In S e a r c h of Identity:

An Autobiography

Anwar el-Sadat
(Rev. ed. 1992)

Translated by:
Jack L. Rives, Lt Colonel, USAF
Seminar H (Amb Newton)
National War College
September 18, 1992

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 But to come to those who have become princes through their own
merits and not by f o r t u n e . . , it will be seen that they owed nothing
to fortune but the opportunity which gave them matter to be
shaped into what form they thought fit; and without that
opportunity their powers would have been wasted, and without
their powers the opportunity would have come in vain.

- Machiavelli

The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable

one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all
progress depends on the unreasonable man.

- George Bernard Shaw

Either lead, follow, or get out of the way.

- Popular Bumper-Sticker

Translator's Disclaimer
and
Note on Sources

Following is an "excerpt" of the "1992 revised edition" of Anwar el-Sadat's In Search

of Identity: An Autobiography. The material is based on the seminar readings:
excerpts from the 1977 (original) edition of Sadat's book; Bard E. O'Neill, "The
October War: A Political-Military Assessment," Air University Review, 25 (July-
August 1974): 27-35; and Henry Kissinger, "Why We Were Surprised" from Chapter
11 in Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 459-461, 465-467.
 9

The October War

I r e c a l l one starry e v e n i n g w e l l over a y e a r b e f o r e t h e

O c t o b e r War, w h e n I r e f l e c t e d on the c o n d i t i o n s f a c i n g m y people.

We w e r e a p o o r country, but worse, we w e r e v e r y d e m o r a l i z e d . I

g a z e d to the n o r t h e a s t for both the cause and the p o s s i b l e cure.

There lay Israel, the state we had long v o w e d to d r i v e into the

sea. She, however, was the p r o u d victor: as a c u l m i n a t i o n of

h e r w a r s a g a i n s t us, she now stood upon our lands in t h e Sinai.

Her o c c u p a t i o n cost us e c o n o m i c a l l y ; it was an o b v i o u s security

threat; and e v e r y day it p r o v i d e d a t a u n t i n g a f f r o n t to our

n a t i o n a l pride. The I s r a e l i s b e l i e v e d t e r r i t o r y p r o v i d e d safety

and t h e y w e r e u n w i l l i n g to enter m e a n i n g f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s .

N e i t h e r our A r a b b r o t h e r s nor the w o r l d at large p r o v i d e d real

s u p p o r t to us. My t h o u g h t s t u r n e d to the Soviets, who had become

an u n r e l i a b l e ally. L o o k i n g into the night sky, I decided that

d e s p i t e everything, now was the time for my n a t i o n to r e a c h for a

new destiny.

I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y s u c c e s s e s had c r e a t e d a false p i c t u r e .

C o n t r a r y to p o p u l a r conception, they w e r e not i n v i n c i b l e a n d we

w e r e not inept. I had to win back h o n o r and p r e s t i g e for m y

people--not only in Egypt but t h r o u g h o u t the A r a b world. It

w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y to inflict losses on Israel. The m y t h that

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they w e r e u n b e a t a b l e had grown, but I k n e w the reality: Israel

is a s m a l l country, little able to suffer a s i g n i f i c a n t loss of

soldiers, property, and equipment. I n e e d e d to a f f e c t the p s y c h e

of the I s r a e l i s to m a k e t h e m u n d e r s t a n d that t e r r i t o r y a l o n e

p r o v i d e s no real security.

T h e 1972 s u m m i t c o n f e r e n c e b e t w e e n N i x o n and B r e z h n e v had

r e i n f o r c e d the s u p e r p o w e r e m p h a s i s on detente. The p r a c t i c a l

e f f e c t for us was a d r a m a t i c r e d u c t i o n in S o v i e t support. At the

same time, A m e r i c a n b a c k i n g of Israel was as s t r o n g as ever. My

c o u n t r y h a d b e e n r e d u c e d to a m e a n i n g l e s s p a w n in the b a l a n c e of

p o w e r game. The status quo was a c c e p t a b l e to Israel and now

a p p a r e n t l y also to the Soviets and Americans, but it was c l e a r l y

i n t o l e r a b l e for us.

I k n e w the U n i t e d States had the c a p a c i t y to be an e f f e c t i v e

mediator in the M i d d l e East, but I had to c o n v i n c e the A m e r i c a n s

it was in t h e i r i n t e r e s t to do so. At the time, the A m e r i c a n s

had c h o s e n to d e - e m p h a s i z e our area; they w e r e p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h

such matters as Vietnam, detente, the o p e n i n g w i t h China, and the

Watergate debacle. The U n i t e d States was not w i l l i n g to

intervene a g a i n s t Israel to b r i n g about a fair r e s o l u t i o n of our

dispute. P a r t of the reason, no doubt, was b e c a u s e t h e y v i e w e d

m y n a t i o n as a p a r t n e r of the S o v i e t s - - a n a t i o n not to be helped.

For years, the Soviets had shown a p p r e c i a t i o n for our

233
friendship by p r o v i d i n g substantial aid. They w e r e e s p e c i a l l y

helpful with military equipment and training. By 1972, however,

their s u p p o r t had d e g e n e r a t e d to a h a l f - h e a r t e d responsiveness

that was unacceptable. Even when they p r o m i s e d to p r o v i d e

c e r t a i n weapons, deliveries were incessantly delayed. M a n y of

the w e a p o n s that were finally shipped were not the ones we

needed.

Ultimately, my disgust boiled over. In July 1972, I called

in the s o v i e t ambassador and told him p l a i n l y that I refused to

accept his n a t i o n ' s arrogant manner of d e a l i n g w i t h us. I

provided a deadline of one week for the 15,000 Soviet m i l i t a r y

advisors to depart my country. They could either take t h e i r

aircraft and e q u i p m e n t when they left, or they could sell t h e m to

us. The Soviets met my deadline, taking most of their m i l i t a r y

equipment as they withdrew.

The Soviet d e p a r t u r e worked to our benefit. They w e r e not

p o p u l a r w i t h my countrymen, and my expulsion order was w i d e l y

praised in Egypt. Of course, the level of Soviet s u p p o r t h a d

already markedly diminished, and I foresaw no l i k e l i h o o d of a

return to the days of bountiful aid in any event. The p e r c e p t i o n

that the Soviet d e p a r t u r e meant we would not launch a m i l i t a r y

offensive was also important. In reality, we could not h a v e

initiated an a s s a u l t while the Soviet advisors remained in

country. I needed freedom of action to face the Israelis without

234
the limitations direct superpower involvement imposed. The

decisions about my nation's security were for m e to m a k e a n d no

consultation with or a p p r o v a l f r o m any other country was needed.

I was able to s e c u r e an a g r e e m e n t with Hafez al-Assad for

Syria to join us in a c o o r d i n a t e d attack against Israel. By t h e

fall of 1972, I moved to a c t u a l war planning, directing my war

minister to flesh o u t the battle. He s o o n r e p o r t e d back that our

forces would be r e a d y even faster than I had requested. For my

personal reassurance of our r e a d i n e s s , I convened the Supreme

Council of t h e armed forces. As I feared in t h e back of m y mind,

I learned the war minister had lied to me. He h a d failed even to

convey my plans to t h e p r o p e r military commanders! His real

reason for t h e d u p l i c i t y and failure to act: he was afraid to go

to war. I replaced him with a war minister who had the proper

attitude. Quickly, the new minister worked with the military on

my plans f o r an offensive war. I was satisfied we h a d sufficient

military power to a c h i e v e my goals.

Preparing the military w a s n o t enough. I also needed to

improve our standing in t h e c o m m u n i t y of n a t i o n s . Israel had

been carved o u t of A r a b lands following the Second World War.

Her aggressive nature had been shown in 1957 and then most

clearly by her cowardly attack in 1967. Other nations began to

understand our p o s i t i o n and to o f f e r support. I could see the

prospects for the virtual diplomatic isolation of Israel. As a

235
block, the t h i r d w o r l d c o u n t r i e s d e n o u n c e d the c o n t i n u i n g Israeli

o c c u p a t i o n of A r a b lands. M o s t of the A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s w e r e

p o i s e d to o f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t d i p l o m a t i c support. The t r a d i t i o n a l

disputes a m o n g the A r a b states also calmed, as all s h a r e d the

g o a l of r e t a k i n g the lands Israel had seized in 1967. I believed

we w o u l d be able to take a d v a n t a g e of l o n g - h e l d p l a n s to use oil

as a w e a p o n a g a i n s t Israel. The e c o n o m i c tool was an i m p o r t a n t

a d j u n c t to m y m i l i t a r y plans.

The seeds for d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s on m a n y f r o n t s had been

planted. The c o a l i t i o n of support was u n p r e c e d e n t e d , but I k n e w

it w a s fragile. I w o u l d have to m o v e q u i c k l y to t a k e p r o p e r

a d v a n t a g e of the m a n y f a v o r a b l e factors that w e r e c o a l e s c i n g .

M y u l t i m a t e goal was to r e g a i n the o c c u p i e d lands. The

issue w a s how to b r i n g the p r e s s u r e on Israel to a c h i e v e our

objectives. Our b a c k r o o m efforts to r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t w i t h the

I s r a e l i s m a d e it clear they v i e w e d us w i t h contempt; they

b e l i e v e d we had n e i t h e r the will nor the p o w e r to d e f e a t them.

T h e y saw no r e a s o n to n e g o t i a t e a fair agreement. Without a

d r a m a t i c m o v e on our part, Israeli l e a d e r s h i p w o u l d not r e s o l v e

the S i n a i issue. I s t u d i e d the s i t u a t i o n o b j e c t i v e l y and

r e a l i z e d t h a t e v e n the m o s t intense d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s w o u l d be

fruitless. I d e c i d e d to embrace Clausewitz: the p o l i t i c a l m e a n s

of w a r w o u l d be u s e d to a c h i e v e my p s y c h o l o g i c a l and d i p l o m a t i c

objectives.

236
 W h a t w e r e the risks of war? A n o t h e r m i l i t a r y d e f e a t by

Israel w o u l d m e a n the end for me. Politically, I c o u l d not

survive; my physical safety w o u l d also be at g r a v e risk. An

I s r a e l i v i c t o r y c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y open the d o o r for a L i b y a n

m i l i t a r y v e n t u r e a g a i n s t my people. D e s p i t e all this, I was

a b s o l u t e l y c o n v i n c e d that war was the r i g h t choice.

I n e e d e d to a c h i e v e at least initial m i l i t a r y success. Even

if the I s r a e l i s d r o v e us back, I could f o r e s e e an e v e n t u a l

d i p l o m a t i c victory. S u r p r i s e was essential. I m a d e a n u m b e r of

m o v e s to c a u s e Israel to d i s c o u n t as a bluff my final

preparations for war. The removal of the S o v i e t a d v i s o r s h a d

a l r e a d y b o l s t e r e d the Israeli belief t h a t we w o u l d not fight. My

whispers to a E u r o p e a n d i p l o m a t about "secret plans" to v i s i t the

United Nations in O c t o b e r were, as expected, dutifully conveyed

to the Israelis. The I s r a e l i s simply did not b e l i e v e I had a

military option. T h e y t h o u g h t my a g g r e s s i v e s p e e c h e s w e r e e m p t y

rhetoric. T h e y a s s u m e d I was m e r e l y p l a y i n g out a war of words.

In b o t h M a y and A u g u s t 1973, we e n g a g e d in l a r g e - s c a l e m i l i t a r y

e x e r c i s e s t h a t c a u s e d the I s r a e l i s to r e s p o n d w i t h full

mobilizations. W h e n we launched our O c t o b e r attack, Israel had

s e e n all the s i g n a l s but d e c i d e d to save the costs of a n o t h e r

mobilization.

T h e p a t h was thus p a v e d for our o p e n i n g s u c c e s s e s in the air

and on the land. F o l l o w i n g our early v i c t o r i o u s battles, the

237
A m e r i c a n s p r o v i d e d m a s s i v e aid to Israel, and t h e y w e r e a b l e to

prepare a counter-offensive. W h e n the c e a s e - f i r e came, however,

we h a d t a k e n back a p o r t i o n of our Sinai that h a d b e e n c a p t u r e d

in 1967.

Our m i l i t a r y efforts b r o u g h t about the i m m e d i a t e r e s t o r a t i o n

of A r a b pride. We d e s t r o y e d the m y t h of an i n v i n c i b l e Israeli

military. I s r a e l began to r e a l i z e that the t e m p o r a r y p o s s e s s i o n

of our lands did not provide an eternal i n s u r a n c e policy.

S u p p o r t by my c o u n t r y m e n and also from our friends in t h e r e g i o n

and a r o u n d the w o r l d h e l p e d us to m e e t our goals. The oil

e m b a r g o was t a k i n g effect, and it c l e a r l y added p r e s s u r e to h e l p

us r e a c h our objectives. Of c r i t i c a l importance, our v i c t o r y

g a v e me the p o w e r to later p u r s u e p e a c e w i t h Israel d e s p i t e

protests f r o m our A r a b friends. It was my people, a f t e r all, who

had s u c c e s s f u l l y fought the Israelis. We had e a r n e d the r i g h t to

c o m p l e t e our m i l i t a r y t r i u m p h w i t h a f a v o r a b l e p e a c e s e t t l e m e n t .

T h e O c t o b e r War m e a n t the s u p e r p o w e r s w o u l d once a g a i n

engage in the area. Their involvement in the war r e i n f o r c e d the

image of the M i d d l e East as a powder keg that could p r o v o k e a

S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n confrontation. The v a r i o u s d i p l o m a t i c

i n i t i a t i v e s - - i n c l u d i n g the oil e m b a r g o - - c a u s e d the U n i t e d States

to m o v e from its reflexive, blind support of Israel. I saw real

prospects for the U n i t e d States to m e d i a t e the p e a c e p r o c e s s and

f o r c e I s r a e l to bargain.

238
 In 1967, Israel showed the great v a l u e of s e i z i n g the

initiative and u t i l i z i n g the i n s t r u m e n t s of s u r p r i s e and

deception. We did the same in the O c t o b e r W a r - - a n d v i c t o r y

resulted. We c l e a r l y understood, however, t h a t no m a t t e r h o w

great our m i l i t a r y success, war was m e r e l y an i n s t r u m e n t and not

the end in itself. A f t e r I saw we had r e a c h e d our o b j e c t i v e s , we

l i m i t e d the s u f f e r i n g and casualties. That also h e l p e d us in

later d i p l o m a t i c efforts.

A n a t i o n c a n n o t b a r g a i n w h e n its o p p o n e n t does not b e l i e v e

it has the p o w e r to e s c a l a t e the stakes if n e c e s s a r y to e n f o r c e

its will. Paradoxically, I w e n t to war to m a k e peace: until

Israel p e r c e i v e d we had s u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h to pose a real

threat, no p e a c e f u l r e s o l u t i o n of our c o n f l i c t was p o s s i b l e .

The c o m p l e x i t y of my story should not o b s c u r e s o m e s i m p l e

truths. A leader m u s t c o n c e n t r a t e on a limited o b j e c t i v e and

t h e n use all a v a i l a b l e m e a n s to a c h i e v e it. No s t r a t e g y can be

guaranteed, but once a good p l a n is chosen, diversions f r o m the

l o n g - t e r m goal can lead to failure. In the end, I had u s e d

virtually all the tools of s t a t e c r a f t in p u r s u i t of my plan. The

situation I had p o n d e r e d that starry night may h a v e s e e m e d

hopeless. I saw it as an opportunity. W i t h some g o o d f o r t u n e

and t h e g r a c e of Allah, we succeeded. The u l t i m a t e r e s u l t

v a l i d a t e d my strategy.

239