J Forensic Sci, 2020

doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.14490
PAPER Available online at: onlinelibrary.wiley.com

GENERAL

Kevin J. Strom,1 Ph.D.; Joshua A. Hendrix,1 Ph.D.; William J. Parish,1 Ph.D.; Patricia A. Melton,1 Ph.D.;
and Hannah Feeney,1 Ph.D.

Estimating Crime Laboratory Efficiency in the

Testing of Sexual Assault Kits*,†

ABSTRACT: Over the past decade, the large numbers of untested sexual assault kits (SAKs) have been highlighted as a systematic problem
that jeopardizes or delays justice for victims. Considering the benefits of testing SAKs, researchers have worked to shed light on why sexual
assault evidence has not been effectively submitted to and processed by crime laboratories. Missing from this discourse has been an understand-
ing of the types of practices or qualities that encourage efficiency in the testing of SAKs in crime laboratories. We analyzed results of a
national survey administered to all publicly funded state and local crime laboratories (N = 132 respondents) to provide critical information
about (i) the extent to which laboratories are testing all of the SAKs possible given the resources they have available; and (ii) the impact that
staffing, equipment, policies, and other practices have on SAK testing efficiency. We find that the average laboratory tests only about 69% of
the SAKs possible given the resources available to them. However, although technical inefficiencies explain a large proportion of the number
of untested SAKs, the accumulation of untested SAKs must also be attributed to laboratories having insufficient resources (e.g., too few foren-
sic analysts). Moreover, results from stochastic frontier models show that doubling the number of forensic analysts in the typical laboratory
would allow them to expand their SAK testing capacity by nearly 50%. Implications of these findings are discussed as they relate to the priori-
tization of resources for crime laboratories, which often operate under strict budgetary realities.

KEYWORDS: sexual assault, sexual assault kits, rape kits, SAK backlog, forensic analysis, crime laboratories

The struggles of many jurisdictions in tracking, submitting,
and testing their sexual assault kits (SAKs) have been widely
acknowledged in the past decade (1–11). The accumulation of
SAKs in police evidence property rooms (“unsubmitted SAKs,”
those never submitted to a crime laboratory for testing) and in
crime laboratories (“untested SAKs,” those submitted to a crime
laboratory but that have not been tested) can be understood lar-
gely as a function of one of two persistent bottlenecks in the
criminal justice system (9,12,13). First, some SAKs are entered
into evidence by a law enforcement agency but for varied and
sometimes complex reasons, they are not submitted to a labora-
tory for forensic testing. Most infamously, in 2002 more than
13,000 unsubmitted SAKs were discovered in Los Angeles
County. In 2009, 11,000 kits were found in a police storage
facility in Detroit. Tragically, almost three-quarters of unsubmit-
ted SAKs in Detroit were placed into storage partially because
investigators did not believe the assaults constituted “real rape”
or because the victim was believed to be responsible for the
assault committed against them (2). Although researchers have
not precisely identified the number of unsubmitted SAKs that
1 demonstrates how such funds can be used effectively. Thus,
RTI International, 3040 East Cornwallis Road, P.O. Box 12194, Research
Triangle Park, NC, 27709.
Corresponding author: Joshua A. Hendrix, Ph.D. E-mail: jhendrix@rti.org
*Presented at the 75th Annual Meeting of the American Society of Crimi-
nology, November 13-16, 2019, in San Francisco, CA.
†
Funding provided by the U.S. Department of Justice, Award No. 2013-
NE-BX-0006.
Received 4 Mar. 2020; and in revised form 27 May 2020; accepted 28
May 2020.
exist at the national level, it has been speculated that at any
given time there are at least several hundred thousand, which are
collectively known as the “rape kit backlog” (14).
The second component, the accumulation of untested SAKs,
pertains to SAKs submitted to a crime laboratory for testing but
that are never actually analyzed (or their analysis is significantly
delayed) (14). As public knowledge of the importance of submit-
ting and testing SAKs becomes more mainstream, researchers
have produced a substantial body of knowledge to explain why
some SAKs are either never subjected to forensic analysis in a
crime laboratory or they undergo testing delays. To date, most
studies have focused on factors that explain why some SAKs are
never submitted to a crime laboratory by the law enforcement
agency and remain in evidence storage. Less attention has been
given to understanding the accumulation of untested SAKs in
crime laboratories. Moreover, other than a handful of process
studies conducted within a single laboratory, research has said
little about the qualities and practices that encourage laboratory
efficiency when it comes to SAK testing. Accordingly, although
the last decade has seen tremendous growth in the amount of
federal funding available to crime laboratories for building their
DNA-testing capacities, there is limited empirical evidence that
more research is needed to elaborate on the characteristics (e.g.,
number of analysts), practices (e.g., outsourcing of SAKs to pri-
vate laboratories, or enhancing work flow processes with
automation), and policies (e.g., SAK-only testing policies) that
are most effective for increasing SAK testing efficiency. Further-
more, although it has been largely assumed that resource depri-
vation is the foremost reason for persistent delays in testing

© 2020 American Academy of Forensic Sciences 1

2 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
SAKs in crime laboratories, no study has investigated to what
extent inefficiencies in the use of existing resources are also to
blame.
We employ stochastic frontier modeling with a national sur-
vey of state and local crime laboratories that conduct biological
forensic analysis (N = 132 respondents) to assess how staffing,
technology and equipment, evidence policies, and other practices
contribute to the number of SAKs tested by crime laboratories.
Although we recognize that there are multiple units housed with
crime laboratories, our focus is specifically on the DNA unit and
not on all other units within the laboratory such as firearms or
toxicology units. We also examine to what extent laboratories
are testing the maximum number of SAKs possible, given their
level of input resources. Stochastic frontier models are also used
to determine to what extent technical inefficiencies (i.e., the inef-
ficient use of resources) contribute to untested SAKs. In addi-
tion, we present descriptive statistics to showcase (i) the average
number of SAKs processed and not processed by laboratories in
a year’s time; (ii) the types of resources available to laboratories,
including the number of SAK analysts and equipment units; (iii)
the types of policies relating to incoming SAKs used by crime
laboratories throughout the nation; and (iv) other basic features
of crime laboratories that have been underexplored in past
research (e.g., the percentage of laboratories that belong to a
multi-laboratory system or that have a backlog reduction pro-
gram). Our findings help build the knowledge base around iden-
tifying practices and characteristics that produce the greatest
returns for increasing forensic laboratory testing capacities.
Background
Recent advancements in DNA processing technology and the
existence of the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a
national DNA database, have provided strong arguments for
addressing the problem of unsubmitted and untested SAKs
(2,3,8). Particularly compelling evidence has been produced indi-
cating that testing previously shelved or stored SAKs (i.e.,
unsubmitted) can lead to numerous CODIS hits and may help
identify serial rapists, solve cold cases, or exonerate the wrongly
accused (3,15–18); but see Fallik & Wells (19). For example,
more than 9000 CODIS hits have been generated from invento-
rying approximately 100,000 SAKs across 64 jurisdictions under
the U.S. Department of Justice-funded Sexual Assault Kit Initia-
tive (SAKI), which since 2015 has supported state and local
agencies in strengthening their multidisciplinary response to sex-
ual assault (see www.sakitta.org). However, as noted, many
SAKs are not tested in a timely manner or tested at all. Valen-
tine et al. (20) found that only 38% of eligible SAKs were sub-
mitted for testing to the Utah state crime laboratory. Cantwell’s
(21) study of 17,115 cases of unknown-perpetrator sexual assault
in Washington State found that only 24% of SAKs were submit-
ted. Other studies have shown that fewer than 60% of SAKs
were submitted for testing (6,22–25).
Critically, Luminais, Lovell, and Flannery’s (26) process eval-
uation finds that factors related to both resource constraints and
a culture of victim blaming are deeply intertwined and cannot be
understood in isolation. Specifically, because of a pervasive flow
of cases into the system, agencies are incentivized to dismiss as
many as possible to reduce their caseload and keep the sexual
assault “conveyer belt” moving. Thus, finding reasons to classify
a victim as noncredible, unaccountable, or in other ways under-
serving of a full investigation is an efficient apparatus for ensur-
ing that caseloads remain manageable. Indeed, studies show that
a range of case characteristics, if present, can undermine investi-
gators’ perceptions that the survivor is a “real” victim or that
testing the SAK would be beneficial, and in consequence these
SAKs are less likely to be submitted for testing (see also Sleath
& Bull [27]). These include the victim admitting to being intoxi-
cated before the assault, a lack of obvious physical injuries as a
result of the attack, and the victim bathing after the assault
(1,2,6,11,22,28–32).
Less attention has been given to the accumulation of SAKs in
crime laboratories after being submitted by law enforcement
agencies. One explanation for understanding the inability of
crime laboratories to process the overwhelming number of analy-
sis requests they receive relates to the extensive amount of time
it takes to process and analyze DNA forensic evidence (33,34).
Key advances in forensic science technology and practice in
recent years have created an unprecedented demand for forensic
testing, and many jurisdictions do not appear to have the staffing
or technological resources to keep up with this demand in a
timely manner (12,35–42). Inadequate funding for quality techni-
cians, high turnover rates among analysts because of demanding
work conditions, and relatively low pay have also been
described as key factors that threaten an efficient system for pro-
cessing DNA requests (43).
To date, few studies have been conducted that can speak to
what characteristics, practices, or policies of crime laboratories
are associated with SAK testing efficiency. Instead, most
research on crime laboratories and their abilities to test incoming
SAKs are process studies that describe how a single agency used
federal funds to reduce their backlog. For example, some labora-
tories have implemented process improvement procedures,
including Lean Six Sigma evaluations, moved to a paperless
analysis environment, and purchased new equipment to address
increases in DNA analysis requests (44). Similarly, King (45)
described successes in the form of improved case completion
time and backlog reductions when the Wisconsin State Crime
Laboratory used federal funds to increase their use of robotics in
case analysis, increase their DNA analytical staff, outsource sex-
ual assault cases to a private laboratory, and institute evidence
submission guidelines. Campbell et al. (46) compared DNA
extraction methods, deployed on previously unsubmitted SAKs,
to identify effective methods for obtaining a CODIS-eligible pro-
file. The study also addressed personnel and supply cost compar-
isons associated with the different workflows. Although
valuable, these process studies are focused within a single
agency, leaving us with limited understanding of the most
important labor and capital inputs across laboratories.
Why study SAK testing efficiency in crime laboratories? In
response to the nationwide upsurge in DNA requests, the
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has devoted substantial fund-
ing for increased laboratory capacity over the past several dec-
ades. Historically, NIJ has allocated a significant portion of
funds to DNA laboratories to increase their capacity to process
more DNA samples and in turn reduce the number of samples in
queue for analysis. With this assistance, crime laboratories’
capacity to process DNA has seen considerable growth through
increased automation, the hiring of additional personnel, and
enhanced testing methodology and protocols. Yet, the demand
for DNA testing continues to exceed capacity of crime laborato-
ries, causing significant testing delays (47). Thus, to use these
capacity enhancement funds effectively, it is essential that we
build the knowledge base around what laboratory practices and
characteristics yield the greatest dividends for increasing testing
capacities. Without this information, it is possible that
 STROM ET AL.
laboratories will devote funds to resources that have negligible
or even counterproductive effects on testing capacity.
Methods
Study Overview and Research Questions
This study derives from a mixed-methods project on SAK
processing funded by the NIJ. Objectives of that study included
understanding agency—and cross-agency—level factors that pro-
mote submitting and testing SAKs among a linked sample of
law enforcement agencies and the crime laboratories to which
they submit biological evidence. Data collection, conducted in
2014, included surveys administered to publicly funded forensic
crime laboratories at state, county, and municipal levels that con-
duct biological forensic analysis and to a sample of linked law
enforcement agencies. The project team also conducted site visits
in six jurisdictions, during which interviews and focus groups
were conducted with (i) a law enforcement agency that submits
SAKs to crime laboratories for testing; (ii) a crime laboratory
that receives and tests those SAKs submitted by the aforemen-
tioned law enforcement agency; and (iii) a prosecuting attorney
who works with the aforementioned agencies to seek convictions
for sexual assault offenses.
In this article, we focus our analysis on survey data collected
from 132 crime laboratories. We ground our analyses of these
data within a structural contingency framework, which posits
that organizations pivot and adapt their approaches and technolo-
gies to remain effective even during challenging periods (see
[48,49] for modern applications). This theory suggests that orga-
nizations consistently search for more efficient processes to
accommodate their environment and circumstances, and thus, the
current study seeks to understand the ways in which crime labo-
ratories modify practice (or otherwise) to meet the demand
required from previously unsubmitted SAKs. Our primary
research questions are as follows: (i) How productive are labora-
tory analysts, equipment units and technologies (e.g., robotics),
policies (e.g., case acceptance policies), and other characteristics
(e.g., being a part of a multi-laboratory system) for laboratory’s
abilities to test SAKs? (ii) Are there technical inefficiencies that
contribute to the accumulation of untested SAKs in crime labora-
tories? (iii) To what extent are accumulations of untested SAKs
driven by such inefficiencies? And (iv) to what extent are accu-
mulations of untested SAKs driven by a lack of resources (e.g.,
too few staff)?
Sample and Key Measures
Our data collection strategy began with a national survey of
all state and local crime laboratories that conduct biological
forensic analysis. All laboratories that conduct biological foren-
sic analysis (N = 222) in the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Census
of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime Laboratories were contacted,
and 67% of them (N = 147) responded to the survey. Fifteen
laboratories were dropped from analysis because they provided
an insufficient level of information on key items (N = 132). A
comparison of our final sample with the population of labora-
tories that conduct biological forensic analysis indicated some
minimal bias in our sample. For example, our sample over-
represented laboratories from the South (51% of our sample
compared with 36% of the population), underrepresented labora-
tories from the Midwest (15% of our sample compared with
27% of the population), but laboratory type proportions (i.e.,
. ESTIMATING CRIME LABORATORY EFFICIENCY 3
state, county, or municipal) from our sample strongly resembled
those of the population. Our sample also strongly resembled the
population on other key measures such as the percentage that
are a part of a multi-laboratory system, average number of
employees, and average budget expenditures.
Core survey questions asked respondents, typically the labora-
tory director or assistant director, to provide (i) the number of
SAK DNA requests received during the previous calendar year;
(ii) the number of SAK DNA requests completed during the pre-
vious calendar year; (iii) the number of SAK DNA requests
waiting to be processed at the end of the previous year (defined
as SAKs not in the processing queue); and (iv) the number of
SAK DNA analysis requests that entered the system at the end
of the previous calendar year but had not been tested as of
30 days into the new calendar year. We also measured and ana-
lyzed the total number of unprocessed SAKs, defined as the sum
of SAKs waiting to be processed plus the number of SAKs in
the processing queue for more than 30 days. This measure pro-
vides a metric of how close laboratories are to meeting all pro-
cessing demands.
The survey also collected information on the number of DNA
analysts employed at each laboratory and the types and number
of DNA processing equipment each laboratory had. In addition
to facilitating an analysis of the impact of these key input
resources on the number of SAKs tested, these measures also
serve as important proxies for laboratory size, a key concept
under structural contingency theory. Other measures of labora-
tory size, such as number of full-time employees, were excluded
from our analysis because of their collinearity with the number
of analysts measure (a correlation coefficient of 0.823). We used
data on the average number of SAKs processed per DNA analyst
and total number of SAKs processed to calculate a measure of
the number of full-time equivalent analysts used to process SAK
evidence. We used data on the types and number of DNA pro-
cessing equipment to identify the number of “complete equip-
ment sets,” defined as the number of unique sets of thermal
cyclers, quantitative polymerase chain reaction (PCR) thermal
cyclers, and electrophoresis detection systems or genetic analyz-
ers. We also identified whether laboratories were using robotic
systems for DNA extraction or amplification, which we con-
trolled for separately.
Finally, we collected information on practices that might theo-
retically have an impact on improving laboratory processing effi-
ciency. These included responses on whether a laboratory was
part of a multi-laboratory system, the presence of a defined SAK
backlog reduction program, whether the laboratory had a case
manager and/or supervisor on staff (i.e., a staff member who is
responsible for the disposition of cases, including assigning
cases to analysts or tracking the completion of cases), whether
any portion of the received SAKs were outsourced, and the
types of DNA receiving and processing policies in place at the
laboratory. Each of these variables represents a laboratory’s
attempt to adapt to the challenge of previously submitted SAKs,
and we sought to understand whether these efforts were effective
(50). Respondents were also asked to indicate whether their lab-
oratory had any of several policies in place (whether formal or
informal in nature). The purpose of including policy indicators
was to explore whether any policies either increase or inhibit the
testing of SAKs so that we can make recommendations regard-
ing which policies laboratories should implement versus which
ones to remove for having a negative impact on SAK testing.
These included policies related to case acceptance, removal of
cases that will not be prosecuted, evidence acceptance, evidence
4 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
prioritization, evidence retention, case-item restriction, 100%
analysis, 100% testing of all items, analysis of only the most
probative evidence, SAK-only analysis, prescreening for male
DNA, allowing for cancellations, obtaining first a consensual
partner’s standard, a no-suspect policy, or some other policy we
did not mention. Ultimately, although we investigated the effects
of all policies, our final stochastic frontier models included only
six core policies related to case acceptance, case removal, analy-
sis of only the most probative evidence, SAK-only analysis,
allowing cancellations, and obtaining a consensual partner’s stan-
dard.
Analytical Approach
We employed stochastic frontier analysis (51) to measure the
capacity of crime laboratories to test SAKs and whether there
are any inefficiencies that might lead to an accumulation of
untested SAKs. This modeling approach is appropriate because
it accomplishes these goals simultaneously while also allowing
for post hoc analysis of the modeling results to understand to
what extent the accumulation of untested SAKs is driven by
technical inefficiencies as opposed to insufficient resources such
as too few personnel. The model defines technical inefficiency
as the extent to which crime laboratories test fewer SAKs than
are possible given their resources that support the process of
testing SAKs (e.g., number of analysts and presence of a case
manager or supervisor).
Stochastic frontier analysis can be conceptualized as a two-
step approach. In the first step, we estimate resource productivity
(e.g., how many SAKs one analyst can process) and then use
this information to identify a production frontier. The production
frontier is defined as the maximum number of SAKs a labora-
tory could process given the productive resources it has avail-
able. In the second step, we assess whether laboratories are
systematically processing fewer SAKs than implied by their pro-
duction frontier. Specifically, we calculate an efficiency score
for each laboratory, which represents the number of SAKs pro-
cessed relative to the maximum number of SAKs that could
have been processed given the number of analysts and equip-
ment available. This score indicates how near to productive
capacity laboratories are operating, with efficiency scores of 1
indicating they are processing as many SAKs as possible and
scores below 1 indicating they are processing fewer SAKs than
possible.
A generic stochastic frontier specification is presented below:
Number of SAKs tested ¼ f ðProductive ResourcesÞ
Technical Inefficiencies þ Error,
where f( ) denotes a generic functional form. We use a Translog
specification, a flexible specification that accommodates nonlin-
earities in the relationship between productive resources (e.g.,
number of analysts) and the number of SAKs tested. The func-
tional f(Productive Resources) represents the production frontier
—or the maximum number of SAKs that could be tested—and
the Technical Inefficiencies parameter measures the extent to
which laboratories test fewer SAKs than possible. The model
also includes a standard statistical error term (Error).
After estimating the parameters in our stochastic frontier mod-
els, we also carried out two postestimation analyses. In the first
postestimation analysis, we explored whether laboratories could
meet all processing demands if they operated at their productive
capacity (i.e., with efficiency scores of one). In the second
postestimation analysis, we used our estimates of resource pro-
ductivity and a simple economic production model to identify an
optimal ratio of analysts to equipment sets. This optimal ratio of
analysts to equipment sets describes the least-cost approach to
scaling up crime laboratory capacity.
We convert the measure of Technical Inefficiencies into an
efficiency score, which is given by the following:
Efficiency ¼ ½ f ðProductive ResourcesÞ  Technical Inefficiencies=
f ðProductive ResourcesÞ:
Thus, efficiency measures the number of SAKs tested by each
crime laboratory as a proportion of their production frontier.
Using this measure, we make additional calculations to inform
(i) how many laboratories would still have a SAK backlog if it
were possible to eliminate all Technical Inefficiencies, and (ii)
among those laboratories that would still have a backlog in the
absence of Technical Inefficiencies, what proportion of the back-
log could be eliminated if all Technical Inefficiencies were
removed. Converting the evidence into these two metrics helps
inform the degree to which the accumulation of untested SAKs
is a result of technical inefficiency versus a general lack of
resources (e.g., too few staff).
Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of crime laboratories.
On average, they processed 295 SAKs in the previous year and
had 254 unprocessed SAKs in their possession. All but eight
laboratories (94%) reported at least one unprocessed SAK in
their custody. Laboratories employed an average of eight foren-
sic analysts and had fewer than two complete equipment units.
Most laboratories had robotic systems for DNA extraction or
amplification but fewer than half had robotic systems for both
DNA extraction and amplification. Descriptive statistics also
show that about one-third of laboratories (35%) belong to a lar-
ger multi-laboratory system, about one-sixth outsource some of
their SAKs to a private laboratory, and half have a case manager
or case supervisor. About 40% of laboratories have a backlog
reduction program in place.
The most commonly used policies among our sample relate to
evidence retention (88%), evidence prioritization (83%), obtain-
ing a consensual partner’s standard (82%), allowing cancellation
requests (79%), evidence acceptance (76%), case acceptance
(70%), analyzing only the most probative evidence (63%), and
case-item restriction (54%). Fewer than half of respondents
reported that their laboratory had policies related to 100% analy-
sis (40%), prescreening for male DNA (37%), removing cases
that will not be prosecuted (35%), a no-suspect policy (31%), a
test-all-items policy (23%), and a SAK-only analysis policy
(22%). Sixteen percent reported they had some other policy in
place that we did not mention.
Table 2 presents results from stochastic frontier analysis. In
Model I, we enter only productive inputs (e.g., number of foren-
sic analysts, equipment) and other key laboratory characteristics
(i.e., part of a multi-laboratory system; presence of a case man-
ager and/or case supervisor; outsourcing SAK testing). Model I
also includes two dummy variables measuring the number of
SAK laboratories received in the previous year to control for the
overall volume of cases they manage annually. To create these
variables, we calculated terciles from responses to the item that
 STROM ET AL. . ESTIMATING CRIME LABORATORY EFFICIENCY 5

TABLE 1––Descriptive statistics for laboratories in the analysis sample TABLE 2––Stochastic frontier modeling results (N = 132).
(N = 132).
Measure Model 1 Model 2
Mean/ ‡
Measure % SD Min. Max. Number of SAK analysts (in logs) 0.49 (0.07) 0.49‡ (0.07)
Number of complete equipment units (in 0.13 (0.20) 0.30 (0.18)
Number of SAKs processed in 2013 294.83 403.28 5 1969 logs)
Total number of SAKs unprocessed as of 254.08 806.25 0 7100 Laboratory has any robotic systems −0.14 (0.23) 0.22 (0.22)
January 1, 2014 Laboratory is part of a multi-laboratory 0.13 (0.13) −0.03 (0.12)
At least one unprocessed SAK as of 94% system
January 1, 2014 Laboratory has a case manager or case 0.15 (0.12) 0.12 (0.11)
Number of SAK analysts* 7.92 8.31 0.2 36 supervisor
Number of complete equipment units† 1.55 0.81 1 5 Laboratory outsources any of their SAKs 0.03 (0.18) −0.36* (0.17)
Number of thermal cyclers 5.28 4.19 1 30 Number of SAKs received: middle tercile 1.07‡ (0.14) 0.93‡ (0.13)
Number of quantitative PCR thermal 1.98 1.25 1 8 Number of SAKs received: upper tercile 2.05‡ (0.18) 1.90‡ (0.15)
cyclers Laboratory has a case acceptance policy −0.34† (0.12)
Number of DNA analyzers 2.85 1.97 1 12 Laboratory has a policy to remove cases that −0.43† (0.13)
(electrophoresis/genetic) will not be prosecuted
Laboratory has robotic systems for 88% Laboratory has a policy to analyze only the 0.20 (0.14)
extraction most probative evidence
⋯has robotic systems for amplification 52% Laboratory has a SAK-only analysis policy 0.43† (0.13)
⋯has robotic systems for extraction and 49% Laboratory allows request cancellations 0.22 (0.13)
amplification Laboratory obtains a consensual partner’s −0.16 (0.15)
⋯is part of a multi-laboratory system 35% standard
⋯has a backlog reduction program 40% Technical efficiency 0.65‡ 0.69‡
⋯has a case acceptance policy 70% Standard deviation of technical efficiency (0.20) (0.18)
⋯has a policy to remove cases that will 35%
not be prosecuted SAK, sexual assault kit. Standard errors are in parentheses.
⋯has an evidence acceptance policy 76% *p < 0.05
†
⋯has an evidence prioritization policy 83% p < 0.01
‡
⋯has an evidence retention policy 88% p < 0.001.
⋯has a case-item restriction policy 54%
⋯has a 100% analysis policy 40%
⋯has a policy to test all items 23% laboratory inputs. Specifically, expanding the analyst workforce
⋯has a policy to analyze only the most 63%
by 100% is associated with a 49% increase in the number of
probative evidence
⋯has a SAK-only analysis policy 22% SAKs that could be tested (p < 0.001). In other words, by dou-
⋯has a policy to prescreen for male 37% bling the workforce, the average laboratory could expand their
DNA capacity to test SAK requests by nearly half. Our models do not
⋯allows request cancellations 79% show any statistically significant effects for equipment indica-
⋯has a policy to first obtain a 82%
consensual partner’s standard tors. Stated otherwise, laboratories that have more complete
⋯has a no-suspect policy 31% equipment sets do not test more SAKs on average than laborato-
⋯has some other policy 16% ries with fewer equipment sets. Likewise, having a robotic sys-
Observations 132 tem is not associated with a higher number of processed SAKs.
SAKs, sexual assault kits. Being a part of a multi-laboratory system or having a case man-
*
Measure was calculated using crime laboratory’s report of the average ager/supervisor is also not statistically associated with the num-
number of SAKs processed per analyst over the calendar year 2013 and ber of tested SAKs. As expected, laboratories that receive a
crime laboratory’s report of the total number of SAKs processed over the larger number of SAKs also process a larger number than those
calendar year 2013. One laboratory’s calculated number of analysts was top-
coded at 36 (originally calculated as 1081). who receive fewer SAKs. We also find that laboratories that
† only analyze SAK evidence process 43% more SAKs than labo-
For all laboratories in this sample, this measure indicates the number
of complete sets of thermal cyclers, quantitative PCR thermal cyclers, and ratories that also analyze other types of evidence.
electrophoresis detection systems or genetic analyzers. For laboratories that Model II shows that several characteristics and policies are
use robotic systems for DNA extraction and/or amplifications, this measure
associated with a lower number of processed SAKs. These
also incorporates these equipment items in calculating the number of com-
plete sets. include (i) outsourcing SAKs, (ii) having a case acceptance
policy, and (iii) having a case removal policy. It is also impor-
tant that both models produced low efficiency scores. In partic-
asked how many SAKs were processed in the previous calendar ular, the average efficiency scores ranged between 0.65 and
year. Thirty-three percent of laboratories were assigned to the 0.69 (p < 0.001). These coefficients indicate that on average,
low tercile (the reference category) (mean number of SAKs pro- laboratories are only testing about 65%–69% of the SAKs pos-
cessed = 45), 35% were assigned to the middle tercile (mean sible given the resources available to them. However, there is a
number of SAKs processed = 144), and 32% were assigned to substantial amount of variation around these averages, as the
the upper tercile (mean number of SAKs processed = 728). standard deviation ranges between 0.18 and 0.20, which sug-
Model II adds a subset of the laboratory policy measures pre- gests that some laboratories are exceptionally inefficient in
sented in Model I. We could not include all policy measures using their resources whereas others are considerably more effi-
because doing so resulted in data that were too thinly sliced to cient. Because Model 2 is saturated with a high number of pre-
obtain reasonable inference from the statistical model. All coeffi- dictor variables, we also assessed several additional models in
cients in the models represent the impact of the model covariate which the laboratory policy indicators were entered one at a
on the number of SAKs tested in percentage terms. time. These models showed only slight variations in the esti-
Both models yielded statistically significant effects. For exam- mates and levels of statistical significance that are currently
ple, in both models we find that analysts are highly productive presented.
6 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
Table 3 presents two postestimation calculations we conducted
among laboratories that had at least one unprocessed SAK at the
time of our survey (94% of laboratories in our sample). First,
using each laboratory’s technical efficiency estimate, we pre-
dicted the number of additional SAKs that could have been pro-
cessed under perfect technical efficiency. Next, we estimated the
proportion of laboratories that could have had zero unprocessed
SAKs if they operated under perfect technical efficiency. Across
the two models, our analysis revealed that if laboratories oper-
ated with perfect technical efficiency, they could have processed
111–129 additional SAKs, on average. However, 45%–55% of
laboratories would have been unable to eliminate their process-
ing queue even if they were operating under perfect technical
efficiency. Thus, even if all laboratories were operating under
perfect technical efficiency, up to 55% of them would still have
a SAK testing backlog. This means that although technical inef-
ficiency explains a large proportion of the number of unpro-
cessed SAKs, so do insufficient resources.
Additional calculations were made to derive a least-cost
expansion path from the stochastic frontier results. This theoreti-
cal result describes the optimal mix of productive inputs (i.e.,
SAK analysts and DNA analysis equipment) associated with
testing any quantity of SAK analysis requests. Specifically, we
wrote an equation that determines the optimal ratio of analysts
to equipment sets. The production model underlying our stochas-
tic frontier analysis implies the following least-cost expansion
path (see Appendix A):
SAK analysts %Δ SAKsprocessed=%Δ SAK analysts
¼ 
Equipment %Δ SAKs processed=%Δ Equipment
Price of equipment
 enforcement agencies not to submit SAKs for forensic testing,
Analyst salaries
Using the average wage reported by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics for forensic science technicians and the annual cost of
purchasing and maintaining a complete set of DNA analysis
equipment, we estimated the left-hand side ratio of analysts to
equipment. The results of this calculation are provided in
Table 4. The optimal ratio is between 3 and 4 analysts per
equipment set, depending on the cost of equipment purchased.
Combining this with the stochastic frontier results, a laboratory
could optimally increase its capacity by 50% by doubling the
number of analysts employed in addition to purchasing one new
equipment set for every 3–4 analysts added.
TABLE 3––Postestimation calculations based on models 1 and 2.
Postestimation Statistic Mean
Number of unprocessed SAKs at the end of 2013 269.02
Model 1
Additional SAKs that could have been processed under 129.17
perfect technical efficiency
Proportion of laboratories that could have had no 55%
unprocessed SAKs under perfect technical efficiency
Model 2
Additional SAKs that could have been processed under 111.08
perfect technical efficiency
Proportion of laboratories that could have had no 45%
unprocessed SAKs under perfect technical efficiency
SAK, sexual assault kit. Table only includes laboratories that reported at
least one unprocessed SAK (N = 124).
TABLE 4––Least-cost expansion path calculations and results.
Productive Input Low End High End
DNA processing equipment
Thermocyclers (per year) R1 $2000 $5000
DNA analyzers (per year) R2 $10,000 $17,500
Robotic systems for extraction (per year) R3 $5000 $12,000
Robotic systems for amplification (per year) $7500 $10,000
R4
Maintenance agreement (per year) R5 $100,000 $100,000
DNA processing equipment subtotal $124,500 $144,500
R6 = R1–R5
Analysts (average annual BLS salary) R7 $60,690 $60,690
Price of DNA processing equipment/analyst 2.05 2.38
wages R8 = R6/R7
Relative productivity R9 1.63 1.63
Optimal ratio of analysts to equipment 3 4
R10 = R8 * R9
Per year equipment costs were calculated by assuming a 10-year life of all
equipment; using this assumption, we divided the approximated full cost of a
new equipment purchase by 10.
Bureau of Labor Statistics salary was obtained for forensic science techni-
cian.
Relative productivity is given by the ratio of the coefficient on analysts
divided by the coefficient on equipment sets, which are reported in Table 2.
Discussion
Although considerable attention has focused on the problem
of untested SAKs in crime laboratories, research has said little
about the characteristics, practices, and policies of crime labora-
tories that lead to SAK testing efficiency. An ample (and grow-
ing) body of research has investigated the factors that cause law
yet there is a dearth of information about how untested SAKs
accumulate in crime laboratories and what can be done to
address this problem. More specifically, research has not
addressed whether insufficient laboratory resources or the inade-
quate use of existing resources are contributing factors. Although
we know that many crime laboratories are receiving more SAK
testing requests than they can accommodate, it has previously
been unknown whether laboratories are processing all SAKs pos-
sible given the resources they have available.
Our study analyzes laboratory efficiency in SAK processing,
including whether laboratories are testing the maximum number
of SAKs possible. The analysis also examines whether the accu-
mulation of untested SAKs in laboratories should be attributed
to a lack of resources to test all requests, inefficiencies in using
their resources, or both. Our findings are important as they offer
practical, scientifically based guidance to crime laboratories, pol-
icy makers, and other key stakeholders regarding how internal or
external dollars should be invested to expand laboratory capacity
SD most effectively for SAK testing.
The analysis revealed several important implications for labo-
827.44
ratories and the larger criminal justice and forensic fields. First,
148.55 doubling the number of forensic analysts is associated with a
49% increase in the number of SAKs that could be tested. This
finding is intuitive in the sense that increased labor power will
help to enhance productivity. Historically, state and local labora-
161.45 tories have invested significant resources in technology, equip-
ment, and software, which can help to streamline the processing
of forensic casework. However, this study is the first to quantify
the critical role that analysts play in laboratory efficiency in
SAK testing insofar that they are able to maximize technical
resources. More simply, SAK laboratory efficiency cannot be
 STROM ET AL.
surrogated by new equipment or software but requires having
enough trained and qualified analysts. Of course, it is important
to recognize that although our study has quantified the essential
role that staffing plays in processing SAKs, many laboratories
face real challenges to increasing their analyst labor force (e.g.,
a lack of necessary labor budgets to hire and maintain staff; rela-
tively low pay and long hours present challenges related to the
recruitment and retention of qualified forensic scientists; a lack
of capacity to support lengthy training processes that can last
anywhere from 6 months to 1.5 years; challenges addressing
health and wellness for analysts, including avoiding burnout;
and insufficient physical space in the laboratory to support add-
ing additional staff). These findings can be used by laboratory
directors or other leaders in state and local government to bolster
their requests for bringing additional forensic analysts onboard
and creating the infrastructure to do so.
Notably, our models do not find equipment sets and robotic
systems to have a statistically significant effect on the number of
SAKs tested in crime laboratories. It would be logical to assume
that laboratories with more budgetary freedom to invest in cutting
edge or essential pieces of equipment would also show higher
levels SAKs tested. It is possible that our measures do not address
the complexity of the relationship between technology and pro-
ductivity. For example, it might be difficult to fully quantify the
effects of equipment without considering how analysts use it. To
provide a crude example, equipment sets that process 100 samples
rather than 50 samples can process more efficiently in terms of
samples per unit of time. However, there are human labor hours
required to prepare and load the instruments with samples, a pro-
cess that is now more time intensive because there are more sam-
ples to manage. An increase in equipment processing power is
also accompanied by increased demands for data interpretation
and analysis, both of which still require human labor. Thus, the
impact of technology may be offset because of new forms of
labor related to the advanced technology.
Other statistically nonsignificant findings were also notewor-
thy, although not always unanticipated. For example, we do not
find it surprising that being a part of a multi-laboratory system
is not statistically associated with increases in the number of
SAKs tested. In some instances, laboratories that are part of such
a system may be able to shift some of their casework to a labo-
ratory that has more “available” time or capacity. However, in
most systems it is probably rare that one or more laboratories
have the capacity to take on additional casework. Moreover, it is
possible that the labor hours required to transferring casework
might have a negative impact on the laboratory’s overall testing
capacity. In other words, labor power that could have been used
for processing SAKs may instead be used to prepare casework
for transfer. We were surprised to find that having a laboratory
case manager or case supervisor was not associated with a
higher level of testing productivity. It would be logical to expect
that laboratories that have employed a managerial position to
oversee processing of forensic evidence would develop efficient
and coordinated processes for testing cases. In fact, past research
featuring interviews with laboratory personnel (see Strom and
colleagues [52]) has found that staff value the case manager/case
supervisor position because it helps ensure cases move along
through the queue, that all questions about each case are
answered without pulling an analyst off the line to investigate it,
and that cases are thoroughly completed before going out the
door. Despite this, our models do not show any effect of this
position on productivity. More research is needed to replicate
and explore this lack of statistical significance.
. ESTIMATING CRIME LABORATORY EFFICIENCY 7
Our analysis also found that outsourcing SAKs in addition to
numerous policy types are significantly associated with the num-
ber of SAKs processed. Specifically, we found that laboratories
outsourcing SAKs test 36% fewer SAKs than those that do not
outsource. This finding is intuitive—laboratories that send out
some SAKs will ultimately process fewer than those who do
not. Beyond this, there is an obvious need for human labor when
laboratories choose to prepare and coordinate SAK shipping to a
private laboratory. Even more critically, outsourcing can create a
massive bottleneck when all the results come back from the out-
sourced laboratory. The laboratory that outsourced the SAKs
must conduct an extensive technical review to take ownership of
the data before CODIS entry. This can require an investment in
labor that the laboratory may not be able to afford given it is
possible the reason for outsourcing was limited capacity in the
first place. Thus, for multiple reasons, it is sensical that laborato-
ries outsourcing some SAKs process fewer SAKs overall.
Models showed statistically significant effects for three policy
types. First, we found that having a case acceptance policy is
associated with lower numbers of SAKs tested. This finding is
expected; policies that screen out specific cases will reduce the
overall number of cases processed in laboratories with such a
policy. We also find that having a policy to remove cases that
will not be prosecuted is also associated with lower numbers of
SAKs tested. Although it is intuitive that laboratories reducing
the number of SAKs they have to test will have lower levels of
efficiency, the burden of pulling cases out of the case workflow
(i.e., diverting human labor away from the progression of SAKs
through the system) should also be considered. It is also worth
noting that in addition to having negative effects on productivity,
we do not recommend this practice given that the failure to test
these SAKs prohibits the opportunity for the offender’s DNA
profile to be uploaded into CODIS and potentially linked to
other unsolved crimes.
Our analyses revealed that having a SAK-only analysis policy
is associated with higher levels of productivity. This finding is
compelling, especially considering that having a policy to only
analyze the most probative evidence was found to be nonimpact-
ful. Our interpretation of these effects is that having a SAK-only
policy improves productivity because under these circumstances
the laboratory is processing the most probative evidence (the
SAK) compared with secondary evidence (e.g., bed linens). The
SAK is typically the best choice for analysis because it derives
directly from the victim’s body, and our results suggest that hav-
ing another policy to narrow the most probative evidence further
offers minimal returns. Thus, based on these findings we recom-
mend that laboratories not waste time on a policy at the sample
level. Instead, laboratories should test SAKs and avoid sec-
ondary evidence unless the SAK is negative.
Another key finding is that some laboratories exhibit substan-
tial technical inefficiencies. In other words, some laboratories are
not using their resources in ways that are adequately efficient or
effective for achieving a high level of SAK testing output.
Results showed that on average, laboratories are only testing
about 65%–69% of the SAKs possible, given the resources they
have available to them. However, even if the laboratories in our
sample were operating under perfect technical efficiency, only
about half of them could eliminate their SAK testing queue with
available resources. This means that although inefficiency is a
problem, laboratories also need additional resources to accom-
modate the testing requests they receive. Based on this research,
resource investments laboratories might consider to increase pro-
cessing capacity include (i) increasing staff; (ii) redefining what
8 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
technicians can do on a case (e.g., having technicians, rather
than analysts, resolve case questions, ensure cases are ready for
analysis, prepare paperwork, cut and prep samples, package evi-
dence for return to agencies, and close out case paperwork); (iii)
dividing staff into specialized teams, such as a sexual assault
team that only works SAK cases; (iv) diverting especially chal-
lenging data interpretation (e.g., complex mixtures) to a handful
of specially trained staff; and (v) increasing equipment in strate-
gic ways, with a special consideration of how doing so will
impact human labor and staffing needs.
Finally, our models suggest that if laboratories want to hire
new analysts and purchase new equipment, they should make
these purchases at a ratio of 3–4 analysts for every purchased
equipment set. This was found to be an optimal ratio in the
sense that they will be able to expand their productive capacity
with the smallest impact on their budget. The implication of this
finding is that spending all the laboratory’s budget on one piece
of equipment might not be optimal. Instead, laboratories should
consider purchasing equipment to create more complete equip-
ment sets. They should think about their workflow and recognize
what sample size (batch) an analyst typically works with, then
decide how these samples move through the process and there-
fore how equipment sets should be composed (e.g., several
extraction robots that do 35 samples each but only 2 thermal
cyclers at 96 samples each and only two sequencers at 96 sam-
ples each). Based on these findings, we argue that buying equip-
ment without adding analysts may not be as helpful as doing
both simultaneously. Rather, laboratories must think strategically
about the long-term implications of investing in new technology
and how additional staff will be needed to optimize the produc-
tive outputs of that equipment. In light of structural contingency
theory, these findings may be interpreted to mean that some
efforts to adapt to an increased demand of previously unsubmit-
ted SAKs may be misguided; the current study’s results high-
light which efforts may be most efficient for crime laboratories
to pursue in earnest.
Limitations
As with any research attempting to model these complex
concepts, this study has limitations to acknowledge. First, effi-
ciency as it is defined here is static and represents only a snap-
shot in time. Furthermore, efficiency in terms of SAK testing
only considers the technical components of SAK processing in
laboratories and does not account for criminal justice outcomes
pertaining to case closure or prosecution nor factors related to
victims. Our study was also focused on understanding the role
of equipment, policies, analysts, and the volume of SAKs sub-
mitted for testing in laboratories’ abilities to process SAKs but
did not account for competing responsibilities related to non-
sexual assault cases and evidence or noncasework activities.
Future longitudinal studies should explore the impact of all
resources and responsibilities on efficiency over time and
across different outcomes (e.g., case closures) to provide more
nuanced information about the value of various laboratory
resource inputs. Likewise, it may be considered a limitation
that our questionnaire only asked respondents to report the
number of tested SAKs, which does not accurately reflect the
complex reality of SAK submissions. In practice, the submis-
sion of SAKs can occur across multiple transactions, like when
a CODIS-eligible profile is not obtained on the items that the
agency originally submitted for testing and that in turn might
encourage them to submit additional items. Future research
should more carefully capture the back-and-forth nature of sub-
missions and identify whether these interactions influence a
laboratory’s capacity to test SAKs. Notably, these data were
self-reported by laboratory staff rather than based on official
audits or administrative records. It is possible that respondents
inflated the number of SAKs tested in the previous year to
portray their laboratory more positively, especially given the
increasingly negative attention on SAK backlogs.
A final limitation is that although this is one of the first stud-
ies to examine the connections between laboratory policies and
the testing of SAKs, our operationalization of policies oversim-
plifies the role they play and their impact on testing. Our policy
variables are binary, measuring only the presence or absence of
these policies and therefore do not fully capture their content,
thoroughness, or the extent to which they are implemented with
fidelity. However, our analysis provides a critical base for future
research, which should work to unpack the nuances associated
with policy implementation and how various factors (e.g., com-
pleteness, level of detail, mode of implementation) impact SAK
processing.
Conclusion
The criminal justice system has received intense scrutiny for
untested SAKs. Fortunately, there are efforts in place to address
the problem, including an influx of federal and state funding not
only to inventory and test previously unsubmitted SAKs but also
to build capacity through training and policy development in
agencies. Although these efforts have produced positive results
and indicate reform potential, we must also acknowledge the
challenges that agencies—along with their partners in forensics,
prosecution, victim advocacy, and medical care—face in the
struggle to respond fully to sexual assault. Undoubtedly, these
challenges are complex and will require thoughtful and holistic
solutions. It is imperative that researchers continue to build the
knowledge base and produce actionable research that identifies
and informs effective strategies and practices for ensuring sexual
assault evidence is properly collected, investigated, submitted to
a crime laboratory, and subjected to thorough forensic testing.
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10 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES

52. Strom K, Hendrix J, Melton PA, Parish WJ. Efficiency in processing Applying this rule to a Translog functional form, we get the
sexual assault kits in crime laboratories and law enforcement agencies: following equation:
final report. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2017.

x2 ðβ1 þ β11 lnðx1 Þ þ β12 lnðx2 Þ þ γ1 pÞ p1

Appendix A. The Least-Cost Expansion Path ¼ , (3)
x1 ðβ2 þ β12 lnðx1 Þ þ β22 lnðx2 Þ þ γ2 pÞ p2
The lowest cost expansion path comprises the set of all opti-
mal input mixes. To derive an equation that defines such a set, which implicitly defines x1 as a function of x2. Unfortunately,
consider the following minimization problem: no explicit solution can be derived from (Eq. 3). A useful
approximation to the lowest cost expansion path may be derived,
min fp1 x1 þ p2 x2 þ λ½q∗  Fðx1 ,x2 Þg (1) however, if we approximate the terms in parentheses with the
x ,x
1 2 average value across all laboratories in our sample. That is, let
where pk denotes the price associated with input xk, q* denotes n
the maximum number of SAKs that the laboratory could pro- ^1 ¼ n1 ∑ β^1 þ β^11 ln ðx1 Þ þ β^12 ln ðx2 Þ þ ^γ 1 p,
α (4)
i¼1
cess, and F (x1, x2) denotes the laboratory’s production function.
The first-order conditions for problem (Eq. 1) imply the follow-
and let
ing relationship:
n
∂Fðx1 ,x2 Þ=∂x1 p1 ^2 ¼ n1 ∑ β^2 þ β^12 ln ðx1 Þ þ β^22 ln ðx2 Þ þ ^γ 2 p,
α (5)
¼ (2) i¼1
∂Fðx1 ,x2 Þ=∂x2 p2
Then, (Eq. 4) and (Eq. 5) can be inserted into (Eq. 3) to
Equation (Eq. 2) implicitly defines input x1 as a function of obtain:
x2. The associated explicit mapping represents the laboratory’s
lowest cost expansion path in x2 − x1 coordinate space. ^1 p2
α
To derive the lowest cost expansion path associated with this x1 ¼ x 2 ,
^2 p1
α
modified Translog production function, we use the following
helpful rule of differentiation:
which provides a linear approximation to the lowest cost expan-
sion path associated with the modified Translog production
∂Fðx1 ,x2 Þ ∂lnF ðx1 ,x2 Þ
¼ F ðx1 ,x2 Þ function.
∂xk ∂xk