Military Intelligence in

Vietnam
1965-1967
Michael J. McCarthy
 Military Intelligence in
Vietnam
• III MAF, 1965
– Structure
– Capabilities
– Development
• MACV, 1965
– Structure
– Allied support
– Capabilities
• Intelligence for Operation STARLITE
 Marine Corps
Intelligence Doctrine
• LFM-3, Landing Force
Intelligence
– April 1961
• Focused on amphibious
warfare
– Limited applicability to
extended land operations
– Limited applicability to
counterinsurgency
operations
LFM-3, Landing
Force Intelligence
 Development of
Intelligence Doctrine
• FMFM 2-1, Intelligence
– Mar 1967
• Retains focus on
amphibious operations
• Significantly expanded
• Includes new section:
Intelligence Requirements for
Counterguerrilla Operations
– Guerrilla Forces
– Civil Population
– Terrain
FMFM 2-1, Intelligence
 III MAF
Intelligence Structure
III MAF
G-2
Colonel Leo J. Dulacki

Administration Counter-
Intelligence

Special Intelligence Combat

Activities Intelligence

Air Intelligence

Reconnaissance
Based on Doctrine
 3rd Marine Division
Intelligence Structure
3rd Marine Division
G-2
Lt Col Richard Schriver

Communications
Reconnaissance
Special Agencies

Administration Combat Counter- Aerial

Intelligence Intelligence Reconnaissance

Photo Interrogator Order of Aerial

Interpreters Translator Battle Observers
Teams Section
Based on Doctrine
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Intelligence Structure
1st MAW
G-2
Lt Col Billy Barber

Administration Counter
Intelligence

Air Combat Special

Intelligence Activities

Targeting
Based on Doctrine
 Marine Expeditionary
Force
Intelligence Forces
Marine Expeditionary
Force
G-2

Force Communications
Reconnaissance Reconnaissance
Company Units

Marine Division Marine Aircraft Wing

G-2 G-2

Reconnaissance Marine Marine Composite

Battalion Observation Reconnaissance
Squadron Squadron
 III MAF
Intelligence Forces
Late 1965
III MAF
G-2
June 1965
Da Nang

III MAF G-2 1st Radio

1st Force Reconnaissance
Company Company
Da Nang 1 MAW Da G-2 Nang. Phu Bai, Pleiku

3 MARDIV G-2
3rd Marine Division 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Combine
G-2 to form a single intelligence
G-2 staff
Da Nang Da Nang

3rd Reconnaissance 2nd Marine Observation 6th Marine Observation

Battalion Squadron Squadron
Da Nang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai Da Nang Ky Ha

1st Marine Composite

Reconnaissance Squadron
Da Nang
 III MAF
Intelligence Forces
1967
III MAF
G-2

1st Force Reconnaissance 1st Radio

Company Battalion

3rd Force Reconnaissance

Company

3rd Marine Division 1st Marine Division 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
G-2 G-2 G-2

3rd Reconnaissance 1st Reconnaissance 2nd Marine Observation

Battalion Battalion Squadron

6th Marine Observation

Squadron

3rd Marine Observation

Squadron
5th Reconnaissance 5th Force Reconnaissance
Battalion Company 1st Marine Composite
Reconnaissance Squadron
 “Communications
Reconnaissance Units”
• Mission:
– Communications Intercepts
• Units:
– 1st Radio Company
• Deployed to Pleiku, 1961
• Detachment to Phu Bai, 1963
• Task Force to Khe Sahn and
Dong Bach Ma, 1964
• Withdrawn, 1964
• Redeployed to Da Nang with III
MAF, 1965
– 1st Radio Battalion
• Arrived in Da Nang, 1967

US Army AN/PRD-1 Direction Finder

 Force Reconnaissance
Company
• Units
– 1st Force Reconnaissance
Company
– 3rd Force Reconnaissance
company
• Employment
– 4-6 man teams
– Insert into area of interest
by helicopter
– Locate enemy units
– Avoid contact
– Report on enemy
disposition, activity, terrain Marine Force Reconnaissance
 Force Reconnaissance
Company
Reconnaissance • Operations
Company
• Initially poorly used
Supply and • 1st Force Reconnaissance
Service Platoon
Company assigned to 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion
Reconnaissance Reconnaissance
Platoon Platoon
in October 1965

Reconnaissance Reconnaissance
• Structure
Platoon Platoon – 6 Platoons, each with three
Reconnaissance Reconnaissance
teams
Platoon Platoon – Each team has 4 men

Reconnaissance Reconnaissance Reconnaissance

Team Team Team
 Division Reconnaissance
Battalion
• Units
– 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
– 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
• Employment
– 12-13 man teams
– Insert by helicopter
– Locate enemy units
– Call in infantry
Marine Reconnaissance Gunner
With Rocket Launcher
 Division Reconnaissance
Battalion
Reconnaissance
Battalion • Structure
– Companies
Reconnaissance Reconnaissance attached to
Company Company
infantry
Reconnaissance Reconnaissance regiments
Company Company
– Platoons attached
to infantry
Reconnaissance Reconnaissance
Platoon Platoon battalions
– Teams sent on
Reconnaissance Reconnaissance
Platoon Platoon patrols

Team Team Team Team

 Marine Observation
Squadron
• VMO-2 at Da Nang
Dong Ha – To Monkey Mountain
Phu Bai and Dong Ha July 1966
• VMO-6 at Ky Ha
Da Nang
Monkey Mountain • VMO-3 at Phu Bai
Ky Ha
– Arrived December 1966
• Equipped with O-1B
Bird Dog
O-1B Bird Dog – Visual Reconnaissance
 Marine Composite
Reconnaissance Squadron
RF-8A Crusader • VMCJ-1 at Da Nang
– 9 RF-8A Crusaders
• Daylight photoreconnaissance
• Detachment aboard CVA-31
• December 1965
– 69 sorties for III MAF
USS Bon
Homme Richard – 9 EF-10B Skyknights
• Electronic reconnaissance
• April – August 1965
– 90% of sorties flown against
North Vietnam
EF-10B Skyknight
 Marine Composite
Reconnaissance Squadron
• RF-8As supplemented by RF-4B Phantoms
– October 1966

EA-6B Intruder

RF-4B Phantom

• EF-10Bs supplemented by EA-6 Intruders

– November 1966
 Photo Reconnaissance
Sorties
1000
RF-4
900 Number of Sorties
Over
800
North Vietnam
700
RF-8
Over
600
North Vietnam
500
RF-4
400 Over
RF-8
300 South Vietnam
Over
200
South Vietnam
100
0 1965 1966 1967
3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr
 Electronic Reconnaissance
Sorties
1200
EA-6
Number of Sorties Over
1000
North Vietnam
800
EF-10
600 Over
South Vietnam EA-6
400 EF-10 Over
Over South Vietnam
200 North Vietnam

0 1967
1965 1966
3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr
Other Intelligence Forces
 Agent Reports

• Considered to be best
source of information

• Each battalion S-2

cultivated his own
local agents
Questioning Agents
 Villagers

• Request information on
the local activities of the
Viet Cong
– Greatly aided by the Civil
Affairs Program and
Counterinsurgency
Program
• Apprehend detainees

Questioning Villagers
 Categories of Detainees

• Innocent civilians
• Civilian defendants
• Returnees under the
“Chieu Hoi” Program
• Prisoners of War
Prisoners of War
and Defectors
• Obtained during
village sweeps and
contact
• Doctrine: Keep at
lowest level possible
to obtain maximum
tactical intelligence
• Reality: Immediately
pass up to division
level
Processing Prisoners
 Standard
Operating
Procedures
3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines
16 August 1965
• “Prisoners are one of
the most valuable
sources of information
of the enemy”
• “Immediately after
capturing prisoners,
units will disarm,
search, segregate, and
tag them.”
1st Marine Division Captive Card
 Prisoners of War
and Defectors
• Interrogated by division
Interrogator Translator
Teams
– Peacetime exercise
procedures proved
counter-productive
– Little feedback to line units
– Reports arrived too late to
be useful
• Passed to South
Vietnamese authorities
within two days
Prisoner of War Camp
Captured Documents

• VC and NVA very

prolific
• Documents sent to
Division G-2 for
exploitation
• Approximately 10%
considered useful

Reviewing Captured
Documents
 Captured Equipment

• Marines like
souvenirs
• III MAF had
no exploitation
capability
• Formed ad-hoc
exploitation
teams
Captured Equipment
 Interaction with
Other Forces
• US Forces • South Vietnamese Forces
– Navy – Army
– Air Force – Popular Forces
– Army – Regional Forces
– Special Forces
– National Police
• Allied Forces
– Australia
– New Zealand
– South Korea
– Philippines South
Korean
– Thailand Troops
Marine Liaison Officers

• Served as liaison officers

to local governments
– District Level
– Province Level
• Obtained good
information on VC
organization and activities
at village level
– Passed information within
24-48 hours
Marine Liaison Officers
 District Agents

• Quang Tin Province

– Advanced Political
Action Team
• Intelligence Net of the
Nationalist Party of
Vietnam
– 74 paid cadre personnel
Quang Tin
– Over 5,000 unpaid
members
 AN/TPS-21
Artillery Radar
• Used to register artillery
– 10 radars per regiment
• Also used to monitor enemy ground activity
– Size
– Location
– Direction
– Speed

US Army AN/TPS-33
US Marine Corps
AN/TPS-10
 Intelligence Reporting

• Periodic Intelligence Report (PIR)

– Written by divisions, wings, and higher commands
• May also be written by lower units
• Disseminated at least to battalion and squadron level
– Normally issued daily during combat operations
• Intelligence Summary (ISUM or INTSUM)
– Written by regiments, groups, and higher commands
– Normally written every 6 hours during combat oprations
• Specialized reports
– Prisoner Interrogation Reports
– Captured Document Exploitation Reports
– Reconnaissance Exploitation Reports
 Battalion S-2

• Responsibilities
– Support commander and staff in planning and
operations
– Maintain patrol sighting overlay, trail and water
source overlay, and mined areas overlay
• Perspective
– Reports from higher headquarters usually arrived
several days late
– Situation maps generally outdated
– Must rely on own resources to understand situation
 Intelligence Structure
1965
US Pacific Command
J-2
National Honolulu

Intelligence
Millitary Assistance Command, Vietnam
Agencies J-2
Saigon
Maj Gen McChristian

III MAF I Field Forces, Vietnam

G-2 G-2
Da Nang Nha Trang
I Corps Tactical Zone II Corps Tactical Zone

II Field Force, Vietnam

1st Marine Aircraft Wing 3rd Marine Division G-2
G-2 G-2 Long Binh
Da Nang Da Nang III Corps Tactical Zone

Groups Regiments
S-2 S-2

Squadrons Battalions
S-2 S-2
 MACV J-2 Mission

• Support and improve

South Vietnamese
intelligence capabilities
• Support the
Commander, USMACV
• Support CINCPAC and
the National Command
Authorities
Major General McChristian
 MACV Intelligence Staff
June 1965
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
MACV J-2

Executive Officer Deputy J-2

Sector Intelligence

Deputy J-2 Deputy J-2 Deputy J-2

Combat Intelligence Production Support

Military Attache Combined Intelligence Counterintelligence

Liaison Center, Vietnam Division
Office

Intelligence Estimates Management

Operations Division Division
Division

Exploitation Production Plans and Training

Division Division Division

J-2 Element
Combat Operations Warning Branch Current Indications &
Center Intelligence Branch
 South Vietnamese
Intelligence Structure
• No centralized intelligence system
– Most intelligence organizations outside of the
control of the Joint General Staff
• National Police Intelligence
• Regional Forces Intelligence
• Province Forces Intelligence
• Virtually no intelligence collection assets or
capability at the village and hamlet level
 Joint Intelligence

• Joint Intelligence Program established in 1965

– American military advisors served as conduits for
intelligence to ARVN units
– American military detachments provided to ARVN
corps, divisions, and province headquarters
• Provided by the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion
– ARVN military intelligence detachments provided to
the US Army brigades and divisions
• 10 established by 1967
• New Intelligence Centers jointly manned
 MACV Intelligence Staff
December 1965
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
MACV J-2

Plans and Training Management

Division Division

Intelligence Intelligence Operations Counterintelligence

Division Division Division

Combined Intelligence Combined Military

Center, Vietnam Interrogation Center
135th Military
Intelligence Group
Combined Document
Exploitation Center 149th Military
525th Military Intelligence Group
Combined Material
Intelligence Group Exploitation Center
 Combined Military
Interrogation Center
Combined Military
• Process and Interrogation Center

interrogate
prisoners
• Manned equally
by Vietnamese
and American
personnel

Interrogating a Prisoner
 Combined Document
Exploitation Center
• Translate,
review, and
store
captured
enemy
documents
• Staffed
mainly by
Vietnamese
personnel
CDEC Translators
 Combined Material
Exploitation Center
• Examine
captured weapon
systems and
booby traps to
determine
capabilities and
countermeasures
• Staffed mainly
by American
personnel
CMEC Technical Personnel
 Aerial Reconnaissance

• Electro-optical imagery
• Infra-red imagery
• Radar imagery

RF-4 RF-101
 Army Security Agency

• Collected and decrypted communications

– 3 general support fixed field stations
• 8th Radio Research Unit at Phu Bai (MACV & III MAF)
• 3rd and 7th Radio Research Units at Saigon (MACV)
– 1 general support aviation battalion
• 224th Aviation Battalion (Radio Research) (MACV)
– 2 direct support radio research battalions
• 303rd Radio Research Battalion (II Corps)
• 313th Radio Research Battalion (III Corps)
– 20 direct support radio research companies
• Attached to divisions and independent brigades
224th Aviation Battalion
(Radio Research)
Airborne Radio Direction Finding

Crew: 2
Speed: 160 kts

U-6A Beaver
 5th Special Forces Group

• Bases throughout I Corps

• Gathered information
Khe Sanh – Agents
– Patrols
Ashau
Da Nang
– Base
Camps
Kham Duc Tien Phuc
• Passed to
Tra Bong
– MACV
Ha Thanh Ba To
– III MAF Special Forces
Gia Vuc
 Igloo
White
• Track infiltration
along the Ho Chi
Minh Trail

Ho Chi Minh Trail

 Igloo White
• ADSID III
• ACOUSID III
• COMMIKE III
• EDET III

EC-121

P-2V Neptune

ADSID III
Sensor
 Intelligence for
Operation STARLITE
• Location and identity of enemy units
– Agent reports from local population
• Direct result of III MAF civic action program and
counterguerilla program
– Defector interrogation
• Conducted by ARVN General Thi on 15 August
– Communication intercepts and direction finding
• “Mobile unit” controlled by MACV J-2
• Likely U-6A Otters operated by 224th Aviation Battalion
(Radio Research)
 Intelligence for Operation
STARLITE
1st Force Reconnaissance Company
• 1st and 2nd Platoons USS Iwo Jima
– Assigned to 2/4

• 3rd Platoon
– Learned of operation only 2 days prior to execution
– No opportunity to conduct reconnaissance
– Remained aboard USS Iwo Jima during operation
 Intelligence for
Operation STARLITE
HMM 163 & BLT 3/7

• General Intelligence for Planning

– MACV Order of Battle (31 Mar 65)
– III MAF INTSUM & SPOT Reports
– MARKET TIME INTSUM
– Various messages from MACV
– Liaison with 22nd ARVN Division; 5th Special Forces Group;
& Binh Dinh Sector Operations Intelligence Center
– Task Force 78 Intelligence Estimates & Overlays
– Task Force 78 Aerial Photography
 Intelligence for
Operation STARLITE
HMM 163 & BLT 3/7

• Specific Intelligence for

Planning
– III MAF Intelligence Report
– Task Force 78 aerial
photography
• Current Intelligence UH-34D Dog
– ISUMs from BLT 3/7
– Pilot Inflight Reports
– Pilot debriefs
Operation
STARLITE
 Flaws of the Intelligence
System
• Highly centralized
– Information tended to flow to MACV J2 to support
General Westmoreland
– Finished intelligence flowed down to tactical units
too late to be useful
• Focused on order of battle intelligence
– Collection and analysis of other types of information
was neglected
• Political activity of the Viet Cong guerilla units
• Subject to leaks via ARVN personnel
Military Intelligence in
Vietnam
1965-1967
Michael J. McCarthy