David v. Arroyo G.R. No.

171396, May 3, 2006 Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5,
declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of
the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever
it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces
to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity
as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State
of National Emergency.
warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune,
which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched
without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006.
Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of
the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building –
were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a
composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of
the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and
seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her
constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
ISSUE:
1.    Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et
al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2.    Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
RULING:
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and 1.    NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al.,
G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable
some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
Army, and some members of the political opposition in a
warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They
on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
take-over the reins of government as a clear and present
danger.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a)   When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
(b)   When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit
warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner David’s warrantless
arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting
officers could invoke was their observation that some
rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust
Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner
David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was
not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing
it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to
sedition.
2.    NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT
valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is
illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure.
Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a
house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence
of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2)
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must
direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property
is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at
any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated
by the CIDG operatives.
Sanidad v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-44640, October 12,
1976
FACTS:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on
16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays")
to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the
period for the exercise by the President of his present
powers.
20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President
issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031,
amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by
declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing
for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
"barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly,
Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of
Presidential Decree 991.
On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President
issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16
October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses
that the people's continued opposition to the convening of
the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have
such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,
which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive
supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C.
Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced
L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking
to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos.
991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as
it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on
16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution.
As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16
has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976,
another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction,
docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman,
a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting
that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of
the Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16,
Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5
October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and
Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the
forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
ISSUE:
Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the
amendment of the Constitution.
RULING:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on
Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The
National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority
vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such
a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2
thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later
than three months a after the approval of such amendment
or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim
National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is
conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the
Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly,
upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to
this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when
ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There
are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the
constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending
process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a
vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National
Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional
Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an
election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members
of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the
Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call
by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v.
COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President
is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he
shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President
the determination of the time when he shall initially convene
the interim National Assembly, consistent with the
prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country.
When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted
on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact
that under the same, the incumbent President was given the
discretion as to when he could convene the interim National
Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of
the interim National Assembly soon found support from the
people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15,
1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was
submitted, the people voted against the convening of the
interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July
1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated
their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim
National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February
1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National
Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated,
because some of the members of Congress and delegates of
the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed
automatically members of the interim National Assembly,
were against its inclusion since in that referendum of
January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In
sensustriciore, when the legislative arm of the state
undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution,
that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not
legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather,
it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the
fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is
provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the
regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the
Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly).
While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to
legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional
conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative
in character. In political science a distinction is made
between constitutional content of an organic character and
that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is
one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of
the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer.
The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The
President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
amendments to the Constitution.
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council G.R. No. 202242, April
16, 2013
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth
member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean
one representative each from both Houses which comprise
the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “
a representative of congress” refers that both houses of
congress should have one representative each, and that
these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system
of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in
performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7
members only with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the
Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead
of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in
Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the
phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed
as to having only one representative that would come from
either house, not both. That the framers of the constitution
only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral
body refers to its primary function in government – to
legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An
inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be
said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC.
Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates
that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
FALLO:
The motion was denied.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630
FACTS:
The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross
selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties
sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from
the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. The Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association (CREBA) contends that the imposition
of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered
into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate
the constitutional provision of “non-impairment of
contracts.”
ISSUE: judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the
Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it enactment of statutes – beyond those prescribed by the
violates the contract clause under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill Constitution - have been observed is precluded by the
of Rights. principle of separation of powers;(3) That the law does not
abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor
RULING:
interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any
No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the
of the parties the right to an education; and(4) That, in view
imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate
of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that
by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of
the law is regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that
the law would violate the constitutional provision of non-
it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause
impairment of contracts, is only slightly less abstract but
are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of
nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to say that the
prospective relief by writ of prohibition. WHEREFORE, the
parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of
petitions are DISMISSED.
prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing
power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is
also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government which
retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good
order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never
been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's
power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has
been granted for a valid consideration.

 Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the
Court does not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its
position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax
exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a
specific, law. Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects
as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To
sum up, the Court holds:(1) That the procedural
requirements of the Constitution have been complied with
by Congress in the enactment of the statute;(2) That