[ G.R. No.

194061, April 20, 2015 ]

EMELIE L. BESAGA, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND LUZVIMINDA ACOSTA AND
DIGNA MATALANG COCHING, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the October 30, 2009 decision[2] and the
October 1, 2010 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.'SP No. 100616.

The CA affirmed the decision[4] of the Office of the President setting aside the resolution[5] of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary. The DENR Secretary earlier
affirmed the orders dated December 1, 2003[6] and July 26, 2004[7] of the DENR Regional Executive
Director (RED), Region IV-B-MIMAROPA.[8]

The Antecedents[9]

The dispute involved Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 located at Barangay Port Barton, San Vicente, Palawan,
which are parts of a six-hectare timberland.

On February 11, 2003, Emelie L. Besaga (petitioner) applied for a Special Land Use Permit (SLUP) for Lot
Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 for a bathing establishment. According to the petitioner, the lots are covered by
Tax Declaration No. 048 in the name of her father, the late Arturo Besaga, Sr. who allegedly occupied the
land during his lifetime.

On February 13, 2003, spouses Felipe and Luzviminda Acosta (respondent spouses) also applied for
SLUP for a bathing establishment over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514. According to the respondent spouses,
they acquired Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 through a March 19, 1998 Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed by
Rogelio Maranon, a registered survey claimant, and a February 9, 1999 Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights,
executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr.,[10]and Digna Matalang Coching (another respondent in this case), also
registered survey claimants.

On September 10, 2003, the respondents challenged the petitioner's SLUP application before the DENR.
On December 1, 2003, the RED issued the order giving due course to the petitioner's SLUP application and
rejecting the respondents' SLUP application. The RED later denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration on July 26, 2004.

The respondent spouses received the July 26, 2004 order on August 16, 2004. They tiled on. August 25,
2004, through registered mail, an Appeal Memorandum to the Office of the DENR Secretary, copy
furnished the petitioner's lawyer and the Office of the RED. The appeal fee was paid on September 10,
2004. Respondent Digna Matalang Coching received the July 26, 2004 order on August 30, 2004 and filed
her appeal (which adopted the appeal of the respondent spouses) on September 16, 2004.

While the appeal was pending in the Office of the DENR Secretary, the RED issued a Certificate of
Finality[11]declaring the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders final and executory for failure of the
respondents to file a Notice of Appeal.

On December 10, 2004, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) issued the
SLUP[12]to the petitioner covering Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514. On November 18, 2005, the SLUP was
converted into a Special Forest Land-Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT).

On August 6, 2006, the DENR Secretary rendered a decision (i) vacating the December 1, 2003 and July
26, 2004 orders of the RED; (ii) amending the coverage of the SLUP of the petitioner to cover Lot No. 4513
only; and (iii) giving due course to the SLUP of the respondent spouses to cover Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.

Acting on the motion for reconsideration[13] filed by the petitioner, the DENR Secretary reversed his August
6, 2006 decision on October 17, 2006 and held that the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the
RED have attained finality because: (i) the respondent spouses filed an Appeal Memorandum, instead of a
Notice of Appeal; (ii) the Appeal Memorandum was directly filed with the DENR Secretary and not with the
RED; and (iii) the respondent spouses failed to pay the required appeal fees within the reglementary
period.

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

The CA, through the assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the decision of the Office of the President.

The petitioner filed the present petition to contest the CA's ruling.

The DENR's Findings

The RED, relying mainly on the report[14] prepared by the chief of Forest Management Services ruled in
favor of the petitioner.

The report gave credence to Tax Declaration No. 048,[15] which purportedly showed that Lot Nos. 4512,
4513 and 4514 are parts of the six (6) hectare timberland occupied by the petitioner's father during his
lifetime. The RED also gave weight to the statements of two former Barangay Captains of Port Barton and
the document signed by the alleged occupants of the said six (6) hectare timberland supporting the
petitioner's claim.

The DENR Secretary reversed the orders of the RED in his decision dated August 6, 2006.[16]

He ruled that the petitioner cannot claim preferential right to apply for an SLUP over Lot Nos. 4512 and
4514 in view of her sweeping allegation that the said lots are part of the six (6) hectare timberland, which
his father possessed in his lifetime and whose possession she tacked. The DENR Secretary asked: if
indeed the petitioner tacked the possession of his father and she was the actual occupant over Lot Nos.
4512 and 4514, why was she not made the survey claimants of the said lots?

The DENR Secretary found that the respondent spouses have a preferential right over Lot Nos. 4512 and
4514. Rogelio Maranon, the registered survey claimant and occupant of Lot No. 4512, waived and
transferred his right over the lot in favor of the respondent spouses in a duly-notarized Affidavit of Waiver of
Rights. The respondent spouses derived their right over Lot No. 4514 from Arturo Besaga, Jr. and Digna
Matalang Coching, the registered survey claimants, who executed a duly-notarized Joint-Affidavit of Waiver
of Rights over the said lot. The DENR Secretary held that these are the legal and vital documents
(disregarded by the chief of Forest Management Services) which support the preferential rights of the
respondent spouses over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.

The DENR Secretary, however, reversed his August 6, 2006 decision in a resolution[17] dated October 17,
2006. He ruled that the respondent spouses failed to perfect the appeal because they filed a Memorandum
of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal contrary to Section 1(a) of DENR Department Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 87, series of 1990.[18]

The Office of the President's Ruling[19]

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

It held that the orders of the RED did not become final because there is no law, rule or regulation
prohibiting an appellant to file an appeal memorandum, instead of a notice of appeal, to the office
concerned. It further held that the appeal memorandum itself serves as a sufficient notice of the party's
intention to elevate the case to a higher authority. The Office of the President observed that in a plethora of
cases, notices of appeal are filed directly with the DENR, rather than with the RED, which practice has not
since been prohibited nor made as a ground for the outright dismissal of the appeal. Finally, it found that
the respondent spouses paid the appeal fees. All of these negate the finding that the respondent spouses
did not perfect their appeal to the DENR Secretary.

As to the merits of the case, the Office of the President found that Tax Declaration No. 048 did not cover
Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 but Lot No. 4741, which is entirely different and distinct from the contested
lots. It gave credence to the Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed by Rogelio Maranon and the Joint
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights jointly executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr. and Digna Matalang Coching in favor of
the respondent spouses. No countervailing proof was presented by the petitioner to impugn these
affidavits.

The CA's Ruling

The CA sustained the Office of the President. Citing decisions of this Court, it held that rules of procedure
are construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. They are not to be applied in a very
rigid and technical manner, as they are used only to hold secure and not to override substantial justice.

The CA ruled that the orders of the RED have not attained finality.

The Petition

The petitioner seeks reversal of the CA decision and resolution for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
She submits that the respondent spouses failed to perfect an appeal in the administrative proceedings. She
argues that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and that failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to
be reviewed final and unappealable. She adds that the liberal interpretation of the rules has no clear
application in the present case because the respondents failed to adequately explain their non-compliance
therewith.

As is proper under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner does not raise any factual questions.

Respondent's Comment[20]
The respondent spouses ask for the petition's dismissal for lack of merit. They submit that the CA acted in
accordance with law and jurisprudence in upholding the ruling of the Office of the President.

They argue that to dismiss the case on the mere ground of technicalities would mean to dispense with the
determination of the party having preferential right on the disputed lots and could cause the perpetuation of
a wrong. They maintain that the cases cited by the petitioner, where procedural rules were strictly enforced
by this Court, involved violation of the rules either before the trial court, the CA or before this Court, and not
before an administrative agency like the DENR. In sum, the respondent spouses contend that the orders of
the RED have not attained finality, thus, said orders are still subject to reversal, amendment or modification
on appeal.

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:[21]

I. WHETHER THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY THE RESPONDENTS WAS CORRECTLY FILED TO

THE DENR SECRETARY AND NOT TO THE REGIONAL OFFICE AS PROVIDED UNDER
SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990;

II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS' APPEAL TO THE OFFICE OF THE DENR SECRETARY
WAS PERFECTED DESPITE OF THEIR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO
NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990;

III. WHETHER THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL INVOLVING

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS WAS CORRECTLY APPLIED BY THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS IN THE CASE OF RESPONDENTS;

IV. WHETHER  THE  ASSAILED  ORDERS,  ISSUED  ON DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 26, 2004,
OF THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF DENR REGION IV-MIMAROPA IN DENR CASE
NO. M-003-03-F, WERE ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY;

V. WHETHER THE PERFECTION OF APPEAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO

NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990 IS NOT ONLY MANDATORY BUT JURISDICTIONAL; AND

VI. WHETHER THE ORDERS DATED DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 23, 2014 CAN STILL BE
MODIFIED AND SET ASIDE BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.

The resolution of these issues hinges on whether the orders of the RED dated December 1, 2003 and July
26, 2004 have attained finality because the respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal directly to the
DENR Secretary instead of a Notice of Appeal to the RED.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition.

The petitioner insists that the filing of a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal was fatal to
the respondent spouses' case.
We are not convinced of the merits of this position.

The crux of the dispute is Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87. It provides:

Section 1. Perfection of Appeals. - a) Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, appeals from
the decisions/orders of the DENR Regional Offices shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after the
receipt of a copy of the decision/order complained of by the party adversely affected, by tiling with
the Regional Office which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving copies thereof upon the
prevailing party and Office of the Secretary, and paying the required fees. [Emphasis ours.]

According to the petitioner, this provision is mandatory and jurisdictional. She argues that respondents filed
a defective appeal because: (i) they filed a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii)
directly to the DENR and not to the Regional Office, which adjudicated the case; and (iii) no docket fee was
paid.[22]

The petitioner cites jurisprudence to bolster her argument that the perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period prescribed by law is not oniy mandatory but also jurisdictional.

We accordingly review the cited cases to determine the correctness of the petitioner's submitted position.

In Asian Spirit Airlines v. Bautista,[23] the CA dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to file his
brief within the time provided by the Rules of Court. The appellant not only neglected to file its brief within
the stipulated time but also failed to seek an extension of time based on a cogent ground before the
expiration of the time sought to be extended. In sustaining the CA, we held that liberality in the application
of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause
needless delay in the administration of justice.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[24] we affirmed the trial court when it considered a motion for
reconsideration pro forma for not containing a notice of hearing. We held that a motion that does not
contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not
even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.

In Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA,[25] the Regional Trial Court granted the petitioner a non-extendible
15-day period to file a Petition for Review from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The petitioner
failed to file the petition despite the extension. We held that the requirements for perfecting an appeal within
the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.

In MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC,[26] we affirm the CA when it denied due course to the petitioner's appeal
because of its failure to explain why another mode of service other than personal service was resorted to.
We held that an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that service has been made to the other
parties in a case. It is a requirement totally different from the requirement that an explanation be made if
personal service of pleadings was not resorted to.

Finally, in Artistica Ceramica v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc.,[27] the issue was
whether the petitioner properly filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We held that as a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of
the CA is appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. The failure to file the appeal within the 15-day reglementary
period under Rule 45 is not an excuse to use Rule 65. Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal,
In sum, all these cases strictly applied the rule that the right to appeal is a mere statutory right and the party
who avails of such right must comply with the law. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost.

To reiterate, these involved violations of the Rules of Court while the cases were pending in the trial court,
the CA or before this Court. They do not involved violation of administrative rules of procedure. They
are not strictly applicable in the present case.

The Nature of Administrative

Rules of Procedure

It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised in the manner
prescribed by law. This has been consistently held in relation to non-observance by a party-litigant of the
Rules of Court and failure to offer a valid and acceptable excuse for non-compliance.

Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before administrative bodies the general rule has always been
liberality.

Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law. [28] 
Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object to assist the
parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.[29]

In Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp.,[30] we held:

It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice,
rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would
subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities
should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities, x x x This is especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies,
such as the IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of procedure. [Emphasis supplied.]

The liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the
requirements of due process.[31]

Administrative due process means reasonable opportunity to be heard. As held in Vivo v. Pagcor.[32]

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due
process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this
means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not
always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. [Emphasis supplied.]

Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained.[33]

Thus, while this Court allows liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure to enhance fair trial
and expedite justice, we are keenly aware that liberal construction has no application when due process is
violated. The crucial point of inquiry in cases involving violation of administrative rules of procedure is
whether such violation disregards the basic tenets of administrative due process. If the gravity of the
violation of the rules is such that due process is breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly applied.
Otherwise, the rules are liberally construed.

Liberal Construction as
Applied in the Present Case

It is undisputed that the respondent spouses, instead of filing a Notice of Appeal to the RED, filed a
Memorandum of Appeal to the DENR Secretary within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period. They paid
the appeal fee, although beyond the fifteen (15)-day period. These violate Section 1 (a) of DAO No. 87
which requires the filing of a Notice of Appeal and the payment of the appeal fee within the reglementary
period.

Do these errors breach due process so as to call for the strict application of administrative rules of
procedure? Is there basis for the liberal construction of the rules?

We uphold liberality.

First, there is no violation of due process. In fact, to sustain the position of the petitioner and strictly apply
Section l(a) of DAO No. 87 may violate the respondent spouses right to due process as this would result to
a denial of their right to appeal.

We stress that the respondent spouses appealed within the reglementary period. The appeal was
timely filed, albeit not directly to the office which issued the order sought to be reviewed. They also paid the
full appeal fees although beyond the 15-day period.

We hold that these procedural lapses were neither prejudicial nor unfair to the petitioner. The petitioner's
right to due process was not breached.

Notably, both the petitioner and the RED were furnished copies of the Memorandum of Appeal, a
fact that the petitioner did not deny.[34]

We agree with the observation of the Office of the President that the Memorandum of Appeal essentially
served the purpose of the Notice of Appeal. The filing of the Memorandum of Appeal had the same
practical effect had a Notice of Appeal been filed: inform the RED that his order is sought to be appealed to
the DENR Secretary.

Significantly, the respondent spouses notified the petitioner of the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. The
petitioner subsequently filed her opposition thereto. When the DENR Secretary initially ruled in favor of the
respondent spouses, the petitioner tiled a motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

Clearly, the petitioner participated in every stage of the administrative proceeding. Her right to be heard
was not compromised despite the wrong mode of appeal.

As to the late payment of the appeal fee, suffice it to say that this Court has disregarded late payment of
appeal fees at the administrative level in order to render substantial justice.[35]

Second, the liberal construction of DAO No. 87 would serve its purpose, i.e., grant a party the right to
appeal decisions of the Regional Offices to the DENR Secretary in order for the latter to review the findings
of the former. To disallow appeal in this case would not only work injustice to the respondent spouses, it
would also diminish the DENR Secretary's power to review the decision of the RED. It would deny the
DENR Secretary the opportunity to correct, at the earliest opportunity, "errors of judgment" of his
subordinates. This is obviously not the intent of DAO No. 87.
Finally, the petitioner failed to convince us why liberality should not be applied. The petitioner does not
claim that her right to due process was violated as a result of the wrong mode of appeal. The petitioner
merely asks this Court to strictly construe DAO No. 87 and affirm the orders of the RED, which according to
her, have attained finality.

Between strict construction of administrative rules of procedure for their own sake and their liberal
application in order to enhance fair trials and expedite justice, we uphold the latter. After all, administrative
rules of procedure do not operate in a vacuum. The rules facilitate just, speedy and inexpensive resolution
of disputes before administrative bodies. The better policy is to apply these rules in a manner that would
give effect rather than defeat their intended purpose.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the October 30, 2009 decision
and October 1, 2010 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100616, affirming the August 13,
2007 decision of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 06-K-398.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 117890. September 18, 1997]

PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS-
FOOD and GENERAL TRADE (NFSW-FGT)/ JESUS PASCO, MARTIN BONARES,
EVANGELINE PASCO, TERESITA NAVA, FELIXBERTO NAVA, JOHNNY GARRIDO, EDUARDO
NUEZ and DELMA NUEZ, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In the proceedings before the labor arbiter, only the unregistered trade name of the employer-
corporation and its administrator/manager were impleaded and subsequently held liable for illegal
dismissal, backwages and separation pay. On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations
Commission motu proprio included the corporate name of the employer as jointly and severally liable for
the workers claims.Because of such inclusion, the corporation now raises issues of due process and
jurisdiction before this Court.

The Case

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the Decision [1] of Public
Respondent National Labor Relations Commission[2] in NLRC Case No. V-0334-92[3] promulgated on
September 27, 1993 and its Resolution [4] promulgated on September 12, 1994 denying
reconsideration. Affirming the decision[5] dated September 2, 1992 of Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy,
the impugned NLRC Decision disposed thus:[6]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy,
dated September 2, 1992, subject to the amendments and modification stated above and ordering the
respondent-appellant, Jose Edmundo Pison and the respondent Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development
Corporation to pay jointly and severally the claims for backwages and separation pay of the complainant-
appellees in the above-entitled case, except the claims of Danny Felix and Helen Felix, in the amount
specified below:

Name Backwages Separation Pay Total

1. Jesus Pasco P14,729.00 P12,818.06 P27,547.06

2. Evangeline 14,729.00 12,874.81 27,603.81

Pasco

3. Martin Bonares 14,729.00 9,035.06 23,764.06

4. Mariolita Bonares 14,729.00 8,455.00 23,184.00

5. Felixberto Nava 14,729.00 13,505.31 28,234.31

6. Teresita NAva 14,729.00 3,417.31 18,146.31

7. Johnny Garrido 8,489.00 4,463.94 12,952.94

8. Eduardo Nuez 8,489.00 11,399.44 19,888.44

9. Delma Nuez 8,489.00 9,507.94 17,996.94
In addition, the respondent-appellant and the respondent corporation are ordered to pay attorneys fees
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award.

The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution, on the other hand, reads:[7]

WHEREFORE, the decision in question is hereby modified in the sense that the monetary award of
Mariolita Bonares be [sic] deleted. Except for such modification, the rest of the decision stands.

Arguing that the National Labor Relations Commission did not have jurisdiction over it because it was
not a party before the labor arbiter, petitioner elevated this matter before this Court via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Acting on petitioners prayer[8], this Court (First Division) issued on January 18, 1995 a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from executing the assailed Decision and Resolution.

The Facts

As gathered from the complaint[9] and other submissions of the parties filed with Executive Labor
Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, the facts of the case are as follows:

Together with Complainants Danny and Helen Felix, private respondents -- Jesus Pasco, Evangeline
Pasco, Martin Bonares, Teresita Nava, Felixberto Nava, Johnny Garrido, Eduardo Nuez and Delma Nuez,
all represented by Private Respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers-Food and General Trade
(NSFW-FGT) -- filed on June 13, 1988 a complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, payment of
backwages and attorneys fees against Hacienda Lanutan/Jose Edmundo Pison. Complainants alleged that
they were previously employed as regular sugar farm workers of Hacienda Lanutan in Talisay, Negros
Occidental. On the other hand, Jose Edmundo Pison claimed that he was merely the administrator of
Hacienda Lanutan which was owned by Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation.

As earlier stated, the executive labor arbiter rendered on September 2, 1992 a decision in favor of the
workers-complainants, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Jose Edmundo
Pison/Hda. Lanutan, Talisay, Negros Occidental, to PAY the following complainants their backwages (one
year) plus separation pay in the following amounts, to wit:

BACKWAGES SEPARATION PAY TOTAL

1. J. Pasco -P14,729.00 P12,818.06 P27,547.06

2. E. Pasco - 14,729.00 12,784.81 27,603,81

3. Bonares - 14,729.00 8,404.56 23,133.56

4. F. Nava - 14,729.00 13,505.31 28,234.31

5. T. Nava - 14,729.00 3,427.31 18,146.31

6. J. Garido - 8,489.00 4,463.94 12,952.94

7. E. Nuez - 8,489.00 11,399.44 19,888.44

8. D. Nuez - 8,489.00 9,507.94 17,996.94

plus ten percent (10%) of the total award as attorneys fees in the amount of P17,550.34 or in the total
amount of ONE HUNDRED NINETY THREE THOUSAND FIFTY THREE AND 71/100 (P193,053.71), all
these amounts to be deposited with this Office within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision. The claim
of complainants Danny and Helen Felix are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

In affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter, public respondent ordered respondent-appellant,
Jose Edmundo Pison and the respondent Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation to pay
jointly and severally the claims for backwages and separation pay of private respondents. The motion for
reconsideration dated October 14, 1993 was apparently filed by Jose Edmundo Pison for and on his own
behalf only. However, Pison did not elevate his case before this Court. The sole petitioner now before us is
Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation, the owner of Hacienda Lanutan.

The Issue

Petitioner submits only one issue for our resolution:[10]

Public Respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
included motu proprio petitioner corporation as a party respondent and ordered said corporation liable to
pay jointly and severally, with Jose Edmundo Pison the claims of private respondents.

In essence, petitioner alleges deprivation of due process.

The Courts Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner contends that it was never served any summons; hence, public respondent did not acquire
jurisdiction over it. It argues that from the time the complaint was filed before the Regional Arbitration
Branch No. VI up to the time the said case was appealed by Jose Edmundo Pison to the NLRC, Cebu,
petitioner Corporation was never impleaded as one of the parties x x x. It was only in the public
respondents assailed Decision of September 27, 1993 that petitioner Corporation was wrongly included as
party respondent without its knowledge. Copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution were not sent to
petitioner but only to Jose Edmundo Pison, on the theory that the two were one and the same. Petitioner
avers that Jose Edmundo Pison is only a minority stockholder of Hacienda Lanutan, which in turn is one of
the businesses of petitioner.[11] Petitioner further argues that it did not voluntarily appear before said tribunal
and that it was not given (any) opportunity to be heard; [12] thus, the assailed Decision and Resolution in this
case are void for having been issued without jurisdiction.[13]
In its memorandum, petitioner adds that Eden vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment,[14] cited by public
respondent, does not apply to this case. In Eden, petitioners were duly served with notices of hearings,
while in the instant case, the petitioner was never summoned nor was served with notice of hearings as a
respondent in the case.[15]
At the outset, we must stress that in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules governing service of
summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. [16] Also, in labor cases,
punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of the working man; it
should not defeat the complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties. This
Court is ever mindful of the underlying spirit and intention of the Labor Code to ascertain the facts of each
case speedily and objectively without regard to technical rules of law and procedure, all in the interest of
due process.[17] Furthermore, the Labor Code itself, as amended by RA 6715,[18]provides for the specific
power of the Commission to correct, amend, or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in the
substance or in the form of the proceedings before it[19] under Article 218 (c) as follows:

(c) To conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter or controversy within its jurisdiction,
proceed to hear and determine the disputes in the absence of any party thereto who has been summoned
or served with notice to appear, conduct its proceedings or any part thereof in public or in private, adjourn
its hearings to any time and place, refer technical matters or accounts to an expert and to accept his report
as evidence after hearing of the parties upon due notice, direct parties to be joined in or excluded from the
proceedings, correct, amend, or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form, give
all such directions as it may deem necessary or expedient in the determination of the dispute before it, and
dismiss any matter or refrain from further hearing or from determining the dispute or part thereof, where it is
trivial or where further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable; xxx (Underscoring
supplied.)

In this case, there are legal and factual reasons to hold petitioner jointly and severally liable with Jose
Edmundo Pison.

Jurisdiction Acquired over Petitioner

Consistent with the foregoing principles applicable to labor cases, we find that jurisdiction was acquired
over the petitioner. There is no dispute that Hacienda Lanutan, which was owned SOLELY by petitioner,
was impleaded and was heard. If at all, the non-inclusion of the corporate name of petitioner in the case
before the executive labor arbiter was a mere procedural error which did not at all affect the jurisdiction of
the labor tribunals.[20] Petitioner was adequately represented in the proceedings conducted at the regional
arbitration branch by no less than Hacienda Lanutans administrator, Jose Edmundo Pison, who verified
and signed his/Hacienda Lanutans position paper and other pleadings submitted before the labor arbiter. It
can thus be said that petitioner, acting through its corporate officer Jose Edmundo Pison, traversed private
respondents complaint and controverted their claims. Further unrebutted by petitioner are the following
findings of public respondent:[21]

It should further be noted that two responsible employees of the said corporation, namely, Teresita
Dangcasil, the secretary of the administrator/manager, and Fernando Gallego, the hacienda overseer, had
submitted their affidavits, both dated July 20, 1988, as part of the evidence for the respondent, and that, as
shown by the records, the lawyer who appeared as the legal counsel of the respondent-appellant,
specifically, Atty. Jose Ma. Torres, of the Torres and Valencia Law Office in Bacolod City, (Rollo, p. 17) was
also the legal counsel of the said corporation. (Rollo, p. 23)

Also, it is undisputed that summons and all notices of hearing were duly served upon Jose Edmundo
Pison. Since Pison is the administrator and representative of petitioner in its property (Hacienda Lanutan)
and recognized as such by the workers therein, we deem the service of summons upon him as sufficient
and substantial compliance with the requirements for service of summons and other notices in respect of
petitioner corporation. Insofar as the complainants are concerned, Jose Edmundo Pison was their employer
and/or their employers representative. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, we rule that Jose
Pisons knowledge of the labor case and effort to resist it can be deemed knowledge and action of the
corporation. Indeed, to apply the normal precepts on corporate fiction and the technical rules on service of
summons would be to overturn the bias of the Constitution and the laws in favor of labor.
Hence, it is fair to state that petitioner, through its administrator and manager, Jose Edmundo Pison,
was duly notified of the labor case against it and was actually afforded an opportunity to be heard. That it
refused to take advantage of such opportunity and opted to hide behind its corporate veil will not shield it
from the encompassing application of labor laws. As we held in Bautista vs. Secretary of Labor and
Employment:[22]

Moreover, since the proceeding was not judicial but merely administrative, the rigid requirements of
procedural laws were not strictly enforceable. It is settled that --

While the administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. However, the standard of due
process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of
fairness is not ignored. (fn: Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores, 152 SCRA 237).

xxx

It is of course also sound and settled rule that administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial functions
are unfettered by the rigid technicalities of procedure observed in the courts of law, and this is so that
disputes brought before such bodies may be resolved in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner
possible. (fn: Rizal Workers Union vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431).

Given all these circumstances, we feel that the lack of summons upon the petitioners is not sufficient
justification for annulling the acts of the public respondents.

Contrary to petitioners contention, the principles laid down in Eden are relevant to this case. In that
case, a religious organization, SCAFI,[23] denied responsibility for the monetary claims of several
employees, as these were filed against SCAPS [24] and its officer in charge -- the employees believed that
SCAPS was their employer. In rejecting such defense, this Court ruled:[25]

With regard to the contention that SCAPS and SCAFI are two different entities, this lacks merit. The change
from SCAPS to SCAFI was a mere modification, if not rectification of the caption as to respondent in the
MOLE case, when it was pointed out in the complainants position paper that SCAPS belongs to or is
integral with SCAFI as gleaned from the brochure, Annex A of said position paper, which is already part of
the records of the case and incorporated in the Comment by way of reference. The brochure stated that
SCAPS is the implementing and service arm of SCAFI, with Bishop Gaviola as National Director of SCAPS
and Board Chairman of SCAFI, both their address: 2655 F.B. Harrison, St., Pasay City. Thus, the real party
in interest is SCAFI, more so because it has the juridical personality that can sue and be sued. The change
in caption from SCAPS to SCAFI however does not absolve SCAPS from liability, for SCAFI includes
SCAPS, SCAPS -- the arm, SCAFI, -- the organism to which the arm is an integral part of the rise and fall
of SCAPS, and vice-versa. Thus, SCAFI has never been a stranger to the case. Jurisprudence is to the
effect that:

An action may be entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it
appears that the naming of the party would be a formality. (Baguio vs. Rodriguez, L-11078, May 27, 1959)

Comparable to Eden, Hacienda Lanutan is an arm of petitioner, the organism of which it is an integral
part. Ineluctably, the real party in interest in this case is petitioner, not Hacienda Lanutan which is merely its
non-juridical arm. In dealing with private respondents, petitioner represented itself to be Hacienda
Lanutan. Hacienda Lanutan is roughly equivalent to its trade name or even nickname or alias. The names
may have been different, but the IDENTITY of the petitioner is not in dispute. Thus, it may be sued under
the name by which it made itself known to the workers.

Liability of Jose Edmundo Pison

Jose Edmundo Pison did not appeal from the Decision of public respondent. It thus follows that he is
bound by the said judgment. A party who has not appealed an adverse decision cannot obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted, if there is any, in the decision of the lower
court or administrative body.[26]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, for its failure to show grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the National Labor Relations
Commission. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order
issued on January 19, 1995 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003]

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, petitioner, vs. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive

Secretary, Office of the President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary, Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR assails the Decision of

the Court of Appeals, dated April 18, 2001, affirming the decision of the Office of the President in
Administrative Order No. 12 ordering petitioners dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth.
Petitioners dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by
private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. Private respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of
accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent
charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel Aire Drive,
Burbank, Los Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. He further alleged that
petitioners in-laws who were living in California had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts and
they could not have purchased such an expensive property for petitioner and his wife. Private respondent
accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.
Private respondent attached to his letter-complaint the following documents:
a) a copy of a Grant Deed, dated May 27, 1993, where spouses David and Judith Tedesco
granted the subject property to petitioner and his wife;
b) a copy of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by petitioner and his wife in California
appointing petitioners sister-in-law Estela D. Fajardo as their attorney-in-fact, to negotiate and
execute all documents and requirements to complete the purchase of the subject property; and,
c) an excerpt from the newspaper column of Lito A. Catapusan in the Manila Bulletin, entitled
Beatwatch, where it was reported that a low-ranking, multimillionaire DPWH employee, traveled
to Europe and the U.S. with his family, purchased an expensive house in California, appointed
a woman through an SPA to manage the subject property and had hidden and unexplained
wealth in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached documents were indorsed by the Philippine
Consulate General of San Francisco, California, to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC)[1] for investigation. Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the
PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo.Petitioner
explained that in view of the unstable condition of government service in 1991, his wife inquired from her
family in the U.S. about their possible emigration to the States. They were advised by an immigration
lawyer that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she
was interested in buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not do so at that time as there
was a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property pending full payment
of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles. Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property
and put the title in the names of petitioner and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her
at the same time to circumvent the prohibition in her mortgage contract.
Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before
the Ombudsman.[2] He attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report [3] of the
Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.
From May 29, 1996 until March 13, 1997, the PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the
complaint. While petitioner participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents
through his counsel, private respondent-complainant could not be located as his Philippine address could
not be ascertained. In the course of the investigation, the PCAGC repeatedly required petitioner to submit
his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data
Sheet. Petitioner ignored these directives and submitted only his Service Record. He likewise adduced in
evidence the checks allegedly issued by his sister-in-law to pay for the house and lot in Burbank, California.
When the PCAGC requested the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to furnish it with copies of petitioners
SALN from 1992-1994, it was informed that petitioner failed to file his SALN for those years.
After the investigation, the PCAGC, in its Report to the Office of the President, made the following
findings: Petitioner purchased a house and lot in Burbank, California, for US$195,000.00 (or P3.9M at the
exchange rate prevailing in 1993). The sale was evidenced by a Grant Deed. The PCAGC concluded that
the petitioner could not have been able to afford to buy the property on his annual income of P168,648.00
in 1993 as appearing on his Service Record. It likewise found petitioners explanation as unusual, largely
unsubstantiated, unbelievable and self-serving. The PCAGC noted that instead of adducing evidence,
petitioners counsel exerted more effort in filing pleadings and motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
shopping. It also took against petitioner his refusal to submit his SALN and ITR despite the undertaking
made by his counsel which raised the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioners acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out
of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioners dismissal from
service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.
On August 24, 1998, the Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the
recommendation of the PCAGC, issued Administrative Order No. 12, [4] ordering petitioners dismissal from
service with forfeiture of all government benefits.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. His appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed.[5]
Hence, this petition for review where petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: first, whether
he was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC; second, whether his guilt was proved
by substantial evidence; and, third, whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman
rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.
On the issue of due process, petitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal
rules of administrative due process when it relied on Bundalians unverified letter-complaint. He gripes that
his counter-affidavit should have been given more weight as the unverified complaint constitutes hearsay
evidence. Moreover, petitioner insists that in ruling against him, the PCAGC failed to respect his right to
confront and cross-examine the complainant as the latter never appeared in any of the hearings before the
PCAGC nor did he send a representative therein.
We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the
opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as
the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process
are sufficiently met.[6] In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the
proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located.[7] Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue
that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant.
Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before
it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence,
attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President
and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of the
investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the
due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in
the investigation.[8]
Neither can we sustain petitioners contention that the charge against him was unsupported by
substantial evidence as it was contained in an unverified complaint. The lack of verification of the
administrative complaint and the non-appearance of the complainant at the investigation did not divest the
PCAGC of its authority to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. Under Section 3 of Executive Order
No. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form
or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department. Indeed, it is not totally uncommon
that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. The
Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and
manner concerning official acts or omissions. The Court Administrator of this Court investigates and takes
cognizance of, not only unverified, but even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or
officials for violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This policy has been adopted in line with the serious
effort of the government to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service.
 It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
[9]
 This was afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.
On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrative
investigations. First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint.[10] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds
equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. [11] Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of
the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters
within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error
of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the
evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to
receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.[12]
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the subject property was in his name. However, he insisted
that it was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo who paid for the property in installments. He submitted as proof
thereof the checks issued by Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the property. His evidence,
however, likewise fail to convince us. First, the record is bereft of evidence to prove the alleged internal
arrangement petitioner entered into with Fajardo. He did not submit her affidavit to the investigating body
nor did she testify before it regarding her ownership of the Burbank property. Second, the checks allegedly
issued by Fajardo to pay for the monthly amortizations on the property have no evidentiary weight as
Fajardos mere issuance thereof cannot prove petitioners non-ownership of the property. Fajardo would
naturally issue the checks as she was appointed by petitioner as attorney-in-fact and the latter would
naturally course through her the payments for the Burbank property. Third, petitioners own evidence
contradict his position. We cannot reconcile petitioners denial of ownership of the property with the loan
statement[13] he adduced showing that he obtained a loan from the World Savings and Loan Association for
$195,000.00 on June 23, 1993 to finance the acquisition of the property. Then, three (3) years later, on May
30, 1996, petitioner and his wife executed a Quitclaim Deed [14] donating the Burbank property to his sisters-
in-law Estela and Rose Fajardo allegedly to prove his non-ownership of the property. It is obvious that the
Quitclaim Deed is a mere afterthought, having been executed only after a complaint for unexplained wealth
was lodged against petitioner. Why the Quitclaim Deed included Rose Fajardo when it was only Estela
Fajardo who allegedly owned the property was not explained on the record. Petitioners evidence failed to
clarify the issue as it produced, rather than settled, more questions.
Petitioner admitted that the Grant Deed over the property was in his name. He never denied the
existence and due execution of the Grant Deed and the Special Power of Attorney he conferred to Estela
Fajardo with respect to the acquisition of the Burbank property. With these admissions, the burden of proof
was shifted to petitioner to prove non-ownership of the property. He cannot now ask this Court to remand
the case to the PCAGC for reception of additional evidence as, in the absence of any errors of law, it is not
within the Courts power to do so. He had every opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC.
Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the
Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be
sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this
review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise
of administrative powers.[15] Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability
for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the
Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was
investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As
the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application in the case at bar.
Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly sustained petitioners dismissal from service as the
complaint and its supporting documents established that he acquired a property whose value is
disproportionate to his income in the government service, unless he has other sources of income which he
failed to reveal. His liability was proved by substantial evidence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on

Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner, 
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII,
and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER
CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and
Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.

Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305,
entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining
the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons
acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-
finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt
proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,1 the
President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations
(PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the
following functions and responsibilities:3

b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions,
smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are
prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper
recommendations to the President of the Philippines.

c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and
3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of
unlawfully amassed wealth ... .

h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints

against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and
prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an
investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the
power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation.4

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to
respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad
testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY
ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain
investigation pending therein."

Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court
of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.
On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining
the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons
acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-
finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt
proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed
on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity.6

As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the
authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the
organization and the analysis of evidence.7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only
for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for
determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than
illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done.8 An administrative agency may be
authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in
proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial
nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely
investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings
to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive
Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths,
and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of
documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions
and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power
operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e),
and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b),
(e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the
creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service.
To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions
would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under 
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5)
fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see
no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the
Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of
documents under a subpoena duces tecumor otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same
restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly
seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case
must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with
the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued
by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an administrative
subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial
subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To
an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the
subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does
not appear. 15
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or
not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of
a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of
violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be
for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a
pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot
rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully
authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some
helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be
relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the
laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the
power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it
is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too
may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be
stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of
the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn
statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous
transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from
respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to
the investigations.

We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations,
generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that
since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the
forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in
nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the
same approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could
possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present
case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely
cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City
Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines
or to file the corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis
of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. 30Anyway, by all means,
respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his
privilege against self-incrimination.

A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of
the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral
way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No.
88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly
said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the
issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule
is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it. 35

Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista
to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and
declared of no force and effect.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the result.

Barredo, Makasiar, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ, took no part.

  

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the
current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses
worth in this jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises
that of 
Davis1 and that of Jaffe.2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion.3 A
similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz,4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt.5 A
concurrence is thus called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a
person who may be involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the
expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute
be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the
position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to
such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion.

1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The
broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so
far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United
States v. Morton Salt 
Co.,7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American
case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be
of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the
investigatory power. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is
within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably
relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought
shall not be unreasonable.""8 It has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent
adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs
preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad
into the right of search and seizure is now permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds
that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures
and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is unnecessary here to examine the question of
whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let
alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined
literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of
process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct
their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the
name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a
right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society,
from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced
measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by
nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy
themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered
clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon
this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been
cited in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but
precisely adhering to its command. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of
corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent
Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and
seizure, he is not without a remedy.

2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court:
"Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary
extension of the privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally
deserving of the utmost deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of
the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. 14 There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph:
"Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that
tends to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called
as a witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v.
Gil, 16 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any
modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor
compels the statement, however, that for me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A
distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully
considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr.
decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus compelled
to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is not ruled out
in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets
aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require
respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials
similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of
anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers."1

While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO,2 on the
basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that
"he is merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and
irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the
President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges",3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at
bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes
subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn
statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding
investigation."4

Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the
PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of
Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of
other city officials named and unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is
the sworn statement of one Carlos Montañez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to
the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named
respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."

All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements
(which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of
the hearing 5) show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely
witnesses but in reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.)

Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan,6 wherein the Court through then Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as
against the order of the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged
unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position
was virtually that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and
ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him.
Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of
injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a
malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right
of the accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness
stand."8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed,
such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high
sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To
quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions
stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force
or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its
identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to
surrender to his detriment."

That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and
effect criminal in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is
borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that
on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montañez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1,
petition, supra, 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal
Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross
overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City.

The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of
investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege
(against self-incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law:
respondent was in factbeing investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation
was actually criminally charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has
recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by
expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silentand to counsel, and to be informed of
such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in violation of said
section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.

Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in
securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was
unquestionably a party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to
remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This
legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a
supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing
expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from
respondent court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the
injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions." This contention has of course
been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in
court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding investigation" and
subpoenas.

The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must
ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional
guarantees of the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and
unreasonable search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed
up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the
petitioner's executive charter 12 and the evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and
as conceded in the petition itself, after the corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding
charges against the persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices
such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in other cases." 13
There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its
executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find no need,
however, of going further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that
respondent Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime
suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain
silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand.

I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the
current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses
worth in this jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises
that of 
Davis1 and that of Jaffe.2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion.3 A
similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz,4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt.5 A
concurrence is thus called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a
person who may be involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the
expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute
be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the
position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to
such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion.

1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The
broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so
far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United
States v. Morton Salt 
Co.,7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American
case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be
of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the
investigatory power. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is
within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably
relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought
shall not be unreasonable.""8 It has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent
adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs
preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad
into the right of search and seizure is now permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds
that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures
and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is unnecessary here to examine the question of
whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let
alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined
literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of
process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct
their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the
name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a
right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society,
from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced
measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by
nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy
themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered
clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon
this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been
cited in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but
precisely adhering to its command. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of
corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent
Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and
seizure, he is not without a remedy.

2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court:
"Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary
extension of the privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally
deserving of the utmost deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of
the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. 14 There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph:
"Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that
tends to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called
as a witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v.
Gil, 16 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any
modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor
compels the statement, however, that for me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A
distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully
considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr.
decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus compelled
to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is not ruled out
in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets
aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require
respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials
similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of
anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers."1

While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO,2 on the
basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that
"he is merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and
irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the
President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges",3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at
bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes
subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn
statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding
investigation."4

Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the
PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of
Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of
other city officials named and unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is
the sworn statement of one Carlos Montañez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to
the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named
respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."

All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements
(which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of
the hearing 5) show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely
witnesses but in reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.)

Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan,6 wherein the Court through then Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as
against the order of the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged
unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position
was virtually that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and
ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him.

Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of
injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a
malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right
of the accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness
stand."8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed,
such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high
sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To
quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions
stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force
or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its
identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to
surrender to his detriment."

That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and
effect criminal in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is
borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that
on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montañez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1,
petition, supra, 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal
Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross
overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City.

The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of
investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege
(against self-incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law:
respondent was in factbeing investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation
was actually criminally charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has
recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by
expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silentand to counsel, and to be informed of
such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in violation of said
section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.

Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in
securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was
unquestionably a party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to
remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This
legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a
supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing
expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from
respondent court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the
injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions." This contention has of course
been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in
court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding investigation" and
subpoenas.

The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must
ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional
guarantees of the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and
unreasonable search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed
up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the
petitioner's executive charter 12 and the evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and
as conceded in the petition itself, after the corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding
charges against the persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices
such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in other cases." 13

There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its
executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find no need,
however, of going further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that
respondent Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime
suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain
silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand.

I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.

G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995

GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner, 

vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA,
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, and HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J.
LIWAG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case requires us to determine the extent to which the Ombudsman may call upon government
prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his
office and the conditions under which he may do so.

Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and
the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the
Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of
duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial
Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed under preventive suspension. This is a petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with
respect to the two proceedings.

The background of this case is as follows:

On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a
criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. 1 The
cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas where they were docketed as OMB-
VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively.

The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found
no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After
reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the
recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the
Regional Trial Court.2

Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Arturo
C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the "filing of
appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, . . ." 3 The case was eventually
assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.

It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that
only acts of lasciviousness had been committed.4 With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of lasciviousness against Mayor
Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe. 5

In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994, Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to any action taken on the previous referral of the case, more
specifically the directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.6

As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman
Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show
cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful
directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. 7

For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor
were given until August 3, 1994 within which to submit their answer. 8 An answer 9 was timely filed
by them and hearings were thereupon conducted.

It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two prosecutors with
the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One
was an administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil
Service Law) 10 and another one was a criminal complaint for violation of §3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code. 11 The complaints were based on the alleged refusal
of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with
attempted rape.

In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas

Mojica issued an order on August 15, 1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial
Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6)
months, 12 pursuant to Rule III, §9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to §24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting Secretary of
Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of Region VII as Acting Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu.

On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders 13 in the two
cases, directing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and
controverting evidence.

On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition to set aside the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of
Justice:

(a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica
and related orders, referring to the Office of the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor the
records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0140, entitled Jessica V. Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrisimo, "for filing of the appropriate action (for Attempted Rape) with the Regional
Trial Court of Danao City.

(b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and related orders
directing petitioner and Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in
writing within three (3) days from receipt why they should not be punished for indirect
Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing . . . to file the
appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.

(c) The 1st Indorsement dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J.

Liwag, ordering the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of
the Office of the Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against
respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in recognition of the authority of said Office.

(d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by
Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189,
entitled Julian Menchavez vs. Oliveros Kintanar and Gloria Lastimosa, placing
petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for a
period of six (6) months, without pay.

(e) The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag
directing Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to
implement the letter dated August 15, 1994 of Ombudsman Vasquez, together with
the Order dated August 15, 1994, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar under preventive suspension.

(f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994,
designating Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu.

Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not necessarily in the order they are
stated in the petition.
 I.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on
the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor
Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa claims that the Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have
concurrent authority to investigate public officers or employees and that when the former first took
cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then
became the duty of the Ombudsman's office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary
investigation by filing the information in court instead of asking the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation and filing of the information were part
and parcel of the preliminary investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the filing
of information in court could not be delegated by it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Petitioner defends her actuations in conducting a preliminary investigation as having been made
necessary by the insistence of the Ombudsman to delegate the filing of the case to her office.

In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case
against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public
office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders
and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate
and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime
committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related
to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or
omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public
official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.

In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance.
§31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:

Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the

personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or
lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist
in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized
to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.
(Emphasis added)

It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman
Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape
against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo.

It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary
investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file
the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would
still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under §31 of the
Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control"
of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct,
review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her
own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.

II.

The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an
information for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the
complaint in the case she found that he had committed only acts of lasciviousness.
§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for
contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an
administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner
herself says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an
information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.

Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience
or resistance of a lawful process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for
indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 of the Rules of Court is for respondents to determine after
appropriate hearing. At this point it is important only to note the existence of the contempt power of
the Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful orders.

III.

Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be
found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the
Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension. The pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state:

§21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the

Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials
of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only
by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

§22. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment
the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall
not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

A.

Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because,
at any rate, the evidence against them is not strong as required by §24. The contention is without
merit. Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia: 17

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the
administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment
or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a
preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending
an officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his
innocence. (Emphasis added).
It is true that, under §24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive suspension of a public
official, the evidence against him should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is
present:

(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;

(b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 18 however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the
determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary
hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar
argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case:

The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the

discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the
"judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. . . . 19

In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension of
petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar on the following grounds:

A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein cases and the
records pertaining thereto against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and
herein petitioner] clearly leads to the conclusion that the evidence on record of guilt is
strong and the charges involved offenses of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty
and dishonesty which will warrant respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and
herein petitioner] removal from the service. Moreover, considering the unabashed
attitude of respondents in openly announcing various false pretexts and alibis to
justify their stubborn disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman as their
official position in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in print and
broadcast media, the probability is strong that public service more particularly in the
prosecution of cases referred by the Office of the Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial
Prosecutor's office will be disrupted and prejudiced and the records of said cases
even be tampered with if respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein
petitioner] are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's Office during the
pendency of these proceedings.

Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the
preventive suspension of petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the
administrative complaint against them were done in the course of their official transaction with the
Office of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the
prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman
did not have to go far to verify the matters alleged in determine whether the evidence of guilt of
petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the purpose of placing them under preventive
suspension.

Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case
against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper
prosecution of that case may not be hampered.20 In addition, because the charges against the two
prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if
proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their
preventive suspension.

B.
Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and contends that it
should only be for ninety (90) days on the basis of cases decided by this Court. Petitioner is in error.
She is referring to cases where the law is either silent or expressly limits the period of suspension to
ninety (90) days. With respect to the first situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga v.
Sandiganbayan 21 that —

To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under
Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the
guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth the rules on the period of
preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as follows:

1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be
limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this
applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are
validly charged under said Act.

2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all
officers or employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided
under Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807, and shall be limited to a maximum
period of ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in the
disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of delay shall both be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a
presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable
time as the circumstances of the case may warrant.

On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive
suspension pursuant to §24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive
suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay." Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus
according to law.

C.

Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved before any
action in the administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt case involves a
prejudicial question. There is simply no basis for this contention. The two cases arose out of the
same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before the other.
Whatever order is followed will not really matter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of
Preventive Suspension is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan
and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Romero, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

REGALADO, J., concurring:
I concur and welcome this opportunity to make some observations on the matter of the power of the
Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioner for six (6) months without pay, and which petitioner
assails in the case at bar.

It would, of course, be a handy expedient to just refer petitioner to the provisions of Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6770 which expressly grants that authority to respondent Ombudsman.
Conveniently, we would merely need to remind petitioner that for this Court to limit such authority to
suspend to a lesser period would, in effect, be constitutive of judicial legislation. But I will go a little
further by essaying the rationale for such conferment of a more extended authority to the
Ombudsman on the issue of preventive suspension, vis-a-visthe provisions on preventive
suspension in other enactments, and thereby dispel lingering doubts or misgivings thereon.

It is true that the Civil Service Decree allows a maximum preventive suspension of only ninety (90)
days. 1However, a comparison of the grounds therefor2 with those provided for in the Ombudsman
Act 3 will readily show that there is in the latter the added requirement that the evidence of guilt is
strong and the additional ground that "the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
case filed against him." Further, in the aforecited Section 41 of the Civil Service Decree, preventive
suspension may be imposed on the mere simple showing that the charge involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service:
whereas in Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, it is required that such charges must be supported
by strong evidence of guilt in order to justify preventive suspension.

On the other hand, the still shorter period of sixty (60) days prescribed in the Local Government
Code of 1991 4 as the maximum period for the preventive suspension of local elective officials is
justifiable and deemed sufficient not only because the respondent involved is elected by the people,
but more precisely because such preventive suspension may only be ordered "after the issues are
joined." That means that before the order of suspension is issued, all the preliminary requirements
and exchanges had been completed and the respondent had already filed his counter-affidavits to
the affidavits of the complainant and the latter's witnesses. At that stage, the case is ready for
resolution if the parties would not opt for a formal hearing.

The preparatory procedures before such stage is reached undoubtedly necessitate and consume a
lot of time. Yet, it will be noted that those preliminary steps are included in the case of the period of
preventive suspension ordered even before issues are joined, as in preventive suspension by the
Ombudsman pursuant to the aforecited Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770. They conceivably
include the service of the subpoena or order for the respondent to file his counter-affidavits, the
usual resort to motions for extension of time to comply with the same, the improvident recourse to
the Supreme Court to suspend, annul or otherwise delay the proceedings, as well as the filing and
resolution of motions to dismiss or for a bill of particulars or for the inhibition of the investigating
officer, the denial of which motions is often also brought all over again to this Court on petitions
for certiorari.

An illustration of how the proceedings can be delayed by such procedural maneuvers is afforded by
the case of Buenaseda, et al. vs. Flavier, et al.,5 the decision in which was ultimately promulgated
by this Court on September 21, 1993. The petitioners therein questioned through repeated
resourceful submissions the order of preventive suspension issued by the Ombudsman on January
7, 1992 and it took more than twenty (20) months before said order could eventually be reviewed on
the merits and finally sustained by the Supreme Court.

That is not all. Even after the formal hearing is scheduled, respondents can easily resort to the
same dilatory tactics usually employed by an accused in regular court trials in criminal actions. Such
stratagems can obviously result in the continued occupancy by the respondent of his office and, in
the language of the law, could "prejudice the case filed against him."

The longer period of six (6) months for preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 6770 was
evidently induced by a desire to more meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of the
Office of the Ombudsman over public officials and employees in order to serve as a deterrent
against illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient conduct on their part. As the agency mandated by the
Constitution to undertake such task, it was invested with the corresponding authority to enable it to
perform its mission. This intention is easily deducible from the pertinent constitutional provisions
creating said office and from the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6770. Significantly, it is the
only body authorized to investigate even officials removable by impeachment.6

For purposes of the present case, therefore, and specifically on the issue subject of this concurring
opinion, it would be advisable to recall what we said in Buenaseda, to wit:

The purpose of RA No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may
need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being
the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be
given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objective of the
Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should
be avoided.

A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be

liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for
Department of which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas
Louisiana Gas, Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. [2d] 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206
Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 [1934]).

On the foregoing considerations, which are much a matter of judicial and legislative experience, it is
puerile for petitioner to impugn the expanded authority of preventive suspension as now granted by
law to the Ombudsman. In fact, in certain situations, the maximum allowable period may even prove
too short to subserve the intended purpose of the law.

Separate Opinions

REGALADO, J., concurring:

I concur and welcome this opportunity to make some observations on the matter of the power of the
Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioner for six (6) months without pay, and which petitioner
assails in the case at bar.

It would, of course, be a handy expedient to just refer petitioner to the provisions of Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6770 which expressly grants that authority to respondent Ombudsman.
Conveniently, we would merely need to remind petitioner that for this Court to limit such authority to
suspend to a lesser period would, in effect, be constitutive of judicial legislation. But I will go a little
further by essaying the rationale for such conferment of a more extended authority to the
Ombudsman on the issue of preventive suspension, vis-a-visthe provisions on preventive
suspension in other enactments, and thereby dispel lingering doubts or misgivings thereon.

It is true that the Civil Service Decree allows a maximum preventive suspension of only ninety (90)
days. 1However, a comparison of the grounds therefor2 with those provided for in the Ombudsman
Act 3 will readily show that there is in the latter the added requirement that the evidence of guilt is
strong and the additional ground that "the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
case filed against him." Further, in the aforecited Section 41 of the Civil Service Decree, preventive
suspension may be imposed on the mere simple showing that the charge involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service:
whereas in Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, it is required that such charges must be supported
by strong evidence of guilt in order to justify preventive suspension.

On the other hand, the still shorter period of sixty (60) days prescribed in the Local Government
Code of 1991 4 as the maximum period for the preventive suspension of local elective officials is
justifiable and deemed sufficient not only because the respondent involved is elected by the people,
but more precisely because such preventive suspension may only be ordered "after the issues are
joined." That means that before the order of suspension is issued, all the preliminary requirements
and exchanges had been completed and the respondent had already filed his counter-affidavits to
the affidavits of the complainant and the latter's witnesses. At that stage, the case is ready for
resolution if the parties would not opt for a formal hearing.

The preparatory procedures before such stage is reached undoubtedly necessitate and consume a
lot of time. Yet, it will be noted that those preliminary steps are included in the case of the period of
preventive suspension ordered even before issues are joined, as in preventive suspension by the
Ombudsman pursuant to the aforecited Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770. They conceivably
include the service of the subpoena or order for the respondent to file his counter-affidavits, the
usual resort to motions for extension of time to comply with the same, the improvident recourse to
the Supreme Court to suspend, annul or otherwise delay the proceedings, as well as the filing and
resolution of motions to dismiss or for a bill of particulars or for the inhibition of the investigating
officer, the denial of which motions is often also brought all over again to this Court on petitions
for certiorari.

An illustration of how the proceedings can be delayed by such procedural maneuvers is afforded by
the case of Buenaseda, et al. vs. Flavier, et al.,5 the decision in which was ultimately promulgated
by this Court on September 21, 1993. The petitioners therein questioned through repeated
resourceful submissions the order of preventive suspension issued by the Ombudsman on January
7, 1992 and it took more than twenty (20) months before said order could eventually be reviewed on
the merits and finally sustained by the Supreme Court.

That is not all. Even after the formal hearing is scheduled, respondents can easily resort to the
same dilatory tactics usually employed by an accused in regular court trials in criminal actions. Such
stratagems can obviously result in the continued occupancy by the respondent of his office and, in
the language of the law, could "prejudice the case filed against him."

The longer period of six (6) months for preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 6770 was
evidently induced by a desire to more meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of the
Office of the Ombudsman over public officials and employees in order to serve as a deterrent
against illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient conduct on their part. As the agency mandated by the
Constitution to undertake such task, it was invested with the corresponding authority to enable it to
perform its mission. This intention is easily deducible from the pertinent constitutional provisions
creating said office and from the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6770. Significantly, it is the
only body authorized to investigate even officials removable by impeachment.6

For purposes of the present case, therefore, and specifically on the issue subject of this concurring
opinion, it would be advisable to recall what we said in Buenaseda, to wit:

The purpose of RA No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may
need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being
the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be
given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objective of the
Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should
be avoided.

A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be

liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for
Department of which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas
Louisiana Gas, Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. [2d] 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206
Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 [1934]).

On the foregoing considerations, which are much a matter of judicial and legislative experience, it is
puerile for petitioner to impugn the expanded authority of preventive suspension as now granted by
law to the Ombudsman. In fact, in certain situations, the maximum allowable period may even prove
too short to subserve the intended purpose of the law.
[ GR No. 186502, Dec 13, 2017 ]

CARLOS R. SAUNAR v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA +

DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 20 October 2008 Decision [1] and the
17 February 2009 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100157 which affirmed the
19 January 2007 decision[3] of the Office of the President (OP) dismissing petitioner Carlos R. Saunar
(Saunar) from government service.
THE FACTS
Saunar was a former Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which he joined as an
agent in 1988. Through the years, he rose from the ranks and eventually became the Chief of the Anti-Graft
Division. During his time as chief of the said division, Saunar conducted an official investigation regarding
the alleged corruption relative to the tobacco excise taxes and involving then Governor Luis "Chavit"
Singson, former President Joseph E. Estrada (President Estrada), and former Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
President Estrada's assailed involvement in the tobacco excise tax issue became one of the predicate
crimes included in his indictment for plunder.[4]
In Special Order No. 4003[5] dated 27 August 2004, Saunar was reassigned as regional director for Western
Mindanao based in Zamboanga City. During his stint as such, he received a subpoena ad
testificandum from the Sandiganbayan requiring him to testify in the plunder case against President
Estrada. After securing approval from his immediate supervisor Filomeno Bautista (Bautista), Deputy
Director for Regional Operation Services (DDROS), Saunar appeared before the Sandiganbayan on
several hearing dates, the last being on 27 October 2004.[6]
On 29 October 2004, then NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco (Wycoco) issued Special Order No.
005033[7]informing Saunar that he was relieved from his duties as regional director for Western Mindanao
and was ordered to report to the DDROS for further instructions. Pursuant thereto, he reported to Bautista
on the first week of November 2004. Bautista informed Saunar that an investigation was being conducted
over his testimony before the Sandiganbayan and that he should just wait for the developments in the
investigation. In the meantime, Bautista did not assign him any duty and told him to be available at any time
whenever he would be needed. He made himself accessible by staying in establishments near the NBI. In
addition, he also attended court hearings whenever required.[8]
On 6 October 2006, Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
requiring him to answer the allegations against him in the PAGC Formal Charge dated 3 October 2006. The
charge was based on a letter, dated 19 August 2005, from Wycoco recommending an immediate
appropriate action against Saunar for his failure to report for work since 24 March 2005, without approved
leave of absence for four (4) months.[9]
On 23 October 2006, Saunar was reassigned as regional director of the Bicol Regional Office. On 29
January 2007, he received a copy of the OP decision dismissing him from service.
The OP Decision
In its 19 January 2007 decision, the OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and dismissed him from service. It pointed out that Saunar
failed to report for work for more than a year which he himself admitted when he explained that he did not
report for work because he had not been assigned any specific duty or responsibility. The OP highlighted
that he was clearly instructed to report to the DDROS but he did not do so. It added that it would have been
more prudent for Saunar to have reported for work even if no duty was specifically assigned to him, for the
precise reason that he may at any time be tasked with responsibilities. The OP, however, absolved Saunar
from allegedly keeping government property during the time he did not report for work, noting that he was
able to account for all the items attributed to him. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and as recommended by PAGC, Atty. Carlos R. Saunar, Regional
Director, NBI, for Gross Neglect of Duty under Section 22(b), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of EO 292 in relation to Section 4(A) of RA 6713 and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is
hereby DISMISSED from government service with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and disqualification for re-employment in the government service.[10]

Saunar moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the OP in its 12 June 2007 resolution.
[11]
 Undeterred, he appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed 20 October 2008 decision, the CA affirmed in toto the OP decision. The appellate court ruled
that Saunar was not deprived of due process because he was informed of the charges against him and was
given the opportunity to defend himself. It expounded that the absence of formal hearings in administrative
proceedings is not anathema to due process.
On the other hand, the CA agreed that Saunar was guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty as manifested by his
being on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) for a long period of time. The appellate court disregarded
Saunar's explanation that he stayed in establishments nearby and that he had attended court hearings from
time to time. In addition, the CA found that Saunar violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 because public
interest was prejudiced when he continued to receive his salary in spite of his unjustified absences. Thus, it
ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition for review filed in this case is
hereby DENIED and, consequently, DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision of the
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita dated January 19, 2007 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[12]

Saunar moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its assailed 17 February 2009 resolution.
Hence, this appeal raising the following:
ISSUES
I
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT
DENIED DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO
SECURITY OF TENURE AS GUARANTEED IN THE CONSTITUTION; AND
II

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAELS GRAVELY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENTS THAT PETITIONER
COMMITTED GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, HAD ABANDONED HIS POST AND WENT ON AWOL FOR
HIS ALLEGED FAILURE TO REPORT FOR WORK FROM MARCH 24, 2005 TO MAY 2006. [13]

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is meritorious.
Administrative due process 
revisited
Saunar bewails that he was deprived of due process, pointing out that no real hearing was ever conducted
considering that the clarificatory conference conducted by the PAGC was a sham. In addition, he asserts
that he was not notified of the charges against him because he was only made aware of the allegations
after the PAGC had formally charged him. Further, Saunar highlights the delay between the time PAGC
received Wycoco's letter-complaint and when he received the formal charge from the PAGC.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution is similar with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the American
Constitution in that it guarantees that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. While the words used in our Constitution slightly differ from the American Constitution, the
guarantee of due process is used in the same sense and has the same force and effect.[14] Thus, while
decisions on due process of American courts are not controlling in our jurisdiction, they may serve as
guideposts in the analysis of due process as applied in our legal system.
In American jurisprudence, the due process requirement entails the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.[15] Likewise, it was characterized with fluidity in that it negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.[16]
In Goldberg v. Kelly (Goldberg),[17] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court ruled that due process requires
the opportunity for welfare recipients to confront the witnesses against them at a pre-termination hearing
before welfare benefits are terminated, to wit:
The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard. It is not enough that a welfare recipient may present his position to the decision maker in writing or
second hand through his caseworker. x x x Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral
presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker
appears to regard as important. Particularly where credibility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in
many termination proceedings, written submissions are wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.

In Goldberg, the U.S. Supreme Court went on to highlight the importance of confronting the witnesses
presented against the claimant, viz:
In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. x x x What we said in Greene v McElroy,
360 US 474, 496-497, 3 Led 2d 1377, 1390, 1391, 79 S Ct 1400 (1959), is particularly pertinent here:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where
governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact
findings the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it
is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might
be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance,
prejudice or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-
examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment . . . This Court has be
zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, but also in all
types of cases where administrative actions were under scrutiny.

Welfare recipients must therefore be given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
relied on by the department.[18]

In subsequent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that a lack of formal hearing in the administrative
level does not violate procedural due process. In Arnett v. Kennedy (Arnett),[19] a case involving the
dismissal of a non-probationary federal employee, the US Supreme Court ruled that a trial-type hearing
before an impartial hearing officer was not necessary before the employee could be removed from office
because the hearing afforded by administrative appeal procedures after the actual dismissal is a sufficient
requirement of the Due Process Clause.
In Mathews v. Eldridge (Mathews),[20] the U.S. Supreme Court explained that an evidentiary hearing prior to
termination of disability benefits is not indispensable, to wit:
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of
subsistence:
The crucial factor in this context x x x is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over
eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.

Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon financial need. x x x
xxxx
All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the "capacities
and circumstances of those who are to be heard to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to
present their case. In assessing what process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the
good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare
programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of
individuals. This is especially so where, as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant
with an effective process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative action, but also assure a right to
an evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the denial of his claim becomes
final.[21]

It is true that in both Arnett and Mathews, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that due process. was not violated
due to the lack of a formal hearing before the employee was dismissed and welfare benefits were cancelled
in the respective cases. Nevertheless, in both cases it was recognized that the aggrieved party had the
opportunity for a hearing to settle factual or evidentiary disputes in subsequent procedures. In our legal
system, however, the opportunity for a hearing after the administrative level may not arise as the reception
of evidence or the conduct of hearings are discretionary on the part of the appellate courts.
In our jurisdiction, the constitutional guarantee of due process is also not limited to an exact definition.[22] It
is flexible in that it depends on the circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of
the situation.[23]
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations,[24] the Court eruditely expounded on
the concept of due process in administrative proceedings, to wit:
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice
Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and property of
the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice
Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in
Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.)
This principle emanate from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.
R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S.
142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.) "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor
Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-stillwater Knitting Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) ... The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that
the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would
not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24
S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U.
S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274,
288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50
S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure
does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.
S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of
investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or
agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a
provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions
as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the
exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular
heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the
United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is
no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.[25]
(emphases supplied)

From the pronouncements of the Court in Ang Tibay, the fluid concept of administrative due process
continued to progress. In In Re: De Borja and Flores,[26] the Court ruled that there was no denial of due
process when the Public Service Commission cancelled the certificate of Jose de Borja to operate an ice
plant without prior notice or hearing because a hearing was conducted after the applicant filed a motion for
reconsideration. In Manila Trading Supply Co. v. Philippine Labor Union,[27] the Court ruled that due
process was observed even if the report of the investigating officer was not set for hearing before the Court
of Industrial Relations because during the investigation stage, the parties were given the opportunity to
cross-examine and present their side to the case. It is noteworthy that in both cases due process was
observed because the parties were given the chance for a hearing where they could confront the witnesses
against them.
In Gas Corporation of the Phils. v. Minister Inciong,[28] the Court explained that there is no denial of due
process when a party is afforded the right to cross-examine the witnesses but fails to exercise the same, to
wit:

1. The vigor with which counsel for petitioner pressed the claim that there was a denial of procedural
due process is inversely proportional to the merit of this certiorari and prohibition suit as is quite
evident from the Comment of the office of the Solicitor General. It is undoubted that the due
process mandate must be satisfied by an administrative tribunal or agency. So it was
announced by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations. That is still good law. It follows, therefore, that if procedural due process were in fact
denied, then this petition must prosper.It is equally well-settled, however, that the standard of
due process that must be met in proceedings before administrative tribunals allows a certain
latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored. So the following recent cases have
uniformly held: Maglasang v. Ople, Nation Multi Service Labor Union v. Agcaoili, Jacqueline
Industries v. National Labor Relations Commission, Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v.
Bureau of Labor Relations, Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, and
Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation. From the Comment of the office of the Solicitor
General, it is quite clear that no imputation of arbitrariness can be justified. The opportunity to
present its side of the case was given both parties to the controversy. If, for reasons best
known to itself, petitioner did not avail of its right to do so, then it has only itself to blame.
No constitutional infirmity could then be imputed to the proceeding before the labor arbiter.
[29]
 (emphasis supplied)

Again, there was no denial of due process in the above-mentioned case because the parties were
ultimately given the chance to confront the witnesses against them. It just so happened that therein
petitioner failed to promptly avail of the same.
In Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission (Arboleda),[30] the Court expounded that administrative
due process does not necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings, to wit:
The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial
proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases decided by this Court. Actual adversarial proceedings
become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to
witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is a procedural right which the employee must ask for
since it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be conducted thereon.[31](emphasis
supplied)

Thus, while the Court in Arboleda recognized that the lack of a formal hearing does not necessarily
transgress the due process guarantee, it did not however regard the formal hearing as a mere superfluity. It
continued that it is a procedural right that may be invoked by the party. It is true that in subsequent cases,
[32]
 the Court reiterated that a formal hearing is not obligatory in administrative proceedings because the due
process requirement is satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to explain their respective sides
through position papers or pleadings. Nonetheless, the idea that a formal hearing is not indispensable
should not be hastily thrown around by administrative bodies.
A closer perusal of past jurisprudence shows that the Court did not intend to trivialize the conduct of a
formal hearing but merely afforded latitude to administrative bodies especially in cases where a party fails
to invoke the right to hearing or is given the opportunity but opts not to avail of it. In the landmark case
of Ang Tibay, the Court explained that administrative bodies are free from a strict application of technical
rules of procedure and are given sufficient leeway. In the said case, however, nothing was said that the
freedom included the setting aside of a hearing but merely to allow matters which would ordinarily be
incompetent or inadmissible in the usual judicial proceedings.
In fact, the seminal words of Ang Tibay manifest a desire for administrative bodies to exhaust all possible
means to ensure that the decision rendered be based on the accurate appreciation of facts. The Court
reminded that administrative bodies have the active duty to use the authorized legal methods of
securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. As such, it
would be more in keeping with administrative due process that the conduct of a hearing be the general rule
rather than the exception.
The observance of a formal hearing in administrative tribunal or bodies other than judicial is not novel.
In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company,[33] the Court opined that in illegal dismissal
cases, a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory when requested by the employee in writing, or
substantial evidentiary disputes exists, or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar
circumstances justify it.
In Joson v. Executive Secretary Torres (Joson),[34] the Court ruled that the respondent was denied due
process after he was deprived of the right to a formal investigation with the opportunity to face the
witnesses against him, to wit:
The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of
A.O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the
parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the
Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be
conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he is
accorded several rights under the law, to wit:
xxxx
Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was
decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against
elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the
Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after
formal investigation and hearing. A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to
dispense with a hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in
contrast but contradictory to each other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Position papers are often-times prepared with the
assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation can make the discovery of truth difficult. The
jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to
appointive officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective government
officials are not exactly similar to those against appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to
elective local officials are separate and distinct from appointive government officers and employees. This
can be gleaned from the Local Government Code itself.[35] (emphases and underlining supplied)

Thus, administrative bodies should not simply brush aside the conduct of formal hearings and claim that
due process was observed by merely relying on position papers and/or affidavits. Besides, the Court
in Josonrecognized the inherent limitations of relying on position papers alone as the veracity of its
contents cannot be readily ascertained. Through the examination and cross-examination of witnesses,
administrative bodies would be in a better position to ferret out the truth and in turn, render a more accurate
decision.
In any case, the PAGC violated Saunar's right to due process because it failed to observe fairness in
handling the case against him. Its unfairness and unreasonableness is readily apparent with its disregard of
its own rules of procedure.
The procedure to be observed in cases of clarificatory hearings is set forth under the PAGC rules of
procedure. Rule III, Section 3 of its 2002 New Rules of Procedure states:
SECTION 3. Action After Respondent's Response.— If, upon evaluation of the documents submitted by
both parties, it should appear either that the charge or charges have been satisfactorily traversed by the
respondent in his Counter-Affidavit/verified Answer, or that the Counter-Affidavit/verified Answer does not
tender a genuine issue, the Commissioner assigned shall forthwith, or after a clarificatory hearing to
ascertain the authenticity and/or significance of the relevant documents, submit for adoption by the
Commission the appropriate recommendation to the President.
The Commissioner assigned may, at his sole discretion, set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to
the parties or their witnesses if he or she believes that there are matters which need to be inquired into
personally by him or her. In said hearing, the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If they so desire, they may submit
written questions to the Commissioner assigned who may propound such questions to the parties
or witnesses concerned. Thereafter, the parties be required, to file with the Commission, within an
inextendible period of five (5) days and serve on the adverse party his verified Position Paper. (emphasis
and underlining supplied)

On the other hand, the 2008 Rules of Procedure amended the said provision to read as follows:
SECTION 7. Clarificatory Hearings and Position Papers. - After the filing of the Answer, the Commission
may, at its discretion, conduct Clarificatory Hearings, in which case, subpoenas may be issued for the
purpose. Should a Clarificatory Hearing be conducted, all parties relevant to the case shall be notified at
least five (5) days before the date thereof. Failure of a party to appear at the hearing is not necessarily a
cause for the dismissal of the complaint. A party who appears may be allowed to present evidence, even in
the absence of the adverse party who was duly notified of the hearing.
During a Clarificatory Hearing, the Commission or the Hearing Officer, as the case may be, shall ask
clarificatory questions to further elicit facts or information. The parties shall be afforded the opportunity
to be present and shall be allowed the assistance of counsel, but without the right to examine or
cross-examine the party/witness being questioned. The parties may be allowed to raise clarificatory
questions and elicit answers from the opposing party/witness, which shall be coursed through the
Commission or the Hearing Officer, as the case may be, for determination of whether or not the
proposed questions are necessary and relevant. In such cases, the Commission or the Hearing Officer,
as the case may be, shall ask the question in such manner and phrasing as may be deemed appropriate.
(emphasis and underlining supplied)
xxxx

Under the PAGC rules of procedure, it is crystal clear that the conduct of clarificatory hearings is
discretionary. Nevertheless, in the event that it finds the necessity to conduct one, there are rules to be
followed. One, the parties are to be notified of the clarificatory hearings. Two, the parties shall be afforded
the opportunity to be present in the hearings without the right to examine witnesses. They, however, may
ask questions and elicit answers from the opposing party coursed through the PAGC.
To reiterate, due process is a malleable concept anchored on fairness and equity. The due process
requirement before administrative bodies are not as strict compared to judicial tribunals in that it suffices
that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, such "reasonable opportunity"
should not be confined to the mere submission of position papers and/or affidavits and the parties must be
given the opportunity to examine the witnesses against them. The right to a hearing is a right which may be
invoked by the parties to thresh out substantial factual issues. It becomes even more imperative when the
rules itself of the administrative body provides for one. While the absence of a formal hearing does not
necessarily result in the deprivation of due process, it should be acceptable only when the party does not
invoke the said right or waives the same.
The Court finds that Saunar was not treated fairly in the proceedings before the PAGC. He was deprived of
the opportunity to appear in all clarificatory hearings since he was not notified of the clarificatory hearing
attended by an NBI official. Saunar was thus denied the chance to propound questions through the PAGC
against the opposing parties, when the rules of the PAGC itself granted Saunar the right to be present
during clarificatory hearings and the chance to ask questions against the opposing party.
Even assuming that Saunar was not deprived of due process, we still find merit in reversing his dismissal
from the government service.
Gross neglect of duty negated
by intent of the government 
employee concerned
It is true that the dropping from the rolls as a result of AWOL is not disciplinary in nature and does not result
in the forfeiture of benefits or disqualification from re-employment in the government.[36] Nevertheless, being
on AWOL may constitute other administrative offenses, which may result in the dismissal of the erring
employees and a forfeiture of retirement benefits.[37] In the case at bar, Saunar was charged with the
administrative offense of gross neglect of duty in view of his prolonged absence from work.
The OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
because he was on AWOL from March 2005 to May 2006. He, however, bewails that from the time we was
directed to report to the DDROS, he was never assigned a particular duty or responsibility. As such, Saunar
argues that he cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty because there was no "duty" to speak of. In
addition, he assails that he had made himself readily available because he stayed in establishments near
the NBI.
Gross Neglect of Duty, as an administrative offense, has been jurisprudentially defined. It refers to
negligence characterized by the glaring want of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is a duty to act, not inadvertently, but willfully and intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference
to consequences with respect to other persons who may be affected.[38]
When Saunar was relieved as regional director of Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the
DDROS, he was obligated to report to the said office. He, however, was not assigned any specific task or
duty and was merely advised to make himself readily available. Saunar often stayed in establishments near
the NBI because he was also not provided a specific station or office. The same, nonetheless, does not
establish that he willfully and intentionally neglected his duties especially since every time he was required
to attend court hearings through special orders issued by the NBI, he would do so. Clearly, Saunar never
manifested any intention to neglect or abandon his duties as an NBI official as he remained compliant with
the lawful orders given to him. In addition, when he received the order reassigning him as the regional
director for the NBI Bicol Office, he also obeyed the same. Saunar's continued compliance with the special
orders given to him by his superiors to attend court hearings negate the charge of gross neglect of duty as
it evinces a desire to fulfil the duties and responsibilities specifically assigned to him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, argues that Saunar's attendance at several court
hearings pursuant to special orders does not exculpate him from the charge of gross neglect of duty. As
highlighted by the OSG, the certificate of appearances Saunar presented account only for fourteen (14)
days.[39]
Notwithstanding, Saunar's conduct neither constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In order
to be liable for violating the said provision, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.[40] As discussed above, Saunar's action was not tantamount to
inexcusable or gross negligence considering that there was no intention to abandon his duty as an NBI
officer.
Illegally dismissed government
employees entitled to full back 
wages and retirement benefits
On 11 August 2014, Saunar reached the compulsory age of retirement from government service.[41] In view
of Saunar's retirement, reinstatement to his previous position had become impossible. Thus, the only
recourse left is to grant monetary benefits to which illegally dismissed government employees are entitled.
In Campol v. Balao-as,[42] the Court extensively expounded the rationale behind the grant of full back wages
to illegally dismissed employees, to wit:
An employee of the civil service who is invalidly dismissed is entitled to the payment of
backwages. While this right is not disputed, there have been variations in our jurisprudence as to the
proper fixing of the amount of backwages that should be awarded in these cases. We take this opportunity
to clarify the doctrine on this matter.
Ginson and Regis also involved the question of the proper fixing of backwages. Both cases awarded
backwages but limited it to a period of five years. Ginson does not provide for an exhaustive explanation for
this five-year cap. Regis, on the other hand, cites Cristobal v. Melchor, Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II,
32 Laganapan v. Asedillo, Antiporda v. Ticao, and San Luis v. Court of Appeals, in support of its ruling. We
note that these cases also do not clearly explain why there must be a cap for the award of backwages, with
the exception of Cristobal. In Cristobal, a 1977 case, we held that the award of backwages should be for a
fixed period of five years, applying by analogy the then prevailing doctrine in labor law involving employees
who suffered unfair labor practice. We highlight that this rule has been rendered obsolete by virtue of
Republic Act No. 6175 which amended the Labor Code. Under the Labor Code, employees illegally
dismissed are entitled to the payment of backwages from the time his or her compensation was withheld up
to the time of his or her actual reinstatement.
In 2005, our jurisprudence on backwages for illegally dismissed employees of the civil service veered away
from the ruling in Cristobal.
Thus, in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, we categorically declared—
An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and
other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and
just because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not
having left her office and should be given the corresponding compensation at the time of her reinstatement.

We repeated this ruling in the 2005 case Batangas State University v. Bonifacio, in the 2007
case Romagos v. Metro Cebu Water District, and in the 2010 case Civil Service Commission v. Magnaye,
Jr.
Thus, the Decision, in refusing to award backwages from Campol's dismissal until his actual reinstatement,
must be reversed. There is no legal nor jurisprudential basis for this ruling. An employee of the civil
service who is ordered reinstated is also entitled to the full payment of his or her backwages during
the entire period of time that he or she was wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of his
or her position and from enjoying its benefits. This is necessarily so because, in the eyes of the law, the
employee never truly left the office. Fixing the backwages to five years or to the period of time until the
employee found a new employment is not a full recompense for the damage done by the illegal
dismissal of an employee. Worse, it effectively punishes an employee for being dismissed without his or
her fault. In cases like this, the twin award of reinstatement and payment of full backwages are dictated by
the constitutional mandate to protect civil service employees' right to security of tenure. Anything less than
this falls short of the justice due to government employees unfairly removed from office. This is the
prevailing doctrine and should be applied in Campol's case.
This entitlement to full backwages also means that there is no need to deduct Campol's earnings from his
employment with PAO from the award. The right to receive full backwages means exactly this — that it
corresponds to Campol's salary at the time of his dismissal until his reinstatement. Any income he may
have obtained during the litigation of the case shall not be deducted from this amount. This is
consistent with our ruling that an employee illegally dismissed has the right to live and to find
employment elsewhere during the pendency of the case. At the same time, an employer who
illegally dismisses an employee has the obligation to pay him or her what he or she should have
received had the illegal act not be done. It is an employer's price or penalty for illegally dismissing an
employee.
xxxx
We rule that employees in the civil service should be accorded this same right. It is only by imposing
this rule that we will be able to uphold the constitutional right to security of tenure with full force and
effect. Through this, those who possess the power to dismiss employees in the civil service will be
reminded to be more circumspect in exercising their authority as a breach of an employee's right to
security of tenure will lead to the full application of law and jurisprudence to ensure that the
employee is reinstated and paid complete backwages. (emphasis supplied)

As it stands, Saunar should have been entitled to full back wages from the time he was illegally dismissed
until his reinstatement. In view of his retirement, however, reinstatement is no longer feasible. As such, the
back wages should be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his compulsory retirement.[43] In
addition, Saunar is entitled to receive the retirement benefits he should have received if he were not
illegally dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 20 October 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 100157 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Carlos R. Saunar is entitled to full back
wages from the time of his illegal dismissal until his retirement and to receive his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur. 
Bersamin, J., on official leave. 

January 11, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on December 13, 2017 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on January 11,
2018 at 10:20 a.m.
Very truly yours,
  (SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court 

G.R. No. 173590               December 9, 2013

PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISANTO G. DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
 DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated April 4, 2006 July 19, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88891 which reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated
November 23, 20044and January 6, 20055 of petitioner Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC), through its
then Postmaster General and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Dario C. Rama (PG Rama), finding that the
latter gravely abused its discretion when it revived the administrative charges against respondent Crisanto
G. De Guzman (De Guzman) despite their previous dismissal.

The Facts

Sometime in 1988, De Guzman, then a Postal Inspector at the Postal Services Office,6 was investigated by
Regional Postal Inspector Atty. Raul Q. Buensalida (Atty. Buensalida) in view of an anonymous complaint
charging him of dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.7 As a result
thereof, Atty. Buensalid are commended8 that De Guzman be formally charged with twelve (12) counts of
the same offenses and eventually be relieved from his post to protect the employees and witnesses from
harassment.

Since the Postal Services Office was then a line-agency of the Department of Transportation and
Communication(DOTC), Atty. Buensalida’s investigation report was forwarded to the said department’s
Investigation Security and Law Enforcement Staff (ISLES) for further evaluation and approval. Contrary to
the findings of Atty. Buensalida, however, the ISLES, through a Memorandum9dated February 26,
1990prepared by Director Antonio V. Reyes (Dir. Reyes), recommended that De Guzman be exonerated
from the charges against him due to lack of merit. The said recommendation was later approved by DOTC
Assistant Secretary Tagumpay R. Jardiniano (Asec. Jardiniano) in a Memorandum10 dated May 15, 1990.

On February 6, 1992, Republic Act No. (RA)7354,11 otherwise known as the ― ”Postal Service Act of
1992,” was passed. Pursuant to this law, the Postal Services Office under the DOTC was abolished, and all
its powers, duties, and rights were transferred to the PPC.12 Likewise, officials and employees of the Postal
Services Office were absorbed by the PPC.13

Subsequently, or on July 16, 1993, De Guzman, who had by then become Chief Postal Service Officer,
was formally charged14 by the PPC, through Postmaster General Eduardo P. Pilapil(PG Pilapil), for the
same acts of ―dishonesty, gross violation of regulations, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and the Anti-graft law, committed as follows”:

Investigation disclosed that while you were designated as Acting District Postal Inspector with assignment
at South Cotabato District, Postal Region XI, Davao City, you personally made unauthorized deductions
and/or cuttings from the ten (10%) percent salary differential for the months of January-March, 1988,when
you paid each of the employees of the post office at Surallah, South Cotabato, on the last week of April
1988, and you intentionally failed to give to Postmaster Juanito D. Dimaup, of the said post office his
differential amounting to ₱453.91, Philippine currency; that you demanded and required Letter Carrier
Benjamin Salero, of the aforestated post office to give fifty (₱50.00) pesos out of the aforesaid differential;
that you personally demanded, take away and encashed the salary differential check No. 008695317 in the
total amount of ₱1,585.67, Philippine currency, of Postmaster Benjamin C. Charlon, of the post office at
Lake Cebu, South Cotabato, for your own personal gain and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the
said postmaster; that you personally demanded, required and received from Postmaster Peniculita B.
Ledesma, of the post office of Sto. Niño, South Cotabato, the amount of ₱300.00, ₱200.00 and ₱100.00 for
hazard pay, COLA differential and contribution to the affair "Araw ng Kartero and Christmas Party,"
respectively; that you personally demanded and required Letter Carrier Feliciano Bayubay, of the post
office at General Santos City to give money in the amount of ₱1,000.00, Philippine Currency, as a condition
precedent for his employment in this Corporation, and you again demanded and personally received from
the said letter carrier the amount of ₱300.00 Philippine currency, as gift to the employees of the Civil
Service Commission, Davao City to facilitate the release of Bayubay’s appointment; that you demanded
and forced Postmaster Felipe Collamar, Jr.,of the post office at Maitum, South Cotabato to contribute
and/or produce one (1) whole Bariles fish for shesami (sic), and you also required and received from the
aforesaid postmaster the amount of ₱500.00 Philippine currency; that you demanded and required
Postmaster Diosdado B. Delfin to give imported wine and/or ₱700.00, Philippine currency, for gift to the
outgoing Regional Director Escalada; and that you failed to liquidate and return the substantial amount of
excess contributionson April, 1987, June, 1987 and December, 1987,for Postal Convention at MSU, arrival
of Postmaster General Banayo and Araw ng Kartero and Christmas Party, respectively, for your own
personal gain and benefit to the damage and prejudice of all the employees assigned at the
aforementioned district.

In a Decision15dated August 15, 1994, De Guzman was found guilty as charged and was dismissed from
the service. Pertinently, its dispositive reads that ―”[i]n the interest of the service, it is directed that this
decision be implemented immediately.”16

It appears, however, that the a fore-stated decision was not implemented until five (5) years later when
Regional Director Mama S. Lalanto (Dir. Lalanto) issued a Memorandum17 dated August 17, 1999 for this
purpose. De Guzman lost no time in filing a motion for reconsideration,18 claiming that: (a) the decision
sought to be implemented was recalled on August 29, 1994 by PG Pilapil himself; and (b)since the decision
had been dormant for more than five (5)years, it may not be revived without filing another formal charge.
The motion was, however, denied in a Resolution19 dated May 14, 2003, pointing out that De Guzman failed
to produce a copy of the alleged recall order even if he had been directed to do so.

Undaunted, De Guzman filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was resolved20 on June 2, 2003 in
his favor in that: (a) the Resolution dated May 14, 2003 denying De Guzman’s first motion for
Reconsideration was recalled; and (b) a formal hearing of the case was ordered to be conducted as soon
as possible. After due hearing, the PPC, through PG Rama, issued a Resolution21 dated November 23,
2004, finding De Guzman guilty of the charges against him and consequently dismissing him from the
service. It was emphasized therein that when De Guzman was formally charged on July 16, 1993, the
complainant was the PPC, which had its own charter and was no longer under the DOTC. Thus, the ISLES
Memorandum dated February 26, 1990 prepared by Dir. Reyes which endorsed the exoneration of De
Guzman and the dismissal of the complaints against him was merely recommendatory. As such, the filing
of the formal charge on July 16, 1993 was an obvious rejection of said recommendation.22

De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration was denied initially in a Resolution23 dated January 6, 2005, but
the motion was, at the same time, considered as an appeal to the PPC Board of Directors (Board).24 The
Board, however, required PG Rama to rule on the motion. Thus, in a Resolution25 dated May 10, 2005, PG
Rama pointed out that, being the third motion for reconsideration filed by De Guzman, the same was in
gross violation of the rules of procedure recognized by the PPC, as well as of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), which both allowed only one (1) such motion to be entertained.26 It was further held that res
judicata was unavailing as the decision exonerating De Guzman was ―”only a ruling after a fact-finding
investigation.” Hence, the same could not be considered as a dismissal on the merits but rather, a
dismissal made by an investigative body which was not clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial power.27

Meanwhile, before the issuance of the Resolution dated May 10, 2005, De Guzman elevated his case on
March 12, 200528 to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus,29 docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 88891, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in that: (a) the
case against him was a mere rehash of the previous complaint already dismissed by the DOTC, and
therefore, a clear violation of the rule on res judicata; (b) the assailed PPC Resolutions did not consider the
evidences submitted by De Guzman; (c) the uncorroborated, unsubstantiated and contradictory statements
contained in the affidavits presented became the bases of the assailed Resolutions; (d) the Resolution
dated November 23, 2004 affirmed a non-existent decision; (e) Atty. Buensalida was not a credible witness
and his testimony bore no probative value; and(f) the motion for reconsideration filed by De Guzman of the
Resolution dated November 23, 2004 is not the third motion for reconsideration filed by him.

On June 10, 2005, De Guzman appealed30 the Resolution dated May 10, 2005 before the PPC Board,
which resolution was allegedly received by De Guzman on May 26, 2005. Almost a year later, the Board
issued a Resolution31 dated May 25, 2006,denying the appeal and affirming with finality the Decision
dated August 15, 1994and the Resolution dated May 14, 2003. The motion for reconsideration
subsequently filed by De Guzman was likewise denied in aResolution32 dated June 29, 2006. On April 4,
2006, the CA rendered a Decision33 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88891, reversing the PPC Resolutions
dated November 23, 2004 and January 6, 2005, respectively. It held that the revival of the case against
De Guzman constituted grave abuse of discretion considering the clear and unequivocal content of the
Memorandum dated May 15, 1990 duly signed by Asec. Jardiniano that the complaint against De Guzman
was already dismissed.
Aggrieved, PPC moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution34 dated July 19,
2006, hence, the instant petition.

Meanwhile, on July 26, 2006, De Guzman filed an appeal of the PPC Board’s Resolutions dated May 25,
2006 and June 29, 2006 with the CSC35 which was, however, dismissedin Resolution No. 08081536 dated
May 6, 2008. The CSC equally denied De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration there from in Resolution
No. 09007737 dated January 14, 2009.

The Issues Before the Court

The essential issues for the Court’s resolution are whether: (a) De Guzman unjustifiably failed to exhaust
the administrative remedies available to him; (b) De Guzman engaged inforum-shopping; and (c) the
investigation conducted by the DOTC, through the ISLES, bars the filing of the subsequent charges by
PPC.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded
an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from
entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the
courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.38PPC claims that De Guzman
failed to subscribe to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies since he opted to file a premature
certiorari case before the CA instead of filing an appeal with the PPC Board, or of an appeal to the CSC,
which are adequate remedies under the law.39

The Court agrees with PPC’s submission.

Under Section 21(d) of RA7354, the removal by the Postmaster General of PPC officials and employees
below the rank of Assistant Postmaster General may be appealed to the Board of the PPC, viz.:

Sec.21.Powers and Functions of the Postmaster General. — as the Chief Executive Officer, the Postmaster
General shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(d) to appoint, promote, assign, reassign, transfer and remove personnel below the ranks of Assistant
Postmaster General: Provided, That in the case of removal of officials and employees, the same may be
appealed to the Board;

xxxx

This remedy of appeal to the Board is reiterated in Section 2(a), Rule II of the Disciplinary Rules and
Procedures of the PPC, which providesfurther that the decision of the Board is, in turn, appeal able to the
CSC, viz.:

Section2. DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION. – (a) The Board of Directors shall decide upon appeal the
decision of the Postmaster General removing officials and employees from the service. (R.A. 7354, Sec. 21
(d)). The decision of the Board of Directors is appeal able to the Civil Service Commission. It is well-
established that the CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, and, as such, is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.40 The PPC, created
under RA7354, is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. Thus, being an
employee of the PPC, De Guzman should have, after availing of the remedy of appeal before the PPC
Board, sought further recourse before the CSC. Records, however, disclose that while De Guzman filed on
June 10, 2005 a notice of appeal41 to the PPC Board and subsequently appealed the latter’s ruling to the
CSC on July 26, 2006, the sewere all after he challenged the PPC Resolution dated November 23, 2004
(wherein he was adjudged guilty of the charges against him and consequently dismissed from the service)
in a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA(docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88891). That the
subject of De Guzman’s appeal to the Board was not the Resolution dated November 23, 2004 but the
Resolution dated May 10, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration of the first - mentioned resolution is
of no moment. In Alma Jose v. Javellana,42 the Court ruled that an appeal from an order denying a motion
for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment
itself.43 Thus, finding no cogent explanation on DeGuzman’s endor any justifiable reason for his premature
resort to a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA, the Court holds that he failed to adhere to
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies which should have warranted the dismissal of said
petition.

B. Forum-shopping.

PPC further submits that De Guzman violated the rule on forum-shopping since he still appealed the order
of his dismissal before the PPC Board, notwithstanding the pendency of his petition for certiorari before the
CA identically contesting the same.44

The Court also concurs with PPC on this point.

Aside from violating the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, De Guzman was also guilty of
forum-shopping by pursuing two (2) separate remedies –petition for certiorari and appeal –that have long
been held to be mutually exclusive, and not alternative or cumulative remedies.45 Evidently, the ultimate
reliefsought by said remedies whichDe Guzmanfiled only within a few months from each other46 is
one and the same – the setting aside of the resolution dismissing him from the service. As illumined
in the case of Sps. Zosa v. Judge Estrella,47 where in several precedents have been cited on the subject
matter:48

The petitions are denied. The present controversy is on all fours with Young v. Sy, in which we ruled that
the successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari both to assail the trial court’s dismissal
order for non-suit constitutes forum shopping. Thus,

Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.

There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least suchparties as represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata.

Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in
forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her
filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by
way of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of lit is pendentia are present between the two
suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly the
same facts and refer to the same subject matter – the RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-
5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders.
The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is
evident that the judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in the other.

xxxx

The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two or more
appeals, and, in the event that the ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the others, she cannot
post facto validate this circumstance as a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not been speedy or
adequate enough, in order to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if adopted, would sanction the
filing of multiple suits in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner couches it, becomes a
―precautionary measure” for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a favorable decision. This is the
very evil that the proscription on forum shopping seeks to put right. In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the
Court stated that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by
two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking
advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a
favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules against
forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of the case.

Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari and the petition for review (G.R. No. 157745)
filed with this Court must be denied for lack of merit.

We also made the same ruling in Candido v. Camacho, when the respondent therein assailed identical
court orders through both an appeal and a petition for an extraordinary writ.

Here, petitioners questioned the June 26, 2000 Order, the August 21, 2000 Clarificatory Order, and the
November 23, 2000 Omnibus Order of the RTC via ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 69892) and through a
petition for certiorari(CA-G.R. SP No. 62915) in different divisions of the same court. The actions were filed
with a month’s interval from each one. Certainly, petitioners were seeking to obtain the same relief in two
different divisions with the end in view of endorsing which ever proceeding would yield favorable
consequences. Thus, following settled jurisprudence, both the appeal and the certiorari petitions should be
dismissed.(Emphases supplied; citations omitted)

Similar thereto, the very evil that the prohibition on forum-shopping was seeking to prevent – conflicting
decisions rendered by two (2) different tribunals–resulted from De Guzman’s abuse of the processes. Since
De Guzman’s appeal before the PPC Board was denied in its Resolutions49dated May 25, 2006 and June
29, 2006, De Guzmans ought the review of said resolutions before the CSC where he raised yet again the
defense of res judicata. Nonetheless, the CSC, in its Resolution No. 08081550 dated May 6, 2008, affirmed
De Guzman’s dismissal, affirming "the Resolutions of the PPC Board of Directors dismissing De Guzman
from the service for Dishonesty, Gross Violation of Regulations, and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service."51

De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution was similarly denied by the CSC in its
Resolution No. 09007752 dated January 14, 2009. On the other hand, the petition for certiorari, which
contained De Guzman’s prayer for the reversal of Resolutions dated November 23, 2004 and January 6,
2005 dismissing him from the service, was granted by the CA much earlier on April 4, 2006. It should be
pointed out that De Guzman was bound by his certification53 with the CA that if he ―should thereafter learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency,” he ―undertake[s]to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to [the]Honorable Court.”54 Nothing, however, appears on record that De Guzman had informed the CA of
his subsequent filing of a notice of appeal before the PPC from the Resolution dated May 10, 2005. By
failing to do so, De Guzman committed a violation of his certification against forum-shopping with the CA,
which has been held to be a ground for dismissal of an action distinct from forum-shopping itself.55

Moreover, De Guzman’s contention56 that the filing of the notice of appeal from the said Resolution was
only "taken as a matter of precaution"57 cannot extricate him from the effects of forum-shopping. He was
fully aware when he filed CA-G.R. SP No. 88891 that PG Ramahad forwarded the records of the case to
the PPC Board for purposes of appeal.58 Yet, he decided to bypass the administrative machinery. And this
was not the first time he did so. In his Comment to the instant petition, De Guzman claimed59 that in
response to the Memorandum60 dated August 17, 1999 issued by Dir. Lalanto implementing his dismissal
from service, he not only filed a motion for reconsideration but he likewise challenged the actions of the
PPC before the Regional Trial Court of Manila through a petition for mandamus docketed as Case No. 99-
95442. Even when CA-G.R. SP No. 88891 was decided in De Guzman’s favor on April 4, 2006, and PPC’s
motion for reconsideration was denied on July 19, 2006, De Guzman nonetheless filed on July 26, 2006 an
appeal before the CSC from the denial by the PPC Board of his Notice of Appeal dated June 7, 2005 as
pointed out in CSC Resolution No. 090077.61 While De Guzman did inform the CSC that he previously filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA, he failed to disclose the fact that the CA had already rendered a
decision thereon resolving the issue of res judicata,62 which was the very same issue before the
CSC.
Verily, unscrupulous party litigants who, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, repeatedly try
their luck in several different for a until a favorable result is reached63 cannot be allowed to profit from their
wrongdoing. The Court emphasizes strict adherence to the rules against forum-shopping, and this case is
no exception. Based on the foregoing, the CA should have then dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
De Guzman not only for being violative of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies but also due to
forum-shopping.

In addition, it may not be amiss to state that De Guzman’s petition for certiorari was equally dismissible
since one of the requirements for the availment thereof is precisely that there should be no appeal. It is
well-settled that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits is to appeal.
This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the tribunal rendering the judgment is its lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of
discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision.64 In fact, under Section 30, Rule III (C) of
the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of the PPC, among the grounds for appeal to the PPC Board from
an order or decision of dismissal are: (a) grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Postmaster General;
and (b) errors in the finding of facts or conclusions of law which, if not corrected, would cause grave and
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant. Clearly, therefore, with the remedy of appeal to the PPC
Board and thereafter to the CSC available to De Guzman, certiorari to the CA should not have been
permitted.

In this relation, it bears noting that PPC has sufficiently addressed De Guzman’s argument that an appeal
would not be a speedy and adequate remedy considering that the resolution dismissing him from service
was to be "implemented immediately."65 

To elucidate, on February 24, 2005, before De Guzman filed the petition for certiorari dated March 12,
2005, the PPC Board had passed Board Resolution66 No. 2005-14 adopting a "Corporate Policy that
henceforth the decision of the Postmaster General in administrative cases when the penalty is removal or
dismissal, the same shall not be final and executory pending appeal to the Office of the Board of
Directors." Shortly thereafter, or on March 8, 2005, PG Rama issued Philpost Administrative Order67 No.
05-05 pursuant to the aforementioned Board Resolution, the pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder:

1. Decisions of the Postmaster General in administrative cases where the penalty imposed is
removal/dismissal from the service shall not be final and executory pending appeal to the Office of
the PPC Board of Directors x x x

2. Decisions of the Postmaster General in administrative cases where the penalty imposed is
removal/dismissal from the service shall be executory pending appeal to the Civil Service
Commission;

3. Respondents who have pending appealed administrative cases to the PPC Board of Directors
are entitled to report back to office and receive their respective salary and benefits beginning at the
time they reported back to work. No back wages shall be allowed by virtue of the PPC Board
Resolution No. 2005-14;

4. Following the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, back wages can only be recovered in case the
respondent is exonerated of the administrative charges on appeal; and

5. PPC Board Resolution No. 2005-14 took effect on 24 February 2005. x x x

PPC further claimed that instead of reporting for work while his motion for reconsideration and,
subsequently, his appeal were pending, "[De Guzman] voluntarily elected to absent himself." Much later,
however, De Guzman "finally reported back [to]work and thereby received his salary and benefits in full for
the covered period."68 De Guzman failed to sufficiently rebut these claims, except to say that he was never
given any copy of the aforementioned board resolution and administrative order.69 Therefore, considering
that his dismissal was not to be executed by PPC immediately (if he had appealed the same), De
Guzman’s contention that an appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedysimilarly deserves no
merit.
 C. Res judicata.

De Guzman likewise failed to convince the Court of the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata for having
been charged of the same set of acts for which he had been exculpated by the ISLES of the DOTC whose
recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman was subsequently approved by
then DOTC Asec. Jardiniano.

The Court agrees with PPC’s argument that there was no formal charge filed by the DOTC against De
Guzman and, as such, the dismissal of the complaint against him by Asec. Jardiniano, upon the
recommendation of the ISLES, did not amount to a dismissal on the merits that would bar the filing of
another case.

While the CA correctly pointed out that it was the DOTC, through its Department Head, that had disciplinary
jurisdiction over employees of the then Bureau of Posts, including De Guzman, it however proceeded upon
the presumption that De Guzman had been formally charged. But he was not.

Pertinent is Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service which reads as
follows:

Section 16. Formal Charge. – After a finding of a prima facie case, the disciplining authority shall
formally charge the person complained of. The formal charge shall contain a specification of charge(s),
a brief statement of material or relevant facts, accompanied by certified true copies of the documentary
evidence, if any, sworn statements covering the testimony of witnesses, a directive to answer the charge(s)
in writing under oath in not less than seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice for the
respondent to indicate in his answer whether or not he elects a formal investigation of the charge(s), and a
notice that he is entitled to be assisted by a counsel of his choice. (Emphasis supplied)

The requisite finding of a prima facie case before the disciplining authority shall formally charge the person
complained of is reiterated in Section 9, Rule III (B) of the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of the PPC, to
wit:

Section 9. FORMAL CHARGE. – When the Postmaster General finds the existence of a prima
facie case, the respondent shall be formally charged. He shall be furnished copies of the complaint,
sworn statements and other documents submitted by the complainant, unless he had already received the
same during the preliminary investigation. The respondent shall be given at least seventy-two (72) hours
from receipt of said formal charge to submit his answer under oath, together with the affidavits of his
witnesses and other evidences, and a statement indicating whether or not he elects a formal investigation.
He shall also be informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel of his choice. If the respondent already
submitted his comment and counter-affidavits during the preliminary investigation, he shall be given the
opportunity to submit additional evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

The investigation conducted by the ISLES, which "provides, performs, and coordinates security,
intelligence, fact-finding, and investigatory functions for the Secretary, the Department, and Department-
wide official undertakings,"70was intended precisely for the purpose of determining whether or not a prima
facie case against De Guzman existed. Due to insufficiency of evidence, however, no formal charge was
filed against De Guzman and the complaint against him was dismissed by Asst. Secretary Jardiniano.

In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be
between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity
of cause of action.71

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities
of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections; or when
the judgment is rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment
rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.72
In this case, there was no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the above-stated
definition.1âwphi1 The dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman in the Memorandum73 dated May
15, 1990 of Asec. Jardiniano was a result of a fact-finding investigation only for purposes of
determining whether a prima facie case exists and a formal charge for administrative offenses
should be filed. This being the case, no rights and liabilities of the parties were determined therein with
finality. In fact, the CA, conceding that the ISLES was "a mere fact-finding body," pointed out that the
Memorandum74 dated February 26, 1990 issued by Dir. Reyes recommending the dismissal of the
complaint against De Guzman "did not make any adjudication regarding the rights of the parties."75

Hence, for the reasons above-discussed, the Court holds that PPC did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it revived the case against De Guzman despite the previous dismissal thereof by Asec. Jardiniano.
Since said dismissal was not a judgment on the merits, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply.

In fine, due to the errors of the CA as herein detailed, the Court hereby grants the present petition and
accordingly reverses and sets aside the farmer's dispositions. The Resolutions dated November 23, 2004
and January 6, 2005 of the PPC ordering De Guzman's dismissal from the service are thus reinstated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 4, 2006 and the Resolution dated July
19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88891 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Resolutions dated November 23, 2004 and January 6, 2005 of petitioner Philippine Postal Corporation are
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.