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NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE

NLRC rules of procedure is relevant in determining which has jurisdiction because under the NLRC rule it will
tell you that lack of jurisdiction is a ground to dismiss. Another important consideration is the provision in the
prescription of money claim. Because if money claim is barred by law then certainly it will not prosper. Unless
you waive your right to question based on the ground of prescription.

Does the labor code provide for the prescriptive period of money claim? When it is reckoned
from?
Art. 291 all money claims arising from ER-EE relations accruing during the effectivity of this code shall
be filed within 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred. It is
reckoned from the time the cause of action accrues.

When does the cause of action accrue?

When there is a violation of a right.

Essential elements of a cause of action:

1. Legal right of the plaintiff,
2. Correlative obligation of the defendant, and
3. Act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiffs legal right.

Example: Service incentive leave and overtime pay is a right provided by law if there is a violation, there is
an injury arising from such violation. (If you have rendered overtime you have to demand, only when ER
denies that the cause of action accrues).
It is important to know when your cause of action accrues in determining the reckoning of the prescriptive
period of 3 years.

If I will file a money claim today Dec. 3, 2001, I can only recover money claim way back as what
period?
3 years from now that will be Dec. 3, 1998.

How long is an ER required to keep a payroll?

Under the rules implementing the LC, Rule X, Sec. 12. All employment records required to be kept
and maintained by employers shall be preserved for at least 3 years from the date of the last entry in the
records.
Money claim does not only refer to labor standard provision. It also includes retirement fee and
separation pay for authorized causes.

Guzman vs. CA
G.R. No. 132257. October 12, 1998

Separation pay and retirement pay partakes of money claim and it prescribes in 3 years.
The company because of serious business reverses undertook a partial suspension of operation
resulting in the forced leave for 6 months of complainant. A case was instituted by complainant before the
NLRC for illegal forced leave in violation of CBA with respect to optional retirement and separation pay
grant. Complainant was dismissed from employment on November 16, 1992 without payment of retirement
and separation benefits under the CBA. Complainant filed a case in July 16, 1996.
RULING: Under Article 291 of the Labor Code, money claims specifically recoverable under this
Code should be filed within 3 years from the time their cause of action accrues.
The filing of complaint in the NLRC in December 7 does not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period because NLRC has no jurisdiction of the case since the Voluntary Arbitrator has
jurisdiction over the case regarding interpretation and implementation of the CBA.
Since the case was filed in July 16, 1996, hence the cause of action has already prescribed.

Motion to dismiss the complaint is a prohibited pleading except:

1. On the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2. Improper venue,
3. Res judicata or
4. Prescription.

Contents of the complaint

1. Name and address of the complainant.
2. Name and address of the ER.
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3. No. Of the workers of the particular company.

4. Causes of action of the complainant.

PROCEDURE
1. Complaint filed with the RAB of the NLRC which has jurisdiction over the workplace of said EE.
Venue vs. Jurisdiction
Venue is only procedural and is provided under the NLRC rules. While jurisdiction is defined by law under art
217.
2. After docketing, it will be forwarded to the executive labor arbiter (ELA) for raffle purposes.
3. Once assigned to the labor arbiter, the la will issue summons where a copy of the complaint will have
to be attached as well as the date, place, and time of initial hearing. All these document must served
to the respondent.

Purpose of summons: For the proper acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. Should
the service be improper, the respondent can file a motion to dismiss and the la can dismiss the case based on
that ground. It must be delivered to the respondent or his lawyer. The service of summon will depend upon
the kind of respondent applying the rules of civil procedure.
4. Once the summons has been properly served, the respondent well have to comply by attending the
conference as stated in the notice of hearing.

MANDATORY CONFERENCE – The initial hearing

How many initial conferences are now authorized under the rule?
Before, in the old rules, it was 3 settings. Now, it is only 2.

Purpose: To amicably settle the case upon a fair compromise, or determining the real parties in interest, or
defining and simplifying the issues in the case, entering into admissions and stipulation of facts and threshing
out preliminary matters.

Is the LA authorized to compromise under the labor code?

No. His power to compromise is provided under NLRC rules of procedure.

Can the parties enter into a compromise not in the presence of the LA?
Yes. Under the NLRC rules of procedure, Rule 5, Section 2. A compromise agreement entered into
by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending shall be approved by
him if, after confronting the parties, particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that they understand the
terms and condition of the settlement and that it was entered into freely and voluntarily by them and the
agreement is not contrary to law, morals and public policy.

St. Gothard Disco Pub and Restaurant vs. NLRC

218 SCRA 336

This was a quitclaim involving a compromise agreement not before the labor arbiter whom the
case was assigned but with another Labor Arbiter. The SC held that said compromise agreement was void
because it was in violation of the rules of procedure of the NLRC.
Compromise before the LA is final and executory. It shall be enforced through writ of execution.
FACTS: St. Gothard Disco was hit by Typhoon Ruping. As a result of the stoppage of business, 28
employees filed claims for separation pay and 13th month pay in the NLRC.
NLRC awarded in favor of the employees.
The owners appealed to the NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioners’ appeal on the ground that no
cash or security bond was posted.
Owners filed a petition for certiorari.
RULING: The posting of a cash or surety bond equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from is a mandatory requirement for perfection of the appeal under Article 223 of the Labor
Code.

NOTE: QUITCLAIM partakes the nature of a compromise, and such a settlement shall be
approved by the Labor Arbiter under the Implementing Rules.

Loyola Security and Detective Agency vs. NLRC

GR 113287, May 9, 1995

In this case, the SC noted that there is no provision regarding compromise agreements before the
Labor Arbiter, the rules of procedure before the NLRC should be applied strictly. Should the parties arrive at

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any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute, the same shall be reduced to writing and signed
by the parties and their respective counsels if any before the Labor Arbiter. The settlement shall be
approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied that it was voluntarily entered into by the parties and
after explained to them the terms and consequences thereof.

Private respondents Victor Prado, Sr. and Matilde Tuscano filed a complaint against petitioners, the
Loyola Security and Detective Agency and the latter's general manager. Ruperto Acle, Jr., for illegal
dismissal illegal deduction, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime pay, legal holiday pay,
premium pay for holiday and rest day, and violation of P.D. No. 851.

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT; FOR VALIDITY THEREOF, REQUIRES THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

AND APPROVED BY THE LABOR ARBITER. — The Labor Code of the Philippines does not contain any
provision on compromise agreements or quitclaims in cases pending before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
However, the New Rules of Procedure of NLRC in Section 2, Rule V (Proceedings Before Labor Arbiter)
provides that: . . . "Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute,
the same shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their respective counsels, if any, before
the Labor Arbiter. The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied that it was
voluntarily entered into by the parties and after having explained to them the terms and consequences
thereof. "A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter
before whom the case is pending shall be approved by him if, after confronting the parties, particularly the
complainants, he is satisfied that they understand the terms and conditions of the settlement and that it
was entered into freely, and voluntarily by them and the agreement is not contrary to law, morals and
public policies." In the case at bench, the NLRC found that: ". . .. In the case at bar, the satisfaction of
judgment dated October 19, 1990 was executed by the complainants without the assistance of their counsel
and without the approval of the Labor Arbiter. There is also a great disparity with regards to the monetary
award . . .." We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by NLRC inasmuch as its decision is supported
by the records of the case. Thus, we adopt the findings of NLRC to the effect that the settlement entered
into by the parties was without the assistance of counsel or approval of the Labor Arbiter.
CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; AGENCY; SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY; WHEN REQUIRED.
— We also note that respondent Prado executed that compromise agreement not only on his own behalf
but on behalf of respondent Tuscano. There is, however, no showing that respondent Prado was duly
authorized by respondent Tuscano to waive a part of the award given her. Under Article 1878 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, a special power of attorney is necessary: ". . . (2) To effect novations which put an
end to obligations already in existence at the time the agency was constituted; (3) To compromise, . . . (4)
To waive any obligation gratuitously; . . . (15) Any other act of strict dominion." Hence, being violative of
existing law and jurisprudence, such settlement cannot be given force and effect.

 Mandatory conference is analogous with pre-trial in criminal and civil cases.

Stipulation of facts to be proposed to respondent ER for money claims. (still employed)

1. Existence of ER-EE relationship.
2. That the EE was employed for a particular period of time.
3. EE is receiving this particular salary.
4. That respondent is doing business in this particular name.
5. If no compromise agreement is entered into the parties will then be required to submit their
respective verified position paper within an inextendible period of 10 days.

Contents of position paper:

 SECTION 4 RULE 7, Civil Procedure, as amended by Administrative Matter 00-2-10, May 1,
2000 provides that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
according to his personal knowledge and based on authentic records.
 Verification is important because the case may be decided based on position papers alone without need
of conducting formal hearings. Violation of this requirement would either mean that such pleading would
be expunged from the records and the party concerned subjected to sanctions.
 Position papers should also be accompanied by affidavit of the witnesses which shall take place of the
latter’s testimony. (RULE V SECTION 3)

Purpose of affidavit
 To take the place of the witnesses’ direct testimony.
 Support allegations in the position paper.

If the LA decides to conduct hearing, there would be no need of direct examination or Q&A because the
position paper would take the place of the direct testimony of the witness. The only requirement would be for
the affiant to identify the affidavit and to offer the testimony of the witness. And thereupon, proceed to the
cross-examination of such witness.

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Does the position paper require certification against forum shopping?

Yes. NLRC Rules provide that rules on civil procedure would apply suppletorily. (RULE 1 SECTION
3)
Furthermore, the Rules of Court specifically mentions not only of courts but also “tribunals and
agencies” such as LA and NLRC.

Maricalum vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 384

Certification against forum-shopping applicable to NLRC.
The Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping as provided by Supreme Court Circular 04-94 is a
mandatory and should accompany pleadings filed before the NLRC. Since the NLRC is a quasi0judicial agency
hence initiatory pleading filed before it should be accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping.

 Such certification should be signed not by the lawyer but by the party. Except if you are the in-house
lawyer of such company.

Escorpizo vs. University of Baguio

306 SCRA 503, GR 121962, April 30, 1999

Petitioner Esperanza Escorpizo was initially hired by respondent University of Baguio on June 13,
1989 as a high school classroom teacher. Under the rules of the respondent University, appointment to
teach during the first 2 years at the University is probationary in nature. Attainment of a permanent status
by s faculty member is conditioned upon compliance with certain requirements, such as passing the
professional board examination for teachers (PBET).
On March 18, 1991, respondent University informed petitioner that it was terminating her
employment for her failure to pass the PBET. Petitioner pleaded that she be given another chance since she
had just taken the PBET and hope to pass the same. Unfortunately, she failed again. Undaunted, she took
the examination a third time in November 1991. This time, she passed. Nevertheless, on June 15, 1992, the
University did not renew Escorpizo’s contract of employment on the ground that she failed to qualify as a
regular teacher.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of backwages and reinstatement. Labor
Arbiter ordered reinstatement but without backwages. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed
said appeal and affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner files instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
PETITION DISMISSED. The assailed resolution of the NLRC is AFFIRMED.
CERTIORARI WILL LIE IF THERE IS NO APPEAL OR ANY OTHER PLAIN, SPPEDY AND ADEQUATE
REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW. –In the case at bar, the plain and adequate remedy
expressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of the impugned resolution, based on palpable
or patent errors, to be made under oath and filed within 10 days form receipt of the questioned resolution
of the NLRC, a procedure which is jurisdictional. Hence, original action of certiorari, as in this case, will not
prosper. Further, it should be stressed that without a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within the
10-day reglementary period, the questioned order, resolution or decision of the NLRC becomes final and
executory after 10 calendar days from receipt thereof. Consequently, the merits of the case can no longer
be reviewed to determine if the public respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion.
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING MUST BE BY PETITIONER OR ANY OF THE
PRINCIPAL PARTY. – As pointed out by the private respondents, the certification in the present petition was
executed by the counsel of petitioners, which is not correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must
be by the plaintiff or any of the principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of
petitioners is also a cause for the dismissal of this action.

Certification of non-forum shopping to be signed by the complainant, not the lawyer.

Damasco vs. NLRC

Dec. 4, 2000

It is now axiomatic that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process,
the requirements of which is satisfied where parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand.

As noted by the Solicitor General and petitioner Damasco, the labor arbiter set the case several
times for preliminary conference but the parties failed to reached an amicable settlement. The labor arbiter
then ordered the parties to submit their position papers. In compliance therewith, the parties submitted
position papers where they set out and argued the factual as well as the legal bases of their position.
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Damasco filed her position paper, computation of money claims and affidavit. For his part, Sia filed his
position paper and affidavit. Damasco, in turn, filed her affidavit in reply to the affidavit of Sia. After both
parties had filed their replies, the case was deemed submitted for resolution as the labor arbiter did not find
it necessary to conduct a trial-type hearing. Note that the filing of position papers and supporting
documents fulfills the requirements of due process. Further, it is within the discretion of the labor arbiter to
determine if there is a need for a hearing. Thus, we cannot subscribe to Sia’s posturing that the labor arbiter
gravely abused its discretion when he dispensed with the hearing to receive further evidence.
Moreover, Sia was given additional opportunity to argue his case on appeal before the NLRC in a
memorandum and motion for reconsideration which pleadings were likewise considered by that labor
agency in the course of resolving the case. Sia cannot thereafter interpose lack of due process since he was
given sufficient time and ample chances to be heard in the present case. Consequently, the alleged defect in
the proceedings in the labor arbiter, if there be any, should be deemed cured.

 If other causes of action were not included in the original complaint, remedy is to file an amended
complaint.

Holding of trial is discretionary on the LA, why?

Because if based on the position paper, the facts are not controverted, then the Labor Arbiter can
decide based on the position papers. However, if controverted, then the Labor Arbiter would see the need to
ask clarificatory questions to further elicit facts.

Do the technical rules on evidence apply? Is there a provision in LC?

Article 221, LC - In any proceeding before the commission or any of the Labor Arbiter’s, the rules on
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling….

 RULE 5, SECTION 9, NLRC RULES – The proceedings before a Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in
nature. Subject to the requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto.

 NOTE: It does not mean however that the rules on evidence will not be used. Such will not only be
controlling.

Admissibility of evidence involving money claims. What is the quantum of proof in labor cases?
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – relevant evidence, which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.

Burden of proof [EX. Complainant alleges that ER did not pay minimum wage, overtime pay.]
Burden rests upon ER to prove correct payment. Based on SC rulings, it is a negative allegation and
does not require proof on the claimant. Also because The ER keeps payroll records.

{Opinion of Marquez} However, it does not dispense on the part of the claimant to prove or specify his
allegations such as the particular date or # of hours of unpaid overtime. EE should share the burden.

How can Employer prove payment?

The employer can prove payment though the payroll. One of the parts of the payroll is the dotted
line where the EE will sign upon receipt of the payment.

 Since the law requires the ER to keep certain records, such as the payroll, then it is easier for the ER to
prove payment than for the EE to prove non-payment.

Admissibility of evidence?
Rules on hearsay evidence would apply. A piece of paper which is not authenticated such as a
payroll, the same being undated and unsigned, would be considered a private document.

How is a private document authenticated?

(Rules on Evidence) Its due execution and authenticity must be proved by either anyone who saw the
document execute or written or by the evidence of the genuineness of the signature and handwriting of the
maker.
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Cases: Admissibility of Evidence: Even if it is a Labor Case, the SC applied Rules on Evidence

Daily Time Record which is a mere photocopy.

Jarcia Machine Shop vs. NLRC

266 SCRA 97

We fail to see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of public
respondent in upholding the labor arbiter's decision which declared Tolentino's transfer as a constructive
dismissal.
With respect to its first argument, petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in not taking into consideration private respondent' s propensity to absence, tardiness
and work undertime which is allegedly well-established in private respondent's daily time records (DTR). It
is claimed that a perusal of these DTRs would show that private respondent had been absent or had worked
undertime quite a number of times for the year 1992. This had been the case since private respondent got
married. Petitioner claims that private respondent's record of absences, tardiness and undertime work gives
petitioner more than sufficient reason to impose some disciplinary action against private respondent.
However, despite his work attitude, private respondent was not dismissed but merely transferred by
petitioner to another position.
Indeed, the DTRs annexed to the present petition would tend to establish private respondent's
neglectful attitude towards his work duties as shown by repeated and habitual absences and tardiness and
propensity for working undertime for the year 1992. But the problem with these DTRs is that they are
neither originals nor certified true copies. They are plain photocopies of the originals, if the latter do exist.
More importantly, they are not even signed by private respondent nor by any of the employer' s
representatives. In all of the DTRs attached to the present petition, the space provided for the employee's
signature is conspicuously blank. Hence, as pointed out by private respondent in his Comment, these DTRs
have not been established as pertaining to private respondent, thus raising the probability that these
records may have been simulated to justify private respondent's demotion and transfer. At this juncture, it
should be noted that private respondent himself impugns the authenticity of these DTRs.

Notebook which is undated and unsigned. According to the SC there is uncertainty as to the origin and
authenticity of the same.

Jimenez vs. NLRC

256 SCRA 84

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff
must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment,
rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal
certainty that the obligation h as been discharged by payment.
When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the
burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such a
defense to the claim of the creditor. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of
going forward with the evidence — as distinct from the general burden of proof — shifts to the creditor,
who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment.
In the instant case, the right of respondent Pedro Juanatas to be paid a commission equivalent to
17%, later increased to 20%, of the gross income is not disputed by petitioners. Although private
respondents admit receipt of partial payment, petitioners still have to present proof of full payment. Where
the defendant sued for a debt admits that the debt was originally owed, and pleads payment in whole or in
part, it is incumbent upon him to prove such payment. That a plaintiff admits that some payments have
been made does not change the burden of proof. The defendant still has the burden of establishing
payments beyond those admitted by plaintiff.
The testimony of petitioners which merely denied the claim of private respondents, unsupported by
documentary evidence, is not sufficient to establish payment. Although petitioners submitted a notebook
showing the alleged vales of private respondents for the year 1990, the same is inadmissible and cannot be
given probative value considering that it is not property accomplished, is undated and unsigned, and is thus
uncertain as to its origin and authenticity.

Involves a written summation of accounts which is undated and unsigned.

Callanta vs. NLRC

225 SCRA 526

Anent the claims for refund, petitioner once again failed to convincingly prove the authenticity of
his claim against private respondent company. Petitioner claims that the amounts of P76,893.42 and
P10,000.00 allegedly owed to him by private respondent company were matters proved during the hearings
before the Labor Arbiter. However, the records show that no hearing for the reception of evidence was ever

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conducted by the Labor Arbiter. At most, what transpired were preliminary hearings which had to be reset
for five (5) times due to the absence of counsel for private respondent. In fact, because of the absence of
counsel for respondent company, the Labor Arbiter just ordered the parties to submit their respective
position papers in lieu of actual hearings. This having been the case, the Court is not convinced that the
money claims of petitioner have really been proven during the alleged hearings before the Labor Arbiter, if
any, especially in the present case where the money claims are even refuted by private respondent.
In support of its claims for refund, petitioner presented a written summation of accounts reflecting
the amounts allegedly owed by private respondent company to him. However, the aforestated summation is
undated and unsigned, thus inadmissible and uncertain as to its origin and authenticity. Further kindling the
flame of suspicion as to the origin of the summation in question is the context of the November 17, 1987
letter of petitioner to private respondent Limpe. Quite unusual is the fact that in refuting the findings of the
alleged "post audit" conducted by private respondent company, petitioner did not even bother to mention
the source of his conclusion that private respondent company still owes him P76,893.42, while at the same
time complaining that somehow he is being refused access to and disclosure of some of the company
records, particularly the records/audit of E.V. Rodriguez and J. Pong, Jr. These facts are inconsistent with
petitioner's contention that it was the auditor of private respondent company itself who made the written
summation.

Xerox copy is a scrap of paper. It must be a certified true copy if offered as evidence.

Capili vs. NLRC

273 SCRA 589

The validity then of UM's "retirement" of the petitioner upon the latter's 60th birth anniversary on
18 August 1993 could only be based on proof that the petitioner became a member of its Retirement Plan at
any time after his employment in 1982 but before 18 August 1993. The burden to prove such a fact was on
UM, but the record fails to show that UM has discharged that burden.
UM's belated attempt to prove that it is a school policy to retire employees who reach the age of
60, pursuant to UM's Retirement Policies dated 16 December 1990 24 and Updated Retirement Policy dated
3 August 1993, cannot sway this Court in UM's favor. These documents are mere scraps of paper, they
being only xerox copies. They have not been certified to be true copies or offered in evidence before the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Neither have they even been referred to in UM's comment in this case.

Can the LA validly decide based on position papers?

If the issues are not controverted, then such method is practicable and valid. If the facts are
controverted, then hearing must be conducted. Such is usually applied in illegal dismissal cases. In money
claims, you just show your payroll.

 No motion for reconsideration is allowed from a judgment or order of the LA. (RULE V, SECTION 19,
NLRC RULES).
 The remedy is to appeal such decision to the NLRC within 10 calendar days from the receipt of the
decision of the LA. It is 5 calendar days if the decision came from the RD.

Motion for reconsideration in NLRC is a prohibited pleading.

Bombase vs. NLRC

245 SCRA 496

The claim of petitioner that her backwages should be recomputed was correctly denied by public
respondent. The matter was only raised by petitioner when she moved for reconsideration of the Order of
March 19, 1992 of Arbiter del Rosario. Her motion was denied on July 8, 1992 on the ground that under the
rules of public respondent said motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. The denial was appealed
to the NLRC and it was rightly affirmed by public respondent NLRC for section 17, Rule 5 of the Revised
Rules of the NLRC categorically provides that "no motion for reconsideration of any order or decision of the
Labor Arbiter shall be given due course." In connection therewith, Article 223 of the Labor Code, as
amended, provides that "decision, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders." It is thus plain that petitioner can no longer assail the correctness of her
award of backwages as she failed to challenge it by means of appeal to the NLRC and within the ten (10)
day period required by the Labor Code, as amended. In Ramones v. NLRC, we held that this appeal period
is jurisdictional.
We also sustain the award of separation pay given by the public respondent to petitioner.

If the judgment involves a monetary award, how is the appeal perfected?

By posting a cash or surety bond exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees. (Rule VI, Sec. 6)

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What are the other requirements to perfect appeal?

1. Proof of payment of appeal fee.
2. Under oath
3. Filed on time
4. File a memorandum of appeal containing:
- Grounds relied upon and arguments in support thereof.
- Relief prayed for.
- Statement of date when decision was received.
- Proof of service to other party.

Appeal fee is jurisdictional.

Luna vs. NLRC

GR 11604, Mar. 20, 1997

Private respondent Grandeur Security Services Corporation also defends the order of the NLRC and
contends that petitioners' appeal was not perfected because the required appeal fees were paid beyond the
reglementary period.
The issue in this case is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petitioners' appeal. We hold that it did not. Under the rules of the
NLRC, an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision to the NLRC may be taken (1) by filing a verified
memorandum of appeal and (2) by paying the appeal fees filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
of a decision, award or order of the Labor Arbiter. Both requisites must be satisfied, otherwise the running
of the prescriptive period for perfecting an appeal will not be tolled.

Payment of appeal docketing fee not required for perfection of appeal.

Aba vs. NLRC

311 SCRA 248

Not jurisdictional but merely a technical rule citing Article 277(d) of the LC which states that no
docket fee shall be assessed in labor standards dispute.
Is delay in paying the appeal docketing fee fatal to petitioner’s appeal? The Office of the Solicitor
General opines that the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for failure to pay the appeal docketing fee on time
was not in consonance with the constitutional mandate to protect labor and settled jurisprudence.
Accordingly, it moves for the setting aside of the decision of the NLRC which dismissed Aba’s appeal and
motion for reconsideration for non-payment of the appeal docketing fee.
The petition is impressed with merit. "Appeal" means the elevation by an aggrieved party of any
decision or award of a lower body to a higher body by means of a pleading which includes the assignment
of errors, arguments in support thereof, and the reliefs prayed for. On the other hand, "perfection of an
appeal" includes the filing, within the prescribed period, of the memorandum of appeal containing, among
others, the assignment of error/s, arguments in support thereof, the relief sought and, in appropriate cases,
posting of the appeal bond. An appeal bond is necessary only in case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, in which case, the appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by
a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the appeal was filed within the reglementary period. The
memorandum of appeal contained an assignment of errors, the arguments in support thereof, and the
reliefs sought. No appeal bond was necessary as the decision being appealed did not contain any monetary
award. Nowhere is it written that payment of appeal docketing fee is necessary for the perfection of the
appeal. Therefore, there is no question that the appeal in the instant case has been perfected and the
failure to pay the appeal docketing fee is not fatal. Besides, it is settled jurisprudence that technical rules of
evidence are not binding in any proceedings before the Commission or any of the labor arbiters.
It has been the policy of this Court to resolve labor disputes with the view of compassionate justice
towards the working class.

 Marquez comments that docket fee and appeal fee are not the same!

Distinction between perfection of appeal and filing of appeal

Teofilo Gensoli and Co. vs. NLRC

289 SCRA 407

In perfecting their appeal, petitioners filed with NLRC a supersedeas bond to cover only the
amount of One Hundred Eighty One Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Nine and 10/100 (P181,969.10) Pesos,
the excess amount disputed on appeal.

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To the appeal of petitioners, private respondents interposed their opposition on the ground that
the supersedeas bond posted by petitioners did not equal the monetary award of Four Hundred Thirty Four
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Two and 50/100 (P434,752.50) Pesos and attorney's fees.
As the appeal from subject Decision was not perfected within the 10-day reglementary period; on
August 11, 1993, the NLRC dismissed the appeal, holding, thus —

". . . The Commission (Fourth Division) after due deliberation, RESOLVED to

DISMISS the instant appeal for failure of respondent-appellants to comply with the
requirement for the perfection of an appeal specifically the posting of the required cash or
surety bond equivalent to the monetary award. The monetary award in the judgment
appealed from is P434,752.50, whereas the supersedeas bond posted is only
P181,969.10, and therefore, deficient by P252,783.40. The law and the present Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC are very explicit in the matter of posting a cash or surety bond
equivalent to the monetary award in The petition is impressed with merit.”

Salutory and prevailing is the rule that technical rules be not strictly followed and the spirit and
intent of the Labor Code be taken into account.
True it is, Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, requires a cash or
surety bond in an amount equal to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. But for the
perfection of the appeal on the merits, to be threshed out by the NLRC, the requirements of the law should
be given a liberal interpretation.
This policy of liberal interpretation was unequivocably ratiocinated and amply settled in the case of
Oriental Mindoro Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (246 SCRA 801 [1995]), to wit:

"The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for
the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an
appeal by the employer may be perfected 'only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond.' The word 'only' makes it perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended the posting
of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an
employer's appeal may be perfected. That requirement is intended to discourage
employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their
employees' just and lawful claims.
Considering, however, that the current policy is not to strictly follow technical
rules but rather to take into account the spirit and intention of the Labor Code, it would
be prudent for us to look into the merits of the case, especially since petitioner disputes
the allegation that private respondent was illegally dismissed. . . "
Indeed, well entrenched is the principle of liberal interpretation of the Labor
Code, as amended. order to perfect an appeal by an employer (Article 223 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Sections 3 (a) and 6, Rule VI of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended). As held by the Supreme Court, ". . . perfection
of an appeal in the manner . . . prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional
and failure to perfect an appeal as required by the Rules has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory."

Is property bond allowed?

Although RULE VI SECTION 6 doesn’t provide for it, the case of UERM-Memorial Medical Center
vs. NLRC, March 3, 1997, GR 110419, allows the same. Judgment was more than P17M. The property
bond offered was P102M.

UERM-Memorial Medical Center vs. NLRC

March 3, 1997, GR 110419

The question presented in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is whether or not in perfecting
an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a property bond is excluded by the two forms
of appeal bond — cash or surety — as enumerated in Article 223 of the Labor Code.
Within the reglementary period for appeal, the petitioners filed their Notice and Memorandum of
Appeal with a Real Estate Bond consisting of land and various improvements therein worth P102,345,650.
The private respondents moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Article 223 of the Labor Code, as
amended, requires the posting of a cash or surety bond. The NLRC directed petitioners to post a cash or
surety bond of P17,082,448.56 with a warning that failure to do so would cause the dismissal of the appeal.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging it is not in a viable financial condition to post a
cash bond nor to pay the annual premium of P700,000.00 for a surety bond. On 6 October 1992, the NLRC
dismissed petitioners' appeal. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the NLRC in a
resolution dated 7 June 1993.
Hence, this petition assailing the two resolutions as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. On 28 June 1993, we temporarily enjoined the NLRC from implementing the questioned
resolutions and from executing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The applicable law is Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, which
provides:

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"In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer

may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from."

We have given a liberal interpretation to this provision. In YBL (Your Bus Line) v. NLRC 4 we ruled:

". . . that while Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
6715, requiring a cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in
the judgment appealed from for the appeal to be perfected, may be considered a
jurisdictional requirement, nevertheless, adhering to the principle that substantial justice
is better served by allowing the appeal on the merits threshed out by the NLRC.

Then too, in Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission we held:

"The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for
the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an
appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond." The word "only" makes it perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended the posting
of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an
employer's appeal may be perfected. The requirement is intended to discourage
employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their
employees' just and lawful claims.
Considering, however, that the current policy is not to strictly follow technical
rules but rather to take into account the spirit and intention of the Labor Code, it would
be prudent for us to look into the merits of the case, especially since petitioner disputes
the allegation that private respondent was illegally dismissed."

We reiterate this policy which stresses the importance of deciding cases on the basis of their
substantive merit and not on strict technical rules. In the case at bar, the judgment involved is more than
P17 million and its precipitate execution can adversely affect the existence of petitioner medical center.
Likewise, the issues involved are not insignificant and they deserve a full discourse by our quasi-judicial and
judicial authorities. We are also confident that the real property bond posted by the petitioners sufficiently
protects the interests of private respondents should they finally prevail. It is not disputed that the real
property offered by petitioners is worth P102,345,650. The judgment in favor of private respondent is only a
little more than P17 million. So holds that the foregoing requirement of the law should be given a liberal
interpretation.

Your Bus Line vs. NLRC

190 SCRA 160
Reiterates the UERM case.

Hence, this petition for review, which this Court will treat as a special civil action for certiorari,
whereby petitioners raised the sole issue that the NLRC erred in not giving due course to the appeal for
failure to satisfy a purely technical requirement when issues involving substantial rights were raised in the
appeal.
The petition is impressed with merit.

Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended by Republic Act No. 6715 provides as follows:
"ART. 223. Appeal. . . . — In case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission
in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from."
(Emphasis supplied.)

The NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on September
5, 1989, provide in Section 5 thereof as follows:
"Section 5. Requisites of Appeal; When Perfected. . . . shall be under oath
with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond
as provided in Section 7 of these rules. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

The appeal interposed by petitioners to the NLRC was made on September 11, 1989, or just after
six (6) days from the effectivity of the aforestated Interim Rules. In undertaking the appeal, the counsel of
petitioners relied on the notice of the decision in the case which stated the requirements of an appeal
without any mention that a bond must be filed. Apparently said counsel did not know as yet of said new law
and Interim Rules requiring the posting of a bond on appeal. It also appears that private respondents did
not know about it as no opposition to the appeal was made on this account.
Moreover, in the appealed decision of the labor arbiter the exact total amount due to the private
respondents as separation pay is not stated which would be the basis of the bond that is required to be filed
by petitioners under the said law. Thus even if petitioners may be expected to know the law, then they

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allege that they would have to go to the socio-analyst of the NLRC to compute the approximate amount due
the private respondents as the basis of the amount of the bond to be filed so that it is not probable that
they may be able to secure such computation within the non-extendible period of ten (10) days to appeal
provided for by law.
Petitioners also assert that at that time the petitioner corporation was in financial distress. At any
rate they offered to post the bond in compliance with the requirement of the law so that they may be
afforded the relief of an appeal.
The Court finds that while Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715,
requiring a cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed
from for the appeal to be perfected, may be considered a jurisdictional requirement, nevertheless, adhering
to the principle that substantial justice is better served by allowing the appeal on the merits threshed out by
the NLRC, the Court finds and so holds that the foregoing requirement of the law should be given a liberal
interpretation.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Maximiano C. Asuncion, this Court relaxed the rule in
Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, by allowing a liberal interpretation of the
rule that the payment of the docket fees is jurisdictional. More so when the party involved demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules to pay the docket fees required. This Court held that the payment of said
fees may be authorized by the Court within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. The greater interest of justice will be served by giving due course to the
appeal despite the much delayed filing of the appeal bond.
In this case, the circumstances of the non-filing of the bond are understandable and could be
attributed to excusable oversight. The Court holds that petitioners should be given the opportunity to file
the required bond and avail of the remedy of appeal.

Does the exclusion of damages and attorney’s fees in the bond per Sec. 6, Rule VI, NLRC rules
have statutory basis?
Note that Article 223 of the LC provides that the bond should be equivalent to the monetary award
in the judgment appealed from.

Are moral damages included in the computation of "monetary award" for purposes of
determining the amount of the appeal bond?

Fernandez vs. NLRC

Jan. 28, 1998, GR 105892

The SC said there is no conflict because Article 223 provides for the requisites to perfect the appeal
while the NLRC rules, the manner of computing the bond.

Petitioners contend that Respondent NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal of private
respondents because the appeal bond was insufficient. Although the total monetary award in their favor was
P1,078,200.55, private respondents posted a cash bond in the amount of P752,183.00 only. In computing
the monetary award for the purpose of posting an appeal bond, private respondents relied on Rule VI,
Section 6 of the 1990 New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and excluded the award for damages, litigation
expenses and attorney's fees. Petitioners argue however that the said rule cannot prevail over Article 223 of
the Labor Code, which does not provide for such exclusion.
We agree with private respondents. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a
bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied.)
On the other hand, Rule VI, Section 6 of the 1990 NLRC New Rules of Procedure, invoked by
private respondent, provides:

"Section 6. Bond. — In case of the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a

monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant,
reduce the amount of the bond. However, an appeal is deemed perfected upon the
posting of the bond equivalent to the monetary award exclusive of moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees.
Nothing herein however, shall be construed as extending the period of appeal."
(Emphasis supplied.)

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There is no conflict between the two provisions. Article 223 lays down the requirement that an
appeal bond should be filed. The implementing rule, on the other hand, explains how the appeal bond shall
he computed. The rule explicitly excludes moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees from the
computation of the appeal bond. This exclusion has been recognized by the Court in a number of cases.
Hence, in Erectors vs. NLRC, the Court nullified an NLRC order requiring the posting of an appeal bond
which, among others, "even included in the computation the award of P400,000.00 for moral and exemplary
damages." Indeed, the said implementing rule is a contemporaneous construction of Article 223 by the
NLRC pursuant to the mandate of the Labor Code; hence, it is accorded great respect by this Court.

If the last day to file an appeal falls on a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday

You can still file it on the next working day. In computing the 10-day period, do not exclude these
days because the law speaks of calendar days.

Under what mode of service can a pleading before the NLRC be filed?
The NLRC Rules do not provide for a more of serving pleadings in general. The Rules of Court
provides however that it can be done through:
- Personal delivery
- Registered Mail

 For purposes of computing the reglementary period, if the filing is done by registered mail, the date of
mailing is the date of filing. If by ordinary mail, the date of actual receipt is the date of filing. See
INDUSTRIAL PAPER VS NLRC [233 SCRA 597].

Industrial Paper vs. NLRC

233 SCRA 597

SERVICE OF PLEADINGS; RULE IF MADE BY ORDINARY MAIL OR BY PRIVATE MESSENGERIAL

SERVICE. — On the issue of the timeless of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, we find that the
NLRC correctly applied the rule that where a pleading is filed by ordinary mail or by private messengerial
service, it is deemed filed on the day it is actually received by the court, not on the day it was mailed or
delivered to the messengerial service. As this Court held in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC,
(209 SCRA 55 [1992]): The established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-
forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the
date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of
filing of that pleading.

Is it possible to file a Motion to Reduce Bond?

Yes, see Rule 6, Section 6. However, you must file it within the reglementary period to appeal and
the act of filing does not stop the running of the period to appeal. Note that the appeal is perfected once a
bond is filed.
See the following cases and do not mistake one from the other because these cases were decided
prior to the amendment:

Star Angel Handicraft vs. NLRC

236 SCRA 580

The appeal bond is required under Paragraph 2 of Article 223 of the Labor Code, which provides:
"In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from."

Section 3(a), Article 223, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides:
"Requisites for Perfection of Appeals. — (a) The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of the this Rule; shall be under oath with
proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 5 of this Rule; . . ."

Under Section 5 of Rule VI, the appellant is required to pay an appeal fee of P100.00 to the
Regional Arbitration Branch, Regional Office, and to attach to the records of the case the official receipt of
such payment.
In Section 6 of Rule VI, it is provided that:
"Bond. — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the

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Supreme court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. The Commission may, in
meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond.
(However, an appeal is deemed perfected upon the posting of the bond equivalent to the
monetary award exclusive of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees
[Deleted, effective on January 14, 1992]). Nothing herein however, shall be construed as
extending the period of appeal."

Neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically provide for a situation where the
appellant moves for a reduction of the appeal bond. Inasmuch as in practice the NLRC allows the reduction
of the appeal bond upon motion of appellant and on meritorious grounds, it follows that a motion to that
effect may be filed within the reglementary period for appealing . Such motion may be filed in lieu of a bond
which amount is being contested.
In the meantime, the appeal is not deemed perfected and the Labor Arbiter retains jurisdiction
over the case until the NLRC has acted on the motion and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC.
An analogous procedure is the extension of time to file a record on appeal, provided the motion for
such extension is filed before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing said record on appeal. If
the order of the trial court granting the motion is issued only after the expiration of the original period, the
appeal may still be perfected within the period extended. Likewise, the appeal is deemed perfected only
after the approval of the record on appeal and not upon the filing of said record on appeal.

Coral Point Development Corporation vs. NLRC

GR 129761, February 28, 2000

Article 223, second paragraph, of the Labor Code states that when a judgment involving monetary
award is appealed by the employer, the appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent
to the monetary award in the judgment.
This is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case the monetary award will be
given to them upon dismissal of the employer’s appeal.
It is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of
their obligations to the employees.
In Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. NLRC, this Court said:
The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for
the perfection of an appeal by the employer is clearly limned in the provision that the
appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond." The word "only" makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended that the
posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer may be the exclusive means by which
an employer’s appeal may be perfected.

In meritorious cases and upon motion of the appellant, the NLRC may reduce the amount of the
bond. Also in some cases the requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal
was relaxed, but the decisions were justified due to substantial compliance with the rule. We recognized in
Star Angel Handicrafts v. NLRC that neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically
provide for a situation where the appellant moves for a reduction of the appeal bond, and
Inasmuch as in practice the NLRC allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon
motion of appellant and on meritorious grounds, it follows that a motion to that effect
may be filed within the reglementary period for appealing. Such motion may be filed in
lieu of a bond which amount is being contested. In the meantime, the appeal is not
deemed perfected and the Labor Arbiter retains jurisdiction over the case until the NLRC
has acted on the motion and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC.

 The prevailing rule now is that the filing of a motion to reduce bond will not stop the reglementary period
to file an appeal.

If the NLRC has the authority to entertain a motion to reduce bind,

then it can also grant extension to file bond.

Alcosero vs. NLRC

288 SCRA 140

APEX appealed to the NLRC on 15 August 1993 assailing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Instead
of posting an appeal bond, however, APEX filed in lieu thereof a motion for the reduction of the appeal bond
seven (7) days from its receipt of the Labor Arbiter's decision. After due consideration, the NLRC on 4 May
1994 promulgated a resolution providing in part that APEX had already paid all the claims due to
complainants in connection with this case as evidenced by the individual receipts and quitclaims executed by
the latter. There being no allegation that complainants were forced or pressured into signing the receipts
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and quitclaims, the NLRC sustained as valid the aforementioned documents. Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter's
decision was ordered vacated and set aside, and the above entitled case dismissed for lack of merit. Hence,
the instant petition for certiorari questioning the resolution of the NLRC.
Petitioners contend that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal of APEX notwithstanding that the assailed decision of the
Labor Arbiter had long become final and executory for failure of APEX to file the required appeal bond within
the reglementary period of ten (10) days, which bond was an indispensable requirement for the perfection
of the appeal.
Ordinarily, where the losing party desires to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter it must
be done within ten (10) days from receipt of the decision. When the judgment involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Compliance with these requirements is both mandatory
and imperative as the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is jurisdictional. But in a
growing number of cases, we have relaxed the stringent application of the rule concerning the posting of
appeal bond within the 10-day reglementary period as a requirement for the perfection of an appeal. Thus,
in the leading case of Star Angel Handicraft v. National Labor Relations Commission, we held —
Neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically provide for a
situation where the appellant moves for a reduction of the appeal bond. Inasmuch as in
practice the NLRC allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon motion of appellant and
on meritorious grounds, it follows that a motion to that effect may be filed within the
reglementary period for appealing. Such motion may be filed in lieu of a bond which
amount is being contested. In the meantime, the appeal is deemed perfected and the
Labor Arbiter retains jurisdiction over the case until the NLRC has acted on the motion
and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC.
In this case, APEX filed in lieu of an appeal bond a motion for the reduction of the bond together
with the Memorandum of Appeal seven (7) days from receipt of the Labor Arbiter's decision. The NLRC held
that the appeal of APEX was founded on meritorious grounds, hence, it gave due course to the same
despite the fact that no appeal bond was posted at that time. The NLRC could not be faulted for doing so
since it had authority to entertain motions for the reduction of the appeal bond. And when APEX posted the
required bond within the extended period granted by the NLRC, it was deemed to have seasonably
perfected its appeal.

Once the bond has been reduced, the employer cannot file a Motion for Reconsideration as this would
amount to an extension of the period to perfect an appeal.

Mers Shoes vs. NLRC

286 SCRA 647

It has been held in numerous decisions that failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.
This timeworn issue is again before us.

Having received the above decision on February 4, 1994, petitioner perfected its appeal before
respondent NLRC on February 14, 1994. Simultaneous with the filing thereof, petitioner filed a motion to
reduce the amount of the bond which the NLRC partially granted in an order dated May 31, 1995, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent-movants should be, as it is
hereby ordered to post a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in the amount of P403,126.20
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt hereof.
Should respondents-movants opt to post a surety bond, they shall, in addition,
submit with their counsel a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond to
be posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.
SO ORDERED."

On July 28, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration from the above order which the
NLRC treated as a motion for extension of time to perfect an appeal which is a prohibited pleading under
the New Rules of Procedure. Consequently, ruling that the ten-day reglementary period within which to post
the appeal bond having lapsed, NLRC dismissed the instant appeal. Hence, this petition.
We find for the respondents.
Article 223 of the Labor Code requires, inter alia that in case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from. Perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. This requirement is intended to discourage employers
from using the appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employee's just and lawful
claims. Such a requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with.
The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of
an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal by the employer may be

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perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The word "only" makes it perfectly clear, that the
lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by
which an employer's appeal may be perfected. It must be noted, however, "that the law does not require its
outright payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the
appeal fail."
While Section 6(c), Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows the reduction of the
appeal bond upon motion of appellant and on meritorious grounds, the same must be filed within the
reglementary period for appealing. The records reveal that when petitioner sought the reduction of the bond
to P200,000.00, the NLRC partially granted the same by allowing a 50% reduction of the required bond or in
the amount of P403,126.20.
In support of petitioner's contention, it begs the Court to re-examine the following cases, to wit:
YBL v. NLRC; Erectors, Incorporated v. NLRC; and Rada v. NLRC, in relation to the case at bar.
After a careful scrutiny of the above cases and finding that the factual circumstances differ from
each other, we are unconvinced of its application to the instant petition. A distinction, therefore, of said
cases is in order.

In the Erectors case, the labor arbiter rendered a decision which reinstated the respondent
therein to his former position with full backwages, without loss of seniority rights or benefits accruing after
his dismissal, and to pay him P300,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and 10%
of all said sums, as attorney's fees. While YBL did not question the reinstatement aspect of the decision, it,
however, sought to dismiss the award of moral and exemplary damages. For allegedly failing to post the
bond within the reglementary period, NLRC dismissed the appeal. On petition before this Court, we ruled
that:
"The equivalence thus expressly prescribed between the amount of the appeal
bond and the monetary award, less moral and exemplary damages, made in the decision
sought to be appealed not only underscores the fact that the obvious and logical purpose
of an appeal bond is to insure, during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that
would defeat or diminish recovery under the judgment if subsequently affirmed; it also
validates and justifies, at least prima facie, an interpretation that would limit the amount
of the bond to the aggregate of the sums awarded other than in the concept of moral and
exemplary damages."

In fine, the labor arbiter gravely erred in including moral and exemplary damages in the
computation of the appeal bond when the law clearly provides that moral and exemplary damages shall not
be included in fixing the amount of the bond.

In the YBL case, the NLRC similarly dismissed the appealed decision of the labor arbiter for the
non-posting of the appeal bond within the reglementary period. We ruled, thus:
"Moreover, in the appealed decision of the labor arbiter the exact total amount
due to the private respondents as separation pay is not stated which would be the basis
of the bond that is required to be filed by petitioners under the said law. Thus even if
petitioners may be expected to know the law, then they allege that they would have to go
to the socio-analyst of the NLRC to compute the approximate amount due the private
respondents as the basis of the amount of the bond to be filed so that it is not probable
that they may be able to secure such computation within the non-extendible period of ten
(10) days to appeal provided for by law." (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the foregoing circumstance, petitioner therein could not have posted a bond, the same
having been omitted by the labor arbiter.

In Rada, the labor arbiter likewise committed the same infraction as in the YBL case. Thus:
"Said decision did not state the amount awarded as backwages and overtime
pay, hence the amount of the supersedeas bond could not be determined. It was only in
the order of the NLRC of February 16, 1990 that the amount of the supersedeas bond
was specified and which bond, after an extension granted by the NLRC, was timely filed
by private respondent."

The instant petition, however, presents a different factual milieu. As pertinently observed by the
Solicitor General in his Comment:
"To have the bond reduced is not a matter of right on the part of the movant but
lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of meritorious grounds. After
the NLRC had exercised its discretion in fixing the bond, the petitioner should have
complied with it. To file a subsequent motion this time seeking another reconsideration of
the already reduced value of the bond, is indeed to request for an extension of time to
perfect the appeal which is prohibited under the NLRC Rules of Procedure. To rule
otherwise will encourage endless motions for reconsideration seeking reduction of the
required bond thereby rendering futile the requirement of the law to make bond an
indispensable requisite for the perfection of appeal by the employer."

We, therefore, rule that for petitioner's failure to post the required bond within the reglementary
period after it has been ordered reduced, the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioner's appeal.

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The NLRC may grant or dismiss the appeal. Can the aggrieved party file a motion for
reconsideration?
YES. It must be filed within 10 calendar days from receipt of the dismissal of the appeal.

What if the Motion for Reconsideration is denied?

The decision will become final and executory.

If there is no Motion for Reconsideration filed before the NLRC, the decision becomes final and executory
and therefore there is no way by which another government body can review the case; the only remedy is a
motion for reconsideration.

Zapanta vs. NLRC

292 SCRA 586

NLRC; MOTION FOR RECON, A PREREQUISITE BEFORE ANY FURTHER REMEDY MAY BE
PURSUED. — Fatal to this action is petitioner's failure to move for the reconsideration of the assailed
decision on the dubious pretext that it will be a mere rehash of the arguments and issues previously raised
in his position paper, but which stratagem conveniently skirts as a consequence the reglementary period
therefor, especially if the same has already expired. The implementing rules of respondent NLRC are
unequivocal in requiring that a motion for reconsideration of the order, resolution, or decision of respondent
commission should be seasonably filed as a precondition for pursuing any further or subsequent remedy,
otherwise the said order, resolution, or decision shall become final and executory after ten calendar days
from receipt thereof.
RATIONALE. — The rationale therefor is that the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to
rectify such errors or mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had. This
merely adopts the rule that the function of a motion for reconsideration is to point out to the court the error
that it may have committed and to give it a chance to correct itself. Petitioner cannot, on its bare and self-
serving representation that reconsideration is unnecessary, unilaterally disregard what the law requires and
deny respondent NLRC its right to review its pronouncements before being haled to court to account
therefor. On policy considerations, such prerequisite would provide an expeditious termination to labor
disputes and assist in the decongestion of court dockets by obviating improvident and unnecessary recourse
to judicial proceedings. The present case exemplifies the very contingency sought to be, and which could
have been, avoided by the observance of said rules.

If the decision of the NLRC becomes final and executory due to the denial of the MFR, is there an
appeal of the decision of the NLRC?
NO. There is no appeal from the decision of the NLRC but there is still a remedy under RULE 65 of
the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The ground of prima facie evidence of abuse
of discretion is a ground for appealing the decision of the LA to the NLRC.

Will the filing of a Petition for Certiorari stay the decision of the NLRC?
NO. However, to enjoin enforcement of the decision of the NLRC which is final and executory, under
Rule 65, you have to apply for the issuance of a TRO and eventually a writ of injunction. There is no way of
preventing the decision of the NLRC from becoming final and executory except by the filing of MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION within the prescribed period of 10 days. Since the motion for reconsideration has been
denied, the decision will have to become final and executory and subject to execution. There is no more
appeal from that decision but there is a Special Civil Action [Certiorari] on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. To prevent execution of the decision, the aggrieved party can apply for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order.

If you apply for a TRO, for how many days will it be valid?
60 days. If issued by RTC, 20 days.

Can it be extended?
NO.

 Note that a Special Civil Action is an original action and the RTC, CA and SC have concurrent and original
jurisdiction. However, always follow the principle of HIERARCHY OF COURTS. At this stage where the
NLRC decision is the subject of the certiorari, the RTC does not have jurisdiction because the RTC is of the
same level as the NLRC and the LA is of the same level as the lower courts.

 LEGAL FORM 

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Before the LA:

JUAN DE LA CRUZ (COMPLAINANT)
VS
SHOEMART (RESPONDENT)

If both parties appeal:

JUAN DE LA CRUZ (COMPLAINANT-APPELLANT)
VS
SHOEMART (RESPONDENT-APPELLANT)

If SM files a Petition for Certiorari:

SHOEMART (PETITIONER)
VS
JUAN DE LA DRUZ (PRIVATE RESPONDENT)
AND NLRC (PUBLIC RESPONDENT)

- In a certiorari case under Rule 65, there is a need to identify or implead the public respondent
because the petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion.
- The petition will again be docketed by the CA
- From the NLRC, you should file it directly to the CA because it is an original action.
- The petition should be copy-furnished the other party.
- The NLRC is represented by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL located in Amorsolo,
Makati City.
- Once the petition is filed before the CA, it will require the respondent to file a COMMENT. The
OSG will file the comment for NLRC. The private respondent will also file a comment.
- Thereafter the CA will determine if there is a need for the petitioner to file a REPLY TO THE
COMMENT, ordinarily within an extendible period of 10 days.
- If the CA gives due course to the petition, the CA will require BOTH parties to file their
respective MEMORANDA which is akin to a position paper which summarizes their respective
claims and allegations.
- Thereafter, the case shall be submitted for decision by the CA without prejudice to the prayer
for injunctive writ (TRO or WPI). If the CA believes that the case is meritorious, the CA will
make the TRO permanent.

From the CA, is there still a Motion For Reconsideration?

YES. To be filed within 15 days, which the CA may either grant or deny.

From the CA, is there a remedy?

YES. Appeal by Certiorari under Rules 45 of the Rules of Court to be filed within 15 days from
receipt of the decision of the CA on the ground of pure questions of law. If is involves the application of the
rules or the law, it is a “question of law”.

 The SC is not a trier of facts but factual findings of the SC may be reviewed in exceptional cases.

Will the Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 prevent the decision of the CA from becoming final
and executory?
It will become final and executory. But if you file an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 within the
prescribed period, the decision of the CA will be stayed.

 LEGAL FORM 

If the CA reverses NLRC decision, the caption of the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC
shall read:

JUAN DE LA CRUZ (PETITIONER)

VS
SHOEMART (RESPONDENT)

 We do not need to implead the CA as respondent. This is found in Rule 45 Section 4.

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