Richard L.

Lanigan

COMMUNICOLOGY:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY
OF THE HUMAN SCIENCE
Verbetes 1 - 47
PART 1. ENTRY TERMS BY LANIGAN pp. 209-228

Verbetes 48 - 57
PART 2. ENTRY TERMS FROM LOUIS HJELMSLEV pp. 228-229

Verbetes 58 - 80
PART 3. ENTRY TERMS FROM ROMAN JAKOBSON pp. 229-236

(New Diagrams and Illustrations Included in this PDF Edition)

CITATION FORM

Richard L. Lanigan,
“Communicology: An Encyclopedic
Dictionary of the Human Science (Appendix B)”,
The Human Science of Communicology:
A Phenomenology of Discourse in
Foucault and Merleau-Ponty,
Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press 1992,
pp. 197—236.
ISBN 0-8207-0242-0

PDF EDITION © 2016 Richard L Lanigan

International Communicology Institute
Washington, DC 20003-3377, USA
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
 AppENDIX B

communicology : An Enq ctoped,ic

Dictionary of the Human Silence

TNTRODTJCTION FOR USERS

Entries in the encyclopedic diction ary follow

the motivated se-
quence of figure 14, "Chart: Theory and Methodology
in the Human
Sciences'""Theory" on the chart branchesinto "eid.ii."
and *empiri-
cal," however' the meaning of "theory" is dependent
upon the distinc-
tion between "praxis" and. "poiesis"so these two
definitions immedi-
ately follow the "theory" entry. There is also a
caregoricaldistinction
to be made between "theory" and "methodology,"
,.- the methodology
entry comes next. With all contextual definitions
now presented,the
categoricaldivision benveen "eidetic" and "empirical"
can occur with
the next entrieswhich are "eidetic"and "empirical"
respectively.Thus,
the sequenceof entries in the encyclopedicaie,ion
ary.orro.ms to the
outline suggestedby the figure 14 chart. But
you can find particular
entries quickly by using the alphabericalindex
berow.
All encyclopedicdictionary terms are listed alphabetically
and refer
to their entry number location (not page number).
There are total of
80 entries' Primary entriesare designurla by
u plain number, for ex-
ample: 25' Where there are useful secondury
d.finitions that occur
within the context of a cognate en try, such
second,ary entriesare indi-
cated by a parenthetical number, for example
: eai . Many, but nor
all, of these secondary entries have full definitions
(but did nor
merit a separateprimary entry by themselves).
The actual listing of
terms in the encyclopedicdiction ary occurs
accordi.g to a motivated

rg7
198 Appendix B

logic sequence in which the immediately precedi.g or succeeding

terms(s) from an ideational group. Thus, it is always useful to examine
the entries around the one you located initially.

INDEX OF ENTRIES

A
A-B-CI[example] ( 12)
Abduction (201, (33)
Ability (l l )
Addressee 68, (74)
Addresser 67, (73)
Adduction (24), (33)
Abstract 1B
Acta t4
Actualization 11, (B ), (25), (27), (29), [seeFi gs.
14 8c151
Alethia ( 15)
Ambiguity (26)
Analysis ( l 2)
Analytical 23
Anthropology (73), (80)
Answers (34)
Apodeictic 40, (45)
Appearance (8), fseeFi g. 15]
Apperception (72), ( 79)
Apposition (66)
Arbitrariness (6e)
Aristotle 4,5,6
Assertoric 37, (41)
Axiom (33)

B
Bateson (33), (4r), (42)
Because-motive (16), (38)
Biology (73), (80)
Birth (2)
Both/And IseeCommunicationTheory]
Boundary condition ( 15), ( 16)
Burke (35)

C
Capability ( 10)
Capta 15, (4), (7), (34)
 Appendix B 199

Categorematical 66
Case (5), (6), (33)
Causality (32)
Ch ia sm (35)
Ch o ice 65, (66), (69)
Cice r o (15),(16)
Coda ( l2)
Co d e ( s) 72, (43), (64), (69), (79)
Co h e r e n ce (17)
Co m m u n ico lo g ie (1)
Co m m u n ico lo sy t
Co m m u n ica tio n Theory 2 , 5 8 , 6 5 , ( 2 6 ), ( 2 8 ), ( 4 3 )
[Co m m . T h e o r y Dia g r a m ] [seeFig. 3]
Co m m u n ity (3 8 )
Conative 74
Co n cr e te r7
Co n n o ta tio n (12), (47)
Co n so cia te s (23)
Co n sta n t (54)
Co n str u ct (4)
Con tac t 7T
Co n te m p o r a r ie s (23)
Co n te xt 69, (65), (66), (75), (77)
Co n ve n tio n (t4)
Conversational analysis (77)
Core (33)
Correlation 49
Counter-example (2e)
Create ( 14)
Cr itica l 24
Cr iticism ( 12)
Cu ltu r a l Stu clie s (36)

D
Data 16, (4), (7)
De d u ctio n (23), (33)
De m o n str a tio n (16), (21)
De n o ta tio n (12), (46)
De o n tic lo g ic (3 r)
De p e n d e n t va r ia b le (32)
De scr ip tio n (33)
De u te r o le a r n in g (33)
Dia ch r o n y ( ic ) (70), (76)
Dia le ctic (34)
Diagrammatic (6e)
Dictio n a r y [e xa m p le ] (27), (46), (65), [seeFi g. 15 note]
200 Appendix B

Disclosure ( 15)
Discourse ( 1), (35), (61)
Discovery ( 15)
Description (45)
Diachrony (62)
Distinctive features 63, (73)
Doing (5), (14)
Double articulation (78)

E,
E,conomics (73), (80)
Effect (32), (64)
Egocentric culture (77)
Eidetic 8
Either/Or IseeInformationTheoryJ
E,lement 59
E m bodim ent (76)
Emotive (73)
Empirikos (e)
E nc y c lopedia I ex am ple] (28), (47), (66)
E,ntelechy (l l )
Envoi ( 12)
Empirical I
Ethnography 42, (38)
Exemplar 2,,(7)
Experiential 26, [seeFig. I4l
Experimental 25, [seeFig. 14]
Explanation 13, (30)
Explication 12, (36)
Expression (44), (73)
Extension ( 12), (47)-

F
Facttrm (40)
Falsifrcation (2e)
F ie ld (33)
F o cu s (33)
Form 46,54, [seeFig. 15]
Formation rule (33)
F o u ca u lt, M ich e l (1), (2), (33), (35)
F o u n d a tio n (3r), (40)
Freucl, Sigmund (22)
Fu n ctio n 52, 60
Functive 53
 Appendix B 201

G
Geistesgeschich te (41)
Geisteswissen schaft (1)
Ge m e in sch a ft (41)
Generalize 2 0 , ( 2 1 ), ( 4 3 )
Ge n e r a l Se m a n tics (1)
Gesellschaft (42)
Gr o u n d ( in g ) (3r), (33)

H
Hall, Edward (77)
Hermeneutics (36)
Historiography (37)
Horizon (33)
Horizontal (62)
Human sciences BO
Human sciencesdiagram [see Fi g. 4)
Human speech (7e)
Husserl, Edmond (33), (7t), (79)
Hypostatization (30)
Hypothesis (36)

I
Ico n (44), (69)
Id e a s [seeFig. 15]
Id e o g r a p h ic scie n ce (45)
In d e x (44), (69)
In d e p e n d e n t va r ia b le (32)
Imaginative variation (13)
In clu ctio n (25), (32), (33)
In fe r e n ce (33), (37)
Information theory 3, (2S ,1 (27), (32), (66)
In-order-to-motive (r5), (39)
In te n sio n ( l 2) , (46)
In ten tionality (44), (45), (76)
I n terpre tan t (33), (69)
In terpretation (33), (45)
I n tersubj ectivi ty (40)
I n tuition (2), (3e)
In ve n tio n (14), (16)
In terpretive studies (36)
In te r vie win g (15)
Ir o n y (32), (38)
 202 Appendix B

J
Jakobson, Roman (1), (2)

K
Knowledg. (38)
Kom mun i kation sgeme in schaft (1)
Kulturwissenschaft (42)

L
Language (62)
Langue (72)
Law of Non-Contradiction (2)
L e b e n swe lt (41)
Linguistics 90, (73)
Lived (11)
Logic 33, (66)

M
Mach, Ernst (37)
Magnitude (31)
Making (6)
Maieutic (34)
Marked term 65
Mathematic 31
Medieval (66)
Message 70, (67), (78)
Metalinguistic 7B
Metaphor (33), (34), (35), (40), (61)
Metatheory (4),,[seeFig. 15]
Method (6)
Methodology 7, [seeFi gs.14 k 151
M ill' s M et hod (32)
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (t), (15),(16),(33),(35),(44),(45),
(76)
Metonymy (31), (34), (35), (39), (62)
Model (4), [seeFi gs.L4 k 15]

N
Na m in g (22), (74)
Naturwissenschaf t (30)
Naturalistic method (36)
Necessary condition 28, (24), (59)
Ne u tr a l M o n ism (37)
No e m a (e)
Noesis (8)
No m o th e tic .scie n ce (43)
Nu ll h yp o th e sis (2e)
 Appendix B 203

o
Ob je ct (33)
Object language (78)
Observation (37)
On tic (e)
On to lo g ica l (B )
Op p o sitio n (2), (65)
Orclinary language (77)
Oth e r n e ss (35), (7r), (76)

P
Pairing (72), ( 79)
Paradigm (4), (69)
Paradigmatic axis 56, 61, (69), (75)
Paradox (26)
Parole (70), (78)
Pe ir ce , Ch a r le s S. (33)
Pe r ce p tio n (44)
Perspective (35)
Pharmakon (2)
Particulanze 19, (45)
Ph a tic tt
Ph e n o m e n a (21), (23)
Phenomenology 45,(l ), (2), (40),fseeFi gs.14& l 5l
Ph e n o m e n o n (22), (23), [seeFig. 15]
Plato (34)
Po ie sis 6, (seeFig. l5l
Po e tic 76, (6)
Position (65)
Possibiliry (2), (26), (33)
Postulate (33I
Praxis 5,,[seeFig. l5i
Probabiliry (25), (32)
Process 5t, (43)
Proposition (36)
Propositional calculus (33)
Precis ( l 3)
Predecessors (23)
Problematic 39
Procedure (7)
Process (4)
Protorype (7)
Puzzle (201

a
qED ( l 6)
QEF ( l 4)
204 Appendix B

QEI ( 15)
Quadrilateral Model (35)
Qualitative methodology 35
Quantitative methodology 30
Questions (34)

R
Realization 10, (8), (28), (29), [seeFi g. r4)
Re d u ctio n ( l 3), (33), (35), (45)
Redundancy features 64, (73)
Referential t5
Relation 4B
Representamen (44)
Representation (35)
Re sp e ct ( 15)
Result (33)
Revelatory phrase (15), (22)
Reversibility (2), (76), (79)
Rhetoric 34, (l l ), (66)
Ruesch & Bateson (41), (42)
Rule (4), (33)
Ru p tu r e Id isco n tin u ir yl (2)

S
Sa u ssu r e , F e r d in a n d de (44), (69), (70), (78)
Savior (2), (32)
Scie n tific m e th o d (30)
Schutz, Alfred (15), (23), (38), (39)
Se le ctio n ( 18)
Self (35), (40), (76)
Semiology 43, (39)
Se m io tic Ph e n o m e n o lo g y (33), (45)
Se m io tics 80, (43), (73)
Sign 44
Signified (44), (45)
Signifier (44), (45)
Sim ile (32), (34), (35), (38)
So cio ce n tr ic cu ltu r e (77)
Sociology (1), (31)
So p h istic (34)
Sp e e ch Act 7e
Sta te m e n t (30)
Statistic 32
Structure 47, (34), [seeFi g. 15]
Structuralism (44)
Subjectivity (40)
 Appendix B 205

Substance 55r
Successors (23)
Su fficie n t co n d itio n 27, (60)
Symbol (33), (44), (69)
Sy. categorematical 66
Syn ch r o n y ( ic) (61), (72), (78)
Syneccloche (31),,(34), (35), (37)
Sy.tasmatic axis 57,62, (71), (77)
Sy.tagm (77)
System 50, (7), (64)
Systematic (30), (42)
Syste m ic (36), (41)

T
T a kin g ( 15)
T e ch n e (6)
T e le n o m ic (74)
T e le o lo g ica l (71)
T e r ke l, Stu d s ( 15)
T e r m in tr s a d q u e m ( l 5)
T e r m in u s a quo ( 16)
T e xt (67), (68)
T h e m a tic 38, (42)
Theorem (33)
T h e o r ia 4
Theory 4, [seeFi gs.14 & 15]
Thought (10)
T o ke n (23), (21), (25), (26)
Tone (23), (21), (25), (26)
T r a n sfo r m a tio n r u le (33), (64)
T r o p ic 35- (66)
T r u th co n d itio n 29
Typ. (23), (24), (25), (26)
Typification 22
Typology 21, (47)

TJ
[-lnderstanding (2), (32), (33), (10)
Unmarkecl term 66
fJtte r a n ce (67), (68)

V
Va lu e ch o ice (74)
Variable (55)
Verbal (58), (78)
Verificaticln (36)
 206 Appendix B

Verisimilitude (30)
Vertical (61)
Vulnerability ( 15)

w
We lta n sch a u u n g (42)
X
X [e xa m p le ] ( 12)
Y
Y [e xa m p le ] (12)
Z
Z-Y-X [example] ( l 2)
 Appendix B 207

THEORY

E,IDE,TIC EMPIR[CAL
{RealizationModeU {ActualizationModeU

Analytical Critical Experimental Experiental

IDeduction] tAdductionl IInduction] tAbductionl

{Sufficiency} {Necessity} {Actuality} {Possibiliry}

METHODOLOGY

QUANTITATTVE QUAI,ITATIVE
[T r u th Co n d itio n M e th o d ] and Sufficient
INecessary
ConditionMethocll

Mathematic Statistic Logic

IFounclation] [Correlation] tRelationl
(Magnitude Data) (Probability Data) (PossibiliryData)

Phenomenology Semiology Ethnography Historiography

[Foundation ] tRelationl ICorrelation] ICorrelation]

(Formal Capta) (SubstantialCapta) (Symbolic Capta) (Artifactual Capta)
{Apodeictic} {Problematic} {Thematic} {Assertoric}

Fieure 14. Chart: Theory and Methodology in the Human Sciences.

208 Appendix B

< Theory

@ .a
a
X
sb .eb
o 'F
O
:--,- =(Xl O- CU
---.N
a) . N
9cu
fcg -r=*t
x q) 7.
i) C)
5E
t .<
\-
a a

Metatheory> . Mb d e l>

Fieur e 15. Phenom enol os v : T he F or m and Str uc ttr r e of Appear anc e.

Note: To r .r nder stand th e di agr am , thi nk of'Ideas as the " w or d" entr i es i n a D i c ti r >n-
ar y. Think of' l,xper iences as the " es s ay " entr i es i n an Enc y c l c l pedi a. T hus , ev er y w or d
ir t a clictiollar l, has For r n ( l dea) , and, ev er y " es s ay " entr y i n an enc v c k r pec l i a has a
Str tr cttr r e ( l,xper ience) . Di c ti onar i es te l l y ou how to us e w or ds ( fr r r m s ; i deas ) , but not
what wor d to tr sc; hence, y ( ) Ll tend to go fr om w or d to w or d ( Appear anc es ) tr y i nu t<l
clecicle which or te is the bes t des c r i pti on ( c ounts as an ex per i enc ed Phenom enon) , but
the clictionar y canr lot tcll y ou w hat i dea to c hoos e!
F- ncvclopcclias tell vou w hat fac ts to us e ( s tr uc tur es ; ex per i enc es ) , but not how tc r
ttse ther n; hence, ,vor .ltetnd t( ) r er ead the es s av goi ne ov er and ov er the fac ts ( Appear -
ances) tr ving to clecide how to defi ne Ar - lex per i enc e ( m ak e a Phenonl er - r on) , but the
 Appendix B 209

encyclopedia cannot tell yotr how to thi nk ! C l om bi ni ng thes e ac ti v i ti es y i el c l s ( I ) the En-

cyclopedic Dictionar y which is the R eal i z ed i c l ea of an ex per i enc e or a T heor y , anc l ( 2) ,
the Illustr ated Dictionar y that is the Ac tual i z ec l ex per i enc e of an i dea or a M oc l el . U s i ng
the encyclopeclic dictionar y [e.g., an al m anac or " w hat- i s - i t book " i s :l I] ex er c i s e i r t
M etatheor y; the use of the illustr at ed di c ti onar y [e.8., a " tex tbook " or " how - to book " ]
is the pr actice of M ethodology.

Penr 1. EXINV TENUS BY IANIGAN

1. Cotvttr,tuNICoLoGY= the discipline that studies the discourse of

human communication; the term was first used in the late
1950' s in t he Unit ed S t a t e s a n d i s a s s o c i a t e d ( 1 ) w i t h t h e e a r l y
founders of the International Communication Association,
especially Franklin H. Knower and Elwood Huey Allen Murray,
and (2) with Wendell Johnson, a major scholar in the theory
of General Semantics. The term was first used in a textbook title
byJoseph A. Devito, Communicologl: An Introduction to the Study
of Communication (Harper & Row, 1978). Later, Devito offered
this definition in his The Communication Handbook: A Dictionary:
"Communicology: The study of the processesinuolaed, in the sending
and receiuing of messages;the studry of speechand language disordns
and thnapy " (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, p. 65). The first
usage in a theory book is Richard L. Lanigan, Phenomenologlof
Communication: Mnleau-Ponty's Thematics in Communicologl and
Semiologl (Duquesne University Press, 1988). A precis of ideas
in the present glossary was presented by Lanigan as "Commu-
nicology: Paradigm Dialogue Position Thesis" at the Muy 1985
conference of the International Communication Association
held at Honolulu, Hawaii.
There has been some use of the term in FrarLce (communi-
cologie) and an occasional use of the term as an appropriate
translation of the German Kommunikationsgemeinschaft Com-
municology, as a word composed of both a Latin term (commu-
nis) and a Greek term (logos) follows the precedent estab-
lished by the disciplinary name of "sociology. " The meaning
of "communicology" is founded on its historic connection
t o t he "ideogr aphic " ( p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g ) e m p h a s i s i n t h e o r y
construction and application found within the Geisteswissen-
schaft (human science) traditioo, especially the tradition asso-
ciated with phenomenolosy, both American (Peirce, -fames,
Urban) and European (Cassirer, Jakobson, Jaspers, Merleau-
Ponty, Foucault) .
Basic Reference books include: ( 1) Herbert Spiegelberg,
The Phenomenological Mouement: A Histoncal Introduction, thircl
revised and enlarged edition, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
210 Appendix B

lishers, 1984, especially "Part Five-The Essentials of the Phe-

nomenological Method." (2) Donald PolkinghorDe, Methodol-
ogy for the Human Sciences: Systems of Inquiry, Albany: State
[-lniversity of New York Press, 1983 (3) Richard L. Lanigan,
Phenomenologl of Communication: Merleau-Ponty's T'hematics in
Phenomenology and Semiology,Pittsburgh: Duquesne Universiry
Pr es s , 1988 ; a n d , ( 4 ) E . F . K a e l i n a n d C . O . S c h r a g ( E d s . ) ,
American Phenomenologl: Origins and Deuelopments (Vol . 26:
Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological
Research), Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.

2. CounauNICATIoN THeonY= binary analogue logic that constitutes

possibiliry differentiation (i.e., certai.ry) by combination; simply
formulated as "a choice of context"; strictly formulated as "the
choice of a context by relation which entails a choice by cor-
relation": formalized as:

{Both IBoth /,\r^d] And [Either / Or]l

Note: In discourse, communication theory is exemplified
primarily by declarative sentences with action verbs, e.g., "You
won the Nobel Prize for Peace," and secondarily by imperative
s ent enc es , e . g . , " C o m e i n ! " . U s e o f t h e v e r b o f b e i n g ( " i s " ) ,
rather than an action verb, in declarative sentences shifts the
message from a 'ocommunication theoretic" meaning to an
"information theoretic" signification, e.g., "You are the winner
of the Nobel Pnze for Peace" or "You are saying 'come in'. " The
shif t phenomenon is also known as the "ts/ ought" paradox, i.e.,
information (ontic) versus communication (deontic) .
Historical Note: Michel Foucault suggests that the "law of
c om m unic at i o n " ( s e e J a k o b s o n N o t e b e l o w ) i s d e m o n s t r a t e d
by reversing the hierarchy of Aristotle's "laws of thought" (i.e.,
shifting from a deductive to an ad- or. abductive logic) and
giving primacy to understanding (sauior) the Law of Non-
Contradiction: "Something cannot both be and not be at the
same time." To understand this LN-C, human beings first intuit
that the reverse must be true, otherwise one would not under-
stand the exclusion the law describes. This is Foucault's idea of
ntpture in a system that both defines the old system (jakobson's
"marked term") and gives birth to a new system (Jakobson's
"un-marked term"). Thus, what we understand is {Something
bot h f is and i s n o t p o s s i b l e ] a n d f e i t h e r c a n o r c a n n o t ] b e ] . F o r
example, there is Plato's famous illustration of the pharmakon,
or drug: {Something both [is a medicine and a poison] and
[ eit her c an o r c a n n o t ] b e h e a l t h y ] .
Jakobson Notes: (1) "Two outstanding lineuistic achieve-
ments in particular are based on the existence of invariant
 Appendix B 2l I

semantic values: the ability to introduce words into new context

and the ability to translate. We cannot use or ttnderstand a worcl
in a new context unless we are already familiar with certain
components of the context, i.e., unless these components possess
an invariant semantic value. In translation as well, we orient
ourselves on the basis of the invariant values of the signs"
( Holens r ein, p . 9 8 ) . ( 2 ) " O p p o s i t i o n i s a b i n a r y r e l a t i o n i n
which one term 'univocally, reversibly, and necessarily' calls for
anorher" (p. 122); "A phenomenologcal analysis differs from a
purely logical one by not only examining each dattrm as it is
t in
it s elf , ' but a l s o a s i t i s g i v e n i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s , 'f o r u s '. F r o m
this phenomenological point of view, oppositionappearsas both
an ex c lus ion a n c l a n i n c l u s i o n " t p . 1 2 4 ; m y e m p h a s i s ] .

3. IxponmrroN Tnnony - digital logic that constitutes probability

differentiation (i.e., reduces uncertainty) by exclusion; simply
formulated as "a context of choice"; strictly formulatecl as "the
context of a choice by correlation which entails a context by
relation": formalized as:

{E ither [Eithe r / Or] Or I Both/And] ]

Note: In discourse, information theory is exemplified pri-
marily by interrogative sentences with the verb of being, e.9.,
"Are you the winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace?" and, sec-
ondarily in exclamatory sentences, e.g., "Fire!" Use of an action
verb, rather than the verb of being ( "is") , in interrogative
sentences shifts the message from an "information theoretic"
signification to a "communication theoretic" meaniog, e.8.1
"Tell me if you know the winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace"
or "Stop yelling fire!"

4 . Tnaony - propositions; statements expressing the complelenormatiue

criteria for choosing or selectins contexts ofjudgment; a set of
process ntles. For Aristotle, the sciences of theoria deal with the
metaphysical question of how to undsrstand uhat is ahuays or is
,fo, the most Part; there are three such sciences: philosophy,
mathematics, and physics. Where the criteria are limited (in-
cclmplete), they constitute a model. Where there is only one
criterion, it is a construct. A metatheory is a theory used as the
process (see Hjelmslev terms) of poiesis. Thus, a metatheory
model is known as a paradigm for its constrttcts which are d"ata
or capta.

3. Pnnxrs
based on the Greek concepts of praktike (practical sciences; for
Aristotle there are two: ethics Ithe good person] and politics
I t he good. it y ] ) ; a n a c t i v i t y t h a t h a s a g o a l w i t h i n i t s e l f ; t h e o r y
 212 Appendix B

used u particular context (typically analyticator exlterimental),

it
usually a theory specifyitg a problem in order ro clerive a
soltrtion, i.e ., a Case.Praxis is the opposite of poie.sis.

6. Polnsl3 - procedure, production, petformance,' "making, " horu to make

things, based on the Greek concepts of poietikr (producrive sci-
ences; for Aristotle there are three: Topics,how to make a good
argument; Rltetoric, how make a good speech; poetics, how to
make a good poem) and its subcategory tichni (craft, skill, arr,
applied science); an activitywith an external goal, it brings ipto

ff i::ff',"ff:i;i,r,I"]:';::i".ffi:;,::;'::r;J::ii,:fl
lT[",X;
:;"l:tr
:t,".!{f:*'Hi{; l;I'i;;':r:'f"T;i:?:1ff;
Not e: "m et hod " u s u a l l y i m p l i e s a n a t h e o r e t i c a l c o n d i t i o n ,
i. e. , eit her t he ph e n o m e n a a r e t o o c o r n p l e x f o r a t h e o o r t h e
ry
phenomena are presumecl to be too obvious to require a the ory.
AIso in recen t years, quali tative researchers (.rp". ially in

G',f "j;ffi,':ff
:i",il', ,l?lT
:::ffiT;ilffii :JilS"ii
debates. Do not confuse this usage with "poeric
function" (which is equal to poiesis). -llkobson's

7. MernoDol-o(]Y= practices;actions expressing the completenormatiye

context (trsually eidetic) for makin g a choice (s); u
ryrrem for the
constitution or production of Results. Where the context is
limited (incomplete), it constitutes a procedure.Iu,rherethere is
only one known colltext, it is an exemplar.A methodotogis praxis
used as a sl.stem(see Hjelmslev terms) of poiesi.s.Thu;, a meth-
oclcllogical procedure is known as a prototype for its exemplars
which are data or capta. In short, methodol ogy is "theory by
analogy" where "practice" usuallv implies a knowledg. oi, or
belief in, an action (procedure), rather than the p..formance

i#.T"
f ft;:.J:
clure) .
x:?:.1:"f
ffi il::T1,
ffJ,Hl.,f
Jr::
8. Elorrtc = tltinking; a con ceptual or ide ational process; to make
sense, to be consciotrs of; realizing/realization. Eidetic the ory
construction is tested reflexively by empirical theory consrruc-
tion. The Greek term eidos means appearance, constitutiye
nature, form, type, species, and idea.
FIis torical Note:_In Heidegger's exis tential phen omenoloEry,
the term ontologzcal, and in Ffusserl's transcenclen tal phrnori'"-
nology, the term noesis (noetic), is used to designate eidetic
 Appendix B 213

phenomena and now has general use as a term in the human

s cie n c es .

9 . L,vplRI(AI- = experiencing;a performance process or acticlns; the

activity of doing; to make sienificant, to be engaged with;
actuali ztng/ actuali zatron Empirical theory construction is tested
reflexively by eidetic theory construction. The Greek term
empirikos means experience gained through practice.
Historical Note: In Heidegger's existential phenomenolos/,
the term ontic, and in Husserl's transcendental phenomenol-
o$/, the term noema (noematic), is used to designate empirical
phenomena and now has general use as a term in the human
s c ienc es .

t0. RE.tt.tzATIoN = capability; consciousnessof experience;the process of

constituting a subject/object of consciousness; what can be
thought by a person.

1 1 . Ac;ru,ql lzATtoN - ability; experienceof consciousness;the process of

constituting a subject/oblect of experience; what can be lived
by u per s on.
Historical Note: Aristotle ref.erred to the process as entelechy,
which means "actualization from potential." For Aristotle, poetic
d,iscoursemoves from the actual to the potential, whereas in
rhetoric the discourse moves from the potential to the actual.

12. Expt,l(ATIoN = method of analysis or criticism; from the French

expl'icationde lexte,literally the "explication of a text," i.e., recon-
stituting a concrete message by analysis or criticism. For ex-
ample, if an argument has the form of a thesis (I) with three

::?::,*,'*
"il,',!' ::'l'X?,L
;,:i'#'lHI? i#
iT;Ii,'r;
s t r bpoint s ( 2, X, \ | also apply to the thesis (I).The idea with
this methodology is that the choices of content(what is explicit)
all adhere to the stntcture (relationship) implicit in the thesis
(argument being made). The structural characteristics of (A,
B, C) must be shown to occur in (2, X, Y) . For example in this
case, (A, B, C) literally belong to the Roman alphabet, there
is a hierarchy of letters in this alphabet (A-first, B=Second,
C= t hir d) , and, all t h e l e t t e r s a r e c a p i t a l s . S u c h a c o n t e n t a n d
strtrcture is explicated by an analysis where the new (2, X, \0
c ont ent and s t r uc t ur e m a t c h e s t h e o r i g i n a l ( A , B , C ) . T h u s , ( 2 ,
X, \| also belong to the Roman alphabet, have the same dif-
ferential hierarchy (Z-first Ito last] , X=Second Ito last] , Y=third
I t o las t ] ) , and, all t h e l e t t e r s a r e c a p i t a l s .
A similar result occurs with criticism by explication. Thus,
2t4 Appendix B

within the Roman alphabet, A is a primary beginnins and Z ts

a primary endirg, B and Y are secondvry, while C ancl X are
tertiary respectively, and, both sets of printed capital letters
present a precise differentiation from (l ) each other as letters
per se, (2) from each other as sets of letters, ancl (3) each other
simultaneously as individual letters and letter sets by contrast
to both lower case letters and script letters.
A more familiar, but complex example, is in the category of
semantic meaning where connotation (intension) is an expli-
cation by analysis and denotation (extension)is an analysis by criti-
cism. Thus, encyclopedias help you analyze meanirg, while
dic t ionar ies help y o u c r i t i q u e m e a n i n g .
St ill anot her e x a m p l e o f e x p l i c a t i o n i s t h e c o m p a r i s o n
between an "envoi" and a "coda" (both terms originally taken
from "literary or rhetorical criticism") . An Enuoi (French for
' m es s age' ) is a m e s s a g e s e n t t o t h e r e a d e r a t t h e e n d o f a w r i t t e n
document, a sort of explicit "moral of the story"i technicallv,
it is a message defrned by "same structure, different content"
that "says" the same thing as the original message (recall the
analytic or critical comparison example of A-B-C and Z-Y-X
above). A Coda (Latin for "tail" as in "the tail that wags the dog")
is a "reversing" message sent to the reader at the end of awritten
doc um ent , ( also a s o r t o f e x p l i c i t " m o r a l o f t h e s t o r y " ) ;
technically, it it is a message defined by "same content, different
structure" that "says" something dilfennl from the orisinal
message (review the analytical or critical comparison above, but
substitute X-Y-2, a new structure for Z-Y-X, (an old structure
becauseit is the old structure already present in A-B-C).

13. Expu.tlATIoN = method of experience or experiment; from the

French reduction de texte, literally "reduction of the text," i.e.,
reconstituting an experience (as a form of precise) or experi-
ment (as a form of imaginatiue unriation). As explanation by
experience, a familiar example of the precise (or "summary"
experience) is the usual "book review" that one frnds in pro-
fessional journals, i.e., a scaled down version of the structure
and content of the original full-length book that provides the
same approximate experience of the full-length book. Turning
to explanation by experiment, a familiar example of imagi-
native variation is the usual "book review essay" on a given book
( or t opic am ons s e v e r a l b o o k s ) i n a j o u r n a l , i . e . , t h e s t a t e m e n t
of the book(s) main thesis (argument ancl evidence; structure
and content) contrasted ancl compared to the reviewer's thesis
as an "imagination" that "varies" the original thesis by chang-
i.g or modi$,i.g the original argument and evidence. Most
authors would prefer a positive precise as the "review" of their
 Appendix B 215

book, but frequently all they get is a negative imaginative

variation "review" (which usually prompts a letter to the jour-
nal editor from the author claiming the reviewer clid not
understand the book) .

1 4 . ACTA - is that "which was t<t be done" (Q.E.F.= quod erat facien-
dum). That which is createdas evidence either by conuentionor
inaention.In Nfred Schutz's phenomenology, acta is associated
with capta (acting; an action) ancl data (activity; an act).

1 5 . C,qprn
inaeniendum). That which is taken as evidence or discoury Qlis-
closure). Discovery is associated with truth as the usual trans-
lation of the Greek aletheia (lit. uncovering or "clearing") . In
Nfred Schtitz's phenomenol.gy, capta is associated with the in-
ord,er-to-motiue marked by the future perfect verb from, i.e., what
"shall have been" the case (the terminus ad quem or movement
toward a destination point as a boundury condition; borrowed
from Cicero's De Oratore). In Merleau-Ponry's phenomenolosl,
c apt a is "t r ans ce n d e n t " ; c a p a b i l i r y , " I c a n ; I a m a b l e 1 s - "
Not e: Capt a a n d t h e d i s c o v e r y - d i s c l o s u r e p r o c e s s a r e
especially well illustrated by Studs Terkel, the noted Chicago
writer and radio interviewer, who uses a semiotic phenomenol-
ogic al appr oac h t o i n t e r v i e w i n g . H e e x p l a i n s h i s m e t h o d
("Interviews and Interviewers" fAugust 1970], Audiotape BB-
2550, Pacifica Tape Library, Los Angeles, Calif.) by saying that
he has two rules for interviewing: ( I ) Respect the Person; and
(2) Listen. You respect the person by understanding that s/he
(a) has "no rule" for answerirg, (b) is accepting "vulnerability"
by talking, and (c) finds the experience a "surprise." You listen
by hearing the "ranelatoryphras€," i.e., that (a) the phrase is a
signifier, it names the experieRce for the first time (surprise),
(b) the phrase is a signified, it defines the experience (r,ulnera-
biliry) , and (c) the phrase is a sign; the experience is reflexive
self-consciousness (No Rule) .

1 6 . Dnra = is that "which was to be demonstrated" (Q.E.D. - quod srat

d,emonstrandum), that which ts giuen as evidence or inuention. In
Nfred Schutz's phenomenolosl, data is associated with the
because-motiue marked b;, the pluperfect verb form, i.e., what
"had been" the case (the terminus a quo or movement away
from a starti.g point as a boun dury condition, borrowed from
Cicero's De Oratore). In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenolo$/, data
is "immanent"; ability, "I think, I feel" (a la Descartes) .

17. CoxcnETE = The coherenceof a whole or category before anything

is abstracted from it. For example, because a declarative sen-
 216 Appendix B

t enc e s hows t he c ohe r e n c e o f a c o m p l e t e ( w h o l e ) t h o u g h t , i t

can be abstracted into the parts of speech (whole - the parts
j3;:*r3l'::;1
.,lHH;i'ri,l:,5Til[!'i);,::i'iffi,:TJl;,1
j. , r c t ions , et c . ) .

18. Assrnecr = The selectionof parts (empirical) or aspects (eidetic)

from a whole or category upon which to focus attention. Note:
"abstract" does not mean something that lacks existence in
realiry.
19. P,qnTIC;UIARIZE= To reduce an initial class or category to exclude
(more) dissimilar items.

20. GEwEnaT,IZE= To extenda parti cularized class or category to include

(more) similar items.

21 . T\t ot,Ocy - trthenomena(Gk., plural); the class, set, or group to

which a rypification belongs; the typology is eid,eticwhere the
original rypification is constituted by u necessary condition; the
rypology is empincal where the original rypification is consti-
tttted bv sufficient condition.
Notei Eidetic typology is the counterpart to deductive demon-
strationin logical or mathematical research method (sometimes
called interpolation); empirical rypology is the counterpart to in-
ductive generalizationin statistical research method (sometimes
called extrapolation) .

22. TYprrtcxrION - phenomenon (Gk., singular) ; the appearance (of the

subject, object) which has meaning as a direct result of being
(expressed, perceived as) a referent by necessary or sufficient
c ondit ion.
Note: See the capta entr/, especially the rntelalory phrase
which is an example of rypification. Other examples are Freud's
notions of a "slip of the tongue" in speaking, "a slip of the pen"
in writins, and the "dream symbol" in thinking. ln grammar,
the "parts of grammar" such as nouns, pronouns, verbs, ad'
verbs, adjectives, prepositions, and conjunctions function as
rypifications by namirg a function ("parts of speech") that is a
nec es s ar y c ondit ion ( i. e., t h e " s u b j e c t " ; w h a t e v e r y o t t " t h i n k " )
and a sufficient condition (i.e., the "predicate"; whatever you
"ruy" or "write" after or before you "think"). See also the explication
entry.

23. Arru,yrlcnl - use of dnductiuelogic fRule + Case - Result] . In the

samecontext {Rule} rwo phenomena {Case}are internallycom-
pared {Result};Analysisrequires sufficienq(see"Sufficient Con-
that the
dition") as a standard otjudgment, i.e., the eid,eticclaim
 Appenrtix B 217

comparison holds true for this and subsequent cases (particular

tokensand typescannot be clistinguishecl) and that the truth of
the claim (tonality) is dependent on the case(s) chosen. Ana-
lytical models of theory construction are tested reflexively by
Critical models (an internal test) and by Experiential models
(an external test) .
Note: Two diffennl "phenomena" be the samephenome-
non at different times /places. This -uy is a k"y point in the study
of discursive phenomena, especially with regard to Alfred
Sc hut z ' s t em po r a l m o d e l o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n : ( 1 )
Predecessors = perSons who never can share time/ space, e .g.,
you and your great-grand parents; (2) Consociates [Associates]
-- persons who do share trrne/space, e.e.,
/ou and your class-
mates; (3) Contemporaries = persons who share time, but not
space, e.g., /ou and the President of France; and (4) Successors
- persons who do not share trme/space, but can, e.9., /ou and
your sreat-grand children.

24. Crurlcer, - use of ad,ductiuelogic [Rule + Result - Case (universal;

a priori) l. In diffennl contexts {Rule}, an extemal comparison
{ Res ult } es t abl i s h e s t h e i d e n t i t y o f t w o p h e n o m e n a {C a s e };
criticism requires necessity(see "Necessary Conclition") as a
standard ofjudgment, i.e., the eidetic claim that the compari-
son holds true in all typesof the case (universal; no exceptions,
all tokensfit all Vpes) and that the truth of the claim (tonalitfl
is obvious beforeit is experienced (a priori). Critical models clf
theory construction are tested reflexively by Analytical models
(an internal test) and by Experimental models (ar-t exterltal
tesr) .

25. ExpEnIMENTAT,= use of inductiueloeic {Case + Result- Rule}. With

fwo phenomena {Case},'an internal comparjson {Result} estab-
lishes the same context {Rule}. Experimentation requires actu-
aliry as a standard of judgment. Actuality is the empirical
presence/ absence of a phenomena which validates the pres-
ence/ absence of another phenomena. An experiment requires
actuality as afunction of probability as a standard of judgment, i.e.,
the empirical clarm that the comparison holds true for this and
subsequent cases (particular tokens and typescannot be distin-
guished) and that the truth of the claim (tonalifr) is dependent
on the case(s) chosen. E,xperimental models of theory con-
strtrction are tested reflexively by Experiential models (an
internal test) and by Critical models (atr external test) .
Note: E,xperimentation is information theoretic, i.e., proba-
bility can make you more and more certain of how you are
choosing, but it never tells you (defines) whatyou are choosing
or have chosen. See the statistic entry.
 218 Append,ixB

26. ExpnnIENTIAL - use of abductiue logic [Rule + Result = Case (Par-

ticular; a posteriori) ]. In the same context {Rule}, an intnnal
comparison {Result} establishes the identity of two phenomena
{Case}. L,xperience requires possihilityasa standard ofjudgment,
i.e., the empirical claim that the comparison holds true for this
tyQeof case (particular; all tokensfit the definition of the Vpe)
and that the truth of the claim (tonalit) is obvious after it is
ex per ienc ed ( a po s t e r i o r i ) . E , x p e r i e n t i a l m o d e l s o f t h e o r y
construction are tested reflexively by Experimental models (an
internal test) and by Analytical models (an external test).
Note: Something is logically either possible or it is nor.
PclssteILITYshould not be confused with the positivist idea of
"low probability"; rather, possibiliry is a "claim for immediacy"
meaning that you can think of (eidetic possibility) or experi-
ence (empirical possibiliry) one completely describable case of
the phenomenon. For example, you can draw a picture of'the
mythical animal called a "unicorn" (eidetic possibility of the
empirical), you can say that "Buddha" is the name of god
(empirical possibiliry of the eidetic) , you can say that your grear-
grandchildren will have been eirls (eidetic possibility of the
eidetic), and you can say that 'John and Mary" will have been
t he nam es of t wo o f y o u r g r e a t - g r a n d c h i l d r e n (empirical
pos s ibilir y of t he em p i r i c a l ) .
Not e: Ex per ienc e i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r e r i c , i . e . , p o s s i -
biliry can make you more and more certain of whal you are
choositrS, but it never tells you (defines) howyou are choosing
or have chosen. Thus, most puzzles, ambiguities, and para-
doxes rely on the fact that compared phenomena are incor-
rectly and simultaneously thought to be both eidetic and
em pir ic al.

27. SurptcllF-NTCorvolrtoN - The logical criterion by which rhe a'ctu-

alization of one phenomenon is constituted, validated, and
confirmed by the a,ctualizationof another phenomenon.
Eidetic Example: Within Information Theory, either a "yes"
or "no" choice provides the same information, i.e., affirms the
ex is t enc e of . t he c ont e x t ; e a c h c h o i c e i s a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n
f or t he ot her c hoic e.
Empirical Example: Answer the followirg questions: "Can
you tell a lie?" Every answer is a sufficient condition for any
other, regardless of what you said. Note that replies like "maybe"
and "I don't know" function the same way as "yes" and "no" be-
cause all replies do not haue any meaning, each one merely signi-
fies you have chosen and, therefbre, confirms that you recog-
nize and adhere to the context within which you are supposed
to choose. You know how to play the game, but you still do not
 Appendix B 2r9

whatthe game is, e.9.,fincling the word you want in a dictionary.

28. NscnssARYCoxolrloN = The logical criterion by which the reali-

z a ti o n o f o n e p henomenon i s consti tuted, val i dated, and
confirmed by the realizationof another phenomenon.
Eidetic Example:Within Communication Theory,any choice
g::'ffi"'?;-,?';"J:::H thechoiceisa necessary
-'aning;
Empirical Example: Respond with a complete declarative
sentence to the followi.g question: "What is your name, ?ge ,
and place of birth?" This question and your answer are a neces-
sary condition for the meanins of each other, regardless of what
you said. All human beings know before they respond to this
question that it will have meaning (the a priori characteristic of
whatis said) and that the particular meaning cannot be changed
once it is expressed (the uniuersalcharacteristic of what is said).
You know what the game is, but you do not know hou to play,
e.g., finding the meaning you want in an enqclopedia.

29. Tnurs CoxDITION - The logical criterion by which the realization

of one phenomena is constituted, validated, and confirmed by
the actualization of another phenomenon. All judgments are
either "true" or "false."
Eidetic Example: "I always speak the truth, especially now
that you are listening."
E,mpirical Example: "Tomorrow's sunrise will be the same as
today's sunrise. "
Note: The general failure of deduction in the physical and
social sciences as a truth conditional method led to the current
use of induction where only judgments of fakity (argument by
counter-example) can be demonstrated as an empirical possi-
bility (the "theory of falsification") or statistical probabiliry (the
"null hy pot hes is " ) .

30. Qu,+xrlrATN'E MEruoDoLoGy - the practice of using a truth con-

dition method in order to compare and contrast choices made
within a given context of magnitude, probability, or possibility
clata. The natural science traclition or lVatunttissenschoft ap-
proach of sys/ematicjudgment, i.e., the procedure of moving
from (l) hypostatization, to (2) uerisimilitude, to (3) explanation,
to (4) statement. This procedure is frequently, if carelessly,
referred to as "experimental" or "scientific" method.

31. MerusMATI(l = a truth condition methodology which measures

::#,ff
l;1Tff:ffilJ*lnr; ;;."Tt
"',S; IJ,#],'i)f,l))
to a new point of reference (that which is "5;rounded") .
220 Appendix B

Empirical Example: "My breadbox is larger than your apart-

m ent " or "W hen it c o m e s t o c a r s , b i g g e r i s b e t t e r . "
Eidetic Example: "Literal meaning allows for easy translation
in a foreigr language."
Note: In the arts ancl humanities context, the tropes of
metonymy(substance / attribute comparison) and rynecdoche(part/
whole comparison) exempliry d magnitude measure in dis-
course. See tropic entry. Also, a clifference by degree in logic is
known as a rleontic logtc, usually marked by the presence of the
wor d "s hould" in a s t a t e m e n t , e . g . , " T h i s s h o u l d b e a g o o d
movie." In this logical context, sociologists often use the name
"frrounded theory. "

32. Srnusrlc = a truth condition methodology which measures proba-

bility (difference by kind and degree, e.e., two small versus one
large), usually fronl tlvo assumed reference points ("dependent
variables") to two new pclints ("independent variables") . The
usual format is a "two-by-two" matrix (e.g., either "fwo" or
"one"; eit her "s m all" o r " l a r e e " ) a n d i s i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r e t i c
( eit her / or c hoic e) .
E,mpirical Example: "A small bird in the hand is worth two
big bir ds in t he bus h . "
Eidetic E,xample: "E,ither my translation is literal or meta-
phorical and it will be understood that way or not."
Note: In the arts and humanities context, the tropes of simile
(positive part/ attribute comparison) and irony (negatle part/
at t r ibut e c om par is on ) e x e m p l i f y a p r o b a b i l i t y m e a s u r e i n
discourse. Also, contemporary notions of causalityin both the
hum anit ies and t he s c i e n c e s r e l y o n " M i l l 's M e t h o d " o f i n d u c -
tive loeic $ohn Stuart Mill , Systemof Logtc, 1843):
( I ) Method of Agreement,when two things happen together,
one is the cause and one is the effect;
(2) Method of Dffirence,when two thinss happen together,
except for one aspect in each thing, one aspect is the cause
and the other is the effect;
(3) Method of Agreement and Diffennce, when two things
happen together, have nothing in common except for one
as pec t in eac h t hin g , o n e a s p e c t i s t h e c a u s e a n d t h e o t h e r
is the effect:
(4) Method of ConcomitantVariation,when two thinss change
in the same wvf , one is the cause and the other is the effect;
and
(5) Method of Residueslor "residues by mistake "] , when all
the causes/ effects are know about two things, except for two
aspects, one aspect is the cause and the other is the effbct.
Because the methods are information theoretic. how cause
 Appendix B 221

and effect work is knowr, but uhat either the cause or the effectis
remains unknown.

33. I-clclt; - a truth conclition methodology which measlrres possibility

(difference by kind, e.g., ail edible oranse verstrs a rotten
apple), usually from a known or assumed ref'erence point (a
classor typesuchas "edible") to a new point (that which rs a nlem-
berof t he c las s s uc h a s " o r a n g e " o r " a p p l e " ) , e . S . , " O n e r o t t e n
apple will spoil the barrel" or "The best translation is the one
that communicates." The trope of- metaphor (substance/whole
comparison) exemplifies a possibility measure in discourse.
Note: A discussion of "possibiliW" occurs in the glossary entry
for experiential.
Historical Note: In the human sciences ancl philosophy, the
logics of Charles Sanders Peirce (CollectedWorks,2.6l9 - 644)
are a standard of reference; he called thern "normative semiotic
m odels ":

( 1) Deduc t io n : R t r l e + C a s e = R e s u l t . *
(2) Induction: Case + Result = Rule. [see statisticentry1
(3) Abduction: Rule + Resttlt = Case. {particular; a pos-
teriori I
(4) Adduction: Rule + Result - Case. {universal; a priori}
*Theor y Constr uction fr equentl y fol l ow s a for m al deduc ti v e m odc l and i s
known as a Pr opositional C aLc ul us c om pos ed of' ( 1) pr i m i ti v e s y m bol s t( ) r epr e-
sent founclational concepts , ( 2) r ul es of for m ati on to c <tnnec t the s y r nbol s , ( 3)
axiom s ( clr pclstulates) , i .e., fc x tndati onal c onc epts that ar e tl ot pr <l v abl e atr d,
ther efbr e, m ust be ( a) c ons i s tent, ( b) c onr pl ete, ar td ( c ) i nc l eper tdent of'otr e
angther , ( 4) r ules of tr ans fbr m ati on that al l ow fi r r ( a) s ubs ti tuti otr and ( b)
infer ence, and ( 5) theor em s , i .e., c onc c pts that ar e pr ( ) v er - r by tr ans for r ni ng
axiom s. See.]oseph G. Il r ennan, A H andhook oJ Logz c ,2nc 1. ed., N ew Yor k :
Har per and Row, 1961 , p. 126 fI'.

From the perspective of semiotic phenomenology, the fol-

lowing seneral relations of terminology and procedllre can be
treated as equivalents:

Mefleau-Ponty Husserl Peirce (2.227-229)

HORIZON=
DESCRI I PTI O N= RU[.F,= OB.Jl,(lT
RI,DUCTION= FIEI.D= RL,SUI-T= GROLJND
INTERPRETATION= CIORE(FOCUS)= (ASE = INTERPRETANT*

*intnpr etant - - a sign of a s i gn; " i r tter pr eter " = a per s on w ho us c s An " i nter -
pr etant" to m ake a.jucl gr nent, ei ther ei deti c or em pi r i c al ; the i n[e r pr etatr t i s
the sam e concept as () r eeor y Bates on's deuter ul eur ni ng or " l c ar ni ng how ttl
lear n"; and, it is sim ilar to M i c hel F ouc aul t's s ntti ur ( ) r " ul l der s tandi ng; k nr tw
how. "
222 Appendix B

34. RgnroRlc - discoltrse as praxls; following the general discussion in

Pla to ' s d ia lo g u e Sophi st. there are four rhetori cs consi dered as
stn r ctu r e s ( like lo gi c) of thought and expressi on:

M a ie u tic: q u e stio n s that gi ve (data) or take (capta) answ ers.

Im a ie u tic is a fo rm of-the tropes si mi l e and i ronyJ
Rhe toric: Answers that sive (data) or take (capta) questions.
Irlretoric is a form of the trope rnetaphor]
So p h istic: An swe r s t hat si ve (data) or take (capta) answ ers.
[so p h istic is a fo rm of the trope metonymy]
Dia le ctic: Qu e stio n s that gi ve (data) or take (capta) questi ons.
fd ia le ctic is a fb r m of the trope synecdoche]

35. Tnoptc = discoursea,spoiesis,'"tropic logic" in the USA is associated

with the Kenneth Burke model of "master tropes" and their
"lit er al or r ealis t i c a p p l i c a t i o n s " ( m e t a p h o r = p e r s p e c t i v e ,
metonymy - reduction, syneccloche = representation, irony -
dialec t ic ) ; in Eur op e , i t i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e c o n c e p t o f " l e
m6me et I'autre" that translates from the French as both "self
and other" and "same and different" thereby yielditg the ratio
{Self: Same :: Other : Different}. For Merleau-Ponty, the Self-
Other ratio is the relation of c hiasm. For Foucault, the Same-
Different ratio is the relation of interstices.ln the semiotic phe-
nomenology of Michel Foucault, poiesis operates the "law of
communication" within the "quadrilateral mod,elof discorlrse"as
int er pr et ed by Lan i g a n ( s e e f i g u r e B ) .

36. Qu,e.t,trATIV!- Mar.goDolocly = the practice of using a necessary

and/ or sufficient condition method in order to compare and
contrast choices made within a taken context of artifactual,
symbolic, substantial, or I'ormal Capta. The human science
tradition or Geiste.swissenschaft approach of systemicjudgment,
i. e. , t he pr oc edur e o f m o v i n g f r o m ( 1 ) h y p o t h e s i s ,t o ( 2 )
uertfication, to (3) explication, to (1) proposition. This procedure
is frequently, if carelessly, referred to as "artistic," "hllmanistic,"
or "naturalistic" method. The use of "naturalistic" is especially
trnf ortunate since it is the positivist view of science that is based
on "nature." This is one reason why "cultural studies" and
"interpretive studies" (hermeneutics) are becomitg standard
synonyms for qualitative research.

37 . Assl,nroRlc = obseruationand its losic, rhetoric, and tropic appli-

cation, especially as Historiography; consciousness of what is
actual or occtrrring; the study of Art{actual Capta;discourse that
relies orl synecd,oche as a tropic structure. In research applica-
tion, arr assertoric often leads to an apocleictic in praxis (see the
praxis entry) .
 Appendix B 223

Em pir ic al Ex a m p l e : " T h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t i n t h e r n i d s t o f a
fielcl study grabs a stoneby the edge of'a small stream of water."
S/ he has obs er v e d ( c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) t h i s o b j e c t a s a " s t o n e " ;
s/he has taken (capta) this object otrt of nature (fact) and into
culture (artifact
( ex per ienc e) o, n o t , i n w h i c h c a s e i t r e m a i n s p a r t o f n a t u r e .
Eidetic Example: "27 Atrgust 1789, Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of Citizens, by the Nzrtional Assembly of France,
Article l5: L,very communiry has a right to demand of all its
agent s an ac c oun t o f t h e i r c o n d u c t . " I n t h e m i d s t o f t h e F r e n c h
Revolution, the men and women observed (consciousness)
themselves as generic beings "IHu-] Man"; therefore, they t.ook
(capta) themselves out of the revolution (fact = "Declaration
of Right s ") and i n t o g o v e r n m e n t ( a r t t f u c t - " N a t i o n a l A s s e m -
bly ") by t heir v e r y a c t i o n o f " 2 7 A u g u s t 1 7 8 9 " ( e x p e r i e n c e ) . I f
there were no action, Culture would remain constant.
Historical Note: Contemporary science generally holcls the
nineteenth century view of neutral or mental monism offerecl by
Ernst Mach: "natllre" is a construct of mind, therefore, in
methodological terms nature cannot be known directly; it is
known only by human observation. Therefore, nature (an
"external" system) and mind (an "internal" system,) are treated
alike as the product of inferencesabout human exlterience.

38. THEr,tnrIC = knowledgt and its logic, rhetoric, and tropic applica-
tion, especially as Ethnosraphy; consciousness of what is real
or occurred; the stucly of SymbolicCapta. (Sch utz: the "because-
m ot iv e" or "what h a d b e e n " ) ; d i s c o u r s e t h a t r e l i e s o n s i m i l eo r
irony as a tropic structure. In research application, a thematic
often leads to a problematic in praxis (see the praxis entry) .
Em pir ic al Ex a m p l e : - " T h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t i n t h e m i c l s t o f a
field study srabs a tool by the edge ofa small stream of water."
S/he has observed (consciousness) this object as a "cleaved
stone for cutting"; s/he has taken (capta) this objecr out of'
nature (fact - broken stone) and into culture (.symbolicafiifact
= s elf c ons c iousn e s s : c l e a v e d e c l g e s c u t ) b y p i c k i n g i t u p
(experience) as eithn self-evident (to one's Self) or as evidence
f or anot her being ( a n O t h e r ) .
Eidetic Example: "27 August 1789, Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of Citizens, by the National Assembly of France,
Ar t ic le 15: Ev er y c o m m u n i t y h a s a r i g h t t o d e m a n d o f a l l i t s
agent s an ac c oun t o f t h e i r c o n d u c t . " I n t h e m i d s t o f 't h e F r e n c h
Revolution, the men and women observed (consciousness)
themselves as politically generic beings "Citizens"; therefore,
they took (capta) themselves out of the revolution (fact =
"Rights") and into governmen t (symbolicartifuct- "comrnuniry")
224 Append,ixB

by their very action of. "Article 15" (experience).

39. Pnoet.EMATIC = intuition and its logic, rhetoric, and tropic appli-
cation, especially as Senriology; consciousness of what is ideal
or is capable of occurring; the study of substantial capta. (Schutz:
the "in-order-to-motive" or "what shall have been") ; discourse
that relies on metonymJas a tropic structure. In research appli-
cation, a problematic often leads to a thematic in poiesis (see
the poiesis entry) .
Empirical Example: "The anthropologist in the midst of a
field study grabs a knirfeby the edge of a small stream of water."
S/he has observed (consciousness) this object as a "stone cleaved
on tuo sides for parlicularcutting"; s/ he has taken (capta) this
object out of nature (fact - stone broken in a particular manner
inclicatirg purpose) ancl into culture (substantial symbolic artifuct

picking it up (experience) as both evidence of my Self and

S:#il, 9i?x,!r!:,3ri'Jl".crarationor rheRights

' ";',?.:l'
of Man and of Citizens, by the National Assembly of France,
Article 15: Every community has a right to demand of all its
agent s an ac c ollnt o f t h e i r c o n d u c t . " I n t h e m i d s t o f t h e F r e n c h
Rev olut ion, t he m e n a n d w o m e n o b s e r v e d ( c o n s c i o u s n e s s )
themselves as politically empowsredgeneric beings " [Hu-] Man
and,Citizens"; therefore, they took (capta) themselves out of the
revolution (fact = "an account") and into government (substan-
tial symbolic artifact - " c7)ry community") by their very action "to
dem and" ( ex per ie n c e ) .

40. ApooElclrtc - undsrstanding and its losic, rhetoric, and tropic ap-
plication, especially as Phenomenology; consciousness of what
is factual or must occtrr; the stucly of F'ormal C^o,Pta. (Husserl's
factum); discourse that relies on metaphor as a tropic structrlre.
In research application, ?r apodeiitic often leads to an as-
sertoric in poiesis (see the poiesisentry) .
Em pir ic al E, x am p l e : " T h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t i n t h e m i d s t o f 'a
fielcl study srabs a uteapon by the edge of a small stream of
water." S/he has observed (consciousness) this object as a
"stone cleaved on two sides for penetrating and cutting skin";
s/he has taken (capta) this object out of nature (fact - stone
broken in a shnrp point) and into culture (formal substantial sJm-
bolic artifact - self consciousness: a sharp point makes killing
easier) by picki.g it up (experience) as evidence of another be-
i.g (the consciousexperience of an Other like my Selfl. Note that
"Self is the founclation or reference point of judgment fsee
Mathematical entry1 ; this is also the logic of Husserl's famous
 Appendix B 225

thesis that "subjectivity is Intersubjectivity. "

Eidetic Example: "27 Ausust 1789, Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of Citizens, by the National Assembly of France,
Article 15: Every community has right to clemand of all its
^
agents an account of their conduct." In the miclst of the French
Revolution, the men and women observed (consciousness)
themselves as political\ empowned a,nd embodied generic beings,
i.e., "Agents"; therefore, they took (capta) themselves out of the
revolution (fact - "an account of') and into government (formal
substantial symbolic artifuct = "every community has a right") by
t he ex em plar of "t h e i r c o n d u c t " ( e x p e r i e n c e ) .

41 . HrsroRIocRApHy = Assertoric narrative using artifactual capta

with a qualitative logic, rhetoric, or tropic of correlation; by
tradition (Geistesgeschichte)in the discipline of History, an as-
sertoric narrative rs analytical, therefore, validity is obtained in
the application of a critical review. Historiosraphy is the sys-
temic study of human cultures with particular attention to "time
binding" (Ruesch & Bateson) relationships of an individual
(Lebenswelt)and the community (Cemeinscharft).

12. ErnxocRApHy = Thematic narrative using symbolic capta with a

qualitative logic, rhetoric, or tropic of correlation; by tradition
(I(ulturuissenschaft) in the discipline of Anthropology, a the-
matic narrative is experiential,therefore, validity is obtained in
the application of an experimentalreview. Ethnography is the
systemalicstudy of human cultures with particular attention to
"space binding" (Ruesch & Bateson) relationships of a society
(Gesellschaft)and the culture (Weltanschauung).

43. Snutot,OGy = Problematic narrative using substantial capta with

a qualitative logic, rhetoric, or tropic of relation; by tradition
(lVomotheticScience- "generalizing"jud,gment) in ttie discipline of
Linguistics, a problematic narrative is expenmental, therefore,
validiry is obtained in the application of an experientialreview.

::f.:ffi:',T"TTii:%,:'l;T:HU?llffil#"TKJ'::li::
the system of representation); in general, it is the study of "sign
pr oduc t ion" or m es s a g e s ( i . e . , t h e p r o c e s s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) .
"semiotics" is a synonym for "communication" where commu-
nication includes the study of human, animal, and machine
"languages" as icon, index, or symbol systems.

44. Stc;x = (l) in American phenomenology ("the theory of catego-

ries"), the famous definition is that of Charles Sanders Peirce
(CollectedPapers, 2.228), "A sign, or representamen,is something
which stands to somebody for something in some respect or
226 Append,ix B

capacity." Peirce's definition translates the Medieval Latin clefi-

nition of the sign from the perspective of Scholastic philosophy:
'::T':"'#J!: " rhere aremanvtvpesor signs'but the
:!':,"o
"Art Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes
merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses,
jtrst the same, whether any such object actttally exists or not"
(2.247).

n':i};il:,'::'?Jw.T-;"if:.1
"An Index is a sisn which refers tcl the Object that it denotes

lJ,f;b?iJff l,",.,
LJi,I13
by virtue of a law, Jsually an association of general icleas,which
operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to
t hat O bjec t " ( 2 . 2 4 9 ) .
(2) In European structuralism, the famous definition is that
of Ferclinand de Saussure, "I call the combination of a concept
and a sound-image a sign " "I propose to retain the word sign
[signe] to designate the whole and to replace conceptand sound-
image respectively by signiJied,fsignifie] and signifin [signiJf,ant]"
(Course in General Linguistics, p. 67) .
Note: "Sisnifrer" (Sr) refers to the process of expression; the
correct translation of "sisnifiant" is signzfiing. "Signified" (Sd)
refers to the process of perception. In Merleau-Ponty's semiotic

ll' ilil:i:':fl'il;,!InFJfl"u#:
",ffiii i:ffi::5f:
signifiers are "subjects of consciousness" and signifieds are "ob-
jec t s of c ons c io u s n e s s . "

45. Pnl- x oM ENO Loc Y

with a qualitative loeic, rhetoric, or tropic of foundation; by
tradition (kleographic Science= "indiuidualizing" judgment) in the
discipline of Philosophy, an apodeictic narrative is critical,
therefore, validity is obtained in the application of an analytical
review. In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenolos/, a reflexive three
s t ep m et hodolo g y o f ( 1 ) d e s c r i p t i o n , ( 2 ) r e d u c t i o n , a n d ( 3 )
int er pr et at ion o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ( t h e s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t o f
consciousness; "consciousness of - - -") . SemioticPhenomenologyis
a human science approach to research consisting of (l ) the
des c r ipt ion of th e s i s n , ( 2 ) r e d u c t i o n o f t h e s i g n i f i e r , a n d ( 3 )
interpretation of the signifiecl.

16. Fonu = ? p?rticular system(see systementrl). To illustrate the idea,

a clictionary entry sives a complete description of hou some-
thinq is described so that you can recosnize what each of its
characteristics do not haue in common and you understand that
each characteristic is definitional. The individual "how" is a
 AppenclixB 227

PROBLEMATIG:

ronic}
{Paradigmatic/Synch
Selection
I
I
I
I
Combination -){SemioticProcess;
r--
{Syntagmatic/Diachronic} I Permutation)
I

v
{SemioticSystem; Commutation}

TH E MA TIC :

SYSTEM-# HIERARCHY{class(- PROCESS

of

4I
I
II
MANIFESTATION
[selectionbetwepnhierarchiesJ

FORM SUBSTANCE I
tconstantin manifestationl [variablein manifestation]I
-l

I
^
\/;

MUTATION
i
I
[functionbetweenfirqtdegreedenvates]
,, i
I

t( )
\ :
I
CORRELATION RELATION

jio;i '"*L
ll'
[memberof a paradigml [memberof a chain{syntagm}]
Fig u r e 1 6 . Sa u ssure's P robl emati c and H j el msl l ev's Thernati c.
228 Append,ixIl

fornr; in semantics it is called a denotationand in losic it is called

an int ens ion ( no t e s p e l l i n g ; n o t " i n t e n t i o n " ) .
Eidet ic Ex am p l e : A a A a A c h a r a c t e r s h e r e a r e a l l f o r m s o f
the first letter of the Roman alphabet. Your abiliry to recognize
form allows you to decode the handwriting of most people.
E,mpirical Example: Apples, oranges, bananas and tomatoes
are all forms of fruit. Your ability to recognize form allows you
to clecode what you consider edible.

47. SrnucTURF-: a particular process(see processentry). To illustrate the

idea, an en()cloped,iaentry gives a complete description of uhat
something is so that you can recognize what all of its charactn-
istic.shaue in common and you understand that one characteris-
tic (the tone) is defrnitional for the typology,although that par-
ticular characteristic does not define the token. The common
"what" is a structure; in semantics it is called a connotationand
in logic it is called an extension.
Eidet ic Ex am p l e : A A A A a l l h a v e a " p o i n t e d t o p " ( t o n e )
which defines a "capital or upper case" (typology) first letter
(token) of the Roman alphabet; and , v aa a all have a "rounded
top" that defines "lower case" letters.
Empirical Example: Gothic architecture is recognized by its
display of vertical "points" of weight stress; Gothic style is
"pointedness", i.e., all artifacts display points, especially print
with letters like these: A W M K X Z V N. Renaissance archi-
tecture is recognized by its display of vertical weight stress on
"round" arches; Renaissance style is "roundnesS", i.e., artifacts
clisplay curvature on top, especially "Renaissance printjust like
all t his . "

Penr 2. Exrnv Tnnus FRoMLouIs H;rlusLEV

Thes e t er m s ar e t a k e n f r o m t h e g l o s s a r y ( i n d e x e d ) i n L o u t s
Fljelmslev's Prolegomena to a Theory of l-angrage, F. J. Whitfield, Trans.;
Revised E,nglish Eclition (Madison: [-]niversity ofWisconsin Press, 1961).
See fieure 16: "saussure's Problematic and Hjelmslev's Thematic."
While the Prolegomenahas proved to be a deductive failure as a "sci-
ence of linguistics," the work is a positive successin describitg commu-
nication conduct and performance as an abductive logic. The terms
have become standarcl referents in theory construction in the human
sciences generally. See especially the three works by Anthony Wilden:
(1 ) Systemand Stntcture: I)ssaysin Communication ancl Exchange, 2nd ed.
(Tavistock Publications: Metheun, Inc., l9B0); (2) 7-heRules Are l{o
 !
DEFINITIONS:
Linguistics = The communication of verbal messages.
Semiotics = The communication of any messages.
Anthropological Science = The communication in
Social Anthropology and Economics (exchange systems);
communication of messages implied.
Biological Science = The ways and forms of
comunication used by manifold living things.
!
!
Roman Jakobson’s Human Science Model (Holenstein 1976)
!
! Communicology 4

!
3.2. Roman Jakobson’s Communicology Model.

CONTEXT
[Referential / Cognitive]

MESSAGE
[Poetic / Articulating]

ADDRESSER------------------------ADDRESSEE
[Emotive /Expressive] [Conative / Interpretive]

CONTACT
[Phatic / Affective]

CODE
[Metalinguistic / Glossing]

ELEMENTS: Functions:

ADDRESSER ➔ Emotive or Expressive Function

Embodiment (Speaking Person: Grammatical 1st Person)
ADDRESSEE ➔ Conative or Interpretive Function
(Spoken to Person: Grammatical 2nd Person)
CONTEXT ➔ Referential or Denotative; Cognitive Function
Nonverbal (Spoken of Person: Grammatical 3rd Person)
CONTACT ➔ Phatic or Connotative; Affective Function
(Physical and Psychological Engagement)
MESSAGE ➔ Poetic or “Prague Prism” Articulating Function
Verbal (Paradigmatic - Syntagmatic Category Reversal)
CODE ➔ Metalinguistic or Glossing Function
(Double Articulation)
!
!
3.3. Jakobson’s Language Function in Communicology
Roman Jakobson’s Communication Model
3.3.1. EMOTIVE FUNCTION (Embodied Addresser)

➊ Speaking Person (Grammatical 1st Person) State of the speaker, affect, bodily
comportment; implementation of cognition. (Holenstein 1976: 154).
➋ Indication on phonic, grammatical, and lexical levels of Distinctive Features.
➌ The Phases of the Speech Act:
Intention
➥ Innervation
 Appendix Il 229

Grtrn,e:The Strateg of Communication (New York: Rotrtle.lg" & Kegan

Patrl, l9B7); (3) Man andWomrm, War and Peace:T'heStrnte$.st'.s
Oornpaniort
(New York: Routle.lg" ancl Kegan Paul, 1987).

48. Rrt"q.rtoN = Both/And function.

49. ConnntATION = Either / Or funcrion.
50. Srsrgra
= Relationalhierarchy.
51. Pnor;nss
52. Fuxc;rloN - Dependence that firlfills the conditions fcrr an analysis
(analysis: description of an object by the uniform derpendencies
of ot her object s o n i t a n d o n e a c h o t h e r ) .

53. Fux c r t v E = O bje c t t h a t h a s f u n c t i o n t o o t h e r o b j e c t s .

51. Fonv = The constant in a manifestation.

55. SussrANCt - The variable in a manifestation.

= Semiotic system.
56. PanA,nTGMATIC
57. SwT,qGMATIC = Semiotic process.

P,A.RI3. E,xrny TERMSFROMRouex J,txoBSoN

These terms, in acldition to figures 3 and 4,, are taken from the stan-
dard reference work onJakclbson's theory of commtrnication and the
htrman sciences, F,lmar Holenstein, Il"oman.lakobson's Approach to Lan-
guage: PhenomenologicalSnucturalism (Bloominston: Indiana lJniver-
siry Press, 1976) . All bracketed page numbers refer to this book. For
"classic" applications of the theory see especially "Principles of Human
Communication" and "Synopsis of the Theory of Htrman Commtrnica-
tion" in.|urgen Ruesch, SemioticApproaches to Human Relations (The
Hague & Paris: Mouton, 1972; and, "Individual, Group, and Culture:
A Review of the Theory of Human Communication" inJureen Ruesch
and Gregory Bateson, Communication: 'I'he Social Matrix o.f Psychiatrl
0{ e* Yor k : W . W . N o r t o n & C o . , l 9 B 7 ; f i r s t p t r b l i s h e d 1 9 5 1 ) .

58. CoHnuuNI(lATIoN - "The addresser.sendsa tnessageto the addressee.

To be operative, the message requires a contextreferred to ("ref-
er ent " in anoth e r , s o m e w h a t a m b i e u o u s , n o m e n c l a t u r e ) , s e i z -
able by the addressee, and either verbal or capable of being
verbalrzed; a codefully, or at least partially common to the ad-
dresser and addressee (or in other w<lrds, to the encoder and
decoder of the messaee); and, finally, a contact, a physical
230 Appendix B

channel ancl psycholoeical connection between the addresser

i*?:*i:r:'f :i?[lf ::lJ*ffiTffiff

sented in figtrre 3.
il:ff?r'
t';il.
59. E,t.l,tvtENT = the necessary conditions for (l) communication (ad-
dr es s er , addr es s ee , c o n t e x t , m e s s a g e ,c o n t a c t , c o d e ) , ( 2 ) f o r t h e
,I;rJl:?r?f *.,ha,
.ir:\,,:*il:
i\,:::i,'H;?;,:;::;,.1i,
60. FuxclrtoN = the sufficient conditions fo. ( I ) communication (emo-
t iv e, c onat iv e, r ef e r e n t i a l , p o e t i c , p h a t i c , m e t a l i n g u i s t i c ) , a n d
(2) for the prosocliccategoryof clistinctive features in the phoneme
that consists of (a) force, (b) quantity, and (c) tone.

61. P,rmoloMATlt: AXIs _ rliscours (discourse); the "vertical" category

operation of Selection, Substitution, Similarity, ancl Metapho, lp.
139] . The category is in absentia, constitutes langue (code), and
dis play s s y nc hr ony ( s t a t i c s )I p . 1 4 1 1 . P a r e n t h e t i c a l t e r m s a r e
.fakobson's substitutes for Saussure's original terms.

62. ShileGMATIc Axts - langage (grarnma,r; language); the "horizontal"

category operation of Combination, Contexlure, Contigttity, artd
Metonyrylp. 139]. The categoryis inpresentia,constitutes parole
(messages),and displays diachrony (dynamics) tp. 1411. Paren-
thetical terms are.fakobson's substitutes fclr Saussllre's original
t er m s .

63. DtsrtNcrtw- FEerttR[,s - the qualities of'phonemes; there are two

3;::i,,o:';i":HT;"l;3',:3ilfi:i*
[i:il::;
[;];x::;ili
f or c e, quant ir y , an d t o n e t p . 1 7 8 ] .

61. REouNDANcY Fl,,q.ruR!-s

units] that result transformations [significative, cod ed matri-
-fro-
ces)between the paradismatic and syntagmatic axes; the ,ffttt

:*trff,:il:I"i),)Lffi:ll',ffjrlll r il:::.T,xl
:LTffi,.jl"Il';lTfr:^ffi "'i:
: i jj:'x;iT$::"r:?t::
mans] for intersubjectivecommunicat.ionis a convertiblecode,
a transformational systemby means of which a messagecan be
translated from subcode to subcode, from sign systemto sign
system" tp. 421.

65. M,qnxl,DTERM- "Statementof P" tp. 131]; a position (or oppo-

sition); a first term explains itself, hence "marks" itself in a
 Appendix B 231

position which simtrltaneously opposes it to the other possible

positions ofsimilar terms. ln Commztnication'fheory, "the choice
of a c ont ex t " ( s t at e m e n t o f ) " f o r c h o o s i n g " ( P ) . F c l r e x a r n p l e ,
what a clictionary does for words,/ideas: Word entries mark
ttremselves by their definitions (icleas) and simultaneously op-
pose themselves to the other word entries in the dictionary. In
the sentence "Socrates is mortal," the word "Socrates" is marked
by the clefinition "mortal." See the abstraclentry; marked terms
are abstractions.

66. LtxH,trrRK[,D TE,RM- "(l) General Meaning: nonstatement of P";

( 2) "Spec if ic M ean i n g : s t a t e m e n t o f n o n - P ' t p . 1 3 1 ] ; a n a p p o -
sition; a second term explains a first term, hence the "un-
marked" seconcl term explains the now "marked" first term. In
Information Theory,there is first General Meanine in which "the
c ont ex t of c hoic e" ( n o n - s t a t e m e n t o f ) r e s t r i c t s t h e " c h o o s i r g "
(P) , or secondly, there is a Specific Meani.g in which "the
c hoic e of c ont ex t " ( s t a t e m e n t o f ) r e s t r i c t s t h e " n o t c h o o s i n g "
( non- P) . Under t he c o n d i t i o n s o f G e n e r a l M e a n i r g , I n f o r m a -
t ion Theor y ( s ign i f i c a t i o n ) e n t a i l s C o m m u n i c a t i o n T h e o r y
( m eanir g) ; wher ea s , u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f S p e c i f i c M e a n i n g ,
Com m unic at ion Th e o r y ( m e a n i r g ) e n t a i l s I n f o r m a t i o n T h e -
or y ( s ignif ic at ion) . I n s h o r t , m a r k e d m e a n i n g a n d s p e c i f i c u n -
marked meaning stand in an apposition in which Communi-
c at ion Theor y ( c ho i c e o f c o n t e x t ) e n t a i l s I n f o r m a t i o n T h e o r y
(choice in context) . App.sition, for example, is what an ency-
clopeclia does for words,/ideas: Unmarkecl icleas are explained
by marked definitions (worcls). In the sentence "He flies to New
York, and/or she swims from Paris," all ideas are clefined by
word placement. "He" is marked as "masculine" by the expres-
sion later in the sentence of the word "she" which is unmarked
fspecifrc meaning: the statement of non-he]. Thus in this spe-
cially constructed example sentence, all rnarked terms Ihe,
flies, to, New York, and] take on their "marki.g" or meaning
by direct apposition to the subsequent expression of their re-
spective "unmarked" terms [she, swims, from, Paris, or] .Apposi-
tion is the construction of a distinction after two things have
been combinedand thereby a comparison constructs a contrast:
he/ she, flies/swims, to/ from, New York/ Paris, and/or. Now
you know why you can never decided between "and" and/ or
"or " and t hus jus t w r i t e ( l i k e I j u s t d i d ! ) " a n d / o r . " F o r f u r t h e r
discussion, see the concreteentry; unmarked terms are concre-
tions. Marking and unmarking may be used as a "poetic func-
tion" to introdLlce time and space hierarchies of reference. For
example, we may substitute the word "when" for the conjunc-
t ion "and/ or " in ou r e x a m p l e s e n t e n c e , s o i t n o w r e a d s : " H e
9?'9 Appendix R

flies to New York when she swims from Paris." The result is to
int r oc luc e a m ar k ed ( i n p r a e s e n t i a ) t i m e t e r m ( " w h e n " ) w h i c h
inclexes an Llnmarked (in absentia) time reference clf simttlta-
neity. A spatial marking of clirection rlow applies inasmuch as
"to New York" and "from Paris" as marked conjointly by "when"
now refer to their opposite, respective destinations which are
utlmarked. In the original example employing "and/or" we
know someone is arrivine in New York (but the "in absentia"
c it y of or iein is t r nk n o w n ) a n d s o m e o n e i s l e a v i n s f r o m P a r i s
( but t he "in pr aes e n t i a " c i t y o f t e r m i n a t i o n i s t t n k n o w n ) .
Dependine on the natllral language and its cultural referents,
many levels of transformation and hierarchical reference are
possible. Note that in Medieval loeic, syncategorematical worcls
( lik e pr epos it ions , c o n j u n c t i o n s , e t c . t h a t p o i n t t o c a t e g o r i e s )
were thotreht to be secondary to categorematicalwords (like
nouns , v er bs , et c . t ha t n a m e c a t e g o r i e s c l f m e a n i n g ) . B u t i n c o n -
tempo rary cliscourse theories the reverse is true, and this sug-
gests the basis of Jakobson's marked/unrnarked distinction
since the syncategorematical function is that of "marki.g"
(primary) what categorematical function is "unmarked" (sec-
onclary) ir-t use-virtually a definition of rhetoric or a tropic logc.

67. Annm - SSER- The per so n w h o [ i n t e r p e r s o n a l ] o r t h e c o n s c i o u s -

ness which Iintrapersor]al] constitutes a message (encoding) by
engagi.g (expression) the "units of language" in the paradiu-
matic axis moving in the message's "ascending scale of freedom
f c hoic el"; f r om "Lext / t r t t e r a n c e ) s e n t e n c e > p h r a s e > w o r d >
morpherne >

68. Aonnl,SSh,E= The person who [interpersonal], or the experience

whic h I int r aper s onal ] , c o n s t i t u t e s a c o d e ( d e c o d i n g ) b y e n g a g -
ins (perception) the "units of language" in the syntagmatic axis
moving in the code's "descending scale of cocle depenclence
[context] ; from "distinctive feature >
> word >

69. Cox r aXl = par adigm ati c r e l a t i o n l u n i t - p a r a d i g m l ; J a k o b s o n 's

replacement for the term "reference"; d,esigytated tp. 159] or
part of a semiotic system (followitg Peirce): icon or "facttral
similari ty, " inclexor "f-actual con tiguitv, " and symbolor "imputed,
lear ned c ont iguit y " t p . l 5 B l .
Note: jakobson rejectsthe Satrssttrian principle of arbitrari-
ness; signs have a relative motivation to each other (Peirce's
intupretant). Jakobson rejects the Sausstrrian principle of the
linear s ienif ier . He a d o p t 's P e i r c e 's c l i a g r a m m a t i c ( i c o n i c )
r elat ion of t he s igni f i e r a n d s i g n i f i e d , i . e . , " a d i a g r a m i s a s i g n
whose owrl constitution reflects the relational structure of the
 Appendix B 233

t hing r epr es ent ed, " i . e . , " i n t e r s e m i o t i c t r a n s l a t i o n " I p p . 1 5 7 - 9 ] .

See Eclward Hall's model in Appendix 8,.

70. MEss,q.cn = diachronic relation; expression, speaking (parole);

consists of ( 1) lingtristic utterance , (2) language as individual,
pnvare properV,and (3) the individualizing, centrifugal aspect
of language t p. 16 0 1.

71. Cox r ec r = s y nt agm a t i c r e l a t i o n [ u n i t = s y n t a g m ] ; t h e p e r -

formative function in discourse that is both physical (inter-
personal) and psychotogical(embodied; intrapersonal); refers to
H.rsse rl' s thesis that "subjec tivity is in tersubjec tivity" ( differen-
tiation by combination); a human (existential) performance of
Self and Other; "All phonemes designate nothine but mere
otherness" tp. 1721.

72. CooE = synchronic relation, apperception, social language (lan'-

gue),'consists of ( 1) linguistic norm , (2) language as suprain-
dividual, social endowment, and (3) the unifing, centripetal
aspect of language tp. 1601.

73. E,uOftW = expression;process of exchange systems; state of the

s peak er , Addr es s er : ( 1 ) i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f c o g n i t i v e a c t s , ( 2 )
indication on phonic, grammatical, and lexical levels of distinc-
tive features, and (3) performance of the speech act.

TYPE SIC}N* REFE,RE,NT

Linguistic F /F Message Form Messase Form
( Distin ctive F e a tu r e s) (referri ng to)

Semiotic S/S Message Structure Messase Structure

( Re d u n d a n cy F e a tu r es)
Anthropologic F/S Message Form Message Structure
U Economic
Biologc S/F Message Strttcture Message Form

*These illustr ate Peir ce's noti on of the i nter pr etant; s ee the l ogz t e ntr y .

74. CoxarIVE = ualue choice;orientation towards the Addressee; exis-

tential motivation to act with purpose (conatus); redundancy
features are manifest in grammar as the vocative (noun) capacity
to nameand the imperative (verb) capaciry to do; occurs earliest
in language acquisition [p. 155]; Husserl's ego and Merleau-
Ponty's radical cogito: "I can; I am able to. ."

Tl/PE SIGN* REFERE,NT

:
T'axonomy(Static; Systematic)
Eid"etic P/P Purpose (referri.g to) Purpose
234 Appendix B

Empirical Cd/ Cd Conduct Conduct

'l'axonomy(Dynamic; Systemic)
:
7'ekologtcal P/Cd Purpose Conduct
( G oal- I nt ended)
'feleonomic Cd/P Conduct Purpose
( G oal- Dir ec t ed)
*These illustr ate Peir ce 's noti r >n of- the interpretant; see the logtc entry.

75 * :'"HH;?*
i'r?:j:'s'lh
l i:: ff.il:,30,:J,ilT:' 1;$:i:?'::i
e generar
J;}:3:::";ffiace
:fl:$*,T?',{;"1::'."J,'*ll;
TYPE, SIGN* REFERE,NT
Circularity M/M Message (referring to) Message
C/ C Code Code
Ounlapping M/ C Message Code
C/M Code Message
flrese illustrate Peirce's notion of the intupretant; see the logtc entry.

76. PoErlct - the operation of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes

are ratnsible; diachronic relationship. See the poiesis entr/l the
phenomenological concept of rannsibility. An extrapolation of
Jakobson's theory using Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is:

TYPE, SIGN* REFERENT

Embodiment:
SnU Ar / Ar Addresser (referring to) Addresser
Other Ae/ Ae Addressee Addressee

Intentionality:
-l^hetic Ar / Ae Addresser Addressee
Oltnatiue Ae / Ar Addressee Addresser
These illustr ate Pei r c e's noti on of the i ntnpr etan,t; s ee the l ogtc entr y .

77. PH,A,rtc;= the purpose of "establishing, prolonging, checkitrB,

c onf ir m ing or dis c o n t i n u i n g t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n " t p . 1 5 5 ] ;
syntagmatic relationship.
Note: In the discipline of philosophy, "ordinary language
philosophers" have concentrated on this behavioral data as a
means clf inferring communicative intention; the theory is
usually associated with Austin's "phenomenol.gy of speech,"
Searle's "speech act theoyy," and Grice's "conversational impli-
cature." In the disciplines of sociology and speech communi-
cation "conversation al analysis" has taken a similar behavioris-
 Appendix B 235

tic, but atheoretical, approach that is often critiqued as "naive

p<tsitivism" or "neo-linguistics. "
An extrapolation of fakobson's theory trsing Hall's phenom-
enology is:

TYPT SIGN* REFERE,NT

sociocentric ct/ct I conracr (referrinu to) (l on tac t
Culture
Cx / C x # (l on rexr (-l<tntext
F,gocentric Ct/ Ox * Contacr (l on text
Culture
Cx /C t # ( l ontex r C onr ac r
*These illr - r str ate Pei r c e's noti r l n
o{' r he i ntnN tr el ant; s ec the l ogtr entr v .
..gr ( ) ups "
f Edwar d FIall' s conc ept of a " H i gh C l on te x t" c ul tur e w her e pr ov i de
an "infor m ation theor eti c " env i r onr nent; # H al l 's " M i ddl e- ( l gntex t" c r r l tur e
( followins M ar sar et M ead; Appendi x O) w her c : i ntc r ac ti ng .,eer ner ati ons "
r el) r esent gr oups ver s us i ndi v i c l ual s i n a c ( ) ntes t to " c l efi r - r c the s i tr r z r ti 1;r r " ;
* Hall' s "1,( ) w ( lontex t" c ttl tttr c w her e " i ndi v i c l tr al s " pr ov i c l e a " c onl r ntr ni -
cation theor etic" env i r onm er l t. See F l al l 's l l qond C ul tur e, Gar den C i tv , N y
Anchor ' /Doubleday, 1977 , pp. 85- 103) ; s ee Appe.c l i x E)

7 8 . MEr,ql.IN(;ulsrlc = ever7 science has both an objer:tlanguage (dis-

course about extralinguistic entities) and a metalanguage(dis-
c our s e about lingu i s t i c e n t i t i e s ) t p . l 5 9 l ; s y n c h r o n i c r e l a r i o n -
ship; also known as "double articulatir)n. "
No t e: J ak obs on r e p l a c e s S a t r s s u r e 's l a n g u e w i t h " c o d e "
[me-talinguistic function] and parole with "message" lpoetic
f unc t ionl. Salr s s ur e 'ss t a t i c d i c h o t o m y ( d i g i t a l l o g i c ) b e c o m e s
Jakobson's dynamic differentiation (analoglle logic): (a) "For
the speaker the paradigmatic operation of selection supplies
t he bas is f or enc od i n g " i ( b ) " w h i l e t h e l i s t e n e r e n g a g e s t h e
s y nt as m at ic c om bin a t i o n i n d e c o d i r g t h e m e s s a s e " t p . l 6 l l .

T\?E SIGN* REFERENT'

l/nha| Communication:
Object Language OL./ OL f,anetrage Refbren ts
( Sig n ifr e r o r Sig n if i ecl ) (refbrrri ne to)
Metalangtage ML/ Ml. Lanetrage Langtrage
( Sig n ifie r a n d Sig ni fi ed)
"lVonuerbal " Communi cation :

Object Semiotic OS/OS Sign Ref-eren t

( Sig n ifie r o r Sig n ifi ed)
Metasemiotic MS/MS Sisn Sign
( Sig n ifie r a n d Sig n i fi ed)
*These illtr str ate Peir ce' s noti on of the i n,tr r pr etar tt;s ec the l ogtc entr v '.
236 Appendix B

79. Spel,c;n At;r - The progressive phases: intention > innervation >
gradtral production >
Ht r s s er l' s "pair i n g " i >
"The t r niquenes s o f h u m a n s p e e c h l i e s i n
theentire or
corpus
-":ll*:T,'J:fi';gJiliiiT:,::g::i:'
(2) its abiliry to handle abstractions, fictions, or, generally
s peak in. g, t hat w h i c h i s n o t p r e s e n t i n t h e s i t u a t i o n o f t h e
s peak er ;
( 3) it s hier ar c h i c a l s t r - u c t u r e o {'c o n s t i t u t i v e e l e m e n t s a s i n
the dichotomy of distinctive and sisnificative units and the
clivision of the grammatical system in words and sentences or
cocled units and coded rnatrices;
(4) its trse of propositions (afhrmations and negations) ; and
(5) its reversible hierarchy clf diverse function " [pp. 1t]9-90] . "

80. HttMAN St;tr,xr;ts = "Three integrated sciences encompass each

other and present three sradually increasi.g degrees of gen-
er alit y : l. St ucl y i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n of verbal messages =
Li'nguistics.2. Stucly in communication of any messageS= Semiot-

',tT;,i
::,i';ffiH'ff :,r;k?: ],:iiil,L
i,y;'.q;
fr:;i?,i,L #
munication of messages implied) . " 4. "Study in ways and forms
of cornrnunication used by manifolcl living things" = BiologT
[ s c ienc e of ' lif ' e]" t p . l 8 6 - 7 1 . A s c h e m a t i c c l i a g r a m t p . l B T l i s
pr es ent ed in f is u r e 4 .
 ROMAN JAKOBSON PRAGUE PRISM MODEL
VERBAL NOUN

SIMILE (+), METAPHOR SYNECDOCHE METONYMY

IRONY (-) American*
GERUND
(“ing”)

MODIFIER SUBJECT MODIFIER PREDICATE

NOUN NOUN
ACTION
Part / Whole / VERB Substance /
Attribute Substance Part / Whole Attribute

Some Animal Programed My Pet

A Dog Cooked Raw Cat

The Cat Ate Your Dog

One Fish Enjoyed Her Student

Mad Teacher Taught His Laptop

BEING

© 2016 R. L. LANIGAN
METAPHOR VERB METAPHOR
Subject (Figurative,Tropic) Predicate

“IS”

SIMILE(+), IRONY(-) “LIKE”, SIMILE(+), IRONY(-)

Subject “AS” Predicate

Diagram Legend:
PRISM OUTLINE: — — — — —
Rhetorical Variation is Message Meaning as Tropes of Speech (Utterance) or Figures of Language (Writing).
Literal Core is Code Signification as Utterance (Speaking) or Sentence (Writing) exemplified by:
“The Cat Ate Your Dog.”
Vertical Axis is Metaphor (Simile/Irony):
Paradigmatic (space = there) and Syntagmatic (time = then).
[Selection, Substitution, Similarity] {Condensation}
exemplified by:
Horizontal Axis is Metonymy (Synecdoche):
Syntagmatic (space = here) and Diachronic (time = now).
[Combination, Contexture, Contiguity] {Displacement}
* American English (USA) cultural preference for GERUNDS.
Contrasts, e.g., with British (UK) preference for NOUN descriptors.