General

Typical Flare System

Potentials of Overpressure
Presented
Determination of Individual rates
By
Pressure Safety Valves
Dheerendra Dubey

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General Typical Flare System

Main focus of presentation is on estimate of flare
load for various contingencies & sizing of flare
headers

Causes of overpressure & detailed discussion for
various contingencies for flare load calculations.

Detailed discussion and sample calculations for fire
and tube rupture cases.

Types of P S Vs used in a typical flare system &
relieving pressure estimate for single/multiple valve
for operating and fire case.
Controlling Loads

Controlling case for refinery or petrochemical
complexes are usually cooling water or power
failure.

During the preparation of process package for various
units, process licensors provide flare load details for
various possible failure cases. Typical data consist of
flare load (kg/hr or t/hr), relieving temperature (0C),
molecular weight of relieved gas, and back pressure(
kg/cm2g).

By using the flare load for various contingencies,
process engineer has to calculate the maximum
relieving load for a particular failure case for design
of flare system.

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Cooling Water failure

Whenever there is one cooling water system, cooling
water failure loads for various units are added to
calculate total flare load of the complex.

For a large complex with very high flare load for
cooling water failure case, complex may be segregated
in to two or more cooling water systems and then flare
load of one (controlling ) cooling water system may be
considered for further design.
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Power Failure

Power distribution may be from 6-8 substations
which are fed from the main source of power supply.

Main source of power could be captive, grid power or
captive in parallel with grid power.

There are three possible situations of power failure.

Local power failure of a reflux pump for a column in
a particular unit causing reflux failure of that column.
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During revamp, further reduction of load may be possible
when cooling water header is in two distinct separate
directions. Here by considering pumps and CT fans for both
directions from two different sources of power may serve to
reduce flare load. IOCL Mathura & Baroda have used this
concept during revamp to use their existing flare system.
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Total power failure

It gives rise to loss of reflux to towers which results in
relief of gross overheads from each tower.

It may give rise to cooling water as well as steam
failure.
During tripping of steam generation /BFW system,
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supply of steam to unit reboilers is limited to system
hold.
Other considerations are described below:
Miscellaneous for Flare load reduction methods

In certain cases, by suitably changing the design
pressure of a few equipment, flare load can be brought
down.
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Significant reduction in flare loads is possible with
application of high integrity protection system.
Recently it has been used for MRPL , s existing two
flare headers to make them adequate after revamp of
certain units

Reflux pump and cooling water system pumps may be
considered steam turbine driven to avoid flare load for
reflux failure and reduce flare load for cooling water
failure case. In such cases, availability of steam during
power failure needs to be assured. This concept has
been used by Essar Refinery.

While discussing flare job with client, there may be a
need to estimate flare header size, it may be done for
low pressure flare system with vapor sizing formulae,
friction factor chart and procedure given below:
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In case of high flare loads, a review is to be
done to check, if by adopting suitable control
philosophy, flare load can be brought down. For
example, tripping source of heat to reboiler by
sensing pressurization of column overhead with
2 out of 3 voting of pressure switches, CRL
reduced their CDU flare load.

For high temp relief from Hydrogen unit etc
ISBL header is sized as per actual temperature
during relief but OSBL header is maintained of
CS because CS can withstand expected high
temperature for the duration of relief.
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POTENTIALS FOR OVERPRESSURE

Overpressure is the result of an unbalance of the normal
flows of material and energy that causes buildup in
some part of the system.

It has been simplified that with variation in heat or
mass i.e. increase in mass input( failure to open position
of a control valve which is upstream of a vessel or
accidental opening of a valve upstream of a vessel ,
tube rupture in a re-boiler).

Decrease in mass removal (failure to a close position
of a control valve which is downstream of a vessel,
accidental closing of a valve downstream from a vessel,
failure of a compressor downstream from a vessel.
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failure of pump downstream of a vessel. increase in
heat input (failure of a valve to shut off fuel to a fired
heater, increase in heat transfer caused by increase in
LMTD in a re-boiler and fire).

Decrease in heat removal (loss of cooling water, air
condenser failure, loss of heat removing circulating
side stream).

Accumulation ={IN – OUT } (heat or mass )
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Utility failure

The consequences that may develop from the loss of
any utility must be carefully evaluated. Typical utility
and affected equipment are given in table-1.
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Detailed causes of overpressure are as follows:

Closed outlets on vessels

The inadvertent closure of a block valve/ control
valve on the outlet of a pressure vessel (while the
plant is on stream ) may expose the vessel to a
pressure that exceeds MAWP. Pressure relief is
required unless lock open facility are in place.

Inadvertent valve opening

The inadvertent opening of any valve from a source of
higher pressure , such as HP steam or process fluids.
This action requires pressure relieving unless
provision are made for locking or sealing the valve .
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 Partial failure

Effect of overpressure due to loss of a utility should be
studied with chain of developments that could occur
and reaction time involved. The situation in which the
equipment fails but operates in parallel with equipment
that has different energy source, operating credit may
be taken for unaffected and functioning equipment.

An example of CWS with two pumps in parallel with
unrelated energy sources, if one of two sources of
energy fails, partial credit may be taken for other
source that continues to function. Quantity of excess
vapor generated depends on quantity of CW lost.
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Electrical or Mechanical failure

Failure of electrical or mechanical equipment that
provides cooling or condensation in process streams
can cause overpressure in process vessels.
Loss of fans

Fans on air coolers or cooling towers become
inoperative because of loss of power (or a mechanical
breakdown). On cooling towers and air coolers, credit
for cooling effect may be obtained by convection and
radiation in still air at ambient conditions.
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Another example with two pumps in parallel with one
pump providing full flow and second as standby,
Second pump has separate source of energy and is
equipped with controls for automatic start up if first
pump fails. No protective credit is taken for stand by
pump because stand by device is not considered totally
reliable.

Manual cut in of auxiliaries is operator and time
dependent and must be carefully analyzed before it is
used as insurance for overpressure.
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Loss of heat in series fractionation system

In series fractionation (bottoms from first column
feed in to second column, and the bottoms from the
second feed in to the third), loss of heat input to first
column can overpressure the following column.

Loss of heat results in some of the light ends mixing
with bottoms and being transferred to the next
column as feed. Under this circumstance, overhead
load of second column may consist of its normal
vapor load plus light ends from first column. If
second column does not have condensing capacity for
additional load, excessive pressure could occur.
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 Loss of instrument air or Electric Power

The complexity of instrument automation require
continuous sources of air or electric power. To
minimize likelihood of overpressure, fail safe position
of each control valve should be established as an
integral part of design.

Failure position of each control valve is not considered
adequate relief protection as other failures in an
instrument system can cause a control valve to move in
direction opposite its failure position.
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Heat Exchanger tube failure

In shell & tube exchangers, tubes are subject to failure
from thermal shock, vibration and corrosion. Whatever
the cause, HP steam will overpressure equipment on the
low pressure side of the exchanger. The possible
pressure rise need to be ascertained to determine
whether additional relief would be required if flow
from tube rupture were to discharge in to the low
pressure system.
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Reflux failure

The loss of reflux as a result of pump or instrument
failure can cause overpressure in a column because of
condenser flooding or loss of coolant in fractionating
process.
Abnormal heat input from reboilers

Reboilers are designed with specified heat input. When
they are new or recently cleaned, additional heat input
above normal design can occur. In the event of failure
of temperature controller, vapor generation build up
pressure.
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Transient Pressure Surges
Water Hammer

The water hammer is occurring in any liquid filled
system. It is a type of overpressure that can not be
controlled with pressure relief valve because response
of PSV is normally slow.

The oscillating peak pressures, measured in
milliseconds, can rise to many times the normal
operating pressure. These pressure waves damage the
pressure vessels and piping.

Water hammer is frequently caused by quick closing
valves. Where water hammer can occur, use of
pulsation dampeners should be considered.
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Steam Hammer

An oscillating pressure surge, called steam hammer,
occur in piping that contains compressible fluids.

Most common occurrence is initiated by rapid valve
closure.

The oscillating pressure surge occurs in milliseconds,
with a possible pressure rise to many times the normal
operating pressure, resulting in vibration & violent
movement of piping and possible rupture of equipment.
Avoiding use of quick closing valves may prevent
steam hammer.
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Liquid holdup required for normal plant operations,
including refrigerants or solvents, can be effective in
keeping the vessel wall cool & does not require removal
system.

Provision may be made either to insulate the vessel, s
vapor space and apply external water for cooling or to
de pressure the vessel using a vapor de pressure system.

Area design should include adequate surface drainage
facilities and a means for preventing spread of
flammable liquids from one operating area to another.

Easy access to each area and to process equipment for
fire fighting and their equipment.

Fire hydrants, fire fighting equipment, and fire monitors
should be placed in readily accessible locations.
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Plant Fires

Fire is a cause of overpressure in plant equipment.

A provision for controlled shut down or de-pressure
system for the units can minimize overpressure caused
from exposure to external fire.

To limit vapor generation and spread of fire, facilities
should also include removal of liquids from the
systems.

Normally operating product withdrawl systems are
considered superior and more effective for removing
liquids from a process unit, compared with separate
liquid pull down systems.

2500 M2 plot should be considered for a single fire
zone.
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Process changes/Chemical reactions

In some reactions and processes, loss of process
control may result in significant change in
temperature and/or pressure .The result could exceed
intended limit of the material selected.

For cryogenic fluids, pressure reduction can lower
temperature below minimum allowable design temp
of equipment, causing low temp brittle failure.

For exothermic reaction cases, excessive temp and/or
pressure associated with run away reactions may
reduce allowable stress level below design point, or
increase pressure above MAWP.

Where normal PSV’s can not protect, controls are
needed to warn of changes outside intended
temp/press limits to provide corrective action.
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 Determination of Individual relieving rates
Sources of Overpressure

Liquid or vapor rates to establish relief requirements
are developed by heat input(indirect pressure input
through vaporization or thermal expansion) and direct
pressure input from higher pressure sources.
Overpressure may result from one or both of these
sources.

The peak relieving rate is the maximum rate that must
be relieved to protect equipment against overpressure
due to any single cause.

Probability of two unrelated failures occurring
together is very remote & normally not considered.
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Effect of Operator Response

The response to take credit for operator response in
determining max relieving conditions requires
consideration of those who are responsible for
operation and an understanding of the consequences of
an incorrect action. Commonly accepted time range for
response is between 10-30 minutes, depending on
complexity of plant. Effectiveness of this response
depends on process dynamics.
1. Closed Outlets

To protect a vessel or system from overpressure when
all outlets are blocked, capacity of relief device must
be capacity of source of pressure.
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Effects of Pressure, Temperature , and Composition

Pressure and temperature affect the volume and
composition of liquid and vapor.

Vapor is generated when heat is added to liquid. The
rate at which vapor is generated changes with
equilibrium conditions.

When liquid is a mixture of components with
different boiling points, heat introduced produces
vapor that contains more low boiling components.
With more heat input, successively heavier
components are generated in the vapor.
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If all outlets are not blocked, capacity of unblocked
may properly be considered.

Sources of overpressure include pump, compressor, HP
headers, stripped gases from rich absorbent, and
process heat. In case of heat exchanger, closed outlet
can cause thermal expansion or vapor generation.
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Quantity to be relieved should correspond to set
pressure plus overpressure instead at normal
conditions.

If source of liquid is pump then flow-head pump
characteristics should be used to establish relief
flow. Frictional losses at relieving flow and static head
must also be considered to match pump curve.

The compressor flow- pressure characteristics should
be considered in vapor service.
2.0 Cooling or Reflux failure
General

Required relieving rate is determined by heat and
material balance of the system at relieving pressure.

In a distillation system, rate may require calculation
with or without reflux.

Instead of detailed calculations, simple bases is as
follows:
2.1.1 Total Condensing:

Relief load is total incoming vapor to condenser
recalculated at temp that corresponds to new vapor
composition at set pressure plus overpressure, and
heat input prevailing at the time of relief.

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Reflux drum capacity is about 5 minutes, if cooling 3.0 Fan Failure

water failure exceeds this time, reflux is lost then
calculations have to be performed without reflux i.e.
tray-2 vapor.

Second tray vapor may be considered when overhead
receiver holding time is less than five minutes.
2.1.2 Partial Condensing

Relief is difference between incoming and out going
vapor rate @ relieving conditions (or quantity in total
condensing is adjusted downwards by quantity of vapor
normally leaving reflux drum).

Because of natural convection effects, credit for a
partial condensing capacity of 20 to 30 percent of
normal duty is often used. Capacity of relief valve is
based on 70-80 % duty.
4.0 Louver Closure

Louver closure is considered total failure of coolant
with resultant capacity similar to total condensing or
partial condensing cases.

Louver failure may result from automatic control
failure, mechanical linkage failure or destructive
vibration on a manually positioned louver.

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 4.0 Overhead Circuit

In many cases reflux failure due to pump shut down
or valve closure can cause flooding of condenser,
which is equivalent to total loss of coolant with
capacity established with above mentioned method.
Compositional changes caused by loss of reflux may
produce different vapor properties that affect
capacity.
5.0 Pump Around

Relief requirement is vaporization rate caused by an
amount of heat equal to heat removed by pump
around circuit. Latent heat of vaporization would
correspond to latent heat at relieving conditions of
temp and pressure.
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8.0 Absorbent Flow Failure

In a typical acid gas removal unit case, 25 % or more
inlet vapor may be removed, loss of absorbent could
cause overpressure to relief as downstream may not
be adequate to handle increased flow. Each individual
case must be studied for its process and
instrumentation characteristics.
9.0 Accumulation of non-condensables

Normally noncondensables do not accumulate, but
with certain piping configuration, noncondensables
accumulate to the point that condenser is blocked.
Effect is equal to total loss of coolant.
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6.0 Overhead Circuit plus pump around

An overhead circuit plus pump around is arranged so
that simultaneous failure of pump around and
overhead condenser will not occur, part failure of one
with complete failure of other is quite possible.
Required relieving capacity is similar to above
mentioned.
7.0 Side stream reflux failure

Principles similar to overhead circuit and pump around
apply for condenser flooding or changes in vapor
properties resulting from change in composition.
Relieving capacity should be enough to relieve
vaporization rate caused by amount of heat removed
from system.
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10. Entrance of volatile material in to system

It covers water (or hydrocarbon) in to hot oil, expansion
from liquid to vapor is so fast and large that PSV can not
be provided. So proper design and operation are
essential. Avoid water pockets, provide steam
condensate traps, and double block with bleed on
water connections to hot process lines.
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11.0 Failure of process stream automatic controls:
General:

Automatic control devices, directly actuated from
process or indirectly from a process variable (P, T,
Flow, Level) are used at inlets or outlets of vessels or
systems. When transmission signal (or operating
medium to final control element (valve operator) ) fails,
control should assume either fully open or fully closed
position. Design of control valve has to be kept in mind
for relief evaluation.
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If the system has multiple inlets, the position of any
control device in those remaining lines may be
assumed in normal operating position. Therefore
relief capacity is difference between max expected
inlet flow and normal outlet flow adjusted for
relieving conditions, assuming that other valves in
the system are still in operating position at normal
flow.

If one or more of the outlet valves are closed or more
inlet valves are opened by the same failure that
caused the first valve to open, required relief capacity
is difference between max expected inlet flow and
normal flow from outlet valves that remain open.
All flows should be calculated at relieving conditions.
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Capacity Credit

For relief evaluation due to any cause, control valve is
assumed in normal condition at relieving conditions.
Inlet Control Devices

There may be single or multiple inlet lines fitted with
control valves, scenario is to consider one inlet valve in
fully open position regardless of the control valve
failure position. Opening of this control valve may be
caused by instrument failure or mis operation.
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Typical example of a pressure vessel where liquid
bottom on level control discharge in to low pressure
system.

Usually when liquid is let down from high to low
pressure, only flashing effect is of concern in the event,
low pressure has a closed outlet.

However designer should consider vapor will flow in to
low pressure system if loss of liquid level occurs in HP
vessel. In this case, if volume of incoming vapor is
large compared with volume of low-pressure system,
overpressure may occur, relief device on low pressure
side should be able to handle full vapor through liquid
control valve.
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When process systems involve significant differences
in pressure level and volume of vapor contained by
high pressure equipment side is less than volume of
low pressure side, additional pressure may get
absorbed in some cases without overpressure.

In the event of loss of liquid level, vapor flow in to
low pressure system depends on Interconnecting
system, which usually consists of wide open valves
and piping, passes with a differential pressure based
on normal operating pressure on upstream and
relieving pressure downstream equipment, this DP at
initial conditions result in critical flow & may cause
rate to be several times higher than normal flow to
HP side. Unless make up equals outflow, as this will
be for short duration, upstream reservoir is depleted,
relief should be sized to handle peak flow.
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Relief capacity is difference between max inlet & max
outlet flows @ relieving conditions. Also effect of
inadvertent closure by operator has to be considered.

For single outlet with control fail close, relief is max
inlet flow at relieving conditions.

For application with more than one outlets & one outlet
with fail close control device, relief is difference
between max expected inlet flow and design flow @
relieving conditions.

For applications with more than one outlet each with
control device, relief is max expected flow @ relieving
conditions.
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Outlet Control Devices

Each outlet control valve should be considered both in
fully open or fully closed position for purposes of flare
load determination. This is regardless of control valve
failure position and may be caused by instrument
failure or mis operation.. If one or more of inlet valves
are opened by same failure that caused outlet valve to
close, pressure- relieving device may be required to
prevent overpressure.
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If normal instrument operation results in increased
relieving rate then consider instrumentation to operate, if
normal instrument operation results in decrease of
relieving rate then consider instrumentation fail to operate.
Fail Stationary Valves

Even though some control devices are designed to remain
stationary in the last controlled position, one can not
predict the position of the valve during failure. Designer
should consider such devices fully open or closed : no
reduction in relief capacity should be considered when
such devices are used.
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 Special Capacity Considerations

Although control valves are specified and sized for
normal operating conditions, they are expected to
operate during upset conditions, including periods
when PSV s are relieving.

Valve design and valve operator capability should be
selected to position valve plug properly in accordance
with control signals during abnormal conditions.

Since the capacity at pressure relieving are not same as
normal conditions, capacity of control valves should be
calculated for relieving conditions of temp and pressure
in determining required relief capacity.
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Designer should consider potential behavior of system and
each of its components .For example built in over capacity
of burners capable of 125 % of heater, design input must be
considered.

Where limit stops are installed, wide open capacity should
be used. However if mechanical stop is installed and is
adequately documented, use of limited capacity may be
appropriate.

In shell and tube heat exchangers, heat input should be
calculated on the basis of clean conditions.
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In extreme cases , state of fluid controlled may
change (from liquid to vapor or from vapor to liquid).
Wide open capacity of control valve selected to
handle liquid may differ greatly when it handles gas.
This becomes a matter of particular concern where
loss of liquid can occur, causing the valve to pass
high pressure gas to a system sized to handle only the
vapor flashed from normal liquid entry.
11.0 Abnormal Process Heat Input

Required capacity is max rate of vapor generation at
relieving conditions (including non- condensables
produced from overheating) less the rate of normal
condensation or vapor outflow.
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Internal Explosion

Where overpressure against internal explosions caused
by ignition of vapor air mixture is to be provided,
rupture discs or explosion vent panels should be used.
Relief valve react too slowly to protect the vessel
against the extremely rapid pressure build up caused
by internal flame propagation.

Vent area required is a function of initial
T/P/composition, Flame propagation properties,
volume of vessel, pressure at which vent activates, and
maximum pressure that can be tolerated during vented
explosion.
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Peak pressure reached during vented explosion is
usually higher than pressure at which vent device
activates.

Design should follow NFPA 68 and 69.

Inert gas purging may be used when explosion is due to
air

contamination during shut down or start up.
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12.0 Chemical Reaction
Typical methodology for chemical reactions need
pressure relief where possible or other design
strategies like automatic shut down systems, inhibitor
injection, quench, de-inventorying, alternative power
supply, and de pressure.
13.0 Hydraulic Expansion

It is due to increase in liquid volume due to increase
in temperature. It may be due to blockage of cold
liquid in exchanger with hot liquid on other side,
heating of long pipelines with solar radiation.

Typical relieving device is ¾ inch x 1 inch relief
valve.

If this size appears to be inadequate then procedure
given in API-521 (Section3.14.3 ) may be used.
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External Fire

Effect of fire on wetted surface of a vessel

The surface area wetted by internal liquid contents of a
pressure vessel is effective in generating vapor when
exposed to fire. To determine vapor generation , only that
portion of the liquid which is wetted by its internal liquid
and is equal to or less than 25 ft above the source of flame.

Credit can be taken for insulation, if it is fire proof and
project specification allows for this credit. It should be
certain that basic insulating material to function effectively
up to 904 0C during a fire. This period of fire may be up to
two hours, depending on fire fighting provisions. Although
jacketing and coating may burn off or disintegrate,
insulation must retain its shape. Hence no credit is taken
for any insulation.
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Surge Drums-Wetted surface will be up to high level
but at least 50% of total vessel surface.

Knock out drum-Usually operates with only a small
amount of liquid, use surface up to high liquid alarm.

Working Storage tanks Usually 50% of surface. If
material of construction is such that tank collapses
during a fire, PSV not provided. Large capacity cone
roof or floating roof tanks are not provided PSV,
however dome roof tank is provided PSV & VRV

Vessel in pit-use entire area
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Vertical Vessel
Aw = p L D + N p D2 x1.66/4
L- Length of vessel exposed to fire, ft
D-Diameter of vessel, ft
N-Number of heads exposed to fire (assumes
elliptical head)
Liquid- vessels-(such as treating vessels )
Wetted surface of vessels that operate liquid full should
be total surface with in 25 ft height.
Fractionating Column-Wetted surface will be based on
high liquid level (API-normal liquid level plus tray draw
off capacity) in the bottom plus wetted surface
corresponding to four(API-weir height+2 inch) inches of
liquid for any tray with in a height of 25 ft. from grade.
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Shell side –wetted surface area as liquid full vessel
excluding channel area

Tube side-wetted surface of channel

Air Cooled Exchanger-Being designed for ambient
inlet air conditions, during fire, lose all cooling and
condensing ability. Assume exchanger as vessel,
relieving load is calculated by using bare tube area
because most fins are constructed of aluminum and
are destroyed with in first few minutes of fire.

Condensing without sub cooling-wetted surface area
equal to 0.3 times bare tube area (based on bottom
30% of circumference being wetted by condensate
layer.
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Gas Cooling-Surface area is equal to bare tube area.

Liquid Cooling-Wetted surface area is equal to bare tube
area. Fire loading in case of liquid coolers may become
extremely large and in some cases ,dominant loading in
sizing major portion of relief system.

Exposed Height -Since air coolers tend to produce a
chimney effect by drawing hot combustion products in to
Sizing:
Heat Absorption Equations

Amount of heat absorbed by a vessel exposed to open
fire is affected by type of fuel feeding the fire, degree
to which vessel is enveloped by flames(function of
vessel size and shape) and fire proofing measures.
Following formula is used to evaluate these
conditions where there are prompt fire fighting
efforts and drainage of flammable materials away
from vessel.
Q = 21000 F A 0.82

Q-total heat absorption to wetted surface in BTU/hr

their plenums, height limit on fire exposure may not apply. ft2

F=1(No credit for insulation)

A-Total wetted surface in ft2

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Relief flow = Q /(mass heat of vaporization of liquid)

For pure components where P.H. diagram is available, same
shall be used for calculating relieving temp and latent heat
of vaporization. Refer GPSA, for other pure components,
refer fig A-1 of API-521.

Example- C2 Splitter Column

Set pressure-20.5 kg/cm2g

Overpressure-21%

Relieving pressure=20.5x1.21 x 14.22 + 14.7 =364.5
say 365psia

From P.H. diagram,

Relieving temp 40 0F- (approximated on higher side)

Latent heat of vaporization –125 BTU/lb (approximated to
lower side)

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For vessels with hydrocarbon and water as immiscible
phases, both phases exert their individual pressure and
whenever sum of vapor pressures equals relieving
pressure, relief valve opens and temp of liquid at this
point is relieving temp. Vapor composition relieved
would be such that molar ratio of hydrocarbon vapors
and water vapor would be in the ratio of their vapor
pressure.

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Unwetted fire case scenario

For Gas Filled Vessels, relieving capacity need not be
FORMULA USED:
worked out by Process engineer ,as instrument engineer
calculates size of relief valve based on vessel wall RELIEF LOAD= [0.1406*√ √(M*P1)*[[A*(TW-T1)1.25]]/(T11.1506)
temp, and vessel surface area. Vessel wall temp shall be WHERE,
specified as: M= Molecular weight
P1= Relieving pressure

5930C for CS vessels
A= Exposed surface area

649 0C for alloy steel and 400 series SS Tw= Wall temperature

705 0C for 300 series SS T1= Relieving temperature

FPS (System) : FT2/RANKINE/PSIA

Vessel surface area is total surface area of vessel up to
NOTE: Formula from API-520
25 ft from source of flame.

Overpressure of 20% as per API shall be specified for
such valves.

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Process engineer to calculate max relieving temp , if
it exceeds 400 0C,sprinkler system to be provided.
Following equation may be used for relieving temp
calculations,
T2=P2 x T1/P1
P2- 1.2 x Set pressure, kg/cm2 a
P1-Operating pressure, kg/cm2a
T1- Gas Operating temp, 0K
T2-Max gas temp at relieving pressure, 0K
9/1/2009
Opening Manual Valves

When a manual valve is inadvertently opened,
causing pressure build up in a vessel, vessel should
have pressure relief large enough to pass a rate equal
to flow through open valve with pressure in the
vessel at relieving conditions.
Electric Power Failure

Determination of relieving requirements from
power failures require a careful plant or system
analysis to evaluate what equipment is affected by
power failure and how failure of equipment affects
plant operation.
9/1/2009
Example-For a gas storage vessel(CS) operating at
20-40 0C, Specification for relief is as below ;
Vessel wall temp 593 0C
Gas Operating temp 20-40 0C
Operating pressure 5.35 kg/cm2 g
set pressure 38.5 kg/cm2g
Vessel surface area Total area including shell and
dished ends
Maximum gas temp @ relieving pressure
P1/T1=P2/T2
T2=1.2x39.5 x(273+40)/6.35
=2336 0K or 2063 0C > 400 0C
Provide automatic sprinkler system besides relief valve
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Automatic stand by is an excellent device for
maximizing units on stream time, minimizing unit
upsets, and ensuring unit production rates but
circuitry, sequence and components involved are not
yet considered sufficiently reliable to permit credit in
establishing individual relieving requirements.

Power failure may be analyzed in three different
ways i.e. local failure for one equipment,
intermediate failure of one substation affecting one
distribution center or one MCC or one bus, and total
power failure in which all electrically operated
equipment is simultaneously affected.
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Effect of local power failure such as pump failure can
cause loss of cooling water(due to flooding of condenser)
or loss of reflux.

Intermediate power failure may cause more serious effects
than other two failures. Depending on the method of
dividing various pumps and drivers among electrical
feeders, it is possible to lose all the fans of an air cooler at
the same time that the reflux pumps are lost. This can
flood condenser and may void any credit for natural
convection of air condenser.

Total power failure requires additional study to analyze
and evaluate combined effects of multiple equipment
failures. Special consideration should be given to effect of
simultaneous opening of relief valves in several services
to a closed system.
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Flow through ruptured tube

The maximum flow through a ruptured tube occurs when
the break is at the tube sheet. If a break occurs at that
location, high pressure fluid will enter low pressure side by
two routes: 1) through tube sheet (assumed to be square
edged orifice) and 2) through ruptured tube.

By using equation for flow through square edged orifice, an
orifice coefficient of 0.7, and a pseudo orifice area equal to
1.5 times cross sectional area of one tube, flow rate of HP
fluid is approximated.

From Crane (Technical paper No 410),flow through an
orifice is:
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Heat Transfer Equipment Failure-Tube Rupture
General:

An internal failure can vary from a leaking tube or tube
sheet to a complete tube rupture where a sharp break
occurs in one tube. For relatively low pressure equipment,
tube failure is not a contingency when design pressure of
low pressure side is equal to or greater than two thirds the
design pressure of high pressure side.

Tube rupture is a contingency when design pressure of
low pressure side is less than ten by thirteen of design
pressure of high pressure side. If high pressure side of
exchanger operates at 1000 psig or more and contains a
vapor or liquid that can flash or result in vaporization,
complete tube failure should be considered.
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W=1891 do2 C(∆P.ρ)1/2
Where:
W= mass flow rate, lb/hr
do= internal diameter of the orifice, inches ( This is taken
to be tube ID )
C= flow coefficient of an orifice ( Use C=0.7)
∆P= pressure differential , p s i
ρ=upstream density,lb/ft3
By combining 1.5 factor, orifice coefficient, and Crane
formula constant(1891)
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Flow of non-flashing liquid, Effect of LP flow on downstream fluid
W=1985 d2 (DP r)1/2 No heat transfer occurs
W= mass flow rate, lb/hr
If no heat transfer occurs, high pressure fluid will initially

d= tube ID, inches displace an equal volume of low pressure fluid. As the
DP=pressure differential, p s i casualty progresses, high pressure fluid will be relieved
r= upstream density, lb/ft3 directly. The relieving requirements for both time intervals
should be calculated and the largest requirement chosen.
Flow of vapor or two phase mixture
W=1985 Y d2 (DP r )½ Heat transfer occurs

If heat transfer occurs, the effect of both heat transfer and
W= mass flow rate, lb/hr
volume displacement must be considered. (If the effect of
Y=net expansion factor for compressible flow, Refer
heat transfer is large when compared to displacement,
figure-A21 from Crane , or as conservative approach, use
0.8 effect of volumetric displacement may be ignored).
d= tube ID, inches
r=vapor density, lb/ft3 (for two phase flow, use no slip
density) 9/1/2009 77 9/1/2009 78

Wr = We[ Mo/Me +Ce/Co +((Te-To)/To]

Heat transfer with no phase change: where:

The high pressure fluid will displace an equal volume W= mass flow rate, lb/hr
of low pressure fluid. However, the high pressure M= molecular weight
vapors may thoroughly mix with low pressure vapors. C= heat capacity, BTU/lb/0F
This may result in a larger relieving requirement and its T= temperature, 0R
effect may be calculated as follows: Subscripts:
r= relieving requirement
e= entering
o= originally present
Note: This mixing effect does not have to be considered
unless both the high pressure and low pressure fluids are
vapor phase and a significant temperature difference
exists between the two fluids.
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-Heat transfer with phase change Design pressure of low pressure side=55psig
Usually the volumetric displacement is insignificant in ∆P across all trays= 10 psi
this situation. Pacc @ column bottom=1.1(55)+14.7 +10 =85.2 psia
-Calculate bubble temp of liquid phase at relieving P1=112 psig or 126.7 psia
conditions. Sp Gr=0.815
-Calculate change in enthalpy in the hot phase as it is ρ=0.815 x 62.36= 50.82 lb/ ft3
cooled down to bubble point of liquid phase. Since hot oil is non flashing HP fluid, equation for non
-Use enthalpy change of hot phase to vaporize bubble flashing liquid should be used.
point liquid.
Example
Hot oil is HP fluid, From exchanger specification sheet,
tube diameter=3/4 inch,14 BWG
d= 0.584 inch
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W=1985 d2 ( DP r)1/2
=1985(0.584)2 [(126.7-85.2) 50.82]1/2
=31090 lb / hr

THANKS

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