Calalang vs. Register of Deeds. GR 76265. April 22, 1992 PDF

9/1/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 208
VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 215

Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City
*
G.R. No. 76265. April 22, 1992.
VIRGINIA CALALANG, petitioner, vs. REGISTER OF

DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, ADMINISTRATOR OF
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, LUCIA DE LA
CRUZ, CONSTANCIO SIMANGAN, and IGLESIA NI
KRISTO, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 83280. April 22, 1992.
AUGUSTO M. DE LEON, JOSE M. DE CASTRO, JOSE A.

PANLILEO, FELICIDAD VERGARA VDA. DE PINEDA,
FERNANDO L. VITUG I, FERNANDO M. VITUG, II,
FERNANDO M. VITUG III, FAUSTINO TOBIA, ELENA
M. OSTREA and
_____________
* THIRD DIVISION.
216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

FELISA C. CRISTOBAL-GENEROSO, petitioners, vs. THE

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BISHOP ERAÑO
MANALO, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Judgment; When a right or fact has been

judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction so long as it remains unreversed, it should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law
or estate.—With this Court’s ruling promulgated in 1984, it is our
considered view that the petitioners can not raise anew the
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001744a1303af7aad84af003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
question of ownership of Lucia de la Cruz over Lot 671 which had

been determined by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the
Supreme Court in the de la Cruz case. Well-settled is the rule
enunciated in Church Assistance Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, 171
SCRA 408 [1989] that: “When a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long
as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them in law or estate”
Same; Same; Res Judicata; The less familiar concept or less
terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of
judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior
action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually
determined therein or which were necessarily included therein.—
The Court’s ruling has long been final and the issue on ownership
of Lot 671 finally disposed of several years ago. This declaration
must be respected and followed in the instant case applying the
principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness
of judgment. The less familiar concept or less terminological
usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment
refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually
determined therein or which were necessarily included therein.
Land Titles; Land Registration; The sale of the land to Lucia
dela Cruz and the subsequent registration thereof in the Primary
Book of the Registry of Deeds, Manila constitutes constructive
notice to the whole world.—The sale of the land to Lucia dela Cruz
and the subsequent registration thereof in the Primary Book of
the Registry of Deeds, Manila constitutes constructive notice to
the whole world.
Same; Same; It is well established that in rem proceedings
such as land registration constitutes constructive notice to the
whole world.—Moreover, the petition for reconstitution of title by
Lucia dela Cruz which the court held to be valid was a proceeding
in rem. It is
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VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 217
well established that in rem proceedings such as land registration

constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. The petitioners
cannot now claim that they were not notified of the reconstitution
proceedings over said lot. Under the facts of the case, the title in
the name of Lucia dela Cruz (TCT No. RT 58) has become
indefeasible and incontrovertible.
Same; Same; Same; Torrens Title; Under the Torrens System
of registration, the Torrens Title became indefeasible and
incontrovertible one year from its final decree.—Likewise, the INK
was also issued a Torrens Title over Lot 671 as a result of the sale
made to it by the rightful owner, Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. Under
the Torrens System of registration, the Torrens Title became
indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree
(Tirado v. Sevilla, 188 SCRA 321 [1990]). A Torrens Title is
generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land
referred to therein. (Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9
[1990]) It is, therefore, too late in the day for the petitioners to
reopen or question the legality of INK’s title over Lot 671 at this
time.
Same; Same; The present petition is not the proper remedy in
challenging the validity of certificates of titles since the judicial
action required is a direct and not a collateral attack.—In
challenging the validity of the reconstitution of Lucia dela Cruz’s
title, the petitioners are now alleging fraud, collusion and
illegality in the procurement of the certificate of title of Lucia dela
Cruz. It must be recalled that G.R. No. 76265 stemmed merely
from a consulta case with the National Land Titles and Deeds
Administration. Undeniably, the arguments and issues raised by
the petitioner require adjudication of facts which, under the
circumstances of this case, we are not prepared to do as this Court
is not a trier of facts. Moreover, the present petition is not the
proper remedy in challenging the validity of certificates of titles
since the judicial action required is a direct and not a collateral
attack.
PETITIONS to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Alampay & Manhit Law Offices for petitioners in
G.R. No. 83280.
Araceli Baviera for petitioner in G.R. No. 76265.
Eliseo M. Cruz for the Heirs of Lucia dela Cruz.
Cruz, Tafalla, Castillo Jr., Peren & Associates for
private respondent INK.
218

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The subject of controversy in these two consolidated

petitions is a parcel of land—Lot 671-A of the Piedad
Estate located in Barrio Culiat, Diliman.
The petitioners are individual lot owners who claim to
have bought their respective portions from Amando
Clemente in the 1950’s.
Amando Clemente is alleged to be the registered owner
of said land evidenced by Transfer of Certificate Title No.
16212 covering about 81,160 square meters who converted
it into a subdivision known as Clemville Subdivision.
Lot 671-A is actually part of a bigger parcel known as
Lot 671 which is claimed by respondent Iglesia ni Kristo
(INK), which bought said property from Lucia dela Cruz in
1975. Dela Cruz was adjudged the rightful owner of Lot
671 in the case of dela Cruz v. dela Cruz (130 SCRA 666
[1984]). INK began fencing the whole area and placed the
following sign “NO TRESPASSING—IGLESIA NI KRISTO
PROPERTY SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 61969, July
25, 1984.”
Briefly, the dela Cruz v. dela Cruz case is an action for
reconveyance founded on breach of trust filed by Augustina
dela Cruz, et al. against Lucia dela Cruz and INK.
Augustina and her co-plaintiffs charged that the parcel of
land purchased by the INK from Lucia dela Cruz was
actually a part of their inheritance share in the estate of
their late grandfather, Policarpio dela Cruz but which, in
breach of trust known to the INK, Lucia sold to the latter.
Augustina’s suit was originally decided in her favor by
the trial court. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
judgment was reversed and the questioned sale by Lucia
dela Cruz to the INK was upheld. Consequently, Augustina
went to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 61969.
On July 25, 1984, the Court rendered a decision in G.R.
No. 61969 affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The validity of the sale of Lucia to the INK was thereby
upheld and the title of INK to the subject realty (Lot 671)
was validated as well.
This Supreme Court decision spawned the two (2)
petitions
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now before us assailing the validity of Lucia dela Cruz’s

title over Lot 671 which in turn was sold to INK. In G.R.
No. 76265, petitioner Virginia Calalang alleged that she is

the registered owner of a portion of Lot 671-A (subdivision
plan—PSD 32221) as evidenced by TCT Nos. 17566, 17564
and 17562. She allegedly came to know of INK’s claim only
when a prospective buyer inspected the land on August
1986 and saw the “no trespassing” sign.
Petitioner Calalang lost no time in inquiring into the
status of the land and learned about the pending consulta
case (LRC 1978) filed before the Administrator of the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA). This consulta came about when
the Register of Deeds doubted the registrability of the
documents presented before it in the light of his findings
that the land affected was covered by two (2) sets of titles
issued in the names of different owners.
On September 9, 1986, the petitioner filed a Motion to
Intervene requesting the Administrator to conduct an
investigation of the supposed anomaly committed in
connection with the reconstitution of TCT No. RT-58 in the
name of Lucia dela Cruz. This was denied by the
Administrator invoking our ruling in dela Cruz v. dela
Cruz to the effect that TCT RT-58 in the name of
respondent Lucia dela Cruz is the valid title. (Rollo, pp. 44-
47)
Consequently, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
herein petitioner but this was likewise denied by the
Administrator on October 20, 1986 on the ground that the
issues raised therein have already been passed upon and
that the issues being litigious in nature can not be decided
in a consulta case “where the only question to be
determined is the registrability of the document presented
for registration.”
Hence, on October 27, 1986, the petitioner filed the
instant Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition
in G.R. No. 76265 against the Administrator of the
NLTDRA, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and private
respondents Lucia dela Cruz, Constancio Simangan and
Iglesia ni Kristo. Lucia dela Cruz and Constancio
Simangan were impleaded as they were predecessors-in-
interest of INK.
INK and the Administrator filed their comments on
January 5, 1987 and June 29, 1987 respectively. For failure
to locate
220

Constancio Simangan’s whereabouts despite diligent efforts

and considering further that INK is the indispensable
party and the one interested in upholding the validity of
the reconstituted title of respondent Lucia dela Cruz, the
petitioner moved to drop him as respondent. This was
granted by the Court in a resolution dated April 13, 1988.
(Rollo, p. 189)
Taking the cue from the Administrator that present
certificates of title must be cancelled to avoid duplication,
the Register of Deeds, instead of filing its comment
initiated cancellation proceedings of more than 100 titles
against 81 defendants which included herein petitioner on
the basis of this Court’s declaration in the case of dela Cruz
v. dela Cruz that the reconstituted title of respondent Lucia
dela Cruz is the valid title. This petition was filed by the
Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) on January 5, 1987
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-49900.
Consequently, the petitioner moved to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint was premature and maliciously
filed with knowledge of the instant petition with this Court.
INK, on the other hand filed a Motion to Intervene in said
case. Claiming ownership over Lot 671, it prayed for
damages against some of the defendants namely Augusto
de Leon, Jose M. Panlileo and Felicidad Vda. de Pineda
who filed an injunction suit against it (Civil Case No. Q-
45767) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
on September 12, 1985.
Despite opposition of the petitioner to respondent INK’s
Motion to Intervene, presiding Judge Benigno T. Dayaw
granted the motion of INK and denied petitioner’s Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that the issues raised in the
instant petition (G.R. No. 76265) will not substantially
affect said civil case. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner was likewise denied
considering that no restraining order has been issued.
(Rollo, pp. 198-216)
However, instead of filing an answer to the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-49900, the petitioners filed on July 15,
1988 a supplemental petition before this Court to include
as additional respondent, the Honorable Judge Benigno T.
Dayaw and petitioner’s children who were named as
defendants in said Civil Case, as additional petitioners. At
the same time the petitioner prayed for a restraining order
(Rollo, p. 197).
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To this supplemental petition, the OSG in behalf of the

Republic filed its comment pursuant to the Court’s
resolution granting the petitioner’s motion for leave to
include additional parties and to admit supplemental
petition (Rollo, p. 228).
In the meantime, fire gutted the records of the Register
of Deeds in Quezon City. So respondent Judge required the
parties to agree to a stipulation of facts instead of trial.
In G.R. No. 83280, the petitioners alleged that they
and/or their predecessors in interest were issued their
corresponding titles to the lots purchased from Amando
Clemente in the 1950’s yet.
They alleged that they took physical possession of their
lots in Clemville Subdivision by actually occupying the
same, declaring them in their names for tax purposes,
fencing or marking them off and entrusting their care to
“katiwalas”. From the time they acquired their Torrens
Title they and they alone to the exclusion of INK exercised
all acts of undisturbed, peaceful and uninterrupted
ownership and possession including the payment of their
realty taxes.
On or about the second week of August, 1985, INK
started to enclose the entire Clemville Subdivision with
“sawali” fences with billboards randomly posted which
read:
NO TRESPASSING
I.N.C. PROPERTY
SC DECISION
2ND DIVISION
G.R. NO. L. 61969
JULY 25, 1984
INK also destroyed the concrete/hollow block fence

surrounding the lot of petitioner de Castro and started the
construction of housing structures therein. At the same
time, it commenced the delivery of construction materials
to the former premises of petitioner Panlileo to erect a
permanent structure of strong materials on it.
Thus, on August 22, 1985, the petitioner filed with the
RTC-Branch 101 a petition for injunction with damages.
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 45767. Later, this
petition was amended to include Elena Ostrea and Feliza
C. Cristobal-
222

Generoso as additional petitioners.

On August 25, 1985, presiding Judge Santiago issued a
restraining order and set the case for hearing the writ for
preliminary injunction on September 5, 1985.
The September 5 hearing was however, reset to
September 19, 1985 with respondent Eraño Manalo
volunteering to maintain the status quo until then or until
the matter had been resolved by the trial court.
On September 19, by agreement of the parties and in
open court, the Judge issued an order granting the parties
motion to enter into a stipulation of facts instead of going
on with the hearing and to maintain the status quo.
In the course of the exchange of pleadings between the
parties, the trial judge issued an Order on December 6,
1985 denying the petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds that:
“From the exchange of written arguments and the authorities

cited, it appears that the petitioners’ titles which were issued
some ten years earlier than that of respondent’s emanated from a
reconstituted TCT No. RT-52, which covered portion of Lot 671 of
the Piedad Estate of Quezon City. Petitioners’ parcel of land are
within that estate. This reconstituted TCT No. RT-52 was the
subject of a case, ‘De la Cruz v. De la Cruz,” 130 SCRA 66 [1984],
wherein the Honorable Supreme Court declared the said
reconstituted title null and void.
“The principal argument of petitioners that they were not
parties thereto can not be given serious extended discussion as they
could acquire no more rights than the source of their titles. For
brevity, at this initial stage, suffice it to say that under the
foregoing discussed circumstances, the petitioners have not shown
a clear and positive right to a temporary relief.” (italics supplied).
(Rollo, p. 35)
Assailing this order, the petitioners by way of certiorari

elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 08146.
On April 9, 1986, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
Decision with the following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course and is hereby

RESOLVED by setting aside the Order dated December 6, 1985 in
Civil Case No. Q-45767 and directing that the application for
prelimi-
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nary injunctive relief therein be properly heard and evidence for

or against the same be adduced in due course.” (Rollo, p. 39)
On February 12, 1987, respondent INK filed with the lower

court a motion to dismiss the petitioners’ complaint for
injunction on the ground that it does not state a cause of
action.
On August 7, 1987, the lower court issued an Order with
the following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss justified, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
With costs against petitioners.” (Rollo, p. 48)
Seeking relief from the dismissal, the petitioners filed the

two pleadings, to wit:
1) “Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam” dated

September 18, 1987 filed with the RTC, NCR,
Branch 101 Quezon City; and
2) “Omnibus Motion Incident to Execution of the
Decision dated April 9, 1986” dated September 29,
1987 filed with the Court of Appeals.
On December 10, 1987, the Court of Appeals denied

Petitioners’ Omnibus Motion. The petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution by the
RTC dated May 4, 1988.
Hence, the instant petition with the following
assignment of errors.
“THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ITS DECEMBER

10, 1987 RESOLUTION, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ORDERS OF DECEMBER 12, 1986 AND AUGUST 7, 1986
RELATE TO INCIDENTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 45767 TOTALLY
ALIEN TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CA-G.R. SP NO. 08146.”
“THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
VALIDATING THE ORDER OF AUGUST 7, 1986.” (Rollo, p. 16)
In a resolution dated August 30, 1989, G.R. No. 83280 was

consolidated with G.R. No. 76265.
Although other minor issues are involved in these
consolidated cases, the principal and crucial issue that
alone needs to
224

be resolved is the applicability of this Court’s decision in

the dela Cruz case to these cases now before us.
The petitioners argue that the dela Cruz case could not
be applied to them since they were not parties in that case
nor were they ever notified of such case pending between
the parties. The petitioners explained that the dela Cruz
case was a case among the heirs of Policarpio dela Cruz.
Since they acquired their properties from an entirely
different person, Amando Clemente and not from any of the
heirs of Policarpio dela Cruz, they could not be considered
privies to any of them.
In denying applicability, however, the petitioners assail
the Court’s ruling that “the reconstituted title of Lucia dela
Cruz over Lot 671 (TCT No. RT 58) was valid. As the
registered and rightful owner, Lucia de la Cruz had the
perfect and legal right to sell, assign, and convert the
property to respondent INK who as purchaser for value in
good faith holds the same free from all encumbrances
except those noted in said certificate.”
With this Court’s ruling promulgated in 1984, it is our
considered view that the petitioners can not raise anew the
question of ownership of Lucia de la Cruz over Lot 671
which had been determined by the Court of Appeals and
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the de la Cruz case.
Well-settled is the rule enunciated in Church Assistance
Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408 [1989] that:
“When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by

a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them in law or estate”
The Court’s ruling has long been final and the issue on
ownership of Lot 671 finally disposed of several years ago.
This declaration must be respected and followed in the
instant case applying the principle of res judicata or,
otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. The less
familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata
as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the
situation where the judgment in the prior action operates
as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined
therein or which were necessarily included therein. (De la
Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 165 [1990]).
225
VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 225

Inevitably, the dela Cruz ruling should be applied to the

present petitions since the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before us
now (See Rivas v. SEC, 190 SCRA 295 [1990]). Even the
petitioners substantially adopt the same findings of facts in
their pleadings. The factual inquiry with regards to the
history of Lot 671 has already been laid to rest and may no
longer be disturbed. We quote:
“The undisputed facts indicate that the parcel of land in question

is Lot 671 of the Piedad Estate, GLRO Rec. No. 5975, with an area
of 184,268 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Culiat,
Quezon City; that the totality of the Piedad Estate consists of a
vast tract of land, registered on March 12, 1912, in the name of
the Philippine Government, under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 614 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal;
that when the Piedad Estate was subdivided (with Lot No. 671 as
one of the resulting parcels) whoever was in possession of a
particular lot was given priority and/or preference in the
acquisition thereof provided that the price and the cost of titling
would be paid; that upon such payment, the government would
issue the corresponding certificate of title; that Policarpio de la
Cruz and his wife Luciana Rafael were originally in possession of
the land; that they had three children, namely:
(1) Maximo de la Cruz (married to Feliza Yabut);

(2) Filomeno de la Cruz (married to Narcisa Santiago); and
(3) defendant-appellant Lucia de la Cruz (a widow);
that the plaintiffs-appellees herein are the descendants of the

two sons (Maximo and Filomeno) of Policarpio; that on April 25,
1940, Lot No. 671 was segregated from the totality of the Piedad
Estate, covered by OCT No. 614 and a separate title was issued in
the name of
‘Eugenia de la Paz, soltera’ and ‘Dorotea de la Cruz, viuda’ (this
was Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 40355 of the Register
of Deeds for the Province of Rizal); that on November 29, 1941, a
deed of sale over Lot No. 671 was executed by Eugenia de la Paz
and Dorotea de la Cruz (the registered owners) in favor of
defendant-appellant Lucia de la Cruz; that said deed of sale was
registered with the office of the Register of Deeds on July 17, 1943
and the corresponding certificate of title was issued to Lucia de la
Cruz; that in 1971, Lucia de la Cruz obtained from the land
registration court a reconstituted title (TCT No. RT-59 over Lot
No. 671), the transfer certificate of title previously issued to her in

1943 having been lost; that subsequently,
226

Lot No. 671 (this time, already covered by TCT No. RT-58) was
subdivided into three (3) lots, each of which was issued a separate
title, as follows:
(a) Lot No. 671-A containing an area of 30,000 square meters

and covered by TCT No. 168320;
(b) Lot No. 671-B, containing an area of 4,268 square meters
and covered by TCT No. 168321; and
(c) Lot No. 671-C, containing an area of 150,000 square
meters and covered by TCT No. 168322';
that meanwhile TCT No. 40355 (already previously issued to

and in the names of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz)
continued to exist; that when the title was transferred from the
Rizal Registry to the Quezon City Registry, from the latter
Registry assigned to this TCT a new number, RT-52; that this
same lot (No. 671) was later subdivided into two lots, each with a
title:
(a) Lot No. 671-A (TCT No. 16212)

(b) Lot No. 671-B (TCT No. 16213)
both in the names of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz;

that the second lot (lot No. 671-B, with an area of 103,108 square
meters) was sold on December 17, 1952 to one Narcisa Vda. de
Leon (to whom TCT No. 2009 was later issued); that on May 6,
1964, Narcisa Vda. de Leon transferred the same lot 671-B to
Nieves Paz Eraña (who was later issued in her own name TCT No.
79971).
The undisputed facts further show that in 1971, Nieves Paz
Eraña filed before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil
Case No. Q-16125 for ‘quieting of title’ against Lucia de la Cruz, et
al., praying that TCT No. RT-58, (the reconstituted title of Lucia
de la Cruz), as well as all titles derived therefrom, be declared null
and void; that the case ended with the parties submitting a
compromise agreement with Lucia de la Cruz, among other things,
paying plaintiff Eraña the amount of P250,000.00 to cover the
acquisitive cost of the 103,108 square meters of land included in
the certificate of title of defendant Lucia de la Cruz; that on July
17, 1975, Lucia de la Cruz sold a portion of Lot No. 671-C (one of
the three portions to which the lot included in RT-58 had been
subdivided, and which portion was covered by TCT No. 168322),
consisting of 103,108 square meters to defendant-appellant Iglesia
Ni Cristo, for the amount of P2,108,850.00; that this sale was later
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, with a new title,
TCT No. 209554 being issued in the name of the Iglesia Ni Cristo;
that another deed of absolute sale was executed for the remaining
84,356 square meters in favor also of the Iglesia and said sale was
annotated on TCT No. 168322. In view of said sales and the
227
VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 227

fact that registration of the involved parcels is now in the name

(separately) of Lucia de la Cruz and the Iglesia Ni Cristo, the
present action for reconveyance with damages was instituted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Apparently, there is no mention of Amando Clemente in

the above recital of facts. A closer perusal of the records in
G.R. 76265 would, however, reveal that TCT No. 16212 was
issued for Lot 671-A in the name of Amando Clemente on
August 9, 1951 per report of the Acting Administrator of
the NLTDRA (Rollo, p. 92). Amando Clemente’s TCT No.
16212 emanated from TCT No. 40355 in the name of
Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz. Thus, Amando
Clemente’s predecessors-in-interest are Eugenia dela Paz
and Dorotea dela Cruz whom the Court found to have lost
their rights over lot 671 by virtue of the sale made to Lucia
dela Cruz.
The Register of Deeds correctly observed that this is a
clear case where there is a duplication or overlapping of
titles issued to different names over the same land which
thereby compelled him to file the consulta case with the
NLTDRA:
(1) Lucia dela Cruz’s reconstituted title (RT-58) which

was divided into 3 lots, Lot 671-A, Lot 671-B and
Lot 671-C and was subsequently sold to INK;
(2) Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz’s
reconstituted title (RT-52) which was divided into 2
lots, Lot 671-A and Lot 671-B.
Notwithstanding, it is undisputed that Lot 671 was sold to

Lucia dela Cruz by Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela
Cruz as evidenced by Entry No. 258, page 7, Vol. 7,
Primary Entry Book of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. (de

la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra, pp. 697-698) This is a finding
which can not be disturbed.
“We need not emphasize the fact that the Supreme Court by
tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last
word on what the law is. It is the final arbiter of any justiciable
controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their bearings.
Consequently, we cannot and should not review a case already
passed upon by the Highest Tribunal. It is only proper to allow
the case to take its rest.” (Church Assistance Program, Inc. v.
Sibulo, supra.)
228

The sale of the land to Lucia dela Cruz and the subsequent
registration thereof in the Primary Book of the Registry of
Deeds, Manila constitutes constructive notice to the whole
world. (Heirs of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 253 [1987]; People v. Reyes,
175 SCRA 597 [1989])
Since it is the act of registration which transfers
ownership of the land sold (Government Service Insurance
System v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 244 [1989]), Lot 671
was already owned by Lucia dela Cruz as early as 1943.
Amando Clemente’s alleged title meanwhile which was
issued on August 9, 1951 was very much later. Thus, the
petitioners, who merely stepped into the shoes of Amando
Clemente cannot claim a better right over said land. “Prior
est temporae, prior est in jura” (he who is first in time is
preferred in right) (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA
380 [1980]). The fact that Amando Clemente possessed a
certificate of title does not necessarily make him the true
owner. And not being the owner, he cannot transmit any
right to nor transfer any title or interest over the land
coveyed (Beaterio del Santisimo Rosario de Molo v. Court of
Appeals, 137 SCRA 459 [1985]; Treasurer of the Phil. v.
Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 359 [1987]).
Moreover, the petition for reconstitution of title by Lucia
dela Cruz which the court held to be valid was a proceeding
in rem. It is well established that in rem proceedings such
as land registration constitutes constructive notice to the
whole world. The petitioners cannot now claim that they
were not notified of the reconstitution proceedings over
said lot. Under the facts of the case, the title in the name of
Lucia dela Cruz (TCT No. RT 58) has become indefeasible
and incontrovertible.
Likewise, the INK was also issued a Torrens Title over
Lot 671 as a result of the sale made to it by the rightful
owner, Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. Under the Torrens System
of registration, the Torrens Title became indefeasible and
incontrovertible one year from its final decree (Tirado v.
Sevilla, 188 SCRA 321 [1990]). A Torrens Title is generally
a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred
to therein. (Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9 [1990])
It is, therefore, too late in the day for the petitioners to
reopen or question the legality of INK’s title over Lot 671 at
this time.
The petitioners also contend that what INK purchased
from
229
VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 229

Lucia dela Cruz in 1975 was Lot 671-C-4 LRC 322534

which corresponds roughly to Lot 671-B (Psd-32221) and
did not affect Lot 671-A of Amando Clemente at all. This is,
however, belied by the fact that the sale made by Dorotea
dela Cruz to Lucia dela Cruz (as indicated in Entry No.
258) was Lot 671 which was later on conveyed to INK.
In challenging the validity of the reconstitution of Lucia
dela Cruz’s title, the petitioners are now alleging fraud,
collusion and illegality in the procurement of the certificate
of title of Lucia dela Cruz. It must be recalled that G.R. No.
76265 stemmed merely from a consulta case with the
National Land Titles and Deeds Administration.
Undeniably, the arguments and issues raised by the
petitioner require adjudication of facts which, under the
circumstances of this case, we are not prepared to do as
this Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, the present
petition is not the proper remedy in challenging the
validity of certificates of titles since the judicial action
required is a direct and not a collateral attack. (Natalia
Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 173 SCRA 534 [1989]). The Court
had this to say:
“We note with approval the lower court’s patient explanation that,
inter alia, the certificate of title issued in the name of the plaintiff
in accordance with the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is
indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the
decree of registration. Under Section 38 thereof, a petition for

review of the decree must be presented within one year after its
entry as described and defined in Section 40 of the same. After the
lapse of one year, the decree of registration becomes
incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all
persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the
registration proceedings. x x x
“Even assuming arguendo that said titles may still be
challenged, the present case does not provide the vehicle for that
remedy since the judicial action required is a direct, and not a
collateral attack. In fact, under the existing law, Section 48 of the
Property Registration Decree expressly provides that a certificate
of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered,
modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.” (at p. 542)
In our capacity as the court of last resort, the petitioners

try to convince us to look or inquire into the validity of the
reconsti-
230

tution proceedings initiated by Lucia dela Cruz, contending

that the implementation of dela Cruz ruling would deprive
them of their properties without due process of law. We
have looked long and hard into the records of the case but
the facts and circumstances plus law and jurisprudence on
the matter do not warrant such action from the Court.
INK’s title over Lot 671 which necessarily included Lot
671-A had already become incontrovertible and
indefeasible. To reopen or to question the legality of INK’s
title would defeat the purpose of our Torrens system which
seeks to insure stability by quieting titled lands and
putting to a stop forever any question of the legality of the
registration in the certificate or questions which may arise
therefrom. (de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra.) In fairness to
INK, as registered owner it is entitled to rest secure in its
land title.
In view of all the foregoing, it would be for the public
interest and the maintenance of the integrity and stability
of the Torrens system of land registration that all transfer
certificates of title derived from the reconstituted title of
Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz be annulled in
order to prevent the proliferation of derivative titles which
are null and void. The legality or validity of INK’s title over
Lot 671 has been settled. The Court has spoken and it has
done so with finality, logically and rightly so as to assure
stability in legal relations and avoid confusion. (see Ver v.
Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80 [1988])
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 76265 and
83280 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ.,

concur.
Petitions dismissed.
Note.—Res Judicata applies to all proceedings including

land registration and cadastral proceedings (Vencilao vs.
Vano, 182 SCRA 491).
——o0o——
231
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Calalang vs. Register of Deeds. GR 76265. April 22, 1992 PDF

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9/1/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 208

VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 215

VIRGINIA CALALANG, petitioner, vs. REGISTER OF

AUGUSTO M. DE LEON, JOSE M. DE CASTRO, JOSE A.

216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

FELISA C. CRISTOBAL-GENEROSO, petitioners, vs. THE

Civil Procedure; Judgment; When a right or fact has been

question of ownership of Lucia de la Cruz over Lot 671 which had

VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 217

Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City

well established that in rem proceedings such as land registration

PETITIONS to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The subject of controversy in these two consolidated

VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 219

now before us assailing the validity of Lucia dela Cruz’s

No. 76265, petitioner Virginia Calalang alleged that she is

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Constancio Simangan’s whereabouts despite diligent efforts

VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 221

To this supplemental petition, the OSG in behalf of the

INK also destroyed the concrete/hollow block fence

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Generoso as additional petitioners.

“From the exchange of written arguments and the authorities

Assailing this order, the petitioners by way of certiorari

“WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course and is hereby

VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 223

nary injunctive relief therein be properly heard and evidence for

On February 12, 1987, respondent INK filed with the lower

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding respondent’s Motion

Seeking relief from the dismissal, the petitioners filed the

1) “Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam” dated

On December 10, 1987, the Court of Appeals denied

“THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ITS DECEMBER

In a resolution dated August 30, 1989, G.R. No. 83280 was

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

be resolved is the applicability of this Court’s decision in

“When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by

VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 225

Inevitably, the dela Cruz ruling should be applied to the

“The undisputed facts indicate that the parcel of land in question

(1) Maximo de la Cruz (married to Feliza Yabut);

that the plaintiffs-appellees herein are the descendants of the

No. 671), the transfer certificate of title previously issued to her in

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(a) Lot No. 671-A containing an area of 30,000 square meters

that meanwhile TCT No. 40355 (already previously issued to

(a) Lot No. 671-A (TCT No. 16212)

both in the names of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz;

VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 227

fact that registration of the involved parcels is now in the name

Apparently, there is no mention of Amando Clemente in

(1) Lucia dela Cruz’s reconstituted title (RT-58) which

Notwithstanding, it is undisputed that Lot 671 was sold to

Primary Entry Book of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. (de

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 229

Lucia dela Cruz in 1975 was Lot 671-C-4 LRC 322534

decree of registration. Under Section 38 thereof, a petition for

In our capacity as the court of last resort, the petitioners