G.R. No.

228680
SPOUSES FRANCISCO and DELMA SANCHEZ, represented by HILARIO
LOMBOY, Petitioners
vs.
ESTHER DIVINAGRACIA VDA. DE AGUILAR, TERESITA AGUILAR, ZENAIDA
AGUILAR, JUANITO AGUILAR, JR., AMALIA AGUILAR, and SUSAN AGUILAR, THE
MUNICIPALITY of LAKE SEBU, represented by its Mayor, BASILIO SALIF, NOEMI
DUTA D. DALIPE in her capacity as ZONING OFFICER II, ZALDY B. ARTACHO, in his
capacity as CHAIRMAN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON LAND CONFLICT, HON. RENATO
TAMPAC, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the 6TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT OF SURALLA-LAKE SEBU, Respondents
DECISION
question only on July 11, 2000, they could not have been in possession thereof ahead of
the heirs of Aguilar. Thus, the heirs are the ones in actual possession of the subject
property and cannot be held liable for forcible entry by stealth as alleged by the Spouses
Sanchez. They merely protected their interests in manifesting the metes and bounds of the
area purchased from them by placing the bamboo fence. In addition, the MCTC was
unconvinced with the spouses' contention that the subject land is an alluvium. An alluvium is
an area formed by running water like a river or a creek. But in a lake like the subject Lake
Sebu, the water is stagnant. Thus the land in question is a natural surrounding of the lake
which existed at the same time with the lake itself. Moreover, the MCTC pointed out that the
subject land is 800 square meters in size which is greater than the area purchased by the
spouses so if there could be a legal claimant, it is the government of Lake Sebu as
foreshore or salvage zone for ·public use. Finally, on the conflicting description of the deed
of sale which states that the property is 600 square meters or 20 x 30 meters, on the one
hand, and boundary on the SW by the lake, on the other, the court held that the former
should prevail as the same is the clearer intention of the spouses. 5

PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated July 28, 2016 and the
Resolution2 dated October 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 03481-
MlN, which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated July 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surallah, South Cotabato, in Civil Case No. 1029-LS.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On July 11, 2000, Juanito Aguilar sold to petitioner spouses Francisco and Delma Sanchez
(Spouses Sanchez) a 600-square-meter portion of his 33,600-square meter lot identified as
Lot No. 71, Pls 870, located in the Municipality of Lake Sebu, South Cotabato. On October
23, 2004, the heirs of Juanito Aguilar, namely, respondents Esther Divinagracia V da. de
Aguilar, Juanito's spouse, and their children, fenced the boundary line between the 600-
square-meter lot of the spouses and the alleged alluvium on the northwest portion of the
land by the lake Sebu. The Spouses Sanchez protested the act of fencing by Esther before
the barangay, but since no settlement was reached, they filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry
against the heirs of Aguilar before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Surallah-Lake
Sebu, Province of South Cotabato. They claimed that under the law, they are the owners of
the alluvium which enlarged their 600- square-meter lot. It cannot, therefore, be fenced by
the heirs of Aguilar. For their part, the heirs refute the existence of the alluvium. They assert
that the "alluvium" referred to is the 800-square-meter area beyond the 600-squaremeter lot
of the spouses which has been in their actual possession but was used, with their tolerance,
by the spouses in connection with their operation of fish cages in that portion of Lake Sebu
abutting their lot.4
On June 7, 2006, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint of the Spouses
Sanchez.1âwphi1 It held that the spouses failed to controvert the prior actual physical
possession of the heirs which was manifested by the improvements found in the subject lot
area consisting of 4 mahogany trees of about 12 to 26 years old, 1 lanzones tree of the
same age, 2 coconut trees of about 30 years old, and other unidentified trees of about the
same age. But since the spouses purchased the 600-meter land adjacent to the land in
On May 27, 2008, the MCTC issued a Writ of Execution ordering the Sheriff to execute its
June 7, 2006 Decision by setting, defining, and/or fixing the boundaries of the respective
properties of the parties according to the following description in the Deed of Sale: "A 600-
square-meter portion of Lot 21, Pls 870 in Lake Sebu, South Cotabato with dimension of 20
meters along the national highway and depth of 30 meters in rectangular shape. Bounded
on the SE by national highway; on the NW by Lake Sebu; on the NE by Lot 71, Pls 870 port;
on the SW by Lot 71, Pls 870 port."6 In implementing the same, the MCTC authorized the
Sheriff to engage the services of professional surveyors, if necessary. In his Report dated
August 26, 2008, however, the Sheriff stated that he discontinued the execution because
when the· surveyor measured the national highway at 60 meters wide, Esther objected and
claimed that the width of said highway is only 30 meters. Said disagreement as to the width
of the highway was submitted to the MCTC, which adopted the findings of the District
Engineer's Office that the width thereof is 58.53 meters. Based on said measurement,
monuments were set on both sides of the highway to determine the area of the spouses'
600-square-meter property. Thus, using the national highway as reference point, the Sheriff
adopted the plan prepared by the geodetic engineer showing that the edge or boundary line
of the 600-square-meter lot of the spouses in the northwest direction is the 20-square-meter
wide public easement abutting Lake Sebu.
Nevertheless, the spouses received a Notice dated February 17, 2009 from the Zoning
Section of the Municipality of Lake Sebu informing them that based on the findings of its
own survey team, the "150-square-meter" lot along Lake Sebu is owned by the heirs of
Aguilar. Thus, in accordance with Section 5(g) of the Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality
of Lake Sebu, the privilege on the utilization of the municipal waters shall be given first
priority to the legal owner of the land alongside the lake unless otherwise waived by him to
others. 7 In another Notice dated March 10, 2009, the Municipality directed the spouses to
demolish their fish cages or refer the case to the Ad Hoc Committee on Lake Sebu Water
Dispute. But after the referral, said Committee ruled in its Decision dated June 19, 2009 that
the land area in excess of the 600-square-meter property purchased by the spouses
belongs to the heirs of Aguilar. As such, said heirs have priority to utilize the lake waters
abutting the land. 8
On May 22, 2010, the spouses filed a Complaint for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Damages
before the RTC seeking to annul the June 7, 2006 Decision of the MCTC for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or for rendering judgment over a non-existent parcel of
land since there is no excess of the 600-square-meter portion to speak of.9
On July 8, 2013, the RTC granted the spouses' complaint and annulled the June 7, 2006
MCTC Decision. It rendered erroneous and without legal basis the findings of the MCTC
that there is a portion of land between the 600-square-meter lot and the lake in the following
manner:
The record of this case shows that when the writ of execution of the decision rendered by
the court a quo in the forcible entry case filed thereat by plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) was
implemented, the parties did not agree as to the point of reference when the survey was
conducted in order to establish the 600-square-meter area bought by plaintiffs (spouses
Sanchez) from the defendants (heirs of Aguilar). Thus, the court a quo directed the District
Engineer's Office of South Cotabato to fix the width of the national highway in order to serve
as the point of reference in locating the 600-square- meter area. The said Office of the
District Engineer found that the width of the national highway is 58.53. It must be
remembered that when the implementing sheriff had the area surveyed, the surveyor
told them that the width of the national highway is sixty meters, while the defendants
(heirs of Aguilar) insisted that it is only thirty (30) meters. As explained in his Report,
the implementing sheriff informed the court that if .the sixty-meters width of the
national highway is made as a point of reference, the lot of the plaintiffs will go
downwards to the lake. Considering then that the width of the natiional highway was
found by the District Engineer's Office to have measured 58.53 meters, or almost
sixty (60) meters, the length of the lot in question therefore must have reached the
edge of the lake. Except however for the easement that the landowner has the
obligation to follow, the lot allegedly claimed by the defendants (heirs of Aguilar) as
alluvium has no basis because the 600- square-meter area purchased by the plaintiffs
(spouses Sanchez) from them went downwards to the lake by reason of the 58.53
width of the national highway. The defendants (heirs of Aguilar) could not include the
area which is part of the national highway in the 600-square-meter lot they sold to the
plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez), thus, inevitably, if there is any alluvium that was formed
at the back portion of the lot abutting the lake, it is part or accessory of the lot sold to
the plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) by them.
The notice, therefore, sent by the Zoning Office of the Municipality of Lake Sebu for the
plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) to demolish the fish cages built by them and to remove any
improvement put up by them in the area abutting their lot, is not proper and no basis in view
of the findings of this court that it is the plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) who are the legitimate
owners of the alleged lot formed by said alluvium, if there is any. Considering likewise the
findings of this court that there is no more lot abutting the lake waters except that of
the plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) by reason of the findings of the width of the national
highway by the District Engineer's Office, which is and should be the point of
reference, plaintiffs are declared the legal owners of the said lot in question as it is
part of the 600 square meters bought by them from the defendants (heirs of
Aguilar). 10
On July 28, 2016, however, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. First, the
appellate court ruled that the MCTC Decision cannot be annulled on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. It is clear that the MCTC acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who filed the
forcible entry complaint before said court. As to the nature of the action, the MCTC likewise
had jurisdiction since under the law, it exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over
ejectment suits. 11 And, second, the CA held that the spouses' complaint is already barred
by laches since it was only on May 22, 2010, or 4 years after the issuance of the June 7,
2006 MCTC Decision that the spouses filed their complaint for annulment. In fact, the
challenged decision had already been executed more than a year prior to the filing of the
complaint. Thus, the spouses' action must necessarily be dismissed,. 12
Furthermore, in a Resolution dated October 10, 2016, the CA rejected the contention of the
Spouses Sanchez that the appeal of the heirs of Aguilar must be denied since their counsel
failed to comply with the MCLE requirements. Under En Banc Resolution dated January 14,
2014, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue
of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the
case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, failure will subject the
lawyer to disciplinary action. 13
On January 26, 2017, the Spouses Sanchez filed the instant petition essentially insisting
that the ruling of the RTC must be upheld in view of the findings of the Sheriff that since the
width of the national highway is almost 60 meters wide, the lot of the spouses must have
gone downwards towards the lake, and thus any portion of land beside said lake must be
considered as part of the land purchased by the spouses from Aguilar.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that a petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in
equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are
wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. 14 Its objective is to undo
or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to
prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. Being exceptional in character, it is not
allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments,
orders or resolutions. Thus, the Court has instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for
the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. 15 In this regard, if the ground relied upon is lack of
jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action
being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on
the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if
a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. 16
In the instant case, the Spouses Sanchez anchored their Complaint for Annulment of
Judgment on the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC. Jurisdiction is the power and
authority of the tribunal to hear, try and decide a case 17 and the lack thereof refers to either
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
action. Lack of jurisdiction or absence of jurisdiction presupposes that the court should not
have taken cognizance of the complaint because the law or the Constitution does not vest it
with jurisdiction over the subject matter. On the one hand, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance . or submission by the
defendant/respondent to the court, or by coercive process issued by the court to such party
through service of summons. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the relief
prayed for. Thus, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery upon all or some of the claims
prayed therein is not essential. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the
Constitution or by law and not by agreement or consent of the parties. Neither does it
depend upon the defenses of the defendant in his/her answer or in a motion to dismiss. 18
Here, the Court agrees with the appellate court that the MCTC had both jurisdictions over
the person of the defendant or respondent and over the subject matter of the claim. On the
former, it is undisputed that the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who filed the Forcible Entry suit before it. On the
latter, Republic Act No. 7691 (R.A. No. 7691) clearly provides that the proper Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original
jurisdiction over ejectment cases, which includes unlawful detainer and forcible entry. 19
Despite this, the Spouses Sanchez insist that the MCTC could not have had jurisdiction
over the disputed land area in excess of their 600- square-meter lot. This is because since
the District Engineer's Office found that the width of the national highway is almost 60
meters wide, the edge of their 600-square-meter lot must have gone downwards and
necessarily reached the edge of the 20-meter wide public easement abutting the Lake
Sebu. Thus, the heirs of Aguilar could not have been in "actual physical possession" of a
non-existent lot for the disputed area belongs to them. The Court, however, is· not
convinced. As duly noted by the CA, the area beyond the 600-square-meter lot abutting
Lake Sebu, whether it is a lot claimed to be in "actual physical possession" of the heirs of
Aguilar or a public easement, refers to the "alluvium" lot area claimed by the Spouses
Sanchez as their own in their forcible entry complaint. It is clear, therefore, that the MCTC
had jurisdiction over the subject matter, which, in this case, is the 600-square-meter lot and
its alleged alluvium.
It bears stressing, moreover, that the Spouses Sanchez explicitly brought the subject matter
to the jurisdiction of the MCTC. They cannot now deny such jurisdiction simply because said
court did not rule in their favor. The Court has consistently ruled that jurisdiction is not the
same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where
there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the
court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal. 20
Thus, the issue of whether the MCTC erred in dismissing the forcible entry complaint, ruling
that the heirs of Aguilar were in actual physical possession over the subject property should
have been raised by the Spouses Sanchez in an appeal before the RTC. But as the records
reveal, the spouses did not do anything to question the decision of the MCTC, merely
allowing the same to attain finality. In fact, the sheriff had already started its execution.
Moreover, without even providing any explanation for their delay, it was only on May 22,
2010, or four (4) years after the issuance of the MCTC ruling on June 7, 2006, that the
spouses filed the instant Complaint for Annulment of Judgment. On this matter, the Court
must emphasize that an action for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction must
be brought before the same is barred by laches or estoppel.21 On the one hand, laches is
the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. On the other hand,
estoppel precludes a person who has admitted or made a representation about something
as true from denying or disproving it against anyone else relying on his admission or
representation. 22 To the Court, the failure on the part of the Spouses Sanchez to file either
an appeal of the MCTC Decision or the instant complaint for annulment of judgment for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, four (4) years to be exact, despite receiving
notice and knowledge of the said decision, constitutes laches that necessarily barred their
cause.
Indeed, the attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order
or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid cornerstone in the dispensation of
justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold
purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and, thus, procedurally,
to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. As to
the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no
longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an
erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court
that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies
cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense
for an indefinite period of time. 23
In the end, the Court deems it proper to note that an ejectment case, such as the forcible
entry complaint filed before the MCTC below, is a summary proceeding designed to provide
expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession of the
property involved. The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical or material
possession (possession de facto) of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical
possession (possession de Jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can
outrightly deprive the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case. Hence, even if the
question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon the issue but only
to determine the question of possession especially if the question of ownership is
inseparably linked with the question of possession. The adjudication of ownership in that
instance, however, is merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving the title to the property. 24
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated July 28, 2016 and the Resolution dated October 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 03481- MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO
PASCUAL, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land Registration
case by oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government lessee, involving as it does
ownership of land formed by alluvium.
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His
registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan
River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow
down towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the applicant's registered land on
the east and on the west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land.
Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it
naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as
foreshore land?
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2) two subsequent
resolutions 2 of the Intermediate Appellate Court 3 (now the Court of Appeals) in Land
Registration Case No. N-84, 4 the application over which was filed by private respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, before the Court of First
Instance 5 (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore
lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of
approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953.
So was his motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro,
filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares
of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was denied by
the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the public domain.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1958, gave due
course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may
be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of
Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the grant. The then Executive Secretary, acting
in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an
application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga,
Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters.
Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto
Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded
on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on
the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's
property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the
riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General,
filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest
possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public
domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of
Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same
reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands
withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.
On June 2, 1960, the court a quo  issued an order of general default excepting the Director
of Lands and the Director of Forestry.
Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and, on
February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro
claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the public domain, it
being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a
part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries
and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that be bad already converted the area
covered by the lease into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Sinforoso
Pascual filed a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and
their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth,
force and strategy, a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The
defendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon: thus they have
thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This, notwithstanding
repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been
docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the parties and the subject
matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land registration case
and was jointly tried by the court a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on
November 1, 1961 and was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the
herein private respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo  rendered judgment finding the subject property to
be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land
registration proceedings.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint
for ejectment in Civil Case No. 2873;
(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over
the land in question; and
(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 2873 and as applicant in Land Registration Case No. N-84 to
pay costs in both instances." 6
The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assisted the
following errors:
1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion
by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly
owned by applicants-appellants [private respondents].
2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore
land.
3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the land in
controversy in favor of applicants-appellants [private respondents].
4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants
[private respondents] are entitled to eject the oppositor-appellee
[petitioners]. 7
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the
petition for registration of the subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from
corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of
the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:
The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the
parties in their respective briefs is — whether or not the land sought to be
registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was
formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the
action of the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of the Talisay and
Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but if formed by the action of
the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned
the land immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. Their
property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by
the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by
the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing
downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other words, between the Talisay
River and the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with both rivers
acting as the boundary to said land and the flow of both rivers meeting
and emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject land was formed at the tip
or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land adding thereto the land
now sought to be registered.
This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the
subject land is immediately attached to appellants' [private respondents']
land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land immediately
faces the Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We can understand
therefore the confusion this case might have caused the lower court,
faced as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding whether or not the
subject land was formed by the action of the two rivers or by the action of
the sea. Since the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay
facing appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be quite easy to
conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial property
of the State as the lower court did in fact rule . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents'] land lies
between these two rivers and it is precisely appellants' [private
respondents'] land which acts as a barricade preventing these two rivers
to meet. Thus, since the flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila
Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the
cause of the deposit thereat for in the natural course of things, the waves
of the sea eat the land on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland. It would not
therefore add anything to the land but instead subtract from it due to the
action of the waves and the wind. It is then more logical to believe that the
two rivers flowing towards the bay emptied their cargo of sand, silt and
clay at their mouths, thus causing appellants' [private respondents'] land
to accumulate therein.
However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not
seem to accept this theory and stated that the subject land arose only
when . . . . Pascual planted "palapat" and "bakawan" trees thereat to
serve as a boundary or strainer. But we do not see how this act of
planting trees by Pascual would explain how the land mass came into
being. Much less will it prove that the same came from the sea. Following
Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were the few trees that acted as
strainers or blocks, then the land that grew would have stopped at the
place where the said trees were planted. But this is not so because the
land mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were
planted.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants [private respondents]
clearly show that the land that accumulated beyond the so- called
boundary, as well as the entire area being applied for is dry land, above
sea level, and bearing innumerable trees . . . The existence of vegetation
on the land could only confirm that the soil thereat came from inland
rather than from the sea, for what could the sea bring to the shore but
sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the other hand, the two
rivers would be bringing soil on their downward flow which they brought
along from the eroded mountains, the lands along their path, and dumped
them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private respondents'] land.
In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding.
While it is true that the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila
Bay fronting appellants' [private respondents'] land, said land is not
foreshore but an accretion from the action of the Talisay and Bulacan
rivers. In fact, this is exactly what the Bureau of Lands found out, as
shown in the following report of the Acting Provincial Officer, Jesus M.
Orozco, to wit:
"Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this
registration made on June 11, 1960, it was found out
that the said land is . . . . sandwitched [sic] by two big
rivers . . . . These two rivers bring down considerable
amount of soil and sediments during floods every year
thus raising the soil of the land adjoining the private
property of the applicant [private respondents]. About
four-fifth [sic] of the area applied for is now dry land
whereon are planted palapat trees thickly growing
thereon. It is the natural action of these two rivers that
has caused the formation of said land . . . . subject of
this registration case. It has been formed, therefore, by
accretion. And having been formed by accretion, the
said land may be considered the private property of the
riparian owner who is the applicant herein [private
respondents] . . . .
In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the
government should be withdrawn, except for the portion
recommended by the land investigator in his report
dated May 2, 1960, to be excluded and considered
foreshore. . . ."
Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the
Bureau of Lands withdrew his opposition dated March 25, 1960, and
limited "the same to the northern portion of the land applied for,
compromising a strip 50 meters wide along the Manila Bay, which should
be declared public land as part of the foreshore" . . . . 8
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the
issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in the name of private
respondents and the reversion to private respondents of the possession of the
portion of the subject property included in Navarro's fishpond permit.
On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited
decision. The Director of Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same decision.
Both motions were opposed by private respondents on January 27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its
decision, to read, viz:
(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that
portion included in their fishpond permit covered by Plan Psu-175181 and
hand over possession of said portion to applicants-appellants, if the said
portion is not within the strip of land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila
Bay on the northern portion of the land subject of the registration
proceedings and which area is more particularly referred to as fifty (50)
meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from corner 5
towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181. . . . 9
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the Director
of Forestry, an extension of time within which to file in this court, a petition for review of the
decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent appellate court and of the aforecited
resolution dated November 21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition for
review entitled, "The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals." 10 We, however, denied
the same in a minute resolution dated July 20, 1981, such petition having been prematurely
filed at a time when the Court of Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners' pending motion to
set aside the resolution dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978.
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating that the
decision dated November 29, 1978 had become final and executory as against herein
petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November
29, 1978 was filed by petitioners' new counsel.
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners'
request for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be
made ex-parte  and filed within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the final order or
judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably erred
in appreciating the fact of the case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and case law
relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.
We find no merit in the petition.
The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of
Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action
of the sea which brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat
and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously
argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries,
respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the
land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. 11 Accretion is the
process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate
fronting the river bank 12; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian
owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. 13 The alluvium, by mandate of
Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment
the soil deposit can be seen 14 but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons 15.
Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is
misplaced.
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila
Bay. Petitioners' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any
of the two rivers whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account for the accretion on
their land. In fact, one of the petitioners, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the
waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after
he had planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to
rise. 16
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) petitioners' own
tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Petitioners' own
land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side
lies now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion
were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the
alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western
boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is
adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is,
that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river
bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the
Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to
what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held that:
Appellant next contends that . . . . Manila Bay cannot be considered as a
sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a
mere indentatiom of the same:
"Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is
shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of
the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a
bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. "
7 C.J. 1013-1014." 17
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what
used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the
northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the facts
of the case. As the trial court correctly observed:
A perusal of the survey plan . . . . of the land subject matter of these
cases shows that on the eastern side, the property is bounded by Talisay
River, on the western side by Bulacan River, on the southern side by Lot
1436 and on the northern side by Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that
the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers meet a certain portion because the two
rivers both flow towards Manila Bay. The Talisay River is straight while
the Bulacan River is a little bit meandering and there is no portion where
the two rivers meet before they end up at Manila Bay. The land which is
adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an
accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers].
Applicant Pascual . . . . has not presented proofs to convince the Court
that the land he has applied for registration is the result of the settling
down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be
rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the action of the two
rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no applicability where the accretion must have
been caused by action of the bay. 18
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the aforegoing observation is that
the disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public
domain. The respondent appellate court, however, perceived the fact that petitioners' own
land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the disputed
land must be an accretion formed by the action of the two rivers because petitioners' own
land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to meet and that the current of the two
rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay which accumulated
somehow to a 14-hectare land. These conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in the
light of the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was deposited, not on either the
eastern or western portion of petitioners' land where a river each runs, but on the northern
portion of petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such conclusions are
further eroded of their practical logic and consonance with natural experience in the light of
Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat and bakawan trees on the
northern boundary of their own land. In amplification of this, plainly more reasonable and
valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in his dissenting opinion when he stated
that:
As appellants' (titled) land . . . . acts as a barricade that prevents the two
rivers to meet, and considering the wide expanse of the boundary
between said land and the Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters . .
. . it is believed rather farfetched for the land in question to have been
formed through "sediments of sand and salt [sic] . . . . deposited at their
[rivers'] mouths." Moreover, if "since the flow of the two rivers is
downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are
deposited at their mouths," why then would the alleged cargo of sand, silt
and clay accumulate at the northern portion of appellants' titled land
facing Manila Bay instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these two
rivers? That being the case, the accretion formed at said portion of
appellants' titled [land] was not caused by the current of the two rivers but
by the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.
The conclusion . . . . is not supported by any reference to the evidence
which, on the contrary, shows that the disputed land was formed by the
action of the sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs of
the original applicant, testified on cross-examination that the land in
dispute was part of the shore and it was only in 1948 that he noticed that
the land was beginning to get higher after he had planted trees thereon in
1948. . . . .
. . . . it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at
high tide could reach as far as the dike of appellants' fishpond within their
titled property, which dike now separates this titled property from the land
in question. Even in 1948 when appellants had already
planted  palapat  and bakawan trees in the land involved, inasmuch as
these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could still reach the dike.
This must be so because in . . . . the survey plan of the titled property
approved in 1918, said titled land was bounded on the north by Manila
Bay. So Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the north. It was only after the
planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in question began to
rise or to get higher in elevation.
The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the
sea water and at the same time a kind of block to the strained sediments
from being carried back to the sea by the very waves that brought them to
the former shore at the end of the dike, which must have caused the
shoreline to recede and dry up eventually raising the former shore leading
to the formation of the land in question." 19
In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and
bakawan trees, the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in
the drying up of its former foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the waters
of Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the northern boundary of
petitioners' own tract of land.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or
an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain
At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.
While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and
Valeriano  20 that Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes of determining which law on
accretion is to be applied in multifarious situations, we have ruled differently insofar as
accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.
In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose  21, Republic v. Court of
Appeals  22, Republic v. Alagad  23, and Meneses v. Court of
Appeals  24, we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by
the mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the
land contiguous thereto.
The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore
of Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by
the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or
for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof.
In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the
disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all
legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein
disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the
national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by
any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a
competent authority." 25 Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have
the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea
is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of
special industries or for coast guard services. 26 Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the
executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified,
under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as
owners of the estates adjacent thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182908               August 6, 2014
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA IMBORNAL and
PEDRO FERRER, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, MRS. REMEDIOS B.
NARVASA-REGACHO, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, and EDUARDO, all
surnamed IMBORNAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 28, 2006
and the Resolution3 dated May 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
57618 which reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated August 20, 1996 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 (RTC) in Civil Case No. D-6978, declared (a) the
descendants of Ciriaco Abrio5 as the exclusive owners of the Motherland covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1462,6 (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano
Imbornal (respondent Victoriano) as the exclusive owners of the first accretion (First
Accretion) covered by OCT No. P-318,7 and (c) the descendants of Pablo Imbornal (Pablo)
as the exclusive owners of the second accretion (Second Accretion) covered by OCT No.
21481,8 and dismissed the complaint and counterclaim in all other respects for lack of merit.
The Facts
Basilia Imbornal+ (Basilia) had four (4) children, namely, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and
Pablo.Francisco I. Narvasa, Sr.9 (Francisco) and Pedro Ferrer (Pedro) were the children10 of
Alejandra, while petitioner Petra Imbornal (Petra) was the daughter of
Balbina.11 Petitionersare the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra
(Francisco, et al.). On the other hand, respondentsEmiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo,
Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal, are the descendants of Pablo.12
During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Barangay Nibaliw
West, San Fabian, Pangasinan with an area of 4,144 square meters (sq. m.), more or less
(Sabangan property), which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra,
and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920.13
Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a
homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga
River in San Fabian, Pangasinan.14 He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent No.
2499115 therefor, and, on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued in his name. Later,
or on May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 10149516 was issued in the name of Ciriaco’s heirs, namely: Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo
Abrio, marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta Corpuz; Remedios
Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio; Dominador Abrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta
Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco).
Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portionof the Motherland, while
respondents occupied the southern portion.17
Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the
southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in
thename of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First
Accretion.18 Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307
sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern portion.19 On November 10,
1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents covering the Second
Accretion.
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of Alejandra
and Balbina, filed on February 27,1984 an Amended Complaint20 for reconveyance,
partition,and/or damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They
anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wifeCatalina, urged
Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco used the proceeds
therefrom to fund his then-pending homestead patent application over the Motherland. In
return, Ciriaco agreed that once his homestead patent is approved, he will be deemed to be
holding the Motherland – which now included both accretions – in trust for the Imbornal
sisters.21
Likewise, Francisco, et al.alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and
misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First Accretion, and the
respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the
said accretions in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they werenot the riparian
owners (as they did not own the Motherland to which the accretions merely formed adjacent
to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their inheritance
claims over the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they respected respondents’
rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their (Francisco, et
al.’s) shares thereon.22 Thus, bewailing that respondents have refused them their rights not
only with respect to the Motherland, but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al.
prayed for the reconveyance ofsaid properties, or, in the alternative, the payment of their
value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, actual
damages in the amount of ₱150,000.00, including attorney’s fees and other costs.23
In their Amended Answer dated March 5, 1984,24 respondents contended that: (a) the
Amended Complaint statedno cause of action against them, having failed to clearly and
precisely describe the disputed properties and specify the transgressions they have
allegedly committed; (b) the action was barred by prescription; and (c) that the properties
sought to be reconveyed and partitioned are not the properties of their predecessors-
ininterest but, instead, are covered by Torrens certificates of titles, free from any
encumbrance, and declared for taxation purposes in their names. In this regard,
respondents prayed that the Amended Complaint be dismissed and that Francisco, et al.be
held liable for the payment of moral damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit in their
favor.
During trial, it was established from the testimonies of the parties that the Motherland was
eventually sold bythe Heirs of Ciriaco to a certain Gregorio de Vera (de Vera), and thatsaid
heirs and deVera were not impleaded as parties in this case.25
The RTC Ruling
On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision26 in favor of Francisco, et al. and thereby
directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the
Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent; and (b) pay actual
damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, and
attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱10,000.00, as well as costs of suit.
The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the present case showed that an
implied trust existed between Ciriaco and the Imbornal sisters with respect to the
Motherland.27 It gave probative weight to Francisco, et al.’s allegation that the Sabangan
property, inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their mother, Basilia, was sold in order to
help Ciriaco raise funds for his then-pending homesteadpatent application. In exchange
therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the Motherland in trust for them once his
homestead patent application had been approved. As Ciriaco was only able to acquire the
Motherland subject of the homestead patent through the proceeds realized from the sale of
the Sabangan property, the Imbornal sisters and, consequently, Francisco, et al. (as the
children of Alejandra and Balbina) are entitled to their proportionate shares over the
Motherland, notwithstanding the undisputed possession of respondents over its southern
portion since 1926.28
With respect to the accretions thatformed adjacent to the Motherland, the RTC ruled that the
owner of the Motherland is likewise the owner of the said accretions. Considering that the
Imbornal sisters have become proportionate owners of the Motherland by virtue of the
implied trust created between them and Ciriaco, they (Imbornal sisters) and their heirs are
also entitled to the ownership of said accretions despite the fact that respondents were able
to register them in their names.
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s ruling, respondents elevated the matter on appeal to the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision29 reversing and setting aside the RTC
Decision and entering a new one declaring: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco as the exclusive
owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano asthe exclusive
owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e., respondents
collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.
With respect to the Motherland, the CA found that Ciriaco alone was awarded a homestead
patent, which later became the basis for the issuance of a Torrens certificate of title in his
name; as such, saidcertificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally through an action for
reconveyance filed by his wife’s (Catalina’s) relatives (i.e., Francisco, et al.being the
children of Alejandra and Balbina, who, in turn, are the sisters of Catalina). The CA further
observed that the homestead patent was not aninheritance of Catalina; instead, it was
awarded by the government to Ciriaco after having fully satisfied the stringent requirements
set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141,30 as amended,31 and his title thereto had
already become indefeasible.32 Consequently, since the entire Motherland was titled in
Ciriaco’s name, his descendants should be regarded as the absolute owners thereof.
On the other hand, with regard to the disputed accretions, the CA ruled that respondents –
i.e., respondent Victoriano with respect to the First Accretion, and all the respondents
withrespect to the Second Accretion – need not be the owners of the Motherland in order to
acquire them by acquisitive prescription. Considering that accretions are not automatically
registered in the name of the riparianowner and are, therefore, subject to acquisitive
prescription by third persons, any occupant may apply for their registration. In this case, the
CA found that respondents have acquired title to the subject accretions by
prescription,33 considering that they have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of
the First Accretion in the concept of an owner since 1949 (when the First Accretion was
formed), which resulted in the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of respondent
Victoriano covering the same. Accordingly, they have also become the riparian owners of
the Second Accretion, and given thatthey have caused the issuance of OCT No. 21481 in
their names over the said Accretion, they have also become the absolute ownersthereof.
Since Francisco, et al. took no action to protect their purported interests over the disputed
accretions, the respondents’ titles over the same had already become indefeasible, to the
exclusion of Francisco, et al.34
At odds with the CA’s disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for reconsideration which
was, however,denied by the CA in a Resolution35 dated May 7, 2008, hence, this petition
taken by the latter’s heirs as their successors-in-interest.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in declaring that: (a)
the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants
of respondent Victoriano are the exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the
descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of the Second
Accretion on the basis of the following grounds: (a) prescription of the reconveyance action,
which was duly raised as anaffirmative defense in the Amended Answer, and (b) the
existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.
At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the Motherland and the
First Accretion are barred by prescription.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by
another, to its rightful and legal owner.36 Thus, reconveyance is a remedy granted only tothe
owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s name.37
As the records would show, the Amended Complaint filed by petitioners’ predecessors-in-
interest, Francisco, et al. is for the reconveyance of their purported shares or portions in the
following properties: (a) the Motherland, originally covered by OCT No. 1462 in the name of
Ciriaco; (b) the First Accretion, originally covered by OCT No. P-318 in the name of
respondent Victoriano; and (c) the Second Accretion, covered by OCT No. 21481 in the
name of all respondents. To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the
Motherland, alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trustfor their predecessors-in-
interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged
that respondents acquired the First and Second Accretions by means of fraudand deceit.
When property is registered in another’s name, an implied or constructive trust is created by
law in favor of the true owner.38 Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person
acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee ofan implied trust
for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of registration of the deed
or the date ofissuance of the certificate of title over the property,39 if the plaintiff is not in
possession. However, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is
imprescriptible. As held in the case of Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.:40
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference
point of the 10-yearprescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance
of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the
property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff,
as the realowner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive
period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a
case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.41 (Emphases supplied)
Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the
registration of the respective titles covering the disputed properties within which to file their
action for reconveyance, taking into account the fact that they were never in possessionof
the said properties. Hence, with respect tothe Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued
on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action for reconveyance therefor should
have been filed until December 5, 1943; with respect to the First Accretion covered by OCT
No. P-318 issued on August 15, 1952in the name of respondent Victoriano, an action of the
same nature should have been filed untilAugust 15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the
Second Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481 issued on November 10, 1978in the name of
the respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until November 10,
1988.
A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended
Complaint42 covering all three (3) disputed properties was filed only on February 27, 1984.
As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within which to seek the
reconveyance of two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the First
Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the Second Accretion having
been seasonably filed. Thus, considering thatrespondents raised prescription as a defense
in their Amended Answer,43 the Amended Complaint with respect to the Motherland and the
First Accretion ought to have beendismissed based on the said ground, with only the cause
of action pertaining to the Second Accretion surviving. As will be, however, discussed
below, the entirety of the Amended Complaint, including the aforesaid surviving cause of
action, would falter on its substantive merits since the existence of the implied trust asserted
in this case had not been established. In effect, the said complaint is completely dismissible.
B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.
The main thrust of Francisco, et al.’s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen
between the Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the
Motherland. This implied trust is anchored on their allegation that the proceeds from the
sale of the Sabangan property – an inheritance of their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters –
were used for the then-pending homestead application filed by Ciriaco over the Motherland.
As such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are, effectively, coowners of the Motherland
together with Ciriaco’s heirs.
An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by operation of
law in order to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing
or downright fraud.44 To reiterate, Article 1456 of the Civil Code states that "[i]f property is
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."
The burden of proving the existence ofa trust is on the party asserting its existence, and
such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its
elements.45 While implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the evidence must be
trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest
on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral
evidence can easily be fabricated.46
In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by Francisco,
et al., that the Motherland had been either mistakenly or fraudulently registered in favor of
Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he was merely a trustee of an implied trust
holding the Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters or their heirs.
As the CA had aptly pointed out,47 a homestead patent award requires proof that the
applicant meets the stringent conditions48 set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and improvement of the
homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and
duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for the grant of his homestead patent
application. As such, it is highly implausible thatthe Motherland had been acquired and
registered by mistake or through fraudas would create an implied trust between the
Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially considering the dearth of evidence showing that the
Imbornal sisters entered into the possession of the Motherland, or a portion thereof,
orasserted any right over the same at any point during their lifetime. Hence, when OCT No.
1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to Homestead Patent No.
24991 on December 15, 1933, Ciriaco’s titleto the Motherland had become indefeasible. It
bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of
Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in Ciriaco’s name are
presumptively regular and proper,49 which presumption has not been overcome by the
evidence presented by Francisco, et al.
In this light, the Court cannot fully accept and accord evidentiary value to the oral testimony
offered by Francisco, et al. on the alleged verbal agreement between their predecessors,
the Imbornal sisters, and Ciriaco with respect to the Motherland. Weighed against the
presumed regularity of the award of the homestead patent to Ciriaco and the lack of
evidence showing that the same was acquired and registered by mistake or through fraud,
the oral evidence of Francisco, et al.would not effectively establish their claims of
ownership. It has been held that oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence,50 especially since the purported agreement transpired decades ago, or in the
1920s. Hence, with respect to the Motherland, the CA did not err in holding that Ciriaco and
his heirs are the owners thereof, without prejudice to the rights of any subsequent
purchasers for value of the said property.
Consequently, as Francisco, et al.failed to prove their ownership rights over the Motherland,
their cause of action with respect to the First Accretion and, necessarily, the Second
Accretion, must likewise fail. A further exposition is apropos.
Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters." Relative thereto, in Cantoja v. Lim,51 the Court, citing
paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936, in relation to
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, as well as related jurisprudence on the
matter, elucidated on the preferential right of the riparian owner over the land formed by
accretions, viz.:
Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or
littoralowner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under
paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936, which reads:
32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands,
marshylands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable
lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as
may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing
lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he
receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.
The Court explained in Santulan v. The Executive Secretary[170 Phil. 567; 80 SCRA 548
(1977)] the reason for such grant of preferential right to the riparian or littoral owner, thus:
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to
lease the foreshore land abutting on his land?
That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866 which provides that, while lands added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits
caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are
no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the established [sic] of special industries, or for the coast guard service, "shall
be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent
thereto and as increment thereof."
In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian
according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretionsor alluvial deposits
due to the action of the sea.1âwphi1
The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to
the riparianowner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the
diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the
case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its
recession.52
Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form
part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the
owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.53
In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners,. are not the
riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First Accretion had .attached, hence, they
cannot assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion
had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second
Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these properties through
prescription as it was ·not established that they were in possession of any of them.
Therefore, whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the
discernible conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over the First
and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot
be reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so since on the other end of the fray lie
respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names covering the First and Second
Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both of which give rise to the superior
credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners' action for reconveyan.ce with respect to
both accretions must altogether fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2006 and the
Resolution dated May 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 are hereby
AFFIRMED, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the Amended Complaint dated
February 27, 1984 filed in said case.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73465 September 7, 1989
LEONIDA CUREG, ROMEO, PEPITO, HERNANDO, MANUEL, ANTONIO AND ELPIDIO
(ALL SURNAMED CARNIYAN) petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES DIVISION), DOMINGO
APOSTOL, SOLEDAD GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES GERARDO,
FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND LILIA MAQUINAD, respondent.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.
Silvestre Br. Bello for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated October 15,1985 in AC-G.R. CV
No. 03852 entitled "Domingo Apostol, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Leonida Cureg, et
al., Defendants-Appellants", which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Isabela, Branch XXII declaring private respondent Domingo Apostol the absolute owner of a
parcel of land, situated in Barangay Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly
described as follows:
... containing an area of 5.5000 hectares, and bounded, on the north,
by Cagayan River; on the east, by Domingo Guingab; on the south,
by Antonio Carniyan; and on the west, by Sabina Mola, with an assessed
value of P3,520. (par. 9 of complaint, p. 4, Record; Emphasis supplied)
On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo, Rosa
Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad, filed a complaint for
quieting of title and damages with preliminary injunction against herein petitioners Leonida,
Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan with the
Regional Trial Court of Isabela and docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 111-373. A temporary
restraining order was issued by the trial court on November 12, 1982.
The complaint alleged that private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the legal
and/or the forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February 1944, the latter
being the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo, who died before the outbreak of the
second world war; that since time immemorial and/or before July 26, 1894, the late
Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,
peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to
all other claimants, of a parcel of land (referred to as their "motherland"), situated in
Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 2.5000 hectares, more or less, and bounded on
the North, by  Cagayan River; on the East, by Domingo Guingab (formerly
 Rosa Cureg); on the  south by Antonio Carniyan; and on the West by
Sabina Mola, ... (p. 2, Record)
that said land was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-3023 in the
name of Francisco Gerardo, which cancels Tax Declaration No. C-9669, also in the name of
Francisco Gerardo; that upon the death of Francisco Gerardo, the ownership and
possession of the "motherland" was succeeded by his only issue, Domingo Gerardo who,
together with three (3) legal or forced heirs, namely Soledad Gerardo, one of private
respondents herein, Primo Gerardo and Salud Gerardo, both deceased, have also been in
actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the same; that Primo Gerardo is
survived by herein respondents, Rosa, Nieves and Flordeliza, all surnamed Gerardo and
Salud Gerardo is survived by respondent Lilia Maquinad; that in 1979, respondents Soledad
Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad verbally
sold the "motherland" to co-respondent Domingo Apostol; that on September 10, 1982, the
verbal sale and conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who executed an
"Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance (Exhibit "Q", p. 206, Rollo); that about
the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition, their "motherland" already
showed/manifested signs of accretion of about three (3) hectares on the north caused by
the northward movement of the Cagayan River; that Domingo Apostol declared the
motherland and its accretion for tax purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-13281 on
September 15, 1982.
The complaint also stated that sometime about the last week of September and/or the first
week of October 1982, when private respondents were about to cultivate their "motherland"
together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by defendants (petitioners
herein) from continuing to do so. Named defendants in said case are herein petitioners
Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed
Carniyan, surviving spouse and children, respectively, of Antonio Carniyan. Further, the
complaint stated that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land situated in
Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela and more particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 2,790 sq. m., more or less bounded on
the  north by Domingo Gerardo; on the East, by Domingo Guingab; on the
south, by Pelagio Camayo; and on the west by Marcos Cureg, declared
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 13131, with an assessed
value of P70.00. (P. 5, Record)
that deceased Antonio Carniyan revised on November 28, 1968 his Tax Declaration No.
13131 dated July 24, 1961 to conform with the correct area and boundaries of his Original
Certificate of Title No. P-19093 issued on November 25, 1968; that the area under the new
Tax Declaration No.15663 was increased from 2,790 square meters to 4,584 square meters
and the boundary on the north became Cagayan River, purposely eliminating completely
the original boundary on the north which is Domingo Gerardo.
Petitioners' answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by private respondents is non-
existent; that Antonio Carniyan, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a
piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land of Francisco
Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that the "subject land" is an accretion to their
registered land and that petitioners have been in possession and cultivation of the
"accretion" for many years now.
The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on July
28,1983 (pp. 244-250, Rollo) on the ground that the defendants were in actual possession
of the land in litigation prior to September 1982. In a decision rendered on July 6, 1984, the
trial court held that respondent Domingo Apostol, thru his predecessors-in-interest had
already acquired an imperfect title to the subject land and accordingly, rendered judgment:
1. declaring Domingo Apostol its absolute owner; 2. ordering the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against herein petitioners; 3. ordering that the writ be made
permanent; and 4. ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondents a reasonable
attorney's fee of P5,000.00, litigation expenses of P1,500.00 and costs (pp. 143-145, Rollo).
On July 17, 1984, petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the trial court on October 15, 1985. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on January 8, 1986. Hence, this petition for review on the
following assigned errors:
A. It erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which is bounded
on the north by the Cagayan River) belongs to the private respondents
and not to the petitioners when the petitioners "Original Certificate of "
Title No. 19093 states clearly that the petitioners' land is bounded on its
north by the Cagayan River.
B. It erred in construing the tax declarations against the interest of the
herein petitioners who are only the heirs of the late Antonio Carniyan
since the late Francisco (supposed predecessor of the respondents)
could not have executed the recently acquired tax declarations (Exhibits
"A" to "A-2") as he died long before World War II and since the late
Antonio Carniyan could no longer stand up to explain his side.
C. Contrary to the evidence and the finding of the Regional Trial Court, it
wrongly ruled that petitioners have never been in possession of the land
(p. 7 of Annex "A", ibid.).
D. It erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to the private
respondents who incredibly claimed that the accretion occurred only in
1982 and is a "gift from the Lord. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)
This petition is impressed with merit.
The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged "motherland" of private respondents
together with the accretion of about 3.5 hectares, the totality of which is referred to in this
decision as the "subject land."
In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the "subject land"
which is an accretion to the registered land while private respondents claimed to be entitled
to the 3.5 hectares accretion attached to their "motherland."
It should be noted that the herein private respondents' claim of ownership of their alleged
two and a half (2 & ½) hectare "motherland" is anchored mainly on four (4) tax declarations
(Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2" and "B", pp. 191, 192, 193, 194, Rollo). This Court has repeatedly
held that the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax
is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. (Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607;
Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; cited in Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29 Phil. 437, 444).
For their part, petitioners relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their Original
Certificate of Title No. P-19093, dated November 25, 1968 (Exhibit "3", p. 189, Rollo) issued
in the name of Antonio Carniyan (petitioners' predecessor-in-interest) pursuant to Free
Patent No. 399431 dated May 21, 1968, clearly showing that the boundary of petitioners'
land on the north is Cagayan River and not the "motherland" claimed by respondents. The
said registered land was bought by the late Antonio Carniyan from his father-in-law, Marcos
Cureg, on October 5, 1956, as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale (Exhibit "8", p.
195, Rollo) which states that the land is bounded on the north by Cagayan River.
In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA
393,401-402, We ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations
and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area
covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates true and legal ownership by the
registered owners over the disputed premises. Petitioners' OCT No.P-19093 should be
accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations (Exhibit "A', dated 1979; Exhibit "A-
1 " undated and Exhibit "A2" dated 1967, pp. 191, 192, 193, Rollo) offered by private
respondents in support of their claim, which declarations are all in the name of private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and appear to have been
subscribed by him after the last war, when it was established during the trial that Francisco
Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.
Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p.
203, Rollo), which the appellate court considered as an admission by him that his land is
bounded on the north by the land of Domingo Gerardo and that he (Carniyan) is now
estopped from claiming otherwise, We hold that said tax declaration, being of an earlier date
cannot defeat an original certificate of title which is of a later date. Since petitioner's original
certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan
River, private respondents" claim over their "motherland," allegedly existing between
petitioners" land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of
the original certificate of title.
It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or
may have existed prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, supra., p. 404). By
the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to
exceptions stated in Section 39, Act 496 (now Sec. 44 of PD No. 1529). Moreover, the tax
declarations of the late Antonio Camiyan subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-19093
(Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already states that its northern boundary is Cagayan River. In
effect, he has repudiated any previous acknowledgment by him, granting that he caused the
accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT No. P-
19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land.
Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioners have never been in possession of the
"subject land" but the evidence on record proves otherwise. First, the trial court on page 11
of its Decision (p. 121, Rollo), stated the reason for denying private respondents' petition for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction, that is, "... the defendants (petitioners herein) were
in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to September, 1982" (p. 121, Rollo).
Second, witness for private respondents, Esteban Guingab, boundary owner on the east of
the land in question and whose own land is bounded on the north of Cagayan River, on
cross-examination, revealed that when his property was only more than one (1) hectare in
1958, (now more than 4 hectares) his boundary on the west is the land of Antonio Carniyan
(T.S.N., 5 May 1983, pp. 19-20). Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a geodetic engineer, on
direct examination stated that in 1974, the late Antonio Carniyan requested him to survey
the land covered by his title and the accretion attached to it, but he did not pursue the same
because he learned from the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same
accretion is the subject of an application for homestead patent of one Democrata Aguila,
(T.S.N., May 18, 1984, pp. 12-13) contrary to the statement of the trial court and the
appellate court that Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did not continue
to survey because persons other than defendants were in possession of the land," which
statement appears only to be a conclusion (p. 7, Rollo). Fourth, We note Exhibit "20" (p.
273, Rollo) for petitioners which is an order by the Director of Lands dated August 14,1980
in connection with the Homestead Application of Democrata Aguila of an accretion situated
in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela. Aguila's application was disapproved because in an
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands of the area applied for which is an
accretion, the same was found to be occupied and cultivated by, among others, Antonio
Carniyan, who claimed it as an accretion to his land. It is worthy to note that none of the
private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest appeared as one of those found
occupying and cultivating said accretion.
On the other hand, the allegation of private respondents that they were in possession of the
"motherland" through their predecessors- in-interest had not been proved by substantial
evidence. The assailed decision of the respondent court, which affirmed the decision of the
trial court, stated that since the "motherland" exists, it is also presumed that private
respondents were in possession of the "subject land" through their predecessors- in-interest
since prior to July 26, 1894. The trial court relied on the testimony of Soledad Gerardo, one
of the private respondents in this case, an interested and biased witness, regarding their
possession of the "motherland." From her testimony on pedigree, the trial
court presumed that the source of the property, the late Francisco Gerardo, was in
possession of the same since prior to July 26, 1894 (pp. 137-140, Rollo).
The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged "motherland" claimed by
private respondents is nonexistent. The "subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by the
northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil
Code:
To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only four
thousand five hundred eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion attached to said
land is approximately five and a half (5.5) hectares. The increase in the area of
petitioners'land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward movement
of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just because the lot
which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande v. Court of
Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the operation of
the Torrens System. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision
appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING Civil Case No. Br. III-373 for quieting of title and damages.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO
RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO,
ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or
private capacities, respondents.
 
ROMERO, J.:p
Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint by the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The complaint was for annulment of
the verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands
regarding a parcel of public land.
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted administrative
remedies before having recourse to the courts.
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan
de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up
Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject
lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As
a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the Municipal Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered against private
respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 20.
The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the
same became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of
judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed
the same. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but
private respondents filed another case for certiorari with prayer for restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25
which was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the
private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied..
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the
survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the
accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to
the applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands.
In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera,
respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered a
report to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D
(equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and
that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario
rendered a decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio
Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if
qualified, may file public land applications covering their respective portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio,
Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad
then ordered him to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove
whatever improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered that private
respondents be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners
Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC,
Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report
and recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by
respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of execution by
respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint.
Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the approval of the
survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual findings made by
the Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling as
the preparation and approval of said survey plans belong to the Director of Lands and the
same shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
resources. 1
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by
Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same
had been acted upon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-
charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case does not fall within the
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also held that there
was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued and
executed..
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL,
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING
FACTS AND THE LAW ON THE MATTER;
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL,
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURT DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE EXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE DECISION OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE PROPER
SUBJECT FOR ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
THE LOWER COURT.
The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not the
subject land is public land. Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an
accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring
property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites : (1)
that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result
of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on
alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-
mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed
by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas
Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. 3 It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and
imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek
and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila, 4 this Court held that the word "current"
indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and
low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of the
rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped from
denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6)
571. 5 The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being
applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey Plan No. MSi-10-06-000571-
D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which was conducted as a consequence of
Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land was described as an
orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was, however, controverted by respondent
Labis in his investigation report to respondent Hilario based on the findings of his ocular
inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy
portion of Cagayan River. The investigation report also states that, except for the swampy
portion which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied by a part of a
big concrete bodega of petitioners and several residential houses made of light materials,
including those of private respondents which were erected by themselves sometime in the
early part of 1978. 6
Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which
was formed by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in
accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. 7 This Court has
often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality. 8 Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court. 9
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or
artificial. In Republic v. CA, 10 this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should
be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457
of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., 11 where
the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river
bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of
man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the
Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill
operations. 12 Even if this Court were to take into consideration petitioners' submission that
the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan
River bounding his land, 13 the same would still be part of the public domain.
Having determined that the subject land is public land, a  fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as
well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction
over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the court a
quo dismissed petitioners' complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which
ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.
However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been
exhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an
Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the
decision of respondent Hilario who was the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands. Said
decision was made "for and by authority of the Director of Lands". 14 It would be incongruous
to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for the Director
of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands.
In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of
the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for
reconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said
motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the case
of Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 15 this Court held that the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside the
orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving public lands
under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond the
bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 16
As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being an
artificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and
control over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law (C.A.
No. 141) which states, thus:
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the
exclusive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act
through the Director of Lands who shall act under his immediate control.
Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct
executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other
form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the
public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be
conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or
capriciousness in the execution order of public respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the Director
of Lands. This Court finds otherwise since said decision was based on the conclusive
finding that the subject land was public land. Thus, this Court agrees with the Court of
Appeals that the Director of Lands acted within his rights when he issued the assailed
execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions.
Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate the
subject land practically changed respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect for
petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to private
respondents Salasalans and Rabayas as they had not yet been issued patents or titles over
the subject land. The execution order merely directed the segregation of petitioners' titled lot
from the subject land which was actually being occupied by private respondents before they
were ejected from it. Based on the finding that private respondents were actually in
possession or were actually occupying the subject land instead of petitioners, respondent
Palad, being the Director of Lands and in the exercise of his administrative discretion,
directed petitioners to vacate the subject land on the ground that private respondents have
a preferential right, being the occupants thereof.
While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied by
them, they nevertheless filed their protest or opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous Sales
Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an application as they were in fact
directed to do so. In any case, respondent Palad's execution order merely implements
respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted that petitioners' own application still has to be
given due course. 17
As Director of Lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any
form of concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public domain. 18 He
may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long as they
are based on the findings of fact.
In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros, 19 this Court held that where, in the disposition of public
lands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly
acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one of
judgment, but not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. Thus, except
for the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, this Court finds no reversible
error nor grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160453               November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.
 DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the
current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where
it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to
the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the
ownership in some other person.
Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio
Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B
(the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had
an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the
Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by
Arcadio Ivan.1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include
Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He
alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint
open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.2
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it
needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal
easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the
applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not
resulted from accretion.3
Ruling of the RTC
On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III
and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and
ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of
San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square
meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot
4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of
Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit:
xxxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the
Issuance of the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC,5 to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE
REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY
APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT
THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING
UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE
AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October
20, 2003.7
Issues
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8
I
RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO
THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER
ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN
EVIDENCE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A
PART OF THE PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED
UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS
CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT
THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS
FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.
IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE
CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-
NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and
whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription
pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of
the waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan
A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this
application which was previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard
after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned
by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from
his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil
Code, it is provided that:
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."9
The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters"
(Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr.,
are the owners of the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River which became
an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is
owned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p.
38 Rollo).10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of
the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not
establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.
The Republic’s submission is correct.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish
the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such
evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to
it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its
registration under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the property was
an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.12 The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the
banks of rivers.13
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to
warrant the grant of their application for land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river
had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up
river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that
Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River xxx (and)
became an orchard after it dried up."
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original
title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about
only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the unavoidable
conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot
4 by the current of the Parañaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that
the effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a
river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The
drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In
other words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from
the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to
be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with
an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner
by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time intervening
between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which
time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness
Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B).
The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the
dried-up bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own
testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Parañaque River that
had dried up and become an orchard.
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of Title No.
44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been
formed by the drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687
recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein
described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed."14
That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B,
which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of
respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast."15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that
became respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was
definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the
recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to
accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks
through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more
or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim
ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457
of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision
as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the
language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only
room for application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership.
Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public
dominion of the State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to
belong to the
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that
the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.19
II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also
because they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining
owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof,
they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for
more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners
of the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid
its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was
duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet,
OIC–Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject
property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot
5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the
foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that
the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a
government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their
favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not
having presented any witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial
Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
xxxx
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the
following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of
the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30)
years."22
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed
by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed
on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the Court,23 the Court has
consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of
the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof,
they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for
more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the
subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its
realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly
approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC
– Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject
property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot
5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more
than thirty years" from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners
of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had
performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they had paid realty
taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to
justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not
conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,25 the tax
declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the
causing of surveys of the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and
adverse possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does
not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are
necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong
to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not
formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that
would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The
admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation purposes
only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 199928 signified that their alleged possession
would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their application for land registration
on March 7, 1997.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for
more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land
by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already
declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land
still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of
private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of
public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. As
earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds
are of public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a
question that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29 a case
involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a
creek. There the Court held:
As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the
Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her
predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she
purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art.
370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must
fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the
land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the
Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain
which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent
any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by
itself, alter its inalienable character.
xxxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took
effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest
since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of
the land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to
acquire them only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are
applicable only when "river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of
the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and
the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the
construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo
v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies
only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not
apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or
esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up
portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows
that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be
entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the
land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the
course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even
alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are
of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases
supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is
indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State.31 Occupation of
public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds
that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the
owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters
only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot
be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be
alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already
declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have
acquired the property through prescription.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and
disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and
disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit:33
NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X
60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive
Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by
the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map
"classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968"
sufficient proof of the property’s nature as alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a
presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public
land, we said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.
Yap34 that:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis
supplied)
35  36 
In Menguito v. Republic, which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento, we specifically
resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to
establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside
Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified
by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No.
Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. x x x."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State,
it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not
constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven
that the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the
Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to
the effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner,
viz:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by
respondent.1âwphi1 The government officials who issued the certifications were not
presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have
accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative
value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that
Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications
are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied)
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-
00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable
by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as
alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive
prescription of Lot 4988-B.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area
of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City,
Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being
part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 219811
REX DACLISON, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BAYTION, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review 1 are the February 5, 2015 Decision2 and the August 3,
2015 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)  in CA-G.R. CV No. 99627, which affirmed in
toto  the April 27, 2012 Decision 4 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 224, Quezon
City (RTC)  in Civil Case No. Q-09-66145, a case for forcible entry.
The Antecedents
On January 27, 2009, respondent Eduardo Baytion (Baytion) filed a Complaint5 for Forcible
Entry and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 43, Quezon City (MeTC) against petitioner Rex
Daclison (Daclison),  which was docketed as Civil Case No. 39225.
In the complaint, Baytion alleged that he was a co-owner of a parcel of land consisting of
1,500 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 221507. The said
property was inherited by him and his siblings from their parents and, as agreed upon, was
being administered by him. As administrator, he leased portions of the property to third
persons.
Erected on the said property was a one-storey building which was divided into seven units
or stalls. One of the stalls was leased to a certain Leonida Dela Cruz (Leonida) who used it
for her business of selling rocks, pebbles and similar construction materials.
When the lease of Nida expired sometime in May 2008, Daclison and other persons acting
under her took possession of the portion leased and occupied by Leonida without the prior
knowledge and consent of Baytion. Since then, Daclison had been occupying the contested
portion and using it for his business of selling marble and other finishing materials without
paying anything to Baytion.
Upon learning of Daclison’s unauthorized entry into the subject portion of the property,
sometime in June 2008, Baytion demanded that he vacate it. Despite oral and written
demands to vacate, Daclison refused to do so. This prompted Baytion to file the complaint
for forcible entry and damages.
Daclison, in his answer, averred that sometime in 1978, Baytion leased the subject portion
to Antonio dela Cruz (Antonio)  where the latter started a business; that ten or fifteen years
later, a stone walling, called a riprap,  was erected at the creek lying beside Baytion’s
property, leaving a deep down-sloping area; that Antonio negotiated with a certain engineer
so he could be in possession of the said down-slope; that Antonio had the down-slope filled
up until it was leveled with the leased portion; that Antonio paid for the right to possess the
same; that in 2000, Antonio’s business was taken over by Leonida, who suffered a stroke in
December 2007; that after her death, the business was taken over by Ernanie Dela
Cruz (Ernanie);  that in February 2008, he (Daclison) entered into a business venture with
Ernanie in the same leased property and he took over the management of the business;
that he received a letter from Baytion addressed to Ernanie requesting the latter to vacate
the subject premises; that Baytion and Ernanie came to an agreement that the latter would
continue the lease of the property; that he issued a check in the amount of ₱100,000.00 as
payment for the rental arrears; that two weeks thereafter, Baytion returned the check and
demanded that Ernanie vacate the property; that Baytion promised that he would no longer
bother them if they would just transfer to the filled-up and plane-leveled property; that on
account of the said promise, he and Ernanie vacated the leased area and transferred their
business to the filled-up portion; that despite the fact that they already vacated the leased
portion of the property, Baytion still filed a complaint with the barangay claiming that the
filled-up portion was part of his property; that the executive officer of the barangay who
conducted the investigation made a report indicating that a mojon was placed by him
(Daclison) which showed the boundary of Baytion’s property; that Baytion acknowledged the
said report and agreed to put an end to the controversy; and that despite Baytion’s
agreement to put an end to the dispute, he still sent a demand letter to vacate.6
On August 25, 2009, the MeTC dismissed the case on the ground that Baytion failed to
include his siblings or his co-owners, as plaintiffs in the case. The dismissal, however, was
without prejudice.
Baytion appealed the case to the RTC, which ruled that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction to
decide the case because the allegations in the complaint failed to constitute a case of
forcible entry. Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, however, the RTC did
not dismiss the case and, instead, exercised its original jurisdiction over the same.
The RTC then decided that Baytion had a better right of possession over the property. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:
1) The defendant and other persons claiming under him to vacate and to turn over
the possession of the subject property to the plaintiff; and,
2) The defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of ₱20,000.00/monthly for the use of
the premises commencing from May 2008 until the subject premises is vacated.
7
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Daclison filed an appeal with the CA.
The CA tackled two issues, namely: a) whether the RTC committed a reversible error when
it exercised original jurisdiction of the case and decided the same on its merits pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court; and, b) who, between Baytion and Daclison, had a
better right to possess the subject property.
The CA ruled that the MeTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case in a summary
proceeding for forcible entry because Baytion failed to allege that he was in prior physical
possession of the property and that he was deprived of his possession under Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. It was of the view that the present action for forcible
entry had actually ripened into one for recovery of the right to possess or accion
publiciana, which was an action in an ordinary civil proceeding in the Regional Trial Court.
The action was aimed at determining who among the parties had a better right of
possession of realty independent of the issue of ownership or title. It was an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.8 Thus, it agreed with the RTC when the
latter correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case following the mandate of Section 8, Rule
40 of the Revised Rules of Court.9
As to the issue of possession, the CA concluded that Baytion, as co-owner of the subject
property, had a better right to possess. It wrote:
Xxx, it is clear that Antonio, Leonida and Ernanie were all lessees of the subject property
and its improvements owned by the plaintiff. Ernanie, who is a sub-lessee of the subject
property, again sub-leased the same to appellant, without authority or consent from
appellee. Thus, since appellant have been possessing the subject property in his capacity
as a mere sub-lessee, he cannot own the subject property and its improvements through
open, continuous and adverse possession of the property. It follows then that appellee has
the right to repossess the subject property.10
On February 5, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed decision, disposing in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the Decision
27 April 2012 rendered by Branch 224 of the RTC of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-09-
66145 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Daclison filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in the assailed
resolution.
Hence, the present petition for review raising the following
ISSUES
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
INSTANT CASE IS AN ACCION PUBLICIANA, MORE SIGNIFICANTLY [WITH]
RESPECT TO THE LAND OUTSIDE TCT NO. 221507; THAT, EFFECTIVELY, THE
RESPONDENT HAS PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY OUTSIDE TCT NO.
221507.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE PETITIONER WAS A LESSEE OF THE SECOND PROPERTY
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE SECOND PROPERTY OR LAND WAS AN UMPROVEMENT ON THE
PROPERTY OF THE RESPONDENT.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO  GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE.
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO  GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE PETITIONER SHOULD PAY THE [RESPONDENT] THE AMOUNT OF
₱20,000 MONTHLY FOR THE USE OF THE PREMISES.12
Daclison insists that what is really in dispute in the present controversy is the filled-up
portion between the riprap constructed by the government and the property of Baytion
and,13 therefore, outside of the land co-owned by Baytion. Accordingly, the RTC and the CA
should have dismissed the case because the leased property was already surrendered to its
owner, thereby, mooting the complaint.14
Daclison insists that Antonio, from whom he derived his right over the contested portion,
made an open, continuous and adverse possession and use of the property when the latter
extended his place of business to the filled-up portion.15 He claims that the filled-up portion
is not an improvement on the leased property as found by the RTC and the court a quo. It is
a property separate and distinct from the leased property.16
The Respondent’s Position
Baytion basically posits that although the disputed portion is outside the description of the
property covered by TCT No. 221507, it forms an integral part of the latter because it is an
accretion, construction, or improvement on the property and, under the law, any accretion or
anything built thereon belongs to him and his co-owners.17
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, it was clear that the disputed property was the filled-up portion between
the riprap constructed by the government and the property covered by TCT No. 221507.
According to Daclison, the property covered by TCT No. 221507 had already been
surrendered to Baytion which the latter never disputed. As such, the Court is now
confronted with the question as to who between the parties has a better right over this
contested portion between the land co-owned by Baytion and the constructed riprap.
Baytion does not have a better
right over the contested portion
The RTC and the CA erred in holding that Baytion has a better right to possess the
contested portion.
Baytion’s contention that he owns that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced. Article
457 of the New Civil Code provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
In other words, the following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be
considered, namely:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.18
In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. To begin
with, the land came about not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible
deposit.1âwphi1 The deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of
the current from the creek adjacent to his property. Baytion failed to prove the attendance of
the indispensable requirement that the deposit was due to the effect of the current of the
river or creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human
intervention.19
Furthermore, the disputed property cannot also be considered an improvement or
accession. Article 445 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the
following articles.
[Emphases supplied]
It must be noted that Article 445 uses the adverb "thereon" which is simply defined as "on
the thing that has been mentioned."20 In other words, the supposed improvement must be
made, constructed or introduced within or on the property and not outside so as to qualify as
an improvement contemplated 'by law. Otherwise, it would just be very convenient for land
owners to expand or widen their properties in the guise of improvements.
In view of all the foregoing, it is the opinion of this Court that Baytion, not being the owner of
the contested portion, does not have a better right to possess the same.1âwphi1 In fact, in
his initiatory pleading, he never claimed to have been in prior possession of this piece of
property. His claim of ownership is without basis. As earlier pointed out, the portion is
neither an accretion nor an accession. That being said, it is safe to conclude that he does
not have any cause of action to eject Daclison.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 5, 2015 Decision and the August 3,
2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 99627
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for possession is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12730             August 22, 1960
C.N. HODGES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
AMADOR D. GARCIA, defendant-appellee.
Gellada, Mirasol and Vallar for appellant.
Roque E. Evidente for appellee.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is an action filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the recovery of the
possession of a portion of land designated as Lot No. 908-Q with an area of 5,931 square
meters, which is alleged to have been seperated from plaintiff's lands by the "natural
change" in the course of a river. The case having been decided adversely against the
plaintiff, the latter appealed to the Court of Appeals. The court, however, certified the caseto
this Court on the ground that it was decided upon a stipulation of facts and for that reason
questions of fact can no longer be raised on appeal.
It appears that the land in dispute was formerly a part of Lot No. 908 of the Cadastral
Survey of Jaro, Iloilo, which lot was acquired by plaintiff C.N. Hodges from Salustiano
Mirasol in January, 1950, and subsequently registered in his name as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2504 issued by the Register of Deeds of Iloilo. This
property was bounded on the north by the Salog River. Adjoining that river on the other side
is Lot No. 2290, which was purchased by defendant Amador D. Garcia from Dr. Manuel
Hechanova on April 15, 1950. On July 12 of that same year, defendant had the land, which
was originally surveyed in 1912 and was then bounded on the SE and SW by the Salog
river, had inreased in area by the river bank, and that the added area, which bounds the
land on the SE and SW, is in turn bounded on the SE and SW by the Salog river. In due
time, defendant applied for the registration of the additional area under the Land
Registration Act, and on March 22, 1952, the cadastral court rendered a decision holding
that the land sought to be registered is an accretion to Lot No. 2290 and decreeing that the
land be registered in his name. On June 30, 1952, the corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. O-229 was issued in favor of the defendant.
Plaintiff claims in these proceedings that the Salog river changed its course and that the
land in dispute — which appears to be a portion of the area added to Lot No. 2290 as above
mentioned — was separated from his Lot No. 908 by the current of the river, and the
separation was abrupt, like in avulsion, so that under Art. 374 of the Civil Code (Art. 463 of
the new) he retains ownership thereof. No evidence, however, was presented by plaintiff to
show that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through
avulsion. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the change was gradual
and caused by accretion and erosion. (Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53
Phil., 55) In any event, it was agreed upon by the parties in open court that "from the year
1917 until the construction of the dike (in 1939) along the river . . ., the course of the Salog
river, starting from the edge of lot 2290, gradually ate up the bank towards the side of the
poblacion of Jaro and at the same time gradually deposited sediments towards the side of
Lot No. 2290;" that "when the defendant bought lot No. 2290 from Dr. Manuel Hechanova in
1950, he found out that there was an accretion along one side of said lot, as now shown on
this plan, PSU-12743-A;" that "by virtue of such accretion towards lot 2290, the defendant
applied for its registration under the Land Registration Act, and decision was on March 22,
1950 by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo;" that "effectively, original certificate of title No.
O-229, dated June 30, 1952, was issued to the defendant;" and that "because of
the gradual deposit of sediments of the Salog River along his land, lot 2290, the defendant
has been in possession of said land since 1950 until now, while the plaintiff and his
predecessors in interest since the gradual loss of lot No 908-Q, covered by water, has never
been in actual possession of the said lot." The foregoing facts have never been denied or
contradicted by plaintiff, and they clearly show that the increase in area of Lot No. 2290 by
the river bank was due to alluvion or accretions which it gradually received (from 1917 to
1939, or for a period of 22 years) from the effects of the current of the river.
It should here be stated that in the cadastral proceedings wherein the land object of this
action was sought to be registered by herein defendant Amador D. Garcia, plaintiff C.N.
Hodges did not file any opposition despite due publication of the notice of the application
and hearing. The record also shows that the land now being claimed by plaintiff had been
litigated in three civil cases. (Exhs. "4", "5" and "6".) In those cases, herein defendant was
recognized as the owner of the land and held legally entitled to its possession. In fact, the
land in question had been adjudged to be owned by him as an accretion to his lot No. 2290.
(See exh. "6" decision of the Court of Appeals in Candelaria Efe, et al. vs. Amador D.
Garcia, CA-G.R. No. 9306-R, October 28, 1952, Reyes, J.B.L., J.,  ponente.)
It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estate as a
result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to
his land used to pertain to plaintiff's estate, which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title,
cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not
protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the
banks. (Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; art. 457 of the new.) Such accretions are natural
incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that
respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act. (Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs.
Tuason, supra).
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-
appellant.
G.R. No. 187633
HEIRS OF DELFIN and MARIA TAPPA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD, HENRY CALABAZARON and VICENTE
MALUPENG, Respondents.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2 dated February 19, 2009 and Resolution3 dated April 30, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90026, which reversed and set aside the
Decision4 dated July 6, 2007 of Branch 5, Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTuguegarao City,
Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5560 for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and
Damages.
The Facts
On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin)5 and Maria Tappa (Spouses
Tappa) filed a complaint6 for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages
(Complaint) against respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud),7 Henry Calabazaron (Calabazaron),
and Vicente Malupeng (Malupeng).8 The property subject of the complaint is a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 3341, Pls-793 with an area of 21,879 square meters, located in
Kongcong, Cabbo, Pefiablanca, Cagayan (Lot No. 3341).9
In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot No.
3341, having been issued an Original Certificate of Title No. P-69103 (OCT No. P-69103)
on September 18, 1992, by virtue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194. 10 Delfin allegedly
inherited Lot No. 3341 from his father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed
that both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open, continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of
the lot since time immemorial. 11
In their Answer, 12 respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the original
owner of Lot No. 3341 was Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo and
Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by operation of
law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and
Irene each owned 10,939 square meters of the lot as their respective shares. Lorenzo had
children namely, Delfin, Primitiva, and Fermina. Upon the death of Irene, her share in tum
passed to her heirs, Demetria, Juanita, Pantaleon and Jose Bacud. 13
Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit dated April 29, 1963 (1963 Affidavit)
signed by Delfin, his sisters, Primitiva and Fermina, and their mother, Modesta
Angoluan. 14 The 1963 affidavit stated that Genaro originally owned Lot No. 3341. It further
stated that one-half (Yz) of the property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole property
was declared as his, only for taxation purposes.
Calabazaron claimed that he became the owner of 2,520 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by
virtue of two Deeds of Sale executed in his favor, one dated October 12, 1970 executed by
Demetria, and another dated August 22, 1971 executed by Juanita. 15 After the sale,
Calabazaron entered into possession of his portion and paid the real property taxes. 16 He
remains in possession up to this date. 17
Malupeng, on the other hand, claimed that he became the owner of 210 square meters of
Lot No. 3341 by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on November 30, 1970 by Pantaleon in
his favor. 18 After the sale, Malupeng entered into possession of his porcion of propeny and
paid the real property taxes. 19 He remains in possession up to this date. 20
Bacud claimed ownership over 1,690 square meters of Lot No. 3341 in his own right as heir
of Irene.21
Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to each of
them. They continued to occupy them despite several demands to vacate from Spouses
Tappa.22
Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed through force and
intimidation.23 Bacud and Malupeng denied this allegation.24
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC issued its Decision,25 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and the Court hereby
orders:
1. Plaintiffs to be the owners of Lot 3341, Pls 793 and unqualifiedly vests in them
the full and untrammeled rights of ownership:
2. All the defendants must, if still in possession of portions of the lot in issue,
convey the same to the plaintiffs;
3. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
The R TC ruled that the basic requirement of the law on quieting of title under Article 447 of
the Civil Code was met, thus:
Delfin and Maria's title is clear and unequivocal, and its validity has never been
assailed by the defendants – nor has any evidence been adduced that successfully
overcomes the presumption of validity and legality that the title of Delfin and Maria
enjoys.27 (Emphasis in the original.)
The RTC ruled that there was no document in the hands of respondents as strong and
persuasive as the title in the name of the Spouses Tappa that will support respondents'
claim of ownership and Irene's antecedent ownership.28 The RTC stated that the 1963
Affidavit contains nothing more than the allegations of the affiants and does not, by itself,
constitute proof of ownership of land, especially as against documents such as titles.29
Respondents appealed to the CA, raising the following arguments:
First, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa fraudulently applied for, and were issued a
free patent over Lot No. 3341, and eventually OCT No. P-69103 dated September 18,
1992.30 They alleged that Spouses Tappa committed fraud because they were not in
possession of the lot since 1963, which possession was required for an applicant for a free
patent under the law. 31
Second, respondents argued that the complaint should be dismissed because both
extinctive and acquisitive prescription have already set in.32 Respondents claimed that both
ordinary acquisitive prescription of 10 years, and extraordinary acquisitive prescription of 30
years in claiming ownership of immovable property apply in the case.33 They argued that
more than 30 years have already lapsed from the time they entered possession of the
subject lot in 1963 up to the filing of the complaint on September 9, 1999.34 They also
pointed out that Spouses Tappa admitted in their complaint that respondents were in
possession of the lot since 1963. 35
Particularly, Calabazaron argued that the 10-year prescriptive period under Article 1134 of
the Civil Code applies to him by virtue of the two duly executed Deeds of Sale in his
favor. 36 It was never alleged that he had any participation in the alleged duress, force and
intimidation in the execution of the 1963 Affidavit.37 Hence, he is a purchaser in good faith
and for value. Calabazaron entered possession of the lot after the sale to him in 1970, thus,
the prescriptive period of l0 years had long lapsed. 38
Bacud and Malupeng claimed that, even assuming that the execution of the 1963 Affidavit
was attended with force and intimidation, the complaint against them should have been
dismissed because the extraordinary acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years under
Article 1137 of the Civil Code applies to them.39 They also argued that the action for quieting
of title had already prescribed since the possession of Bacud and Malupeng started in 1963,
which fact was allegedly admitted by Spouses Tappa in their complaint.40 Thus, Spouses
Tappa had only until 1993 to file a complaint, which they failed to do.
All respondents claimed that from the start of their possession, they (1) have paid real taxes
on the lot, (2) have planted crops, and (3) have continued to possess the lot in the concept
of owners. 41
Third, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa failed to prove their right over the subject lot
because they cannot rely on the certificate of title issued to them on September 18, 1992 by
virtue of a free patent.42 They asserted that Spouses Tappa fraudulently obtained the free
patent on Lot No. 3341 by concealing material facts; specifically the fact of not being in
possession of the lot since 1963. 43
The Ruling of the CA
The CA set aside the decision of the RTC.44 The relevant dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
decision dated July 6, 2007 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint.
SO ORDERED.45
On the issue of prescription, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and explained that their
possession over Lot No. 3341 already ripened into ownership through acquisitive
prescription.46 The CA noted that Spouses Tappa acknowledged in their complaint that they
have not been in possession of the lot, and that respondents have been continuously
occupying portions of it since 1963. 47 It explained:
The substantial length of time between 1963, up to the time of filing of the present complaint
on September 9, 1999, which is more than 30 years, should be considered against
[S]pouses Tappa, and in favor of defendants-appellants. Settled is the rule that an
uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years could ripen into
ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription, which is a mode of acquiring
ownership and other real rights over immovable property. Hence, appellants' possession of
the land has ripened into ownership by virtue of acquisitive prescription.48 (Citation omitted.)
On the merits of the case, the CA ruled that the two indispensable requisites for an action to
quiet title under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code were not met. 49
The first requisite is absent because Spouses Tappa do not have a legal or an equitable title
to or an interest in the property. The CA explained that the free patent granted to Spouses
Tappa produced no legal effect because Lot No. 3341 was a private land, thus:
As heretofore discussed, the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by
appellants of the subject parcel of land within the period prescribed by law has effectively
converted it into a private land. Consequently, the registration in the name of Maria Tappa
on September 18, 1992 under OCT [No.] P-69103, by vi1iue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-
3194, produces no legal effect. Private ownership of land-as when there is a prima
facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants-is
not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, becam,e the Public Land
[L]aw applies only to lands of the public domain.50 (Citation omitted.)
The CA further stated that while Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a free patent over the
property, and were able to register it under the Torrens system, they have not become its
owners. The CA said that "[r]egistration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over
immovable prope1ty---it does not create title nor vest one but it simply confirms a title
already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible."51
The second requisite that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity is likewise unavailing. The CA ruled that no other evidence
(aside from Delfin's own testimony) was presented to prove the allegation of fraud and
intimidation, making the testimony self-serving.52 The CA further noted that Delfin's own
sister, Fermina, one of the signatories of the 1963 Affidavit, belied his testimony. Fermina
testified that they went to the house of one Atty. Carag to sign the affidavit and they did so,
on their own. 53
Spouses Tappa filed a Motion for Reconsideration,54 which the CA denied.55
Hence, spouses Tappa filed a petition for review on certiorari before this court, raising the
following issues:
I. Whether the CA erred in dismissing Spouses Tappa's complaint for quieting of
title against respondents;56
II. Whether the CA erred in not finding that Spouses Tappa's certificate of title
cannot be collaterally attacked in this case;57 and
III. Whether the CA erred in finding that respondents have acquired the property
through acquisitive prescription. 58
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm the decision of the CA.
The action for quieting of title
should not prosper.
The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of possession.
In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,  59 an action for quieting of title is essentially a
common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit:
x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure"... an adjudication that a
claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so
that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any
danger of hostile claim." In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, "... not only to
place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who
has the right would see every cloud of doubt over  the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements  he may desire, to use,  and even
to abuse the property as he deems best. x x x. "60 (Emphasis in the original.)
In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Article 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which
state:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property
or any interest therein.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie  appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.61
Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites.
First, Spouses Tappa's claim of iegal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent and
the certificate of title, OCT No. P-69103 issued in their name cannot stand. The certificate of
title indjcates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-3194. We agree with the
CA that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become
private land by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by
respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of the Public Land
Act,62 which governs public patent applications.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects. whatsoever.1awp++i1 Private ownership of land-as when there is
a prima facie  proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous
occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the
Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no
authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have
passed to private ownership.63
In Magistrado v. Esplana,  64 we cancelled the titles issued pursuant to a free patent after
finding that the lots involved were privately owned since time immemorial. A free patent that
purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of its
issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. 65
In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341 was occupied by, and has
been in possession of the Tappa family, even before the 1963 Affidavit was executed. After
the execution of the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their respective portions of the
property. Delfin testified that before his father, Lorenzo, died in 1961, Lorenzo had been
occupying the lot since before the war, and that Delfin was born there in 1934.66
Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as 1948,
and paid the real property taxes (evidenced by real property tax payment receipts in the
name of Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961).67 Spouses Tappa were likewise shown
to pay the real property taxes from 1961 to 2000.68 Similarly, respondents also declared
their respective portions of Lot No. 3341 for taxation in their names in 1994, and paid real
property taxes on those portions from 1967 to 2004.69 Although tax declarations or realty tax
payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 70
Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and
Malupeng started occupying portions of Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property,
while Calabazaron did the same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's.71 The complaint
stated further that since 1963. the respondents "continuously occupied portion of the subject
land." 72
In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341, the property had been segregated from the
public domain. 73 At the time the patent and the certificate of title were issued in 1992,
Spouses Tappa and their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession, at least to
the half of the lot, since 1934; and respondents were also in possession of the other half
since 1963. Therefore, the free patent issued covers a land already segregated from the
public domain.
In Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago,74 we ruled, thus:
Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land by respondents and their predecessors in interests, they are deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land was thus segregated from the public domain and
the director of lands had no authority to issue a patent. Hence, the free patent covering Lot
2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are void.75
Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession of the
disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by
respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were able to
obtain a free patent of the whole property even if they were not in possession of some of its
portions. Therefore, Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are void not
only because it covers a private land, but also because they fraudulently
included76 respondents' portion of the property. In Avila v. Tapucar,  77 we held that "[i]f a
person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said
certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included."78
In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means
beneficial ownership. 79 As discussed, the free patent and the certificate of title issued to
Spouses Tappa could not be the source of their legal title.
The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that although an
instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses Tappa's
title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights to
the property.
A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or
claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in
truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or
terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.80
The 1963 Affidavit it is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is dated and
appears to be executed and signed by Delfin, his mother, and sisters. It is also notarized by
a public notary. It states that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-half
(l/2) of which is actually owned by Irene as a co-heir. This is contrary to the claim of
Spouses Tappa that the property was solely Lorenzo's. Respondents' argue that this
affidavit evidences the title of their predecessor-in-interest over Lot No. 3341 and effectively,
theirs.81
The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA
correctly found that Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the
1963 Affidavit was "unsubstantiated."82 The CA pointed out that, "[a]side from the testimony
of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was presented to prove the claim of force and
intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving."53 Also, the 1963 Affidavit was duly notarized
and, as such, is considered a public document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as to
its authenticity and due execution.
Thus, we affirm the ruling of the CA that the requisites for an action to quiet title are wanting
in this case.84
There is no collateral attack
on the Certificate of Title.
Spouses Tappa argue that respondents collaterally attacked the certificate of title of Lot No.
3441 when they raised the issue of its validity. Spouses Tappa used the same argument
against the CA when it declared the certificate of title to be without legal effect. 85
Spouses Tappa's argument is without merit. The certificate of title was not collaterally
attacked. Section 48 of PD 1529,86 provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law." This rule is not applicable in this case.
We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,87  where we stated that, "[ w ]
hat cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate
referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds x x x. By title, the law refers to
ownership which is represented by that document."88 Ownership is different from a
certificate of title, the latter being only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. 89 Title
as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used.90
In Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla,  91  citing Lacbayan v. Samay, Jr.,  92 we reaffirm
this ruling, and stated that:
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have
acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not
mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.93
In this case, what respondents dispute, as raised in their Answer, is Spouses Tappa's claim
of sole ownership over Lot No. 3341. As affirmative defense, respondents claimed that
Spouses Tappa were owners of only one-half (1/2) of the lot since it was originally owned by
Genaro, the father of Lorenzo and Irene. 94 Respondents claim that Lorenzo and Irene
became ipso facto  co-owners of the lot. 95 Thus, respondents claim that, by virtue of a valid
transfer from Irene's heirs, they now have ownership and title over portions of Lot No. 3341,
and that they have been in continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of their
occupied portions.96 Malupeng and Calabazaron claim ownership and title over their
respective portions by virtue of a valid sale. Bacud claims ownership and title by virtue of
succession. Therefore, it is the ownership and title of Spouses Tappa which respondents
ultimately attack. OCT No. P-69103 only serves as the document representing Spouses
Tappas' title.
Respondents cannot likewise argue that the certificate of title of Spouses Tappa is
indefeasible.97 We have already ruled that the one-year prescriptive period does not apply
when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the
property.98 This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is
imprescriptible.99 In this case, respondents have been proved to be in possession of the
disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. Thus, their claim against Spouses Tappa cannot be
barred by the one-year prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90026 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184746               August 8, 2012
SPOUSES CRISPIN GALANG and CARlOAD GALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES CONRADO S. REYES AND FE DE KASTRO REYES (As substituted by their
legal heir: Hermenigildo K. Reyes), Respondents.
REYES,*
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the April
9, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its October 6, 2008 Resolution,2 in CA-
G.R. CV. No. 85660.
The Facts
On September 4, 1997, spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes (the
Reyeses)  filed a case for the annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-928
against spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang (the Galangs)  with the Regional Trial Court,
Antipolo, Rizal (RTC),docketed as Civil Case No. 97-4560.
In their Complaint,3 the Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties: (1) a subdivision
project known as Ponderosa Heights Subdivision (Ponderosa),  and (2) an adjoining
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)  No. 185252, with an area of 1,201
sq.m.;4 that the properties were separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried up sometime
in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through Ponderosa; that the Galangs, by
employing manipulation and fraud, were able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up
creek bed from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),  through its
Provincial Office (PENRO); that, specifically, the property was denominated as Lot 5735,
Cad 29 Ext., Case-1, with an area of 1,573 sq.m. covered by OCT No. P-928; that they
discovered the existence of the certificate of title sometime in March 1997 when their
caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso),  informed them that the subject property had been
fraudulently titled in the names of the Galangs; that in 1984, prior to such discovery,
Enteroso applied for the titling of the property, as he had been occupying it since 1968 and
had built his house on it; that, later, Enteroso requested them to continue the application
because of financial constraints on his part;5 that they continued the application, but later
learned that the application papers were lost in the Assessor’s Office;6 and that as the
owners of the land where the new course of water passed, they are entitled to the
ownership of the property to compensate them for the loss of the land being occupied by the
new creek.
The Galangs in their Answer7 denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a
creek and countered that OCT No. P-928 was issued to them after they had complied with
the free patent requirements of the DENR, through the PENRO; that they and their
predecessor-in-interest had been in possession, occupation, cultivation, and ownership of
the land for quite some time; that the property described under TCT No. 185252 belonged
to Apolonio Galang, their predecessor-in-interest, under OCT No. 3991; that the property
was transferred in the names of the Reyeses through falsified document;8 that assuming ex
gratia argumenti  that the creek had indeed changed its course and passed through
Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already claimed for themselves the portion of the dried creek
which adjoined and co-existed with their property; that Enteroso was able to occupy a
portion of their land by means of force, coercion, machinations, and stealth in 1981; that
such unlawful entry was then the subject of an Accion Publiciana before the RTC of Antipolo
City (Branch 72); and that at the time of the filing of the Complaint, the matter was still
subject of an appeal before the CA, under CA-G.R. CV No. 53509.
The RTC Decision
In its Decision,9 dated July 16, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action and for being an erroneous remedy. The RTC stated that a title issued upon a patent
may be annulled only on grounds of actual and intrinsic fraud, which much consist of an
intentional omission of fact required by law to be stated in the application or willful statement
of a claim against the truth. In the case before the trial court, the Reyeses presented no
evidence of fraud despite their allegations that the Galangs were not in possession of the
property and that it was part of a dried creek. There being no evidence, these contentions
remained allegations and could not defeat the title of the Galangs. The RTC wrote:
A title issued upon patent may be annulled only on ground of actual fraud.
Such fraud must consist [of] an intentional omission of fact required by law to be stated in
the application or willful statement of a claim against the truth. It must show some specific
facts intended to deceive and deprive another of his right. The fraud must be actual and
intrinsic, not merely constructive or intrinsic; the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant, because the proceedings which are being assailed as
having been fraudulent are judicial proceedings, which by law, are presumed to have been
fair and regular. (Libudan v. Palma Gil 45 SCRA 17)
However, aside from allegations that defendant Galang is not in possession of the property
and that the property was part of a dried creek, no other sufficient evidence of fraud was
presented by the plaintiffs. They have, thus, remained allegations, which cannot defeat the
defendants title.10
The RTC added that the land, having been acquired through a homestead patent, was
presumably public land. Therefore, only the State can institute an action for the annulment
of the title covering it.
It further opined that because the Reyeses claimed to have acquired the property by right of
accretion, they should have filed an action for reconveyance, explaining "[t]hat the remedy
of persons whose property had been wrongly or erroneously registered in another’s name is
not to set aside the decree/title, but an action for reconveyance, or if the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, an action for damages."11
The Court of Appeals Decision
In its Decision, dated April 9, 2008, the CA reversed  and set aside the RTC decision and
ordered the cancellation of OCT No. P-928 and the reconveyance of the land to the
Reyeses.
The CA found that the Reyeses had proven by preponderance of evidence that the subject
land was a portion of the creek bed that was abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the water, which had now traversed a portion of Ponderosa. As owners of the land
occupied by the new course of the creek, the Reyeses had become the owners of the
abandoned creek bed ipso facto. Inasmuch as the subject land had become private, a free
patent issued over it was null and void and produced no legal effect whatsoever. A
posteriori, the free patent covering the subject land, a private land, and the certificate of title
issued pursuant thereto, are null and void.12
The Galangs moved for a reconsideration,13 but their motion was denied in a Resolution
dated October 6, 2008.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
The Galangs present, as warranting a review of the questioned CA decision, the following
grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT RESOLVING THAT
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS,
HAS THE SOLE AUTHORITY TO FILE [CASES FOR] ANNULMENT OF TITLE
INVOLVING PUBLIC LAND.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE [A] CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS EVEN
WITHOUT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMED[IES].
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DEVIATING FROM THE
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AND INTERPRETING ARTICLE 420 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BY
SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN OPINION BASED ON ASSUMPTION OF FACTS. 14
A reading of the records discloses that these can be synthesized into two principal issues,
to wit: (1) whether the Reyeses can file the present action for annulment of a free patent title
and reconveyance; and (2) if they can, whether they were able to prove their cause of action
against the Galangs.
The Court’s Ruling
Regarding the first issue, the Galangs state that the property was formerly a public land,
titled in their names by virtue of Free Patent No. 045802-96-2847 issued by the DENR.
Thus, they posit that the Reyeses do not have the personality and authority to institute any
action for annulment of title because such authority is vested in the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General.15
In this regard, the Galangs are mistaken. The action filed by the Reyeses seeks the transfer
to their names of the title registered in the names of the Galangs. In their Complaint, they
alleged that: first, they are the owners of the land, being the owners of the properties
through which the Marigman creek passed when it changed its course; and second, the
Galangs illegally dispossessed them by having the same property registered in their names.
It was not an action for reversion which requires that the State be the one to initiate the
action in order for it to prosper. The distinction between the two actions was elucidated in
the case of Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut,16 where it was written:
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title
is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the
allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be
nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence in Gabila v. Barriga  where the
plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or
amendment of the defendant’s title because even if the title were cancelled or amended the
ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would
revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only
person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and
certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership of the
contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well
as the defendant’s fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in successfully obtaining
these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the
nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title
obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is not the State
but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land
in question even before the grant of title to the defendant. In Heirs of Marciano Nagano
v. Court of Appeals we ruled –
x x x x from the allegations in the complaint x x x private respondents claim ownership of the
2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly,
peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that
the lot is private land x x x x Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the
complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the
Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence, the dismissal of
private respondents’ complaint was premature and trial on the merits should have been
conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters. It would have been entirely different if the
action were clearly for reversion, in which case, it would have to be instituted by the Solicitor
General pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141 x x x x
It is obvious that private respondents allege in their complaint all the facts necessary to seek
the nullification of the free patents as well as the certificates of title covering Lot 1015 and
Lot 1017. Clearly, they are the real parties in interest in light of their allegations that they
have always been the owners and possessors of the two (2) parcels of land even prior to
the issuance of the documents of title in petitioners’ favor, hence the latter could only have
committed fraud in securing them –
x x x x That plaintiffs are absolute and exclusive owners and in actual possession and
cultivation of two parcels of agricultural lands herein particularly described as follows
[technical description of Lot 1017 and Lot 1015 x x x x 3. That plaintiffs became absolute
and exclusive owners of the abovesaid parcels of land by virtue of inheritance from their late
father, Honorio Dacut, who in turn acquired the same from a certain Blasito Yacapin and
from then on was in possession thereof exclusively, adversely and in the concept of owner
for more than thirty (30) years x x x x 4. That recently, plaintiff discovered that defendants,
without the knowledge and consent of the former, fraudulently applied for patent the said
parcels of land and as a result thereof certificates of titles had been issued to them as
evidenced by certificate of title No. P-19819 in the name of the Hrs. of Ambrocio Kionisala,
and No. P- 20229 in the name of Isabel Kionisala x x x x 5. That the patents issued to
defendants are null and void, the same having been issued fraudulently, defendants not
having been and/or in actual possession of the litigated properties and the statement they
may have made in their application are false and without basis in fact, and, the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources not having any jurisdiction on the properties the
same not being anymore public but already private property x x x x
It is not essential for private respondents to specifically state in the complaint the actual date
when they became owners and possessors of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. The allegations to the
effect that they were so preceding the issuance of the free patents and the certificates of
title, i.e., "the Department of Environment and Natural Resources not having any jurisdiction
on the properties the same not being anymore public but already private property," are
unquestionably adequate as a matter of pleading to oust the State of jurisdiction to grant the
lots in question to petitioners. If at all, the oversight in not alleging the actual date when
private respondents’ ownership thereof accrued reflects a mere deficiency in details which
does not amount to a failure to state a cause of action. The remedy for such deficiency
would not be a motion to dismiss but a motion for bill of particulars so as to enable the filing
of appropriate responsive pleadings.
With respect to the purported cause of action for reconveyance, it is settled that in this kind
of action the free patent and the certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant’s name. All that must be
alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts which admitting them to be true would
entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff
was the owner of the land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him
of the same.
We rule that private respondents have sufficiently pleaded (in addition to the cause of action
for declaration of free patents and certificates of title) an action for reconveyance, more
specifically, one which is based on implied trust. An implied trust arises where the defendant
(or in this case petitioners) allegedly acquires the disputed property through mistake or
fraud so that he (or they) would be bound to hold and reconvey the property for the benefit
of the person who is truly entitled to it. In the complaint, private respondents clearly assert
that they have long been the absolute and exclusive owners and in actual possession and
cultivation of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 and that they were fraudulently deprived of ownership
thereof when petitioners obtained free patents and certificates of title in their names. These
allegations certainly measure up to the requisite statement of facts to constitute an action
for reconveyance.17 [Emphases supplied]
In this case, the complaint instituted by the Reyeses before the RTC was for the annulment
of the title issued to the Galangs, and not for reversion. Thus, the real party in interest here
is not the State but the Reyeses who claim a right of ownership over the property in
question even before the issuance of a title in favor of the Galangs. Although the Reyeses
have the right to file an action for reconveyance, they have failed to prove their case. Thus,
on the second issue, the Court agrees with the RTC that the Reyeses failed to adduce
substantial evidence to establish their allegation that the Galangs had fraudulently
registered the subject property in their names.
The CA reversed the RTC decision giving the reason that the property was the former bed
of Marigman Creek, which changed its course and passed through their Ponderosa
property, thus, ownership of the subject property was automatically vested in them.
The law in this regard is covered by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall
have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed
the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed
through the property of the claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old
bed left to dry by the change of course was automatically  acquired by the claimant.18 Before
such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must
be shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without
artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove
three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old course of the
creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3) the change of course of the creek from the
old location to the new location by natural  occurrence.
In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course,
its natural abandonment  and the new course. In the face of a Torrens title issued by the
government, which is presumed to have been regularly issued, the evidence of the Reyeses
was clearly wanting. Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not suffice to convince the
Court to order the reconveyance of the property to them. This failure did not escape the
observation of the Office of the Solicitor General. Thus, it commented:
In the case at bar, it is not clear whether or not the Marigman Creek dried-up naturally
back in 1980. Neither did private respondents submit any findings or report from the Bureau
of Lands or the DENR Regional Executive Director, who has the jurisdiction over the subject
lot, regarding the nature of change in the course of the creek’s waters. Worse, what is
even uncertain in the present case is the exact location of the subject matter of dispute.
This is evident from the decision of the Regional Trial Court which failed to specify which
portion of the land is actually being disputed by the contending parties.
xxx
Since the propriety of the remedy taken by private respondents in the trial court and their
legal personality to file the aforesaid action depends on whether or not the litigated property
in the present case still forms part of the public domain, or had already been converted into
a private land, the identification of the actual portion of the land subject of the
controversy becomes necessary and indispensable in deciding the issues herein
involved.
xxx
Notably, private respondents failed to submit during trial any convincing proof of a similar
declaration by the government that a portion of the Marigman Creek had already dried-up
and that the same is already considered alienable and disposable agricultural land which
they could acquire through acquisitive prescription.
Indeed, a thorough investigation is very imperative in the light of the conflicting factual
issues as to the character and actual location of the property in dispute. These factual
issues could properly be resolved by the DENR and the Land Management Bureau, which
have the authority to do so and have the duty to carry out the provisions of the Public Land
Act, after both parties have been fully given the chance to present all their
evidence.19 [Emphases supplied]
Moreover, during cross-examination, Conrado S. Reyes admitted that the plan surveyed for
Fe de Castro Reyes and Jose de Castro, marked before the RTC as Exhibit "A-2," was
prepared by a geodetic engineer without conducting an actual survey on the ground:
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS:
I am showing to you Exhibit "A-2" which is a plan surveyed for Fe de Kastro Reyes and Jose
de Kastro. This plan was prepared by the geodetic engineer without conducting actual
survey on the ground, is it not?
A: I cannot agree to that question.
Q: But based on the certification of the geodetic engineer, who prepared this it appears that
this plan was plotted only based on the certification on this plan marked as Exhibit "A-2", is it
not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, based on this certification that the geodetic engineer conducted the survey of this
plan based on the technical description without conducting actual survey on the ground?
A: Yes, sir.20
At some point, Mr. Reyes admitted that he was not sure that the property even existed:
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS:
The subject matter of this document Exhibit I is that, that property which at present is titled
in the name of Fe de Castro Reyes married to Conrado Reyes, et.al. is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: The subject matter of this case now is the adjoining lot of this TCT 185252, is that
correct?
A: I do not know.
Q: You mean you do not know the lot subject matter of this case?
A: I do not know whether it really exists.
Q: Just answer the question, you do not know?
A: Yes.21
The conflicting claims here are (1) the title of the Galangs issued by the DENR, through the
PENRO, and (2) the claim of the Reyeses, based on unsubstantiated testimony, that the
land in question is the former bed of a dried up creek. As between these two claims, this
Court is inclined to decide in favor of the Galangs who hold a valid and subsisting title to the
property which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court presumes to have
been issued by the PENRO in the regular performance of its official duty.
The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of
patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, with mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a
question of fact which must be proved.22
In this case, the allegations of fraud were never proven. There was no evidence at all
specifically showing actual fraud or misrepresentation. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the
findings of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition 1s GRANTED. The April 9, 2008 Decision and the October 6,
2008 Resolution .of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV. No. -85660, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 97-4560 of the Regional Trial Court of
Anti polo City, Branch 73, is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175542               June 5, 2013
GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL, SPS. ENRIQUE T. MORAGA and VICTORIA SORIANO, FILCON
READY MIXED, INC., DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD
(DARAB), and REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUA YAN
BRANCH, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 183205
VICTORIA P. CABRAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR, JOSEPH NOEL C. LONGBOAN I OFFICE OF THE
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATOR, GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC., SPOUSES
ENRIQUE T. MORAGA and VICTORIA SORIANO and FILCON READY MIXED,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
In G.R. No. 175542, petitioner Green Acres Holdings, Inc. (hereafter, Green Acres) assails
the November 24, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85766
dismissing its appeal from the November 3, 2004 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
while in G.R. No. 183205, petitioner Victoria Cabral seeks to set aside the February 27,
2008 Decision3 and May 29, 2008 Resolution4 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99651.
The facts are as follows:
Victoria Cabral was the original owner of a parcel of land in Barangay Pandayan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan with an area of 11,432 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-73737 (M). The land was placed under the coverage of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, and on March 23, 1993, three Emancipation Patents
were issued to the spouses Enrique Moraga and Victoria Soriano (Spouses Moraga) as
follows: EP No. 496039 with an area of 861 square meters; EP No. 496040 with an area of
2,159 square meters; and EP No. 496041 with an area of 8,941 square meters. The
Spouses Moraga thereafter caused the cancellation of EP No. 496041 and its conversion to
TCT No. 256260 (M).
On August 29, 1994, Cabral filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) seeking the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to the
Spouses Moraga on the grounds that these were obtained through fraud and that the land is
not suitable for rice and corn production and has long been classified as residential,
commercial, industrial and nonagricultural land by the Zoning Administrator of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board. The case was docketed as Reg. Case No. 739-Bul-94.
On December 15, 1995, the PARAD rendered a decision denying the petition for
cancellation of the Emancipation Patents and dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Cabral appealed the decision to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).5
While the appeal was pending, the Spouses Moraga subdivided the lot covered by TCT No.
256260 (M) into three smaller lots, the properties subject of this case. TCT Nos. T-270125
(M) covering 3,511 square meters, T-270126 (M) covering 2,715 square meters, and T-
270127 (M) covering 2,715 square meters were thereafter issued in their names on May 29,
1996. On June 19, 1996, the Spouses Moraga sold the lots to Filcon Ready Mixed Inc.
(Filcon for brevity) and TCT Nos. T-274486 (M),6 T-274487 (M)7 and T-274488 (M)8 were
issued in the name of Filcon on June 24, 1996.
On April 29, 1999, Green Acres purchased9 five lots from Filcon including the three subject
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-274486 (M), T-274487 (M) and T-274488 (M) in the
name of Filcon. Except for an already cancelled annotation of a real estate mortgage in
favor of Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank),10 the titles were free from any
annotations, liens, notices, claims or encumbrances.
On April 30, 1999, the titles of Filcon were cancelled by the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan and new titles were issued in the name of Green Acres including
TCT Nos. T-345660 (M),11 T-345661 (M)12 and T-345662 (M)13 covering the subject
properties. Green Acres then constructed a warehouse building complex on the said lots.
On January 17, 2001, the DARAB resolved Cabral’s appeal and rendered judgment
ordering the cancellation of the titles issued in the names of the Spouses Moraga and those
of Filcon for having been illegally acquired. The dispositive portion of the DARAB decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a NEW JUDGMENT is rendered disposing as follows:
1. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. EP-051 (M) (EP No. 496039; TCT No. EP-
052 (M) (EP No. 496040); TCT No. EP-052 (M) (EP No. 496041); TCT No. T-
270125 (M); TCT No. T-270126 (M); and TCT No. T-270127 (M) – all in the names
of defendants spouses Moraga; TCT No. 274486 (M); TCT No. T-[2]74487 (M),
and TCT No. T-274488 (M) – all in the name of FILCO[N] READY MIXED INC;
2. Directing the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to restore TCT No. T-73737 (M) in
the name of plaintiff Victoria P. Cabral;
3. Ordering defendants Moraga and their assign, FILCON READY MIXED INC., to
vacate the premises of the lands in question and turn over their possession to
herein plaintiff; and,
4. All claims and counterclaims of both parties are hereby dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.14
When Green Acres learned about the DARAB decision, it sent a Letter15 to Filcon on March
15, 2001 advising the latter that it learned that the properties it bought from Filcon were the
subject of an adverse decision of the DARAB. Fearing that its titles and possession might
be disturbed by the DARAB decision, Green Acres reminded Filcon of its warranties under
the deed of sale.
In a letter16 dated March 30, 2001, Filcon replied that it was also an innocent purchaser for
value since at the time it purchased the subject property, it had no knowledge of any legal
infirmity in the title of the Spouses Moraga. In fact, it was able to secure a loan from PCI
Bank in the amount of ₱12 million with the subject property as collateral. Filcon assured
Green Acres that it is coordinating with its predecessor, the Spouses Moraga, to make sure
that Green Acres’ interest over the property is protected.
On April 19, 2001, Green Acres filed a Complaint17 for Quieting of Title, Damages with
Application for Preliminary Injunction and Writ of Preliminary Attachment before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan against Cabral, the Spouses Moraga, Filcon, the DARAB and the Registry
of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 279-M-2001.
Green Acres sought to quiet its title and alleged that it is a purchaser in good faith and for
value, claiming that it had no notice or knowledge of any adverse claim, lien, or
encumbrance on the properties. Neither was it a party to the DARAB proceedings nor did it
have notice of the said proceedings where the DARAB Decision of January 17, 2001 was
issued. Green Acres claimed that the DARAB decision casts a cloud on its titles.
Cabral, in her Answer,18 denied all the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that
Green Acres never acquired valid title to the subject property, much less, can it claim to be
an innocent purchaser for value. She further averred that a declaratory judgment in a
petition to quiet title will effectively subject the DARAB decision to review.
After Green Acres presented its evidence, Cabral filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s
Evidence19 arguing that Green Acres failed to prove that it is a purchaser in good faith and
for value. She maintains that the complaint is not appropriate for quieting of title since it
omitted to assail her titles over the subject property but instead questioned the proceedings
held at the DARAB. She likewise insisted that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
subject property since the same is still within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law and thus under the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
In an Order20 dated November 3, 2004, the trial court granted the demurrer and ordered the
case dismissed.
Green Acres’ motion for reconsideration having been denied, Green Acres filed with the CA
an appeal which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85766.
In the meantime, the DARAB decision became final and executory on April 13, 2005  as no21
further recourse was sought by the Spouses Moraga from the denial of their motion for
reconsideration on February 24, 2005.22On July 8, 2005, Cabral filed with the PARAD a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution23 of the DARAB decision.
On January 25, 2006, the PARAD issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution for lack of merit. It ruled:
Only the decision of the Board as embodied in the dispositive portion of the decision can be
implemented by virtue of a writ of execution. The January 17, 2001 decision merely orders
the cancellation of the Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Titles issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan in favor of Sps. MORAGA and FILCON. Hence, if ever a Writ
of Execution will be issued, it will be up to the FILCON which was included in the dispositive
portion of the Decision that has become final and executory. Nothing in the body of the
decision as well as the dispositive portion thereof directs the cancellation of the title issued
in favor of GREEN ACRES. If we subscribe to the prayer of the movant, we will be in effect
amending the aforementioned decision because we will be inserting something that has not
been directed to be done. x x x
xxxx
Aside from amending the final and executory decision in this case, this Forum will also be
violating the generally accepted principle of due process. It is already settled that even the
administrative arm of the government exercising quasi-judicial functions are not exempt
from observing due process. x x x
xxxx
It is clear as the sun rises from the east that GREEN ACRES was never made a party in the
case at bar. Much less was it mentioned in the decision sought to be executed itself.
GREEN ACRES can not be made to suffer the consequences of a case where it did not
participate.
xxxx
Lastly, to allow movants’ contention will also render the pending case of quieting of title filed
by GREEN ACRES against herein plaintiff movant on April 18, 2001 before the Regional
Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 84 and docketed as Civil Case 279-M-2001 which
was appealed to the Court of Appeals, moot and academic.
All told, the titles of Sps. MORAGA and FILCON sought to be cancelled in the decision have
already been cancelled. Therefore, there is nothing to be done anymore, as the relief
prayed for has become fait accompli.24
Cabral filed a Motion for Recusation25 and a Motion for Reconsideration.26 The PARAD,
however, denied Cabral’s motions on September 11, 2006.27 Thus, on November 7, 2006,
Cabral filed with the PARAD a Notice of Appeal.28
In the meantime, the CA, on November 24, 2006, rendered a decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
85766 dismissing Green Acres’ appeal. Citing the case of Foster-Gallego v. Spouses
Galang,29 the appellate court held that the trial court had no authority to interfere with the
proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction, much less to annul the final judgment of a co-
equal court. The appellate court further held that the only issue in an action to quiet title is
whether there is a cloud in a title to real property because of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or a proceeding that has a prima facie appearance of validity and the DARAB
decision does not fall within said enumeration.
On February 27, 2007, the PARAD issued an Order30 denying due course to Cabral’s Notice
of Appeal and held that the resolution denying the motion for execution is an interlocutory
order against which the remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not an appeal
to the DARAB. The PARAD further ruled that Cabral’s act of impleading Green Acres as
additional defendant only in the execution stage is highly irregular and that to enforce the
decision against Green Acres would violate the latter’s right to due process.
On June 18, 2007, Cabral filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to
annul the January 25, 2006 and September 11, 2006 Resolutions, as well as the February
27, 2007 Order of the PARAD.
On February 27, 2008, the CA denied Cabral’s petition. The appellate court ratiocinated as
follows:
An execution can only be issued against a party and not against one who did not have his
day in court x x x. Green Acres was never a party to the case nor it was (sic) mentioned in
the decision sought to be executed, hence, Green Acres cannot be made to suffer the
consequences of a case where it did not participate. To maintain otherwise would be to
ignore the constitutional prohibition against depriving a person of his property without due
process of law x x x.
Moreover, to apply the decision against Green Acres will amount to collateral attack against
its titles because nowhere in the case or decision that it was considered or passed upon.
Under the Property Registration Decree, titles issued under the Torrens system can only be
altered, modified or cancelled in direct proceeding in accordance with law
 x x x.
Even assuming that spouses Moraga and Filcon fraudulently acquired the disputed lots, still,
Green Acres has valid and legitimate titles over the same since it is a purchaser in good
faith and for value when it acquired the properties from Filcon. A buyer in good faith is one
who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property x x x.31 (Citations omitted.)
Both Green Acres and Cabral are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the CA
decisions adverse to them.
In G.R. No. 175542, Green Acres contends that the CA erred in:
x x x RULING THAT THE DARAB DECISION IS NOT A SOURCE OF A CLOUD THAT IS
SUSCEPTIBLE TO AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.
x x x HOLDING THAT THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO QUIET TITLES TO
REAL PROPERTY AND REMOVE A CLOUD PRODUCED BY A DARAB DECISION.
x x x AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED NOVEMBER
3, 2004 THEREBY IMPLIEDLY HOLDING THAT GREEN ACRES IS NOT A PURCHASER
IN GOOD FAITH FOR VALUE; THUS, ITS TITLE CAN NOT BE QUIETED.32
In G.R. No. 183205, Cabral, on the other hand, argues that the CA erred when it:
x x x FAILED TO CORRECTLY APPLY THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE DARAB
2003 RULES OF PROCEDURE, P.D. 1529 AND THE CIVIL CODE, AMONG OTHERS, AS
WELL AS THE APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.
x x x DISMISSED PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
x x x FAILED TO RULE THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR LONGBOAN.
x x x DECLARED THAT THE DECISION PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 17, 2001
CANNOT BE MADE TO APPLY TO RESPONDENT GREEN ACRES.
x x x DECLARED THAT (SIC) RESPONDENT GREEN ACRES TO BE AN "INNOCENT
PURCHASER FOR VALUE."33
Simply put, the issues raised in the two petitions are essentially as follows: (1) Whether the
January 17, 2001 DARAB decision may be enforced against Green Acres; and (2) Whether
the said DARAB decision in favor of Cabral constitutes a cloud on Green Acres’ title over
the subject properties.
First Issue: Whether the January 17,
2001 DARAB decision may be
enforced against Green Acres.
Cabral contends that the PARAD committed grave abuse of discretion in not issuing the writ
of execution to enforce the January 17, 2001 DARAB decision in her favor. She argues that
the issuance of a writ of execution is ministerial under Section 1, Rule XX of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure which provides that the execution of a final order or decision
shall issue as a matter of course.
Cabral also argues that contrary to the PARAD’s ruling, she is not seeking the amendment
of the final decision sought to be executed. She contends that the directive to the Register
of Deeds to restore TCT No. T-73737 (M) in her name means that it should be done
regardless of who holds title to the property at the time of execution. In this case, it is Green
Acres. She also points out that the transfer from the Spouses Moraga to Filcon in 1996 and
eventually to Green Acres in 1999 transpired after she filed a case with the DARAB in 1994.
Therefore, under Section 12.2, Rule XX of the DARAB Rules, Green Acres is considered a
successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action upon whom the
final judgment or order of the DARAB is conclusive. Cabral also insists that Green Acres
cannot be considered an innocent purchaser for value because the transfers were made to
defeat the DARAB ruling.
Green Acres, for its part, submits that the CA did not err in denying Cabral’s petition for
certiorari. Green Acres contends that Cabral, through her motion for execution, sought the
amendment of the DARAB decision and did not move merely for its execution. Green Acres
points out that Cabral’s motion for execution specifically sought the cancellation of Green
Acres’ titles even though the DARAB decision neither included Green Acres or its titles.
Green Acres points out that if the issuance of a writ of execution that conforms to the
decision may be denied on the ground that it will be inequitable, moreso should it be denied
in the case where the writ of execution prayed for goes beyond the decision. Hence, even if
the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce a final and executory decision is a ministerial
duty, the PARAD may not issue a writ of execution against Filcon and Green Acres as
prayed for by Cabral.
Green Acres also argues that it cannot be bound by the DARAB decision since a writ of
execution of a decision can only be issued against a party to the case and not against one
who did not have his day in court. Moreover, if granted, the execution sought will constitute
a collateral attack against the titles of Green Acres since nowhere in the DARAB decision
sought to be executed were they mentioned. Green Acres also adds that Cabral
misinterpreted Section 12.2 of the DARAB Rules to mean that a judgment issued in a case
is binding upon, and can be executed, even against those parties not impleaded in the case.
Green Acres submits that Section 12 is a mere reproduction of Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court on the principle of res judicata. Thus, the cited DARAB rule does not operate
to bind Green Acres, either presently or in the future, to the DARAB decision which does not
mention Green Acres either in the body or the dispositive portion. Green Acres likewise
argues that impleading it as an additional defendant in the execution stage aggravates the
violation of its right to due process.
Green Acres further contends that Cabral’s argument that it is not a purchaser in good faith
and for value may not be considered in the resolution of her petition before this Court as her
argument goes into the merits of the case and said matters were not raised in her motion for
execution. But even if the argument could be considered, Green Acres claims that the
merits of the case show that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value. Green Acres points
out that when it purchased the properties from Filcon, the properties were covered by
transfer certificates of title, not Emancipation Patents, without any indication that the titles
had their origins from the application of any agrarian law. Green Acres also adds that the
occupancy or possession of the properties of both Filcon and Green Acres were not
clandestine as Cabral claims. Neither can it be true, as Cabral claimed, that its acquisition of
the titles to the properties was made through "surreptitious and illegal transfers." Green
Acres argues that Cabral must have known about the alleged illegal subdivision of the
property and issuance of the transfer certificates of titles or Emancipation Patents, or if she
did not know, she is nonetheless deemed to have received constructive notice of the same
because the properties were registered under the Torrens System. Yet, despite said notice,
Cabral, with gross negligence, failed to annotate a notice of lis pendens on said titles.
We find in favor of Green Acres.
The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of
due process of law.34 In Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,35 this Court ruled:
An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-
conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual
only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only
upon the parties properly impleaded.
Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil
Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses
Chan. The effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses
Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any
judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in
interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution issued
pursuant thereto.36 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is beyond dispute that Green Acres was not made a party in the DARAB case.
Consequently, the January 17, 2001 DARAB decision cannot bind Green Acres. Likewise,
the binding effect of the DARAB decision cannot be extended to Green Acres by the mere
issuance of a writ of execution against it. No one shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by
the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and
not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action
are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant
thereto.37
Moreover, a Torrens title, as a general rule, is irrevocable and indefeasible, and the duty of
the court is to see to it that this title is maintained and respected unless challenged in a
direct proceeding. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sps. Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,38 this Court explained when an action is a direct
attack on a title and when it is collateral:
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to
nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.
The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an
action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof.39
In the instant case, Cabral seeks the execution of a final and executory DARAB decision
that directs the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon.
Nowhere in the said decision is Green Acres or its TCTs mentioned. Nonetheless, in her
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, Cabral alleged that Green Acres, like Filcon, "also
never acquired valid title to the subject land" and "hence, its present TCTs thereto should
likewise be cancelled (together with the respective Emancipation Patents and TCTs of Sps.
Moraga and Filcon Ready Mixed, Inc. mentioned in the DARAB Decision) and reverted back
to her TCT."40 She prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Spouses
Moraga and "their subsequent assigns/successors in interest Filcon Ready Mixed, Inc. and
Green Acres Holdings, Inc."41 Clearly, seeking the cancellation of the titles of Green Acres
by a mere Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of a decision rendered in a case where
said titles were not in issue constitutes a collateral attack on them which this Court cannot
allow.
Furthermore, as correctly ruled by the PARAD and upheld by the appellate court, only the
decision of the DARAB as embodied in the dispositive portion of the decision can be
implemented by a writ of execution. As held in Ingles v. Cantos:42
A writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed,
and the execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award, for
it is a settled general principle that a writ of execution must conform strictly with every
essential particular of the judgment promulgated. It may not vary the terms of the judgment
it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.
Where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it
life, the writ has pro tanto no validity.43
A reading of the fallo of the DARAB decision would show that nothing in it directs the
cancellation of the titles issued in favor of Green Acres. To subscribe to Cabral’s prayer in
her motion is tantamount to modifying or amending a decision that has already attained
finality in violation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
It is also worth noting that the fact that the DARAB by final judgment ordered the
cancellation of the titles of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon does not automatically make the
titles of Green Acres null and void. It is settled that a void title may be the source of a valid
title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.44 An innocent purchaser for value is
one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner,
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays a
full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other person in the property.45 The rationale therefor was
expressed by this Court in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,46 thus:
Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus
issued, acquire rights over the property the court cannot disregard such rights and order the
total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to
impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property
registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the
title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the evident purpose of the
law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. x x x47
Green Acres is considered an innocent purchaser for value. It relied on the certificates of
title of Filcon, free from any liens and encumbrances. The only annotation on them was a
cancelled real estate mortgage in favor of PCI Bank. Thus, as held by the CA, Green Acres
was under no obligation to investigate beyond Filcon’s titles as Green Acres had all the
reason to believe that said titles were free from any lien, claim or encumbrance.
We also agree with the CA that Cabral’s allegation that the Spouses Moraga, Filcon and
Green Acres were parties to illegal contracts cannot be given weight as such goes into the
merits of the case and may not be considered in the execution stage.
If there is anyone to be blamed for Cabral’s failure to recover the subject properties, it is
Cabral herself, who, due to her own negligence, failed to annotate a notice of lis pendens on
the titles of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon and thus give notice to future transferees. She
cannot claim that she was clueless that the subject properties were being transferred. As
Green Acres correctly pointed out, the transfers to Filcon and eventually to Green Acres
were made through public documents and procedures. Also, considering the significant size
of the properties, occupation of the same cannot be made clandestinely. In fact, the
properties were fenced by concrete walls and Filcon had constructed a batch plant while
Green Acres erected a warehouse and building on it. Had her adverse claim been
annotated on said titles, said notice would have served as a warning to Green Acres or
other purchasers of the properties that any right they acquire would be subject to the
outcome of the litigation before the DARAB. Having failed to make such annotation, this
Court has no choice but to uphold the titles of Green Acres, an innocent purchaser for
value.
Whether the DARAB Decision in
favor of Cabral constitutes a cloud
on Green Acres’ title over the subject
properties
Green Acres argues that the DARAB decision is among those enumerated in Article 47648 of
the Civil Code as a possible source of a cloud on title to real property. It contends that there
can hardly be any doubt that the DARAB Decision is an "instrument," or if not, a "record"
and reflects a "claim" on the properties, while the proceedings before the DARAB are
"proceedings" directed at the real properties now owned by Green Acres which are
"apparently valid or effective" but "unenforceable" against the titles of Green Acres. It also
contends that the appellate court’s reliance on Foster-Gallego v. Spouses Galang49 is
misplaced since nothing in said case supports the proposition that a decision of a
coordinate court cannot be a source of cloud under Article 476 of the Civil Code. Green
Acres submits that Foster-Gallego is not applicable because the ruling there was that an
action to quiet title is not the proper remedy when to remove a cloud on a title, a final and
executory decision of the court need to be reviewed or vacated. In the present case, Green
Acres does not seek a review or reversal of the DARAB decision.
Cabral, for her part, insists that the DARAB decision is not among those enumerated in
Article 476 which may cast a cloud on title to real property. As to the applicability of Foster-
Gallego, she argues that assuming that the ruling on the main issue in said case is not
directly germane, the pronouncements therein on the nature, function, purpose and
limitations of a case for quieting of title and the power of the courts in such proceedings are
applicable.
Green Acres’ arguments are meritorious.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property
or any interest therein.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or
uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place
things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable,
respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever
has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can
thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse
the property.50
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.51
There is no dispute as to the first requisite since Green Acres has legal title over the subject
properties. The issue lies in the second requisite.
A cloud on title consists of (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding;
(2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted.52
This Court holds that the DARAB decision in favor of Cabral satisfies all four elements of a
cloud on title.
As Green Acres correctly points out, the DARAB decision, a final one at that, is both an
"instrument" and a "record." Black’s Law Dictionary defines an instrument as a document or
writing which gives formal expression to a legal act or agreement, for the purpose of
creating, securing, modifying or terminating a right.53 A record, on the other hand, is defined
as a written account of some act, court proceeding, transaction or instrument drawn up
under authority of law, by a proper officer, and designed to remain as a memorial or
permanent evidence of the matters to which it relates.54 It is likewise a "claim" which is
defined as a cause of action or a demand for money or property55 since Cabral is asserting
her right over the subject lots. More importantly, it is a "proceeding" which is defined as a
regular and orderly progress in form of law including all possible steps in an action from its
commencement to the execution of judgment and may refer not only to a complete remedy
but also to a mere procedural step that is part of a larger action or special proceeding.56
Also, the DARAB decision is apparently valid and effective.1âwphi1 It is a final decision that
has not been reversed, vacated or nullified. It is likewise apparently effective and may be
prejudicial to Green Acres’ titles since it orders the cancellation of the titles of the Spouses
Moraga and Filcon all from which Green Acres derived its titles. However, as discussed
above, it is ineffective and unenforceable against Green Acres because Green Acres was
not properly impleaded in the DARAB proceedings nor was there any notice of lis pendens
annotated on the title of Filcon so as to serve notice to Green Acres that the subject
properties were under litigation. As such, Green Acres is an innocent purchaser for value.
Furthermore, in the case of Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals,57 this
Court had the occasion to rule that one of the proper remedies of a person who was not
impleaded in the proceedings declaring null and void the title from which his title to the
property had been derived, is an action for quieting title. In said case, Dare Adventure Farm
Corporation purchased property from the Goc-ongs. Dare later discovered that said property
was previously mortgaged by the Goc-ongs to the Ngs. When the Goc-ongs failed to pay
their obligation, the mortgage was foreclosed and the Ngs were declared owners of the
property. Dare, who was not impleaded in the foreclosure case, filed a petition for
annulment of the judgment of the trial court with the appellate court. The Court upheld the
appellate court’s dismissal of the petition since such remedy may be availed only when
other remedies are wanting. We further ruled that Dare’s resort to annulment of judgment
was unnecessary since it cannot be prejudiced by the judgment as it was not impleaded.
Two remedies were suggested to Dare as proper recourse, one of which is an action for
quieting of title:
We agree with the CA's suggestion that the petitioner's proper recourse was either an action
for quieting of title or an action for reconveyance of the property. It is timely for the Court to
remind that the petitioner will be better off if it should go to the courts to obtain relief through
the proper recourse; otherwise, it would waste its own time and effort, aside from thereby
unduly burdening the dockets of the courts.
The petitioner may vindicate its rights in the property through an action for quieting of title, a
common law remedy designed for the removal of any cloud upon, or doubt, or uncertainty
affecting title to real property. The action for quieting of title may be brought whenever there
is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective,
but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title. In the action, the competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the plaintiff and the other claimants, not only to put things in their proper
places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to the immovable, respect and not disturb
the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce
any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.58
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 175542 is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 24, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85766 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. TCT Nos. T-345660 (M), T-345661 (M) and T -345662 (M) registered in the
name of Green Acres Holdings, Inc. are declared VALID and any cloud over such titles
which may have been created by the Decision dated January 17, 2001 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 5129 (Reg. Case No. 739-Bul-94)
is hereby REMOVED.
The petition in G.R. No. 183205 is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated February
27, 2008 and Resolution dated May 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
99651 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner in G.R. No. 183205.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No.199146
HEIRS OF PACIFICO POCDO, namely, RITA POCDO GASIC, GOLIC POCDO,
MARCELA POCDO ALFELOR, KENNETH POCDO, NIXON CADOS, JACQUELINE
CADOS LEE, EFLYN CADOS, and GIRLIE CADOS DAPLIN, herein represented by
their Attorney-in-Fact JOHN POCDO, Petitioners,
vs.
ARSENIA AVILA and EMELINDA CHUA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 assails the 12 October 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 91039. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 14 January 2008 Resolution of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61, in Civil Case No. 4710-R, dismissing the
complaint for lack ofjurisdiction.
The Facts
In June 2000, Pacifico Pocdo, who was later substituted by his heirs upon his death, filed a
complaint to quiet title over a 1,728-square meter property (disputed property) located in
Camp 7, Baguio City, and covered by Tax Declaration 96-06008-106641. Pacifico claimed
that the disputed property is part of Lot 43, TS-39, which originally belonged to Pacifico’s
father, Pocdo Pool. The disputed property is allegedly different from the one- hectare
portion alloted to Polon Pocdo, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants Arsenia Avila
and Emelinda Chua, in a partition made by the heirs of Pocdo Pool. Pacifico alleged that the
defendants unlawfully claimed the disputed property, which belonged to Pacifico.
The facts of the case were summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
As it appears, in 1894, Pocdo Pool, who died in 1942, began his occupation and claim on
three lots that were eventually surveyed in his name as Lot 43, TS 39-SWO-36431, Lot 44,
TS 39-SWO-36420 and Lot 45 TS 39-SWO-36429 with an area of 144,623 [sq.m.], 64,112
[sq.m.], and 9,427 square meters, respectively, and situated at Residence Section 4, Baguio
City. These lots were the subject of a petition to reopen judicial proceedings filed by the
Heirs of Pocdo Pool with the CFI of Baguio City in Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Case
211. The registration of the lots in the names of the petitioners were [sic] grantedin October
1964, but since the decision was not implemented within the 10 years [sic] prescribed
period, the Heirs filed their ancestral land claims with the DENR. In August 1991,
Certificates of Ancestral Lands Claims (CALS) were issued by the DENR for Lots 44 and
45, but Lot 43 was not approved due to Memorandum Order 98-15 issued by the DENR
Secretary in September 199[8].
In the meantime, on September 14, 1960, Polon Pocdo, an heir of Pocdo Pool, ceded his
rights over the three lots to Pacifico Pocdo in exchange for a one hectare lot to be taken
from Lot 43. However, Pacifico entered into a contract with Florencio Pax and Braulio
Yaranon on November 21, 1968 revoking the agreement with Polon. In the contract, the
4,875 square meters where Polon’s house was located became part of the 1-hectare given
to Pax and Yaranon in exchange for their services in the titling of Pacifico’s lands.
Polon filed a complaint in August 1980 [with] the Office of the Barangay Captain at Camp 7,
Baguio City, which was settled by an amicable settlement dated September 3, 1980
between Pacifico and Polon. They agreed that Polon would again retain the 4,875 square
meters and Pacifico would give the 5,125 square meter area, the remaining portion of the 1-
hectare share of Polon, to be taken from Lot 43 after a segregation.
On April 18, 1981, Polon entered into a Catulagan with Arsenia Avila authorizing the latter to
undertake the segregation of his one-hectare land from Lot 43 in accord with the amicable
settlement of September 3, 1980. In exchange, Polon would award to her 2,000 square
meters from the 1- hectare lot. After spending time, money and effort in the execution of the
survey, Avila gave the survey results to Polon prompting Polon to execute a Waiver of
Rights dated January 21, 1987. Accordingly, the subdivided lots were declared for tax
purposes and the corresponding tax declaration issued to Polon and Arsenia, with 8,010
square meters going to Polon and 1,993 square meters to Avila.
On March 10, 2000, finding the amicable settlement, the Catulagan and Waiver of Rights in
order, the CENRO of Baguio City issued in favor of Avila a Certificate of Exclusion of 993
square meters from the Ancestral Land Claim of the Heirs of Pocdo Pool over Lot 43.
On April 27, 2000, however, the Heirs of Polon Pocdo and his wife Konon filed an affidavit
of cancellation with OIC-CENRO Teodoro Suaking and on that basis, Suaking cancelled the
Certificate of Exclusion. On May 8, 2000, Avila complained to the Regional Executive
Director or RED the unlawful cancellation of her Certificate of Exclusion, and on June 1,
2000, the RED issued a memorandum setting aside the revocation and restoring the
Certificate of Exclusion. On August 13, 2001, Avila filed an administrative complaint against
Suaking, and on July 16, 2002, the RED dismissed the letter-complaint of Avila and referred
the administrative complaint to the DENR Central Office.
Acting on the motion for reconsideration by Avila[against oppositors Pacifico Pocdo, et al.],
the RED in an Order on October 28, 2002 set aside the July 16, 2002 order. The Affidavit of
Cancellation dated April 27, 2002 filed by the heirs of Polon Pocdo was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and the validity of the Amicable Settlement, Catulagan and Deed of Waiver of
Rights were recognized. The letter dated April 28, 2000 and certification issued on May 31,
2000 by Suaking were ordered cancelled. Accordingly, the RED held that the TSA
applications of Arsenia Avila and others under TSA Application 15313, 15314, 15409 and
15410 should be given due course subject to compliance with existing laws and regulations.
The DENR Secretary affirmed his Order in [his] Decision of May 14, 2004 in DENR Case
5599, with the modification that the TSAs fo[r] the appellee Avila could now be made the
basis of disposition through public bidding and the appellant may participate in the bidding if
qualified.
Pacifico Pocdo, as the appellant, went on appeal to the Office of the President which
resulted in an affirmance of DENR Secretary’s decision on April 19, 2005 in OP Case 04-H-
360.
As mentioned, having exhausted administrative remedies, the Heirs of Pacifico Pocdo
challenged the OP resolution before the Court of Appeals, but this petition was dismissed
for having been filed late. The Supreme Court dismissed the Heirs’appeal from this
decision.
The instant case, Civil Case 4710-R, before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch
61 was filed by Pacifico Pocdo against Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua in June 2000, just
after the RED set aside Suaking’s revocation on April 28, 2000 and ordered the restoration
of Avila’s Certificate of Exclusion. Since then, the judicial proceedings have run parallel to
the administrative case.3
In a Resolution4 dated 14 January 2008, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that the DENR had already declared the disputed
property as public land, which the State, through the DENR, has the sole power to dispose.
Thus, the claim of petitioners to quiet title is not proper since they do not have title over the
disputed property. The trial court agreed with the DENR Secretary’s ruling that petitioner
may participate in the public bidding of the disputed property if qualified under applicable
rules.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, asserting that the case is not limited to
quieting of title since there are other issues not affected by the DENR ruling, particularly the
validity of the Waiver of Rights and the Catulagan. Petitioners maintained that the DENR’s
ruling that the disputed property is public land did not preclude the court from taking
cognizance of the issues on who is entitled possession to the disputed property and
whether the questioned documents are valid and enforceable against Pacifico and his heirs.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners, in raising the issue of quieting of title, failed to
allege any legal or equitable title to quiet. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, in an action to
quiet title, the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action. Instead of an action to quiet title or accion
reivindicatoria, the Court of Appeals stated that petitioners should have filed an accion
publiciana based merely on the recovery of possession de jure.
On the validity of the Catulagan and the Waiver of Rights, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioners have no right to question these since they were not parties to said documents
had not participated in any manner in their execution. The Court of Appeals ruled that only
the contracting parties are bound by the stipulations of the said documents. Those not
parties to the said documents, and for whose benefit they were not expressly made, cannot
maintain an action based on the said documents.
Thus, the Court ofAppeals affirmed the trial court’s resolution, subject to the right of
petitioners to file the appropriate action.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS SHOULD JUST
FILE THE NECESSARY ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION BECAUSE SAID
COURT HAS FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION IS PRECISELY ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION IN THE PRESENT
CASE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RTC HAD NO JURISDICTION
SINCE IT IS THE COURTS, NOT THE DENR, THAT HAS JURISDICTION OVER
ACTIONS INVOLVING POSSESSION OF LANDS, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT
ADMITTING, THAT THE LAND ISAPUBLIC LAND.
THE COURT OFAPPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
BECAUSE THERE ARE OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION OVER WHICH THE RTC HAS
JURISDICTION, i.e. RECOVERY OF POSSESSION, DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
DOCUMENTS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS HAVE NO
TITLE TO THE PROPERTY THAT WOULD SUPPORT AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF
TITLE WHEN TRIAL HAD NOT YET COMMENCED. NONETHELESS, THE RECORD IS
REPLETE OF PROOF THAT THE PETITIONERS HAVE RIGHTS/TITLE OVER THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.5
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
In the administrative case involving the disputed property,which forms part of Lot 43, the
DENR ruled that Lot 43 is public land located within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. In his
Decision dated 14 May 2004 in DENR Case No. 5599, the DENR Secretary stated:
Lot 43 is public land and part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation. This has already been
settled by the decision of the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Mountain Province
dated 13 November 1922 in Civil Reservation Case No. 1. The fact that the heirs of Pocdo
Pool were able to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Case No. 211 and secure a
decision in their favor for registration of Lot 43 is of no moment.As held in Republic v. Pio R.
Marcos (52 SCRA 238), the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet had no
jurisdiction to order the registration of lands already declared public in Civil Reservation
Case No. 1. Lot 43 being part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, disposition thereof is
under Townsite Sales Application ("TSA"). Precisely on this bone [sic] that Lot 43 was not
awarded a Certificate of Land Ancestral Claim [sic] under DENR Circular No. 03, series of
1990, because it is within the Baguio Townsite Reservation.6
The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the President which held that lands within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation belong to the public domain and are no longer registrable
under the Land Registration Act.7 The Office of the President ordered the disposition of the
disputed property in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure for the disposition of SO ORDERED.
alienable public lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation, particularly Chapter X of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 on Townsite Reservations and other applicable rules.

Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore
correct in dismissing the complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction.1âwphi1 The trial court
had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed
property which is admittedly still part of the public domain. As held in Dajunos v. Tandayag:8

x x x The Tarucs’ action was for "quieting of title" and necessitated determination of the
respective rights of the litigants, both claimants to a free patent title, over a piece of
property, admittedly public land. The law, as relied upon by jurisprudence, lodges "the
power of executive control, administration, disposition and alienation of public lands with the
Director of Lands subject, of course, to the control of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources."

In sum, the decision rendered in civil case 1218 on October 28, 1968 is a patent nullity. The
court below did not have power to determine who (the Firmalos or the Tarucs) were entitled
to an award of free patent title over that piece of property that yet belonged to the public
domain. Neither did it have power to adjudge the Tarucs as entitled to the "true equitable
ownership" thereof, the latter’s effect being the same: the exclusion of the Firmalos in favor
of the Tarucs.9

In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an adjudication that a claim
of title or interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger
of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or
unenforceable claims or demands exist."10 Under Articles 47611 and 47712 of the Civil Code,
the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff has a legal
or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a
cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity.13

In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property, allege that
respondents are unlawfully claiming the disputed property by using void documents, namely
the "Catulagan" and the Deed of Waiver of Rights. However, the records reveal that
petitioners do not have legal or equitable title over the disputed property, which forms part of
Lot 43, a public land within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. It is clear from the facts of the
case that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, the heirs of Pocdo Pool, were not even
granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over Lot 43, which remains public land. Thus,
the trial court had no other recourse but to dismiss the case.

There is no more need to discuss the other issues raised since these are intrinsically linked
to petitioners' action to quiet title.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 12 October 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91039.