III.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW
ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL V. ORMOC CITY L-23794; Feb 17 1968
FACTS:
 The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, imposing "on any and
all productions of sugar milled at petitioner's, municipal tax of 1% per export sale.
Petitioner paid but were under protest.
 Petitioner filed before the CFI contending that the ordinance is unconstitutional for
being in violation of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of
taxation, aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the
Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production
nor a license tax which Ormoc City its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, or the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; that it also violates RA
2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.
ISSUE:
 Whether the ordinance is valid.
 whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal
protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
RULING:
 NO. The SC held that it violates the equal protection clause for it taxes only sugar
produced and exported by petitioner and none other. Even though petitioner, at the
time of the enactment of the ordinance, was the only sugar central in Ormoc, the
classification should have been in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as petitioner, for the
coverage of the tax.
 Though, petitioner can be refunded, they are not entitled to interest because the taxes
were not arbitrarily collected as the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude
arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.
 A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the
city of Ormoc... to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions
as well. Even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax
because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the
entity to be levied upon.
 a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial... distinctions which
make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies
only to... those who belong to the same class.
BASCO v. PAGCOR 197 SCRA 52
FACTS:
 On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant
to the policy of the government, “ to regulate and centralize through an appropriate
institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by
law.” This was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government but
also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the
cash-strapped Government.
 Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.
ISSUE:
 Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR while most other
forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
RULING:
 No. The equal protection clause does not preclude classification of individuals who
may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all
persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same.
 The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of individuals
or objects upon which different rules shall operate.
 Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In
this case, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption.
Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
BINAY v. DOMINGO 201 SCRA 508
FACTS:
 Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60
which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family
income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the
unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila
Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the
Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for
the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no
connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of
Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it
violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.
ISSUE:
 Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
 There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably
classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of
our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus,
statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating
the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not
complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more
painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60
vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less
in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a
precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION v. DE GUZMAN 229 SCRA 801
FACTS:
 RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police
Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government", took effect
on January 2, 1991. RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP
members. Section 39 reads:
o "SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory retirement, for officer
and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six (56);
Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of chief
superintendent, director or deputy director general, the Commission may
allow his retention in the service for an unextendible period of one (1)
year.
 Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private
respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine Constabulary and have
reached the age of fifty-six.
 Private respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for the
issuance of an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction before the RTC of Makati.
They aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975
cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which
provides:
o "Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the
transition period of four (4) years following the effectively of this Act, the
following members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily retired:
o "a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of the
effectivity of this Act.
o "b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year of
the effectivity of this Act.
o "c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the
effectivity of this Act.
o "d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of
the effectivity of this Act."
 Respondents added that the term "INP" includes both the former members of the
Philippine Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as
the Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975. On the other hand,
it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition period provided in Section 89
applies only to the local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age
sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, while the
retirement age for the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
 Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed by a writ of
injunction. He declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes
all members of the present Philippine National police, irrespective of the original
status of the present members of the Philippine National police before its creation
and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall become operative after the lapse
of the four-year transition period. Thus, the preliminary injunction issued is made
permanent. Moreover, he observed, among others, that it may have been the
intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as the "INP" but the PNP
Law failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the
court is to trace the source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to prior laws
on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents involved.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present
Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of its present members
and that Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only after the
lapse of the four-year transition period.
HELD:
 From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it appears that the use of
the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute
could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine
National police (PNP) for retirement purposes and not just the INP. The law itself
distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that "INP" as used in Sec.
89 includes the members of the PC.
 Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that “the law failed to define
who constitutes the INP”, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,
"SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the effectivity of this
Act, the present National police Commisdion and the Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is
the nucleus of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police shall cease to
be a major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National
police, which is the civilian component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National police, shall cease to be the national police force and lieu thereof, a new
police force shall be establish and constituted pursuant to this Act." It is not
altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to define who the
members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed
to categorically restrict the application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically
in favor of the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC
component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-six.
 Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have belabored on the
supposed dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a
situation, courts are not without recourse in determining the construction of the
statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a
statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations
may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law
if it runs counter to the legislative intent.
 The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of R.A.
6975 is applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is
whether the classification is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it
must conform to the following requirements:
o (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
o (2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
o (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
o (4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class.
HIMAGAN v. PEOPLE 237 SCRA 538
FACTS:
 Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged
for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s
younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into
suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the
PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1)
 day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan
assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree,
that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service
Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Sec. 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
RULING:
 The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the
member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and
one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot
be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section
providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment
does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each
other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time
from within which the trial should be finished.
 The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule
on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the
badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them,
as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman
criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under
Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right
to equal protection of the laws.
 Supposing the trial is not terminated w/in 90 days from arraignment, the suspension
of accused should NOT be lifted. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall”
before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA
6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the
trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide
the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative
sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil
liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he
is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for
the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can
compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by
habeas corpus.
 The equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the
one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and
substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members
of the same class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the
classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection
guarantee.