G.R. No.

188066               October 22, 2014

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, 

vs.
CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision2 dated November 21, 2008 and
Resolution3 dated May 14, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03498, which reversed and set aside
the Consolidated Decision4 dated June 30, 2005 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) and
absolved respondent Cynthia E. Caberoy (Caberoy) of any administrative liability.

Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged
with Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f) ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act"by Angeles O. Tuares (Tuares) for allegedly withholding her salary for the month of June 2002. The
case was docketed as OMB-V-A-03-0239-E. Saidcase was consolidated with OMB-V-A-03-0572-I, which was a
complaint filed by Tuares against Ida B. Endonila, Erlinda G. Gencaya, Clarissa G. Zamora and Victoria T. Calunsod.

Caberoy denied the charge against her, alleging, among others, that the payrolls of June 1 to15, 2002 and June16 to
30, 2002 show that Tuares received her salary as shown by her signatures on lines no. 11 of the payrolls.5

In the Consolidated Decision dated June 30, 2005 rendered by the Ombudsman, Caberoy was found guilty of
Oppression and was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service. The dispositive portion of the consolidated
decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Principal II, Ramon Avanceña National
High School, (RANHS), Arevalo, Iloilo City, is hereby found GUILTY of OPPRESSION and is hereby meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH CANCELLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY,
FORFEITURE OFEARNED LEAVECREDITS AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS, AND DISQUALIFICATION FROM
REEMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE. On the other hand, respondents IDA B. ENDONILA, Schools
Division Superintendent, ERLINDA G. GENCAYA, Asst. Schools Division Superintendent, CLARISSA G. ZAMORA,
Administrative Officer III, all three of the Division of Iloilo City, DepEd Region VI, Iloilo City, and VICTORIA T.
CALUNSOD, Officer-In-Charge/Secondary School Head Teacher III, Ramon Avanceña National High School,
(RANHS) Arevalo, Iloilo City, are found NOT GUILTYof the same offense and/or violating Sec. 3 (f) of R.A. 3019and
thus these cases are considered DISMISSED as far as they are concerned. Furthermore, on the administrative aspect
of the counter-allegation of Perjury against herein complainant ANGELES O. TUARES, Ramon Avanceña National
High School, Arevalo, Iloilo City, the same is likewise DISMISSED, for lack of merit.

SO DECIDED.6

Caberoy filed a joint motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Ombudsman in its Order dated September
19, 2006.7

The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002 because of her failure to submit her
clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST), while the other teachers received their salaries for
the same month.8 The Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was "singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one
who did not receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to
submit her clearance and PAST."9 The Ombudsman also took into consideration several infractions previously
committed by Caberoy, which allegedly displayed her "notoriousundesirability as a government officer for withholding
teachers’ salaries without authority."10 According to the Ombudsman, Caberoy could not honestly claim that she had
not been forewarned by the Ombudsman of the grave consequences of her repeated illegal act.11Caberoy filed a
petition for certiorariwith the CA, seeking the reversal of her dismissal from service, and in the assailed Decision dated
November 21, 2008, the CA granted Caberoy’s petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The consolidated decision dated June 30, 2005, of the respondent
Ombudsman is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered ABSOLVING the
petitioner of any liability, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.12
The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution dated May
14, 2009.

In clearing Caberoy from the charge against her, the CA found that no undue injury was caused to Tuares since she
received her June 2002 salary. According to the CA, since Caberoy was charged with Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 and the element of undue injury is absent in this case, Caberoy cannot be held liable for the offense.13 The
CA also ruled that Caberoy’s "refusal" to release Tuares’ salary was justified and the element of "failure to so act x x x
for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material
benefit or advantage in favor of an interestedparty, or [discrimination] against another" under Section 3(f) of R.A. No.
3019, is likewise absent.14 Finally, the CA found that the acts of Caberoy are not constitutive of oppression.15

Lastly, the CA ruled that the Ombudsman’s findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidencesince
Caberoy’s act of withholding Tuares’ salaries was clearly justified.16 Hence, the present petition, based on the ground
that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ REVERSAL OF THE PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S
DECISION FINDING [CABEROY] ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR OPPRESSION IS AN ERROR OF LAW
CONSIDERING THAT ITS FINDINGS IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTAN[T]IAL EVIDENCE.17

The Ombudsman argues that it was error for the CA to exonerate Caberoy on the reasons that the withholding of
Tuares’ salary was justified and that there was no undue injury onher part as she later received her salary. The
Ombudsman contends that Caberoy was found guilty of Oppression, which is an administrative offense under the Civil
Service law, and is distinct from the crime of Violation of R.A. No. 3019, from which she was absolved. According to
the Ombudsman, the quantum of proof in these two offenses (Oppression and Violation ofR.A. No. 3019) is distinct
and the records of the case disclose that there is substantial evidence to support its decision. The Ombudsman also
contests the factual findings of the CA that Tuares actually received her salary, stating that in the summary of payrolls
and the checks, Tuares’ name does not appear. Moreover, no evidence was presented by Caberoy to prove that
Tuares actually received her salary, other than her bare allegation. Finally, the Ombudsman states that Caberoy has
already been penalized several times for previous misconduct, which displays her propensity to commit the
misdemeanor.18

Ruling of the Court

Initially, it must be stated thatin a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is limited only
to a review of errors of law committed by the CA, and the Court is not required to review all over again the evidence
presented before the Ombudsman.19 The rule, nevertheless, admits of exceptions, such as when the findings of the
CA and the Ombudsman are conflicting,20 which is what occurred in the present case. Hence, the Court must now look
into the matter of whether the CA committed a reversible error when it reversed the findings and conclusions of the
Ombudsman.

Tuares charged Caberoy in OMB-V-A-03-0239-E with both Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e)(f) of R.A. No.
3019. The Ombudsman, however, found Caberoy guilty only of Oppression.

Oppression is an administrative offense21 penalized under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,22 which provides:

Section 52. Classification of Offenses.—Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave,
less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.

A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:

xxxx

14. Oppression.

1st Offense – Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;

2nd Offense – Dismissal.

xxxx

Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who
under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act
ofcruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.23 To be held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of
Authority, there must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant’s allegations.24 Substantial evidence
is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion.25 In
this case, the CA correctly overturned the Ombudsman’s findings and conclusions, and explained the reasonsfor
exculpating Caberoy, as follows:

Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Ombudsman contradicted itself when it found and held
thatpetitioner was guilty of "oppression" for not paying the private respondent her June 2002 salary, because as a
matter of fact she has been paidalbeit delayed. Such payment is clearly and indubitably established from the table
where it was shown that private respondent received on July 17 and 25, 2002, her June 2002 salary in the amounts of
₱4,613.80 and ₱4,612.00, respectively.

xxxx

The above narration of facts do not show that petitioner committed acts constitutive of "oppression." Assuming
petitioner’s action is erroneous or overly zealous, this certainly does not merit the most severe penalty of dismissal
from government service. Apparently, the petitioner is only protecting herself from any future, adverse consequences
if she allows the disbursement of public funds without the appropriate supporting documents. "It is a well-known fact
that in the government service an employee must submit his daily time record duly accomplished and approved before
one cancollect his salary."

xxxx

Finally, on the contention that the findings and conclusions of the respondent Ombudsman is considered conclusive
and deserve respect and finality is true only when the same is based on substantial evidence. As discussed above,
the action taken by petitioner in withholding the salaries of private respondent was clearly justified. It was a measure
taken by a superior against a subordinate who ignored the basic tenets of law by not submitting the required
documents to support payment of her salary and proportional vacation pay for the aforesaid period. x x x.

x x x [I]n this case before us, the records is bereft of substantial evidence to support respondent Ombudsman’s
findings and conclusion that petitioner committed oppressive acts against private respondent and violated Sections
3(e) and (f) of RA 3019. On the contrary and as earlier discussed, respondent Ombudsman found and concluded that
private respondent was paid her June salaryalbeit late. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the act of respondent
Ombudsman in concluding that petitioner is guilty as charged despite absence of substantial evidence to support the
same is totally unfounded and is therefore, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of
discretion. x x x.26 (Citations omitted)

The complaint filed by Tuares against Caberoy charged the latter with "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence for having ordered the payroll clerk of [RANHS] to cause the exclusion of [her] name in the
payroll of June 2002 x x x and [in spite of] the fact that [she has already] rendered full service during said days x x x
without any justifiable reason and without due process and without any authority under the law."27 A perusal of Tuares’
allegations shows that her claim pertains to the alleged withholding of her salary for the month of June 2002. Records
show, however, that Tuares was actually paid her salary for the month of June 2002. Thus, the vouchers for the
payroll period of June 1 to 15, 200228 and June 16 to 30, 200229 showed Tuares’ name on line 11 and her signature
acknowledging receipt of her salary for such period. This was, in fact, confirmed in the 2002 salary payrolls submitted
by the RANHS Office of the Auditor and summarized by the Ombudsman,30 to wit:

Period Voucher No. Date of Check Tuares’ No. in the Payroll Amount Received
June (Proportional pay & salary) 101-02-6-161 June 25, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June (Proportional pay) 101-02-6-164 June 28, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June (Proportional pay) PS-02-7-182 July 4, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June (Proportional pay & salary) PS-02-7-195 July 17, 2002 11 ₱4,613.80
June (Proportional pay) PS-02-7-196 July 19, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June PS-02-7-200 July 25, 2002 11 ₱4,612.00
July 101-02-8-231 August 19, 2002 16 ₱4,694.72
1âwphi1

The amounts received and signed for by Tuares correspond essentially to the other amounts she received as salaryfor
the other periods in 2002. On this score, entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the
presumption of regularity under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,31 and absent any evidence presented by
Tuares showing the contrary, good faith must be presumed in the preparation and signing of such payrolls.32

Even assuming, as the Ombudsman asserted, that Tuares received her June 2002 salary only on July 2002, the same
does not constitute Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority. The delay in the release of Tuares’ salary hardly qualifies
as an "act of crueltyor severity or excessive use of authority," especially when she contributed to the cause of the
delay, that is, she submitted her Form 48 (Daily Time Record) for June 2002 only on July 11, 2002.33

Neither can the Court subscribe to the Ombudsman’s conclusion that Tuares was singled out by Caberoy.According to
the Ombudsman:

In other words, as far as these fortunate teachers are concerned, checks dated June 25 and 28, 2002 and July 04 and
19, 2002 actually and in paper covered their June 2002 salary; checks dated July 17 and 19, 2002 actually and in
paper covered their July 2002 salary; x x x.

Whereas on the part of complainant Tuares, this is what really happened: The checks dated July 17 and 25, 2002
were technically for services rendered in June 2002 ascorrected by COA but the amounts corresponding to
complainant’s salaryfor the whole month of June 2002 was actually received by her only in July 2002 and that in effect
means that she did not really receive any amount from the school in June 2002; x x x.

Viewed from the discussion above, it is therefore crystal clear that complainant was singled out by respondent
Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established
earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and PAST.34

It must be stressed that like other grave offenses classified under the Civil Service laws, bad faith must attend the act
complained of. Bad faith connotes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a
breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.35 There must be
evidence, independent of the fact of such delay, which will lead to the inevitable conclusion that it was for the purpose
of singling out Tuares. The Court has consistently upheld the principle that in administrative cases, to be disciplined
for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence against the respondent should be competent and must be
derived from direct knowledge.36 "Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an
administrative complaint with no leg to stand on."37 Except for the Ombudsman’s deduction based on the dates of
issuance of the vouchers and the checks as shown in the payroll, the records of thiscase are bereft of evidence that
will support its view that the delay in the release of Tuares’ salary indicated that she was singled out. Moreover, as
correctly pointed out by the CA, "[t]he certifications issued by Acting Book keeper Hayde S. Momblan will show that it
was not only [Tuares] who was not included in the June 2002 payrolls; there were other teachers who were not
included because they failed to submit the required year-end clearance. x x x Evidently, [Tuares] was not singled out
or discriminated against as insisted by her and respondent Ombudsman."38

All told, the Court finds that the CA did not commit a reversible error in exonerating Caberoy from the charge against
her.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE**

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
G.R. No. 212641

ANGELICA A. FAJARDO, Petitioner 
vs.
MARIO J. CORRAL, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to annul and set
aside the Decision1 dated September 16, 2013 and Resolution2 dated May 9, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 121180.

Respondent Mario J. Corral (Corral), Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Manager of the Treasury Department of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-C-A-09- 0355-G against petitioner
Angelica Fajardo (Fajardo) for Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
Service before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman).3

Fajardo was designated as OIC, Division Chief III, Prize Payment (Teller) Division of the Treasury Department of the
PCSO. Her duties included instituting procedures in actual payment of prizes, conducting periodic check-up, actual
counting of paid winning tickets, and requisitioning of cash for distribution to paying tellers. She was also authorized to
draw cash advance of PhP 3,000,000.00 (PhP 2,000,000.00 for payment of sweepstakes and lotto low-tier prizes, and
PhP 1,000,000.00 for the PCSO-POSC Scratch IT Project.4 For such accountability, Fajardo was bonded with the
Bureau of Treasury for PhP 1,500,000.00. In line with her duties, she was issued a vault, which she alone has access
to as she held its key and knew the combination to open the same, to keep the money and documents in her custody.5

On November 13, 2008, a team from the PCSO Internal Audit Department (IAD) conducted a spot audit on Fajardo's
cash and cash items. The team discovered that Fajardo had a shortage of PhP 218,461.00.6 After such audit, Fajardo
did. not report for work, so said team of auditors sealed her vault on November 17, 2008 and her steel cabinet on
November 28, 2008.7

Corral required Fajardo to report for work, to explain her shortage during the audit, and to be physically present in the
opening of her vault. Fajardo requested an additional five working days within which to report back to work, but she
failed to do the same despite the lapse of such extended period.8

On January 8, 2009, another cash count was conducted, upon recommendation of the Commission on Audit (COA).
Said audit was held in the presence of Fajardo and representatives from IAD and COA. During · the said cash count, it
was discovered that cash worth PhP 1,621,476.00 and checks worth PhP 37,513.00 were missing. As such, Fajardo
had a total shortage of PhP 1,877,450.00. It was also discovered that there were undetermined number of paid
winning sweepstakes tickets amounting to PhP 1,024,870.00 dating back from 2004, which were not processed for
liquidation/replenishment.9

Five days thereafter or on January 13, 2009, a letter was issued to Fajardo, which ordered her to immediately produce
the missing funds and to explain such shortage. However, Fajardo failed to account and to produce the missing funds,
and to give a reasonable excuse for such shortage.10

In a Letter dated January 27, 2009, Fajardo admitted her mistake. She offered to settle her accountability by waiving
all her rights to bonuses and monetary benefits for 2008 and paying PhP 300,000.00. In her letter, Fajardo did not
question the regularity of the conduct of spot audits.11

In her Counter-Affidavit, Fajardo denied that spot audits were conducted; and if so, such were done contrary to
established rules. Hence, the results could not be the basis of any action against her. She maintained that the team of
auditors excluded the vale sheets and other cash items, and that she was not given the opportunity to rule, balance,
and close her books before the conduct of the cash count. Fajardo also claimed that she was forced to sign
Certifications and Demands (Cash Examination Count Sheet), containing her alleged shortage, on two different
occasions.12

THE OMBUDSMAN RULING

In a Decision13 dated September 1, 2010, the Ombudsman found Fajardo guilty of Serious Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service. Thefallo  thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, finding substantial evidence of guilt for Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, respondent ANGELICA A. FAJARDO is hereby meted the penalty of
DISMISSAL from the service, with all its accessory penalties.

Pursuant to Section 7, Administrative Order No. 17 of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Ombudsman
Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006, the Chairman of the Philippine. Charity Sweepstakes Office is hereby
directed to implement this Decision and to submit promptly a Compliance Report within five (5) days from receipt
indicating the OMB case number: OMB-C-A-09-0355-G, entitled "Mario J. Corral vs. Angelica A. Fajardo" to this
Office, thru the Central Records Division, 2nct Floor, Ombudsman Building, Agham Road, Government Center, North
Triangle, Diliman, 1128, Quezon City.

Compliance is respectfully enjoined consistent with Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
and Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).

SO ORDERED.14

Fajardo filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an Order15 dated March 16, 2011.

Aggrieved, Fajardo filed a Petition for Review before the CA.

THE CA RULING

In a Decision16 dated September 16, 2013, the CA dismissed said petition and affirmed the ruling of the Ombudsman.
The dispositive portion reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 1 September 2010, and the Order dated
16 March 2011, of the Office of the Ombudsman, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.17

Fajardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution18 dated May 9, 2014.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT FAJARDO IS GUILTY OF SERIOUS DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF SERVICE.

OUR RULING

Fajardo avers that there was no substantial evidence to support the pronouncement of her administrative liability.

We do not agree.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that questions of fact may not be raised by certiorari under Rule 45 because We
are not a trier of facts. As a rule, factual findings of the Ombudsman and the CA are conclusive and binding in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion.19

We find no reason to deviate from the factual findings of both the Ombudsman and the CA.

A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the [petitioner] has committed acts stated in the complaint or fonnal charge.20 Substantial evidence is
such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine differently.21

In the case at bar, it is established that Fajardo, entrusted with the funds of PCSO, failed to account for cash and cash
items in the amount of PhP 1,877,450.00 and paid winning sweepstakes tickets in the amount of PhP 1,024,870.00.
When she was asked to expound on such shortage, she offered no satisfactory explanation for the same.

The evidence presented were the two Certifications and Demands (Cash and Examination Count Sheet) which were
signed by Fajardo, stating the shortage of funds on her account. It is undisputed that Fajardo offered no explanation
for such shortage of funds when demand was made and admitted her accountability in a Letter dated January 27,
2009.

Fajardo reasoned that her act of signing the Certifications was no proof of admission of the shortage, but a mere
acknowledgement that a demand was made upon her to produce cash. Sμch argument, which was copied entirely
from the case of Rueda, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan22  without proper citation, is flimsy. While the act of signing such
certifications is not tantamount to admission of its contents, still, the fact remains that there was shortage of funds on
Fajardo's account and that she failed to explain the reasons for the same despite reasonable opportunity.

To Our mind, the facts established and the evidence presented support the finding of Fajardo's guilt.

Fajardo was charged with serious dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.

Dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to
defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, or intent to violate the truth.23 Under CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, dishonesty may
be classified as serious, less serious or simple. In this case, Fajardo was charged with serious dishonesty,  which
necessarily entails the presence of any one of the following circumstances:

(1) the dishonest act caused serious damage and grave prejudice to the Government;

(2) the respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest act;

(3) where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property, accountable forms or
money for which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent to commit material gain, graft and
corruption;

(4) The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of respondent;

(5) The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of the dishonest act
related to his/her employment;

(6) The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions;

(7) The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination irrregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but not
limited to impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets; and

(8) Other analogous circumstances.24 (Emphasis. supplied)

Grave misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer coupled with the elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules.25 Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the
official or employee's act of unlawfully or wrongfully using his position to gain benefit for one's self.26 Lastly, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service deals with a demeanor of a public officer which "tarnished the image and
integrity of his/her public office".27

Clearly, Fajardo's acts constitute serious dishonesty for her dishonest act deals with money on her account; and that
her failure to account for the shortage showed an intent to commit material gain, graft and corruption. Evidence of
misappropriation of the missing funds is not required because the existence of shortage of funds and the failure to
satisfactorily explain the same would suffice.28

Grave misconduct was committed when Fajardo failed to keep and account for cash and cash items in her
custody.1âwphi1It must be noted that she was issued a vault by the PCSO and was bonded by the Bureau of
Treasury for her to effectively carry out her duties and responsibilities. Yet, investigation conducted by the PCSO
reveals that she failed to perform such duties when such funds on her account were reported missing. Her corrupt
intention was evident on her failure to explain such missing funds despite reasonable opportunity to do the same.

Lastly, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service was committed because the acts of Fajardo tarnished the
image of PCSO, as the principal government agency for raising and providing funds for health programs, medical
assistance and services, and charities of national character,29 considering that aside from the shortage of funds,
unpaid winning tickets dated 2004 were also found in Fajardo's possession when she should have liquidated and
replenished the same. The CA correctly held that the public would lose their trust to PCSO because of the reported
misappropriation of funds, which are allotted as prizes.30
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated September 16, 2013 and Resolution
dated May 9, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 121180 are AFFIRMED in toto.

Petitioner Angelica A. Fajardo is DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, with all its accessory penalties.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

G.R. No. 213500

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION BUREAU (FFIB), OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICES (MOLEO),Petitioners 
vs
PS/SUPT. RAINIER A. ESPINA, Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated February 27, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated July 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131114, which modified the Joint
Resolution4 dated December 19, 2012 and the Joint Order5 dated July 8, 2013 of petitioner the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in the administrative aspect of the case, docketed as OMB-P-A-12-0532-G,6 and, thereby,
found respondent PS/Supt. Rainier A. Espina (Espina) administratively liable for Simple Misconduct.

The Facts

On July 11 and 17, 2012, petitioner the Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) filed before the Ombudsman an affidavit-
complaint7 and a supplemental complaint,8 respectively, charging Espina and several other PNP officers and private
individuals for: (a) violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080,9 RA 3019,10 RA 918411 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (b)  Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty; arising
from alleged anomalies that attended the Philippine National Police's (PNP) procurement of 40 tires, and repair,
refurbishment, repowering, and maintenance services of a total of 28 units of V-150 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs),
and the related transportation and delivery expenses of 18 units of LAV s between August and December 2007.12 It
averred that the PNP did not comply with the bidding procedure prescribed under RA 9184 and its IRR, in
that: (a)  copies of the bid documents were not furnished to possible bidders; (b)  no pre-procurement and pre-bid
conferences were held; (c) the invitation to bid was not published in a newspaper of general circulation; (d) the
procuring agency did not require the submission of eligibility requirements as well as the technical and financial
documents from the bidders; and (e) no post qualification was conducted. Further, it claimed that there were "ghost
deliveries," i.e., the tires were never delivered to the PNP and no repair and refurbishment works were actually
performed on the LAVs.13 The alleged anomalous transactions are as follows:

Transactions Amount
1. Procurement of 40 tires for 10 LAVs ₱2,940,000.00
2. Repowering and refurbishing of 10 LAVs 142,000,000.00
3. Repair and maintenance of 18 LAVs 255,600,000.00
14
4. Transportation and delivery expenses 9,200,000.00
Total ₱409, 740,000.0015

Espina, as the Acting Chief of the Management Division of the PNP Directorate for Comptrollership at the time the
procurements were made,16 was impleaded in the aforesaid complaints for noting/signing the Inspection Report Forms
(IRFs),17 which confirmed the PNP's receipt of the tires and other supplies, and the performance of repair and
refurbishment works on the LAVs. According to the FFIB-MOLEO, by affixing his signature on the IRFs, Espina
supposedly facilitated the fraudulent disbursement of funds amounting to ₱409,740,000.00 when no goods were
actually delivered and no services were actually rendered.18

In defense, Espina denied any participation in the bidding and/or procurement process and maintained that he
belonged to the Management Division which is responsible for the inspection of deliveries made to the PNP after the
bidding and procurement process.19 He also pointed out that pursuant to the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) No.
XXA20 dated November 17, 1993, his only duty, as the said division's Acting Chief, was to note the reports. According
to him, it was not his responsibility to personally inspect and confirm deliveries and go beyond the contents of the IRFs
submitted by his subordinates, absent any irregularity reported by the property inspectors who are tasked to check
and examine deliveries.21

The Ombudsman Ruling

In a Joint Resolution22 dated December 19, 2012, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Espina and several
other PNP officers for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Section 65 (b) (4) of RA 9184, and for Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification under Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC. The Ombudsman also found
them guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty and, accordingly, recommended their dismissal from
government service.23

Specifically, the Ombudsman held that Espina executed indispensable acts which led to the completion of the illegal
transactions.24 The Ombudsman likewise found it incredulous that the repair and refurbishment works on the LAV s
were completed in only seven (7) days, i.e., from December 20, 2007 to December 27, 2007, considering the
magnitude of the work involved, which included the delivery of the LAVs for repair, the inspection and acceptance of
materials to be used, the actual conduct of repair and refurbishment works, and the delivery, inspection, and
acceptance of the repaired and refurbished LAVs.25 The Ombudsman even noted the admission of one of the experts
engaged in the repair of the LAVs that the repair and refurbishment works thereon were still on-going as late as
February 2008 until 2010 and, hence, could not have been completed in December 2007.26

On reconsideration, the Ombudsman, through a Joint Order27 dated July 8 2013, dropped the charges against Espina
and several other PNP Officers, for violation of Section 65 (b) (4) of RA 9184, but sustained the other findings,
including their dismissal from service in view of their administrative liability. In denying Espina's motion for
reconsideration in the administrative case, the Ombudsman pointed out that while it was not Espina's duty to make his
own inspections of the alleged deliveries and work as the same devolved upon the property inspectors, "it was
incumbent upon [Espina] to affix his signature only after checking the completeness and propriety of the
documents."28 Such disregard of duty paved the way for the consummation of four (4) highly illegal and irregular
transactions, i.e.,  the disbursement of government funds despite apparent non-delivery of the items and non-
performance of works procured.29

Aggrieved, Espina filed a petition for review30 before the CA, imp leading both the Ombudsman and the FFIB-MOLEO
(collectively, petitioners), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 131114.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision31 dated February 27, 2014, the CA ruled in favor of Espina and held that his act of affixing his signature
on the IRFs could not be considered as Grave Misconduct because he did not: (a) unlawfully use his official position
for the purpose of benefiting himself;32 and (b) exhibit corrupt or depraved motives, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rules. It observed that Espina had no participation in the bidding and procurement
process as he belonged to the PNP's Management Division whose function is to inspect and note the deliveries to the
PNP after the required bidding and procurement process had taken place. As such, no liability could attach to him
absent a nexus between his functions as Acting Chief of the Management Division and the alleged anomalous
procurement process.33

The CA found Espina guilty, instead, of Simple Misconduct, a less grave offense punishable with suspension for one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. It rejected
Espina's defense of reliance in good faith on the acts of his subordinates, holding that he had the obligation to
supervise them and ensure that the IRFs and Work Orders they prepared, as well as every procurement-related
document released by his division, were regular, lawful, valid, and accurate, considering the significance of the
transaction related to the disbursement of public funds over which great responsibility attached.34

However, the CA absolved Espina from the charge of Serious Dishonesty, considering that he did not personally
prepare the IRFs but merely affixed his signatures thereon. At best, he imprudently failed to check and counter-check
the contents of the IRFs and the Work Orders he signed, which, however, does not equate to Serious Dishonesty.35

There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the CA imposed on Espina a three-month suspension
reckoned from the time he was actually dismissed from service.36

Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration37 which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution38 dated
July 15, 2014; hence, the present petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Espina should be held administratively liable for the charges
imputed against him.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court emphasizes that as a general rule, factual findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when affirmed by the CA.39In
this case, except as to the legal conclusion on what administrative offense was committed by Espina, the Ombudsman
and the CA both found that Espina signed the IRFs even if there were actually no tires delivered to the PNP and no
repair and refurbishment works performed on the LA Vs. Accordingly, these findings of fact are conclusive and binding
and shall no longer be delved into, and this Court shall confine itself to the determination of the proper administrative
offense chargeable against Espina and the appropriate penalty therefor.

In the case at bar, Espina was charged with grave misconduct and serious dishonesty before the Ombudsman which
found him guilty as charged, and imposed on him the supreme penalty of dismissal from government service with all
its accessory penalties, while the CA adjudged him guilty only of simple misconduct and punished him with a three-
month suspension.

Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.40 It is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior and to
constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer.41 It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.42

There are two (2) types of misconduct, namely: grave misconduct and simple misconduct. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard
of an established rule must be manifest.43 Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established rule is
properly characterized as simple misconduct only.44

On the other hand, dishonesty, which is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity,"45 is classified in three (3) gradations, namely: serious, less serious, and
simple.46 Serious dishonesty comprises dishonest acts: (a) causing serious damage and grave prejudice to the
government; (b)  directly involving property, accountable forms or money for which respondent is directly accountable
and the respondent shows an intent to commit material gain, graft and corruption; (c) exhibiting moral depravity on the
part of the respondent; (d)  involving a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but
not limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets; (e)  committed several times or in various
occasions; (j) committed with grave abuse of authority; (g)  committed with fraud and/or falsification of official
documents relating to respondent's employment; and (h)  other analogous circumstances.47 A dishonest act without
the attendance of any of these circumstances can only be characterized as simple dishonesty.48 In between the
aforesaid two forms of dishonesty is less serious dishonesty which obtains when: (a)  the dishonest act caused
damage and prejudice to the government which is not so serious as to qualify as serious dishonesty; (b) the
respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act; and (c) other analogous
circumstances.49

Both grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, of which Espina was charged, are classified as grave offenses for
which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time offenders.50

Here, the CA correctly observed that while Espina may have failed to personally confirm the delivery of the procured
items, the same does not constitute dishonesty of any form inasmuch as he did not personally prepare the IRFs but
merely affixed his signature thereon after his subordinates supplied the details therein.

Neither can Espina's acts be considered misconduct, grave or simple. The records are bereft of any proof that Espina
was motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or deliberate intent of violating the law, or disregarding any established
rule, or that he wrongfully used his position to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others.

However, after a circumspect review of the records, the Court finds Espina administratively liable, instead, for Gross
Neglect of Duty, warranting his dismissal from government service.51 At the outset, it should be pointed out that the
designation of the offense or offenses with which a person is charged in an administrative case is not controlling, and
one may be found guilty of another offense where the substance of the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently
proves one's guilt,52 as in this case. Notably, the FFIB-MOLEO's supplemental complaint accused Espina with failure
to exercise due diligence in signing the IRFs, which is sufficient to hold him liable for Gross Neglect of Duty.53

Gross neglect of duty is defined as "[n]egligence characterized by want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property."54 In contrast, simple neglect of duty is the
failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a
duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."55
As aptly observed by the CA, Espina had the obligation to supervise his subordinates and see to it that they have
performed their respective functions in accordance with law.56 To recall, Espina was the Acting Chief and Head of the
PNP's Management Division and, as such, had supervisory powers over the departments or sections which
comprise it, namely: (a) the Internal Control and Inspection Section (ICIS); (b) the Accountability and Assistance
Section; (c) the Management Improvement Section; and (d) the Claims and Examination Section (CES).57 Espina
himself admitted that the property inspectors who were tasked to personally inspect deliveries to the PNP belong to
the ICIS which was under his management and stewardship.58 In Lihaylihay v. People,59 the Court pointed out that the
nature of the public officers' responsibilities and their role in the procurement process are compelling factors that
should have led them to examine with greater detail the documents which they are made to approve.

Here, while SOP No. XX4 dated November 17, 1993 which Espina cited does not expressly require the Head of the
Management Division to physically re-inspect, re-check, and verify the deliveries to the PNP as reported by the
property inspectors under him, his duty was not simply to "note" or take cognizance of the existence of the IRFs, but to
reasonably ensure that they were prepared in accordance with law, keeping in mind the basic requirement that the
goods allegedly delivered to and services allegedly performed for the government have actually been delivered and
performed. As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman in its Joint Order dated July 8, 2013, "it was incumbent upon
[Espina] to affix his signature only after checking the completeness and propriety of the documents."60However, while
Espina claims that all the necessary supporting documents such as photographs and delivery receipts were attached
to the IRFs at the time they were routed to him for his signature,61 the Court is hard-pressed to find proof
substantiating such claim to justify his passive attitude towards them. In this jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.62 Without evidence showing otherwise, the Court is constrained to conclude
that the IRFs submitted to Espina for his signature were without supporting documents and could not, perforce, be
taken at face value and relied upon. As this Court ruled in Jaca v. People,63 a superior cannot rely in good faith on the
act of a subordinate where the documents that would support the subordinate' s action were not even in his (the
superior's) possession for examination.

Moreover, the timing of the alleged repair and refurbishment works was suspect. The short seven (7)-day period in
December, 2007 during which the repair and refurbishment works were made on the LAV s should have prompted
Espina to doubt the veracity of the IRFs. As correctly observed by the Ombudsman, it is improbable that the repair
and refurbishment works on the LAVs were carried out from December 20 to 27, 2007, given the magnitude of the
work involved and the fact that such period included the delivery of the LAV s for repair, the inspection and approval of
the materials to be used for the repairs, the actual repair and refurbishment, and the delivery of the LA Vs to the PNP
after the repair.64

The foregoing should not have escaped Espina's attention had he faithfully discharged the obligations attendant to his
office.1âwphi1 Indeed, the Court has pronounced that a public officer's high position imposes upon him greater
responsibility and obliges him to be more circumspect in his actions and in the discharge of his official duties.65 This
particularly applies to the instant controversy, especially where Espina's signature was one of the final steps needed
for the release of payment for the procured items.66 In fact, the disbursement vouchers prepared by the Logistics
Support Service (LSS)

Finance Service were routed back to the CES of the Management Division under Espina's supervision for final
examination of all claims.67 With all these considerations, Espina was expected to employ diligence in ensuring that all
claims were supported by complete pertinent documents. As succinctly put by the CA, Espina's duty as Acting Chief
was not merely ministerial and perfunctory as it related to the disbursement of funds over which a great responsibility
attached.68

More so, considering the sheer magnitude of the amount in taxpayers' money involved, i.e.,  ₱409,740,000.00, Espina
should have exercised utmost care before signing the IRFs. It is of no moment that the disbursement of the
₱409,740,000.00 was spread over several transactions and not through a single payment or that only the IRFs
relating to the delivery of supplies were allegedly presented;69 the fact remains that taxpayers' money was spent
without the corresponding goods and services having been delivered to the government. Indeed, no rule is more
settled than that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to
the people.70

Espina cannot trivialize his role in the disbursement of funds and bank on the lack of confidential written reports from
his subordinates which would have prompted him to make further inquiry. As aptly pointed out by petitioners, Espina
was the last person to affix his signature and, as such, had the power, if not the duty, to unearth and expose
anomalous or irregular transactions.71 Espina cannot blindly adhere to the findings and opinions of his subordinates,
lest he be reduced to a mere clerk who has no authority over his subordinates and the sections he oversees.

The Court is not unaware of the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan72 (Arias) that heads of offices may rely on their
subordinates. For the Arias doctrine to apply, however, there must be no reason for the head of offices to go beyond
the recommendations of their subordinates,73 which is not the case here.
Given the amounts involved and the timing of the alleged deliveries, the circumstances reasonably impose on Espina
a higher degree of care and vigilance in the discharge of his duties. Thus, he should have been prompted to make
further inquiry as to the truth of his subordinates' reports. Had he made the proper inquiries, he would have discovered
the non-delivery of the procured items and the non-performance of the procured services, and prevented the unlawful
disbursement. However, he did not do this at all. Instead, he blindly relied on the report and recommendation of his
subordinates and affixed his signature on the IRFs. Plainly, Espina acted negligently, unmindful of the high position he
occupied and the responsibilities it carried, and without regard to his accountability for the hundreds of millions in
taxpayers' money involved.

Verily, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a "[p ]ublic office is a public trust [and] [p]ublic
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives."74 This high constitutional standard of
conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric and taken lightly as those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply
with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service.75 Erring public officials may also be held personally liable for disbursements made in
violation of law or regulation, as stated in Section 52,76 Chapter 9, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987.77 Thus, public officers, as recipients of public trust, are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices
honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability.78 Unfortunately, Espina failed miserably in this respect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 27, 2014 and the Resolution dated
July 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131114 are hereby SET ASIDE. A new one
is ENTERED finding respondent Rainier A. Espina GUILTY of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY. Accordingly, he
is DISMISSED from government service with all the accessory penalties.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring

ESTELLA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice