Heidegger and the World in an Artwork

Author(s): R. Raj Singh

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 215-
222
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 R. RAJ SINGH
Heideggerandthe Worldin an Artwork
What is an artwork?What distinguishesa piece
of art from ordinaryobjects or things? Heideg-
ger discusses these issues in his essay The Ori-
gin of a Workof Art and arrives at the original
conclusion that what characterizesan artworkis
that in it a world and an earth are revealed
whereas ordinary things do not, for the most
part, yield such disclosure.' Apart from expli-
cating the nature and the role of artworksand
theirconnectionwith the world, truthand histor-
ical unfoldingof Being, Heideggeralso presents
a critiqueof traditionalaesthetics in The Origin
of a Workof Art. Traditionalaesthetics is simi-
larly taken to task in his interpretationof Nietz-
sche's "willto power"as art in Nietzsche,Vol. 1.2
According to Heidegger, the field of aesthetics
has been unable to rise above the bifurcationof
reality into subjects and objects and the use of
the worn out concepts of matterand form in its
attemptsto define the natureof artworks.
Heidegger's critique of aesthetics and his
meditation on the nature of the artwork have
received wide attention in the secondary liter-
ature. However,his centralnotion of "the world
that emerges in an artwork"has yet to be fully
explicated. To learn what kind of world is con-
ceived in The Origin of a Workof Art, we must
identify Heidegger's general position on the
problemof the definition of the world. Not only
do we need to view The Origin of a Workof Art
as one of his ongoing attemptsto spell out the
world'snature,we must also comparethe nature
of the worldoutlined in this essay with the rela-
tively extensive treatmentsof the worldconcept
in his other works.3 In the following pages I
wish to carry out such a study of the worldcon-
cept in The Originof a Workof Art. I shall argue
that an overly narrow understandingof the no-
tion of the world may be responsible for the
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48:3 Summer 1990
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skepticism concerning the universalapplicabil-
ity and merit of Heidegger's ideas on art and
artworks. If the world in the artwork is inter-
preted narrowlyas "a world strictly of this art-
work" and not at the same time "the world in
general" one is likely to conclude that this the-
ory does not applyto artworksof all kindsand of
all ages. The universalrelevanceof Heidegger's
philosophy of art depends upon a proper, i.e.,
wider understandingof "the world" referredto
in The Originof a Workof Art.
Thus, we must ask: What is the connection
between "the world in the artwork" and the
world in general? How is the conception of the
world held in the artwork essay related to the
severalattemptsmadeby Heideggerto articulate
the nature of the world throughouthis career?
How are the allusions to "the worldof the peas-
ant woman" and "the world of this historical
people" in The Origin of a Workof Art to be
reconciledwith "the world"as such?Whatdoes
Heideggertell us in this essay aboutthe relation
between the world and truth, and between the
truthand the openness of Being? It also remains
to be explainedwhy "theearth" is introducedas
a counter-conceptto the world in the laterworks
whereas the world has no such counterpole in
Being and Time.4How is the earthreferredto in
The Origin of a Workof Art relatedto the earth
that is posited as one of the fourfold (Geviert)in
the essays composedby Heideggerin the 1950s?5
How is the earth of an artworkrelated to "the
earth" in general?
Heideggerbegins The Originof a Workof Art
by affirming that only a study of the Being of
the artwork will enable us to comprehend the
nature of art. Attending to the Being of actual
artworks, one notices that they are naturally
present as things, i.e., they have a "thingly"
216 The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

character.Hence one must ask what kind of a footnote in TheEssence of Reasons, he says that
thing is an artwork.It was the observationof the his study of the "system of useful things" in
use-objects, the closest things aroundthe human Being and Timewas only a "preliminarycharac-
being, thatled to the view thatthingshavematter terization" (erste Kennzeichnung)of the prob-
and form. This view was subsequentlyapplied lem of the worldhood of the world.7 In The
to all entities including artworks. Hence, the Essence of Reasons, it was emphasizedthat the
equipmentalcharacterof the equipmentshould worldexercises an ascendancyin the man-world
be probed.Withthis statedaim, Heideggerstud- relation as it governs man's interpretiveunder-
ies the Being of a pairof shoes, not an actualpair standingand it is far from being subservientto
but its pictorial representationin a well-known the subjectivityof the subject.In TheOriginof a
painting by Van Gogh. What the picture tells is Workof Art, which is the next importantwork,
describedgraphicallyby him: Heidegger names the earth as a counterpoleof
the world as world's nature is probed in yet
Fromthe darkopeningof the worninsidesof the anotherway.
shoesthetoilsometreadof theworkerstaresforth... Regardingthe crucial referenceto world and
In the shoesvibratesthe silentcall of the earth,its earth here I arguethatthe referenceto the peas-
quietgift of the ripeninggrainand its unexplained ant woman'sworldandearthshouldnot be taken
self-refusalin the fallow desolationof the wintry in a narrow sense to suggest that, accordingto
field. Thisequipmentis pervadedby uncomplaining Heidegger,the VanGogh paintingrevealsmerely
anxietyas to the certaintyof bread,the wordlessjoy a particularworldand a particularearth. Rather
of havingonce morewithstoodwant,the trembling the observationthat "the world and earth exist
beforethe impendingchildbedand shiveringat the for her and for those who are with her in her
surroundingmenaceof death. This equipmentbe- mode of Being" should be understood in a
longsto the "earth"andit is protectedin the "world" broader sense.8 The painting not only reveals
of thepeasantwoman.6 this peasant'sworldand earth, it also revealsthe
human being's world and the human being's
What is describedhere is how an artworkopens earth, i.e., the worldin general (iiberhaupt)and
up a world and an earth. The shoes depicted in the earth in general. The distinctive role of an
the paintingare viewed as belonging to a peasant artworklies in revealing the worldhoodof the
woman's world and earth. The painting shows world and the earthiness of the earth, and not
thatthis equipmentbelongs to the wholeness of a merely a specific worldand a specific earth.
world, and is rooted in an earth. Heidegger Heidegger's statement "the world worlds"
observes here that the usefulness of an equip- (die Weltweltet), apart from indicatingthat the
ment does not lie in the entity itself, but in its world is betterdescribedby a verb than a noun,
"reliability" (Verlasslichkeit).The reliabilityof also asserts thatthe worldis notjust subservient
the shoes is partof the peasantwoman'sbelong- to man'swill but reigns over (i.e., regulatesand
ing to her earth and of her assuredness in her defines) man's understandingof things and of
world. Because the equipmentis repeatedlyand himself.9 As explained in The Essence of Rea-
reliablyused, reliabilityitself remainsinvisible. sons, Dasein's freedom "lets a world'reign' and
The developmentof Heidegger'sthoughtcon- 'world'" (eine Weltwaltenundweltenlassen).10
cerning the world is evident here. Over and WernerMarxexpresses it as follows:
above what he maintained in Being and Time
regardingthe readiness-to-hand(Zuhandenheit) The meaningfulwholeof the worlddoes not stand
of equipment, it is asserted here that the equip- "opposite" Daseinlikea regionof everexistingideas.
mental being of an equipment, i.e., its service- RatherDaseinin a "primalaction"lets the world
ability and its belonging to a totality may be standbeforeitas its "forthesakeof"andletsit "reign
disclosed in an artwork.This totality was stud- andworld"... "Worlding" of theworldis a "giving"
ied as the "surrounding-world"(Umwelt) in in thatit bestows"meanings"... It functionsas an
Being and Time. In The Essence of Reasons, "openingof meaning.""I
Heidegger probes the man-worldrelation with-
out being confined to the "system of useful In other words, the world's"giving" implies its
things," as he did in Being and Time. In a twin aspects, the "worlding-world"and the

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Singh World,Artworkand Heidegger
"worlded-world," which are inseparable. In
everyday language, the term "world" is often
used for "a worlded-world,"a specific world, or
"a realm" of entities, e.g., the world of mathe-
matics, Shakespeare'sworld, my world. But as
Heidegger maintainsin Being and Time, for an
ontological inquiry the term must be reserved
for thatworld "whereina factical Dasein as such
can be said to live," i.e., for the humanbeing's
world, for the world in general, for what I have
called "the worlding-world."12 The artwork
shows a worlded-world(e.g., the peasant's)and
at the same time, the worlding-world.This is the
ontological role thatthe workperforms.It shows
"a world"as an instanceof "the world."
Why does Heidegger introducethe notion of
the earth as a counterpole of the world at this
stage of his thought, whereas in Being and Time
he treated the world without reference to the
earth? This reference is part of his ongoing
quest to define world, i.e., to spell out its nature
from different perspectives. Subsequentto the
writing of Being and Time, he realized that the
world is not to be described merely as an ele-
ment of man's Being-in-the world but is also to
be thoughtin its essential connection with Being
and truth. As the emergence of the world is
thought to be concomitant with the unconceal-
ment-concealmentprocess of truth (aletheia),
the groundingcounterpoleof the world must be
acknowledged. The positing of the earth as the
groundingother pole of the world substantiates
the insight that the world is not a totality of
"given" entities but an openness, broughtabout
by Being's historical unfolding (Ereignis),and,
at the same time, by man's interpretativeunder-
standing. For a fundamentalontologist it is im-
portantto treat the world, truth and Being dis-
tinctly without denying their concomitance. It
must also be acknowledgedthattheir precise in-
terconnectioncannot be conclusively described
in metaphysical statements. However, thought
must dwell on their distinctness as well as on
their bond. This is precisely what Heidegger
does. Thinkingaboutthe world'sco-occurrence
with truthin the artworkessay, he realizes that if
unconcealmentof truth is coupled with a con-
cealment, the world too must have a concealed
aspect. This he calls the earth.
Next, in The Origin of a Workof Art Heideg-
ger maintainsthat the disclosure in the artwork
means that the truth of an entity "comes to
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217
stand" in it. To study how the truthhappens in
the work, he commentson the Being of a Greek
temple, as an example of a non-representational
artwork.This temple is situatedin the middle of
a rocky valley and has a figure of a god in it.
Heidegger's description of the temple is very
instructiveas to the natureof the world:
It is thetemple-workthatfirstfits togetherandat the
same time gathersarounditself the unity of those
pathsandrelationsin whichbirthanddeath,disaster
and blessing, victoryand disgrace,enduranceand
decline,acquiretheshapeof destinyforhumanbeing.
The all governingexpanseof this open relational
contextis theworldof thishistoricalpeople.13
Heideggermeansto say thatit is the existence of
an artwork, in this case, of the temple, which
attainsand sustainsarounditself a unity of paths
and relations. This unity is the world, the world
of the people who installed this artwork. The
world is described as a unity of various basic
directions and relationswhich grantsdefinition
to humanrealitiessuch as birthanddeath, disas-
ter and blessing, victory and disgrace, endur-
ance and decline. The openness that governs all
significances and defines all relations is the
world. It is only within this openness that a
people (nation, race, historical people) knows
itself.
A fuller interpretationof Heidegger's asser-
tions would be that an artwork discloses the
world of a (historical) people, and at the same
time shows the natureof humanbeing's (world-
ing) world. It shows us how the world histor-
ically worlds, in showing how it has worldedfor
"thispeople." It performedan ontological func-
tion for the people who installed it, and it gives
us a glimpse of their world in a different way.
Heidegger'sallusions to the "historicalpeople"
have been taken too narrowly by several inter-
pretersof this essay, who maintainthat he is no
longer investigating "the world" as he did in
Being and Time but has come to acknowledge
the existence of several historical and cultural
worlds. Nwodo, in his "Workof Art in Heideg-
ger," observes that the world referredto in the
artworkessay is "the cultured world, the intel-
lectual atmosphere of a particular people ... It is
never a world in general nor for all time."'4
Schrag in his "Transvaluationof Aesthetics and
the Workof Art" concludes that "in the end we
218
need to thinkof the worldin the plural."'5 In re-
sponse to these assertions it may be said that
Heidegger's interest in the several worlds stems
from his basic quest to learn what "the world"
means. This quest is not only very much alive in
this investigation but is integral to the defined
role of the artwork.
The references to "a world," "the world of
the peasant woman," "the world of this histor-
ical people" by Heidegger do not mean that,
according to him, the world is nothing but a
specific "world-disclosure"or thatseveralworlds
exist independentlyof each other. The confu-
sion between "a world" and "the world" is
caused by the fact that in everyday language,
which is structuredon the assumption that the
world is a totality of "given" entities, the term
"world"is alternativelyused for a specific total-
ity (e.g., the world of the Greeks) as well as for
the world in general. Heidegger reserves the
term "world" for the latter sense in Being and
Time, but in the artworkessay it is used in both
senses. However, this does not mean that the
lattersense is no longer paramount.
The impressionsthat Heidegger'sview of art
is too romanticand deals exclusively with worlds
gone-by, and is thus hardly applicable to art of
all ages, are based on interpretationsthatare too
narrow. This is why Pdggeler'sconclusion that
"Heidegger neverdeveloped a genuine philoso-
phy of art,"'16 and Kockelmans'sdoubts about
"wherethese reflectionsleave us with respectto
the contemporaryart" are not convincing.17 By
admittedly choosing his examples from "great
art," Heidegger does not mean that his analysis
does not apply to ordinary art. Nor does he
assert thatonly the ancientart can be "great."In
responseto Hegel's statementquoted in the Epi-
logue that "Artis and remainsfor us, on the side
of its highest vocation, something past," Hei-
degger says: "Such questions, which solicit us
more or less definitely, can be asked only after
we have taken into considerationthe nature of
art."8 In other words the issue of greatnesscan
only be raised after we have considered the ori-
gin or nature of what distinguishes an artwork
from other things. The quest for the essence of
art does not need as a first step the categoriza-
tion of artworksinto great and ordinary,past or
modern, original or imitative. Such a classifica-
tion may make sense only after the natureof art
as such is spelled out.
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The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Heideggerclaims furtherthatthe entities sur-
roundingthe templeare "illuminated"by it. It is
not that these entities provide a fitting environ-
ment in which the temple was installed. "We
shall get closer to what 'is' rather,if we thinkof
all this in the reverseorder."9 What is brought
home by Heidegger is that the temple-work
opens up a world and it is this worldthat grants
meaning to the entities that surroundit. We are
so accustomed to considering the entities as
"given"thatit is the disclosurebroughtaboutby
the artworkwhich revealsthatthingsbelong to a
totality, an openness that lets them appear as
they "are." The temple "first gives things their
look and to men their outlook on themselves ...
as long as workis a work, and as long as god has
not fled from it."20 What is meant is that the
worldopened up by the artworknot only reveals
entities but also enables humanbeings to com-
prehend themselves. But their outlook, includ-
ing their religiosity, alters as one era of Being's
grantpasses into another.
At this stage in the essay, Heideggertakes up
the issue of the definition of the world as such.
"On the pathwe must follow here, the natureof
worldcan only be indicated."'21 Eventhis indica-
tion is limited to "warding-off"the prevalent
distortions of world's nature. These remarks
represent Heidegger's basic standpointon the
problem of the definition of the world. The
world cannot be defined easily and in the way
entities are usually defined. The world'snature
can only be spoken aboutas a resultof an onto-
logical inquiry.The first task of such an inquiry
is to ward-off the distorted way in which the
problemof the world is posited and resolved by
metaphysicalthinking. As repeatedlyobserved
in Being and Time, the worldhoodof the world
was nevertreatedas a problemby the traditionof
metaphysics.22Heideggerattemptsto avoid me-
taphysicaldistortions, redefinethe problemand
achieve new insights, in the severalattemptshe
makes to spell out the world's nature in his
careerof "thinking."
In Being and Time, Heideggercarries out the
first of these attemptsas the world is thoughtto
be the constitutive feature of man's Being. In
The Essence of Reasons, he exposes this same
insightin a new way andcalls Dasein'sBeing-in-
the-world"transcendence."Here he gives a new
meaningto this establishedconcept and empha-
sizes that the world exercises an ascendancy in
Singh World,Artworkand Heidegger
the man-worldrelation. In the artworkessay, a
new attemptis made to define the world'snature
in which the world is probed in its essential
connection with truth and Being. In the subse-
quentworks, furtherattemptsare madeto define
the world's nature in its essential connection
with thinghood, dwelling and language.23 No
claim is made in any of these attemptsto have
conclusively defined the world. Nor in any of
these attempts are the conclusions of the first
attempteitheralteredor modified. They are only
furtherenriched.
In the artwork essay, the definition of the
world that was posited in Being and Time is
enrichedby new insights:
Theworldis nota merecollectionof thecountableor
uncountable,familiarand unfamiliarthingsthatare
justthere.Butneitheris it a merelyimaginedframe-
workaddedby ourrepresentation to the sumof such
giventhings.Theworldworlds,andis morefully in
Being than the tangibleand perceptiblerealm in
whichwe believeourselvesto be at home.Worldis
neveranobjectthatstandsbeforeus andcanbe seen.
Worldis theever-nonobjective to whichwearesubject
as long as the pathsof birthanddeath,blessingand
curse,keepus transported intoBeing.Wherever these
decisionsof historythatrelateto ourveryBeingare
made,aretakenupandabandoned by us, go unrecog-
nizedandarerediscovered by new inquiry,therethe
worldworlds.24
First, it is statedhere what the world is not. It is
neithera collection of entities nor an abstraction
pertainingto the totality of all "given" entities.
The world worlds, and is more real than the
things we see and touch. If we want to use the
conceptionsof subjectandobject, then the world
maybe called an everpresentnon-objectivereal-
ity to which man is always subjected. One of the
meanings of "the world worlds" is: wherever
and whenever the basic decisions regarding
man's very Being are taken or a new self-under-
standing obtained, there the worlding of the
world takes place. Human being is born into a
subjection to the world, for the world exists
already holding its sway. But each time human
being's Being is decisively interpreted,the world
(more distinctly) worlds. Heidegger recognizes
that in a distinct era of the history (i.e., the
history of Being's manifesting) the world, in a
way, distinctly worlds. But this does not mean
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219
that the very relation of man with his world
changes in differenteras.
Heideggerreflects furtheron the "earth"that
emerges along with the world in the artwork.
The earth is that out of which the world is
opened up and sustainedas open in an artwork.
The earth also appearsas itself in the material
that the work is produced out of, e.g., wood,
metal, color, language, tone, etc. Whereasin an
equipment the matter disappears into useful-
ness, in an artworkthe materialcomes forth into
the "open" of the work's world. Thus, in an
artwork,the earth is perceivedand preservedas
what is undisclosableby nature.
However,we must be cautiousnot to interpret
the earth too narrowly. It is meant to be more
than merely the materialaspect of the artwork.
That the material aspect represents the earth
does not mean that the earth is nothing but the
materialor thateach artworkhas an earthstrictly
its own. The earth is not just a new name for
"matter." The notionof the earthhas been intro-
duced by Heidegger as a counterpole of the
world, to fully articulate the world's worlding
nature. At the same time, it is meantto destroy
the metaphysicalview of the worldas a "given"
totality of all entities. In several of his lecture-
essays composed in the 1950s, Heideggerrefers
to the fourfold (Geviert) of the earth and sky,
mortalsand divinities.25In the essay titled "The
Thing," he asserts thatthe "mirror-play"(Spie-
gel-Spiel) of these four "whiles" (verweilt) or
sustainsthe world.26
There are severalreasons why Heidegger de-
scribes the nature of the world in this curious
mannerand now speaks of the earth, not merely
as the counterpoleof the worldbut as one of the
four regions of the world. The chief aim is to
destroy the very way anythingis "defined" and
its "essence" articulatedin metaphysicalthink-
ing. Heidegger wants to grasp the "essencing"
not merelythe "essence," "worlding"not merely
the "world." He seeks to destroythe priorityof
the subject over things and of man over the
world. The conception of the fourfold achieves
all this. By replacingthe world-earthdualism in
the artwork essay by "the mirror-playof the
four," he seems to suggest that the dimensions
of the world are not strictly two or strictly four.
The fourfold is not the "polyvalent Being" as
Richardsoncalls it, but to be more precise, the
polyvalent world.27 Kockelmans is right in
220
observing that "Heidegger thus wishes to ex-
press that world, even though it is one, is none-
theless also structured," and in cautioning us
that "the numberfour should not be taken liter-
ally but as an indicationof the complex structure
of the world."28It is evident that the earth has
been posited as the companion concept of the
world, as well as the "ground"of the world, in
both these stages of Heidegger'sthought.
Heidegger also maintainsthat the world and
the earth are differentbut not separate. The op-
position between the two is a "striving" (Streit),
which is not entirely a discord. The opponents
let each other assert their naturesas the sources
of each one's Being lies in the other. Artworkis
an instigatingof the striving between the world
and the earth. This strife is never settled but
remainsa strife.
One of the majorassertions made by Heideg-
ger aboutthe artworkis that in it truthhappens.
He explicates at length how it happens and his
allusions to the world and the earth are part of
this explication. At first, he remindsus that by
truth he does not mean a factual truth or cor-
rectness. Truth is a happening, an unconceal-
ment. The Greek term aletheia describes its
nature. The unconcealmentis not a purely hu-
man activity.
It is not we who presupposethe unconcealedness of
beings;rather,theunconcealedness of beings(Being)
puts us into such a conditionof Being that in our
representation we alwaysremaininstalledwithinand
in attendance uponunconcealedness.29
Heidegger goes on to claim that in the midst of
what-is, there occurs an open place or a "clear-
ing" (Lichtung).This clearing is more in Being
than the beings. What-is does not surroundthis
open center, rather the open encircles all that
"is.' It is due to this clearing that man obtains
access to beings and to his own Being. That
beings are unconcealed "in certain changing
degrees" means that they are, at the same time,
concealed. This concealmentis twofold: a being
can give rise to the question whetherit is or it is
not by refusing to appear, or it may hide or
obscureanotherbeing, i.e., it may presentitself
as other than it is. Heidegger also stresses that
unconcealment is not a permanently existent
state. The primal conflict in the natureof truth
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The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
gives rise to the open (das Offene).To the open
"belong" a worldand an earth.
Buttheworldis notsimplytheopenthatcorresponds
to theclearing,andtheearthis notsimplytheclosed
thatcorresponds Rather,theworldis
to concealment.
the clearingof the pathsof the essentialguiding
directions with which all decision complies ... The
earthis notsimplytheclosedbutthatwhichrisesup
as self-closing.30
Here is a clear warning by Heidegger against
over-simplification and against metaphysical
thinking which treats the world as a "given"
openness that warrantsno furtherinvestigation.
To dwell on the nature of the world and its
connection with the unconcealment-conceal-
ment process of truthis the task of fundamental
ontology. It is easy to consider the world as
nothingbut the disclosed-world,andthe earthas
nothing but what is hidden. The function of the
world is not simply to present beings as dis-
closed, but to open up the groundson the basis
of which beings can be decisively interpreted.In
other words, the world is not merely "a dis-
closure" but thaton the basis of which the "dis-
closing" takes place. The earthis not the hidden
reality which is forever denied to man. But it
emerges as actively self-closing along with the
worlding-world. It represents that aspect of
beings which obliges humanbeing to undertake
interpretativedecisioning concerningthem.
What does Heidegger have to say here about
the precise connectionbetweenthe world, truth,
and Being? He is very cautious about making
assertions about their interconnections,for any
radicalclaim on these issues cannotbe asserted
withoutmetaphysicalassumptions.With regard
to Being and truthhe observes "this self-estab-
lishing of the openness in the open touches a
sphere that cannot yet be explicated here." But
one thing he is sure of is that "Being by way of
its own nature lets the place of openness hap-
pen."'31 Concerningthe truthand the world, he
simply says "Tothe open there belongs a world
and the earth," and warns that world is not
merely "the unconcealed" and the earth not
merely "the concealed." Apart from these ob-
servations,he is reticentaboutthese fundamen-
tal connections.
However,Heidegger'sthinkingof the worldin
close relationto truthdoes not entail that he no
Singh World,Artworkand Heidegger
longer distinguishesbetween the two. Bartky in
her "Heideggerand the WorldDisclosure" does
not hold to the distinction that Heidegger con-
stantly maintains between the world and the
truth, for she interprets his reference to "the
essential ways in which the truth establishes
itself' as "the modes of world-disclosure."32In
her more recently published "Heidegger's Phi-
losophy of Art," Bartky once again fails to
maintain any distinction between either truth
and Being, or between truthand the world, and
does not accept the connection between the
worldandthe earthof the art-workandthe world
and the earth. She remarksthat:
As the essay progressesthe terms worldand earth are
expandedso thatthey no longer referto the aspects of
the artworkalone, but to the revealingand concealing
movementsof any world-disclosureat all ... There is
a lack of symmetry between earth as the thingly
aspect of the work, and the twofold concealment
which is partof any disclosure of Being.33
RegardingHeidegger's statementon artwork
and truth, some skepticism has been expressed.
Does every onlooker experience the so-called
happeningof truthalong with a disclosure of a
worldand an earththe same way? Does the work
portraysomethingobjectively,i.e., correctly,or
does it grant a mere subjective experience?
Schapiro in his "The Still Life of a Personal
Object" points out that the Van Gogh painting
referred to by Heidegger depicts Van Gogh's
own shoes and not those of any peasant wom-
an.34 If Schapiro is right, perhapsall accounts
given by Heidegger concerning the peasant's
worldandearthare misconceived. A responseto
the doubts and criticisms of this nature can be
found in The Originof a Workof Art itself.
The workof art, accordingto Heidegger, does
not carry out a correctportrayalof somethingin
particular. It does not represent a particular
truth. Works of art do not have "a truth" but
"thetruth"happeningin them:
Truthhappensin Van Gogh's painting. This does not
meanthatsomethingis correctlyportrayed,but rather
that in the revelationof the equipmentalBeing of the
shoes, that which is as a whole-world and earth in
theircounterplay-attains to unconcealedness.35
The painting of Van Gogh is meant to be an
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221
example, to illustratethe insight that a work of
art is a happeningof truthin which the worldand
the earth are manifest. Whether it is correctly
observed or incorrectly is irrelevant. This also
does not imply thatan artworkhas to be pictorial
to be revelatoryof the world. Even a piece of
abstractart can be viewed as dealing (however
abstractly)with entities and the world.
On the issue of the encounter between the
onlooker and the artwork, Heidegger says that
an artworktransforms"our accustomed ties to
the world and to earth . .. in orderto stay within
the truth that is happening."36This "staying
withinthe truththatis happening"is a "preserv-
ing" of the work. This preservationis a "know-
ing." It is man's "entranceinto and compliance
with the unconcealednessof Being." It must be
distinguishedfrom "aestheticizingconnoisseur-
ship of the work'sformalaspects."37Heidegger
is clearly maintainingthat the experience of the
truthhappeningin the artworkis one of "trans-
forming"and "transportingout of' the familiar
world, i.e., it enables one to experience the
world ontologically, by rupturingthe familiar
world which is for the most part lived, not ques-
tioned with regard to its worldhood. This dis-
closure is not differentin essence from the reve-
latory occasions such as the breakdownof the
hammeror the experience of dreadreferredto in
Being and Time which Macomber calls the
"momentsof truth."38 Only it may reveala little
more. It may acquaintone with a specific dis-
closure of the world and the earth of a people
and the uniqueunderstandingit hadof its Being-
with.
I have arguedthatat all momentsof his inves-
tigation of art's nature, and in all his chosen
examples, Heidegger has referredultimatelyto
the one and only world and to the one and only
earth. He does not posit several culturalor his-
torical worlds as such nor does he regard the
particularearths of particularartworksas prob-
lematic for one reflecting on the nature of art
and artwork.The particularworld-disclosureis
thatof "the world," and the earthof the artwork
represents "the earth" in general. Only this
broadermeaningenables us to view Heidegger's
investigationas consistent, andapplicableto art-
works of all kinds and all periods. At the same
time, it is evident that the world that is referred
to in the artworkessay is the same world, the
definitionof which is problematicfor Heidegger
222
in many of his early and later works, and the
earth spoken of here is the same earth which he
repeatedlyposits in his laterworks. The concep-
tion of the worldheld in Being and Timeand The
Essence of Reasons is in no way alteredor modi-
fied. It is only furtherexplicatedand enrichedin
this investigationof art's nature.
R. RAJ SINGH
Department of Philosophy
BrockUniversity
St. Catharine's,
Ontario
CanadaL2S3A1
1. Martin Heidegger, The Origin of a Workof Art in
Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. A. Hofstadter (New
York: Harper and Row, 1971). This translation of Der
Ursprungdes Kunstwerkes(Stuttgart:Reclam, 1960) will be
used for all subsequentquotations.
2. MartinHeidegger,Nietzsche, Vol. 1, trans. David Far-
rell Krell (New York:Harperand Row, 1979).
3. The protractedconsiderations on the problem of the
definition of the "world" appear in the following works of
Heidegger: Sein und Zeit (1927; 7th ed., Tfibingen: Neo-
marius Verlag, 1953), VomWesendes Grundes, composed
in 1929, 6th ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), Die
Grundproblemeder Phanomenologie, composed in 1927,
published in Gesamtausgabe,Vol. 24, (Frankfurt:Kloster-
mann, 1975), Die Grundbegriffeder Metaphysik,composed
in 1929, published in Gesamtausgabe,Vol. 30, (Frankfurt:
Klostermann, 1975), "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,"
composed in 1935 and published in Holzwege, (Frankfurt:
Klostermann, 1950), "Hdlderlinund das Wesen der Dich-
tung," composed in 1935-36 and published in Erlauter-
ungen zu ilbiderlins Dichtung, (Frankfurt:Klostermann,
1944), "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," composed in 1938 and
published in Holzwege, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1950),
"Das Ding," "Bauen WohnenDenken," and "Dichterisch
wohnet der Mensch," composed in 1950, 1951, 1951 re-
spectively and publishedin Vortrageund Aufsatze, (Pfullin-
gen: Neske, 1954), "Die Sprache" and "Das Wesen der
Sprache," composed in 1950 and 1957-58 respectivelyand
published in Unterwegs zur Sprache, (Pfullingen: Neske,
1959).
4. MartinHeidegger,Being and Time,trans.J. Macquar-
rie and E. Robinson (New York: Harperand Row, 1962),
p. 93, emphasisadded.
5. Ibid., Note 3.
6. Heidegger, Originof a WorkofArt, p. 33.
7. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, trans.
T. Mallick (NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1969), p. 81. In
footnote 55 Heidegger warns that the problem of the world
should not be merely equated (identifiziert)with the "Onti-
cal system of useful things." The study of the ontological
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The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
structure of equipment, undertaken in Being and Time
serves as a "preliminarycharacterization"(ersteKennzeich-
nung) preparingthe way for the transcendentalproblem of
the worldthat is posed in TheEssence of Reasons.
8. Heidegger, Originof a Workof Art, p. 34.
9. Ibid., p. 44, Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons,
p. 103.
10. Heidegger, TheEssence of Reasons, p. 103.
11. WernerMarx, Heidegger and the Tradition(North-
westernUniversityPress, 1971), p. 184.
12. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 93, emphasis added.
13. Heidegger, Originof a Workof Art, p. 42.
14. C.S. Nwodo, "The Work of Art in Heidegger: A
WorldDisclosure," CulturalHermeneutics4 (1976): 61-74.
15. Calvin D. Schrag, "The Transvaluationof Aesthetics
and the Workof Art" in ThinkingAbout Being: Aspects of
Heideggers Thought,eds. R.W. Sheehanand J.N. Mohanty
(University of OklahomaPress, 1984), p. 118. What Hei-
degger rathermaintainsis thatwe need to thinkof the world
as a verb, not as a noun.
16. Otto Pdggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers
(Pfullingen:Neske, 1963), p. 207.
17. JosephJ. Kockelmans, On the Truthof Being: Reflec-
tions on Heideggers Later Philosophy (IndianaUniversity
Press, 1984), p. 195.
18. Heidegger, Originof a Workof Art, p. 80.
19. Ibid., p. 43.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 44.
22. Heidegger,Being and Time,p. 92.
23. Ibid., Note 3.
24. Heidegger, Originof a Workof Art, p. 44.
25. Ibid., Note 3.
26. Heidegger, "The Thing," in Poetry, Language,
Thought,p. 180.
27. W.J. Richardson,Heidegger:ThroughPhenomenology
to Thought(The Hague:MartinusNighoff, 1973), p. 572.
28. JosephJ. Kockelmans,On the Truthof Being, pp. 95,
119.
29. Heidegger, Originof a WorkofArt, p. 52.
30. Ibid., p. 55.
3 1. Ibid., p. 6 1.
32. Sandra L. Bartky, "Heidegger and the Modes of
World-disclosure,"Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 40 (1979): 2 12-236.
33. SandraL. Bartky, "Heidegger'sPhilosophy of Art"
in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker,ed. T. Sheehan
(Chicago: Precedent, 1981), p. 267.
34. Meyer Schapiro, "The Still Life of a Personal Ob-
ject-A note on Heideggerand VanGogh," in TheReach of
Mind, ed. M.L. Simmer (New York: Springer Publishing
Co., 1968), pp. 203-209.
35. Heidegger, Originof a WorkofArt, p. 56.
36. Ibid., p. 66.
37. Ibid., p. 68.
38. W. Macomber, The Anatomyof Disillusion: Martin
Heideggers Notion of Truth (Northwestern University
Press, 1967), p. 44.