Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166562               March 31, 2009

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, 
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution 2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. 4

The facts follow.

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972
while they were classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975
in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.

At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their second
child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu City. 7 In September
1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations 8 and thereafter proceeded to take a
residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979,
Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field 9 and, in 1980, he began working for
Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family, as member of its active staff, 10 while Carmen worked as
the hospital’s Treasurer.11

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on
August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986;
Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991. 12

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their
youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin
used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. 14 But after they were married, petitioner
continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of
the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and
force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the
gate of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected
to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to
other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they
perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s
drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same. 16

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family
and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of
providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy
expensive equipment for his hobby. 17 He rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his obligation to
his children.19

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling. 20 He would gamble two or three
times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no
money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife’s own jewelry to finance his gambling. 21 There
was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot
Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts. 22 Benjamin only
stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an
act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling
establishments.23

In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the following

manifestations:

1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give
regular financial support to his family.24

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and
athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied
being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances. 25 As for his alleged failure to
support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his
professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support
within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending
his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a
week.28

During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and gambling habits and violent
behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses’ children from
1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated
Carmen even in front of their children.30

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist. 31 Instead of the usual
personal interview, however, Dr. Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the latter had already gone to work
as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic
notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical
abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder. 32

To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a
consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his
expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s) interview with
Benjamin’s brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing
wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good relationship with his fellow doctors
and his good track record as anesthesiologist.35

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision 36 declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found
Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular
activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a
personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage
between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
xxxx

SO ORDERED.37

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he
married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established
fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals 40and in Rep. of the Phils. v.
Court of Appeals and Molina.41

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should
not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or
more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina
ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare
decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the
prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the
petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration. 45 On review, the CA
decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended
Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision. 47

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in
its December 13, 2004 Resolution. 48

Hence, this petition.

For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines
set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;

II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has
been liberalized; and

III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. 49 Basically, it is
a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,50necessary for two simple reasons: economy and
stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. 51

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was
later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s
discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v.
Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the
calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the
18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come
again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not
be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed
conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles
necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary
discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into
the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that
Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a
judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between
the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this
internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare
decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by
legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply
the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as
horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy
correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare
decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is
not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare
decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations.
Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway
today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable
command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is
a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it." In
contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As
Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent
course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as
clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both
respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes
judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate
and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of
Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect
stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and
reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown,
the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by
freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans
from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be
straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law
are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and
held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on
the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2)
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently,
as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification. 53
To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no
longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, 54 and
again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a
law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not.

In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te, 56 we declared that, in hindsight, it may
have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina
unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into
and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well
because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with
another.57

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to
give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. 58 At best, courts
must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a
given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.59The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving
the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set
forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on
the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice
o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus,
the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina
Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and
the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.60

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to
prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband,
and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and the appellate court’s
rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.62 1avvphi1 .zw+

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining
whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality.
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing
the transcript of Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into
consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa
who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with Benjamin’s
brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and gambling problems, or his
violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same
to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondent’s testimony, as well as the totality of evidence
presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to
Article 36.

It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must,
perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES* MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

January 17, 2018

G.R. No. 225642-43

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee 

vs.
JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO, Accused-Appellant
 DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the 17 February 2016 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
1

HC Nos. 01226-MIN and 01227-MIN affirming in toto the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment  of the2

Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 of Davao City (RTC). The RTC found Juvy D.

Amarela (Amarela) and Junard G. Racho (Racho) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) different
charges of rape.

THE FACTS

The two (2) Informations in this case read:

Criminal Case No. 64,964-09

That on or about February 10, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will, immediately after boxing
her legs.
3

Criminal Case No. 64,965-09

That on or about February 11, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will, immediately after
grappling her.4

These two (2) cases were jointly tried before the RTC, and Amarela and Racho's appeals, although
separate, were consolidated in the CA on 13 November 2015. 5

The RTC summarized the factual milieu of this case:

Prosecution presented [AAA], single, housekeeper and a resident of [XXX], Calinan, Davao City. On
February 10, 2009, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, she was watching a beauty contest with
her aunt at Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. The contest was being held at a
basketball court where a make-shift stage was put up. The only lights available were those coming
from the vehicles around.

She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong
Cooperative near the basketball court. Between the cooperative building and the basketball court
were several trees. She was not able to reach the comfort room because [ Amarela] was already
waiting for her along the way. Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was
shocked and was no match to the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the day
care center. He punched her in the abdomen which rendered her weak. Then Amarela undressed
her. She tried to resist him but he was stronger. He boxed her upper thigh and she felt numb. He
placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull
movement. She shouted for help and then three (3) men came to her rescue [so] Amarela fled.

The three (3) persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with her.
So she fled and hid in a neighboring house. When she saw that the persons were no longer around,
she proceeded on her way home. She went to the house of Godo Dumandan who brought her first
to the Racho residence because Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home. Dumandan stayed
behind So Neneng Racho asked her son [Racho] to bring her to her aunt's house instead.

xxxx

[AAA] then said that [Racho] brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to
lie down. When she refused, [Racho] boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by kicking
him but he succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of
[AAA]. [Racho] then inserted his penis into [AAA]'s vagina. After consummating the act, [Racho] left
her. So [AAA] went home alone.

When she reached home, her parents were already asleep. She went inside her room and cried.
The following morning, she decided to leave home. Her mother was surprised at her decision until
eventually, [AAA] told her mother about what happened to her. She told her [eldest] brother first who
got very angry.

They reported the matter to the police and eventually [ Amarela] and [Racho] were arrested. 6

For the defense, Amarela testified for himself denying that he had anything to do with what
happened with AAA:

Defense presented [Amarela] who confirmed the fact that on February 10, 2009, he attended the
fiesta celebrations in Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. He said he met private
complainant, [AAA], at the cooperative building at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. [AAA] asked
him if he knew a person by the name of Eric Dumandan who was allegedly her boyfriend. After a
while, Eric Dumandan passed by and so he told him that [AAA] was looking for him. Then he left.

Amarela said he had a drinking spree with his friend Asther Sanchez. While drinking, he felt dizzy
and fell down from the bench. So Sanchez brought him to the house of his elder brother Joey in
Tawan-tawan. He did not know what happened next because he slept and woke up at six o'clock in
the morning.7

On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping her:

Defense also presented [Racho], a resident of Sitio Maligatong, Barangay Tawan-tawan, Baguio
District, Calinan, Davao City. He testified that he was at the house of his mother on February 10,
2009. At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, [AAA] arrived with Godo Dumandan. [AAA] was asking
for help while crying because she was allegedly raped by three persons in the pineapple plantation.

His mother advised her to just take a bath and change clothes and sleep at his brother's house. But
[AAA] wanted to go home. Since he was the only one who was not drunk, Racho was instructed by
[his] mother to accompany [AAA] in going to her aunt's house.

When they reached Caniamo, [AAA] did not want to be brought to her aunt's house because she
knows the latter would just scold her. Instead, she wanted to be conveyed to their house at Ventura.
Since Ventura was far, Racho did not go with her and instead went back home.

When asked about the charge of rape against him, Racho said he could not have done that because
his hand is impaired while showing a long scar on his left arm. This was a result allegedly of a
hacking incident on September 21, 2008. He offered a Medical Certificate (Exh. 1) issued by Dr. Lugi
Andrew Sabal of the Davao Medical Center which indicates that Racho was confined in the said
hospital from September 21, 2008 up to October 1, 2008 after an operation on his left forearm. He
said that his left arm was placed in a plaster cast but that he removed the cast after three (3)
months. He said that even after he removed the cast, his arm was still painful and he could not move
it around.

Racho said he was surprised when policemen came to his house on February 11, 2009 and invited
him to the police station because there was a complaint for rape against him.

Anita Racho testified that she was at home in the evening of February 10, 2009 together with her
husband and sons Bobby and [Racho]. Godo Dumandan arrived together with [AAA] who was
allegedly raped by three (3) men. [AAA] appeared madly and wet so she advised her to take a bath
and not to go home anymore since it was late. [AAA] insisted on going home, so she asked her son
[Racho] to accompany her. [Racho] at first refused pointing to his elder brother Bobby to accompany
her. He eventually brought [AAA] home. He came back at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening and
then he went to sleep.

The following day, she was surprised when [Racho] was arrested allegedly for raping [AAA]. [Racho]
denied raping [AAA].8

Ruling of the Trial Court

In its joint judgment, the RTC found AAA's testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho,
to be clear, positive, and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their
denial as these could not have overcome the categorical testimony of AAA. As a result, Amarela and
Racho were convicted as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 64964-09 finding
[Amarela] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.

In Criminal Case No. 64965-09, judgment is hereby rendered finding [Racho] GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages. 9

The Assailed CA Decision

Before the CA, Amarela and Racho pointed out that although there were other witnesses, the only
material testimony on record was that of AAA. They argued that there were several circumstances
casting doubt on AAA' s claim that she was raped because her testimony does not conform to
common knowledge and to ordinary human experience.

In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto finding no reason to reverse the
trial court's factual findings. It held:

[AAA] has testified in a straightforward manner during her direct examination and remained steadfast
in her cross-examination that Amarela sexually abused her on February 10, 2009, and [Racho]
abused her five hours later. The first rape incident took place in the daycare center. She was pulled
by Amarela while she was on her way to the comfort room located at the back of the x x x
cooperative building. Private complainant, full of mud and wet, with dress tom, took refuge at the
house of her boyfriend and sought for help. Her boyfriend's father took her to the house of the in-
laws of her cousin. [AAA], who was still wet and muddy, begged the mother-in-law of her cousin that
she be taken to the house of her aunt. While the in-laws of her cousin helped her by having escorted
her to her aunt's house, it turned out however, that [Racho] her escort had another plan in mind.
[Racho] sexually abused [AAA], who had no more strength to fight him.

The records render no reason to reverse the factual findings of the court a quo. Both of the
appellants' denials miserably fail in contrast to [AAA's] positive identification of the accused-
appellants as the person who sexually abused her. There is no doubt in our mind that both
appellants had carnal knowledge of [AAA]. Her credibility is cemented by her lack of motive to testify
against the two appellants, Amarela and [Ra.cho]. There is no evidence to suggest that she could
have been actuated by such motive. The People has ably demonstrated the existence of the
elements of Rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, which states:

xxxx

The Court sees no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that in matters of credibility of
witnesses, the assessment made by the trial court should be respected and given preponderant
weight. [AAA's] ordeal is so traumatic that she would rather forget the whole incident. But once a
rape victim has decided to seek justice, that means she is willing to recall the dastardly detail of the
animalistic act committed on her person.

[Racho] would have us believe that the charge against him was merely fabricated because,
according to him, being raped by two different assailants, on two different occasions and only hours
apart, is contrary to the normal course of things.

We are not convinced.

The Supreme Court has once said that rape in itself is prompted by the abnormal need of a man to
overpower and control a woman by way of sexual abuse. There is no typical mode, norm, or
circumstance in committing rape or sexual abuse for the evil in man has no conscience. In fact, in a
catena of cases, the Supreme Court had ruled that rape is no respecter of time or place. Thus, we
cannot agree with [Racho]'s argument that just because [AAA] had been raped five hours earlier, the
possibility that she might get raped again is nil.
Undeterred, appellants posit that [AAA's] testimony is not substantially corroborated by medical
findings as the medical certificate does not show any physical injuries resulting from the alleged use
of force by the appellants.

We do not agree.

The absence of any superficial abrasion or contusion on the person of the offended party does not
militate against the claim of the latter whose clear and candid testimony bears the badges of truth,
honesty, and candor. It must be stressed that the absence or presence of visible signs of injury on
the victim depends on the degree of force employed by the accused to consummate the purpose
which he had in mind to have carnal knowledge with the offended woman. Thus, the force employed
in rape need not be so great nor of such a character as could not be resisted. It is only that the force
used by the accused is sufficient to enable him to consummate his purpose.

Appellant Amarela also argues that [AAA] could not have identified her assailant because it was very
dark at the place where [AAA] was allegedly pulled by her assailant and the place where she was
allegedly raped.

[AAA], in her re-direct examination, testified that she knew it was Amarela who raped her because
she saw Amarela's fact while Amarela brought her from the cooperative building to the daycare
center.

Time and time again, the High Court has repeatedly ruled that positive identification prevails over
denial, a negative defense that is inherently unreliable. We have no reason to doubt [AAA's]
unwavering assertions positively establishing the identities of the two accused-appellants. We find
the guilt of each of the accused-appellants to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto.  10

OUR RULING

More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual· depredation, rape
cases are solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In
doing so, we have hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly
admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to
protect her honor.   However, this misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts the
11

accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice.

The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case
of People v. Tana,   the Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns
12

raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador,
said:

It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused
unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor.
We cannot believe that the offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place
unless it did actually take place.
13

This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting back then would
have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault;
today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino
woman. We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic
role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent
and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.

In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or
cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused
may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.  Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond reasonable
14

doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.

In an appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down, almost invariably, to
the credibility and story of the victim and eyewitnesses. The Court is oftentimes constrained to rely
on the observations of the trial court who had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling and at times unfriendly,
examination.  It has since become imperative that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial
15

court be accorded great respect by this Court; for it can be expected that said determination is based
on reasonable discretion as to which testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy of
belief.  Although we put a premium on the factual findings of the trial court, especially when they are
16

affirmed by the appellate court,  this rule is not absolute and admits exceptions, such as when some
17

facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, and
misinterpreted.

We follow certain guidelines when the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before us, to wit:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the R TC' s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments
and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly
when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. 18

After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony, reasonable doubt
lingers as we are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The following circumstances,
particularly, would cast doubt as to the credibility of her testimony: (1) the version of AAA's story
appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs materially from her testimony in court; (2) AAA could not
have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the first
time; (3) her testimony lacks material details on how she was brought under the stage against her
will; and (4) the medical findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of any
signs of forced entry.

First, AAA narrates that she was on her way to the comfort room, isolated from the crowd at the
beauty contest and made it easy for Amarela to grab her without anyone noticing:

Q: Now, you said that you watched the beauty contest at around 7:00 in the evening on Feb. 10,
2009. After that, Ms. Witness, while watching, what did you do?

A: I was on my way to the CR.

Q: And where is the CR located?

A: Near the coop.

Q: Can you please tell us the name of that cooperative?

A: Cooperative.

Q: Can you recall the exact name?

A: Maligatong Cooperative.

Q: And, where is this Maligatong Cooperative, Ms. Witness, in relation to the basketball court where
the beauty contest was held?

A: It's near.

xxxx

Q: Now, between the basketball court and the cooperative you referred to, what separates these two
buildings?

A: Durian trees and cacao.

Q: You said that you were going to the CR located at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative to
relieve yourself. And, were you able to go to the CR at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative?
A: Nomore.

Q: Why not?

A: [Amarela] was waiting for me.

Q: Exactly, can you please tell us the location where he was waiting for you?

A: At the back of the cooperative.

Q: And, upon seeing [Amarela] at the back of the cooperative, Ms. Witness, tell us what happened?

A: He pulled me.

Q: Going to what place?

A: Going towards the day care center. 19

Meanwhile, her affidavit-complaint would indicate that Amarela pulled AAA away from the beauty
contest stage to the day care center:

6. At around 6:00 in the afternoon, I, my aunt [BBB] together with her siblings and grand children
went back to Maligatong Cooperative Building to watch a beauty contest. My companions stayed at
the multicab at the parking area of said building, while my cousin [CCC] and I went closer to the
stage. While at there, the person of [Amarela], drunk, suddenly appeared and introduced himself to
me. I resisted to get his hand on my hands because he is holding it tightly and forcibly brought me to
the back portion of the building. I asked for help but nobody heard me maybe because of the high
volume of the sound system.

7. While at the back of said building I saw my boyfriend Eric Dumandan coming and [Amarela] told
him, "Ran (Eric's palayaw) naa si gemma diri!" and Eric responded, "ahh! tinga-a."

8. When Eric left us, [Amarela] grabbed me going to the purok beside the daycare center of Sitio
Maligatong, Brgy. Tawan-Tawan, Baguio District [more or less] 20 meters away from the
[cooperative] building. I shouted for help but still nobody heard me. 20

It has often been noted that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex parte are usually
incomplete and inadequate.  We usually brush aside these inconsistencies since they are trivial and
21

do not impair the credibility of the rape victim.  In this case, however, the version in AAA's affidavit-
22

complaint is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims that she
was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says that she was on her way to
the rest room when she was grabbed. By this alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA's retraction
because it goes into whether it was even possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her will.

If we were to take into account AAA's initial claim that Amarela pulled her away from the vicinity of
the stage, people facing the stage would easily notice that a man was holding a woman against her
will. Thus, AAA's version that she was on her way to the rest room, instead of being pulled away
from the crowd watching the beauty contest, would make it seem that nobody would notice if AAA
was being taken away against her will. If indeed AAA was on her way to the rest room when she was
grabbed by Amarela, why does her sworn statement reflect another story that differs from her court
testimony? To our mind, AAA's testimony could have been concocted to just make her story
believable rather than sticking to her original story that Amarela introduced himself and pulled her
away from the stage. We cannot say that this inconsistency is simply a minor detail because it casts
some doubt as to whether AAA was telling the truth - that she was abducted against her will before
she was raped.

Although we cannot acquit Amarela solely based on an inconsistency, this instance already puts
AAA's credibility in question. Again, we must remember that if we were to convict based solely on
the lone testimony of the victim, her testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and
consistent with human experience. We must set a high standard in evaluating the credibility of the
testimony of a victim who is not a minor and is mentally capable.
Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the whole
incident allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was not
illuminated and that she did not see Amarela's face:

Direct Examination

Q: Now, what separates this beauty contest from what you were testifying a while ago as the
daycare center?

A: Coconut trees, durian trees, and cacao.

Q: ·what else?

A: Several trees.

Q: How about grass?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, can you please tell us the illumination in that place?

A: It was dark.

Q: Why is it that it was dark?

A: Because there was no lighting. 23

Cross-Examination

Q: Since it was already night time, it was very dark at that time, correct?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And when you went to the CR to relieve yourself which CR was located at Maligatong
Cooperative building, it was also dark on your way?

A: Yes, ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Now, while under the makeshift stage of that day care center, it was dark, very dark?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And you cannot see the face of [Amarela], was not clear to you because it was very dark,
correct?

A: Yes, ma' am. 24

Re-Direct Examination

Q: At the time that you said that while [Amarela] was undressing you could not see his face, would
you confirm that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about his body?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why, Ms. Witness?

A: It was dark.
 xxxx

Q: Now, at the time that you were raped you said that it was too dark, how did you then identify that
[Amarela] was the one who raped you?

A: I know him when he brought me from the Coop.

Q: From the Coop. to the day care center that was the time that you identified him?

A: Yes, sir. 25

From AAA's testimony, we are unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given the lighting
conditions in the crime scene. In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified Amarela
while she was being pulled to the day care center. Even so, the prosecution failed to clarify as
to how she was able to do so when, according to AAA herself, the way to the day care center was
dark and covered by trees. Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, we again draw
reservations from AAA's testimony.

Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary responsibility. The
identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.26

Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped naked, and then
raped seems unrealistic and beyond human experience. She said:

Q: At the day care center, where exactly did he bring you?

A: Under.

Q: Under what?

A: Under the makeshift stage.

Q: You said there was also a makeshift stage at the day care center?

A: Yes.

Q: Was it finished makeshift stage or not?

A: Not yet finished.

Q: You said that he brought you under that makeshift stage?

A: Yes.

Q: Please tell us how did you fit in that makeshift stage?

A: Because the flooring is about 2 feet high.

Q: Since you said he pulled you towards that makeshift stage, what was your reaction, Ms. Witness?

A: I was scared.

Q: And what did you do?

A: I did not know what to do then.

xxxx

Q: Now, after that, what happened, Ms. Witness?

A: He pushed me under.

Q: What happened after that?

A: He [punched] me in my abdomen.

Q: What else did he do to you?

A: I felt weak.

Q: After that what happened?

A: He undressed me.

Q: While he was undressing you, what did you do, Ms. Witness?

A: I was just lying down.

xxxx

Q: What else did he do to you while you were resisting his advances?

A: He boxed my upper left thigh.

Q: .What did you feel when he boxed your left thigh?

A: I felt numbness.

xxxx

Q: Now, you said that he undressed you, Ms. Witness, and you said he also undressed himself.
What, then, [did he] do to you?

A: He placed himself on top of me.

Q: What did he do after that?

A: He inserted his penis in my sex organ. 27

From this, AAA would like us to believe that Amarela was able to undress himself and AAA, and
place himself on top of her while under a 2- feet high makeshift stage. It is physically impossible for
two human beings to move freely under a stage, much more when the other person is trying to resist
sexual advances. Moreover, AAA failed to mention how exactly Amarela pulled her to the makeshift
stage without any sign of struggle or resistance. If indeed she was being held against her will, AAA
could have easily called for help or simply run away.

Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical findings of the medico-
legal officer. The medico-legal certificate dated 12 February 2009 would reflect that AAA had no
pertinent physical findings/or physical injuries:28

FINDINGS
GENERAL PHYSICAL FINDINGS
Height 5 feet & 4 inches Weight 44 Kg
Awake, afebrile, not in respiratory
General Survey
distress
Conscious, coherent, respond well to
Mental Status questions when asked and maintained
eye to eye contact
Pertinent Physical Findings/Physical Normal Findings
Injuries
 ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
External Genitalia Normal findings
Urethra and Periurethral Area Normal findings
Perihymenal Area and Fossa (+) Hyperemic/Erythematous
Narvicularis perihymenal area.
(+) Complete laceration at 9 o’clock
Hymen and 3 o’clock positions with minimal
bloody secretion on the lacerated area.
Perineum Normal findings
Discharge None
Internal and Speculum exam Not done
Anal Examination Good Sphincteric tone
DIAGNOSTIC AND EVIDENCE GATHERING
Pending laboratory results
Forensic Evidence and Laboratory
(Spermatocyte determination gram
Results
staining).
IMPRESSONS
Anogenital findings are diagnostic of blunt force or penetrating trauma. 29

Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical examination is concerned, we have held that a medico-
legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case, it being merely corroborative in
nature.  In convicting rapists based entirely on the testimony of their victim, we have said that a
30

medico-legal report is by no means controlling. Thus, since it is merely corroborative in character, a

31

medico-legal report could even be dispensed with. 32

A medico-legal's findings are at most corroborative because they are mere opinions that can only
infer possibilities and not absolute necessities. A medico-legal, who did not witness the actual
incident, cannot testify on what exactly happened as his testimony would not be based on personal
knowledge or derived from his own perception. Consequently, a medico-legal's testimony cannot
establish a certain fact as it can only suggest what most likely happened.

In the same way, a medico-legal's findings can raise serious doubt as to the credibility of the alleged
rape victim. Based on the testimony of the medico-legal officer who conducted the medical
examination on AAA, she diagnosed that the ano-genital findings were caused by a blunt force or
penetrating trauma.

In a study conducted by Radostina D. Miterva,  the most common sites for lacerations were
33

determined, "in rape victims with ring-shaped hymens, lacerations were most commonly located as
followed at dorsal recumbence of the patient: (1) one laceration at 6 o'clock position in 42.02% of
cases; (2) two lacerations at 5 and 7 o'clock positions in 24.55% cases; (3) three lacerations at 3, 6
and 9 o'clock positions in 45.36% of cases; and (4) four lacerations at 3, 5, 6 and 9 o'clock positions
in 25% of cases."

These findings were supported by an earlier study that described patterns of genital injury resulting
from sexual abuse. 34

However, in a similar study comparing injuries from consensual and non-consensual intercourse, the
authors discovered that the statistical results of the locations of vaginal laceration are almost the
same.  Their findings suggest that the injuries are similar after consensual and non-consensual
35

intercourse. 36

From all this, we observe that a specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish
consensual from non-consensual sex. Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the
frequency of lacerations and whether they are located in different positions) to determine whether
the sexual act was consensual or not. If the frequency of lacerations is located in different areas of
the vaginal orifice, then it would be a good indicator that there was sexual abuse. On the other hand,
if the lacerations are found in a specific area, it could indicate forced rape, but could also suggest
consensual intercourse.
In the instant case, the lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the
hymen. Considering the locality of these lacerations, we cannot completely rule out the probability
that AAA voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA's thighs-when she
said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that AAA may have had consensual
intercourse.

Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the
female.  It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is
37

alleged and shown to be without her consent.  Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is
38

not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving
consent.  The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time prior to
39

penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals,
prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion. 40

Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual intercourse as a defense, We must bear in
mind that the burden of proof is never shifted and the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits. Whether the accused's defense has merit is entirely irrelevant in a criminal case. It
is fundamental that the prosecution's case cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. 41

As to Racho's case, we note that AAA testified only once for both criminal cases.  This means that
1âwphi1

both Amarela and Racho were convicted based on her lone testimony. When we rely on the
testimony of the private complainant in rape cases, we require that her testimony be entirely
credible, trustworthy, and realistic. For when certain parts would seem unbelievable, especially when
it concerns one of the elements of the crime, the victim's testimony as a whole does not pass the test
of credibility. Since we doubt AAA's account on how she was raped by Amarela, we have to consider
her testimony against Racho under the same light.

In her testimony, AAA claimed that Racho was instructed to bring her to her aunt's house, but
instead forced her to go inside a house along the way. While inside the house, Racho supposedly
boxed AAA's abdomen, undressed himself, placed himself on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into
AAA's vagina. Afterwards, Racho got dressed and left AAA to go home by herself. 42

We find it odd that AAA was not brought to the police right after she arrived at Godo Dumandan's
house to seek help. Instead, she was brought to the Racho residence where she told Neneng Racho
what happened. Again, instead of reporting the incident to the police, AAA insisted that she be
brought to her aunt's house nearby. This is way beyond human experience. If AAA had already told
other people what happened, there was no reason for her not to report the incident to the proper
authorities.

Faced with AAA's doubtful narration before she went home alone, we are inclined to believe Racho's
version that they parted ways when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. To begin with, Racho
did not even want to bring AAA to her aunt's house nearby.  If he had the intention to have sex with
43

AAA, Racho would not have declined her mother's instruction. To add, Racho said he left AAA by
herself because he did not want to bring AAA to her house since this was in another town from her
aunt's house.  His reason for leaving AAA to go home alone is supported by the fact that he was
44

able to immediately come home right after he left with AAA. Unlike AAA's testimony, the version
offered by Racho is corroborated by the testimony of his mother.

Undeniably, the defenses of denial and alibi are commonly raised in rape cases. Nevertheless, we
have dismissed such defenses for being inherently weak, self-serving, and, more often than not,
uncorroborated. To recall, Racho did not deny that he accompanied AAA to her aunt's house, but he
said he left her when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. Racho's mother corroborated this
part of the story. To our mind, if the denial and alibi are readily available, Racho could have easily
raised these defenses and denied that AAA ever came to the house. His mother could have likewise
covered up this story, but she did not and confirmed that Racho was with AAA that night. If indeed
Racho raped AAA that night, the best defense available for him was alibi which he thought he did not
have to raise, given that he was telling the truth when he left AAA by herself to go home. To our
mind, these are badges of truth which persuade us that Racho might be telling the truth.

In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported
by proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty.  Absolute guarantee
45

of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person of a criminal charge but there must, at least,
be moral certainty on each element essential to constitute the offense and on the responsibility of
the offender.  Thus, the prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case with clarity and
46

persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. 47
The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Whether
AAA's ill-fated story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must do its
part to convince the court that the accused is guilty. Prosecutors are given ample resources of the
government to present a logical and realistic account of every alleged crime, and they should, to the
best of their ability, present a detailed story to get a conviction. But here we cannot ascertain what
happened based on the lone testimony of AAA. It should have been the prosecution's duty to
properly evaluate the evidence if it had enough to convict Amarela or Racho.

Henceforth, we are constrained to reverse the R TC and the CA rulings due to the presence of
lingering doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as
quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case. Amarela and Racho are entitled to an
acquittal, as a matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11 of Davao City, in Criminal Case Nos. 64964-09 and 64965-09, as well as the 17 February
2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC Nos. 01226 and 01227-MIN are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused-appellants Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho are ACQUITTED of the charge of rape
on the ground of reasonable doubt. Their IMMEDIATE RELEASE from custody is hereby ordered
unless they are being held for other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and
by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY

CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. 7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts
its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the
case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage
was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article
26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce
them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To
rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to
file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and
tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
Chairman
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
 EN BANC

April 24, 2018

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner 

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse
and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision  and October 12, 2015 Resolution  of the Court of
1 2

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the

Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-
0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED. 3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation
of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce
Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice
of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general
circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence
(consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012)
for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO
MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband
are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously
registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO. 4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in
form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the

Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce. 5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity
to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."
6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et
al.  ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of
7

the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still
married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court,
the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case
was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.  where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was
8

dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.  In this jurisdiction,
9

the following rules exist:

 1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. 10

2. Consistent with Articles 15  and 17  of the New Civil Code, the marital bond
11 12

between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained

abroad. 13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be

recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to

contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.  Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.  Aside from amending Articles
16 17

36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.  This provision was
18

originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and
approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.  As modified, Article 26 now
19

states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under
Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.  It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
20

precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.  Philippine courts cannot try the case on
21

the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our
22

jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the
spouses, must still be determined by our courts. 23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to
avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is
recognized by his or national law.  The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino
24

women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even
after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and
perhaps have already married again. 25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired
foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree.
We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III: 26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized
American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but
their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter
to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically,
Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese
court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would
not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she
shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin  and Van Dorn  already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
28 29

initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation,respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their
minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the
Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial
court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce
decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to
reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In
ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which
is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v.
Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged
post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the
Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.
30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the
ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that
was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment
in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her
ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal
property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending
in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the
other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay,
et al.  and Medina v. Koike.
32 33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her
second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of
whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x 34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce,
which was granted.  Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of
1âwphi1

foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The
RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that,
consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.  and Garcia v. Recio,  the divorce decree and the
35 36

national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the
CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent
factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short
in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce
is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe
fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic
relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to
Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained
under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of
the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of
the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore,
bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that
the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put
words in the mouth of lawmakers.  The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to
37

have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be
departure." 38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.  Law have ends to
39

achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.  As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:
40 41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law
is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.  Whether the
42

Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of
an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses
are severed by operation on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of
the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind
adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts
have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are
constitutional. 43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.  The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental
44

right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.  When these violations
45
arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.  If a legislative
46

classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest. 47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause
are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.  It includes the right to
48

free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to
vote.  On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights
49

and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.  It is akin to the paramount interest
50

of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare.  It essentially involves a public right or interest that,
51

because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over
the latter. 52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect
to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the
court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites  of
53

the equal protection clause.  Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce
54

decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and
whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a
foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should
not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to
contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another
Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is
recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have
the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were
it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial
difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment

because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or
her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and
38 of the Family Code.  In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be
56

accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed
with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that
all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in
accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For
the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail
what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who
are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same.
Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to
marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what
he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under
the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by
other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,  that a person takes ordinary care of his
57

concerns,  that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to
59

the law and fact,   that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
60

into a lawful contract of marriage,  and that the law has been obeyed.  It is whimsical to easily
61 62

attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she
opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are
entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We
take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature
and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us
to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.  Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general
64

prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question
by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.  Their exchange reveal as follows:
65

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass
a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily
to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that
the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you. 66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine
courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.  On
67

March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which
repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or
unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living
together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.  When the Philippines was liberated and
68

the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710
again prevailed.  From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New
69

Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer
recognized. 70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to
re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
116  1062  2380  and 6027  were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills,
71 72 73 74
H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on
Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading -
with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of
absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as
follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a

common child, or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or

political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a

child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, even if pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the

Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than
one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the
spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife
bears a child after being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a
child of a petitioner; and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than

one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or
both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of
legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen
(18) years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one
(21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband
and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards
with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other
husband and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,

unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
 e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other
and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be
serious or appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition
for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether
or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to
another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and
traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion,
it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other
groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus
establish a state religion.
76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest
of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that
they are good for country. While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal
77

consequences which are governed by the Family Code.  It is in this aspect, bereft of any
78

ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino
family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.  It is also obligated to
79

defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.  To Our mind, the State
80

cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26
only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and
children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact,
among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No.
9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna
Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012").Moreover, in protecting and
strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose
sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect
for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article
26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any
subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in
the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the
stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under
Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions
not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. 82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too
uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect unions.  Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate
83

reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not
found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it.  In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be
84

discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v.
San Luis  quoted:
85

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is
find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.
86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.  A statute
87

may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.
88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel
the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.  The fact of divorce must still first be proven.  Before a a
89 90

foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of
foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office. 92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese
Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu
the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce
Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing
the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.  As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree
94

was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or
law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating
it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on
persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know
by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are
AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

On leave
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO *

Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 I join the dissent of J. Caguioa I join the dissent of J. Caguioa
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I concur, See Separate Opinion No part

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ***

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See dissenting Opinion.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NOEL G. TIJAM ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee, 

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as

well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until
the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error.
It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.  lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition
found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. 

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. 
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, 
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein. 1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. 1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided
the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied
by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation
to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For
it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

 
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, 

vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-
appellee.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused
guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one
(1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his
conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the
poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not
authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with
one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial
was accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed
to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment
as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them
the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His
appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be
an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and
order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of
trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the
detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the
undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have
qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally
of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in
this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be
clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered
sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate
separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a
firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.
 By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by
taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.

FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:

Kind: — ROHM-Revolver

Make: — German

SN: — 64

Cal:— .22

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas
as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted
persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order
condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to
possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the
performance of his duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
Macarandang  and People vs. Lucero.  The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence
2 3

of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to
possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its
decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court
considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,

supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a
certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial
Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of
crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that
while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and
Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero,
We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to
the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to
effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and
by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful
for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards
in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms
are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of
their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he
is not exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our
decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in
this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero,
or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he
accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held
not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with
costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

 
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian,
and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, 
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG
BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars
of the status quo. Ligle do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises
thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of
tune and irrelevant to our day.

The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:

a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the
respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960;

b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:

1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;

2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever

i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of
defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment
rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution;

ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class

privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;

iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent
Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for
their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign
currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with
an authorized bank.

The antecedent facts:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner
Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained
Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on
February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after
policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the
Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check
No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-
108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-
30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear)
used in seducing the complainant.

On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli,
Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805
for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February
24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from
jail.

On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y
Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting
the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After
petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of
P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.

On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking
Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking
Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it.
On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking
Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the
disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order
which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff
of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.

This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated
April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said
section has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive
right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the
writ of preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Central Bank responded as follows:

May 26, 1989

Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino

12 Pres. Osmena Avenue
South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila

Dear Ms. Carolino:

This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section
113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).

The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor
has the same been repealed nor amended.

The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country's banking
system which would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention to
render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The
law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore,
enjoined.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO

Director1

Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners' motion for leave to serve summons
by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y
Northcott." Summons with the complaint was a published in the Manila Times once a week for three
consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in
default on August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendant, ordering the latter:

1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;

2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E.
Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of
them;

3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and

4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of

damages herein awarded;

5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus

6. Costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in graphic
detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:

The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but
was able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden
of Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and
Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon motion of
plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon defendant by publication in
the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising
Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper.
Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of the
period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon motion of the
plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs were
authorized to present their evidence ex parte.

In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor Karen E.

Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a
certain Liberato Madulio, who gave the following testimony:

Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City but has
recently transferred to Arellano University for her second year.

In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema
Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m.
while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an
American approached her. She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already
left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)

The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat
beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that
he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who
is about Karen's age and who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue.
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5)

The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it's
Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach
Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his
niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)

They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the
defendant's house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)

When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that defendant's alleged
niece was not outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside.
When Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her
maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)

Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became
nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and
tied Karen's hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but
defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it
and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)

Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the
door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of
her and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout
but no sound could come out because there were tapes on her mouth. When
defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after the
withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)

He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her
sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so.
While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while
feeling severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a
little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long the defendant was
in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9)

After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take
a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water
while the defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ.
When she took a shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime, defendant
changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower, Karen was
allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired crying. The
incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining the exact
time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food
before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 o'clock the following morning.
(Id., pp. 9-10)

The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast of biscuit and coke
at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For
lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about
12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had
stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like "lugaw". For
the third time, Karen was raped again during the night. During those three times
defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether the
organ was inserted wholly.

Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her
hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for
fear that she might be killed; besides, all the windows and doors were closed. And
even if she shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if
somebody would hear her and would be able to call the police, it was still possible
that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the
defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At
nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)

On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for
thirty minutes after a breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the
evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a window because everything
was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened the window for around fifteen
minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was covered by
styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and
he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)

That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left
but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window covered
by styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she
cried for help through the hole. She cried: "Maawa no po kayo so akin. Tulungan
n'yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!" Somebody heard her. It was a woman,
probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was "istorbo". Karen pleaded for
help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell
asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)

She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed,
this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got
some food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with
biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times.
The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 — 9:00, and the third
was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left but
only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for help but he did not
understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left
the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and
shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The
voices were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a
while, she heard a voice of a woman saying they will just call the police. They were
also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room but
she did not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call for the
police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he might kill her. At that time
she was wearing a T-shirt of the American because the latter washed her dress. (Id.,
p. 16)

Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked her if she had
asked for help because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He
told her to change her clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on
Saturday. He instructed her to tell the police that she left home and willingly; then he
went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but she
could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)

When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she
knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going
upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked
her name and the reason why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped.
Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and the defendant was talking to
them. "Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis," Karen added. "The policeman told him to
just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)

They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house.
They rode the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with defendant,
the policeman, and two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and
one Ate Nita. They were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was investigated by
a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her mother together
with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the
police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)

At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The
written statement she gave to the police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they
proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator and
her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private parts.
It was already 3:00 in the early morning of the following day when they reached the
NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer has been
marked as Exhibit B.

She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City at the time of the incident
but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University, situated
along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in
the school. She first applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University
along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she was denied admission
after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The reason for their denial
was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)

xxx xxx xxx

After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and
sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded
and is ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She
appears to be restless or sad, (Id., p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral
 damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she would always
recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this
experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)

Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the
Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had
become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation.
Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.

Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.

The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:

May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for
declaratory relief rests with the lower court? Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing
that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever."
should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of
petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the
judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for
criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil
liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing
it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in
issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative
power when it took away: a.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced
by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by
way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the
judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.

On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in
issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because the subject
Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was
not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency
deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due
process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to be
reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all
members of a class.

Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to assure the development
and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the
Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the
banking institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same
to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development
of the country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by any person and therefore
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the
public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable
segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some measures to
encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to
some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent
Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some
properties are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426
as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency
deposits shall be exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of
respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman
sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that
it is only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the
sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect of these laws on
petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.

This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.

Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for
declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require
respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.

This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief.  However,
2

exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications
and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus. 3

Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her gesture of
kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the American,
trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said American tourist
Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American
tourist was able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having
received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than
P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation
she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who
had wronged her has the money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this
unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision,

Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was
undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which could
haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel so
humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was refused
admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University, where she sought to
transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of the said High
School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared that they might be
implicated in the case.

xxx xxx xxx

The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and
bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious
illegal detention of his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault
was in her being so naive and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an
American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor capable of
committing such a heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate
incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every forest
there is a
snake, . . . .
4

If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the
incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than his child's rights to said award of
damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a
child of tender years of a country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the
questioned provisions.

It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's
economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the
reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country
has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due
process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be
good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice
and inequality such as the case before us.

It has thus been said that —

 But I also know,  that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of
5

the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new
discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change
with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace
with the times. . . We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted
him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their
barbarous ancestors.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:

The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain
redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and
regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the application
thereof envisaged by the alien. More specifically, the petition raises the question
whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or other court process
accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960
applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere
transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.

The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are
victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines

refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the
strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:

Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency deposits

shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.

Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No.
6426:

Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central

Bank shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall take
effect after the publication of such rules and regulations in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a
week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of
depositors, the rules and regulations at the time the deposit was
made shall govern.

The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act NO. 6426, as
amended by P.D. 1246, thus:

Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency

deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized
under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and
considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the
written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign
currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or
administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or
private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency deposits shall
be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.

The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment

and other court process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.:
 WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1035, certain Philippine banking institutions
and branches of foreign banks are authorized to accept deposits in
foreign currency;

WHEREAS, under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034

authorizing the establishment of an offshore banking system in the
Philippines, offshore banking units are also authorized to receive
foreign currency deposits in certain cases;

WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth

of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking
System in the Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under
the two Systems such as confidentiality of deposits subject to certain
exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income of depositors
who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the
Philippines;

WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality

over such foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits from
tax, and guaranteeing the vested rights of depositors would better
encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking
institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the Philippines
thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly
channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus
directly contributing to the economic development of the country;

Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency
deposits is "to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency
Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines" (3rd Whereas).

The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the
purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:

WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore

banking system, such as political stability, a growing economy and
adequate communication facilities, among others, exist in the
Philippines;

WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as

wide access as possible to the sources of capital funds for economic
development;

WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will

be advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing our links
with foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into
the Philippines, creating employment opportunities and expertise in
international finance, and contributing to the national development
effort.

WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human

resources, and other positive factors provide the Philippines with the
clear potential to develop as another financial center in Asia;

On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD. No.
1035. Its purposes are as follows:

WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the

Philippines has been authorized under a separate decree;

WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank

under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the
resources and managerial competence to more actively engage in
foreign exchange transactions and participate in the grant of foreign
currency loans to resident corporations and firms;
 WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending
authority of the said depository banks under RA 6426 and apply to
their transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to
transaction of the proposed offshore banking units;

It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and
the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas
of PD No. 1035). It is these deposits that are induced by the two laws and given
protection and incentives by them.

Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the
kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.

Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his

dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his
temporary stay in the Philippines.

For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar
deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or
other court processes. 6

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially
to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of
the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).

It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as
a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the
expense of the innocent.

Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the
final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the
foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against
injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.

We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar
as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because
of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by
Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg
Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco
and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., are on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

July 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN,
JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN,
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M.
DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE
LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: ñé+.£ªwph!1

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died
on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both
Petitions were ordered consolidated.

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly
sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: 
têñ.£îhqwâ£

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership
name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the
individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such
person or partnership.  1

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the
name of a deceased partner;   the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of
2

accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients
as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly
indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of
professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such
firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name."  3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. ... 
4

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the
stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national
and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths.  5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name;   there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
6

recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm.  7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world.
8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a
law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a
deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist
from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile
moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15,
1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although
Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins
and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by
petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the
Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it
required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from
including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court
believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise
to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the
name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners.

Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm
name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be
those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his
name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased
partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an
agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either
gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not
represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor
the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor.
There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.

Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names
of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who
can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.

B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the
first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and
Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased
partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to
formal reorganization.

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than
of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the
personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can
exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of
lawyers. 9
têñ.£îhqwâ£

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding

partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is
a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s
204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand,  têñ.£îhqwâ£

... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of
the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be
distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill
and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership
agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)

C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a
trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy.   10
têñ.£îhqwâ£
 A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose
of carrying on trade or business or of holding property."   Thus, it has been stated
11

that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper. 12

The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the
practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.

Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal
Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession
as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public
service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."

xxx xxx xxx

Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money.

2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity, and reliability.

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment
on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.  13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise.   It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
14

ascertained and certified.   The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
15

standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking
of the nature of a public trust."  16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association"
in support of their petitions.

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased
or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our
custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse
at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their
firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed.  têñ.£îhqwâ£

The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...

There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the
propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of
a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op.
cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased
partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be
guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by
custom.

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners
Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the
firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either
name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no

statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association
provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question
as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with
the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate
Division of the First Department has considered the matter and reached The
conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The
use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the
partners.  18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory.   Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must
19

be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.   A local custom as a source of right cannot
20

be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent

evidence like any other fact.   We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the
21

elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a
matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a
juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can
supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system.   When 22

the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist
from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule
against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak
of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any
partner.   Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
23

countenanced.  24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not
be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."  têñ.£îhqwâ£

... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A

trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may
seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire
as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his
professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor
exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn.
There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of
the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done
with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of
law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice
according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and
pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that
spirit. 
25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to
legal and ethical impediment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included
in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which
they served as such.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur

Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.

The facts are undisputed.

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie
has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified
to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia,"
her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.

On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:

"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any
opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound
to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further
holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute
more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with
respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate
child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be
known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.

SO ORDERED."4

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name.

On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is
no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.

Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of
her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a
middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have
as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a
person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear
a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her
mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as
her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for
the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because
under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to
prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the
mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family
Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother." 7

We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination
of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking
of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a
name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism,
to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 9

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of
surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or
illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use
the surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use
such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the
word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

x x x"

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name –

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.

The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in
case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case,
the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of
the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also,
Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and
both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname
of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus

"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname
and that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for
which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he
wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his
name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be
mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the
surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364, which
reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely
because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s
correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile.
Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David but they
all call him Justice David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall
be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of
the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this
for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just
enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate
chapter.

xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the
surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American
tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also
followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.

xxx

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a
matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance
of the decree of adoption.14

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the

Adopted Child –

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess
in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. 15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which
creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship
of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This
was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the
Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to
favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act
of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted. 20

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of
RA 8552.23

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of
the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and
"Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s
surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother
but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of

Adoption Statutes In Favor Of

Adoption –

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 27

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of
the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the
law."28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense
that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29131             August 27, 1969

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant, 

vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants, 
MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee, 
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.

Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M. Brillantes for
plaintiff-appellant.
Antonio T. Lacdan for defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of law being involved
therein.

On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in Civil Case No.
20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:

(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay
jointly and severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25,
1960 until the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees, and plus costs;

(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in this
decision, in case defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to
plaintiff in this decision. From the date of such payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would
pay the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12% per annum until Miguel D. Tecson
has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.

Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case. On
December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets,
rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and
judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701
thereof, against the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No.
20520. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. Acting upon the motion and
plaintiff's opposition thereto, said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:

Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than
P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same court,
the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the
decision of this Court became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on
December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days
 (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this present
case was filed it was filed two days too late.

The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having
prescribed.1äwphï1.ñët

The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals, which, on
March 20, 1969t certified the case to this Court, upon the ground that the only question therein
raised is one of law, namely, whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred
by the statute of limitations.

Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same
Code, "commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final." This, in turn,
took place on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment — which was
received by the defendants herein on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken
therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10) years from December 21, 1955
expired.

Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson maintains otherwise,
because "when the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days each" — according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being leap
years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an
aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court
accepted this view in its appealed order of dismissal.

Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar
year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being
computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of computation.
There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following
year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day,
then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls and, therefore,
that the 366 days constitute one year." 2

The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit
provision of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" — as
the term is used in our laws — to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain,
the Supreme Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it
meant a "natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such
provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the
same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months ... are
referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the "natural," or
"solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be
computed by the actual number of days they have. This concept was later, modified in the
Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be
understood to refer to a calendar month."  4 In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del
Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we
have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be
considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil month," with the particularity
that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added thereto
the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days."

Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for
failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot
be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the
Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act
of Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is so
ordered.

Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Zaldivar, JJ., are on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162155               August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity

as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners, 
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying
reconsideration.3

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied
for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue
district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in
obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to
slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent
suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year. 6

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income
taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32. 8 Therefore,
respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit. 9

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional
documents to support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on
April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. 12 It invoked Section 229 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but
such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from
the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise
after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)

The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to
claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. 13

The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are
of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and
nights from sunset to sunrise.

If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which
they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the
filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was
filed beyond the reglementary period.15

Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. 18 It ruled that Article 13
of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:

The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap
year.19

In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April
14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of
730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed. 20

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 21 Thus, this appeal.

Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly
construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent
inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds
and tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted returns. 23 Hence, the claim
should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time
respondent filed its final adjusted return.

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year
prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted
return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled
that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. 26

However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of

thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according
to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night"
from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain."28 It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to,
but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month." 29 To illustrate,
one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one
calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008. 30

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated
by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled
with the previous one).31Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987
states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify
or designate the laws to be abolished. 32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws
inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987. 1avvphi1

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and
unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses
entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled. 33

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a
year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation
of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-
year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return 34 on April
14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:

Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

  2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

  3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

  4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998

  5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998

  6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998

  7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998

  8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998

  9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999

  10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

  11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

  12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

  14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

  15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

  16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

  17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

  18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

  19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999

  20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999

  21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000

  22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

  23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

  24th March 15, 2000 to

calendar month April 14, 2000

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the
24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within
the reglementary period.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals
which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property
Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, 

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January
7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties
can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties." 3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. 7 In
their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." 8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. 9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; 12 thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in
Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." 13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15 The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. 16 After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of
any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The
Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or
annual.

Hence, this Petition.18

 Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating
him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner'
marriage to the respondent.

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and
53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that
the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties
to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree
before our courts."19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these
two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the
foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity
of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles
1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." 26 A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." 28 Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with
the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read
as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:

x x x     x x x     x x x

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;

x x x      x x x      x x x

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce obtained abroad
is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country.32

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of judicial
notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of
a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic
ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro.
The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional

judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus,
the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of Court, for
the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was
not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part
of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit "B" –
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987
in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage
in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. 60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March
1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to
the court a quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground
of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 155635             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning
certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and
seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September
2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot
staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004
Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in
the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate 6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an
American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen
Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or
Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter,
sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First
Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly
represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No.
362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing
the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the
same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an
Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal
property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa." 11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96,
Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for
declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later
moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment 15 stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a
child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal
Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.
Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix
in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss 17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action
and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed
and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced
several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints
against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094
and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED.
 Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the
proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual
trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against
Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente
went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via
a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing
the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and
from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction
bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the
meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ 25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for
reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in
Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case.
The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8,
2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following
premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule
applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action. 27 Applying said rule in the
light of the essential elements of a cause of action, 28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared
void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she
personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign
divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also
doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The
Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of
her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that
nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life,
such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and
eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated
the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA
which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American
citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning
the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was
denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution. 29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her
petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the
RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION
BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE

PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD
ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE. 30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or
failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. 31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction. 32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety
of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first,
whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the
Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if
so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from
Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such
citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she
was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting
American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an
American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as
an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the
birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may
be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID)
Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to
show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however,
that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of
Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner
Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and

thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other
particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth:     Guam, USA       Date of Birth:     March 5, 1953

Sex:     female                              Civil Status:     married       Color of Hair:    brown

Color of Eyes:     brown               Distinguishing marks on face:    none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1,

Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1)
Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2)
the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a
Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition;
and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the
PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on
October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No
explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance
of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the
Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to
conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation
by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also
known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ
which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws
governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any
Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly
provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by
the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or
five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of
recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which,
to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a
Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have
been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification
certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore,
the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1 st Indorsement
issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of
Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing
disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized
as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican
Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original
petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she
could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that,
while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a
month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question.
Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents
appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A")
and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly
issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to
form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094,
like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What
were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce
Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001) 36 did
Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss
and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of
cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for
argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public
documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her
divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said
divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this
court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally
 appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared
before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by
special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the
acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their Agreement38executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No.
362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on
March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio  that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of
the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, 40 the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by
both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of
its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to
have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal
property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do
so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign

country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title
to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a

right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. 41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente
was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things
stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and,
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8,
2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will
not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American
citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce
secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning
point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained. 42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond
of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As
the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after
completing the legal requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code,
providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph
of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and
Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce
proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on
December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement
provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their
marriage consists onlyof the real property and all the improvements and personal properties
therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No.
168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in
the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x. 46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its
second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the
agreement entered into between the parties dated 14 th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines
shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby
ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by
her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was
not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the
premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and
elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if
the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
 and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to
dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The
petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the
existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief
does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or
uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to
Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the
needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit
Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having
been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months
before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence,
the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a
separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved
as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what
Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have
finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support
hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and
effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
 LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, 

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and
August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on
April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in
a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which,
in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.   Prohibition would then lie since it would be
1

useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings.   Weconsider the petition filed in this
2

case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in
the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over
private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground
of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community
obligations.   As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of
3

KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx  4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending
in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,   only
5

Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law.   In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
6

standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court
of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

 
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 149177               November 23, 2007

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners, 

vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the April 18, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60827, and the July 25,
2001 Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese
consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign
governments,3 entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru
Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. 4 The agreement provides that
respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1,
1999.5 Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog
Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's consultancy contract with
the Philippine Government.6

When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000, this time for the detailed
engineering and construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI)
Project.7 Respondent was named as the project manager in the contract's Appendix 3.1. 8

On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its International
Division, informed respondent that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his
ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the
STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's expiry. 9

Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a negotiation
conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that
respondent’s contract was for a fixed term that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for the
renewal of the ICA.10

As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent consequently
initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.11

For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by and
between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They asserted
that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could only be heard and ventilated in
the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.12

In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved Nippon's request for the replacement of
Kitamura by a certain Y. Kotake as project manager of the BBRI Project. 13

On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular Government v. Frank14 that matters
connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance,15 denied the motion to dismiss.16 The trial court subsequently denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration,17 prompting them to file with the appellate court, on August 14, 2000,
their first Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60205]. 18 On August 23,
2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds—for lack of statement of
material dates and for insufficient verification and certification against forum shopping. 19 An Entry of
Judgment was later issued by the appellate court on September 20, 2000. 20
Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA, on September 19, 2000, still within the
reglementary period, a second Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 already stating therein the
material dates and attaching thereto the proper verification and certification. This second petition,
which substantially raised the same issues as those in the first, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 60827.21

Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court rendered the assailed April 18, 2001
Decision22finding no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The
CA ruled, among others, that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case,
because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. The CA
thus declared that the trial court was correct in applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis.23

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA in the assailed July 25,
2001 Resolution.24

Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of denials, petitioners instituted the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari25 imputing the following errors to the appellate court:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT
CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER OF
THE PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN TWO JAPANESE
NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN
TOKYO, JAPAN.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN OVERLOOKING THE

NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI
SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAWS.26

The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the subject matter jurisdiction
of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts executed
outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci
celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most significant relationship rule," or forum non
conveniens.

However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of the procedural matters raised by the
respondent.

Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 has
already barred the filing of the second petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827 (fundamentally
raising the same issues as those in the first one) and the instant petition for review thereof.

We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 on account of the petition's
defective certification of non-forum shopping, it was a dismissal without prejudice. 27 The same holds
true in the CA's dismissal of the said case due to defects in the formal requirement of
verification28 and in the other requirement in Rule 46 of the Rules of Court on the statement of the
material dates.29 The dismissal being without prejudice, petitioners can re-file the petition, or file a
second petition attaching thereto the appropriate verification and certification—as they, in fact did—
and stating therein the material dates, within the prescribed period 30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said
Rules.31

The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence of a decision on the merits and
leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action
had not been commenced. In other words, the termination of a case not on the merits does not bar
another action involving the same parties, on the same subject matter and theory. 32

Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res judicata effect, and even
if petitioners still indicated in the verification and certification of the second certiorari petition that the
first had already been dismissed on procedural grounds, 33 petitioners are no longer required by the
Rules to indicate in their certification of non-forum shopping in the instant petition for review of the
second certiorari petition, the status of the aforesaid first petition before the CA. In any case, an
omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that will not constitute res judicata
and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not a fatal defect. It will not warrant the dismissal and
nullification of the entire proceedings, considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said
certificate are no longer present. 34
The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that petitioner Hasegawa is only authorized
to verify and certify, on behalf of Nippon, the certiorari petition filed with the CA and not the instant
petition. True, the Authorization35 dated September 4, 2000, which is attached to the
second certiorari petition and which is also attached to the instant petition for review, is limited in
scope—its wordings indicate that Hasegawa is given the authority to sign for and act on behalf of the
company only in the petition filed with the appellate court, and that authority cannot extend to the
instant petition for review.36 In a plethora of cases, however, this Court has liberally applied the Rules
or even suspended its application whenever a satisfactory explanation and a subsequent fulfillment
of the requirements have been made.37 Given that petitioners herein sufficiently explained their
misgivings on this point and appended to their Reply 38 an updated Authorization39 for Hasegawa to
act on behalf of the company in the instant petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient
compliance with the Rules.

However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment to the defect in the verification and
certification. As respondent pointed out, and to which we agree, Hasegawa is truly not authorized to
act on behalf of Nippon in this case. The aforesaid September 4, 2000 Authorization and even the
subsequent August 17, 2001 Authorization were issued only by Nippon's president and chief
executive officer, not by the company's board of directors. In not a few cases, we have ruled that
corporate powers are exercised by the board of directors; thus, no person, not even its officers, can
bind the corporation, in the absence of authority from the board. 40 Considering that Hasegawa
verified and certified the petition only on his behalf and not on behalf of the other petitioner, the
petition has to be denied pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.41 Substantial compliance
will not suffice in a matter that demands strict observance of the Rules. 42 While technical rules of
procedure are designed not to frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended to effect
the proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. 43

Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65 petition to question the
trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that an order denying a
motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition
for certiorari or mandamus. The appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as
defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to trial, and, in case of an adverse decision,
to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course.44 While there are recognized exceptions to this
rule,45 petitioners' case does not fall among them.

This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the case.

Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its jurisdiction to
hear and resolve the civil case for specific performance and damages filed by the respondent. The
ICA subject of the litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals,
and written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no
substantial relationship to the parties 46 following the [state of the] most significant relationship rule in
Private International Law.47

The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they elevated the
case to the appellate court. In the Motion to Dismiss48 filed with the trial court, petitioners never
contended that the RTC is an inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the applicable law which
will determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that of Japan, following the principles
of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.49 While not abandoning this stance in their petition before
the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense of forum non
conveniens.50 On petition for review before this Court, petitioners dropped their other arguments,
maintained the forum non conveniens defense, and introduced their new argument that the
applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant relationship rule. 51

Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on the basis of the change in
theory, as explained in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo.52 We only pointed out petitioners'
inconstancy in their arguments to emphasize their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws principles.

To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these
phases are the following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will
the court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced? 53

Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. 54 Jurisdiction considers whether
it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether
the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply
forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the "minimum contacts"
for one do not always provide the necessary "significant contacts" for the other. 55 The question of
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether
the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment. 56

In this case, only the first phase is at issue—jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects.
1âwphi1

For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the
plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the
issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of
the litigation.57 In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to
subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority
which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by
law.58 It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. 59 To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of
an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, 60 the movant must show that the
court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to
adjudicate the claims.61

In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not
properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No.
00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is
properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.62 What they rather raise as grounds to question subject
matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the
most significant relationship rule."

The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony"63 or the law of the place where
a contract is made.64 The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the "law of the place
where a contract is executed or to be performed." 65 It controls the nature, construction, and validity of
the contract66 and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended
by them either expressly or implicitly.67 Under the "state of the most significant relationship rule," to
ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most
substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court
should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the
domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. 68 This rule takes into account
several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue to be resolved. 69

Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute,
they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law.70 They determine which state's law is
to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. 71 Necessarily, as the only
issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet
called for.

Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have
not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law
should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the
conflict of laws rules.72 Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules
for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved. 73

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a
court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1)
dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the
case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume
jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. 74 The
court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it
may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law
short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.75

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,76 be used to deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 77 Second, whether a suit should be entertained or
dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 78 In this case, the RTC decided to assume
jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense. 79

Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed
by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the
trial and appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner, 
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders  dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of
1

the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled
People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.  On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
2

named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by
the appropriate Court of Holland.  At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
4

old.  Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
5 6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).  However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
7

support to the son, Roderigo. 8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and
since then, have been residing thereat.  Respondent and his new wife established a business known
9

as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.  To date,
10

all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. 12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.  Respondent submitted
13

his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.  Thereafter, the
14

Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for
the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and
still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor,
of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO
LAW. 15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent. Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.  Petitioner also
16 17

filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his

Opposition.  Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.  Subsequently, without the
18 19

RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the
crime charged. 20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,  dismissing the instant
21

criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010. 22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation
to support their child under Article 195  of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable
23

under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to
support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."
24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order  denying petitioner’s Motion for
25

Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s
duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A.
9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262
applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by
our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the
court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010. 26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the
fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic
v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,  which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial
28

court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In
Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to
wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered
in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for
review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
"The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on
questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not
a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or
not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable
under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the
factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will
eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus,
in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should
prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do
not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that
the legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 195  of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support
30

his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in
relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,  respondent is not excused from complying with his
31

obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.  Respondent also
32

added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195  of the New Civil
34

Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15  of the New
35

Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by
their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject
to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his
child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,  the Court held that –

38

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by
their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign
country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.  In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
40

national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support.  While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he
41

is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,  has already enunciated that:
42

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine
of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.  Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
44

has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,  the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as
45

well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the
matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely
show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is
placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s
obligation to support his child is specifically stated,  which was not disputed by respondent.
46

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law,
said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v.
American Realty Corporation,  to wit:
47

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded
and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid
down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws. 48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable
in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,  to wit:
49
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added) 50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom
of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her
or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children. 51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed
here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As
such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is
likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a
legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been
extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime  under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which
52

provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty
(20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,  which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the
53

instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of
facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the
merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice