cases against members of the Judiciary inundate
the courts' dockets, it does not follow that the courts are powerless to shield its
members against suits which are obviously lacking in merit, or those merely
intended to harass the respondent.
The Supreme Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto petition
is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers
Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides that the
House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that the constitutionally-defined
instrumentality which is given the power to try impeachment cases is the Senate.
Nevertheless, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo
warranto involving person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not
been for disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.
Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of person to occupy public position.
It is direct proceeding assailing the title to public office.178 The issue to be resolved
by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally occupying public position
which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was
legally qualified and has complete legal title to the office. If defendant is found to be
not qualified and without any authority, the relief that the Court grants is the ouster
and exclusion of the defendant from office.179 In other words, while impeachment
concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her
office, quo warranto involves matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the
position to begin with.
Given the nature and effect of an action for quo warranto, such remedy is unavailing
to determine whether or not an official has committed misconduct in office nor is it
the proper legal vehicle to evaluate the person's performance in the office. Apropos,
an action for quo warranto does not try person's culpability of an impeachment
offense, neither does writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability.
In Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,180 the Court further
explained the court's authority to issue writ of quo warranto, as complementary to,
and not violative of, the doctrine of separation of powers, as follows:
And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly
complements the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our
analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status
of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law. The
question of whether franchisee is in breach of the franchise specially
enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited to court of law, and not
for an administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has
been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial review
over laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures
by appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo warranto in the instant
cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by
abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed
enough by the franchisees' violation of the franchises extended to them. purported acts of highest ranking officials of the country constitute as an offense to
(Emphasis ours) the citizenry. Following this premise, the impeachment tribunal cannot be expected
to rule on the validity or constitutionality of the Chief Justice's appointment, nor can
Applying the ratio in Divinagracia, the Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
their ruling be of jurisprudential binding effect to this Court. To authorize Congress.
warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative
to rule on public officials' eligibility would disturb the system of checks and balances
of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of
as it would dilute the judicial power of courts, upon which jurisdiction is exclusively
Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally
vested to rule on actions for quo warranto.
committed power of impeachment.
Nevertheless, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obliviate confusion in
Indeed, respondent's case is peculiar in that her omission to file her SALN also
the future as to when quo warranto as remedy to oust an ineligible public official
formed part of the allegations against her in the Verified Complaint for
may be availed of, and in keeping with the Court's function of harmonizing the laws
Impeachment. Verily, the filing of the SALN is Constituional requirement, and the
and the rules with the Constitution, the Court herein demarcates that an act or
transgression of which may, in the wisdom of the impeachment court, be interpreted
omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
as constituting culpable violation of the Constitution. But then, respondent, unlike
official's qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid
the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
is properly the subject of quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the
the Ombudsman, apart from having to comply with the Constitutional SALN
commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it
requirement, also answers to the unique Constitutional qualification of having to be
relates to the qualification of integrity, being continuing requirement but nonetheless
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence-qualifications not
committed during the incumbency of validly appointed and/or validly elected official,
expressly required by the fundamental law for the other impeachable officers. 181 And
cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may
as will be extensively demonstrated hereunder, respondent's failure to file her SALNs
either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
and to submit the same to the JBC go into the very qualification of integrity. In other
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or
words, when Member of the Supreme Court transgresses the SALN requirement prior
criminal action, if otherwise.
to his or her appointment as such, he or she commits violation of the Constitution
and belies his or her qualification to hold the office. It is not therefore accurate to
Judicial power versus Judicial restraint and fear of constitutional crisis
place Members of the Supreme Court, such as, respondent, on absolutely equal
plane as that of the other impeachable officers, when more stringent and
Judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
burdensome requirements for qualification and holding of office are expressly placed
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
upon them.
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
In the same vein, the fact that the violation of the SALN requirement formed part of
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
the impeachment complaint does not justify shifting responsibility to the Congress,
Govemment.183
no matter how noble the respondent and the intervenors portray such act to be. The
fact remains that the Republic raised an issue as to respondent's eligibility to occupy
In the presence of all the requisites184 for the Court's exercise of judicial review,
the position of Chief Justice, an obviously legal question, which can be resolved
there can be no doubt that the exercise thereof is not discretionary upon the Court,
through review of jurisprudence and pertinent laws. Logic, common sense, reason,
nor dependent upon the whims and caprices of any of its Members nor any of the
practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an
parties. Even in cases rendered moot and academic by supervening events, the
unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed
Court nevertheless exercised its power of review on the basis of certain recognized
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from
exceptions.185 Neither is its exercise circumscribed by fear of displeasing co-equal
resolving legal controversy simply because of perceived availability of another
branch of the government. Instead, the Constitution makes it crystal clear that the
remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of process
exercise of judicial power is duty of the Court.
specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of
the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on
As such, the exercise of judicial power could never be made dependent upon the
impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of public official, who at the
action or inaction of another branch of the government. The exercise of judicial
outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law. Evidently, this
restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the
scenario would involve waste of time, not to mention unnecessary disbursement of
sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is thus misplaced.
public funds.
For one, at the time of the filing of, and even during the pendency of the resolution
Further, as an impeachment court, the Senate is tribunal composed of politicians
of the instant petition, no impeachment trial has been commenced by the Senate. In
who are indubitably versed in pragmatic decision making and cognizant of political
fact, it will be purely skeptical, nay lackadaisical, on the part of the Court to assume,
repercussions of acts purported to have been committed by impeachable
at the time the petition was filed, that the House of Representatives will affirm
officials.182 As representatives of the Filipino people, they determine whether the
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment and that trial will eventually
carry on.
For another, and as extensively discussed, the question of whether or not respondent
usurped public office is undoubtedly justiciable. Recall Francisco, Jr., v. House of
Representatives:186
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this
Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which
the controversy may be referred. Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its
duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed
with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions. In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, jurisdiction is not just
power; it is solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be dereliction of duty.
Thus, to exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer's appointment is clear
renunciation of judicial duty. We have held that:
While an appointment is an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to
the limitation that the appointee should possess none of the disqualifications but all
the qualifications required by law. Where the law prescribes certain
qualifications for given office or position, courts may determine whether the
appointee has the requisite qualifications, absent which, his right or title
thereto may be declared void.187 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that respondent
will eventually be tried on impeachment is clear abdication of the Court's duty to
settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Indeed, the easiest way to
lose power is to abdicate it.
Neither does the possibility of the occurrence of constitutional crisis reason for the
Court to abandon its positive constitutional duty to take cognizance of case over
which it enjoys jurisdiction and is not otherwise legally disqualified. constitutional
crisis may arise from conflict over the determination by the independent branches of
government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional
powers. Thus, there can be no constitutional crisis where the Constitution itself
provides the means and bases for the resolution of the "conflict." To reiterate, the
Court's exercise of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto falls within the ambit
of its judicial power to settle justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable. In so doing, the Court is not
arrogating upon itself the Congress' power to determine whether an impeachable
officer may be removed by impeachment or not, which is political, rather than
judicial, exercise.188
In fine, it is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. It cannot be waived by
stipulation, by abdication or by estoppel. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially
judicial in character it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court's constitutional
duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional
duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other
branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment
court through the Senate. As an impeachment court, the Senate's jurisdiction and
the effect of its pronouncement is as limited under the Constitution it cannot rule on
the constitutionality of an appointment of Member of the Supreme Court with
jurisprudential binding effect because rulings of the impeachment court, being
political rather than judicial body, do not form part of the laws of the land. Any
attempt to derogate or usurp judicial power in the determination of whether the
respondent's appointment is constitutional or not will, in point of fact, amount to
culpable violation of the Constitution.
In the same breath, the Supreme Court cannot renege on its avowed constitutional
duty and abdicate its judicial power. To do so would similarly amount to culpable
violation of the Constitution. Instead, this Court asserts its judicial independence and
equanimity to decide cases without fear or favor; without regard as to party's power
or weakness; without regard to personalities; all to the ultimate end that Our
sacrosanct oaths as magistrates of this Court, which We voluntarily imposed upon
ourselves without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, to support and
defend the Constitution and to obey the laws of the land, are strongly and faithfully
realized.
Seeking affirmative relief from the Court is tantamount to voluntary
appearance
In repudiating the Court's jurisdiction over her person and over the subject matter,
respondent harps on the fact that as Chief Justice, she is an impeachable officer who
may be removed only by impeachment by the Senate constituted as an
impeachment court. As extensively discussed, the Court maintains jurisdiction over
the present quo warranto proceedings despite respondent's occupation of an
impeachable office, as it is the legality or illegality of such occupation that is the
subject matter of the instant petition. Further, respondent cannot now be heard to
deny the Court's jurisdiction over her person even as she claims to be an
impeachable official because respondent in fact invoked and sought affirmative relief
from the Court by praying for the inhibition of several Members of this Court and by
moving that the case be heard on Oral Arguments, albeit ad cautelam.
While mindful of Our ruling in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,189 which pronounced that party may file Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over its person, and at the same time raise affirmative defenses
and pray for affirmative relief without waiving its objection to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over its person, as well as Section 20,190 Rule 15, this Court, in several
cases, ruled that seeking affirmative relief in court is tantamount to voluntary
appearance therein.191
Thus, in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi,192 cited in NM
Rotchschild Sons (Australia) Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company,193 wherein defendants filed Motion for Inhibition without submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court, We held:
Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance dissipate when
the respondents' motion for inhibition is considered. This motion seeks sole relief:
inhibition of Judge Napoleon Inoturan from further hearing the case. Evidently, by
seeking affirmative relief other than dismissal of the case, respondents
manifested their voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. It is well-
settled that the active participation of party in the proceedings is tantamount to an
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction.
(Emphasis in the original)
Accordingly, We rule that respondent, by seeking affirmative relief, is deemed to
have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. Following settled
principles, respondent cannot invoke the Court's jurisdiction on one hand to secure
affirmative relief, and then repudiate that same jurisdiction after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief.
II.
The Petition is Not Dismissible on the Ground of Prescription
Prescription does not lie against the State
The rules on quo warranto, specifically Section 11, Rule 66, provides:
Limitations. Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action
against public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right
of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an
action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section
unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment
establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the 1960's the Court had explained in ample jurisprudence the application of
the one-year prescriptive period for filing an action for quo warranto.
In Bumanlag v. Fernandez and Sec. of Justice,194 the Court held that the one-year
period fixed in then Section 16, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court is condition precedent
to the existence of the cause of action for quo warranto and that the inaction of an
officer for one year could be validly considered waiver of his right to file the same.
In Madrid v. Auditor General and Republic,195 We held that person claiming to
position in the civil service must institute the proper proceedings to assert his right
within the one-year period, otherwise, not only will he be considered to have waived
his right to bring action therefor but worse, he will be considered to have acquiesced
or consented to the very matter that he is questioning.
The Court explained in Madrid that the reason for setting prescriptive period is the
urgency of the matter to be resolved. The government must be immediately
informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or position in the
civil service, as against another actually holding it, so that the government may not
be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the person
actually holding the office although illegally, and another for one not actually
rendering service although entitled to do so.196
In Torres v. Quintos,197 the Court further explained that public interest requires that
the rights of public office should be determined as speedily as practicable. We have
also explained in Cristobal v. Melchor and Arcala198 that there are weighty reasons of
public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of such limitation as there
must be stability in the service so that public business may not be unduly
retarded.199
Distinctively, the petitioners in these cited cases were private individuals asserting
their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title to
the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which commenced
the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person
holding the highest position in the Judiciary.
Thus, the question is whether the one-year limitation is equally applicable when the
petitioner is not mere private individual pursuing private interest, but the
government itself seeking relief for public wrong and suing for public interest? The
answer is no.
Reference must necessarily be had to Section 2, Rule 66 which makes
it compulsory for the Solicitor General to commence quo warranto action:
SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. The
Solicitor General or public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the preceding section can be established by
proof must commence such action. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, when the Solicitor General himself commences the quo
warranto action either (1) upon the President's directive, (2) upon complaint or (3)
when the Solicitor General has good reason to believe that there is proof that (a)
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office, position or
franchise; (b) public officer does or suffers an act which is ground for the forfeiture
of his office; or (c) an association acts as corporation without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act, he does so in the discharge of his
task and mandate to see to it that the best interest of the public and the government
are upheld. In these three instances, the Solicitor General is mandated under the
Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition.
That the present Rule 66 on quo warranto takes root from Act No. 160, which is
legislative act, does not give the one-year rule on prescription absolute
application. Agcaoili v. Suguitan,200 squarely addressed this non-absolute character of
the one-year prescriptive period as follows:
x x x in re prescription or limitation of the action, it may be said that originally there
was no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither
could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and
prescription could not be plead as defense to an action by the Government. The
ancient writ of quo warranto was high prerogative writ in the nature of writ of right
by the King against any one who usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty
of the crown, to inquire by what authority the usurper supported his claim, in order
to determine the right. Even at the present time in many of the civilized countries of
the world the action is still regarded as prerogative writ and no limitation or
prescription is permitted to bar the action. As general principle it may be stated
that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo
warranto proceeding brought to enforce public right.
xxxx

In our opinion, even granting that section 216 is applicable to the appellant, the
period of prescription had not begun to run at the time of the commencement of the
present action. He was justified in delaying the commencement of his action
until an answer to his protest had been made. He had right to await the answer
to his protest, in the confident belief that it would be resolved in his favor and that
action would be unnecessary.201 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Continuing, Agcaoili cites People ex rel. Moloney v. Pullmans Palace Car Co.,202 to
emphasize that the State is not bound by statute of limitations nor by the laches,
acquiescence or unreasonable delay on the part of its officers:
It is conceded, the state, acting in its character as sovereign, is not bound by any
statute of limitations or technical estoppel. It is urged, however, that in quo
warranto, under the common-law rule, the courts, in the exercise of their discretion
to grant the writ or not, or upon final hearing, refused aid when the conditions
complained of had existed for number of years with knowledge on the part of the
sovereign, and that the provisions of 1 of chapter 112 of the Revised Statutes,
entitled Quo Warranto, that leave to file the information shall be given if the court or
judge to whom the petition is presented shall be satisfied there is probable cause for
the proceeding, leave the court still possessed of power to consider upon the
hearing, and then apply the same doctrine of waiver and acquiescence. It is the
general rule that laches, acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the
performance of duty on the part of the officers of the state, is not imputable
to the state when acting in its character as sovereign. There are exceptions to
this general rule, but we are unable to see that the allegations of the plea bring the
case within the principles of any such exceptions.
Jurisprudence acros the United States likewise richly reflect that when the Solicitor
General files quo warranto petition in behalf of the people and where the interests of
the public is involved, the lapse of time presents no effective bar:
An information in the nature of quo warranto cannot be filed by private individual
without leave, which the court may, at its discretion, either grant or refuse. To
regulate their discretion as affected by the lapse of time, the English courts adopted
the rule which we have stated. But the Attorney General, representing the Crown
in England and the State in this country, may file an information in the nature of
quo warranto, without leave, according to his own discretion; and we find no
English law which holds that an information, so filed, can be barred by the lapse of
six years independently of any statute to that effect. x x x
The Attorney General being public officer, may be presumed to be capable of
salutary and reasonable discretion, as well as the court, and when, acting in behalf of
the State, he deems it his duty to prosecute for forfeiture, it is not for the court, in
the absence of any statutory limitation, to say he is too late. Indeed this court has
itself decided that, after the information has once been filed, its discretion ceases,
and it has then nothing to do but administer the law the same as in any other
case.203 (Citations omitted)
In People v. Bailey:204
Appellant claims that the action is barred by the provisions of the statute of
limitations. x x x x We are of the opinion that the established rule of law, as to the
statute of limitations and its bearing upon cases of this character, is correctly stated
in the quotations above made and "that the attorney general may file the
information on behalf of the people at any time, and that lapse of time
constitutes no bar to the proceeding." The law, in thus permitting the attorney-
general, either upon his own information or upon the information of private party, to
file an information at any time against one who has unlawfully intruded into and is
holding public office, does not place the courts or private parties in much danger of
having to deal with stale claims. The action can only be brought with the
consent and permission of the attorney-general of the state, and, it is to be
assumed, he will not permit the institution of such suit, if by reason of great
lapse of time the claim has become stale, or for any other reason the state
has ceased to have present interest in it. (Citations omitted)
People v. Bailey quotes McPhail v. People ex rel. Lambert,205 as follows:
We do not consider this quo warranto proceeding, prosecuted by the state's
attorney, for the purpose of ousting one charged with wrongfully and without
authority of law exercising the office, jurisdiction and powers of police magistrate, as
simply civil remedy, for the protection of private rights only. Police magistrates are
public officers, that are provided for in the constitution of the state; and by that
instrument the judicial powers of the state are, in part, vested in them. The office of
police magistrate is one in which the state and the general public have deep interest,
and the jurisdiction attached to it is uniform with that belonging to the office of
justice of the peace. It is matter of public concern to the people of the state, and
against their peace and dignity, that any one should unlawfully, and without
authority of right, exercise the jurisdiction, powers and functions of such office, and
also matter of interest to the state and to the general public that more persons than
the law authorizes are acting as police magistrates. In this country the rule is
that the attorney general or state's attorney may file the information in
behalf of the people, where the interests of the general public are involved,
at any time, and that, in conformity with the maxim, 'Nullum tempus
occurrit regi,' lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding. (Citations
omitted)
Aptly, in State ex rel Stovall v. Meneley,206 it was held that quo warranto action is
governmental function and not propriety function, and therefore the doctrine of
laches does not apply:
Governmental functions are those performed for the general public with respect to
the common welfare for which no compensation or particular benefit is received. x x
x Quo warranto proceedings seeking ouster of public official are
governmental function. (Citations and annotations omitted) No statute of
limitations is, therefore, applicable. The district court did not err in denying
Meneley's motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. x x x x
The doctrine of laches, furthermore, does not apply when cause of action is brought
by the State seeking to protect the public. (Citations and annotations omitted) x x x
Having already noted that the quo warranto action is governmental function and not
propriety function, we hold the district court did not err in denying Meneley's motion
to dismiss on the basis of laches.
In fact, liberal interpretation to quo warranto provisions is sanctioned given that its
primary purpose is to ascertain whether one is constitutionally authorized to hold
office. State ex rel Anaya v. McBride207 elucidates:
Since the Constitution provides for separate and equal branches of government in
New Mexico, any legislative measure which affects pleading, practice or procedure in
relation to power expressly vested by the Constitution in the judiciary, such as quo coming from private practice when she was nominated as Associate Justice of the
warranto, cannot be deemed binding. We cannot render inoperative clause in the Supreme Court, hence, should not be required to submit those SALNs; and that it
Constitution on so slender reed. One of the primary purposes of quo was not feasible for her to retrieve said SALNs from U.P. as her records therein are
warranto is to ascertain whether one is constitutionally authorized to hold more than 15 years old. Notably, these are mere reiterations of her representations
the office he claims, whether by election or appointment, and we must before the JBC.
liberally interpret the quo warranto statutes to effectuate that purpose.
Hence, until recently when respondent's qualification for office was questioned during
Indeed, when the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly
the hearings conducted by the House Committee on Justice on the impeachment
to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or
complaint against the respondent, there was no indication that would have prompted
prescription.208 Indubitably, the basic principle that "prescription does not lie against
the Republic to assail respondent's appointment, much less question the wisdom or
the State" which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4) 209 of the Civil Code,
reason behind the said recommending and appointing authorities' actions. The defect
applies in this case.
on respondent's appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the
contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.
Circumstances obtaining in this case preclude the application of the
prescriptive period
Given the foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on the
part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its right to seek redress
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose
against public wrong and vindicate public interest. Neither can delay be attributed to
of an action for quo warranto. People v. City Whittier,210 explains that the remedy
the Republic in commencing the action since respondent deliberately concealed the
of quo warranto is intended to prevent continuing exercise of an authority unlawfully
fact of her disqualification to the position. Prescription, therefore, cannot be pleaded
asserted. Indeed, on point is People v. Bailey,211 when it ruled that because quo
against the Republic.
warranto serves to end continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the
action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person
Neither can respondent successfully invoke Act No. 3326215 as mentioned in her
to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary.
Table of Authorities. 216 Respondent refers to Section 1217 thereof which provides for
the prescriptive periods for violations penalized by special acts and municipal
In fact, in Cristobal, the Court considered certain exceptional circumstances which
ordinances. Plainly, Act No. 3326 is inapplicable to the instant petition as respondent
took the case out of the statute of limitations, to wit: (1) there was no acquiescence
is not being sought to be penalized for violation of the laws relating to the non-filing
to or inaction on the part of the petitioner, amounting to the abandonment of his
or incomplete, irregular or untruthful filing of SALNs. At any rate, even the theorized
right to the position; (2) it was an act of the government through its responsible
applicability of Act No. 26 will not work to respondent's advantage given that Section
officials which contributed to the delay in the filing of the action; and (3) the petition
2218 thereof provides that the prescriptive period shall be reckoned either from the
was grounded upon the assertion that petitioner's removal from the questioned
day of the commission of the violation of the law, or if such be not known at the
position was contrary to law.
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of the judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment.
In this case, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning respondent's qualification
for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster.
Finally, it bears to stress that this Court finds it more important to rule on the merits
of the novel issues imbued with public interest presented before Us than to dismiss
As will be demonstrated hereunder, respondent was never forthright as to whether
the case outright merely on technicality. The Court cannot compromise on the
or not she filed her SALNs covering the period of her employment in U.P. Recall that
importance of settling the controversy surrounding the highest position in the
during her application for the Chief Justice position, the JBC required the submission
Judiciary only to yield to the unacceptable plea of technicality. It is but more prudent
of her previous SALNs. In response to the JBC, respondent never categorically stated
to afford the Republic, as well as the respondent, ample opportunities to present
that she filed the required SALNs. Instead, she cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by
their cases for proper and just disposition of the case instead of dismissing the
stating that she should not be required to submit the said documents as she was
petition outright on the ground of prescription. Inasmuch as the ultimate
considered to be coming from private practice; that it was not feasible to retrieve
consideration in providing for one-year prescriptive period was public interest, so is it
most of her records in the academe considering that the same are more than fifteen
the same consideration which prompts this Court not to act nonchalantly and idly
years old; and that U.P. already cleared her of "all academic/administrative
watch title to the public office in question be continuously subjected to uncertainty.
responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative
Indeed, dismissal of cases on technicality is frowned upon especially where public
charges as of June 1, 2006"212 in Clearance213 dated September 19, 2011.
interest is at the other end of the spectrum.
Even up to the present, respondent has not been candid on whether she filed the
required SALNs or not. While respondent stated in her Comment that she filed the III.
required SALNs when she was still connected with the U.P. College of Law, 214 she Respondent is Ineligible as Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief
again offered as support the U.P. Clearance above-cited; that she was considered as Justice
To arrive at judicious appreciation of the parties' respective contentions as to
respondent's qualification for the position of Chief Justice, the Court first reviews the
supervisory authority exercised by it over the JBC, and visits the JBC's rules and
procedure relating to the acceptance and nomination of respondent as Chief Justice.
A.
The Court Exercises Supervisory Authority Over the JBC
The Court's supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the
JBC complies with its own rules
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court, composed of the Chief Justice as ex officioChairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, representative
of the Integrated Bar, professor of law, retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
representative of the private sector. (Emphasis ours)
Ambil, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,219 elucidates on the power of supervision in
general:
On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of
an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties." If the
subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Essentially,
the power of supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are
faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay
down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them. 220
Reflective of the above and similar pronouncements, 221 the seminal case of Jardeleza
v. Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno, et al.,222 explains that the power of
supervision being power of oversight does not authorize the holder of the
supervisory power to lay down the rules nor to modify or replace the rules of its
subordinate. If the rules are, however, not or improperly observed, then the
supervising authority may order the work be done or redone, but only for the
purpose of conforming to such rules.
Thus, in interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it is
consistently held that the Court's supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the
JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. As when the policies of the JBC are
being attacked, the Court, through its supervisory authority over the me, has the
duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC is compliant with its own
rules.223
The JBC occupies unique position in the body of government. While the JBC is
created by the Constitution, the Constitution itself prescribes that it exists as an
office subordinate to the Supreme Court. Thus, under the Constitution, the JBC is
chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and it is the Supreme Court that
determines the emoluments of the regular JBC members and provides for the
appropriations of the me in its annual budget.224
The Constitution also vests upon the JBC the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary and such other functions and duties as the Supreme
Court may assign to it.225 On this, Justice Arturo Brion, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al.,226 offers succinct
point:
Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its assigned
task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to
recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty,
but it can, under its power of supervision, direct the JBC to "take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties," if
the duties are not being performed because of JBC's fault or inaction, or
because of extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in this regard
that, constitutionally, the Court can also assign the JBC other functions and
duties a power that suggests authority beyond what is purely
supervisory.227 (Emphasis ours)
JBC's absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper
actions beyond the latter's reach is therefore not what the Constitution
contemplates.
What is more, the JBC's duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the
exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited.
In Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,228 this Court explained that while certain
leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does
not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements:
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to
the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in
the Judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay
down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants'
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to
set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the
Judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities
necessarily requires degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among
the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial
vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration
ofjustice.229 (Emphasis ours)
So too, the JBC's exercise of discretion is not automatically equivalent to an exercise
of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the
Comi's supervisory and corrective powers. The primary limitation to the JBC's
exercise of discretion is that the nominee must possess the minimum qualifications
required by the Constitution and the laws relative to the position. While the
resolution of who to nominate as between two candidates of equal qualification
cannot be dictated by this Court upon the JBC, such surrender of choice presupposes
that whosoever is nominated is not otherwise disqualified. The question of whether
or not nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is determined based on facts
and therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the exercise of discretion on the part
of the nominating body.
Thus, along this line, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of
policy or wisdom as to place the JBC's actions in the same category as political
questions that the Court is barred from resolving. Questions of policy or wisdom refer
"to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government."230
Baker v. Carr231 gives the classic definition of political question:
x x x [p]rominent on the surface of ruiy case held to involve political question is
found textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to coordinate
political department; or lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on the one question.
Obviously, the exercise of the JBC's discretion in the nomination process is not full as
it is limited by the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the laws for
every position. It does not involve aquestion of policy but simply determination,
based on facts, of whether candidate possesses the requisite qualifications or not.
The JBC neither assumes an existence separate from the Judiciary as it is not
intended to be an independent Constitutional body but merely Constitutional office
created and expressly subjected to the Court's supervision. Judicial encroachment
upon the exercise of wisdom of co-equal branch of the government, which is the very
basis of the political question doctrine, is therefore not attendant when the Court
supervises and reviews the action of the JBC which is neither an executive nor
legislative branch enjoying independent political prerogatives.
In fine, the Court has authority, as an incident of its power of supervision over the
JBC, to insure that the JBC faithfully executes its duties as the Constitution requires
of it. Wearing its hat of supervision, the Court is thus empowered to inquire into the
processes leading to respondent's nomination for the position of Chief Justice on the
face of the Republic's contention that respondent was ineligible to be candidate to
the position to begin with.
Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away
by the JBC
As emphasized, the JBC's exercise of discretion is limited by the Constitution itself
when it prescribed the qualifications absolutely required of person to be eligible for
appointment as Member of the Court.
The qualifications of an aspiring Member of the Supreme Court are enshrined in
Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution:
SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any
lower collegiate court unless he is natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member
of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for
fifteen years or more judge of lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no
person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is citizen of the Philippines and
member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) Member of the Judiciary must be person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence. (Emphasis ours)
Evidently, more than age, citizenship and professional qualifications, Our
fundamental law is clear that member of the Judiciary must be person of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence. The inclusion of subsection is
explained in this wise:
xxxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
My amendment is to add new subsection (3) on Section which reads: MEMBER OF
THE Judiciary MUST BE PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY,
AND INDEPENDENCE.
Before the Committee decides on whether or not to accept the amendment, would
like to explain it first.
Mr. Presiding Officer, this is moral provision lifted with modifications from the
"Canons of Judicial Ethics." The reputation of our justices and judges has been
unsavory. hate to say this, but it seems that it has become the general rule that the
members of the Judiciary are corrupt and the few honest ones are the exceptions.
We hear of justices and judges who would issue injunctive relief to the highest bidder
and would decide cases based on hundreds of thousands, and even millions,
mercenary reasons.
The members of the deposed Supreme Court, with few exceptions, catered to the
political likings and personal convenience of Mr. Marcos by despicably surrendering
their judicial independence. Why should we resist incorporating worthy moral
principles in our fundamental law? Why should we canalize our conservative thoughts
within the narrow confines of pure legalism?
I plead to the members of the Committee and to my colleagues in this Constitutional
Commission to support my amendment in order to strengthen the moral fiber of our
Judiciary. Let not our Constitution be merely legal or political document. Let it be
moral document as well.
x x x232
Requirement of these traits stems from the need to ensure the strength and
sustainability of the third branch of the government. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., Inc.,233 sufficiently explains the state interest involved in safeguardingjudicial
integrity: Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to
Courts, in our system, elaborate principles of law in the course of resolving disputes. the personal demeanor of judges.
The power and the prerogative of court to perform this function rest, in the end,
upon the respect accorded to its judgments. The citizen's respect for judgments SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
depends in turn upon the issuing court's absolute probity. Judicial integrity is, in that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observer.
consequence, state interest of the highest order.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the
An approximation of what defines the term "integrity" was made by the Court
integrity of the Judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to
in Jardeleza, as follows:
be done.
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the
"whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that qualifications such as "competence, integrity, 
SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against
probity and independence  are not easily determinable as they are developed and
lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have
nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is not possible or advisable to lay down
become aware.
iron-clad rules to determine the fitness of those who aspire to become Justice,
Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman." Given this realistic situation, there is
The Code of Professional Responsibility, equally applicable to respondent being first
need "to promote stability and uniformity in JBC's guiding precepts and principles."
and foremost lawyer, mince no words in requiring that lawyer shall perform his
set of uniform criteria had to be established in the ascertainment of "whether one
profession in manner compatible with the integrity of the profession, thus:
meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and
heart expected of him" and his office. Likewise for the sake of transparency of its
CANON - LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT
proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of JBC-009.
AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY
True enough, guidelines have been set in the determination of competence, "probity
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
and independence," soundness of physical and mental condition, and "integrity."
Rule 2.01 A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid
defenseless or the oppressed.
down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not, approximately
equated to an applicant's good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
Rule 2.02 In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept case, he shall not refuse
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.
to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to
That is why proof of an applicant's reputation may be shown in certifications or
safeguard the latter's rights.
testimonials from reputable government officials and non-governmental
organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and
Rule 2.03 A lavvyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct discreet background
solicit legal business.
check and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character
of the applicant, the merits of which shall be verified and checked. As qualification,
Rule 2.04 A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed
the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of
unless the circumstances so warrant.
person's character."234 (Emphasis ours)
The case of Jardeleza, however, is not the first time this Court interpreted the xxxx
requirement of integrity. In Samson v. Judge Caballero,235 this Court dismissed judge
for "obvious lack of integrity" in making false statement in his Personal Data Sheet CANON - LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
(PDS). Meanwhile, in Re: Judge Jaime V. Quitain,236this Court declared Judge Quitain THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
to be dishonest and lacking in integrity when he failed to disclose in his PDS that he
was imposed penalty of dismissal from service in an administrative case filed against Rule 7.01 A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making false statement or
him. suppressing material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.

Emphatically, integrity is not only prerequisite for an aspirng Member of the Court
but is likewise continuing requirement common to judges and lawyers alike. Canon of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct237 provides:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Rule 7.02 A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any
person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other
relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in scandalous Section 3. Testimonies of Parties The Council may receive written opposition to an
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. applicant on ground of his moral fitness and its discretion, the Council may receive
the testimony of the oppositor at hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice
It is also important to note that the Court has always viewed integrity with goal of
to the applicant who shall be allowed to be [sic] cross-examine the opposite and to
preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. In Edaño v. Judge
offer countervailing evidence.
Asdala,238 this Court stated that:
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must
not be given due course, unless there appears on its face probable cause sufficient to
also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples
engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case the Council may
faith in the Judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance
either direct discrete [sic] investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon
thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but
in writing or during the interview.
also to the personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the
decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. Section 1,
Section 5. Disqualification The following are disqualified from being nominated for
Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ensure that not only is their conduct above
appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable
observers. Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence,
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases; 
integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in
their decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice
system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in administrative case,
and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. 239 (Emphasis ours)
where the penalty imposed is at least fine or more than P10,000, unless has been
To make sure that applicants to judicial posttwns possess these constitutionally- granted judicial clemency.
prescribed character requirement, the JBC was created. Jardeleza captures the
purpose of the JBC which it finds to be rooted in the categorical constitutional Section 6. Other instances of disqualification Incumbent judges, officials or personnel
declaration that "[a] member of the Judiciary must be person of proven competence, of the Judiciary who are facing administrative complaints under informal preliminary
integrity, probity, and independence." To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in investigation (IPI) by the Office of the Court of Administrator may likewise be
every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges disqualified from being nominated if, in the determination of the Council, the charges
and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the are serious or grave as to affect the fitness of the applicant for nomination.
President are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. Jardeleza continues
that, in this manner, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of For purpose of this Section and of the preceding Section in so far as pending regular
extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more administrative cases are concerned, the Secretary of the Council shall, from time to
importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified. time, furnish the Office of the Court of Administrator the name of an applicant upon
receipt of the application/recommendation and completion of the required papers;
Thus, in compliance with their mandate, the JBC provided for Rule on Integrity in and within ten days from the receipt thereof the Court Administrator shall report in
JBC-009 Rules,240 as follows: writing to the Council whether or not the applicant is facing regular administrative
RULE 4 case or an IPI case and the status thereof. In regard to the IPI case, the Court
INTEGRITY Administrator shall attach to his report copies of the complaint and the comment of
the respondent.
Section 1. Evidence of Integrity The council shall take every possible step to verify
B.
the applicants records and of reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility,
Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of
irreproachable conduct and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this
SALN intimately relates to person's integrity.
purpose, the applicant shall submit to the council certifications or testimonials
thereof from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations,
Respondent postulates that the filing of SALNs bear no relation to the Constitutional
and clearances from the court National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from
qualification of integrity. In so arguing, respondent loses sight of the fact that the
such other agencies as the council may require.
SALN requirement is imposed no less than by the Constitution and made more
emphatic by its accompanying laws and its implementing rules and regulations. In
Section 2. Background Check The Council may order discrete [sic] background check
other words, one who fails to file his or her SALN violates the Constitution and the
on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, and receive feedback
laws; and one who violates the Constitution and the laws cannot rightfully claim to
thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify to validate the means thereof.
be person of integrity as such equation is theoretically and practically antithetical.
We elaborate: Respondent herself, in her Dissenting Opinion in Phil. Savings Bank v. Senate
Impeachment Court241 interprets that "failure to comply" with the law is "prima
The filing of SALN is Constitutional and statutory requirement facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service
of the public officer."
The filing SALN is an essential requirement to one's assumption of public post. It has
Constitutional, legal and jurisprudential bases. In 1961, R.A. No. 3019 was amended by R.A. No. 3047242 by specifying the period
within which public official should make the disclosure and enumerating certain
Of paramount significance, Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution on the public officials who are exempt from the requirement.
Accountability of Public Officers states:
Section 17. public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and Even during the martial law years, under then President Marcos, the obligation
as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit declaration under imposed upon public officers and employees to declare their assets and liabilities was
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the maintained under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 379243 but with the curious addition
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the that the filing and submission of SALN are now to be required from all citizens,
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the subject to few exceptions. P.D. No. 379 was later on amended by P.D. No.
armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the 417244 which amended the contents of the statement and the manner of providing
public in the manner provided by law. (Emphasis ours) the acquisition cost of the properties. Yet still, P.D. No. 379 was further amended by
P.D. No. 555,245 which prescribed stiffer penalties for violation thereof.
However, even prior to the 1987 Constitution, and as early as 1960, our laws
through R.A. No. 3019, required from every public officer detailed and sworn
Two years after the birth of the 1987 Constitution, R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of
statement of their assets and liabilities, thus:
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees246 was enacted and
SECTION 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days
thereby expanded the obligation to disclose by enumerating the information required
after assuming office, thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the
to be disclosed as regards the assets, liabilities, business interests and financial
close of every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or
connections; requiring the identification and disclosure of relatives in government;
upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of
making the statements and disclosures available and accessible to the public; and
the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of Head of department or Chief
prohibiting certain acts.
of an independent office, with the Office of the President, true, detailed sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including statement of the amounts and sources
In particular, Sections and 11 of R.A. No. 6713 provide:
of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. Public officials and employees have an
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public
obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has
officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year,
the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business
may file their first statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the
interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen
close of the said calendar year.
(18) years of age living in their households.
SECTION 8. Prima facie evidence of and dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure.
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three
hundred seventy-nine, public official has been found to have acquired during his
- All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity,
incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of
laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of
property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
lawful income, that fact shall be ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the
Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18)
name of the spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into
years of age living in their households.
consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be
satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents
including but not limited to activities in any club or association or any ostentatious
display of wealth including frequent travel abroad of non-official character by any (a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current
public official when such activities entail expenses evidently out of proportion to fair market value;
legitimate income, shall likewise be taken into consideration in the enforcement of
this section, notwithstanding any ovision of law to the contrary. The circumstances (b) personal property and acquisition cost;
hereinabove mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the administrative
suspension of the public official concerned for an indefinite period until the (c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds,
investigation of the unexplained wealth is completed. and the like;

(d) liabilities, and;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.
The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;  to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the cost
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated
documents shall also execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their
assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain
from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their
business interests and financial connections in previous years, including, if possible,
the year when they first assumed any office in the Government.
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required
statements jointly or separately.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business
Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the
Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national executive officials with
the Office of the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their
respective regions;
(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the
Office of the President, and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in
their respective regions; and
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, with the Civil Service Commission.
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. It shall be the duty of every public
official or employee to identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and
information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency
prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
(C) Accessibility of documents. (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall
be made available for inspection at reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten
(10) working days from the time they are filed as required by law.
(3) Any person requesting copy of statement shall be required to pay reasonable fee
of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for period of
ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After such period, the statement may
be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.
(D) Prohibited acts. It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any
statement filed under this Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for
dissemination to the general public.
xxxx
Section 11. Penalties. (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or
not he holds office or employment in casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or
regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with fine not
exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months salary or suspension not exceeding one
(1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and
hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by heavier
penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations
of Sections 7, or of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five
(5) years, or fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the
discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in proper administrative proceeding shall be
sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of public official or employee, even if no
criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
xxxx
The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and
accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in
dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section of R.A. No.
3019, as amended provides:
Section 9. Penalties for violations. x x x
(b) Any public officer violating any of the provisions of Section of this Act shall be
punished by fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year and six months, or by both such
fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.
The violation of said section proven in proper administrative proceeding shall be
sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of public officer, even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against him.
Bolh Section of R.A. No. 6713 and Section of R.A. No. 3019 require the
accomplishment and submission of true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities.247 Further, under Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, non-compliance with this
requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or fine, it may also result
in disqualification to hold public office. As the Court explained in Hon. Casimiro, et al.
v. Rigor:248
x x x The requirement of filing SALN is enshrined in the Constitution to promote
transparency in the civil service and serves as deterrent against government officials
bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law, every
government official or employee must make complete disclosure of his assets,
liabilities and net worth in order to avoid any issue regarding questionable
accumulation of wealth. The importance of requiring the submission of complete,
truthful, and sworn SALN as measure to defeat corruption in the bureaucracy cannot
be gainsaid. Full disclosure of wealth in the SALN is necessary to particularly
minimize, if not altogether eradicate, the opportunities for official corruption, and
maintain standard of honesty in the public service. Through the SALN, the public can
monitor movement in the fortune of public official; it serves as valid check and
balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth. The failure to file
truthful SALN reasonably puts in doubts the integrity of the officer and normally
amounts to dishonesty.249
As respondent acutely relates her dissent in Philippine Savings Bank:250
In the present case, because of the fact that the Chief Justice is public officer, he is
constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform positive duty to disclose all of
his assets and liabilities. This already operates as the consent required by law.
The Offices of the Chief Justice and of the 14 Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court are an express creation of the Constitution, which vests them with explicit
powers necessary for the proper functioning of democratic government.
Foremost is the principle that public office is by virtue of the peoples mandate to
exercise sovereign function of the government. Hence, public office is public trust or
agency. Appended to the constitutional principle that public office is public trust is
the tenet that public officers occupy very delicate positions that exact certain
standards generally not demanded from or required of ordinary citizens.
Those who accept public office do so cum onere, or with burden, and are considered
as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby
subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto,
and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to
demand the performance of those duties.
One of these burdens or duties is explicitly articulated in Sec. 17 of Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
xxxx
This provision reqmres all public officers and employees, regardless of rank, to
declare their assets and liabilities upon their assumption of office, as may be
required by law. However, it likewise imposes positive duty and heavier onus on
the President; the Vice-President; and members of the Cabinet, Congress, the
Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions and other Constitutional offices and
officers of the Armed Forces with general or flag ranks to publicly disclose their
assets and liabilities.251 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
Faithful compliance with the requirement of the filing of SALN is rendered even more
exacting when the public official concerned is member of the Judiciary. In Office of
the Court Administrator v. Judge Usman,252 the Court emphasized:
From the foregoing, it is imperative that every public official or government
employee must make and submit complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net
worth in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth. This serves as
the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of
public officials and employees in compliance with the constitutional policy to
eradicate corruption, to promote transparency in government, and to ensure that all
government employees and officials lead just and modest lives, with the end in view
of curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining
standard of honesty in the public service.
In the present case, respondent clearly violated the abovequoted laws when
he Jailed to file his SALN for the years 2004-2008. He gave no explanation
either why he failed to file his SALN for five (5) consecutive years. While
every office in the government service is public trust, no position exacts
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than seat in the Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with
the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative
policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of
justice.253 (Emphasis ours)
The above holds necessarily true considering that the obligation of members of the
Judiciary to file their respective SALNs is not only statutory requirement but forms
part of the mandatory conduct expected of judge so that an "honorable competent
and independent Judiciary exists to administer justice and thus promote the unity of
the country, the stability of government, and the well-being of the people." 254
The Code of Judicial Conduct, in no uncertain terms, provide:
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES
RULE 5.02 A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealing that tend to
reflect adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of
judicial activities or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come
before the court. judge should so manage investments and other financial interests
as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualifications.
xxxx
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

RULE 5.08 A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by
law. (Emphasis ours)
xxxx
Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on person's
integrity
To recapitulate, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution requires that member of
the Judiciary must be of proven integrity. To be of proven integrity means that the
applicant must have established steadfast adherence to moral and ethical
principles.255
The necessity of having integrity among the members of the judiciary is clearly
discussed in the Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct:256
Integrity is the attribute of rectitude and righteousness. The components of integrity
are honesty and judicial morality. judge should always, not only in the discharge of
official duties, act honourably and in manner befitting the judicial office; be free from
fraud, deceit and falsehood; and be good and virtuous in behaviour and in character.
There are no degrees of integrity as so defined. Integrity is absolute. In the
judiciary, integrity is more than virtue; it is necessity.
Failure to file the SALN is clearly violation of the law. The offense is penal in
character and is clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and
employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency as deterrent to graft and
corruption. For these reasons, public official who has failed to comply with the
requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the Court
may consider him/her disqualified from holding public office. In De Castro v. Field
Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman,257 We held:
Public service demands the highest level of honesty and transparency from its
officers and employees. The Constitution requires that all public officers and
employees be, at all times, accountable to the people; serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice; and
lead modest lives. Public office is public trust; it must be treated as privilege rather
than right, and rest firmly upon one's sense of service rather than entitlement. In
this light, the Court deems it necessary to reiterate, as final note, its pronouncement
in Casimiro v. Rigor:
The constitutionalization of public accountability shows the kind of standards of
public officers that are woven into the fabric of our legal system. To reiterate, public
office is public trust, which embodies set of standards such as responsibility, integrity
and efficiency. Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart from these standards,
but our society has consciously embedded them in our laws so that they may be
demanded and enforced as legal principles, and the Court is mandated to apply
these principles to bridge actual reality to the norms envisioned for our public
service.
The requirement to file SALN is not trivial or formal requirement. Neither is it
something over which public officials can exercise discretion. It is mandated by Our
Constitution and laws. It is meant to forge transparency and accountability in the
government and as measure meant to curb corruption. This is dear from the policy of
R.A. No. 6713:
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. It is the policy of the State to promote high
standard of ethics in public service. Public officials and employees shall at all times
be accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties with utmost
responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice,
lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.
Respondent nevertheless argues that the filing of SALN has no relation to an
applicant's integrity, moral fitness or character. She cites the cases of Office of the
Ombudsman v. Racho,258Daplas v. Department of Finance and the Office of the
Ombudsman,259Atty. Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman and Department of
Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Services,260 to support her argument that in
order to establish lack of integrity, there is an additional requirement that there must
be showing that there is an intent to commit wrong. 261
It is inaccurate to use the aforesaid cases to support respondent's conclusion that
her integrity is not affected by her failure to file SALNs.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho,262 the Court upheld the Ombudsman's finding
that Racho is guilty of dishonesty for unexplained wealth. The Court, in that case,
noted that Racho's SALN did not reflect the aggregate amount of his bank deposits.
In Daplas v. Department of Finance and the Office of the Ombudsman,263 this Court
merely held therein petitioner Daplas guilty of simple negligence instead of
dishonesty and grave misconduct for her failure to declare several real and personal
properties in her SALN. The Court found that "petitioner's failure to declare the
Galant sedan in her SALNs from 1997 to 2003 stemmed from the fact that the same
was registered in her husband's name, and purportedly purchased out of his personal
money".
Meanwhile, in Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Finance-
Revenue Integrity Protection Service,264 this Court exonerated Atty. Navarro of
dishonesty, grave misconduct and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The Court ruled, in that
case, that the properties not reflected in therein petitioner's SALN were rightfully
excluded as they do not actually belong to him. This Court even noted therein that
the SALN before 2011 merely required general statement of one's assets and
liabilities.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the above mentioned cases are factually
different from the instant petition. The aforesaid jurisprudence, aside from
determining the administrative liability of therein public employees, dealt
with misdeclaration of assets or properties. Meanwhile, the instant petition questions
respondent's qualifications and as an incident thereto, the validity of the process
leading to her appointment. Further, the fundamental issue in the case at bar is not
merely inaccurate entries, but the glaring absence of respondent's SALN for various
years prior to her resignation from the U.P. College of Law.
Respondent posits that person's failure to file SALN, without more, would not
automatically negate "integrity." 265 It is respondent's theory that the failure to file
SALN without any allegation or evidence that one committed graft and corruption by
acquiring unexplained wealth has no bearing on integrity. Respondent's argument,
however, does not persuade.
The SALN laws contemplate both the (1) physical act of filing her and her family's
statement of assets, liabilities and net worth and (2) filing of true, genuine and
accurate SALN. RA 6713 and RA 3019, being special laws that punish offenses,
are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission
of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
detennines whether or not the provision has been violated. An act which is
declared malum prohibitum renders malice or criminal intent completely
immaterial.266 Thus, whether or not respondent accumulated unexplained wealth is
not in issue at this point in time, but whether she, in the first place, complied with
the mandatory requirement of filing of SALNs. Worse, to subscribe to respondent's
view means that the Court would altogether be deprived of the opportunity to
ascertain whether or not she accumulated unexplained wealth as the tools for doing
so, that is, the filed SALNs and the representations contained therein, are lacking.
Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the
Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct, member of the
Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be person of
proven integrity
To recall, the record of the U.P. HRDO only contains respondent's SALNs for the
years 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002. Later,
respondent produced photocopy of her SALN for 1989 and attached the same to
her Ad Cautelam Manifestation/Submission. On the other hand, the records of the
Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman yields "no SALN filed by
respondent except for the SALN ending December 1998" which was subscribed only
in August 2003 and transmitted by the U.P. HRDO to the Ombudsman only on
December 16, 2003. Further, despite having worked as legal counsel for the Republic
from 2003 to 2006 (up until 2009), there is no record that respondent filed her
SALNs for that period.
Respondent could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the
unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, respondent opted to
withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. Respondent
likewise manifests having been successful in retrieving most of the "missing" SALNs
and yet withheld presentation of such before the Court, except for photocopy of her
1989 SALN submitted only in the morning of the Oral Argument and allegedly
sourced from the "drawers of U.P." Only in respondent's Memorandum Ad
Cautelam did she attach the SALNs she supposedly recovered. But the SALNs so
attached, except for the 1989 SALN, were the same SALNs priorly offered by the
Republic. Other than offering legal or technical justifications, respondent has not
endeavored to convince this Court of the existence of the still unaccounted SALNs. As
she herself stated in her July 23, 2012 letter to the JBC, only some, but not all, of
her SALNs are infeasible to retrieve. Thus, this Court is puzzled as to why there has
been no account of respondent's more recent SALNs, particularly those from 2000,
2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006.
Instead, respondent layers her defenses as follows:
1. Invoking the so-called "Doblada doctrine", respondent maintains having
filed all her SALNs.
Respondent firmly latches on to her allegation that she filed her SALNs, only that she
has no records of the same. It is, however, too shallow and impetuous for this Court
to accept such excuse and disregard the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of Concerned Taxpayer v.
Doblada, Jr.,267 and deem as sufficient and acceptable her statement that she
"maintains that she consistently filed her SALNs." Respondent argues that
in Doblada, the Court gave no evidentiary value to the Office of the Court
Administrator's (OCA) report stating that branch Sheriff had failed to file his SALN for
eighteen (18) years, based only on contrary evidence presented by the respondent
Sheriff that proves the existence of only one (1) of his missing SALNs. According to
respondent, the Court's rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily conclude that
respondent failed to file his sworn SALN simply because these documents are
missing in the OCA's files should likewise be made applicable to her case.
Respondent thus concludes that the Republic must categorically prove its allegation
that respondent did not file her SALNs for all relevant years, and not just show that
the same are no longer on file with the relevant offices.
A more cerebral reading of Doblada, however, poses checkered differences to the
case at bar.
To begin with, the Court imposed the ultimate penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of
all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or service of the
government including government-owned and controlled corporation against Doblada
for his failure to declare true and detailed statement of his assets and liabilities for
the years 1974, 1976, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1998. The pronouncement of the
Court with regard to the non-filing of his SALNs for several years was therefore not
the basis for the imposition of the appropriate penalty against Doblada.
The progenesis of Doblada's troubles was letter-complaint filed by concerned
taxpayer with the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, in turn, referred the complaint to
the OCA. Upon report and recommendation of the OCA, the Court directed the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct discreet investigation of the case
and thereafter, to submit report thereon. The NBI reported discrepancies in
Doblada's SALNs and his yearly salaries constituting prima facie evidence of
unexplained wealth and further stated that "[Doblada] also failed to submit his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities for the years 1975 to 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 and
1997 as said documents were not submitted to the NBI by the Records Control
Division of the Supreme Court." Thereafter, the case was referred to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
Initially, the OCA reported that Doblada's records disclose that he had not been
submitting his SALNs for the years 1975, 1977 to 1988, 1990, 1992, 1999 and 2000.
When asked to explain, Doblada maintains having filed all his SALNs and admits that
he does not have copies of said SALNs as he might have accidentally disposed of the
same during the various times that he transferred office. As proof, Doblada
submitted copy of letter dated May 7, 2001 sent by the Acting Branch Clerk of Court,
stating therein that attached to said letter are the sworn SAL[N] of the staff of RTC,
Pasig City, Branch 155, including that of respondent's, for the year 2000. Said letter
was established to have been sent to and duly received by the OCA, and yet
Doblada's SALN for 2000 was one of those missing in the OCA's files.
It was factually established then that Doblada submitted his SALNs to the branch
clerk of court, presumably as the chief or head of the office. The head of the office
then transmitted the original copy of the SALNs received to the repository agency
which, in Doblada's case, is the OCA. Thus, the OCA's report that Doblada did not file
his SALNs was rendered inaccurate by proof that Doblada, through the head of the
office, actually transmitted the required original copy of the 2000 SALN to the OCA.
Considering the contrary proof presented by Doblada in the form of the letter of the
head of the personnel of Branch 155 that the SALN for 2000 exists and was duly
transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency, te Court
therein inferred that Doblada filed his SALNs.
In respondent's case, while the U.P. HRDO, as the concerned personnel division,
produced respondent's SALNs for 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, and 2002, these very same SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of,
nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the
repository agency. Even then, the Court presently receives the certified copies of
said SALNs as evidence of the existence and the filing thereof.
Nevertheless, for the SALNs which the U.P. HRDO itself cannot produce, i.e., 1986,
1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, and not proven
to be in the records of, nor proven to have been sent to and duly received by the
Ombudsman, are altogether different matter. The existence of these SALNs and
the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting
substantial evidence nor by mere inference.
The Court in Doblada also gave the latter the benefit of the doubt considering the
lack of the categorical statement from the OCA, as the repository agency, that
Doblada failed to file his SALN for the relevant years. Te Court observed that the
report of the OCA simply stated that "it does not have on its file the subject SAL[N]
of [Doblada]." Hence, the Court therein concluded that there was no substantial
evidence to show that Doblada failed to file his SALNs for the relevant years.
In stark contrast, the Certification of the Omdusman, as the repository agency in
respondent's case, made the categorical statement that "based on records on
file, there is no SALN filed by [respondent] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except
SALN ending December 1998 which was submitted to this Office on December 16,
2003."
Respondent, through counsel, attempts to mislead the Court as to the value of the
Ombudsman's Certification by re-directing Our attention to "handwritten
certification"268 affixed by the SALN custodian of the Ombudsman. Upon closer
examination, the "handwritten certification" aside from having been "issued" only on
April 6, 2018 appears to have been made at the behest of respondent's counsel
where the handwritten words may have been tailor-fitted to suit respondent's theory.
The signatory of the "handwritten certification" is the same signatory as that of the
Certification earlier issued by the Ombudsman, and thus the former could not have
possibly negated or altered the tenor of the latter. In any case, such "handwritten
certification" cannot eclipse Certification duly and officially issued by the Ombudsman
in response to subpoena issued by the Congress.
Thus, taking the undisputed pieces of evidence consisting of (1) the U.P. HRDO
certifications proving that respondent's SALNs for 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999,
2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 are not in its possession; and (2) the
Ombudsman certification that based on its records, there is no SALN filed by
respondent except that for 1998; coupled with respondent's inability to show proof
that these SALNs actually exist and that these were actually transmitted to and duly
received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency, conclusively establish that for
the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006,
respondent did not file her SALNs.
Otherwise stated, on the basis of the evidence on record and respondent's
unexplained failure to support her allegation of filing with substantial proof, the Court
reaches the inevitable conclusion that the only SALNs filed by respondent were those
for the calendar years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
1998, and 2002, or only eleven (11) SALNs out of her 20 years in U.P., or for even
more ifher engagement as legal counsel by the Republic and as Deputy
Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights as lauded in respondent's PDS,
are treated as government service.
It is for this reason that We hold that the Republic was able to discharge its burden
of proof, and thus it becomes incumbent upon respondent to discharge her burden of
evidence. Sps. De Leon, et al., v. Bank of the Philippine Islands 269 offers distinction
between burden of proof and burden of evidence:
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court defines "burden of proof" as "the duty of
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law." In civil cases, the burden of
proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his case by
preponderance of evidence. Once the plaintiff has established his case, the
burden of evidence shifts to the defendant, who, in turn, has the burden to
establish his defense.270 (Emphasis ours)
Further, the burden of proof in quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed
by the State. Floyd Mechem in his book, entitled A Treatise on the Law of Public
Offices and Officers,271 explains that when the respondent is called upon at the suit of
the State to show by what warrant he assumes to exercise the functions of public
office, the burden of proving his title rests upon the respondent. When, however, the
respondent has made out prima facie right to the office, it is only at that time that
the burden of evidence shifts to the State.272
Montgomery H. Throop adopted the same view as Mechem. Throop, in his book,
entitled A Treatise on the Law relating to Public Officers and Sureties in Official
Bonds,273 states that upon the trial of an information in the nature of quo warranto,
the prosecutor is not required, in the first instance, to show want of title in the
person, against whom the information is exhibited. The burden is upon the
respondent to establish good title; he must establish the continued existence of
every qualification, necessary to the continued holding of the office, if any such
qualifications exist. But where the respondent has shown good prima facie title, the
burden of proof is shifted to the prosecutor.274
In this jurisdiction, Vicente J. Francisco wrote in his book the Revised Rules of Court
in the Philippines,275 that in quo warranto proceeding, the burden rests on the
defendant or respondent, as against the State at least, to show his right to the office
from which it is sought to oust him. Moreover, since the object of such proceedings is
to test the actual right to the office, and not merely use color of right, it is incumbent
upon the respondent to show good legal title, and not merely colorable one, for he
must rely wholly on the strength of his own title. 276
With the submission of its evidence, including the Certifications from the U.P. College
of Law and the Ombudsman showing that respondent did not file all her SALNs, the
Republic has made out prima facie case that respondent failed to comply with the
SALN law. The duty or burden of evidence thus shifted to respondent to controvert
the Republic's prima facie case, otherwise, verdict must be returned in favor of the
Republic.277 However, what respondent merely offered in response to the Republic's
evidence is an unsubstantiated claim that she had filed all her SALNs. Without
admissible documentary and testimonial support, this bare and uncorroborated
assertion scarcely overcomes the Republic's case.
2. Being on leave without pay exempts respondent from filing her SALNs.
Aside from maintaining that she filed all her SALNs, respondent layers her defenses
by saying that her non-filing of SALN is nevertheless excused because she was on
leave from the U.P. College of Law during June 1, 1998 to October 16, 1998, June 1,
2000 to May 31, 2001, June 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002, November 1, 2003 to May 31,
2004, June 1, 2004 to October 31, 2004, February 11, 2005 to October 31, 2005 and
November 15, 2005 to May 31, 2006. However, per the Certification 278 issued by the
U.P. HRDO dated December 8, 2017, it appears that respondent filed her SALN for
the year ending December 31, 2002, year she was purportedly on leave. To this
Court, respondent's own act of filing SALN in 2002 negates her argument that being
on leave excuses her from filing her SALN. As likewise pointed out during the Oral
Arguments,279 respondent, as regular faculty member, receives monthly
compensation and from at least January 2000 to May 2000 (when she was not on
leave), she earned income and thus should have filed her SALN covering said period.
Further, being on leave from government service is not synonymous with separation
from government service. Suffice to say that one does not cease to become
government employee only because one takes an official leave.
On the contrary, relevant laws provide that all public officials and employees are
required to file SALN.
To review, Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution categorically requires that "[a]
public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as
may be required by law, submit declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and
net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag
rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law."
Section of R.A. No. 6713 states that "[p]ublic officials and employees have an
obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has
the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business
interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen
(18) years of age living in their households." Further, "[t]he [SALN] and the
[d]isclosure of [b]usiness [i]nterests and [f]inancial [c]onnections shall be filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the
Ombudsman; (2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national executive
officials with the Office of the President; (3) Regional and local officials and
employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; (4) Officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the
President, and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their
respective regions; and (5) All other public officials and employees, defined in RA
3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission."
Relatedly, Section 34, Chapter 9, Book of the Administrative Code of 1987 also
states that "[a] public officer or employee shall upon assumption of office and as
often thereafter as may be required by law, submit declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth."
Section of R.A. No. 6713, however, provides for certain exceptions to the
requirement: (1) those serving in honorary capacity these are persons who are
working in the government without service credit and without pay; (2) laborers these
are persons who perform ordinary manual labor; and (3) casual or temporary
workers. Respondent claims exception on the argument that for the periods she was
on official leave from U.P., she did not receive any pay.
This statement, however, is inaccurate. The fact that respondent did not receive any
pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her government worker "serving
in an honorary capacity" to he exempted from the SALN laws. She did not receive
pay not because she was serving in an honorary capacity, but for the simple reason
that she did not render any service for said period. Fundamental is the rule that
workers who were not required to work are not, by law, entitled to any
compensation.
3. Respondent is not required by law to keep record of her SALNs.
Respondent invokes Section 8, paragraph C(4) of R.A. No. 6713 which provides:
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. x x x
xxxx
(C) Accessibility of documents. (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall
be made available for inspection at reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten
affirmative vote of the majority of the particular House
(10) working days from the time they are filed as required by law. concerned;
(3) Any person requesting copy of statement shall be required to pay reasonable fee    
to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the cost
of certification. (b) In the case of the Executive Department, the heads of
the departments, offices and agencies insofar as their
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for period of
ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After such period, the statement may
respective departments, offices and agencies are
be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation. concerned subject to approval of the Secretary of
There is no argument that the filed SALNs need not be retained by the receiving Justice
officer or the custodian after more than ten years from the filing or receipt thereof as
such documents may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation. In this    
context, the filer is likewise under no obligation to keep records of such SALNs after
(c) In the case of the Judicial Department, the Chief
the ten-year period.
Justice of the Supreme Court; and
The fact, however, remains that even respondent's more recent SALNs falling within
the ten-year period for her application to the Chief Justice position are not on record.    
Logically, public officer under question should obtain certification from the repository
agency to attest to the fact of filing. In the event that the SALNs were actually filed
(d) In the case of the Constitutional Commissions and
but missing, such certification should likewise attest to the fact that the SALNs filed other Constitutional Offices, the respective Chairman
could no longer be located due to valid reason (such as destruction by natural and members thereof; in the case of the Office of the
calamity, gutted by fire or destruction pursuant to the ten-year period abovecited).
Ombudsman, the Ombudsman.
4. Respondent was never asked to comply with the SALN laws.
The above official shall likewise have the authority to render any opinion interpreting
Respondent likewise banks on the supposed presumption that she filed the SALNs the provisions on the review and compliance procedures in the filing of statements of
considering that the U.P. HRDO never called her attention to the non-filing thereof assets, liabilities, net worth and disclosure of information.
and instead, released clearance and certification in her favor. However, said
circumstance, if true, does not detract from the fact that the duty to properly In the event said authorities determine that statement is not properly filed, they
accomplish the SALN belongs to the public official and the corrective action that the shall inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective
concerned authority is expected to undertake is limited only to typographical or action.
mathematical rectifications.
The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in
For the years that respondent rendered government service in U.P., the relevant similar factual situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in
rules would be that provided under the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and accordance with it shall not be subject to any sanction provided in the Code.
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees dated April 21, 1989. Rule VIII
The Rules implementing R.A. No. 6713 thus authorize only certain officials of the
thereof provides:
Legislative, Executive and Judicial Departments, and the Constitutional Commissions
Rule VIII
and Constitutional offices to establish compliance procedures for the review of
Review and Compliance Procedure
statements in the SALN to determine whether said statements have been been
properly accomplished. The said officials are also authorized to render opinions
Section 1. The following shall have the authority to establish compliance procedures
interpreting the provisions on the review and compliance procedures and to
for the review of statements to determine whether said statements have been
determine whether or not SALN is properly filed. If the SALN was not properly filed,
properly accomplished:
the authorized officials are required to inform the reporting individual and direct
him/her to take the necessary corrective action. The records do not show that at the
(a) In the case of Congress, the designated committees of time respondent assumed her post as professor in U.P., or at any time thereafter
until her resignation, that concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the
both Houses of Congress subject to approval by the President or the Ombudsman had established compliance procedures for the review
of SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P.
The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came about only
on April 16, 2006 when the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Memorandum
Circular No. 10, s. 2006 amending Rule VIII. This was pursuant to CSC Resolution
No. 06-0231 dated February 1, 2006 wherein the esc adopted the revised rules on
review and compliance procedure. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been
expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to respondent
when such rule was not yet in existence at that time.
At any rate, Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman280 clarifies on the limited corrective
action which the head of office can perform as regards the review of SALNs:
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, the corrective action to be allowed should only
refer to typographical or mathematical rectifications and explanation of
disclosed entries. It does not pertain til hidden, undisclosed or undeclared
acquired assets which the official concerned intentionally concealed by one
way or another like, for instance, the use of dummies. There is actually no
hard and fast rule. If income has been actually reported to the BIR in one's ITR, such
fact can be considered sign of good faith.
xxxx
The Court is mindful of the duty of public officials and employees to disclose their
assets, liabilities and net worth accurately and truthfully. In keeping up with the
constantly changing and fervent society and for the purpose of eliminating corruption
in the government, the new SALN is stricter, especially with regard to the details of
real properties, to address the pressing issue of transparency among those in the
government service. Although due regard is given to those charged with the duty of
filtering malicious elements in the government service, it must still be stressed that
such duty must be exercised with great caution as grave consequences result
therefrom. Thus, some leeway should be accorded the public officials. They must be
given the opportunity to explain any prima facie appearance of discrepancy. To
repeat, where his explanation is adequate, convincing and verifiable, his assets
cannot be considered unexplained wealth or illegally obtained.281(Emphasis ours)
5. Respondent's inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete
requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirms or ratifies
her compliance with the SALN requirement.
Respondent, both in her pleadings and in the Oral Arguments, harps on the
purported failure of the JBC to exclude her from the list of shortlisted applicants. She
points to at least eleven times that the JBC could have disqualified her due to her
lack of SALNs but failed to do so. Hence, she argues that she is deemed to have
substantially complied with the legal requirements at the time of her application.
Respondent's argument is specious. The invalidity of respondent's appointment
springs from her lack of qualifications. Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for
the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite proof
of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. It must be underscored
that the JBC En Banc included respondent in the shortlist for the position of Chief
Justice without deliberating her July 23, 2012 Letter. Without prejudice to this
Court's ruling in A.M No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC, the JBC En
Banc cannot be deemed to have considered respondent eligible because it does not
appear that respondent's failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the
body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the
position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications.
Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party sought to
be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake. 282 Again, without
prejudice to the outcome of the pending administrative matter, it appears that
respondent's inclusion was made under the erroneous belief that she complied with
all the legal requirements concomitant to the position.
Respondent failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in
violation of the Constitutional and statutory requirements
Further, the failure to file truthful SALN not only puts in doubt the integrity of the
officer, but such failure to file truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise
amount to dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth
or to make false statements.283
On its face, the SALNs filed by respondent covering her years of government service
in U.P., appear to have been executed and filed under suspicious circumstances:
(a) Respondent's SALN as of December 31, 1996 was accomplished and notarized
only on June 29, 1998, or two years late;
(b) Her SALN as of December 31, 1998 was filed only in 2003, or five years late;
(c) Her SALNs for the years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2002 were notarized only on
August 21, 2003;284
(d) Both the 1996285 and 1997286 SALNs were subscribed and sworn to by respondent
before Zenaida P. Cruz (Administrative Officer IV, Human Resource Development and
Records Section, U.P. Law Center) on June 29, 1998. However, under the Notarial
Registry of Eugenia A. Borras, four SALNs of respondent were acknowledged before
her on August 21, 2003 as cited in the next preceding paragraph. It appears thus
that there were two SALNs for 1997 executed by respondent;
(d) She failed to file her SALNs for 2004, 2005, and 2006 which were the years when
she received the bulk of her fees from the PIATCO cases. As respondent divulged,
she received from the Republic, through the OSG, the following fees 287 in relation to
the PIATCO cases:
Year Income
2004 P7,055,513.56
2005 P11,532,226.00
2006 P2,636,006.64

2007 P4,673,866.36
2008 P4,070,810.93
2009 P301,552.00
TOTAL P30,269,975.49
(e) Her SALN for 2006 was accomplished only on July 27, 2010 and unsubscribed,
only to be later on claimed by respondent to have been really intended as SALN as of
July 27, 2010;
The SALNs that she submitted in support of her application for Chief Justice likewise
bear badges of irregularities:
(f) Her SALN for 2009 was not accomplished under oath, was likewise belatedly filed
only on June 22, 2012 and indicates therein that she was an Associate Justice of the
Court when her appointment came only on August 16, 2010;
(g) Her SALNs for 2006 and 2009 did not reflect the fees she received as counsel for
the Republic in the PIATCO cases.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue's (BIR) Report shows that respondent received from
the OSG the total gross amount of P32,494,805.27 as fees from 2004 to 2009 for
the PIATCO cases. The BIR Report also shows that she paid the withholding taxes on
said fees in the total amount of Php4,599,504.71. By mathematical computation,
respondent would have had Php27,895,300.56 as her net disposable income. This
net disposable income was not reflected in respondent's SALN for 2006 (which she
claims to really be her SALN as of July 27, 2010) nor in her SALN as of 2009. Her
SALN for 2009 revealed net worth of only Php17,936,353.00;
(h) The unaccounted income from the PIATCO cases could not have been due to
losses or liabilities considering that respondent have had an increase in her net worth
from 2002 to 2009. Her SALN for 2002 shows net worth of only Php3,804,000.00
while her SALN for 2009 shows net worth of Php17,936,353.00, her net worth thus
increased by Php14,132,353.00. While the BIR Report shows that respondent
received approximately Php27M in disposable net income, her SALN only shows an
increase of approximately Php14M in net worth. The difference between the two, in
the amount of estimatedly Php13M, was conspicuously missing in the SALNs filed by
respondent;
(i) There is glaring difference between the two 2010 SALNs filed. The total value of
respondent's personal properties in the "SALN as of July 27, 2010" is
Php9,000,000.00, while the value of her personal properties as declared in her
"SALN as of December 31, 2010" increased to Php11,723,010. Respondent,
therefore, enjoyed an increase of approximately Php2,700,000.00 in personal
properties in just span of five (5) months after having been appointed as Associate
Justice.
j) It is contrary to human experience that the SALNs purportedly recovered by
respondent's husband were not stamped received by the UP HRDO. It is unusual that
respondent did not bother to demand that her personal copy be duly stamped
received with particulars as to the date and initial, at least of the party who received
the same as proof that she timely filed her SALN.
(k) There is no indication from the stamped "Certified Photocopy" and initialed by
Rosemarie Pabiona on the SALNs that she is the official custodian of the same, and
whether the photocopies of the original are on file, contrary to Section 24, Rule 1322
of the Rules of Court.
The above circumstances betray respondent's intention to falsely state material fact
and to practice deception in order to secure for herself the appointment as Chief
Justice. It is therefore clear as day that respondent failed not only in complying with
the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of
integrity, honesty and probity.288
Consistently, the Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal
against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies,
inconsistencies and non-disclosures. For instance, in Rabe v. Flores,289 the Court
unanimously imposed the ultimate penalty of dismissal from service upon regional
trial court interpreter with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leaves and
with prejudice to re-employment for dishonesty and for failure to disclose her
business interest, which was "stall in the market" for continued period of four
years.The Court stressed that it is the obligation of an employee to submit sworn
statement as the "public has right to know" the employee's assets, liabilities and net
worth and financial and business interests.
The dockets of the Sandiganbayan itself show that several charges for violationof
R.A. No. 6713 for failure to file and for untruthful declarations in the SALNs resulted
to plea of guilt from the accused, lest the latter run the risk of being
imprisoned.290 Interestingly, the Sandiganbayan concluded criminal  case291 against
certain Rogelio Pureza, then Senior Superintendent of the Philippine National Police,
who was charged with counts of violation of Section in relation to Section 11 of R.A.
No. 6713 for failure to file his annual SALN for the years 1990, 1991, 1992 and
1993. In the course of the investigation by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military relative to an anonymous letter of concerned resident of Kalookan City
on the alleged illegal activities and unexplained wealth of several policemen, Pureza
was found to have no record of his SALN from 1989 to 1993 on file with the PNP
Records Center. In handing guilty verdict, the Sandiganbayan reasoned that the non-
existence of the SALs with the Records Center of the PNP proved that the accused
did not file his SAL for 1990 to 1993. The Sandiganbayan observed that even
assuming that the accused had indeed filed his SAL with the PNP and his records
were lost during the transfer of records, he could have easily and conveniently
obtained copy of his SAL from either the CSC or the Office of the Military
Ombudsman.
It is thus plainly obvious that the courts do not take violations of the SALN laws
slightly even as against lowly public officials.
With more reason should such test of dishonesty and lack of integrity be applied in
the instant case when respondent failed to file her SALNs for several years and for
those years that she filed, the SALNs so filed prove to be untruthful.
 C.
Respondent failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination
pursuant to the JBC rules
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants
who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought
not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination
Further compounding respondent's woes is the established and undisputed fact that
she failed to submit the required number of SALNs in vjolation of the rules set by the
JBC itself during the process of nomination.
To recall, the announcement for the opening of the application and recommendation
of the position of Chief Justice in 2012 was preceded by JBC En Bancmeeting where
the members thereof agreed that applicants who were previously in the government
service must submit all previous SALNs. This agreement was reflected in the JBC's
announcement published on June 5, 2012, where it was made clear that applicants
from the government shall submit, in addition to the usual documentary
requirements, all previous SALNs, with warning that those with incomplete or out-of-
date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.
As extensively quoted, the minutes292 of the JBC deliberation held on July 20, 2012
show that the JBC deliberated on the candidates who submitted incomplete SALNs
and then determined who among them are to be considered as having "substantially
complied." Senator Francis G. Escudero, as then ex officio member, suggested that
"at least an attempt to comply with particular requirement" can be used as
parameter for determining substantial compliance.293
With this, the JBC proceeded to go over, one by one, the compliance of the
candidates with the lacking documentary requirements. For instance, Justice Abad
was considered as having substantially complied because he submitted SALNs in his
year-stint with the OSG and because the filing of the SALN at the time Justice Abad
joined the government was not yet required. Dean Raul C. Pangalangan lacked
SALNs but that he was trying to get them from the Civil Service Commission and so,
regular member Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman moved that the SALNs he
submitted be considered as substantial compliance. Congressman Rufus B. Rodriguez
did not submit even one SALN which prompted Justice Peralta to remark that
Congressman Rodriguez may no longer be interested. Commissioner Rene V.
Sarmiento also submitted incomplete SALNs, but there was no mention whether the
SALNs he submitted were considered as substantial compliance. Similarly, for
respondent, the JBC determined that she did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to
2006 and that, as remarked by Senator Escudero, the filing thereof during those
years was already required. There was no indication that the JBC deemed the three
SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted by respondent for her 20
years as professor in the U.P. College of Law and two years as Associate Justice, as
substantial compliance.
We revisit the pertinent portions of the aforesaid Minutes as follows:
III. Deliberation on Candidates with Incomplete Documentary Requirements:
xxxx
Justice Peralta suggested that the Council examine the matrix per candidate as
follows:
Justice Roberto A. Abad
The Executive Officer reported that Justice Abad lacks the Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the years 1982-1983.
Justice Peralta mentioned that Justice Abad joined the government in the late
70's and during that time there was no R.A. 6713 yet. He added that Justice
Abad might no longer locate them.
Senator Escudero said that SALNs were not yet required at that time.
The Executive Officer said that Justice Abad had been with the OSG from 1982 to
1986; but he submitted only his SALNs for the period 1981, 1984, 1985 and
1986. He was already asked to submit the lacking SALNs.
Justice Peralta asked whether there is need for them to explain the reason for failing
to comply with the requirements considering the time constraint.
Senator Escudero said that it would be more proper for the JBC to ask the candidate
for the reason; however, in the case of Justice Abad, he opined that he substantially
complied with the requirements of the JBC.
Justice Lagman agreed with the Senator.
There being no objection, the Council agreed that Justice Abad had
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED with the requirements of the JBC.
xxxx
The Executive Officer asked for clarification, particularly with respect to SALNs,
whether five (5) SALNs would constitute substantial compliance if the candidate has
been in the government service for twenty (20) years.
The Council examined the list with regard to the SALNs, particularly the candidates
corning from the government, and identified who among them, would be considered
to have substantially complied:
1. Justice Arturo D. Brion - has substantially complied;
2. Justice Antonio T. Carpio - has substantially complied;
xxxx
5. Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza - has complied;
6. Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro - has substantially complied;
xxxx
10. Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
The Executive Officer informed the Council that she had not submitted her
SALNs for period of ten (10) years, (sic) that is, from 1986 to 2006.
Senator Escudero mentioned that Justice Sereno was his professor at U.P. and that
they were required to submit SALNs during those years.
xxxx
(b) Jose Manuel Diokno submitted sworn and verified statement 298 dated July 17,
2012, stating therein that while he served as General Counsel of the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee and as Special Counsel to the Board of Directors of the
Development [Bank] of the Philippines, his engagement was only as consultant on
contractual basis and as such, was not required to file SALN.
(c) Justice Carpio submitted letter299 dated July 23, 2012 stating that he resigned as
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel effective January 31, 1996 and as such, he did not
submit SALN for the year 1995 because the submission for that year was on April 30,
1996 when he was no longer employed with the government. Nevertheless, the
clearance issued by the Office of the President certifies that Justice Carpio has
submitted his SALN and that he has no pending criminal or administrative case.

16. Atty. Ronaldo B. Zamora has lacking SALNs and MCLE cert. (d) Justice Abad submitted an attestation300 dated July 23, 2012 that he does not
have copy of his SALNs for the years 1968 to 1974, 1976 to 1980 and 1982 to 1983.
xxxx
(e) Dean Amado Valdez wrote letter301 dated July 23, 2012 saying that he could no
From the foregoing discourse, it appears that respondent was specifically singled out
longer find the SALNs covering the years 1985 to 1987, 2002 to 2003 and 2004
from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit single piece of SALN for
representing the years of his intermittent government service. He said that in, any
her years of service in the U.P. College of Law. This is in obvious contrast with the
case, the assets reflected in the SALN which he already filed were acquired after he
other shortlisted applicants who submitted SALNs, or whose years in government
left government service as shown by his income tax returns for the periods from
service correspond to the period prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6713.
2005 to 2011.
The minutes of the JBC En Banc meeting also show that Senator Escudero moved
Notably, Jose Manuel Diokno and Dean Amado Valdez were not included in the short
that the determination of whether candidate has substantially complied with the
list.
requirements be delegated to the Executive Committee. 294 In the end, it appears that
the JBC En Banc decided to require only the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs,
That such was the standing requirement of the JBC from at least the incumbent
or from 2001-2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice position. 295 This, as much, was
Associate Justices applying for the position of Chief Justice is evident from the fact
confirmed by Atty. Pascual during the Congressional hearings. 296
that five (5) out of six (6) applicants who were incumbent Associate Justices,
namely: (1) Justice Carpio; (2) Justice Brion; (3) Justice Velasco; and (4) Justice De
From the foregoing, it is clear that the JBC En Banc did not do away with the
Castro were determined to have completely complied with the SALN requirement;
requirement of submission of SALNs, only that substantial compliance therewith, i.e.,
and (5) Justice Abad was determined to have substantially complied. These Justices
the submission of the SALNs for the immediately preceding 10 years instead of all
submitted the following numbers of SALNs:302
SALNs, was deemed sufficient.
Justice Carpio 14 SALNs
Conformably thereto, the following candidates submitted their respective letters as
regards the submission of the SALNs: Justice Brion 12 SALNs
(a) Justice De Castro submitted letter297 dated July 17, 2012 with the attached SALNs
Justice Velasco 19 SALNs
for 16 years covering the period 1997 to 2011, from the time she became an Justice Leonardo-De Castro 15 SALNs
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan on September 23, 1997 until December 2011
as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. She also disclosed that her SALN from Justice Abad 7 SALNs
February 19, 1973 until November 30, 1978 which she filed during her employment
This belies respondent's representation that the JBC maintained its requirement that
in the Supreme Court, could no longer be located. She also disclosed that her
the candidates submit all previous SALNs. If such were the case, only those
personal files, including her SALNs that she filed while employed at the Department
candidates determined to have complied should have been shortlisted, and the
of Justice from December 1, 1978 to September 22, 1997, were among those burned
others, including respondent, should not have qualified. In any case, the requirement
when the third floor of the DOJ was gutted by fire in late 1996 or early 1997. In any
of submitting SALNs within the ten-year period instead of all previous SALNs is more
case, upon inquiry from the CSC, she was told that her SALNs filed as DOJ employee
in keeping with the law. Recall that Section 8, paragraph C(4) of R.A. No. 6713
were already disposed of, as it was way beyond the statutory ten (10) year period.
provides that the filed SALNs need not be retained by the receiving officer or the
custodian after more than ten years from the filing or receipt thereof, and actually
allows such documents to be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.
Be that as it may, records clearly show that the only remaining applicant-incumbent
Justice who was not determined by the JBC En Banc to have substantially complied
was respondent, who submitted only SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after
extensions of the deadline for the submission to do so.
Instead of complying, respondent offered, by way of her letter dated July 23,
2012, justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she
resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus
her government service is not continuous; that her government records are more
than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all
academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that respondent
submitted only SALNs in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an
attempt on respondent's part to comply.
Respondent sought to be excused from complying with the SALN requirement
because, allegedly, the SALNs requested from her (1995-1999 as respondent
alleged) from U.P., are old and thus "infeasible to retrieve." But the Republic,
through the OSG, was able to present before the Court copies of respondent's SALNs
for 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002 from the U.P.
HRDO. These files, therefore, are not "infeasible to retrieve." Also, in comparison
with the other nominees, the SALNs which the latter could no longer produce are
much older in age than the SALNs which respondent regarded as "infeasible to
retrieve". For instance, Justice Abad had no copy of his SALN from 1968-1974, 1976-
1980 and 1981-1983 while Justice Leonardo-De Castro had no copy of her SALNs
from 1973-1978.
Respondent likewise sought special treatment as having complied with the
submission of the SALN by submitting Certificate of Clearance issued by the U.P.
HRDO. This clearance, however, hardly suffice as substitute for SALNs. The import of
said clearance is limited only to clearing respondent of her academic and
administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from
administrative charges as of the date of her resignation on June 1, 2006. But such
could not, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as compliance with the SALN
requirement. Obviously, an administrative officer, performing ministerial and
administrative duties, could not have certified respondent's compliance with the filing
of SALNs which is statutory, and not merely an administrative, requirement.
In all these, respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact, did not file
several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose
material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of
integrity especially from Member of the Supreme Court. On this score, the
observations of the Court in the case of OCA v. Judge Estacion, Jr.303 ring special
significance:
He concealed from the appointing authority, at the time he applied for the judicial
post until his appointment, information regarding the criminal charges for homicide
and attempted homicide filed against him. Such fact would have totally eluded the
Court had it not been complained of by one Mrs. Ruth L. Vda. de Sison who,
incidentally, is the mother of one of the victims. x x x
xxxx
x x x Respondent did not honestly divulge all that the appointing authority ought to
know to correctly discern whether he is indeed fit for the judicial post. He
continuously suppressed vital information on his personal circumstances under the
false belief that he can mislead the Court and get away with it for good. What
respondent did, or omitted to do, was calculated deception committed not only
against the Court but against the public as well, clearly indicative of his lack of moral
rectitude to sit as magistrate, and sufficiently repulsive that it detracts from public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Dismissal indeed is the appropriate
retribution for such kind of transgression.
Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical
conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested with the public trust. They
should inspire trust and confidence, and should bring honor to the judiciary. And
because of their critical position in the judicial bureaucracy, this Court as overseer is
duty-bound to insure that the integrity of the judicial system is preserved and
maintained, by pursuing that ever-vigilant search for the virtues of competence,
integrity, probity and independence mandated by no less than the Constitution
itself.304 (Citations omitted)
Indubitably, respondent not only failed to substantially comply with the submission
of the SALNs but there was no compliance at all. The contents of respondent's Letter
dated July 23, 2012 itself betray an exercise of dishonesty and disposition to deceive
in an attempt to secure for herself the appointment as Chief Justice. In Ombudsman
v. Peliño,305 We held:
Under the laws governing civil service, dishonesty is classified as grave offense the
penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. person aspiring
to public office must observe honesty, candor anq faithful compliance with the law.
Nothing less is expected. This ideal standard ensures that only those of known
probity, competence and integrity are called to the challenge of public service. It is
understood to imply disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty is
malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one's ability to perform his duties with
the integrity and uprightness demanded of public officer or employee. 306
For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered respondent for
interview as it already required the submission of, at least, the SALNs corresponding
to the immediately preceding 10 years up to December 31, 2011.
Parenthetically, the Court observes that the circumstances surrounding the receipt
of, and the action or non-action of the JBC, on respondent's Letter dated July 23,
2012 likewise leave much to be desired. The Letter, while ostensibly sent to and
received by the JBC on the same date, does not appear to have been brought to the
attention of the JBC En Banc. Excerpts307 from the Report of the House Committe on
Justice on this point is revealing:
Justice Peralta, who was acting Chief Justice and ex officio Chairman of the JBC at
the time, testified that he never learned about the non-submission of the SALNs by
then-applicant [respondent], and that he also never saw the letter submitted by the
[r]espondent explaining why she could not submit her SALNs. He stated that had he
known about these matters, he could have raised these issues during the en banc
meeting of the JBC. Atty. [Maria Milagros N. Fernan-]Cayosa likewise stated that she
never saw the letter-explanation, and that she merely relied on the matrix prepared
by the JBC Secretariat which stated that the Respondent Chief Justice Sereno had
already submitted her complete requirements.308
Even the JBC's Execom to which the duty of ascertaining whether or not the
candidates have substantially complied with the documentary requirements had been
expressly delegated by the JBC En Banc, could not produce any minutes of meeting
or record to show that respondent was in fact determined to have complied.
At any rate, the issue of whether or not there is administrative culpability in the
ranks of the JBC, the OEO or the ORSN relative to the nomination of respondent in
2012 is not concern in the instant petition and is matter best left to be decided in
A.M. No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC, now pending before the Court.
Respondent's failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years
means that her integrity was not established at the time of her application
Respondent argues that failure to submit the SALNs to the JBC is not cause for
disqualification because the SALN was not among the documents which the JBC
considered as evidence of integrity.
This Court, again, disagrees.
The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is
eyeing the position of the Chief Justice. The minutes of the JBC En
Bancmeeting309 enlightens as to the rationale behind the requirement:
Senator Escudero moved that additional requirements be imposed by the (JBC) for
the position of Chief Justice, namely (1) all previous SALNs (up to December 31,
[2011]) for those in the government or SALN as of December 31, (2011) for those
from the private sector; and (2) waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of
local and foreign currency bank accounts under the Bank Secrecy Law and Foreign
Currency Deposits Act. The documents shall be treated with utmost confidentiality
and only for the use of the JBC. He proposed that these additional requirements be
included in the publication of the announcement opening the said position. He
explained that the basis of his motion was the fact that the reason why
Chief Justice Corona was removed from office was due to inaccuracies in his
SALN. The Members of the House of Representatives, in the exercise of their
wisdom, determined that non-inclusion of assets in one's SALN is an
impeachable offense. Likewise, majority of the Senate voted to convict
because of the inaccuracies in the bank accounts and statements in his
SALN. He said that the JBC would not want to recommend person who is
susceptible to such kind of attack. He said that the JBC should impose
higher standards to aspirants for the position of Chief Justice.
Congressman Tupas concurred with Senator Escudero's motion and suggested that
the waiver should not be limited to year-end balances only.
There being no objection, the motion was APPROVED. The (JBC) agreed to PUBLISH
the announcement opening the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines together with the additional requirements.
x x x. (Emphasis ours)
The requirement to submit the SALNs along hand with the waiver of bank deposits, is
therefore not an empty requirement that may easily be dispensed with, but was
placed by the JBC itself for reason in order to allow thJBC to carry on its mandate of
recommending only applicants of high standards and who would be unsusceptible to
impeachment attacks due to inaccuracies in SALNs.
Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public
are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant's fitness or propensity to
commit corruption or dishonesty. In respondent's case, for example, the waiver of
the confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that
she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches
the entries indicated in the SALN. This is precisely the reason why the JBC required
the submission of the SALNs together with the waiver of bank deposits, thus:
Justice Lagman expressed that previously the Members had agreed that they would
only use the waiver when there is complaint, doubt, or suspicion on the SALN of any
of the candidates.
Senator Escudero said that if the argument that the JBC would not use the waiver
unless there is complaint, bank information could not be secured. The complaint
could have no basis. He commented that by the time the JBC receives the
information, the public interview is finished. In this case, the least that the JBC could
do is to give the candidate an opportunity to explain his side. He explained that
the theory and logic behind the requirement of waiver was precisely due to
the fact that the former Chief Justice was impeached because of
inaccuracies in his SALN. Thus, the JBC should ensure that all the nominees
who would be nominated would not be accused of the same. The JBC would
just want to avoid situation where the next Chief Justice, nominated by the
JBC and appointed by the President, would again be subjected to
impeachment.
Justice Peralta asked the Senator for clarification whether it is his suggestion that if
the JBC finds something wrong on the bank account of any candidate, he or she
would be asked in public.
Senator Escudero replied that it could be done; however, in the questions that would
be propounded by Member, or in the response of the candidates, the amounts need
not be stated. The questions should only tackle inconsistencies of bank
deposits as against their SALNs.
Justice Lagman agreed with the Senator.
xxxx
Justice Hermosisima commented that the waiver is very easy to comply with. The
problem is that banks may not be able to respond given the very short period of
time. He said that the JBC requires waiver so that in the event that there is any
question as to the accuracy of candidate's accounting in his or her SALN, then, the
JBC would be able to look into the bank accounts without violating the bank secrecy
law. He said that the JBC need not look into their accounts for now as no complaint
has been filed yet on any of the candidates.
Senator Escudero and Congressman Tupas commented that everybody
should comply.
x x x.310 (Emphasis ours)
Respondent is presumed to know of the importance of the filing of the SALN together
with the bank waiver. The waiver which respondent executed under oath clearly
provides:
This waiver is executed on the condition that the JBC or its duly authorized
representatives shall make use of it, as well as any and all information or data
obtained by virtue thereof, for the exclusive and sole purpose of evaluating my
qualifications for the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis ours)
Conclusively then, respondent's failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC means that
she was not able to prove her integrity at the time of her application as Chief Justice.
D.
Respondent's disposition to commit deliberate acts and omissions
demonstrating dishonesty and lack of forthrightness is discordant with any
claim of integrity
attention as regards compliance with the SALN requirements was imposed only in
April 2006 (CSC Resolution No. Memorandum Circular No. 10-2006 dated April 17,
2006) as stated in her Letter. Hence, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected
to perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to respondent when such
rule was not yet in existence at that time;
(4) Her PDS shows that she was Deputy Ca,mmissioner of the Commission on
Human Rights only later to be disclaimed by her during the Oral Argument stating
that it was only functional title;
(5) In her Letter dated July 23, 2012 to the JBC, respondent represented that her
SALNs were infeasible to retrieve when the SALNs that she selectively filed were
available all along in U.P. and in fact the OSG was able to get copies of the same.
Even respondent herself was able to get copy of her 1989 SALN from U.P.;
(6) There is marked incompatibility between the excuse respondent proffered in her
Letter dated July 23, 2012, and the explanation she gave in the Oral Argument. In
the Letter, the respondent reasoned that it is "infeasible to retrieve" all her SALNs
because of the age of said documents, i.e., that they are more than fifteen years old.
However, during her Oral Arguments, she explained that it was "infeasible" to
retrieve them only because of time constraints;
(7) She claims that the other candidates for the Chief Justice position did not comply
with the SALN requirement for the application, when it was only she who did not
comply. Out of the six incumbent Justices who were candidates for the Chief Justice
positions, it was only respondent who did not comply with SALN submission. There
are competent proofs on record to show these other candidates' compliance,
contrary to respondent's allegations.

The Court cannot play blind against the manifest inconsistencies, lack of (8) Respondent committed tax fraud when she failed to truthfully declare her income
forthrightness and dishonesty committed by respondent as government official prior in her income tax returns for the years 2007-2009 and in her value-added tax (VAT)
to and at the time of her application as Chief Justice. In addition to the suspicious returns for the years 2005-2009;
and highly questionable circumstances surrounding the execution of her SALNs, the
following untruthful statements and dishonest acts (as herein elsewhere discussed) Per the BIR Report,311 respondent underdeclared her income in her quarterly VAT
ultimately negate respondent's claim that she is person of proven integrity: Returns the following amounts in the taxable years 2005-2009:
(1) Respondent had no permit from U.P. to engage in private practice while in
government service but she did engage in private practice as shown in her PDS and
admitted in her Ad Cautelam Comment;
Quarterly Declared
Income from Income per Over (Under)
(2) Respondent represented that after her resignation from U.P. in 2006, she was Period
PIATCO Case VAT Return (Php)
engaged, full time, in private practice. However, in her PDS, it was stated that she
was engaged as counsel by the government in the PIATCO cases from 1994 up to (Php) (Php)
2009;
2005
(3) Respondent claims that the clearance issued by U.P., clearing her of
-
academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and Q3 1,398,807.50 -
from administrative charges as of June 1, 2006 can be taken as an assurance that 1,398,807.50
U.P. considered the SALN requirements to have been met since it is the ministerial
duty of the Head of the Office to ensure that the SALNs of its personnel are properly Q4 7,234,455.44 667,333.33 -6567122.11
filed and accomplished. However, this ministerial duty of U.P. HRDO to call her
 to address this matter or that this matter is "totally alien" to this proceedings. This
2006 matter was actually brought up during the Oral Argument. In its Memorandum, the
Q1 - 469,375.00 469,375.00 Republic explained that during the Oral Argument, some Members of the Court raised
questions regarding respondent's income as counsel in the PIATCO cases and the
Q2 - 1,416,664.25 1,416,664.25 payment of the corresponding taxes thereto, hence, the inclusion of the same in its
Memorandum.312 In the same way, respondent could have addressed the same in her
- Memorandum Ad Cautelam, instead she opted to do so in belatedly filed
Q3 1,539,546.28 - Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam.
1,539,546.28
Q4 1,387,292.12 1,246,992.00 -140,300.12 At any rate, respondent's argument in the said Reply/Supplement, implying that the
allegations on the tax fraud are unfounded, and that in including this matter, which
2007 is mere reiteration of the discussion in Article of the Articles of Impeachment, the
OSG usurped the sole power of the House of Representatives to initiate and
Q1 - 2,620,340.17 2,620,340.17 prosecute the Articles of Impeachment in blatant disregard of the
Constitution,313 deserve scam consideration.
Q2 - -  
It bears stressing that respondent is not being prosecuted for tax fraud in this case.
-
Q3 4,379,198.29 2,183,529.33 The Court did not discuss the merits of the said tax fraud nor did the Court made any
2,195,668.96 conviction against the respondent as regards the said offense. Neither is this Court's
finding of respondent's lack of proven integrity during her application anchored upon
Q4 633,670.58 - -633,670.58 this act. This matter is cited as corroborative circumstance to respondent's non-filing
of certain SALNs, already established in this case. Notably, the Congress had already
2008 determined that probable cause exist that respondent committed the said offense.
Q1 - 2,650,440.00 2,650,440.00 Further, respondent's disposition and propensity to commit dishonesty and lack of
Q2 - -   candidness are manifested through her subsequent acts committed during her
incumbency as Chief Justice, which are now matters of public record and also
Q3 - 508,032.00 508,032.00 determined to be constituting probable cause for impeachment:
(9) Caused the procurement of brand-new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least
- Php5,000,000.00;
Q4 5,184,435.85 1,045,262.67
4,139,173.19
(10) Caused the hiring of Ms. Helen Macasaet without the requisite public bidding
2009 and who received excessive compensation amounting to more than
Php11,000,000.00;
Q1 344,243.65 301,552.00 -42,691.65
(11) Misused at least Php3,000,000.00 of government funds for hotel
Total accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices
Undeclared meeting;
-
Income (12) Created the Judiciary Decentralized Office (JDO) in the guise of reopening the
16,656,980.39
Subject to Regional Court Administration Office (RCAO) without being sanctioned by the Court
En Banc;
VAT
On this matter, respondent avers in her Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad (13) Issued Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in Coalition of Associations of Senior
Cautelam that she was not given the chance to be heard on this new matter in the Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court's internal rules
Republic's Memorandum, which makes reference to new documents, totally alien to an misrepresented that the TRO was issued upon the recommendation of the
and outside of the matters raised in the Republic's Petition, Reply, and other Member-in-charge;
previous submissions.
(14) Manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the
There is no truth to the allegation that respondent was not afforded the opportunity Maute cases outside of Mindanao;
 SEC. 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do certain thing
(15) Ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar
benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses thing at another time; but it may be received to prove specific inent or
of deceased judges and Justices; knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like. (Emphasis ours)
(16) Appointed Geraldine Econg as Head of the JDO and Brenda Jay Angeles-
E.
Mendoza as Chief of the Philippine Mediation Center Office (PMCO) without the
Respondent's ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
approval of the Court En Banc;
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice
(17) Failed and refused to appoint qualified applicants to several high-ranking
The Court is all too aware that the instant petition neither partakes of an
positions in the Supreme Court;
administrative or criminal proceeding meant to determine culpability for failure to file
SALNs. Respondent maintains that she filed ail her SALNs, only that she refuses to
(18) Ordered the dissemination of erroneous information on what transpired during
present proof of such SALNs before the Court. The Court's pronouncement, however,
the Supreme Court En Banc deliberations in A.M. No. 16-08-04-SC on the alleged
should not be made dependent upon the pieces of evidence which party may possibly
involvement of four (4) incumbent judges in illegal drugs and undermined the co-
present in different forum. Rather, the Court is mandated to render judgment based
equal power of the Executive Department by ordering the Executive Secretary
on the evidence presented before it, in compliance with the dictates of due process.
himself to file cases against the judges;
And the evidence, as it stands before Us, shows that respondent failed to file nine
SALNs in her 20-year service in U.P. College of Law and submitted to the JBC only
(19) Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then Solicitor General, now
three out of the required ten SALNs at the time of her application as Chief Justice.
Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving
national security against the latter;
Respondent split hairs in stating that failure to file is different from failure to submit
the SALNs to the JBC. That may be true. But it is likewise true that despite ample
(20) Clustered the nominees for the six (6) vacant positions of Associate Justice in
opportunity to do so, respondent chose not to present evidence as to preponderate
the Sandiganbayan without legal basis and in so doing, impaired the power of the
the case in her favor. The Court cannot therefore be faulted, at least for purposes of
President to appoint members of the Judiciary;
the instant quo warranto proceedings, to conclude that respondent not only failed to
submit the SALNs to the JBC, but altogether failed to file the same.
(21) Misrepresented to the members of the Supreme Court En Banc that there were
Justices who requested to do away with the voting of recommended applicants to the
Such failure to file and to submit the SALNs to the JBC, is clear violation not only of
vacant positions in the Supreme Court;
the JBC rules, but also of the law and the Constitution. The discordance between
respondent's non-filing and non-submission of the SALNs and her claimed integrity
(22) Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude Court of Appeals Associate
as person is too patent to ignore. For lack of proven integrity, respondent ought to
Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta from the shortlist of nominees for the position of
have been disqualified by the JBC and ought to have been excluded from the list of
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals;
nominees transmitted to the President. As the qualification of proven integrity goes
into the barest standards set forth under the Constitution to qualify as Member of the
(23) Interfered with the investigation conducted by the House of Representatives on
Court, the subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will not qualify an
the alleged misuse of the tobacco funds in the Province of Ilocos Norte by unilaterally
otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of respondent in the
preparing Joint Statement, asking the House of Representatives to reconsider its
shortlist of nominees submitted to the President cannot override the minimum
show cause order against the Justices of the Court of Appeals, and then pressuring
Constitutional qualifications.
then Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, now Associate Justice Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. to likewise sign the same;
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the
time of appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer's entire
(24) Undermined and disrespected the impeachment proceedings conducted by the
tenure as continuing requirement. 315 When the law requires certain qualifications to
House of Representatives against her.314
be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to
Again, while concedingly the foregoing acts as revealed during the Congressional serve as public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes
hearings on the impeachment are not proper subjects of the instant quo candidate.316
warranto petition, these acts are nevertheless reflective and confirmatory of
respondent's lack of integrity at the time of her nomination and appointment as Chief The voidance of the JBC nomination as necessary consequence of the Court's finding
Justice and her inability to possess such continuing requirement of integrity. Indeed, that respondent is ineligible, in the first place, to be candidate for the position of
Rule 130, Section 34 of the Rules on Evidence provide: Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as matter of course. The
Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as
the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the
OEO, as regards the circumstances relative to the selection and nomination of
respondent submitted to this Court in A.M. No. 17-11-12 and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC.
Relatedly, the Court, in quo warrantoproceeding, maintains the power to issue such
further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office,
position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.317
Neither will the President's act of appointment cause to qualify respondent. Although
the JBC is an office constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the
selection and nomination process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.
The regular members of the JBC are appointees of the President, including an ex
officio member, the Secretary of Justice, who serves as the President's alter ego. As
observed during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutiopal Commission:
xxxx
MR. CONCEPCION. The Judicial and Bar Council is no doubt an innovation. But it is
an innovation made in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in
the appointment of judges.
At present, there will be about 2,200 positions of judges, excluding those of the
Supreme Court, to be filled. We feel that neither the President alone nor the
Commission on Appointments would have the time and the means necessary to
study the background of every one of the candidates for appointment to the various
courts in the Philippines, specially considering that we have accepted this morning
the amendment to the effect that no person shall be qualified unless he has proven
high sense of morality and probity. These are matters that require time, which we
are sure the President does not have except, probably, he would have to endorse the
matter to the National Bureau of Investigation or to some intelligence agency of the
government. And we do not think that these agencies are qualified to pass upon
questions of morality, integrity and competence of lawyers.
As regards the implication that we are, in effect, depriving the President of the power
of appointment, all we do consider is the fact that the members of the Council are all
appointees of the President. They are alter egos of the President so, in effect, they
are exercising the power by virtue of the appointment by the President. So, the
alleged negation or denial or emasculation of the appointing power of the President
does not really exist since all members of the Council, except those who are ex -
officio members who, by the way, are also appointees of the President, are all
appointees of the President.
In effect, the action of the JBC, particularly that of the Secretary of Justice as ex
officio member, is reflective of the action of the President. Such as when the JBC
mistakenly or wrongfully accepted and nominated respondent, the President, through
his alter egos in the JBC, commits the same mistake and the President's subsequent
act of appointing respondent cannot have any curative effect.
Besides in Luego v. Civil Service Commission,318 We said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he
does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (Emphasis
ours)
As emphasized in Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission:319
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for particular position. It also has no authority to direct the
appointment of sub'stitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially
within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the
only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, while the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the
exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the
appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of
which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.
Even as respondent took her "oath of office," she remains disqualified. An oath of
office is qualifying requirement for public office and prerequisite to the full investiture
of the office.320 The oath, couched in the following tenor, states:
Ako ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa
abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at
ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas,
na aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas; na tunay na
mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang legal,
at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng
Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito nang walang
ano mang pasubali hangaring umiwas.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
As respondent herself expressed through her dissent in Philippine Savings
Bank, "[w]hen public officer affixes his signature on his Oath of Office, he embraces
all his constitutional and statutory duties as public officer, one of which is the
positive duty to disclose all  of his assets and liabilities. Thus, for all public
officers, what is absolute is not the confidentiality privilege, but the
obligation of disclosure."321
While respondent putatively took an oath to defend and support the Constitution and
to obey the laws of the land, she had not been forthright with the circumstances
surrounding the lacking SALNs. This makes her oath untruthful and altogether false.
F.
Respondent is de facto officer removable through quo warranto
The effect of finding that person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the
status of de facto officer.322
Tayko v. Capistrano,323 through Justice Ostrand, instructs:
Briefly defined, de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of judicial office under
color of an appointment or election thereto x x x. He differs, on the one hand, from
mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the
others hand, from judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified
and whose term of office has not expired x x x. (Citations omitted)
For lack of Constitutional qualification, respondent is ineligible to hold the position of
Chief Justice and is merely holding colorable right or title thereto. As such,
respondent has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal
from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore,
of quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust respondent from the
appointive position of Chief Justice. Tayko continues:
The rightful authority of judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial functions,
cannot be questioned by any merely private suitor, nor by any other, excepting in
the form especially provided by law. judge de facto assumes the exercise of part of
the prerogative of sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is open to the
attack of the sovereign power alone. Accordingly, it is well established principle,
dating from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed by an unbroken current of
decisions, that the official acts of de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as
those of de jure judge, so far as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned. The rule is the same in civil and criminal cases. The principle
is one founded in policy and convenience, for the right of no one claiming title or
interest under or through the proceedings of an officer having an apparent authority
to act would be safe, if it were necessary in every case to examine the legality of the
title of such officer up to its original source, and the title or interest of such person
were held to be invalidated by some accidental defect or flaw in the appointment,
election or qualification of such officer, or in the rights of those from whom his
appointment or election emanated; nor could the supremacy of the laws be
maintained, or their execution enforced, if the acts of the judge having colorable, but
not legal title, were to be deemed invalid. As in the case of judges of courts of
record, the acts of justice de facto cannot be called in question in any suit to which
he is not party. The official acts of de facto justice cannot be attacked collaterally. An
exception to the general rule that the title of person assuming to act as judge cannot
be questioned in suit before him in generally recognized in the case of special judge,
and it is held that party to an action before special judge may question his title to
the office of judge on the proceedings before him, and that the judgment will be
reversed on appeal, where proper exceptions are taken, if the person assuming to
act as special judge is not judge de jure. The title of de facto officer cannot be
indirectly questioned in proceeding to obtain writ of prohibition to prevent him from
doing an official act nor in suit to enjoin the collection of judgment rendered by him.
Having at least colorable right to the officer his title can be determined only in quo
warranto proceeding or information in the nature of quo warranto at suit of the
sovereign. (Citation omitted)
Although Tayko dealt with challenge to the title of judge, who is not an impeachable
official, the ruling therein finds suitable application since quo warrantoas remedy is
available against respondent who is de facto Chief Justice, having mere colorable
right thereto. This must necessarily be so since the Constitution, in providing that
impeachable officials can only be removed by impeachment, presumes that such
impeachable official is one having de juretitle to the office.
Upon finding that respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice
and is therefore unlawfully holding and exercising such public office, the consequent
judgment under Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and exclusion
of respondent from holding and exercising the rights, functions and duties of the
Office of the Chief Justice.
IV.
Guidelines for the Bench, the Bar and the JBC
The present is the exigent and opportune time for the Court to establish well-defined
guidelines that would serve as guide posts for the bench, the bar and the JBC, as
well, in the discharge of its Constitutionally mandated functions. In sum, this Court
holds:
Quo warranto as remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of,
provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present, when the
subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or
election relating to an official's qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity being continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be
the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
Members of the Judiciary are bound by the qualifications of honesty, probity,
competence, and integrity. In ascertaining whether candidate possesses such
qualifications, the JBC in the exercise of its Constitutional mandate, set certain
requirements which should be complied with by the candidates to be able to qualify.
These requirements are announced and published to notify not only the applicants
but the public as well. Changes to such set of requirements, as agreed upon by the
JBC En Banc through proper deliberation, such as in this case when the JBC decided
to allow substantial compliance with the SALN submission requirement, should also
be announced and published for the same purpose of apprising the candidates and
the public of such changes. At any rate, if candidate is appointed despite being
unable to comply with the requirements of the JBC and despite the lack of the
aforementioned qualifications at the time of application, the appointment may be the
subject of quo warranto provided it is filed within one year from the appointment or
discovery of the defect. Only the Solicitor General may institute the quo
warranto petition.
The willful non-filing of SALN is an indication of dishonesty, lack of probity and lack
of integrity. Moreso if the non-filing is repeated in complete disregard of the
mandatory requirements of the Constitution and the law.
Consistent with the SALN laws, however, SALNs filed need not be retained after more
than ten years by the receiving office or custodian or repository unless these are the
subject of investigation pursuant to the law. Thus, to be in keeping with the spirit of
the law requiring public officers to file SALNs to manifest transparency and
accountability in public office if public officers cannot produce their SALNs from their
personal files, they must obtain certification from the office where they filed and/or
the custodian or repository thereof to attest to the fact of filing. In the event that
said offices certify that the SALN was indeed filed but could not be located, said
offices must certify the valid and legal reason of their non-availability, such as by
reason of destruction by natural calamity due to fire or earthquake, or by reason of
the allowed destruction after ten years under Section of R.A. No. 6713.
V.
Blatant Disregard and Open Defiance to the Sub Judice Rule
Perhaps owing to novelty, the instant case has opened pandora's box of unsolicited
opinions, streaming in abundance from those professed legal and non-legal experts
alike. This flurry of opinions, demonstrations, public and media appearances made by
the parties themselves or at their behest, or by their lawyers and spokespersons,
had demonstrably shifted the plane from what should otherwise be purely legal, calm
and sober approach to the present controversy into detestable feast
of pros and cons, and of mediocre and haphazard approximation of perceived good
versus evil. This veritable feast had become too delectable to escape the waiting
predators' keen sense of attack, especially at time when the prey appears to be at its
most vulnerable. This Court is an institution designed and dedicated to specific
purpose and thus refuses to fall prey and invite claws to dig into its walls. Because of
the various extraneous redirections from the merits which the instant case has
received, there is need to emphasize that this case involves purely legal and
justiciable matter which the Court intends, and had resolved, through the application
of the Constitution, the law and relevant jurisprudence, unswayed by personalities or
sentiments.
As such, the Court had lent extreme tolerance to the parties and nonparties equally,
as the Court shall ultimately speak through its decision. Be that as it may, the Court,
in jealous regard of judicial independence, cannot simply overlook the open and
blatant defiance of the sub judice rule suffered by the present action.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice. 324 The rationale for this rule is for the
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law, to be immune from every extraneous
influence; for the case to be decided upon evidence produced in court; and for the
determination of such facts be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or symphathies. In
fine, what is sought to be protected is the primary duty of the courts to administer
justice in the resolution of cases before them.325
Thus, it is generally inappropriate to discuss the merits of and make comments on
cases sub judice and such acts may even result to contempt of court. In US. v.
Sullen326 it was stated:
In clear case where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial business
unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of
verdicts; or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not
hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be
permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free
from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be
insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as last resort, as an individual
exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an
unprejudiced tribunal.
In Our jurisdiction, this rule finds legal basis on the Court's power of contempt. Rule
71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
xxxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice;
x x (Emphasis ours)
The oft-cited defense of persons charged with indirect contempt for violating the sub
judice rule is their right to free speech. Needless to say, this Court would be the first
in line of combat in legal battle to uphold such constitutionally-protected right.
However, when actions, posing to be innocent exercise of such right, "impede,
interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice" or "make serious and
imminent threat thereto", this Court will not hesitate to call out and punish the
same.327 In Sheppard v. Maxwell,328 the US Supreme Court reminds that although the
freedom of expression should be given great latitutde, it must not be so broad as to
divert the trial away from its objective which is to adjudicate both criminal and civil
matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting.
The sub judice rule finds more austere application to members of the Bar and of the
Bench as the strict observance thereof is mandated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct:
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
CANON 13 A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN
FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE
APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
Rule 13.02 A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against party.
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY
CANON - INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is pre-requisite to the rule of law and fundamental guarantee
of fair trial. judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both
its individual and institutional aspects.
SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before any court or administrative agency.
SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of
judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational
independence of the judiciary.
SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in
order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the
maintenance of judicial independence.
CANON - INTEGRITY
Integrity is essentially not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also
to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in
the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen
to be done.
CANON - IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not
only to the decision itself but to the process by which the decision is made.
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession, and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while proceeding is before or could come
before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall
judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of
any person or issue.
CANON - PROPRIETY
SECTION 2. As subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should
do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in way that
is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always
conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office
and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
Lawyer speech is subject to greater regulation for two significant reasons: one,
because of the lawyer's relationship to the judicial process; and two, the signficant
dangers that lawyer's speech poses to the trial process.329 As such, actions in
violation of the sub judice rule may be dealt with not only through contempt
proceedings but also through administrative actions.
It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate branches of the Government
and even men and women learned in law had succumbed to the tempting affray that
tends to divert the instant quo warranto action from its primary purpose. Even
worse, respondent and her spokepersons chose to litigate respondent's case, apart
from her Ad Cautelam submissions to the Court, before several media-covered
engagements. Through her actuations, respondent appears to have forgotten that
this is court action for quo warranto, and as such, the concomitant rule on sub
judice unnegotiably applies. Worst still, respondent who is lawyer and who asserts
right to the Chief Justice position and therefore must foremost be aware of the rule,
continues to conjure public clamor against the Court and its Members with regard to
this pending case in Court.
It is interesting to note that respondent initially refused to participate in the
congressional hearings for the impeachment complaint. When this petition for quo
warranto was filed, respondent continuously refuses to recognize this Court's
jurisdiction. Instead of participating in the process and answering the charges
against her truthfully to assist in the expeditious resolution of the matter, respondent
opted to proceed to nationwide campaign, conducting speeches and accepting
interviews, discussing the merits of the case and making comments thereon to vilify
the members of the Congress, cast aspersions on the impartiality of the Members of
the Court, degrade the faith of the people to the Judiciary, and falsely impute ill
motives against the government that it is orchestrating the charges against her. It is
well-nigh unthinkable for respondent to profess deprivation of due process when she
herself chose to litigate her case before the media.
These public appearances,330 to name few, are as follows:
Event Source Quotatio
ns
'Speak Video: "Kung
Truth to <https://web.facebook.com/juliusnleone manalo
Power' n/videos/889291114607029/> ang quo
forum in Article: warrant
UP <https://www.rappler.com/nation/2018 o,
Diliman, 54-sereno-quo-warranto-destroyjudicial- mapupu
Quezon independence> nta tayo
City sa
on May diktatur pigilan
5, 2018   ya," she ito ..."
said she
"Talaga said.
ng Integrat Article: "Ano po
wawasa ed Bar <https://businessmirror.com.ph/sereno- ang
kin of the seesdictatorship-after-filingof-quo- tawag
complet Philippin warranto-petitionagainst-her/> sa
ely ng es (IBP) kondisy
quo Central on na
warrant Luzon   ang
o na ito Regional citizen
ang Conventi walang
judiciar on and kalaban
y." Mandato -laban
ry sa
"Pag Continui gobyern
itong ng Legal o" Chief
quo Educatio Justice
warrant n at thr Maria
o Quest Lourdes
natuloy, Hotel A.
hindi na here Sereno
right on May asked.   
and 2, 2018  
reason,
kundi "Ang
will will tawag
na po doon
nu'ng dictator
whoeve ship,
r is on hindi po
top. So constitu
kailanga tional
n natin democr
acy ang is
tawag granted
doon, " , the
she Judiciar
said. y will
destroy
"That is itself,"
what is Sereno
going to said as
happen she also
if the praised
quo the
waranto IBP's
petition stand to
is oppose
granted and
," dismiss
Sereno the
stated.   petition.
   Forum Video: "Of my
on <https://web.facebook.com/24OrasGMA colleagu
"The upholdin /videos/l 0156438427991977/?t=16> es,
boomin g Article: know
g voice Judicial <http://newsinfo.inquirer. that
of Indepen net/985460/defend-judicial- several
Justice dence at independence-cjsereno-tells-law- of
Vicente the students> them,
Mendoz Ateneo have
a has Law   had
reverbe School their
rated in   qualifica
that if Rockwell tions,
the quo , Makati their
waranto City on inability
petition Wednes to
day, Ap submit being
ril 25, docume singled
2018 ntary out?, "
require she told
ments, law
waived, student
several s at the
of Ateneo
them. If Law
the JBC School
was during
correct forum
in on
saying judicial
that an indepen
attempt dence.
to  
submit "The
require questio
ments, ns
that propoun
good ded by
faith Suprem
should e Court
be itself,
accorde they
d to the wanted
14, to
includin examin
g those e
against everythi
me, ng did
why am in the
the only past in
one the
hope ang
they JBC...14
would kaming
find pare-
somethi parehon
ng g
scandal sitwasy
ous in on.
my life. Bakit
was just nagrekl
preparin amo
g kung
myself kayo
for the nalagay
questio sa
n, 'ilang listahan
boyfrien at ako
d mo nalagay
na?,'" sa
Sereno listahan
said, . Ang
which masam
elicited a ay
laughter hindi
from kayo
the ang
crowd. nalagay
  at ako
"Hindi ang
ko nalagay
naman , " she
po added.
minanip Speech <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/20 "The
ula ni at the 18/04/23/1808492/sereno-camp- month
konti Commen questions-sc-haste-decide-her-case> of May
cement is time po,
Exercise <https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/04/21/ that 'is indicatio
s of the no-need-to-rush-quo-warranto-sereno/> suppose n po ito
College    d to be na
of Law devoted mayroo
of the   to n na po
Universit writing silang
y of San decision conclusi
Agustin s in the on bago
(USA) in many pa man
Iloilo pending marinig
City, cases ang
on April before lahat,"
20, the Sereno
2018 Court. said.
Anyway Fellowsh <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/981806/s "Even
the ip of the ereno-ups-attack-vs-quo-warranto-in- your
session Philippin speech-at-lawyers-forum? very
will e Bar utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium livelihoo
resume Associati =Social&utm_source=Facebook#link_ti ds are
on June on (PBA) me=1523450119> threate
5, so in   ned;
wha's Makati there is
with the City no
rush?" on April safety
  11, for any
"Wala 2018 of
namang you...
dahilan That is
para how
magma deadly
dali." this quo
  warrant
"Kung o
totoo petition
is," she kamikaz
added. e
  bringing
Sereno it the
said if destruct
the ion of
Suprem the
e Court entire
would judiciar
coopera y as
te in well as
the the
move of entire
the consitut
Executi ional
ve to framew
oust her ork."
sans 30th <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/973692/s "I look
impeac Annivers ereno-delivers-most-powerful-speech- at any
hment ary and yet-not-all-peers-happy> forum
trial, "I 23rd to try
will use National me
directly Conventi other
the on of than
words the the
of Chief Philippin constitu
Justice e tionally
Davide Women exclusiv
that it Judges e form
will be Associati of
judicial on impeac
hara- (PWJA) hment
kiri, if in Manila as an
not Hotel on admissi
judicial Thursda on by
y, Marc the aga
h 8, complai naman
2018 nant yata
and my para
other umamin
detracto sila na
rs that wala
after 15 silang
hearing napala
s, they kundi
have matindi
failed to ng
come kabigua
up with n kaya't
any kung
evidenc anu-ano
e which na
can be lamang
convicte ang
d in the gimik
Senate, ang
" she ginagaw
asserte a nila
d. masuno
  d
"Sila lamang
ang ang
nagsim kanilan
ula g nais,"
bakit ay Sereno
aw added.
nilang CNN <https://www.youtube.com/watch? In this
tapusin Philippi v=HlYKAQ4QPcY intervie
? nes 1. w, CJOL
Napaka (March http://cnnphilippines.com/videos/2018/ Sereno,
9,2018) 03/09/One-on-one-with-Chief-Justice- among impeac
; One Maria-Lourdes-Sereno.html>  others, hment
on One stated provisio
with   that her ns of
the defense the
Chief preparat Constitu
Justice ion was tion so
with directed that has
Pinky towards been
Webb the the
impeach prepara
ment tion all
proceedi along.
ngs as Well,
she has haven't
not yet
assesse assesse
d yet d this
the quo latest
warrant quo
o warrant
petition o
as of petition.
the Not yet
intervie time
w.  maybe"
   
- "From - CJOL
the very Sereno
beginni refused
ng, we to talk
were about
looking the quo
really at warrant
the o
petition, that
but such
interpre action
ted the does
SC's not
resoluti mean
on that the
which SC
directed assume
her to s
commen jurisdicti
t on on over
said the quo
petition warrant
without o case.
taking  
due - "Yan
course naman
to the talaga
petition. ang
CJOL hindi ko
said pwede
that pagusa
such pan,
action ano."
of the  
SC does - On
not jurisdicti
mean on:
anythin "Normal
g and yan,
affirmed mar ami
Webb's kaming
interepr ganyan
etation petition.
Wala  
naman - "Mara
talagan mi ho
g ibig kaming
sabihin laging
yan. In ginaga
most mit na
cases, without
walang due
ibig course
sabihin at
yun kasi marami
hindi pa kaming
prejudg dinidism
ed. Pero iss na
hayaan nanggal
niyo po ing sa
muna without
yung giving
lawyers due
ko ang course
magsabi pero
kasi pinagko
mahirap comme
naman nt... It
pong doesn't
pangun mean...
ahan ko Ang
sila eh usual
ginagaw traditio
a pa po n po
nila namin
yung ay
sagot walang
eh". ibig
 sabihin know
po yun" that our
Speech <https: www.youtube.com/watch? Directed women
of CJOL v="iN511xW9bpk"> towards judges,
Sereno politicia for
at the ns exampl
Panpaci suppose e, are
fic dly always
Univers regardin eager to
ity g the make
North ongoing stand
Philippi impeach for
nes ment judicial
(March proceedi indepen
9, ngs, dence.
2018) CJOL Kayong
(Posted Sereno mga
by CNN said, pulitiko,
Philippi "Wag wag
nes) na 'wag nyong
niyo pakiala
kami man
gigipitin ang
" and aming
further mga
stated gustong
that gawin
such kung
what palagay
judicial nyo
indepen kayo ay
dence tama at
means. andyan
  ang
- I ebidens
 ya, 2018) sila
lalabas * Forum tumigil,
naman was hangga'
yan eh. organize t naisip
Pero d by ng isa,
huwag youth yung
na groups,  nagaak
huwag Ako Ay usa sa
nyo Isang akin,
kaming Sereno a "ay
gigipitin nd Youth yung
. Yan for SALN
ang ibig Miriam niya,
sabihin yung
ng SALN
judicial nya na
indepen sinabi
dence" nya sa
Speech <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/987807/li - CJOL JBC na
on "The ve-chief-justice-sereno-at-up-diliman- Sereno nahihira
Mumshi forum> emphasi part
e on zed that niyang
Fire: AJ humana
Speak Leonard p (sic).
Truth o-De Yun,
to Castro's dun
Power" inhibitio tugisin.
held at n would At
the prove sinabi
Univers that she nya na
ity of is dapat
the unbiase ako ay
Philippi d.      idisquali
nes fy dahil
(May 5, - Hindi unjust
daw na woke.
ako ang The
naappoi youth
nt. May would
injustice not
na listen to
nangyar lies.
i. So The
alam na people
natin own the
ang isa judiciar
sa y. They
pinagsis are not
imulan owned
nito"  by the
  judiciar
- CJOL y, the
Sereno justices,
said the
that judges"
"Even and
when that the
they "good
thought will
they always
have prevail
won, in over
the end, evil".
they will  
never - CJOL
win. Sereno
The said
country that two
is of her
already accuser
s, who impeach
she ment
consider proceedi
s as her ngs) at
rival ginawa
also, itong
will be kaso
one of net quo
those warrant
who will o kung
decide saan
the quo ang
warrant dalawa
o sa nags
petition ab ing
filed hindi
against ako
her, dapat
thereby naappoi
against nt eh
the sila rin
basic ang
rules of maghuh
fair usga sa
play.   akin.
  Saan
- "Eh kayo
bakit nakakila
biglang ng
umatras sitwasy
sila(pert on na
aining yung
to his karibal
accuser niyo sa
s in the posisyo
n ang the oral
may argume
kapang nts now
yarihan sit as
sabihin judge?
kayong This
dapat violates
ka the
matang most
gal sa basic
posisyo norms
n, hindi of
ikaw fairplay.
dapat. ..Ngayo
Paano n
nangyar talaga,
i? Under nakita
what na, na
rules of hindi ho
fairness ako
, what bibigya
rules of n talaga
Constitu ng Hang
tion or ito ng
legal kahit
system, anong
can an modicu
accuser m of
who fairness
acted "
also as   
my - She
prosecu discusse
tor d that
during one of
the of quo
effects warrant
of an o would
invalid result
appoint into
ment is dictator
the ship and
forfeitur would
e of destroy
retireme the
nt judiciary
benefits . 
.  
   - At ano
- "At ho ang
alam mangya
nyo ho, yari
pag kung
sinabi ang
na buong
invalid sangay
yung ang
appoint lahat ng
ment, kawani
pati ng
yung gobyern
retirem o ay
ent kayang
benefits takutin
ho at hindi
tatangg na
alin" pweden
g
- The maging
granting indepen
dent?.. sa
Ano ganoon
hong g
mangya sitwasy
yari on na
kung may
ang matindi
COMELE ng
C ho ay panana
sinabiha kot sa
n ng buong
Preside bayan?
nte at Ang
Solicitor tawag
General po dun,
na diktalur
"yungpa ya..
rtido Kung
lang manalo
namin po ang
ang quo
pweden warrant
g o, yan
manalo, po ang
kung magigin
hindi i- g
quo resulta"
warrant  
o ka - "Saan
namin?" g korte
Ano po kayo
yun? pupunta
Ano ? Sino
yung ang
tawag magtata
pang na petition
huwes nito,
kung complet
madali ely ang
na sila judiciar
mapata y"
nggal?..  
. Hindi - "Ano
na ho na ho
kayo ang
makaka mangya
takbo, yari sa
kasi bayan
lahat ho natin
ng kung
judges wala na
tatakuti hong
n ng security
Solicitor of
General tenure
...Saan sa
ho kayo govern
pupunta ment
sa isang service?
arbiter Kasi
na kung
impartia may
l?.. wala hauntin
na po. g
Wawasa kulang
kin lang sa
nitong file...
quo kulang
warrant ang file
o na
 nabigay Ateneo discusse
sa JBC. Law d the
eh School contents
naglala for the of the
basan forum quo
na ho Tindig: warrant
ang forum o
SALN on petition. 
ko... upholdi  
pero eto ng - On the
tatangg judicial prescrip
alin at indepen tive
gagawa dence period,
sila ng as pillar CJOL
prinsipy of Sereno
o at democr said
ikawaw acy that
asak ng (April jobs of
buong 25, the
bayan 2018) justices,
para judges
lang sa and
kanilan govern
g ment
persona employe
l na es are
interes. jeopardi
Nakakal zed
agim po because
ang of the
pangya assertio
yaring n of the
ito" OSG
Speech <https://www.youtube.com/watch? CJOL that
on v="oh35V4BMiww> Sereno petition
for quo apply
warrant against
o does govern
not ment. It
prescrib must be
e persona
against l
the knowled
govern ge of
ment. the
CJOL Solicitor
Sereno General
said himself
that And so
such if you
assertio change
n makes the
the person
action of the
impresc Solicitor
riptible. General
  , the
- "Accor period,
ding to continu
the es to
Solicitor always
General be
, the fresh.
one It's
year never
prescrip prescrip
tive tible,
period complet
can ely
never impresc
riptible  
action. 1.
So you
jeopardi - On the
ze the effect of
jobs of the quo
the warrant
justices, o
the petition,
judges CJOL
and all Sereno
gov't said
employ that all
ees. incumbe
You nt
allow judges
selected and
targetin justices
g would
against be
the prejudic
Chief ed
Justice because
for their
reasons qualifica
that are tions
very may
obvious suddenl
now y be
and you reviewe
destroy d. 
the  
legal - "The
professi SC itself
on" really
wanted because
to all of
examin their
e every qualifica
little tions
thing may
did in suddenl
the past y be
in the reviewe
hope d. The
that JBC was
they wrong
would to
find waive
somethi this
ng qualifica
scandal tion for
ous this
about position
my . can
life..." tell you
as
- "It matter
also of
prejudic record
es more that of
than my
2000 colleagu
judges es,
and know
justices that
that are several
already of them
sitting have
now had
their had
qualifica missing
tions, require
their ments,
inability should
to be
submit accorde
docume d to 14
ntary of us,
require includin
ments, g those
waived. who
Several have
of complai
them. ned
So if loudly
the JBC against
was me
correct among
in my
saying colleagu
that an es, why
attempt am the
to only
submit one
the being
require singled
ments, out?
the The
good rules of
faith inability
accorde to
d to submit
those all the
who SALNs
 falsely conditioning the public's mind that this is fight for democracy. Once and for
were all, it should be stated that this is not fight for democracy nor for judicial
waived independence. This is an undertaking of the Court's duty, as it is called for by the
in favor Republic, to judicially determine and settle the uncertainty in the qualification, or
otherwise, of respondent to sit on the highest position in the Judiciary.
of 14
out of The detrimental effect of this open and blatant disregard of the sub judice rule or the
evil sought to be prevented by the said rule is already manifest. In fact, in the May
20 2, 2018 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, certain individuals, including lawyers,
applican already made their own pre-judgment on the case:
GRANTING THE QUO WARRANTO PETITION IS ILLEGAL, BETRAYAL OF
ts, out DEMOCRACY
of the
were THE SUPREME COURT TRAMPLED ON the Philippine Constitution and betrayed its
primary duty to the Filipino people when it violated Chief Justice Ma. Loudes Sereno's
shortlist right to due process.
ed. Why
The Supreme Court abandoned its chief mandate to ensure an independent judiciary
is the by accepting bankrupt Quo Warranto petition and refusing to inhibit five openly
rule biased Justices.
being
The Judiciary's Code of Conduct decrees resistance against attempts to subvert
invoked judicial independence. It orders judges to be impartial. The five justices bowed to
only Congress' impeaclunent summons. They attacked the Chief Justice in proceedings
that refused her right to question accusers. Doing so, they prejudged the Chief
against Justice and betrayed the Court's position as co-equal branch of the government.
me?
And so We repudiate as illegal ruling tainted with these shameful acts.

it would The Quo Warranto action against CJ Sereno, filed beyond the one year deadline, is
appear itself illegal and unconstitutional the Supreme Court has affirmed many times that
impeachment is the only mode for removing an impeachable officer.
that this
is In accepting this farcical petition, it crushes constitutional checks and balances it
selected threatens every Filipino citizen's right to free, impartial justice system.

targetin The State derives its power from the people. When the key instruments of the State
g" conspire to subvert the Constitution and democracy, the people must rise as the last
bastion of our rights and freedoms.
The public actuation of respondent showing disdain and contempt towards some
Members of the Court whom she dubbed as "Biased 5" later increased and modified
We challenge the Supreme Court: Pull back from the brink. Do not be party to the
to "Biased 6" can no longer be tolerated. She may be held liable for disbarment for
death of judicial independence. Heed the Constitution. OBEY THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
violating the Canons of Professional Responsibility for violating the sub judice rule by
CONDUCT. COMPEL THE INHIBITION OF THE BIASED 5. DISMISS THE ILLEGAL QUO
repeatedly discussing the merits of the quo warranto petition in different fora and for
WARRANTO PETITION!
casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Court even before decision
is made, designed to affect the results of the Court's collegial vote and influence
If the Biased will not inhibit, then we call on them to resign. The people will not
public opinion. This wrongful actuation exemplify poor regard for the judicial system
acccept any Decision tainted by gross injustice and Justices who cannot act with
and may amount to conduct unbecoming of Justice and lawyer.
justice. (Emphasis ours)
Such actions, indeed, resulted to the obfuscation of the issues on hand, It could readily be seen that such statements do not only "tend to" but categorically
camouflaging the charges against her with assaults to judicial independence, and force and influence the deliberative and decision-making process of this Court.
Notably, the threatening tenor could not go unnoticed.
To be sure, the Court is not merely being unreasonably sensitive in addressing this
matter, as in fact, it guarantees that it is not swayed or influenced by such attacks
and maintains its judicial independence in resolving this controversial case. However,
when aggressive actions are taken against the Judiciary as an institution and clouds
of doubt are casted upon the people's faith in the administration of justice, especially
so when the same are perpetrated by members of the Bar, this Court cannot be
apathetic to and is not helpless against such attacks, but the prudent thing to do is
to stand and deal with it head on.
Epilogue
The foregoing discourse thins down to public officer's accountability to the public.
The very purpose and nature of public office is grounded upon it being public trust.
No less than our Constitution gave special importance on the principle of public office
being public trust. Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution categorically states
that:
Section 1. Public office is public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
It is therefore an established principle that public office is not "property" but is public
trust or agency, governed by the Constitution and by existing laws. There is no
Torrens title to public office. Justice Malcolm, in Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial
Board of Rizal,331 expounded on this principle, viz.:
In the case of Taylor v. Beckham ([1899], 178, U. S., 548), Mr. Chief Justice Fuller
said that: "Decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies
or trust, and not property as such." The basic idea of government in the Philippine
Islands, as in the United States, is that of popular representative government, the
officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one
man or set of men has proprietary or contractual right to an office, but
where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and
holds the office as trust for the people whom he represents.332 (Emphasis
ours)
The right to hold public office under our political system is therefore not natural
right. It exists, when it exists at all, only because and by virtue of some law
expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. 333 Needless to say, before one can
hold public office, he or she must be eligible in accordance with the qualifications
fixed by law and the authority conferring and creating the office. There is no such
thing as vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office public officer who is not truthful, not forthright, in complying with the
qualifications to public office, perforce, has not legally qualified, was not legally
appointed, and consequently, has not legally assumed the said public office
disqualification cannot be erased by intentional concealment of certain defects in
complying with the qualifications to public office set by the Constitution and laws.
The passage of time will not cure such invalidity of holding public office, much less,
foreclose the right and duty of the government, the keeper of the said public office,
to oust and remove the usurper.
One who claims title to public office must prove beyond cavil that he/she is legally
qualified to the said office, otherwise, he or she has no ground to stand upon his or
her claim of title to the office and his or her title may reasonably be challenged.
qualification must be proved positively, clearly, and affirmatively. It cannot be
proved by mere acquiescence nor by estoppel or prescription. In the same vein,
disqualification cannot be obliterated by intentional concealment thereof. As matter
of fact, such concealment is clear manifestation of lack of integrity, probity, and
honesty. It cannot be over-emphasized that public service requires integrity. For this
reason, public servants must, at all times, exhibit the highest sense of honesty. By
the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to,
and hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that public office is
public trust.334 The expectation of strong adherence to this principle escalates
proportionately as one ascends to public office. John Adams, then President of the
United States, said, "society's demands for moral authority and character increase as
the importance of the position increases."
In this case, it was found that respondent is ineligible to hold the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court position for lack of integrity on account of her failure to file
substantial number of SALNs and also, her failure to submit the required SALNs to
the JBC during her application for the position. Again, one of the Constitutional
duties of public officer is to submit declaration under oath of his or her assets,
liabilities, and net worth upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be
required by law.335 When the Constitution and the law exact obedience, public
officers must comply and not offer excuses. When public officer is unable or unwilling
to comply, he or she must not assume office in the first place, or if already holding
one, he or she must vacate that public office because it is the correct and honorable
thing to do. public officer who ignores, trivializes or disrespects Constitutional and
legal provisions, as well as the canons of ethical standards, forfeits his or her right to
hold and continue in that office.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY
of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the
Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination
process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub
judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme
Court.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., no part.
Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., Pls. see Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., Please see my Concurring Opinion.
Peralta, J., Please see separate concurring opinion.
Bersamin, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Del Castillo, J., dissent. Pls. see separate opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., certify that J. Bernabe submitted her Separate Opinion voting to
DISMISS the petition.
Leonen, J., dissent. See separate opinion.
Jardeleza, J., certify that J. Jardeleza left his vote concurring with the ponencia of J.
Tijam.
Caguioa, J., dissent See separate opinion.
Martires, J., concur in the results with separate opinion.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on May 11, 2018 Decision/Resolution, copy attached
herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on May 11, 2018 at 5:57 p.m.
Very truly yours,
 
(SGD)
EDGAR O. ARICHETA
  Clerk of Court
EN BANC
G.R. No. 216930, October 09, 2018
COUNCIL OF TEACHERS AND STAFF OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES (CoTeSCUP), SENTRO NG MGA NAGKAKAISANG
PROGRESIBONG MGA MANGGAGAWA (SENTRO), FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS (FFW), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (NCL), PUBLIC
SERVICES LABOR INDEPENDENT CONFEDERATION (PSLINK), PARTIDO
MANGGAGAWA (PM), ADAMSON UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, FACULTY ALLIED AND WORKER UNION OF CENTRO ESCOLAR
UNIVERSITY, FACULTY ASSOCIATION MAPUA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY FACULTY ASSOCIATION, HOLY ANGEL
UNIVERSITY TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES UNION, LYCEUM FACULTY
ASSOCIATION, SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
SILIMAN UNIVERSITY FACULTY ASSOCIATION, UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST
RAMON MAGSAYSAY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-FFW (UERMEA-FFW),
UNION OF FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES OF ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY,
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY UNION, PROF. FLORDELIZ ABANTO
(IN HER CAPACITY AS VICE PRESIDENT OF ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE
FACULTY ASSOCIATION), PROF. REBECCA T. AÑONUEVO (IN HER CAPACITY
AS PRESIDENT OF MIRIAM COLLEGE FACULTY ASSOCIATION), PROF. MARIA
RITA REYES CUCIO (IN HER CAPACITY AS FACULTY OF SAN BEDA COLLEGE),
AND MR. JOMEL B. GENERAL (IN HIS CAPACITY AS EMPLOYEE OF
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION AND OFFICER OF THE
FFW), Petitioners, v. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER
EDUCATION, SECRETARY OF THE TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND MIRIAM COLLEGE, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 217451, October 9, 2018]
DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA (PAMBANSANG ALAGAD NG SINING AT
PROFESSOR EMERITUS, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES/UP); CONG.
ANTONIO TINIO (ACT TEACHERS' PARTYLIST); CONG. FERNANDO "KA
PANDO" HICAP (ANAKPAWIS PARTYLIST AT TAGAPANGULO NG
PAMALAKAYA); CONG. JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON (KABATAAN PARTYLIST);
DR. RHODERICK NUNCIO (VICE-DEAN, NG KOLEHIYO NG MALALAYANG
SINING, DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY/DLSU); PROP. AURA ABIERA
(TAGAPANGULO NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO AT PANITIKAN NG
PILIPINAS SA UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES-DILIMAN); DR. ERNESTO
CARANDANG II (TAGAPANGULO NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO, DE LA
SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA); DR. ROBERTO AMPIL (TAGAPANGULO NG
DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS); PROP.
MARVIN LAI (TAGAPANGULO NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINOLOHIYA NG
POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES/PUP); PROP. NELSON
RAMIREZ (TAGAPANGULO NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO, UNIVERSITY
OF THE EAST/UE-MANILA); DR. ESTER RADA (TAGAPANGULO NG
KAGAWARAN NG FILIPINO, SAN BEDA COLLEGE-MANILA); PROP. JORGE
PACIFICO CUIBILLAS (TAGAPANGULO NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO,
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY-MANILA); PROP. ANDREW PADERNAL
(TAGAPANGULO NG KAGAWARAN NG FILIPINO, PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD
NG PASIG/PLP); PROP. MICHAEL DOMINGO PANTE (FACULTY MEMBER SA
HISTORY DEPARTMENT, ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY); BENJAMIN
VALBUENA (TAGAPANGULO NG ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS/ACT-
PHILIPPINES); DR. PRISCILLA AMPUAN (PANGULO NG QUEZON CITY
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION/QCPSTA); PROP. CARL MARC
RAMOTA (PANGULO NG ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS-STATE
UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES/ACTSUC); DR. ROWELL MADULA (PANGULO
NG ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS-PRIVATE SCHOOLS/ACTPRIVATE);
 DR. AURORA BATNAG (PANGULO NG PAMBANSANG SAMAHAN SA
LINGGWISTIKA AT LITERATURANG FILIPINO/PSLLF); DR. JUDY
TAGUIWALO (FULL PROFESSOR SA COLLEGE OF SOCIAL WORK AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, UP DILIMAN); DR. DANILO ARAO (ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR SA DEPARTMENT OF JOURNALISM, COLLEGE OF MASS
COMMUNICATION, UP DILIMAN); DR. DAVID MICHAEL SAN JUAN
(EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEMBER NG NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE
AND THE ARTS-NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LANGUAGE AND
TRANSLATION/NCCANCLT); RONNEL B. AGONCILLO JR., (PANGULO NG
PHILIPPINE NORMAL UNIVERSITY/PNU-STUDENT GOVERNMENT); DR.
REUEL MOLINA AGUILA (PALANCA HALL OF FAMER AT TAGAPAYO NG
KATAGASAMAHAN NG MGA MANUNULAT SA PILIPINAS); ERICSON ACOSTA
(MANUNULAT AT DATING BILANGGONG POLITIKAL, AT KASAPI NG
ANAKPAWIS PARTYLIST); PROP. ADRIAN BALAGOT (DIREKTOR NG CENTER
FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION, PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG
MARIKINA/PLMar); PROP. PENAFRANCIA RANIELA BARRAZA (ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR, DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO AT PANITIKAN NG PILIPINAS,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES-DILIMAN); PROP. HERMAN MANALO
BOGNOT (FACULTY MEMBER SA DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN LANGUAGES,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES); PROP. LAURENCE MARVIN CASTILLO
(INSTRUCTOR SA DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITIES, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES-LOS BAÑOS); DR. ANTONIO CONTRERAS (FULL PROFESSOR
SA POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY/DLSU);
PROP. RAMILITO CORREA (PANGULO NG SANGGUNIAN SA
FILIPINO/SANGFIL); GEROME NICOLAS DELA PEÑA (PANGULO NG
SAMAHAN NG MGA MAG-AARAL SA ASIGNATURANG FILIPINO, SAMFIL-
PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG PASIG/PLP); PROP. WENNIELYN FAJILAN
(FACULTY MEMBER NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO, UNIVERSITY OF
SANTO TOMAS); FLODY FERNANDEZ (PANGULO NG RAMON MAGSAYSAY
HIGH SCHOOL (CUBAO) FACULTY CLUB); PROP. SANTIAGO FLORA (VICE-
PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS NG QUEZON CITY POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY); PROP. MELANIA FLORES (NATIONAL PRO NG ALL UP
ACADEMIC EMPLOYEES' UNION, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES/UP); DR.
LAKANDUPIL GARCIA (FULL PROFESSOR NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO,
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-DASMARIÑAS); DR. FANNY GARCIA (PALANCA
AWARDEE AT FACULTY MEMBER NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO, DE LA
SALLE UNIVERSITY/DLSU); PROP. JONATHAN GERONIMO (COORDINATOR
NG KATAGA-MANILA UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS/UST); PROP.
VLADIMEIR GONZALES (ASSISTANT PROFESSOR SA DEPARTAMENTO NG
FILIPINO AT PANITIKAN NG PILIPINAS-UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES-
DILIMAN); PROP. FERDINAND PISIGAN JARIN (PALANCA AWARDEE AT
PANGULO NG KATAGA-SAMAHAN NG MGA MANUNULAT SA PILIPINAS);
JOHN ROBERT MAGSOMBOL (PANGULO NG UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS-
PANULAT); PROP. JOEL MALABANAN (TAGAPAYO NG KAPISANANG DIWA AT
PANITIK/KADIPAN SA PHILIPPINE NORMAL UNIVERSITY/PNU); PROP.
DENNIS MANGUBAT (FACULTY MEMBER NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO
NG SAN BEDA COLLEGE-MANILA); PROP. JOANNE MANZANO (FACULTY
MEMBER NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO AT PANITIKAN NG PILIPINAS-
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES-DILIMAN); PROP. BERNADETTE NERI
(ASSISTANT PROFESSOR SA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO AT PANITIKAN
NG PILIPINAS, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES-DILIMAN); RAYMOND
PALATINO (TAGAPANGULO NG BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN/BAYAN-
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION); PROP. APRIL PEREZ (ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
SA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO AT PANITIKAN NG PILIPINAS,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES-DILIMAN); PROP. JAYSON PETRAS
(DEPUTY DIRECTOR NG INSTITUTE OF CREATIVE WRITING, UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINESDILIMAN); PROP. CRIZEL SICAT-DE LAZA (KATUWANG NG
KALIHIM NG SANGGUNIAN NG FILIPINO/SANGFIL AT FACULTY MEMBER SA
DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS/UST);
PROP. DENNIS JOSEPH RAYMUNDO (FACULTY MEMBER NG KALAYAAN
COLLEGE); DR. BEVERLY SARZA (FACULTY MEMBER NG PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT, DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA); DR. RAQUEL SISON-
BUBAN (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR SA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG DE LA
SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA); PROP. VIVENCIO M. TALEGON, JR. (FULL-
TIME FACULTY SA UNIVERSITY OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, ORTIGAS
CENTER, PASIG); ISAAC ALI TAPAR (PANGULO NG MANILA SCIENCE HIGH
SCHOOL FACULTY ASSOCIATION); DR. DOLORES TAYLAN (ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR SA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO, DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-
MANILA); DR. ALITA TEPACE (PROPESOR SA PHILIPPINE NORMAL
UNIVERSITY-MANILA); PROP. OM NARAYAN VELASCO (INSTRUCTOR SA
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES-LOS BAÑOS); ANDREA JEAN YASOÑA
(PANGULO NG KAPISANANG DIWA AT PANITIK-PNU); PROP. REYNELE BREN
ZAFRA (FACULTY MEMBER NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS); DR. RUBY ALUNEN (FACULTY MEMBER NG
DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA);
PROP. BAYANI SANTOS, JR. (FACULTY MEMBER NG DEPARTAMENTO NG
FILIPINO NG MANUEL LUIS QUEZON UNIVERSITY/MLQU); PROP. CHRISTO
REY ALBASON (GURO SA SINING NG BAYAN/GUSI); PROP. LILIBETH
OBLENA-QUIORE (FACULTY MEMBER NG DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA); PROP. DANIM MAJERANO (DIREKTOR
NG PANANALIKSIK AT EDUKASYON, SAMAHANG SALIKSIK PASIG, INC.);
RUSTUM CASIA (KM 64 POETRY COLLECTIVE); CHARISSE BERNADINE
BAÑEZ (TAGAPAGSALITA NG LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS/LFS); DR.
JENNIFOR AGUILAR (CHAIRPERSON NG DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION NG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES/PUP); PROP. MOREAL NAGARIT CAMBA (TAGAPANGULO NG
DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO, UNIVERSITY OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC -
PASIG); PROP. CLEVE ARGUELLES (CHAIRPERSON NG POLITICAL SCIENCE
PROGRAM, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINESMANILA); DR. MARIA LUCILLE ROXAS (FACULTY MEMBER SA
DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA);
PROP. VOLTAIRE VILLANUEVA (FACULTY MEMBER SA PHILIPPINE NORMAL
UNIVERSITY); DR. JOSEFINA MANGAHIS (FACULTY MEMBER SA
DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA);
PROP. EMMA SISON (FACULTY MEMBER SA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO
NG DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA); AYLEEN ORTIZ (MANUNULAT);
PROP. EFREN DOMINGO (FACULTY MEMBER SA DEPARTAMENTO NG
FILIPINO NG DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITYMANILA); PROP. LESLIE ANNE
LIWANAG (FACULTY MEMBER SA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG DE LA
SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA); DR. LAKANGITING GARCIA (FACULTY
 MEMBER SA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-
MANILA); PROP. MIRYLLE CALINDRO (FACULTY MEMBER SA
DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA); DR.
LAKANDUPIL GARCIA (FACULTY MEMBER SA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO
NG DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITYDASMARIÑAS); DR. DEXTER CAYANES
(FACULTY MEMBER SA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG DE LA SALLE
UNIVERSITY-MANILA); DR. TERESITA FORTUNATO (FACULTY MEMBER SA
DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-MANILA); DR.
MA. RITA ARANDA (FACULTY MEMBER SA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITYMANILA); DR. EMMA BASCO (FACULTY MEMBER SA
DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO NG DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY-
MANILA), Petitioners. v. PANGULONG BENIGNO SIMEON "NOYNOY" C.
AQUINO III, AT PUNONG KOMISYUNER NG KOMISYON SA LALONG MATAAS
NA EDUKASYON/COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION (CHED) DR.
PATRICIA LICUANAN, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 217752, October 9, 2018]
ANTONIO "SONNY" F. TRILLANES IV, GARY C. ALEJANO AND FRANCISCO
ASHLEY L. ACEDILLO,Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 218045, October 9, 2018]
EDUARDO R. ALICIAS, JR. AND AURELIO P. RAMOS,
JR., Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (DepEd) AND THE
SECRETARY OF THE DepEd, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 218098, October 9, 2018]
RICHARD TROY A COLMENARES, RENE LUIS M. TADLE, ERLINDA C.
PALAGANAS, RUTH THELMA P. TINGDA, RONALD TAGGAOA, JOSEPH
PORFIRIO ANDAYA, FLORANTE DULACA, FROILAN A. ALIPAO; KATHLEA
FRANCYNN GAWANI D. YAÑGOT, MIEL ALEXANDRE A. TAGGAOA, AGATHA
ZITA DISTOR, ISABELLE C. UMINGA, ALDWIN GABRIEL M. PINAS, ATREENA
MARIE DULAY, ZION GABRIEL SANTOS, SIBLINGS BRENNAN KEANE, BREN
KIMI, AND BASLEY KICH, ALL SURNAMED DELA CRUZ, JASSEL ANGELO
ENRIQUEZ, SIBLINGS GYRO MATTHEW AND MARGA RAUXIELLE AGLAIA,
BOTH SURNAMED GUEVARRA, SIBLINGS ALTHEA, ALEXA, AND AMANDA, ALL
SURNAMED ABEJO, AND ELEANNIE JERECE S. CAWIS, REPRESENTED BY
THEIR PARENTS LEANDRO B. YAÑGOT, JR., JENNIFER A. TAGGAOA, MILO
DISTOR, JOSE MARI UMINGA, GABRIEL PAUL PINAS, SOFRONIO DULAY, LUZ
A. SANTOS, BARBY M. DELA CRUZ, RUBY G. ENRIQUEZ, ROWENA C.
GUEVARRA, MARISEL P. ABEJO, AND VITTORIO JERICO L. CAWIS,
RESPECTIVELY, FOR THEMSELVES AND THE CLASS THEY REPRESENT;
REVENENDO R. VARGAS, ANNIELA R. YU-SOLIVEN, VILMA C. BENIGNO,
MARIA CRISTINA F. DUNGCA, LIZA DAOANIS, ROMMEL M. FRANCISCO,
FELIZA G. AGUSTIN, EMELITA C. VIDAL, ROMMEL D. RAMISCAL, JOCELYN
ELEAZAR DE GUZMAN, ANDREA P. VILLALON, AND JOYCE FE T. ALMENARIO,
FOR THEMSELVES AND THE CLASS THEY
REPRESENT, Petitioners, v.DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SECRETARY ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION CHAIRPERSON
PATRICIA B. LICUANAN, TECHNICAL SKILLS AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY DIRECTOR-GENERAL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECRETARY ROSALINDA D. BALDOZ,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY CESAR V. PURISIMA, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 218123, October 9, 2018]
CONG. ANTONIO TINIO (REPRESENTATIVE, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST);
CONG. NERI COLMENARES (REPRESENTATIVE, BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST);
DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA (NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE AND
PROFESSOR EMERITUS, UP); CONG. CARLOS ZARATE (REPRESENTATIVE,
BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST); CONG. FERNANDO "KA PANDO" HICAP
(REPRESENTATIVE, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST; CHAIRPERSON,
PAMALAKAYA); CONG. LUZVIMINDA ILAGAN (REPRESENTATIVE, GABRIELA
WOMEN'S PARTY); CONG. EMMI DE JESUS (REPRESENTATIVE, GABRIELA
PARTY-LIST); CONG. TERRY RIDON (REPRESENTATIVE, KABATAAN PARTY-
LIST); RENATO REYES, JR. (SECRETARY-GENERAL, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN/ BAYAN AND PARENT OF AN ELEMENTARY STUDENT);
BENJAMIN VALBUENA (CHAIRPERSON, ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED
TEACHERS-PHILIPPINES); MARTIN DIÑO (CHAIRPERSON OF THE
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION); JOVITA MONTES
(SPOKESPERSON, PARENTS' MOVEMENT AGAINST K TO 12); KHARLO FELIPE
MANANO (SECRETARY-GENERAL, SALINLAHI ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN'S
CONCERNS); GERTRUDES LIBANG, (NATIONAL VICE-CHAIRPERSON,
GABRIELA); RONEL AGONCILLO (STUDENT REGENT, PNU); VENCER MARIE
CRISOSTOMO (NATIONAL CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN); CHARISSE
BERNADINE BAÑEZ (NATIONAL SPOKESPERSON, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS/LFS); EINSTEIN RECEDES (NATIONAL CHAIRPERSON STUDENT
CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES); MICHAEL BELTRAN
(NATIONAL SPOKESPERSON, KABATAANG ARTISTA PARA SA TUNAY NA
KALAYAAN); SARAH JANE ELAGO (NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL UNION
OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES); MARC LINO ABILA (NATIONAL
PRESIDENT, COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES); VANESSA
FAYE BOLIBOL (CONVENOR, STOP K TO 12); DR. ROLANDO TOLENTINO
(DEAN, COLLEGE OF MASS COMMUNICATION, UP); DR. FEDELIZ TUY
(ASSOCIATE VICE DEAN, COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, SBC MANILA);
DR. ERNESTO CARANDANG II (CHAIRPERSON, FILIPINO DEPARTMENT,
DLSU MANILA); PROF. MARIA LOURDES AGUSTIN (CHAIRPERSON,
INSTITUTE OF TEACHING AND LEARNING, PNU); PROF. ROWENA RIVERO
(CHAIR, ENGLISH, FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT,
SBC MANILA); PROF. CLEVE ARGUELLES (CHAIRPERSON, POLITICAL
SCIENCE PROGRAM, DLSU MANILA); DR. ANNABEL QUILON (CHAIR,
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); DR. BAYANI MATITU (CHAIR,
HUMAN KINETICS DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. MARVIN LAI
 (CHAIRPERSON, DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINOLOHIYA, PUP MANILA);
PROF. MERDEKA C. MORALES (CHIEF, PUP CENTER FOR CREATIVE
WRITING); DR. ROBERTO AMPIL (CHAIRPERSON, FILIPINO DEPARTMENT,
UST); PROF. NELSON RAMIREZ (CHAIRPERSON, FILIPINO DEPARTMENT,
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST MANILA); DR. JENNIFOR AGUILAR
(CHAIRPERSON, MA FILIPINO PROGRAM, GRADUATE SCHOOL, PUP); DR.
LIWAYWAY ACERO (CHAIRPERSON, HUMAN BIOLOGY AND SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); DR. ESTER RADA (CHAIRPERSON, FILIPINO
DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); DR. MARVIN REYES (PREFECT OF STUDENT
ACTIVITIES, COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, SBC MANILA); PROF. NEILIA
BALANON-RAMIREZ (ASSISTANT PREFECT OF STUDENT DISCIPLINE,
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, SBC MANILA); PROF. LUISITO
MACAPAGAL (CHAIRPERSON, MATHEMATICS DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA);
DR. NOEL SANTANDER (CHAIRPERSON, THEOLOGY DEPARTMENT, SBC
MANILA); PROF. GERARD SANTOS (ASSISTANT PREFECT OF STUDENT
DISCIPLINE, COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, SBC MANILA); PROF.
ALBERT OASAN (ASSISTANT PREFECT OF STUDENT DISCIPLINE, COLLEGE
OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, SBC MANILA); PROF. JULIUS TUTOR (ASSISTANT
PREFECT OF STUDENT ACTIVITIES, COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, SBC
MANILA); PROF. SYBIL AGREDA (ASSISTANT PREFECT OF STUDENT
ACTIVITIES, COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, SBC MANILA); PROF.
LEOMAR REQUEJO (CHIEF, MUSIC SECTION, PUP); DR. AURORA BATNAG
(PANGULO, PAMBANSANG SAMAHAN SA LINGGWISTIKA AT LITERATURANG
FILIPINO); PROF. RAMILITO CORREA (PRESIDENT, SANGGUNIAN SA
FILIPINO/SANGFIL); PROF. CHRISTO RAY ALBAZON (PRO, GURO SA SINING
NG BAYAN, PUP); DR. RAMON GUILLERMO (PRESIDENT, ALL UP ACADEMIC
EMPLOYEES' UNION); PROF. MELANIA FLORES (NATIONAL PRO, ALL UP
ACADEMIC EMPLOYEES' UNION); PROF. ORESTES DE LOS REYES
(PRESIDENT, ADAMSON UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES); PROF.
JAMES PLATON (VICE PRESIDENT FOR LABOR EDUCATION, UST FACULTY
UNION); MR. FELIX PARINAS, JR., (PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER, ALL UP
WORKERS' UNION); PROF. MICHAEL PANTE (FACULTY, HISTORY
DEPARTMENT, ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY); PROF. VLADIMEIR B.
GONZALES (FACULTY, UP-DILIMAN); PROF. LAURENCE MARVIN S. CASTILLO
(FACULTY, UP-LOS BAÑOS); DR. ROMMEL RODRIGUEZ (ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR, UP-DILIMAN); DR. DOLORES TAYLAN (FACULTY MEMBER,
FILIPINO DEPARTMENT, DLSU MANILA); DR. TERESITA FORTUNATO
(FACULTY MEMBER, FILIPINO DEPARTMENT, DLSU MANILA); DR. RAQUEL
SISONBUBAN (FACULTY MEMBER, FILIPINO DEPARTMENT, DLSU MANILA);
PROF. LILIBETH QUIORE (FACULTY MEMBER, FILIPINO DEPARTMENT, DLSU
MANILA); DR. MA. RITA ARANDA (FACULTY MEMBER, FILIPINO
DEPARTMENT, DLSU MANILA); PROF. PORTIA PLACINO (FACULTY MEMBER,
UP DILIMAN); PROF. JOEL MALABANAN (FACULTY MEMBER, COLLEGE OF
LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE, PNU); DR. LUCIA B. DELA CRUZ (REGISTERED
GUIDANCE COUNSELOR; PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF MAKATI); PROF.
GERARDO LANUZA (PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, UP
DILIMAN); PROF. SARAH JANE S. RAYMUNDO (ASSISTANT PROFESSOR,
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UP DILIMAN); PROF. FERDINAND
JARIN (FACULTY MEMBER, PHILIPPINE NORMAL UNIVERSITY); PROF.
EMELITO SARMAGO (FACULTY MEMBER, UST); PROF. MARY ANNE MALLARI
(FACULTY MEMBER, UST); PROF. WENNIELYN FAJILAN (FACULTY MEMBER,
UST); PROF. REYNELE BREN ZAFRA (FACULTY MEMBER, UST); PROF. JOHN
KELVIN BRIONES (FACULTY MEMBER, ENGLISH DEPARTMENT, COLLEGE OF
ARTS AND LETTERS, BULACAN STATE UNIVERSITY); PROF. DENNIS
MANGUBAT (FACULTY MEMBER, FILIPINO DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA);
PROF. MINERVA SERRANO (FACULTY MEMBER, MATHEMATICS
DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. MARIE JOCELYN BENGCO (FACULTY
MEMBER, PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. CLYDE CORPUZ
(FACULTY MEMBER, SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); DR.
LIZA CRUZ (FACULTY MEMBER, HUMAN BIOLOGY AND SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); DR. SOCORRO DE JESUS (FACULTY MEMBER,
ENGLISH, FOREIGN LANGUAGES, AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT); PROF.
TERESITA DULAY (FACULTY MEMBER, MATHEMATICS DEPARTMENT, SBC
MANILA); PROF. JULIO CASTILLO, JR. (FACULTY MEMBER, DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. ESTHER CUARESMA (FACULTY MEMBER,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENT, SBC
MANILA); PROF. ARNOLD DONOZO (FACULTY MEMBER, MATH DEPARTMENT,
SBC MANILA); PROF. ROAN DINO (FACULTY MEMBER, KAGAWARAN NG
FILIPINOHIYA, PUP); DR. MARIA ELIZA CRUZ (FACULTY MEMBER, NATURAL
SCIENCES DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. JOSEPHINE DANGO
(FACULTY, THEOLOGY DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. HIPOLITO RUZOL
(FACULTY, KAGAWARAN NG FILIPINO, SBC MANILA); PROF. KERWIN MARK
MARTINEZ (FACULTY, SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES DEPARTMENT,
SBC MANILA); DR. VIOLETA REYES (FACULTY, SOCIAL SCIENCES AND
HUMANITIES DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. LUISITO DE LA CRUZ
(FACULTY, SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES DEPARTMENT, SBC
MANILA); ATTY. ALDEN REUBEN LUNA (FACULTY, SOCIAL SCIENCES AND
HUMANITIES DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. DON SANTANA (FACULTY,
MATHEMATICS DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. CHARLES BROÑASA
(FACULTY, MATHEMATICS DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. JESSTER
FONSECA (FACULTY, THEOLOGY DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); DR. NERISSA
REVILLA (FACULTY, ENGLISH, FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE
DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF. ROMANA ALIPIO (FACULTY, ENGLISH,
FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF.
JOSEPHINE PAZ ANDAL (FACULTY, ENGLISH, FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND
LITERATURE DEPARTMENT SBC MANILA); PROF. MIGUELA MIGUEL
(FACULTY, ENGLISH, FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT,
SBC MANILA); PROF. ARJAN ESPIRITU (FACULTY, ENGLISH, FOREIGN
LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA); PROF.
PILIPINO RAMOS (FACULTY, ACCOUNTANCY DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA);
PROF. KIM GUIA (FACULTY, PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT, SBC MANILA);
PROF. JONA IRIS TRAMBULO (FACULTY, TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES/TUP); ELIZABETH ANTHONY (UNIVERSITY OF SANTO
TOMAS); EMELITO SARMAGO (UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS); RONALD
P.TAGGAOA (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, SAINT
LOUIS UNIVERSITY); TERESITA MENNA K. DE GUZMAN (FACULTY, PHYSICAL
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); SAMUEL D.
BARTOLOME (PROFESSOR, RELIGION DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS
UNIVERSITY); REYNALDO O. DUMPAYAN (PROFESSOR, RELIGION
DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); JEROME P. ARO (FACULTY, CAD-
 SCIS DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); SAMUEL D. SILOG
(FACULTY, RELIGION DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY);
ROSALINDA P. SEGUNDO; (PROFESSOR, SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT,
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); BRIGITTE P. AWISAN (FACULTY, RELIGION
DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); RAUL LEANDRO R. VILLANUEVA
(ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS
UNIVERSITY); LAWRENCE DEXTER D. LADIA (PROFESSOR, RELIGION
DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); GEORGE M. TAWAO (SPECIAL
SERVICES DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); DONNIE D. EVARISTO
(SPECIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); CHERRY M.
RAFANAN (NURSING AIDE, HOSPITAL OF THE SACRED HEART SLU); JULIO
U. BERSAMIRA, JR. (PRINTING PRESS ASSISTANT, PRINTING PRESS OFFICE
SLU); JONES Q. CALINGAYAN (FACULTY, PHYSICAL EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); BRIAN LORENZO A. SALVALEON
(KITCHEN HELPER, SLU LADIES' RESIDENCE HALLS); ROLLY L. MARANES
(LABORATORY TECHNICIAN, SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING, SLU); CAROL ANN
F. BALAUS (ACCOUNTING CLERK, UFESLU SLU EMPLOYEES UNION);
MICHELLE B. BRAGAS (ACCOUNTING CLERK, UFESLU SLU EMPLOYEES
UNION); ERNESTO JOEY F. CHOMAWIN (SPECIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); GIAN CARLO C. GEGUIERA (FACULTY,
RELIGION DEPARTMENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY); MON KARLO
MANGARAN (BARANGAY COUNCILOR, CANIOGAN, MALOLOS, BULACAN);
MARY ANGELICA H. REGINALDO (STUDENT, M.A. MALIKHAING PAGSULAT,
DFPP-KAL, UP DILIMAN); RUSTUM CASIA (KM64 POETRY COLLECTIVE);
ELIZABETH ANTHONY (PRESIDENT, UST PANULAT); ARIES GUPIT (LEAGUE
OF FILIPINO STUDENTS); BRIX JUSTINE PAGTALUNAN (PARTIDO-
PAGKAKAISA NG DEMOKRATIKONG MAG-AARAL/PDM-BULACAN STATE
UNIVERSITY); FRANCIS JAMES PAGDANGANAN (PARTIDOPAGKAKAISA NG
DEMOKRATIKONG MAG-AARAL/BULSU); ANGELO SUALIBIO (STUDENTS FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN BULACAN STATE
UNIVERSITY/STAND BULSU); MARK JOSEPH DOMASIG (STUDENTS FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN BULSU); JOHN RAVEN
BALDOVINO (STUDENTS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
IN STAND BULSU); CEDRIQ CLEMENTE (STUDENTS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN STAND BULSU); MARIE ANTONETTE VALENCIA
(STUDENTS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN STAND
BULSU); REINARD SANCHEZ (STAND BULSU); RICHARD PATRIARCA
(STUDENTS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN BULACAN
STATE UNIVERSITY/STAND BULSU); JOEL A. CAPULONG (TONTONGAN TI
UMILI, BAGUIO CITY); JEANETTE R. CAWIDING (TONTONGAN TI UMILI);
MILAGROS K. AO-WAT (TONTONGAN TI UMILI); HILDRINE L. ALVAREZ
(TONTONGAN TI UMILI); VICENTE R. TOCA III (TONTONGAN TI UMILI);
TRACY ANNE D. DUMALO (TONTONGAN TI UMILI); KING CRIS P. PULMANO
(TONTONGAN TI UMILI); MARBEN M. PANLASIGUI (TONTONGAN TI UMILI);
LUKE T. BAGANGAN (TONTONGAN TI UMILI); NINO JOSEPH Q. OCONER
(TONTONGAN TI UMILI); DR. PRISCILLA AMPUAN (PRESIDENT, QUEZON
CITY PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION/ QCPSTA); JACKSON
BACABAC (TREASURER, QCPSTA); RAYMOND PALATINO (CHAIRPERSON,
BAYAN-NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION); LOUIE ZABALA (PRESIDENT, MANILA
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION); PROF. CARL MARC RAMOTA
(PRESIDENT, ACT SUC); DR. ROWELL MADULA (PRESIDENT, ACT PRIVATE);
PROF. JONATHAN GERONIMO (SECRETARY GENERAL, ACT PRIVATE
SCHOOLS); MICHAEL ESPOSO (AUDITOR, ACT PRIVATE SCHOOLS); DR.
DAVID MICHAEL SAN JUAN (PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER, ACT PRIVATE
SCHOOLS); MR. ISAAC ALI TAPAR (PRESIDENT, MANILA SCIENCE HIGH
SCHOOL FACULTY ASSOCIATION); PROF. RAMIR M. CRUZ (PRESIDENT,
FACULTY ASSOCIATION, COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING,
PUP), Petitioners, v.PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON "NOYNOY" C. AQUINO,
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION (CHED) CHAIRPERSON DR. PATRICIA
LICUANAN, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (DEPED) SECRETARY BR. ARMIN
LUISTRO, TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(TESDA) DIRECTOR JOEL VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 218465, October 9, 2018]
MA. DOLORES M. BRILLANTES, SEVERO L. BRILLANTES, EMELITA C. VIDAL,
FELIZA G. AGUSTIN, EVELYN G. ASTILLA, BRENDA P. BASCOS, ENRICO C.
PUNO, MERIAM N. CHAMACKALAYIL, MA LINDA T. FERNANDO, MARIBEL R.
LORENZO, CARMELO A. YAMBAO, JOSEPHINE M. DE GUZMAN, ELENA B.
CABARLES, GIRLIE M. TALISIC, JACQUELYN N. MARQUEZ, VIVIAN G. SADAC,
FELIZA G. AGUSTIN, MARIBEL R. LORENZO, GRACE G. ORALLO, ROSARIO
ANTES, GERALDINE G. LUI, WALLY Y. CAMACHO, STANLEY FRANCIS M.
LIBERATO, MARJORIE M. SUN, BELEN PANTALEON, IRENE N. ROCHA,
CRISTINA T. SANTOS, MARIFE P. OROLFO, CRISTINA L. GANALON, MARITES
R. LAZARO, JUANITO SALAZAR, CHRISTINA G. CRUZ, RAMONETTE P.
SONCUYA, PAUL ROMMEL C. CAPISTRANO, EDGARDO B. ALVINEZ, JENNIFER
C. RODELAS, MARIA VILMA M. ANOS, TERESITA F. ESPEJO, CHRIS C.
KATAPANG, FERDINAND BADULIS, MELODY M. RAMIREZ, MINERVA DV.
CRUZ, MARIA BERNADETTE A. CALORACAN, MA. CINDERELLA B. ESPIQUE,
EVANGELINE A. OBNIAL, ANALYN B. REYES, MARY E. BALLELOS, ANALEA A.
RIVERA, HELEN T. TABIOS, VALENTINE B. CUSTODIO, ROSE ANDRADE,
CHERYL JOY MIRANDA, JOCELYN MARIANO, REBECCA C. CUARTERO, MARIA
MARIETES B. LAURETA, SPS. GIL L. ANISTA & MARLYN P. ANISTA, MARLOUE
ABAINZA, FLORDELIZA C. DE VERA, MA. MARGIE G. MIRALLES, MILAGROS
M. ESTABILLO, ANGELICA D. BINGCO, ROSFELIZ GEMINI CATIPAY, CHERRYL
C. MIRHAN, ROGER S. BERNAL, SAMUEL C. EGUIA, LIZA C. SALVADOR,
SLENDA CAGAS, MA. FRANCISCA ANTONIO, EVELYN R. SUMAYLO, LESLEY V.
ARGUELLES, FOR THEMSELVES AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR
CHILDREN, MATTHEW M. BRILLANTES, PATRICIA GINGER C. VIDAL, JELIZA
G. AGUSTIN, ANGELO JOSE G. ASTILLA, BRYAN CHRISTOPHER P. BASCOS,
RENEE LOUISE L. PUNO, RUBEENA N. CHAMACKALAYIL, KIMBERLY T.
FERNANDO, SHANAYAH R. LORENZO, MICHAEL ADRIAND G. YAMBAO,
JOHANSSON EDWARD DE GUZMAN, RANIER B. CABARLES, JAELA MARIE
TALISIC, JANUS ROMELL N. MARQUEZ, RYAN DAVID G. SADAC, SHANAYAH
R. LORENZO, PAUL ORALLO, EMILSON RYAN ANTES, GRACE ANN ERICKA
LUI, SOFIA MARIYA KYSHA CAMACHO, BEATRICE COLLEEN LIBERATO,
CHLOE SOFIA SUN, GELAH PANTALEON, JUSTINE ELIZA N. ROCHA, EDRIN
CLYDE T. SANTOS, CONSTANCIO P. OROLFO III, RONIN RIC GANALON,
SOFIA KAYLE LAZARO, DJ SALAZAR, DAN PRECIOSO G. CRUZ, JULIE ANNE
LOI P. SONCUYA, RICCI PAULINE CATHERINE J. CAPISTRANO, PAUL ED
 JEREMY M. ALVINEZ, JOSEPH C. RODELAS, RONALD M. ANOS, JASON F.
ESPEJO, LAURA CHRISTINE C. KATAPANG, KEITH GABRIEL BADULIS, RON
EDRICH RAMIREZ, TOMMIE DANIEL DV. CRUZ, DENISE ANN A. CALORACAN,
ELLA MAE B. ESPIQUE, ROSEMARY KEITHLEY A. OBNIAL, RONALDO B.
REYES, JR. & ANNA LETICIA B. REYES, CARYLLE ALEX E. BALLELOS,
JACKLORENZ A. RIVERA, KARL ADRIAN TABIOS, BREN CHRISTIAN B.
CUSTODIO, SHANIA CHIER ANDRADE, CARL JUSTINE MIRANDA, ERIN
MARIANO, DENISE NICOLE CUARTERO, GRANT PAUL LAURETA, MA.
PATRICIA ANN P. ANISTA, MARDI LOUISE ABAINZA, JAYLORD MOSES C. DE
VERA, HANNAH MARIE MIRALLES, SANREE M. ESTABILLO, GIO ANN
TRINIDAD BINGCO, ARFEL DOMINICK B. CATIPAY, KITH CEAZAR MIRHAN,
JEAN RYAN A. BERNAL, SAMANTHA NICOLE EGUIA; OFFICERS OF THE
MANILA SCIENCE HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES CLUB,
REPRESENTED BY: ISAAC ALI TAPAR, RUTH DAYRIT, RAYMOND APOSTOL,
GINAROSE HABAL, CYNTHIA LYNNE CAUZON, ANABELLE BAYSIC, CRISTINA
RICO, KRISTIN MACARANAS, ROMEO BINAMIRA, AND THE CLASS HEREIN
REPRESENTED, Petitioners, v. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
DEPT. OF EDUCATION SECRETARY BR. ARMIN LUISTRO, NCR REGIONAL
DIRECTOR LUZ S. ALMEDA, MANILA SCHOOLS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT
PRISCILA C. DE SAGUN, MANILA SCIENCE HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPAL MARIA
EVA S. NACION, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, Respondents.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Doon sa ang trona’y ginawa ng dunong, bagong kabataa’y sadyang umuusbong, mga
kamalia’y kanyang natutunton, at dangal ng diwa ang pinayayabong; ang liig ng
bisyo’y kanyang napuputol; sala’y namumutla kung nasasalubong; sinusupil niya ang
bansang ulupong, at hangal mang tao’y kanyang inaampon.
- Jose Rizal1
Before the Court are consolidated petitions under Rule 65, assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 105332 (K to 12 Law), RA No.
101573 (Kindergarten Education Act), and related issuances of the Department of
Education (DepEd), Commission on Higher Education (CHED), Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) and Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA) implementing the K to 12 Basic Education Program.
History of the Philippines'
Basic Education System
On January 21, 1901, the Philippine Commission created the Department of Public
Instruction4 through Act No. 745. All schools established under the auspices of the
Military Government were made under the control of the officers of the Department
of Public Instruction6 and as early as this law, the primary education established
through it was considered free.7 Act No. 74 also made English language as the basis
of all public school instruction8 and allowed optional religious instruction in all
schools.9
On March 10, 1917, Act No. 270610 was passed mandating the recognition and
inspection of private schools and colleges by the Secretary of Public Instruction in
order to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and
colleges.11 The authority of the Secretary over private schools and colleges was later
on expanded under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 18012. The Secretary was vested
with the power "to supervise, inspect and regulate said schools and colleges in order
to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same." 13
The concept of free public primary instruction was also enshrined in the 1935
Philippine Constitution. Specifically, the State's interest in a complete and adequate
system of public education was stated in Section 5, Article XIV:
SEC. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to
regulation by the State. The Government shall establish and maintain a
complete and adequate system of public education, and shall provide at
least free public primary instruction, and citizenship training to adult
citizens. All schools shall aim to develop moral character, personal discipline, civic
conscience, and vocational efficiency, and to teach the duties of citizenship. Optional
religious instruction shall be maintained in the public schools as now authorized by
law. Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom. The State
shall create scholarships in arts, science, and letters for specially gifted citizens.
(Emphasis supplied)
On August 7, 1940, CA No. 586,14 otherwise known as the Educational Act of 1940,
was enacted to comply with the constitutional mandate on free public primary
education. This resulted in the revision of the public elementary system, 15 which had
the following objectives:
x x x (a) to simplify, shorten, and render more practical and economical both the
primary and intermediate courses of instruction so as to place the same within the
reach of the largest possible number of school children; (b) to afford every child of
school age adequate facilities to commence and complete at least the primary course
of instruction; (c) to give every child completing the primary course an adequate
working knowledge of reading and writing, the fundamentals of arithmetic,
geography, Philippine history and government, and character and civic training; and
(d) to insure that all children attending the elementary schools shall remain literate
and become useful, upright and patriotic citizens.16
To give effect to the foregoing objectives, the Department of Public Instructions was
authorized to revise the elementary school curriculum, to be approved by the
President, and adjust the academic school calendar to coincide with the working
season in the Philippines.17 In addition, Section 4 set standards for the age of
admission to public elementary schools and the minimum length of time for the
completion of primary and intermediate courses, to wit:
SEC. 4. With the approval of the President of the Philippines, the required age for
admission to the public elementary schools may be raised to not more than nine
years and the length of time required for the completion of the elementary
instruction comprising both the primary and intermediate courses reduced to not less
than five years. Any increase that may be approved in accordance with this section
regarding the minimum age of school children shall not affect those already enrolled
before the school year 1940-1941.
The law also made compulsory the attendance and completion of elementary
education, except when the child was mentally or physically incapable of attending
school or when it was inconvenient to do so considering the means of transportation
available or on account of economic condition of the parents the child could not
afford to continue in school.18 The parents or guardians or those having control of
children therein required to attend school without justification were liable to a fine of
not less than twenty nor more than fifty pesos.19
In 1947, Executive Order (EO) No. 9420 was issued renaming the Department of
Instructions to the Department of Education.
In 1953, RA No. 89621 or the Elementary Education Act of 1953 was passed, again
revising the elementary school system and instituting a primary course composed of
Grades I to IV, and an intermediate course composed of Grades V to VII, thus:
SEC. 3. To put into effect the educational policy established by this Act, the
Department of Education is hereby authorized to revise the elementary-school
system on the following basis: The primary course shall be composed of four grades
(Grades I to IV) and the intermediate course of three grades (Grade V to VII). Pupils
who are in the sixth grade of the time this Act goes into effect will not be required to
complete the seventh grade before being eligible to enroll in the first year of the
secondary school: Provided, That they shall be allowed to elect to enroll in Grade VII
if they so desire.
This law also made the enrollment and completion of elementary education
mandatory.22 Every parent or guardian or other person having custody of any child
was required to enroll such child in a public school upon attaining seven years of age
except when: (1) the child enrolled in or transferred in a private school, (2) the
distance from the home of the child to the nearest public school exceeded three
kilometers or the said public school was not safely or conveniently accessible, (3) on
account of indigence, the child could not afford to be in school, (4) child could not be
accommodated because of excess enrollment, and (5) child was being
homeschooled, under the conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Education. 23
The revision of the elementary school system was guided by the policy stated in
Section 5, Article XIV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution and with the consideration
that it was "the main function of the elementary school to develop healthy citizens of
good moral character, equipped with the knowledge, habits, and ideals needed for a
happy and useful home and community life."24
In 1972, the Department of Education was again renamed to Department of
Education and Culture, through Proclamation No. 1081;25 and was later on converted
to Ministry of Education and Culture in 1978.26
The 1973 Philippine Constitution maintained the State's interest in a free public
elementary education. This concept of free education was, however, expanded to the
secondary level, if the finances of the State permitted it, thus:
Article XV
SEC. 8. (1) All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of, and subject
to regulation by, the State. The State shall establish and maintain a complete,
adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of
national development.
xxxx
(5) The State shall maintain a system of free public elementary education
and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free
public education at least up to the secondary level. (Emphasis supplied)
Legislations under the 1973 Philippine Constitution implemented the foregoing
policies. In Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 232,27 or the Education Act of 1982, it was
declared as a policy of the State "to establish and maintain a complete, adequate
and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national
development."28 And under BP Blg. 232, "Formal Education" was defined as the
hierarchically structured and chronologically graded learnings organized and provided
by the formal school system and for which certification was required in order for the
learner to progress through the grades or move to higher levels." 29It corresponded to
(1) elementary education, which was primarily concerned with providing basic
education and usually corresponds to six or seven years, including the preschool
programs;30 and (2) secondary education as "the state of formal education following
the elementary level concerned primarily with continuing basic education and
expanding it to include the learning of employable gainful skills, usually
corresponding to four years of high school."31 This law also created the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports,32 which later on became the Department of Education
Culture and Sports by virtue of EO No. 117.33
As shown above, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitution did not state that
education at any level was compulsory. This changed in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which made elementary education mandatory, thus:
Article XIV
SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all.
SEC. 2. The State shall:
xxxx
(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the
elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents
to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of
school age[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent legislations implemented the policies stated in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Thus, secondary education was provided for free in RA No.
6655,34 otherwise known as the Free Public Secondary Education Act of 1988. Under
RA No. 6655, students in public high schools were free from payment of tuition and
other school fees.35 And in response to the mandate of the Constitution to promote
and make quality education accessible to all Filipino citizens, RA No.
6728,36 otherwise known as Government Assistance To Students and Teachers In
Private Education Act, was enacted in 1989 where the voucher system under the
Private Education Student Financial Assistance Program (PESFA) 37 was implemented
as follows:
SEC. 5. Tuition Fee Supplement for Student in Private High School. — (1) Financial
assistance for tuition for students in private high schools shall be provided by the
government through a voucher system in the following manner:
(a) For students enrolled in schools charging less than
one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) per year
in tuition and other fees during school year 1988-
1989 or such amount in subsequent years as may be
determined from time to time by the State
Assistance Council: The Government shall provide
them with a voucher equal to two hundred ninety
pesos (P290.00): Provided, That the student pays in
the 1989-1990 school year, tuition and other fees
equal to the tuition and other fees paid during the
preceding academic year: Provided, further, That the
Government shall reimburse the vouchers from the
schools concerned within sixty (60) days from the
close of the registration period: Provided,
furthermore, That the student's family resides in the
same city or province in which the high school is
located unless the student has been enrolled in that
school during the previous academic year.
(b) For students enrolled in schools charging above one
thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) per year in
tuition and other fees during the school year 1988-
1989 or such amount in subsequent years as may be
determined from time to time by the State
Assistance Council, no assistance for tuition fees
shall be granted by the Government: Provided,
however, That the schools concerned may raise their
tuition fees subject to Section 10 hereof.
(2) Assistance under paragraph (1), subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall be granted and
tuition fees under subparagraph (c) may be increased, on the condition that seventy
percent (70%) of the amount subsidized allotted for tuition fee or of the tuition fee
increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits
of teaching and non-teaching personnel except administrators who are principal
stockholders of the school, and may be used to cover increases as provided for in the
collective bargaining agreements existing or in force at the time when this Act is
approved and made effective: Provided, That government subsidies are not used
directly for salaries of teachers of non-secular subjects. At least twenty percent
(20%) shall go to the improvement or modernization of buildings, equipment,
libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and similar facilities and to the payment of other
costs of operation. For this purpose, school shall maintain a separate record of
accounts for all assistance received from the government, any tuition fee increase,
and the detailed disposition and use thereof, which record shall be made available for
periodic inspection as may be determined by the State Assistance Council, during
business hours, by the faculty, the non-teaching personnel, students of the school
concerned, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and other concerned
government agencies.
The voucher system was expanded in RA No. 8545,38 or the Expanded Government
Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education Act, as follows:
SEC. 5. Tuition Fee Supplements for Students in Private High Schools.— (1) Financial
Assistance for tuition for students in private high schools shall be provided by the
government through a voucher system in the following manner:
(a) For students enrolled in schools charging an amount as may be determined by
the State Assistance Council, the government shall provide them with a voucher in
such an amount as may be determined by the council: Provided, That the
government shall reimburse the vouchers from the schools concerned within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the close of the registration period.
(2) Assistance under paragraph (1), subparagraph (a) shall be guaranteed to all
private high schools participating in the program for a number of slots as of the
effectivity of this Act as the total number of students who availed of tuition fee
supplements for school year 1997-1998: Provided, That the State Assistance Council
may in subsequent years determine additional slots and/or additional participating
high schools as may be deemed necessary.
In the same law, elementary and secondary education were redefined. Elementary
education was the first six (6) years of basic education, excluding pre-school and
grade seven;39 while secondary education was the next four (4) years after
completion of basic education.40
In 2001, RA No. 898041 or the Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD)
Act  was implemented. This law established a national ECCD system which "refers to
the full range of health, nutrition, early education and social services programs that
provide for the basic holistic needs of young children from birth to age six (6), to
promote their optimum growth and development." 42 These programs include, among
others, optional center-based and home-based early childhood education. 43
In the same year, RA No. 915544 or the Governance of Basic Education Act of
2001  was enacted. Section 2 thereof declared it as a State policy "to protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality basic education and to make such
education accessible to all by providing all Filipino children a free and compulsory
education in the elementary level and free education in the high school level." 45 Basic
education was defined in this law as "the education intended to meet basic learning
needs which lays the foundation on which subsequent learning can be based. It
encompasses early childhood, elementary and high school education as well as
alternative learning systems for out-of-school youth and adult learners and includes
education for those with special needs." 46 It was also in this law where the then
Department of Education Culture and Sports was renamed the DepEd. 47
Education for All 2015 and
the Kindergarten
Education Act
In 2000, at the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, one hundred sixty four
(164) governments, including the Philippines, pledged to achieve, by 2015, the
following six (6) Education for All (EFA) goals: (1) expansion and improvement of
early childhood care and education; (2) universal access to complete free and
compulsory primary education of good quality; (3) equitable access to appropriate
learning and life skills program for youth and adult; (4) improvement of levels of
adult literacy, especially for women; (5) gender parity and equality in education; and
(6) improvement of all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring their
excellence.48
In consonance with the country's agreement to achieve these goals, the DepEd, in
2002, undertook the preparation of the Philippine EFA 2015 Plan of Action, in
collaboration with various stakeholders at the national and field levels, including
relevant government agencies and civil society groups.49 The primary goal of the
Philippine EFA 2015 Plan of Action, which the government officially adopted in
2006,50 is to provide "basic competencies for all that will bring about functional
literacy."51 The Philippine EFA 2015 Plan of Action translated the sic (6) Dakar goals
into four (4) objectives and nine (9) critical tasks, to wit:
Universal Goals and Objectives of Philippine EFA 2015
1. Universal Coverage of out of school youth and adults in providing
learning needs;
2. Universal school participation and total elimination of dropouts and
repeaters in grades 1-3;
3. Universal completion of the full basic education cycle with
satisfactory annual achievement levels; and
4. Total community commitment to attain basic education
competencies for all.
Nine Urgent and Critical Tasks
1. Make every school continuously improve its performance.
2. Expand early childhood care and development coverage to yield
more EFA benefits.
3. Transform existing non-formal and informal learning options into a
truly viable alternative learning system yielding more EFA benefits;
4. Get all teachers to continuously improve their teaching practices.
5. Increase the cycle of schooling to reach 12 years of formal basic
education.
6. Continue enrichment of curriculum development in the context of
pillars of new functional literacy;
7. Provide adequate and stable public funding for country-wide
attainment of EFA goals;
8. Create network of community-based groups for local attainment of
EFA goals; Monitor progress in effort towards attainment of EFA
goals.52
On January 20, 2012, the Philippine Congress took a pivotal step towards the
realization of the country's EFA goals with the enactment of the Kindergarten
Education Act. Section 2 thereof declared it the policy of the State "to provide equal
opportunities for all children to avail of accessible mandatory and compulsory
kindergarten education that effectively promotes physical, social, intellectual,
emotional and skills stimulation and values formation to sufficiently prepare them for
formal elementary schooling" and "to make education learner-oriented and
responsive to the needs, cognitive and cultural capacity, the circumstances and
diversity of learners, schools and communities through the appropriate languages of
teaching and learning."
The Kindergarten Education Act institutionalized kindergarten education, which is one
(1) year of preparatory education for children at least five years old, 53 as part of
basic education, and is made mandatory and compulsory for entrance to Grade
1.54 It also mandated the use of the learner's mother tongue, or the language first
learned by a child,55 as the primary medium of instruction in the kindergarten level in
public schools, except for the following cases wherein the primary medium of
instruction would be determined by the DepEd:
a. When the pupils in the kindergarten classroom have different mother
tongues or when some of them speak another mother tongue;
b. When the teacher does not speak the mother tongue of the learners; 
c. When resources, in line with the use of the mother tongue, are not yet
available; and  which took effect on June 8, 2013. The K to 12 Lawseeks to achieve, among others,
d. When teachers are not yet trained how to use the Mother Tongue Based
Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) program.56
On April 17, 2012, DepEd, in consultation with the Department of Budget and
Management, issued DepEd Order (DO) No. 32,57 the Kindergarten Education Act's
implementing rules and regulations. DO No. 32 provides that the Kindergarten
Education General Curriculum (KEGC) shall focus on the child's total development
according to his/her individual needs and socio-cultural background. The KEGC shall
be executed in a play-based manner and shall address the unique needs of diverse
learners, including gifted children, children with disabilities, and children belonging to
indigenous groups.58
The K to 12 Law and related issuances.
Before the enactment of the K to 12 Law, the Philippines was the only country in Asia
and among the three remaining countries in the world that had a 10-year basic
education program.59 The expansion of the basic education program, however, is an
old proposal dating to 1925. The studies are as follows: (a) the Monroe Survey
(1925) stated that secondary education did not prepare for life and recommended
training in agriculture, commerce, and industry; (b) the Prosser Survey (1930)
recommended to improve phases of vocational education such as 7 th grade
shopwork, provincial schools, practical arts training in the regular high schools, home
economics, placement work, gardening, and agricultural education; (c) the UNESCO
Mission Survey (1949) recommended the restoration of Grade 7; (d) the Education
Act of 1953 mandated that the primary course be composed of four grades (Grades I
to IV) and the intermediate course of three grades (Grade V to VII); (e) the
Swanson Survey (1960) recommended the restoration of Grade 7; (f) Presidential
Commission to Survey Philippine Education (PCSPE) (1970) gave high priority to the
implementation of an 11-year program, consisting of six years of compulsory
elementary education and five years of secondary education; (g) Congressional
Commission on Education (EDCOM) Report (1991), recommended that if one year
was to be added, it might either be seven years of elementary education or five
years of secondary education; (h) Presidential Commission on Educational Reforms
(2000) proposed to include the establishment of a one-year pre-baccalaureate
system that would also bring the Philippines at par with other countries; and (i)
Presidential Task Force on Education (2008) emphasized that in a 12-year pre-
university program, it was important "to specify the content of the 11 th and the
12th years and benchmark these with programs abroad."60
Despite these proposals, the 10-year basic education cycle remained in force. Thus,
prior to the enactment of the K to 12 Law, the Philippines, joined only by Djibouti
and Angola, were the only countries in the world with a 10-year basic education
system.61
To be at par with international standards and in line with the country's commitment
in EFA 2015, the Philippine Congress, on May 15, 2013, passed the K to 12 Law,
the following objectives: (1) decongest the curriculum; (2) prepare the students for
higher education; (3) prepare the students for the labor market; and (4) comply with
global standards.62
One of the salient features of the K to 12 Law is the expansion of basic education
from ten (10) years to thirteen (13) years, encompassing "at least one (1) year of
kindergarten education, six (6) years of elementary education, and six (6) years of
secondary education x x x. Secondary education includes four (4) years of junior
high school and two (2) years of senior high school education." 63
The K to 12 Law also adopts the following key changes in the Basic Education
Curriculum (BEC): (1) Mother Tongue (MT) will be used as a primary medium of
instruction from Kindergarten to Grade 3 and an additional learning area in Grades 1
to 3;64 (2) the time allotted per learning area in elementary will generally be reduced
to allow off-school learning experiences at home or in the community; while the time
allotment in secondary level will generally increase in view of the additional two (2)
years in Senior High School;65 (3) the spiral progression approach will be used in
Science, Mathematics, Araling Panlipunan, MAPEH and Edukasyon sa Pagpapakatao,
wherein the learning process is built upon previously learned knowledge for students
to master their desired competencies by revisiting the subject several times and
relating new knowledge or skills with the previous one;66 and (4) specialization
courses will be offered to prepare students for employment or engage in profitable
enterprise after high school.67
Apart from mastering core subjects, the additional two (2) years of Senior High
School will allow students to choose among academic, technical-vocational, or sports
and arts, as specialization, based on aptitude, interest and school capacity. 68 Hence,
graduates of Senior High School under the K to 12 BEC are envisioned to already be
prepared for employment, entrepreneurship, or middle-level skills development
should they opt not to pursue college education.69
Furthermore, the K to 12 Law extends the benefits provided under RA No. 8545 to
qualified students.70 DepEd is mandated to engage the services of private education
institutions and non-DepEd schools offering Senior High School through the On September 4, 2013, the K to 12 implementing rules and regulation (K to 12 IRR)
programs under RA No. 8545 and other financial arrangements based on the were issued.74 Rule VI of the K to 12 IRR covers the implementation of RA No. 8545
principle of public-private partnership. for qualified students enrolled in senior high school. The programs of assistance are
available primarily to students who complete junior high school in public schools and
The K to 12 Law also imposes upon the DepEd, CHED, and TESDA, the task to taking into consideration other factors such as income background and financial
promulgate the implementing rules and regulations, which shall provide, among needs of the students.75 The forms of assistance that the DepEd may provide include
others, appropriate strategies and mechanisms to ensure the smooth transition from a voucher system, "where government issues a coupon directly to students to enable
the existing 10-year basic education cycle to the K to 12 cycle addressing issues them to enroll in eligible private education institutions or non-DepEd public schools
such as multi-year low enrollment and displacement of faculty of Higher Education of their choice under a full or partial tuition or schooling subsidy". 76
Institutions (HEIs) and Technical Vocational Institutions (TVIs). 71
Further, Section 31 of the K to 12 IRR confers upon the DepEd, in collaboration with
DepEd is likewise mandated to coordinate with TESDA and CHED in designing the the DOLE, CHED and TESDA, the duty to promulgate the appropriate joint
enhanced BEC to ensure college readiness and avoid remedial and duplication of administrative issuance to ensure the sustainability of the private and public
basic education subjects;72 and to consult other national government agencies and educational institutions, and the promotion and protection of the rights, interests and
other stakeholders in developing the K to 12 BEC, which shall adhere to the following welfare of teaching and non-teaching personnel. For this purpose, the DOLE was
standards: tasked to convene a technical panel with representatives from the DepEd, CHED,
TESDA and representatives from both teaching and non-teaching personnel
organizations, and administrators of educational institutions. 77
(a) The curriculum shall be learner-centered, inclusive and
developmentally appropriate; In compliance with the foregoing mandate, DOLE organized three area-wide tripartite
education fora on K to 12 in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. DOLE also conducted
(b) The curriculum shall be relevant, responsive and research- regional consultations with HEIs, teaching and non teaching personnel.78
based;
(c) The curriculum shall be culture-sensitive; As a result of the tripartite consultations, DOLE, DepEd, TESDA and CHED issued on
(d) The curriculum shall be contextualized and global; May 30, 2014 the Joint Guidelines on the Implementation of the Labor and
Management Component of Republic Act No. 10533 (Joint Guidelines). The Joint
(e) The curriculum shall use pedagogical approaches that are Guidelines was issued to (a) ensure the sustainability of private and public
constructivist, inquiry-based, reflective, collaborative and educational institutions; (b) protect the rights, interests, and welfare of teaching and
non-teaching personnel; and (c) optimize employment retention or prevent, to the
integrative; extent possible, displacement of faculty and non-academic personnel in private and
(f) The curriculum shall adhere to the principles and framework of public HEIs during the transition from the existing 10 years basic education cycle to
Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) which the enhanced K to 12 basic education.
79

starts from where the learners are and from what they already To achieve these goals, the Joint Guidelines provides that the following, in the
knew proceeding from the known to the unknown;
instructional materials and capable teachers to implement the
MTB-MLE curriculum shall be available;
(g) The curriculum shall use the spiral progression approach to
ensure mastery of knowledge and skills after each level; and
(h) The curriculum shall be flexible enough to enable and allow
schools to localize, indigenize and enhance the same based on
their respective educational and social contexts. The
exercise of management prerogative, shall be observed:
a. ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy making processes
affecting their rights, duties, and welfare; 
b. the DepEd and private educational institutions may hire, as may be relevant
to the particular subject, graduates of science, mathematics, statistics,
engineering, music and other degree courses needed to teach in their
specialized subjects in elementary and secondary education, provided they
passed the Licensure Examination for Teachers; 

production and development of locally produced teaching c. graduates of technical-vocational courses may teach in their specialized
materials shall be encouraged and approval of these materials subjects in secondary education, provided that they possess the necessary
73 certification from TESDA and undergo in-service training; 
shall devolve to the regional and division education units.
 d. the DepEd and private educational institutions may hire practitioners, with
expertise in the specialized learning areas, to teach in the secondary level,
provided that they teach on part-time basis only;  entitled General Education Curriculum: Holistic Understandings, Intellectual and Civic
e. faculty of HEIs offering secondary education shall be given priority in hiring,
provided said faculty is a holder of a relevant Bachelor's degree and must
have satisfactorily served as a full time HEI faculty;  public HEIs in the country.84
f. if it is impossible for the affected HEI faculty members and academic support
personnel to be placed within the institution, they shall be prioritized in
hiring in other private and public senior high schools (SHS);  24 units of language and literature, 15 units of mathematics and natural sciences, 6
g. faculty of HEIs may be allowed to teach in their general education or subject
specialties in secondary education, provided said faculty is a holder of a
relevant Bachelor's degree and must have satisfactorily served as a full time
HEI faculty;  language and humanities, 15 units of mathematics, natural sciences, and information
h. without prejudice to existing collective bargaining agreements or
institutional policies, HEI faculty and non-teaching personnel who may not
be considered may avail of the retrenchment program pursuant to the
provisions of the Labor Code; and
i. in educational institutions where there is no collective agreement or
organized labor union, management may adopt policies in consultation with
faculty or non-academic clubs or associations in the school consistent and in
accordance with the aforementioned criteria. 80
K to 12 Program
Implementation and CHED
Memorandum Order (CMO)
No. 20, Series of 2013
The K to 12 basic education was implemented in parts. Universal kindergarten was
offered starting School Year (SY) 2011-2012.81 In 2012, DepEd started unclogging
the BEC to conform to the K to 12 Curriculum. Thus, DO No. 31 was issued setting
forth policy guidelines in the implementation of the Grades 1 to 10 of the K to 12
Curriculum. DO No. 31 provides that effective SY 2012-2013, the new K to 12 BEC,
which follows a spiral approach across subjects and uses the mother tongue as a
medium of instruction from Grades 1 to 3, shall be first implemented in Grades 1 and
7 of all public elementary and secondary schools; and while private schools are
enjoined to do the same, they may further enhance the curriculum to suit their
school's vision/mission.82
Five (5) school years from SY 2012-2013, the implementation of the K to 12 basic
education was to be completed. In 2018, the first group of Grade 6 and Grade 12
students under the K to 12 BEC are set to graduate.
Accordingly, to accommodate the changes brought about by the K to 12 Law, and
after several public consultations with stakeholders were held,83 CMO No. 20,
Competencies was issued on June 28, 2013. CMO No. 20 provides the framework
and rationale of the revised General Education (GE) curriculum. It sets the minimum
standards for the GE component of all degree programs that applies to private and
Previously, there were two General Education Curricula (GECs), GEC-A and GEC-B.
CMO No. 59, Series of 1996 provided for GEC-A, which required 63 units divided into
units of humanities, 12 units of social sciences, and 6 units of mandated subjects.
This was taken by students majoring in the humanities, social sciences, or
communication. Meanwhile, CMO No. 4, series of 1997 implemented GEC-B, which
was taken by all other students. GEC-B required 51 units divided into 21 units of
technology, 12 units of social sciences, and 3 units of mandated subjects.
Under CMO No. 20, the GE curriculum became outcome-oriented and categorized
into: (a) Intellectual Competencies; (b) Personal and Civic Competencies; and (c)
Practical Responsibilities. 85 This GE curriculum requires the completion of 36 units as
compared to the previous 63/51 units requirement. These 36 units are distributed as
follows: 24 units of core courses; 9 units of elective courses; and 3 units on the life
and works of Rizal.86 The required GE core courses are: (1) Understanding the Self;
(2) Readings in Philippine History; (3) The Contemporary World; (4) Mathematics in
the Modern World; (5) Purposive Communication; (6) Art Appreciation; (7) Science,
Technology and Society; and (8) Ethics.87 Further, the GE curriculum provided an
element of choice88 through elective courses which include the following: (1)
Mathematics, Science and Technology; (2) Social Sciences and Philosophy; and (3)
Arts and Humanities.89
The Petitions
Claiming that the K to 12 Basic Education Program violates various constitutional
provisions, the following petitions were filed before the Court praying that
the Kindergarten Education Act, K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31, Joint
Guidelines, and CMO No. 20, be declared unconstitutional:
1. Petition for Certiorari90 filed by Council for Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines and several other organizations duly organized
under Philippine laws, representing faculty and staff of colleges and
universities in the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. 216930; 
2. Petition to Declare Republic Act No. 10533, otherwise known as the
"Enhanced Basic Education Act of 2013," as Unconstitutional and/or
Illegal91 filed by petitioners Antonio "Sonny" Trillanes, Gary C. Alejano, and
Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers, and
members of Congress, docketed as G.R. No. 217752; 
 3. Petition to Declare Unconstitutional, Null, Void, and Invalid Certain
Provisions of R.A. No. 10533 And Related Department of Education (DepEd)
Implementing Rules and Regulations, Guidelines or Orders92filed by
petitioners Eduardo R. Alicias, Jr. and Aurelio P. Ramos, Jr., in their
capacities as citizen, taxpayer, parent and educator, docketed as G.R. No.
218045; 
4. Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus93 filed by petitioner Richard
Troy A. Colmenares in his capacity as citizen invoking strong public interest
and transcendental importance, petitioners Kathlea Francynn Gawani D.
Yañgot and several others, as a class, and on behalf of others who stand to
suffer direct injury as a result of the implementation of the K to 12 Basic
Education Program, and petitioners Rene Luis Tadle and several others, in
their capacities as taxpayers concerned that public funds are being illegally
and improperly disbursed through the enforcement of the invalid or
unconstitutional laws and issuances, docketed as G.R. No. 218098; 
5. Petition for Certiorari  and Prohibition,94 docketed as G.R. No. 218123, filed
by Antonio Tinio, et al., suing in their capacities as taxpayers and concerned
citizens; 
6. Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus95 filed by petitioners
Spouses Ma. Dolores M. Brillantes and Severo L. Brillantes and several
others, as students, parents and teachers, who stand to suffer direct injury
from the K to 12 BEC and implementation of the two (2) additional years of
high school, docketed as G.R. No. 218465; and  B. Substantive:
7. Petition for Certiorari  and Prohibition  filed by Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera and
several others who are faculty and staff of colleges and universities in the
Philippines who stand to suffer direct injury in the implementation of CMO
No. 20 and Congressman Antonio Tinio and other party-list representatives
in their capacities as members of the Congress, who are also collectively
suing in their capacities as taxpayers and concerned citizens, docketed as
G.R. No. 217451.96
The present consolidated petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the implementation of
the K to 12 Law and other administrative issuances in relation thereto.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the public respondents, opposed these
petitions.97 Private respondent Miriam College in G.R. No. 216930 also filed its
Comment/Opposition.98
On April 21, 2015, the Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 217451, enjoining the
implementation of CMO No. 20 insofar only as it excluded from the curriculum for
college the course Filipino and Panitikan as core courses.99
However, in G.R. Nos. 216930, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218923 and 218465, the
Court denied petitioners' prayer for issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction on the implementation of the K to 12 Law, its implementing rules,
the Kindergarten Education Act, and other administrative issuances in relation
thereto, for lack of merit. 100
In the Resolutions dated April 5, 2016101 and April 12, 2016,102 the Court directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The Issues
Culled from the submissions of petitioners, public respondents, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), and respondent Miriam College, the following are the
issues for the Court's resolution:
A. Procedural:
1. Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy;
2. Whether certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are proper remedies
to assail the laws and issuances.
1. Whether the K to 12 Law was duly enacted; 
2. Whether the K to 12 Law constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power; 
3. Whether DO No. 31 is valid and enforceable;
4. Whether the K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31 and/or the Joint
Guidelines contravene provisions of the Philippine Constitution on: 
a. establishing and maintaining a system of free elementary
and high school education and making elementary
education compulsory for all children of school age (Section
2[2], Article XIV); 
b. the right to accessible and quality education at all levels
and duty of the State to make such education accessible to
all (Section 1, Article XIV); 
c. the primary duty of parents to rear and prepare their
children (Section 2[2], Article XIV);
 d. the right of every citizen to select a profession or course of
study (Section 5[3], Article XIV);  for Culture and the Arts, Establishing National Endowment
e. patriotism and nationalism (Sections 13 and 17, Article II,
Section 3[1] and [2], Article XIV);
f. the use of Filipino as medium of official communication and
as language of instruction in the educational system
(Section 6, Article XIV); and regional languages as auxiliary
media of instruction (Section 7, Article XIV); 
g. academic freedom (Section 5[2], Article XIV); and
h.  the right of labor to full protection (Section 18, Article II,
Section 3, Article XIII and Section 5[4], Article XIV); 
5. Whether CMO No. 20 contravenes provisions of the Philippine
Constitution on: 
a. the use of Filipino as medium of official communication and
as language of instruction in the educational system
(Section 6, Article XIV);  OSG further asserts that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition sought by
b. preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a
Filipino national culture (Sections 14, 15, and 16, Article
XIV);  assailed issuances.104
c. inclusion of the study of the Philippine Constitution as part
of the curriculum of all educational institutions (Section
3[1], Article XIV); 
d. giving priority to education to foster patriotism and
nationalism (Section 17, Article II and Sections 2 and 3,
Article XIV); and 
e. the protection of the rights of workers and promotion of
their welfare (Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article
XIII). 
6. Whether CMO No. 20 violates the following laws: 
a. RA No. 7104 or the Commission on the Filipino Language
Act;  functions conferred upon these political bodies.106 Thus, when a case is brought
b. BP Blg. 232 or the Education Act of 1982; and  upon the Constitution, as in these consolidated cases, it becomes not only the right
c. RA No. 7356 or the Act Creating the National Commission
Fund for Culture and the Arts and For Other Purposes. 
7. Whether the K to 12 Law violates petitioners' right to substantive
due process and equal protection of the laws.
THE COURT'S RULING
Procedural Issues
Power of Judicial Review
and the Remedies of
Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus
The OSG submits that the cases filed by petitioners involve the resolution of purely
political questions which go into the wisdom of the law: they raise questions that are
clearly political and non-justiciable and outside the power of judicial review. 103 The
petitioners are unwarranted because Congress, DepEd and CHED did not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, nor did they unlawfully neglect the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, with regard to the
The Court disagrees.
The political question doctrine is "no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review"105 under the expanded definition of
judicial power of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 1, Article VIII thereof
authorizes courts of justice not only "to settle actual case controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
In determining whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government,
the Court is guided primarily, by the Constitution, and secondarily, by existing
domestic and international law, which set limits or conditions to the powers and
before the Court with serious allegations that a law or executive issuance infringes
but in fact the duty of the Court to settle the dispute. 107 In doing so, the Court is "not
judging the wisdom of an act of a coequal department, but is merely ensuring that
the Constitution is upheld."108 And, if after said review, the Court does not find any
constitutional infringement, then, it has no more authority to proscribe the actions
under review.109
Moreover, that the assailed laws and executive issuances did not involve the exercise
of judicial or quasi-judicial function is of no moment. Contrary to the Solicitor
General's assertion, it has long been judicially settled that under the Court's
expanded jurisdiction, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies
to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion, any act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.110
That said, the Court's power is not unbridled authority to review just any claim of
constitutional violation or grave abuse of discretion. The following requisites must
first be complied with before the Court may exercise its power of judicial review,
namely: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial interest in the case that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the act or
issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the very  lis mota of the case.111 Of these four,
the most important are the first two requisites, and thus will be the focus of the
following discussion.
Actual case or controversy
An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute since the courts will decline to
pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of
authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.112 Related to the requirement of
an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," and a question is ripe
when the act being challenged has a direct effect on the individual challenging
it.113 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act
had been accomplished or performed by either branch of government before a court
may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. 114
Relevantly, in Sps. Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,115 (Imbong) where the constitutionality of
the Reproductive Health Law was challenged, the Court found that an actual case or
controversy existed and that the same was ripe for judicial determination considering
that the RH Law and its implementing rules had already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law had already been passed. Moreover, the
petitioners therein had sufficiently shown that they were in danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.116
Similar to Imbong, these consolidated cases present an actual case or controversy
that is ripe for adjudication. The assailed laws and executive issuances have already
taken effect and petitioners herein, who are faculty members, students and parents,
are individuals directly and considerably affected by their implementation.
Legal Standing
Legal standing refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act.117 In constitutional cases, which are often brought through public
actions and the relief prayed for is likely to affect other persons, 118 non-traditional
plaintiffs have been given standing by this Court provided specific requirements have
been met.119
When suing as a concerned citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled
or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.120
In the case of taxpayers, they are allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.121
On the other hand, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to
sue to question the validity of any official action which infringe upon their legislative
prerogatives.122
An organization, asserting the rights of its members, may also be granted standing
by the Court.123
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 216930 and 218465 include organizations/federations duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines, representing the interest of the faculty
and staff of their respective colleges and universities, who allegedly are threatened
to be demoted or removed from employment with the implementation of the K to 12
Law. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 217752 and 218045 are suing as citizens, taxpayers
and in their personal capacities as parents whose children would be directly affected
by the law in question. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 218123 and 217451 are suing in their
capacities as teachers who allegedly are or will be negatively affected by the
implementation of the K to 12 Law and CMO No. 20, respectively, through job
displacement and diminution of benefits; and as taxpayers who have the right to
challenge the K to 12 Law and CMO No. 20 as public funds are spent and will be
spent for its implementation.
Under the circumstances alleged in their respective petitions, the Court finds that
petitioners have sufficient legal interest in the outcome of the controversy. And,
considering that the instant cases involve issues on education, which under the
Constitution the State is mandated to promote and protect, the stringent
requirement of direct and substantial interest may be dispensed with, and the mere
fact that petitioners are concerned citizens asserting a public right, sufficiently
clothes them with legal standing to initiate the instant petition. 124
Substantive Issues
I.
K to 12 Law was duly enacted
Petitioners question the validity of the enactment of the K to 12 Law claiming that:
(1) sectors which would be directly affected by the K to 12 Basic Education Program
were deprived of their right, under Section 16, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution,
to be consulted or participate in matters which involved their interest prior to the
passage of the law;125 (2) the enrolled bill which the President signed into law varies
significantly from the reconciled version of the bill as approved by Congress and
reported in the Senate Journal on January 30, 2013,126 and that the Court, pursuant
to its ruling in Astorga v. Villegas,127 (Astorga) should look into the entries in the
Journal to determine whether the K to 12 Law was duly enacted;128 and (3) the K to
12 Law was incomplete because it failed to provide sufficient standards by which the
DepEd, CHED and TESDA, might be guided in addressing the possible impact of the
implementation of the K to 12 Law on labor; thus, Section 31 of the K to 12 IRR and
the Joint Guidelines, which spring forth from such undue delegation of legislative
power, are invalid and unconstitutional.129
For its part, the OSG contends that the K to 12 Law was enacted in accordance with
the procedure prescribed in the Constitution and that contrary to petitioners'
assertion, the text of the enrolled bill which was eventually signed into law is not
different from the consolidated bill drafted by the Bicameral Conference Committee
and approved by the Senate and House of Representatives. 130 Further, the OSG
argues that there is no undue delegation of legislative power because the K to 12
Law provides a sufficient standard on the impact on labor due to its
implementation.131
Private respondent Miriam College shares the same view that the K to 12
Law sufficiently provided standards to guide the relevant administrative agencies and
the private educational institutions in the implementation of the K to 12 Law and
address all issues on labor.132
The Court holds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the K to 12 Law was validly
enacted.
First, petitioners' claim of lack of prior consultations is belied by the nationwide
regional consultations conducted by DepEd pursuant DepEd Memorandum Nos.
38133 and 98,134 series of 2011. The regional consultations, which aimed "to inform
the public [and] to elicit their opinions, thoughts, and suggestions about the K to 12
program,"135 ran from February to March 2011 and were participated in by students,
parents, teachers and administrators, government representatives, and
representatives from private schools and private sectors. 136
The Philippine Congress, in the course of drafting the K to 12 Law, also conducted
regional public hearings between March 2011 to February 2012, wherein
representatives from parents-teachers' organizations, business, public/private school
heads, civil society groups/non-government organizations/private organizations and
local government officials and staffs were among the participants. 137 And even
assuming that no consultations had been made prior to the adoption of the K to 12,
it has been held that the "[p]enalty for failure on the part of the government to
consult could only be reflected in the ballot box and would not nullify government
action."138
Second, the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case. Under the "enrolled bill
doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President
and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed
is conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as to its due enactment. 139 The
rationale behind the enrolled bill doctrine rests on the consideration that "[t]he
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the [Judiciary] to act
upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the
question properly arises, [as in the instant consolidated cases], whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution." 140
Jurisprudence will show that the Court has consistently adhered to the enrolled bill
doctrine. Claims that the required three-fourths vote for constitutional amendment
has not been obtained,141 that irregularities attended the passage of the law,142 that
the tenor of the bill approved in Congress was different from that signed by the
President,143 that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill, 144 and
even claims that the enrolled copy of the bill sent to the President contained
provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted by the conference
committee,145 had all failed to convince the Court to look beyond the four corners of
the enrolled copy of the bill.
As correctly pointed out by private respondent Miriam College, petitioners' reliance
on Astorga is quite misplaced. They overlooked that in Astorga, the Senate President
himself, who authenticated the bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature,
so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider. 146Without such
attestation, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the Court was
constrained to consult the entries in the journal to determine whether the text of the
bill signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress.147
In stark contrast to Astorga, this case presents no exceptional circumstance to justify
the departure from the salutary rule. The K to 12 Law was passed by the Senate and
House of Representatives on January 20, 2013, approved by the President on May
15, 2013, and, after publication, took effect on June 8, 2013. Thus, there is no doubt
as to the formal validity of the K to 12 Law.
Third, there is no undue delegation of legislative power in the enactment of the K to
12 Law.
In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate,
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. 148 The policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate must be set forth therein. 149 The sufficient
standard test, on the other hand, mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.150
The K to 12 Law adequately provides the legislative policy that it seeks to
implement. Section 2 of the K to 12 Law provides:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State shall establish, maintain and support a
complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the
people, the country and society-at-large.
Likewise, it is hereby declared the policy of the State that every graduate of basic
education shall be an empowered individual who has learned, through a program
that is rooted on sound educational principles and geared towards excellence, the
foundations for learning throughout life, the competence to engage in work and be
productive, the ability to coexist in fruitful harmony with local and global
communities, the capability to engage in autonomous, creative, and critical thinking,
and the capacity and willingness to transform others and one's self.
For this purpose, the State shall create a functional basic education system that will
develop productive and responsible citizens equipped with the essential
competencies, skills and values for both life-long learning and employment. In order
to achieve this, the State shall:
(a) Give every student an opportunity to receive quality education that is globally
competitive based on a pedagogically sound curriculum; that is at par with
international standards;
(b) Broaden the goals of high school education for college preparation, vocational
and technical career opportunities as well as creative arts, sports and entrepreneurial
employment in a rapidly changing and increasingly globalized environment; and
(c) Make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs, cognitive and
cultural capacity, the circumstances and diversity of learners, schools and
communities through the appropriate languages of teaching and learning, including
mother tongue as a learning resource.
Moreover, scattered throughout the K to 12 Law are the standards to guide the
DepEd, CHED and TESDA in carrying out the provisions of the law, from the
development of the K to 12 BEC, to the hiring and training of teaching personnel and
to the formulation of appropriate strategies in order to address the changes during
the transition period.
SEC. 5. Curriculum Development. — The DepEd shall formulate the design and
details of the enhanced basic education curriculum. It shall work with the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) to craft harmonized basic and tertiary
curricula for the global competitiveness of Filipino graduates. To ensure college
readiness and to avoid remedial and duplication of basic education subjects, the
DepED shall coordinate with the CHED and the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA).
To achieve an effective enhanced basic education curriculum, the DepED shall
undertake consultations with other national government agencies and other
stakeholders including, but not limited to, the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), the private and public
schools associations, the national student organizations, the national teacher
organizations, the parents-teachers associations and the chambers of commerce on
matters affecting the concerned stakeholders.
The DepED shall adhere to the following standards and principles in developing the
enhanced basic education curriculum:
(a) The curriculum shall be learner-centered, inclusive and developmentally
appropriate;
(b) The curriculum shall be relevant, responsive and research-based;
(c) The curriculum shall be culture-sensitive;
(d) The curriculum shall be contextualized and global;
(e) The curriculum shall use pedagogical approaches that are constructivist, inquiry-
based, reflective, collaborative and integrative;
(f) The curriculum shall adhere to the principles and framework of Mother Tongue-
Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) which starts from where the learners are
and from what they already knew proceeding from the known to the unknown;
instructional materials and capable teachers to implement the MTB-MLE curriculum
shall be available;
(g) The curriculum shall use the spiral progression approach to ensure mastery of
knowledge and skills after each level; and
(h) The curriculum shall be flexible enough to enable and allow schools to localize,
indigenize and enhance the same based on their respective educational and social
contexts. The production and development of locally produced teaching materials
shall be encouraged and approval of these materials shall devolve to the regional
and division education units.
xxxx
SEC. 7. Teacher Education and Training. — To ensure that the enhanced basic
education program meets the demand for quality teachers and school leaders, the
DepED and the CHED, in collaboration with relevant partners in government,
academe, industry, and nongovernmental organizations, shall conduct teacher
education and training programs, as specified:
(a) In-service Training on Content and Pedagogy. — Current DepED teachers shall be
retrained to meet the content and performance standards of the new K to 12
curriculum. The DepED shall ensure that private education institutions shall be given
the opportunity to avail of such training.
(b) Training of New Teachers. — New graduates of the current Teacher Education
curriculum shall undergo additional training, upon hiring, to upgrade their skills to
the content standards of the new curriculum. Furthermore, the CHED, in coordination
with the DepED and relevant stakeholders, shall ensure that the Teacher Education
curriculum offered in these Teacher Education Institutes (TEIs) will meet the
necessary quality standards for new teachers. Duly recognized organizations acting
as TEIs, in coordination with the DepED, the CHED, and other relevant stakeholders,
shall ensure that the curriculum of these organizations meet the necessary quality
standards for trained teachers.
(c) Training of School Leadership. — Superintendents, principals, subject area
coordinators and other instructional school leaders shall likewise undergo workshops
and training to enhance their skills on their role as academic, administrative and
community leaders.
Henceforth, such professional development programs as those stated above shall be
initiated and conducted regularly throughout the school year to ensure constant
upgrading of teacher skills.
SEC. 8. Hiring of Graduates of Science, Mathematics, Statistics, Engineering and
Other Specialists in Subjects with a Shortage of Qualified Applicants, Technical-
Vocational Courses and Higher Education Institution Faculty. — Notwithstanding the
provisions of Sections 26, 27 and 28 of Republic Act No. 7836, otherwise known as
the "Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994", the DepED and private
education institutions shall hire, as may be relevant to the particular subject:
(a) Graduates of science, mathematics, statistics, engineering, music and other
degree courses with shortages in qualified Licensure Examination for Teachers (LET)
applicants to teach in their specialized subjects in the elementary and secondary
education. Qualified LET applicants shall also include graduates admitted by
foundations duly recognized for their expertise in the education sector and who
satisfactorily complete the requirements set by these organizations: Provided, That
they pass the LET within five (5) years after their date of hiring: Provided,
further, That if such graduates are willing to teach on part-time basis, the provisions
of LET shall no longer be required;
(b) Graduates of technical-vocational courses to teach in their specialized subjects in
the secondary education: Provided, That these graduates possess the necessary
certification issued by the TESDA: Provided, further, That they undergo appropriate
in-service training to be administered by the DepED or higher education institutions
(HEIs) at the expense of the DepED;
(c) Faculty of HEIs be allowed to teach in their general education or subject
specialties in the secondary education: Provided, That the faculty must be a holder of
a relevant Bachelor's degree, and must have satisfactorily served as a full-time HEI
faculty;
(d) The DepED and private education institutions may hire practitioners, with
expertise in the specialized learning areas offered by the Basic Education Curriculum,
to teach in the secondary level: Provided, That they teach on part-time basis only.
For this purpose, the DepED, in coordination with the appropriate government
agencies, shall determine the necessary qualification standards in hiring these
experts.
xxxx
SEC. 12. Transitory Provisions. — The DepED, the CHED and the TESDA shall
formulate the appropriate strategies and mechanisms needed to ensure smooth
transition from the existing ten (10) years basic education cycle to the enhanced
basic education (K to 12) cycle. The strategies may cover changes in physical
infrastructure, manpower, organizational and structural concerns, bridging models
linking grade 10 competencies and the entry requirements of new tertiary curricula,
and partnerships between the government and other entities. Modeling for senior
high school may be implemented in selected schools to simulate the transition
process and provide concrete data for the transition plan.
To manage the initial implementation of the enhanced basic education program and
mitigate the expected multi-year low enrolment turnout for HEIs and Technical
Vocational Institutions (TVIs) starting School Year 2016-2017, the DepED shall
engage in partnerships with HEIs and TVIs for the utilization of the latter's human
and physical resources. Moreover, the DepED, the CHED, the TESDA, the TVIs and
the HEIs shall coordinate closely with one another to implement strategies that
ensure the academic, physical, financial, and human resource capabilities of HEIs
and TVIs to provide educational and training services for graduates of the enhanced
basic education program to ensure that they are not adversely affected. The faculty
of HEIs and TVIs allowed to teach students of secondary education under Section 8
hereof, shall be given priority in hiring for the duration of the transition period. For
this purpose, the transition period shall be provided for in the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR).151
Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and appreciated in its entirety, is
complete in all essential terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on
the power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and TESDA. The fact that the K to 12
Law did not have any provision on labor does not make said law incomplete. The
purpose of permissible delegation to administrative agencies is for the latter to
"implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by 'filling in' the details which
the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide." 152 With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
legislature has found it necessary to entrust to administrative agencies, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them, the authority to
provide direct and efficacious solutions to these problems.153 This is effected by the
promulgation of supplementary regulations, such as the K to 12 IRRjointly issued by
the DepEd, CHED and TESDA and the Joint Guidelines issued in coordination with
DOLE, to address in detail labor and management rights relevant to implementation
of the K to 12 Law.
DO No. 31 is valid and enforceable
Petitioners also claim that DO No. 31 is a usurpation of legislative authority as it
creates a law without delegation of power.154 According to petitioners, DO No. 31,
which changed the curriculum and added two (2) more years to basic education, has
no statutory basis. It also violates the constitutional right of parents to participate in
planning programs that affect them and the right to information on matters of public
concern.155Petitioners further contend that since DO No. 31 imposes additional
obligations to parents and children, public consultations should have been conducted
prior to its adoption and that the assailed DO should have been published and
registered first with the Office of the National Administrative Register before it can
take effect.156
Again, petitioners' arguments lack factual and legal bases. DO No. 31 did not add
two (2) years to basic education nor did it impose additional obligations to parents
and children. DO No. 31 is an administrative regulation addressed to DepEd
personnel providing for general guidelines on the implementation of a new
curriculum for Grades 1 to 10 in preparation for the K to 12 basic education. DO No.
31 was issued in accordance with the DepEd's mandate to establish and maintain a
complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of
national development,157 formulate, plan, implement, and coordinate and ensure
access to, promote equity in, and improve the quality of basic education; 158 and
pursuant to the Secretary's authority to formulate and promulgate national
educational policies,159 under existing laws.
Moreover, more than a year prior to adoption of DO No. 31, and contrary to
petitioners' assertions, DepEd conducted regional consultations and focus group
discussions, participated in by students, parents, teachers and administrators,
government representatives, and representatives from private schools and private
sector,160 to elicit opinions, thoughts and suggestions about the K to 12 basic
education.161
There is also no merit in petitioners' claim that publication is necessary for DO No.
31 to be effective. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
including the rules and guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance
of their duties are not required to be published.162 At any rate, the Court notes that
DO No. 31 was already forwarded to the University of the Philippines Law Center for
filing in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and
took effect pursuant to said provisions. 163
Having established that the K to 12 Law and its related issuances were duly enacted
and/or validly issued, the Court now discusses whether they contravene provisions of
the Constitution.
II.
Police power of the State
Police power is defined broadly as the State's authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
This all-comprehensive definition provides ample room for the State to meet the
exigencies of the times depending on the conditions and circumstances. As the Court
eruditely explained in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp.164 (Basco):
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA
481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,
163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu
v. Ericta, supra).
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its
origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in
the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the
plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-
protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic
force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of the winds of change. 165
From the legislative history of the Philippine education system as detailed above, one
can easily discern that the enactment of education laws, including the K to 12
Law and the Kindergarten Education Act, their respective implementing rules and
regulations and the issuances of the government agencies, are an exercise of the
State's police power. The State has an interest in prescribing regulations to promote
the education and the general welfare of the people. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,166 the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a State,
having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of basic education."167
Here, petitioners essentially assail the State's exercise of police power to regulate
education through the adoption of the K to 12 Basic Education Program, because
the K to 12 Law and its related issuances purportedly violate the Constitutional
provisions as enumerated in the outline of issues above.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. 168 For a law to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.169 The grounds for nullity must be clear beyond reasonable
doubt.170 Hence, for the Court to nullify the assailed laws, petitioners must clearly
establish that the constitutional provisions they cite bestow upon them demandable
and enforceable rights and that such rights clash against the State's exercise of its
police power under the K to 12 Law.
To be sure, the Court's role is to balance the State's exercise of its police power as
against the rights of petitioners. The Court's pronouncement in Secretary of Justice
v. Lantion171 (Lantion) instructs:
x x x The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is
a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law." The approach requires that we "take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation or type of situation." These interests usually consist in the exercise by
an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government's
promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other. 172
In fact, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,173 where the question was the validity of a statute
criminalizing the failure of parents to allow their children to attend compulsory high
school education, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that although the State's interest in
universal education is highly ranked in terms of State functions, this does not free
this exercise of State function from the balancing process when it impinges on
fundamental rights and interests, specifically the Free Exercise Clause, thus:
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for
education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and
duration of basic education. See, e.g., Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534,
69 L Ed 1070, 1077, 45 S Ct 571, 39 ALR 468 (1925). Providing public schools ranks
at the very apex of the function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility
was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent
education in a privately operated system. There the Court held that Oregon's statute
compelling attendance in a public school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably
interfered with the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their offspring,
including their education in church-operated schools. As that case suggests, the
values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children
in their early and formative years have a high place in our society. See also Ginsberg
v New York, 390 US 629, 639 20 L Ed 2d 195, 203, 88 S Ct 1274 (1968); Meyer v
Nebraska, 262 US 390, 67 L Ed 1042, 43 S Ct 625, 29 ALR 1446 (1923); cf. Rowan v
Post Office Dept., 397 US 728, 25 L Ed 2d 736, 90 S Ct 1484 (1970). Thus, a
State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental
rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as
they, in the words of Pierce, "prepare [them] for additional obligations." 268
US at 535, 69 L Ed AT 1078.174
As quoted above, this balancing of interest approach has been applied in this
jurisdiction in Lantion in determining whether there was a violation of the private
respondent's right to due process when he was not furnished a copy of the request
for his extradition. This right was balanced against the country's commitment under
the RP-US Extradition Treaty to extradite to the United States of America persons
who were charged with the violation of some of its laws. 175
The Court held in Lantion that at the stage of the extradition, it was only at an
evaluation stage; thus there was yet no requirement that he be given notice of the
proceedings. At that stage, the balance was tilted in favor of the interest of the State
in helping suppress crime by facilitating the extradition of persons covered by
treaties entered into by the government. 176
It is with these standards and framework that the Court examines whether the
enactments of the Kindergarten Education Act, the K to 12 Law and their
implementing rules and regulations, were valid exercises of the State's police power
to regulate education.
In this regard, and to digress, only self-executing provisions of the Constitution
embody judicially enforceable rights and therefore give rise to causes of action in
court.177 Accordingly, it is necessary to determine first whether the constitutional
provisions invoked by petitioners are self-executing; and if they are, is there a
conflict between these rights and the State's police power to regulate education? If a
conflict does exist, do the rights of petitioners yield to the police power of the State?
Non-self-executing constitutional provisions
As defined, "a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action."178
In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,179 it was ruled that
all provisions of the Constitution are presumed self-executing, 180 because to treat
them as requiring legislation would result in giving the legislature "the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law." 181 And this could
result in a cataclysm.182
This pronouncement notwithstanding, however, the Court has, in several cases, had
occasion to already declare several Constitutional provisions as not self-executory.
In Tanada v. Angara,183 it was settled that the sections found under Article II of the
1987 Philippine Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In fact, in the cases
of Basco,184Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,185and Tondo Medical Center Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals,186 the Court categorically ruled that Sections 11, 12,
13, 17 and 18 of Article II, Section 13 of Article XIII, and Section 2 of Article XIV, of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respectively, are non-self-executing. The very
terms of these provisions show that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but merely guidelines for legislation. 187 And the failure of the legislature to
pursue the policies embodied therein does not give rise to a cause of action in the
courts.188
In specific application to the present petitions, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance,189 the Court also ruled that Section 1, Article XIV on the right of all citizens
to quality education is also not self-executory. The provision "for the promotion of
the right to 'quality education' x x x [was] put in the Constitution as moral incentives
to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights." 190
Further, Section 6, Article XIV on the use of the Filipino language as a medium of
instruction is also not self-executory. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this:
MR. DE CASTRO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Just a matter of clarification. On the first sentence, we use Filipino
as an official medium of communication in all branches of government. Is that
correct?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. And when we speak of Filipino, can it be a combination of Tagalog
and the local dialect, and, therefore, can be "Taglish"? Is that right?
MR. VILLACORTA. Not really "Taglish," Madam President.
MR. BENNAGEN. It can be standard.
MR. DE CASTRO. Or the combination of the local language and Tagalog?
MR. VILLACORTA. As it naturally evolves.
MR. DE CASTRO. Suppose I am a Muslim official from Sulu and I will use Filipino in
my communication. So I will write: "Di makadiari ang iniisip mo." It is a combination
of Tausog — "di makadiari" and Tagalog — "ang iniisip mo." The one receiving in the
main office may not understand the whole thing. I am just clarifying because when
we use Filipino as a medium of official communication, there is a possibility that the
message may not be understood when it reaches the central office or when it goes to
another area.
MR. VILLACORTA. That is why the wording is, "The government shall take steps to
initiate and sustain the use of Filipino." And in Section 1, it says: "as it evolves, it
shall be further developed and enriched," the implication being that it will be
standardized as a national language.
MR. DE CASTRO. Yes, but then in Section 2, we come out with Filipino as a medium
of official communication. I am just giving an example that as an official
communication, it may not be understood by the one at the receiving end, especially
if one comes from the South and whose message is received in the North or in the
center. As I said, "Di makadiari ang iniisip mo," is half Tausog and half Tagalog.
MR. VILLACORTA. Commissioner Bennagen, who is an expert on culture and
minorities, will answer the question of the Gentleman.
MR. BENNAGEN. I think what we envision to happen would be for government
agencies, as well as other nongovernmental agencies involving this, to start
immediately the work of standardization — expanding the vocabularies,
standardizing the spelling and all appropriate measures that have to do with
propagating Filipino.
MR. DE CASTRO. In short?
MR. BENNAGEN. The work will codify this national lingua franca as it is taking place
and will be subjected to other developmental activities.
MR. OPLE. Madam President, may I say a word?
MR. DE CASTRO. In short, does the committee want us to understand that
Section 2, even if ratified, will not as yet be effective because it is still
subject to the provisions of law and as Congress may deem appropriate? So
the medium of official communication among branches of government
cannot as yet be Filipino until subject to provisions of law and as Congress
may deem appropriate. Is that correct?
MR. OPLE. Madam President.
MR. DE CASTRO. No, I am asking the committee, please.
THE PRESIDENT. What is the answer of the committee?
MR. VILLACORTA. That is correct, Madam President.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
MR. OPLE. I just wanted to point out that when the words "official communication'' is
used, this must satisfy the standards of accuracy, precision and, perhaps, clarity or
lack of ambiguity; otherwise, it will not be communication. One can lose a war
through imprecise communication in government and, therefore, I think the word
"communication" should be understood in its correct light — that when one writes
from Sulu, as in the example given by Commissioner de Castro, he has to consider
the following: Is his communication clear? Is it unambiguous? Is it precise? I just
want to point out that when we speak of official communication, these normal
standards of good communication ought to be recognized as controlling, otherwise,
the interest of public administration will be vitally affected.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Shall we vote now on the first sentence?
MR. RODRIGO. I think it should be on the first two sentences.
THE PRESIDENT. There was a suggestion, and that was accepted by the committee,
to vote on the first sentence.
MR. RODRIGO. Only on the first sentence? But there are two sentences.
THE PRESIDENT. No, that was already approved.
MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, may I ask for a vote now because this has been
extensively discussed.
THE PRESIDENT. Will the chairman read what is to be voted upon?
MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, the first sentence reads: "SUBJECT TO
PROVISIONS OF LAW AND AS CONGRESS MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE, THE
GOVERNMENT SHALL TAKE STEPS TO INITIATE AND SUSTAIN THE USE OF FILIPINO
AS A MEDIUM OF OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION AND AS LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION
IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM."
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the first sentence, please raise their
hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 37 votes in favor and none against; the first sentence is
approved.191
Section 3, Article XIII, on the protection of labor and security of tenure, was also
declared by the Court in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,192 (Agabon)
as not self-executory. Reiterating Agabon, the Court explained in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc.,193 that Section 3, Article XIII, does not automatically confer
judicially demandable and enforceable rights and cannot, on its own, be a basis for a
declaration of unconstitutionality, to wit:
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, there
are some which this Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII
being one, particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon
v. National Labor Relations Commission, has described to be not self-actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may
be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged
and observed without need for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the
constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights
embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be
impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous
tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to
labor" and "security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified,
and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor
against any form of removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies
an unimpeachable right to continued employment — a utopian notion, doubtless —
but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still
needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection
and promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as well.
Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating
their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a
source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an employee
for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested
by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require
legislative enactments for their enforceability. (Emphasis added)
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct
enforceable rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be declared
unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every
worker or union over every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social
justice for labor.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the
working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a
sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative
action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not
just for the executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to
protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that
constitutional agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then
Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept
that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection — such as the
working class or a section thereof — the Court may recognize the existence of a
suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny
formulated in Central Bank Employee Association exaggerate the significance of
Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied Article XIII
in conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article XIII, by itself, without the
application of the equal protection clause, has no life or force of its own as elucidated
in Agabon. 194
Here, apart from bare allegations that the K to 12 Law does not provide mechanisms
to protect labor, which, as discussed, have no legal bases, petitioners have not
proffered other bases in claiming that the right to protect labor and/or security of
tenure was violated with the implementation of the K to 12 Law. To be sure, the
protection of labor from illegal dismissal has already been set in stone with the
enactment of the Labor Code and the Civil Service Law.
Given the foregoing, petitioners cannot claim that the K to 12 Law and/or any of its
related issuances contravene or violate any of their rights under the foregoing
constitutional provisions because these provisions simply state a policy that may be
"used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws."195 They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights. 196 In other words, the Kindergarten
Education Act, the K to 12 Law and its related issuances cannot be nullified based
solely on petitioners' bare allegations that they violate general provisions of the
Constitution which are mere directives addressed to the executive and legislative
departments. If these directives are unheeded, the remedy does not lie with the
courts, but with the power of the electorate in casting their votes. 197 As held
in Tañada v. Angara:198 "The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations
of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade 'into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy-making."'199
In view of the foregoing, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the remaining
constitutional provisions, international treaties, and other special laws invoked by
petitioners, which have allegedly been violated by the implementation of the K to 12
Law. For the constitutional provisions, the Court shall determine whether these
constitutional provisions are in conflict with the police power of the State in enacting
and implementing the K to 12 Law, and if so, whether these constitutional provisions
yield to the police power of the State.
Compulsory Elementary and
High School Education
Petitioners argue that the legislature violated the Constitution when they made
kindergarten and senior high school compulsory. For petitioners, compulsory
kindergarten and senior high school expanded the constitutional definition of
elementary education and that the Congress violated the rule of constitutional
supremacy when it made kindergarten and senior high school compulsory. 200
On the other hand, the OSG contends that while Section 2, Article XIV states that
elementary education shall be compulsory, it did not preclude Congress from making
kindergarten and secondary education mandatory (based on the clear wording of the
law and deliberations of the Constitutional Commission).201 Further, the laws advance
the right of child to education, and they do not violate any international agreement
(Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], the International Covenant of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child [CRC]) to which the Philippines is a signatory. 202
The State's policy in implementing the K to 12 Program is stated as follows:
x x x [I]t is hereby declared the policy of the State that every graduate of basic
education shall be an empowered individual who has learned, through a program
that is rooted on sound educational principles and geared towards excellence, the
foundations for learning throughout life, the competence to engage in work and be
productive, the ability to coexist in fruitful harmony with local and global
communities, the capability to engage in autonomous, creative, and critical thinking,
and the capacity and willingness to transform others and one's self.
For this purpose, the State shall create a functional basic education system that will
develop productive and responsible citizens equipped with the essential
competencies, skills and values for both life-long learning and employment. In order
to achieve this, the State shall:
(a) Give every student an opportunity to receive quality education that is globally
competitive based on a pedagogically sound curriculum that is at par with
international standards;
(b) Broaden the goals of high school education for college preparation, vocational
and technical career opportunities as well as creative arts, sports and entrepreneurial
employment in a rapidly changing and increasingly globalized environment; and
(c) Make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs, cognitive and
cultural capacity, the circumstances and diversity of learners, schools and
communities through the appropriate languages of teaching and learning, including
mother tongue as a learning resource.203
There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and related issuances and the
Constitution when it made kindergarten and senior high school compulsory. The
Constitution is clear in making elementary education compulsory; and the K to 12
Law and related issuances did not change this as, in fact, they affirmed it.
As may be gleaned from the outlined history of education laws in the Philippines, the
definition of basic education was expanded by the legislature through the enactment
of different laws, consistent with the State's exercise of police power. In BP Blg. 232,
the elementary and secondary education were considered to be the stage where
basic education is provided.204 Subsequently, in RA No. 9155, the inclusion of
elementary and high school education as part of basic education was affirmed. 205
The legislature, through the Kindergarten Education Act, further amended the
definition of basic education to include kindergarten. Thereafter, the legislature
expanded basic education to include an additional two (2) years of senior high
school. Thus, by then, basic education comprised of thirteen (13) years, divided into
one (1) year of kindergarten, six (6) years of elementary education, and six (6)
years of secondary education — which was divided into four (4) years of junior high
school and two (2) years of senior high school.
The Constitution did not curtail the legislature's power to determine the extent of
basic education. It only provided a minimum standard: that elementary education be
compulsory. By no means did the Constitution foreclose the possibility that the
legislature provides beyond the minimum set by the Constitution.
Petitioners also contend that the expansion of compulsory education to include
kindergarten and secondary education violates the UDHR, the ICESCR and the
CRC.206
Petitioners' argument is misleading.
There is nothing in the UDHR, ICESCR and CRC which proscribes the expansion of
compulsory education beyond elementary education.
Article 26 of the UDHR states:
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in
the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall
be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on
the basis of merit. 
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among
all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the
United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given
to their children. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
There is absolutely nothing in Article 26 that would show that the State is prohibited
from making kindergarten and high school compulsory. The UDHR provided a
minimum standard for States to follow. Congress complied with this minimum
standard; as, in fact, it went beyond the minimum by making kindergarten and high
school compulsory. This action of Congress is, in turn, consistent with Article 41 of
the CRC which provides that "[n]othing in the present Convention shall affect any
provisions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child and
which may be contained in: (a) [t]he law of a State party; or (b) [i]nternational law
in force for that State.''
The enactment of the K to 12 Law was the manner by which the Congress sought to
realize the right to education of its citizens. It is indeed laudable that Congress went
beyond the minimum standards and provided mechanisms so that its citizens are
able to obtain not just elementary education but also kindergarten and high school.
Absent any showing of a violation of any Constitutional self-executing right or any
international law, the Court cannot question the desirability, wisdom, or utility of
the K to 12 Law as this is best addressed by the wisdom of Congress. As the Court
held in Tablarin v. Gutierrez207:
x x x The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a
denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or
features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They
appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added
on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959,
and other admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various
medical schools, public or private. Petitioners' arguments thus appear to relate to
utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is
essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission nor
competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of
legislation or administrative regulation. Those questions must be addressed to the
political departments of the government not to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and
administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace
learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to
secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public
order — of the general community. An important component of that public order is
the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which
no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. 208
Petitioners also claim that the K to 12 basic education and the two (2) additional
years in high school should not have been applied retroactively in violation of Article
4 of the Civil Code.209 Petitioners assert that students who had already began
schooling prior to 2013 or upon the passage of the K to 12 Law already acquired a
"vested right" to graduate after the completion of four (4) years of high school,
pursuant to Sections 9(2) and 20 of BP Blg. 232; thus, the K to 12 BEC cannot be
applied to them.210
Again, petitioners' contentions are without merit.
The K to 12 Basic Education Program is not being retroactively applied because only
those currently enrolled at the time the K to 12 Law took effect and future students
will be subject to the K to 12 BEC and the additional two (2) years of senior high
school. Students who already graduated from high school under the old curriculum
are not required by the K to 12 Law to complete the additional two (2) years of
senior high school.
More importantly, BP Blg. 232 does not confer any vested right to four (4) years of
high school education. Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or
prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a
present interest. The right must be absolute, complete, and unconditional,
independent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of future benefit, or a
contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws,
does not constitute a vested right.211 Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the rights of
students under Section 9 of BP Blg. 232 are not absolute. These are subject to
limitations prescribed by law and regulations. In fact, while Section 9(2) of BP Blg.
232 states that students have the right to continue their course up to graduation,
Section 20 of the same law does not restrict elementary and high school education to
only six (6) and four (4) years. Even RA No. 9155 or the Governance of Basic
Education Act of 2001, which was enacted under the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
does not specify the number of years in elementary and high school. In other words,
BP Blg. 232 or RA No. 9155 does not preclude any amendment or repeal on the
duration of elementary and high school education. In adding two (2) years of
secondary education to students who have not yet graduated from high school,
Congress was merely exercising its police power and legislative wisdom in imposing
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education, in compliance
with its constitutional duty to promote quality education for all.
Right to select a profession or course of study
Petitioners in G.R. No. 218123 insist that the implementation of the K to 12 Law is a
limitation on the right of senior high school students to choose their
professions.212 For petitioners, a number of prospective senior high school students
will be unable to choose their profession or vocation because of the limit on what
senior high schools can offer and the availability of the different strands. This lacks
basis.
There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and its IRR and the right of the senior
high school students to choose their profession or course of study. The senior high
school curriculum is designed in such a way that students have core subjects and
thereafter, they may choose among four strands: 1) Accountancy, Business and
Management (ABM) Strand; 2) Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics
(STEM) Strand; 3) Humanities and Social Sciences (HUMSS) Strand; and 4) General
Academic (GA) Strand.213
Petitioners have failed to show that the State has imposed unfair and inequitable
conditions for senior high schools to enroll in their chosen path. The K to 12 Program
is precisely designed in such a way that students may choose to enroll in public or
private senior high schools which offer the strands of their choice. For eligible
students, the voucher program also allows indigent senior high school students to
enroll in private institutions that offer the strands of their choice.
Mother Tongue as medium of instruction
Petitioners argue that the use of the MT or the regional or native language as
primary medium of instruction for kindergarten and the first three (3) years of
elementary education contravenes Section 7, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which expressly limits and constrains regional languages simply as
auxiliary media of instruction.214 This is an argument of first blush. A closer look at
the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal the contrary. In fine, there is no conflict between
the use of the MT as a primary medium of instruction and Section 7, Article XIV of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Sections 6 and 7, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
SEC. 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be
further developed and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and other
languages.
Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the
Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of
official communication and as language of instruction in the educational system.
SEC. 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the
Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English.
The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall
serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also confirm that MT or regional
languages may be used as a medium of instruction:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. When the Commissioner speaks of
auxiliary official languages in their respective regions, what exactly does he have in
mind?
MR. BENNAGEN. In addition to Filipino and English, they can be accepted also
as official languages, even in government and in education.
MR. SUAREZ. So that not only will they be a medium of instruction or
communication but they can be considered also as official languages.
MR. BENNAGEN. That is the intention of the committee. We should respect also the
regional languages. x x x215 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. May I be enlightened on some of the aspects of this proposed
substitute amendment? The first is, does it follow from the wording that the regional
languages shall serve as an auxiliary media of instruction and no law can prohibit
their use as such? This means that subject to provisions of law and as Congress may
deem appropriate, it would refer only to what are included in the first sentence. It
will not apply to the second sentence relating to regional languages as auxiliary
media of instruction.
MR. TREÑAS. That is correct. Precisely, there is a period after "educational system"
and that is a new sentence.
MR. DAVIDE. As an auxiliary medium of instruction, it can actually be the
primary medium, until Congress shall provide otherwise.
MR. TREÑAS. It shall be auxiliary.
MR. DAVIDE. But in the meantime that Congress shall not have deemed appropriate
or that there is no provision of law relating to the use of Filipino as the medium of
instruction, it can itself be the primary medium of instruction in the regions.
MR. TREÑAS. That is correct because of the provision of the first sentence.
MR. DAVIDE. On the supposition that there is already a law that Congress had
deemed it appropriate, the regional language shall go hand in hand with Filipino as a
medium of instruction. It cannot be supplanted in any way by Filipino as the only
medium of instruction in the regional level.
xxxx
VOTING
xxxx
MR. VILLACORTA. Shall we vote now on the next sentence, Madam President?
THE PRESIDENT. Will the chairman please read the next sentence.
MR. VILLACORTA. The next sentence, Madam President, reads: "THE REGIONAL
LANGUAGES SHALL SERVE AS AUXILIARY MEDIA OF INSTRUCTION IN THE
RESPECTIVE REGIONS."
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized before we proceed to vote.
MR. PADILLA. Section 2 of the committee report states:
The official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and English, until otherwise
provided by law. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in their
respective regions.
That second sentence in Section 2 of the committee report may be amended by that
second sentence which says: "THE REGIONAL LANGUAGES SHALL SERVE AS
AUXILIARY MEDIA OF INSTRUCTION IN THE RESPECTIVE REGIONS." I believe we
should consider the first sentence of Section 2 and then say: "THE REGIONAL
LANGUAGES SHALL SERVE AS AUXILIARY MEDIA OF INSTRUCTION IN THE
RESPECTIVE REGIONS." That is my proposal.
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, the Commissioner's point is that this particular
second sentence here should be transposed to Section 2 of the other committee
report.
MR. PADILLA. Yes, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does the committee say?
REV. RIGOS. Madam President, perhaps if we approve the second sentence, we can
delete the second sentence in Section 2. Is that the idea?
MR. PADILLA. That is correct.
REV. RIGOS. Since we are talking about medium of instruction here, we would rather
retain it in the first section.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President, but if no mention is made of English, it might be the
impression contrary to what has already been agreed upon — that English may not
be used as a medium of instruction. And it shall be clear that the first
preference is Filipino, the national language, without prejudice to the use of
English and also the regional languages.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President, do we understand the Commissioner correctly that
he would rather delete that in the first section and amend the second sentence in
Section 2?
MR. PADILLA. Yes, Madam President. That is the reason I suggested that the
proposal be divided into two sentences. We approved the first sentence. The second
sentence should be corrected to Section 2 of the committee report.
MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, the committee is divided; therefore, we would
like the floor to decide on this matter.
MR. PADILLA. The only reason I am saying this is to make clear in the
Constitution that the medium of communication and the language of
instruction are not only Filipino as a national language, and that the medium
of instruction is the regional languages, otherwise, there would be no
mention of English. I believe that we are all agreed that the first preference
is the national language, Filipino, but it does not prevent the use of English
and also of the regional languages.216 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is thus clear from the deliberations that it was never the intent of the framers of
the Constitution to use only Filipino and English as the exclusive media of instruction.
It is evident that Congress has the power to enact a law that designates Filipino as
the primary medium of instruction even in the regions but, in the absence of such
law, the regional languages may be used as primary media of instruction. The
Congress, however, opted not to enact such law. On the contrary, the Congress, in
the exercise of its wisdom, provided that the regional languages shall be the primary
media of instruction in the early stages of schooling. Verily, this act of Congress was
not only Constitutionally permissible, but was likewise an exercise of an exclusive
prerogative to which the Court cannot interfere with.
Petitioners further contend that the MTB-MLE is counter-productive, anti-
developmental and does not serve the people's right to quality of education, which
the State, under the Constitution, is mandated to promote. 217Moreover, in contrast to
the benefits of the MTB-MLE that respondents assert, petitioners claim that
comparative international and domestic data have shown MT monolingualism to be
inferior; while high literacy and proficiency in English indicates human development,
makes people more globally competitive and relatively happier.218
Petitioners' arguments are again misplaced. While the Constitution indeed mandates
the State to provide quality education, the determination of what constitutes quality
education is best left with the political departments who have the necessary
knowledge, expertise, and resources to determine the same. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission again are very instructive:
Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education"
to send appropriate signals to the government that, in the exercise of its
supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum
requirements in all areas: curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library,
laboratory class and other facilities, et cetera, and it should see to it that satisfactory
minimum requirements are met by all educational institutions, both public and
private.
When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among
others, as curriculum development, development of learning resources and
instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory facilities, innovations in
educational technology and teaching methodologies, improvement of research
quality, and others. Here and in many other provisions on education, the principal
focus of attention and concern is the students. I would like to say that in my view
there is a slogan when we speak of quality of education that I feel we should be
aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other words, even if the
quality of education is good now, we should attempt to keep on improving
it.219 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, when the government, through the K to 12 Law and the DepEd issuances,
determined that the use of MT as primary medium of instruction until Grade 3
constitutes a better curriculum, it was working towards discharging its constitutional
duty to provide its citizens with quality education. The Court, even in the exercise of
its jurisdiction to check if another branch of the government committed grave abuse
of discretion, will not supplant such determination as it pertains to the wisdom of the
policy.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 218045 also claim that the provision on the use of MT violates
the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth,
recognized under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Petitioners aver that by using the MT in teaching the students, it compels parents to
do something utterly redundant, inefficient, and wasteful, as the students are
presumably already fluent in speaking their MT.220 In other words, they no longer
need to be taught their native language.
Petitioners are once again incorrect as there is no conflict between the use of MT as a
primary medium of instruction and the right of parents in rearing their children.
While Section 12, Article II grants parents the primary right to rear and educate their
children, the State, as parens patriae, has the inherent right and duty to support
parents in the exercise of this constitutional right. In other words, parents' authority
and the State's duty are not mutually exclusive but complement each other. 221 In the
matter of education, a parent is always the first teacher. The language first learned
by the child or his "mother tongue", which the child understands best and hence, an
effective tool for further learning, is first and foremost taught by the parent. The
inclusion in the K to 12 Program of the MT as a medium of instruction and a subject
in the early years of learning is, therefore, not intended to curtail the parents' right
but to complement and enhance the same.
Moreover, despite the provision on the use of MT as primary medium of instruction
for kindergarten and Grades 1 to 3, Filipino and English remain as subjects in the
curriculum during the earlier stages of schooling and will later on be used as primary
medium of instruction from Grade 4 onwards. In other words, in addition to the MT,
the basics of Filipino and English will still be taught at the early stages of formal
schooling; and should the parents, in the exercise of their primary right and duty to
rear their children, so desire to give additional Filipino and English lessons to their
children, they have the absolute right to do so. Nothing in the K to 12 Law prohibits
the parents from doing so.
Academic freedom
Petitioners in G.R. No. 216930 also allege that faculty from HEI stand to lose their
academic freedom when they are transferred to senior high school level as provided
in the K to 12 Law, the K to 12 Law  IRR and the Joint Guidelines.222
Without question, petitioners, who are faculty members in HEIs, indeed possess the
academic freedom granted by Constitution. This Court, in its previous decisions, has
defined academic freedom for the individual member of the academe as "the right of
a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to
make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution
would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or
objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments."223
However, the Court does not agree with petitioners that their transfer to the
secondary level, as provided by the K to 12 Law and the assailed issuances,
constitutes a violation of their academic freedom. While the Court agrees, in
principle, that security of tenure is an important aspect of academic freedom — that
the freedom is only meaningful if the faculty members are assured that they are free
to pursue their academic endeavors without fear of reprisals — it is likewise equally
true that convergence of security of tenure and academic freedom does not preclude
the termination of a faculty member for a valid cause.224 Civil servants, like
petitioners, may be removed from service for a valid cause, such as when there is
a bona fide reorganization, or a position has been abolished or rendered redundant,
or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the
exigencies of the service.225 Hence, petitioners' contention that the law is
unconstitutional based on this ground is specious.
Free public education in the
elementary and high school
levels
Petitioners claim that making kindergarten compulsory limits access to
education;226 that 400,000 to 500,000 Grade 11 students will be forced to enroll in
private schools, pushed by government towards a more expensive, not free
education;227 and that there will be a de facto privatization of senior high school
education (through the voucher system) and that this is a violation of the
constitutional provision mandating free high school education.228
The OSG counters that the Senior High School Voucher program (subsidy given to
those who will enroll in non-DepEd schools) does not force students to enroll in
private SHS. It simply offers a viable alternative to both student and government —
to the student, a subsidized private education; and to the government, decongested
public schools.229
The Court fully agrees with the OSG.
Petitioners' argument that the establishment of the voucher system will result in
the de facto privatization of senior high school is not only speculative, it is also
without any basis. The voucher system is one of the mechanisms established by the
State through RA No. 6728, otherwise known as the Government Assistance to
Students and Teachers in Private Education Act. In Mariño, Jr. v. Gamilla,230 the
Court recognized that RA No. 6728 was enacted in view of the declared policy of the
State, in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution, to promote and make
quality education accessible to all Filipino citizens, as well as the recognition of the
State of the complementary roles of public and private educational institutions in the
educational system and the invaluable contribution that the private schools have
made and will make to education."231 Through the law, the State provided "the
mechanisms to improve quality in private education by maximizing the use of
existing resources of private education x x x."232 One of these is the voucher system
where underprivileged high school students become eligible for full or partial
scholarship for degree or vocational/technical courses.
The program was later expanded through RA No. 8545. In the K to 12 Law, the
benefits under RA No. 8545, including the voucher system, were made applicable to
qualified students under the enhanced basic education, specifically to the qualified
students enrolled in senior high school.233
The establishment and expansion of the voucher system is the State's way of tapping
the resources of the private educational system in order to give Filipinos equal
access to quality education. The Court finds that this manner of implementing the
grant of equal access to education is not constitutionally infirm.
CMO No. 20 is constitutional
Petitioners assert that CMO No. 20 is violative of the Constitution because the study
of Filipino, Panitikan and the Philippine Constitution are not included as core
subjects.
The Court disagrees.
First, the constitutional provisions alleged by petitioners to be violated are non-self-
executing provisions. As discussed above, the framers of the Constitution, in
discussing Section 6 of Article XIV, explained that the use of Filipino as a medium of
official communication is still subject to provisions of law.234
In Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc.,235 the Court held that Section 15 on arts
and culture of Article XIV is not self-executory because Congress passed laws dealing
with the preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage. 236 The Court was of
the view that all sections in Article XIV pertaining to arts and culture are all non-self-
executing, which includes Section 14 on Filipino national culture and Section 18 on
access to cultural opportunities. The Court in Basco237 also ruled that Section 17,
Article II on giving priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and
sports, and Section 2, Article XIV on educational values, are non-self-executing.
Thus, the Court reiterates that these constitutional provisions are only policies that
may be "used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws." 238 The Court
reiterates that they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. 239
Second, it is misleading for petitioners to allege that there is a violation of the
constitutional provisions for the simple reason that the study of
Filipino, Panitikan and the Constitution are actually found in the basic education
curriculum from Grade 1 to 10 and senior high school. To be sure, the changes in the
GE curriculum were implemented to ensure that there would be no duplication of
subjects in Grade 1 to 10, senior high school and college. Thus, the allegation of
petitioners that CMO No. 20 "removed" the study of Filipino, Panitikan and the
Constitution in the GE curriculum is incorrect.
As regards Section 3(1), Article XIV on the requirement that all educational
institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as part of the curricula, the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm that the intention was for it to
be constitutionally mandated. The Court agrees that there is indeed a constitutional
mandate that the study of the Constitution should be part of the curriculum of
educational institutions. However, the mandate was general and did not specify the
educational level in which it must be taught. Hence, the inclusion of the study of the
Constitution in the basic education curriculum satisfies the constitutional
requirement.
In this regard, it must be emphasized that CMO No. 20 only provides for
the minimum standards for the GE component of all degree programs. Under
Section 13 of RA No. 7722 or the Higher Education Act of 1994, the CHED is
authorized to determine the (a) minimum unit requirements for specific academic
programs; (b) general education distribution requirements as may be
determined by the Commission; and (c) specific professional subjects as may be
stipulated by the various licensing entities. The provision further provides that this
authority shall not be construed as limiting the academic freedom of universities and
colleges. Therefore, HEIs are given the freedom to require additional Filipino
or Panitikan courses to these minimum requirements if they wish to.
Third, petitioners aver that non-inclusion of these subjects in the GE curriculum will
result to job displacement of teachers and professors, which contravenes the
constitutional provisions on protection of labor and security of tenure. Once more,
Section 3, Article XIII and Section 18, Article II do not automatically confer judicially
demandable and enforceable rights and cannot, on their own, be a basis for a
declaration of unconstitutionality. Further, the Court finds that, in fact, teachers and
professors were given the opportunity to participate in the various consultations and
decision-making processes affecting their rights as workers. 240
CMO No. 20 does not
contravene any other laws
As claimed by petitioners, CMO No. 20 violated Section 14 of RA No. 7104 or
the Commission on the Filipino Language Act because it interfered with the authority
of the Commission on the Filipino Language (CFL) on matters of language.
Petitioners reiterate that it is the CFL who has the authority to formulate policies,
plans and programs to ensure the further development, enrichment, propagation and
preservation of Filipino and other Philippine language241 and thus, CMO No. 20 should
have retained the nine (9) units of Filipino in the GE curriculum, as proposed by the
CFL.
Petitioners also aver that CMO No. 20 violates RA No. 7356 or the Law Creating the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts because the non-inclusion of Filipino
and Panitikan as subjects in the GE curriculum is a violation of our "duty x x x to
preserve and conserve the Filipino historical and cultural heritage and resources." 242
Lastly, petitioners allege that CMO No. 20 violates BP Blg. 232 or the Education Act
of 1982, specifically, Section 3 on the role of the educational community to promote
the social and economic status of all school personnel and Section 23 on the
objectives of tertiary education which includes a general education program that will
promote national identity and cultural consciousness.
Again, the Court disagrees.
It must be noted that nothing in these laws requires that Filipino and Panitikan must
be included as subjects in the tertiary level. Further, as already established, it is
within the authority of the CHED to determine the GE distribution requirements. The
Court also reiterates that the study of Filipino and Panitikan can easily be included as
courses in the tertiary level, if the HEIs wish to. Thus, petitioners' arguments that
CMO No. 20 violates the aforementioned laws must fail.
III.
The K to 12 Law does not
violate substantive due
process and equal
protection of the laws.
Petitioners also assert that the K to 12 Law is unconstitutional for violating the due
process clause, as the means employed is allegedly not proportional to the end to be
achieved, and that there is supposedly an alternative and less intrusive way of
accomplishing the avowed objectives of the law. They point to studies which showed
that lengthening the time did not necessarily lead to better student performance.
They further assert that "[g]iven adequate instruction, armed with sufficient books,
and a conducive learning environment, the Filipino student does not need at all two
(2) additional years of senior high school" and hence the imposition of additional
years in senior high school is "unduly oppressive an unwarranted intrusion into the
right to education of all Filipino students, thus violating their right to substantive due
process."243 In addition, they claim that the assailed law is violative of the due
process clause because, allegedly, the law served the interests of only a select few.
According to them, majority of the Filipinos will never apply for graduate school
admission to a foreign university or for professional work in a foreign corporation,
and these are the only people who supposedly need the additional two years of basic
education. They point to the fact that Filipinos are being currently employed as
caregivers, seafarers, house helpers, etc. despite the fact that they have undergone
only ten (10) years of basic education. Hence, the assailed law is unconstitutional for
serving the interests of only a select few.244
Again, the Court disagrees. There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and right of
due process of the students.
It is established that due process is comprised of two components, namely,
substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due
process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal. 245
Substantive due process, the aspect of due process invoked in this case, requires an
inquiry on the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person
to his property. In Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita,246 the Court held:
x x x The inquiry in this regard is not whether or not the law is being enforced in
accordance with the prescribed manner but whether or not, to begin with, it is a
proper exercise of legislative power.
To be so, the law must have a valid governmental objective, i.e., the interest of
the public as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the intervention
of the State. This objective must be pursued in a lawful manner, or in other words,
the means employed must be reasonably related to the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive.247(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, two things must concur: (1) the interest of the public, in general, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the intervention of the State;
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.
Here, the K to 12 Law does not offend the substantive due process of petitioners.
The assailed law's declaration of policy itself reveals that, contrary to the claims of
petitioners, the objectives of the law serve the interest of the public and not only of a
particular class:248
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall establish, maintain and support a
complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the
people, the country and society-at-large.
Likewise, it is hereby declared the policy of the State that every graduate of basic
education shall be an empowered individual who has learned, through a program
that is rooted on sound educational principles and geared towards
excellence, the foundations for learning throughout life, the competence to
engage in work and be productive, the ability to coexist in fruitful harmony
with local and global communities, the capability to engage in autonomous,
creative, and critical thinking, and the capacity and willingness to transform
others and one's self.
For this purpose, the State shall create a functional basic education system that
will develop productive and responsible citizens equipped with the essential
competencies, skills and values for both life-long learning and employment.
In order to achieve this, the State shall:
(a) Give every student an opportunity to receive quality education that is globally
competitive based on a pedagogically sound curriculum that is at par with
international standards;
(b) Broaden the goals of high school education for college preparation, vocational
and technical career opportunities as well as creative arts, sports and entrepreneurial
employment in a rapidly changing and increasingly globalized environment; and
(c) Make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs, cognitive and
cultural capacity, the circumstances and diversity of learners, schools and
communities through the appropriate languages of teaching and learning, including
mother tongue as a learning resource. (Emphasis supplied)
All students are intended to benefit from the law. Without ruling on the effectiveness
of the revised curriculum, it is erroneous to view the K to 12 Law and the DepEd
Orders in question extending basic education by two (2) years simply to comply with
international standards; rather, the basic education curriculum was restructured
according to what the political departments believed is the best approach to learning,
or what they call as the "spiral approach." This approach, according to respondent,
will yield the following benefits for all students: (1) it is decongested and offers a
more balanced approach to learning; (2) it would help in freeing parents of the
burden of having to spend for college just to make their children employable; (3) it
would prepare students with life skills that they learn while schooling; (4) it is
seamless; (5) it is relevant and responsive, age-appropriate, and focused on making
learners succeed in the 21st century; and (6) it is enriched and learner-
centered.249 Thus, contrary to the claims of petitioners, the assailed law caters to the
interest of the public in general, as opposed to only a particular group of people.
Furthermore, the means employed by the assailed law are commensurate with its
objectives. Again, the restructuring of the curriculum with the corresponding
additional years in senior high school were meant to improve the quality of basic
education and to make the country's graduates more competitive in the international
arena.
Respondents proffer, and petitioners concede, that the Philippines is the last country
to adopt a 12-year basic education curriculum. However, petitioners submit that
adding two (2) years in the basic education curriculum is not the answer to achieve
these objectives, and that there is supposedly a less intrusive way to achieve these
goals, namely, to increase the salaries of the teachers, invest in better and more
resource materials, and building of more classrooms to achieve the goal of improving
the quality of education in the Philippines. Petitioners ought to be reminded,
however, that the objectives of the law are two-pronged. It was meant not only to
(1) improve the basic education in the country, but also to (2) make it at par with
international standards. It is in this second purpose that the means employed by the
assailed law is justified. Thus, having established that the interest of the public in
general is at the heart of the law, and that the means employed are commensurate
to its objectives, the Court holds that the K to 12 Law is not violative of the due
process clause.
The students of Manila Science High School (MSHS), petitioners in G.R. No. 218465,
aver, in particular, that the decongestion of the originally existing basic education
curriculum and the lengthening of the basic education cycle do not, and should not,
be made to apply to them as their curriculum is supposedly congested on
purpose.250 It supposedly should not apply to them because "[they] are gifted and
thus are advanced for their age, with the capability to learn better and faster
compared to other high school students. Because of their higher mental capabilities,
they neither need decongesting nor a longer period of time or any spiral approach,
for them to in fact master their heavier in scope and more advanced math and
science subjects."251They are supposedly "not being trained for immediate
employment after high school but for them to pursue tertiary education, particularly
career paths either as mathematicians, scientists or engineers, which the country
needs most for its development." 252 This, these petitioners asseverate, makes the
means employed by the K to 12 Law not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of its intended purpose. Thus, as applied to MSHS students, the K to
12 Law is arbitrary, unfair, oppressive, discriminatory and unreasonable and thus
violative of their substantive due process. 253 They further allege that the law is
violative of the equal protection clause for treating them in the same way as all other
high school students when they are supposed to be treated differently for not being
similarly situated with the rest.254
In essence, what these petitioners are saying is that the K to 12 Law did not make a
substantial distinction between MSHS students and the rest of the high school
students in the country when it, in fact, should have done so.
This contention is without merit.
To assure that the general welfare is promoted, which is the end of the law, a
regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. 255 Those
adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that
the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the
common goal, was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason.256 This, petitioners' failed to
sufficiently show. For this reason, the Court holds that the K to 12 Lawdid not violate
petitioners' right to due process nor did it violate the equal protection clause. In JMM
Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,257 the Court explained the
object and purpose of the equal protection clause in this wise:
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and
individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to
operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be
treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause
of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is
based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject
of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law,
concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future
conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection
guarantee.258 (Emphasis supplied)
To emphasize, valid classifications require  real and substantial differences to justify
the variance of treatment between the classes. The MSHS students did not offer any
substantial basis for the Court to create a valid classification between them and the
rest of the high school students in the Philippines. Otherwise stated, the equal
protection clause would, in fact, be violated if the assailed law treated the MSHS
students differently from the rest of the high school students in the country.
To be clear, the Court is not saying that petitioners are not gifted, contrary to their
claims. The Court is merely saying that the K to 12 Law was not infirm in treating all
high school students equally. The MSHS students are, after all, high school students
just like all the other students who are, and will be, subjected to the revised
curriculum.
The Court agrees with these petitioners to the extent of their claim that they have
the right granted by Article 3(3) and (6) of Presidential Decree No. 603, or the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, to education commensurate with their abilities. 259 However,
the Court disagrees that the said right granted by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code was violated when the revised curriculum under the K to 12 Law was applied to
them. It bears repeating that the law is being merely applied to the whole segment
of the population to which petitioners belong. Further, the basic education under the
K to 12 was intended to meet the basic learning needs of the students and it is broad
enough to cover alternative learning systems for out-of-school learners and those
with special needs.260
This is not to say that they shall be continually subjected strictly to the K to 12
curriculum which they describe as "inferior," "diluted," and "anemic." 261 The K to 12
Law explicitly recognized the right of schools to modify their curricula subject, of
course, to the minimum subjects prescribed by the DepEd: 262
SEC. 5. Curriculum Development. — The DepED shall formulate the design and
details of the enhanced basic education curriculum. It shall work with the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) to craft harmonized basic and tertiary
curricula for the global competitiveness of Filipino graduates. To ensure college
readiness and to avoid remedial and duplication of basic education subjects, the
DepED shall coordinate with the CHED and the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA).
To achieve an effective enhanced basic education curriculum, the DepED shall
undertake consultations with other national government agencies and other
stakeholders including, but not limited to, the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), the private and public
schools associations, the national student organizations, the national teacher
organizations, the parents-teachers associations and the chambers of commerce on
matters affecting the concerned stakeholders.
The DepED shall adhere to the following standards and principles in developing the
enhanced basic education curriculum:
(a) The curriculum shall be learner-centered, inclusive and developmentally
appropriate;
(b) The curriculum shall be relevant, responsive and research-based;
(c) The curriculum shall be culture-sensitive;
(d) The curriculum shall be contextualized and global;
(e) The curriculum shall use pedagogical approaches that are constructivist, inquiry-
based, reflective, collaborative and integrative;
(f) The curriculum shall adhere to the principles and framework of Mother Tongue-
Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) which starts from where the learners are
and from what they already knew proceeding from the known to the unknown;
instructional materials and capable teachers to implement the MTB-MLE curriculum
shall be available;
(g) The curriculum shall use the spiral progression approach to ensure mastery of
knowledge and skills after each level; and
(h) The curriculum shall be flexible enough to enable and allow schools
to localize, indigenize and enhance the same based on their respective
educational and social contexts. The production and development of locally
produced teaching materials shall be encouraged and approval of these materials
shall devolve to the regional and division education units. (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, the K to 12 IRR confirms the inclusiveness of the design of the Enhanced
Basic Education in mandating that the enhanced basic education programs should be
able to address the physical, intellectual, psychosocial, and cultural needs of
learners.263 The IRR mandates that the Basic Education Program should include
programs for the gifted and talented, those with disabilities, the Madrasah Program
for Muslim learners, Indigenous Peoples Programs, and Programs for Learners under
Difficult Circumstances.264 The K to 12 IRRalso allows the acceleration of learners in
public and private educational institutions. 265 Therefore, the remedy of petitioner
students is with MSHS and/or DepEd, and not with this Court.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 218045 also challenge the K to 12 Law on the ground of
violation of the equal protection clause by arguing that private schools are allowed to
offer extra and optional curriculum subjects in addition to those required by the K to
12 Law and DepEd Orders, and thus, rich families will tend to enroll their children in
private schools while poor families will be constrained to enroll their children in
English starved public schools.266
The argument is untenable.
The Court, no matter how vast its powers are, cannot trample on the previously
discussed right of schools to enhance their curricula and the primary right of parents
to rear their children, which includes the right to determine which schools are best
suited for their children's needs. Even before the passage of the K to 12 Law, private
educational institutions had already been allowed to enhance the prescribed
curriculum, considering the State's recognition of the complementary roles of public
and private institutions in the educational system. 267 Hence, the Court cannot sustain
petitioners' submission that the assailed law is invalid based on this ground.
Other arguments against
the constitutionality of the
K to 12 Law
Petitioners in G.R. No. 217752 argue that DepEd's use of global competitiveness as
justification in the policy shift to K to 12 is not relevant to the needs of the people
and society, as not everyone will be working abroad.268 Essentially, they are assailing
the validity of the law for allegedly violating Section 2(1), Article XIV of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, which states that:
SEC. 2. The State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of
education relevant to the needs of the people and society[.]
As previously discussed, however, Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution is a non-self-executing provision of the Constitution. Again, as the Court
already held in Basco, "Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
[Philippine] Constitution x x x are merely statements of principles and policies. As
such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by
Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles." 269 The K to 12 Law is one
such law passed by the Legislature to bring the said guiding principle to life. The
question of what is 'relevant to the needs of the people and society' is, in turn, within
the sole purview of legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot intervene.
Another assertion against the constitutionality of the K to 12 Law is that it allegedly
violates the constitutional State duty to exercise reasonable supervision and
regulation of educational institutions mandated by Section 4, Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioners in G.R. No. 218123 allege that DepEd's Basic Education
Sector Transformation Program (BEST) is supported by Australian Aid and managed
by CardNo, a foreign corporation listed in the Australian Securities Exchange. CardNo
allegedly hires specialists for the implementation of the K to 12 curriculum. 270 This
partnership between CardNo and DepEd is allegedly violative of the above
Constitutional provision, which reads:
SEC. 4. (1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision
and regulation of all educational institutions.
(2) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and
mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation
in all educational institutions.
The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in
the citizens of the Philippines.
No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of
aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any school. The
provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools established for foreign
diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law,
for other foreign temporary residents.
(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such
institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may
likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to the limitations provided by law
including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or
contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall
be exempt from tax. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners point to Section 4(1) and Section 4(2), paragraph 2, as legal basis for the
supposed unconstitutionality of the partnership between DepEd and CardNo in the
implementation of the K to 12 curriculum.
Petitioners' reading of the above Constitutional provisions is erroneous. Sections 4(1)
and 4(2) deal with two separate matters that the Framers of the Constitution sought
to address. Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to crystallize the
State's recognition of the importance of the role that the private sector plays in the
quality of the Philippine education system. Despite this recognition, the Framers
added the second portion of Section 4(2) to emphasize that the State, in the exercise
of its police power, still possesses the power of supervision over private schools. The
Framers were explicit, however, that this supervision refers to external governance,
as opposed to internal governance which was reserved to the respective school
boards, thus:
Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the
word "reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and regulation"; two, the addition
of the word "quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of the wordings
in the 1973 Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be
relevant to the goals of national development, to the present expression of "relevant
to the needs of the people and society"; and four, the explanation of the meaning of
the expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as
the recognition and strengthening of the complementary roles of public and
private educational institutions as separate but integral parts of the total
Philippine educational system.
When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external
governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational
institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards
of directors or trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on
external governance, the State would still have the inherent right to regulate
educational institutions through the exercise of its police power. We have thought it
advisable to restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We
found it necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictumof our
Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities vs. The Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In
that case, the court said, and I quote:
It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution
provides for control of education by the State.
The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate
means power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention to prove that State control of private education was intended by organic
law.
The addition, therefore, of the word "reasonable" is meant to underscore
the sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State
supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer
only to the power of the State to provide regulations and to see to it that
these regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does not include the
right to manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the
right to dominate.271 (Emphasis supplied)
In stark contrast, Section 4(2), Article XIV, which was copied from the 1973
Philippine Constitution, refers to ownership and administration of individual schools.
This interpretation is clear both from a plain reading of the provision itself, and from
the deliberations of the Framers of the Constitution:
MR. GUINGONA. The committee refers to both ownership and administration. If I
may be allowed to continue, may I refer the Commissioner to the same section that I
have specified in the 1973 Constitution. The Commissioner will notice that this
particular provision does not only refer to administration because it speaks also of
educational institution which should be owned solely by citizens or corporations of
the Philippines.
MR. REGALADO. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. In other words, even in the 1973 Constitution, the contemplation or
the intention of the fundamental law was to include both ownership and
administration.
MR. REGALADO. They are not merely these, because otherwise there is an error of
language in the Constitution then. Paragraph 7 of Section 8 states: "Educational
institutions, other than those established by religious orders, mission boards, or
charitable organizations."
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. REGALADO. In other words, with the exception of educational institutions
established by religious orders, mission boards, or charitable organizations, then all
educational institutions shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines and at the
time, of course, by corporations or associations 60 per centum of the capital of which
is owned by citizens. In other words, educational institutions of religious orders were
exempted from that requirement by the very constitutional provision which was
further implemented and ramified with clarity in P.D. No. 176. 272
Thus, petitioners are mistaken in applying Section 4(2), Article XIV to Section 4(1),
Article XIV as they deal with completely different matters. The restrictions expressed
in Section 4(2), Article XIV only refer to ownership, control, and administration of
individual schools, and these do not apply to the State's exercise of reasonable
supervision and regulation of educational institutions under Section 4(1), Article XIV.
Hence, there is nothing under the provisions of the Constitution which prohibits the
State to forge a partnership with a foreign entity, like CardNo, in the exercise of this
supervision and regulation of educational institutions.
Further, it is asserted that the K to 12 Law violates the constitutional duty of the
State to provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in
civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills as commanded by Section 2, Article XIV
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Petitioners decry the supposed lack of
mechanisms in the K to 12 Law to accommodate groups with special needs.273 As
previously discussed, Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is not
a self-executing provision. Furthermore, petitioners' argument has no factual basis
because DepEd has already put in place programs to address the needs of
indigenous peoples, Muslim children, adult learners, PWDs, out of school youth and
other sectors of society in keeping with the aforesaid constitutional provisions, in line
with the K to 12 Law. The Court agrees with the following discussion by the OSG in
its Comment on this point:
The petitioners' argument has no factual basis because the DepEd has already put in
place programs to address the needs of the indigenous peoples, Muslim
schoolchildren, adult learners, and persons with disabilities (PWDs) in line with the
K-12 program. DepEd Order No. 103, s. 2011 directed the creation of the Indigenous
Peoples Education Office (IPsEO), which is a mechanism for the mobilization,
implementation, and coordination of all the programs and projects of DepEd
pertaining to IPs education, pursuant to "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997." This law mandates all government agencies to recognize and promote the
rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities and Indigenous Peoples within the
framework of national unity and development.
Dep[E]d Order No. 62, s. 2011 entitled "The National Indigenous Peoples Education
Policy Framework," was issued to serve as an instrument in promoting shared
accountability, continuous dialogue, engagement, and partnership among
governments, IPs communities, civil society, and other education stakeholders in
upholding the IPs Learners' education rights. In support of DepEd's commitment to
strengthen its policy on Indigenous Peoples Education (IPEd), DepEd Order No. 26, s.
2013 promulgated the Implementing Guidelines on the Allocation and Utilization of
the Indigenous Peoples Education (IPEd) Program Support Fund.
Likewise, DepEd Order No. 46, s. 2013, entitled "Guidelines on the Madrasah
Education Program and Utilization of the Support Fund," was issued to engage
Muslim learners with relevant educational opportunities and processes.
On the other hand, DepEd Order No. 39, s. 2013 was issued in support of DepEd's
Special Education Program for learners with special needs and disabilities, including
those who are gifted and talented. DepEd Memorandum No. 108, s. 2013 entitled
"2013 Alternative Learning System Accreditation and Equivalency (ALS & ALE) Test
Registration and Administration" was promulgated to facilitate the ALS & ALE Test,
designed to measure the competencies of those who have neither attended nor
finished the elementary or secondary education in the formal school system. Passers
of this test are given a certificate/diploma (which bears the seal and the signature of
the Secretary of the Department of Education) certifying their competencies as
comparable to graduates of the formal school system. Hence, they are qualified to
enroll in the secondary and post secondary schools.
DepEd Order No. 17, s. 2014 was also issued to provide the guidelines on the Abot-
AlamProgram, a convergence program that is being undertaken by a consortium of
various national government agencies, non government organizations, the National
Youth Commission, and institutions under the leadership of DepEd to locate the out-
of-school youth (OSY) nationwide who are 15-30 years old and who have not
completed basic/higher education or who are unemployed, and to mobilize and
harmonize programs which will address the OSY's needs and aspirations.
DepEd Order No. 77, s. 2011 organized the Advisory Council for the Education of
Children and Youth with Disabilities (ACECYD) to formulate an agenda for action and
the framework for collaboration between the DepEd and the disability sector and
other stakeholders in providing education to children and youth with disabilities.
DepEd Order No. 64, s. 2011 directed all Schools Division and City Superintendents
(SDSs) and District Supervisors to strictly implement relevant policies and best
practices on the promotion and compensation of all Alternative Learning System
(ALS) mobile teachers and implementers to ensure equal opportunities and standard
implementation on the promotion and compensation of the ALS implementers.
Likewise, DepEd Order No. 22, s. 2010, entitled "Mainstreaming and
Institutionalizing Madrasah Education Program by Transferring Its Developed
Components to the Bureau of Elementary Education, Regional and Division Offices,
and the Establishment of Madrasah Education Unit," was promulgated with the
ultimate objective of peace building, national unity and understanding. Under this
scheme, DepEd shall develop the Standard Madrasah Curriculum (SMC) for Pre-
elementary and Secondary levels, along with the development of instructional and
learning materials, to complete the cycle of basic education Madrasah.
These inclusion programs are continuously being implemented to respond to the
needs of the education sector during the transition period. They show the resolve of
the DepEd to harness the necessary systems and structures to respond to the needs
of the indigenous peoples, Muslim schoolchildren, adult learners, PWDs, OSYs, and
the other sectors of society, in keeping with the constitutional provisions on the
rights of indigenous peoples to preserve and develop their cultures, and to provide
training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills to adult, disabled, and out-of-
school youth.274
In fine, the contentions of petitioners are therefore without any factual basis and
utterly devoid of merit.
IV.
Policy issues
In an attempt to bolster their case against the K to 12 Law, petitioners also raised
the following policy issues:
a) K to 12 only increases the resource gap by creating more need
for resources. The solution to the problem is closing the
resource gap by giving priority to education in the budget and
public spending program of the government and addressing the
issue of poverty and malnutrition and programs aimed at
alleviating if not eradicating poverty in the long run but instead
government comes up with the K to 12 Law which is a copycat
and elitist solution.275
b) K to 12 is problem-ridden. Instead, what we need is to
 prioritize deficiencies in personnel, facilities and materials; and
a nationalist-oriented curriculum relevant to the needs of the
people.276
c) The Philippine government does not have enough funds to add
two (2) more years of senior high school.277
d) Student-teacher ratio is far from ideal.278
e) Teachers are paid low salaries.279
f) There is no assurance that senior high school results in good
employment.280
Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. To reiterate, government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not
for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination.281 Stated otherwise, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. 282 Indeed, whether an enactment is wise
or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best
means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner — all these are
matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does
not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. When the validity of
a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative
power.283 In the case of Tañada v. Cuenco,284 the Court, quoting American
authorities, held:
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is
considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon
the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers
are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves
only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are
spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases
their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political
policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the
legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority
not granted him by the Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do
permit the departments, separately or together, to  recognize that a certain set of
facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the
consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." 285 (Emphasis
in the original)
Similarly, in Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. DENR Region 12
Employees,286 the Court held that:
x x x. However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather
than to its legality. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot
inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative
department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and
each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action
assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by
the other departments.
The Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been tasked with the
awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Unless there is
a clear showing of constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court's exercise of the judicial power,
pervasive and limitless it may seem to be, still must succumb to the
paramount doctrine of separation of powers. After a careful review of the
records of the case, we find that this jurisprudential element of abuse of discretion
has not been shown to exist.287 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, the courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution, but also because the judiciary, in the determination of actual cases and
controversies, must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.288 The Court, despite its vast powers, will not review the wisdom,
merits, or propriety of governmental policies, but will strike them down only on
either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2) grave abuse of
discretion.289 For having failed to show any of the above in the passage of the
assailed law and the department issuances, the petitioners' remedy thus lies not with
the Court, but with the executive and legislative branches of the government. 290
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the
Court declares Republic Act No. 10533, Republic Act No. 10157, CHED Memorandum
Order No. 20, Series of 2013, Department of Education Order No. 31, Series of 2012,
and Joint Guidelines on the Implementation of the Labor and Management
Component of Republic Act No. 10533, as CONSTITUTIONAL. The Temporary
Restraining Order dated April 21, 2015 issued in G.R. No. 217451 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza,
Tijam, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Bersamin and Gesmundo, JJ., on official business. 
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on wellness leave.
 
  

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on October 9, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled cases, the original of which
was received by this Office on November 5, 2018 at 4:20 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA 

Clerk of Court