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B. H. LIDDELL HART:

THE STRATEGY OF THE INDIRECT APPROACH

AND THE COUNTER-NARCOTICS CAMPAIGN

COLONEL ANTHONY A. WOOD, USMC

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1990 -
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
B.H. Liddell Hart: The Strategy of the Indirect Approach and the 5b. GRANT NUMBER
Counter-Narcotics Campaign
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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

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National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J
McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
 Narcotics is the m o s t d a n g e r o u s c u r r e n t t h r e a t to n a t i o n a l
security. O d d l y enough, and d e s p i t e f o r t y - f i v e y e a r s of c o l d w a r
c o n t i n g e n c y planning, it is also p r o b a b l y the m o s t c l e a r l y
d e f i n e d t h r e a t -- and one w h i c h lends itself to " c l a s s i c a l "
c a m p a i g n planning. In c o m p a r i s o n w i t h either the t h r e a t of
g e n e r a l w a r w i t h the Soviets or a m a j o r e c o n o m i c c r i s i s involving
the d e f i c i t and i n t e r n a t i o n a l debt situation, the n a r c o t i c s
t h r e a t is b o t h less h y p o t h e t i c a l and m o r e imminent.
W h y is the n a r c o t i c s t h r e a t so c l e a r l y d e f i n e d ?
B e c a u s e we k n o w the n a r c o t i c s cartels' general
s t r a t e g i c objectives.

B e c a u s e we can identify the areas s u p p o r t i n g t h e vital

f a c i l i t i e s and crops.

Because, in m a n y cases, we k n o w the i d e n t i t i e s of

p r i n c i p a l leaders and l i e u t e n a n t s - and t h e i r habits.

B e c a u s e we have e x p e r i e n c e w i t h the v a r i o u s t a c t i c s and

m e t h o d s w h i c h the c a r t e l s e m p l o y to m a r k e t t h e i r
p r o d u c t as well as s u b v e r t civil, military, and m o r a l
authority.

And b e c a u s e we can d i s c e r n the o u t l i n e s of the

p o l i t i c a l and social f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h our e f f o r t s
to e l i m i n a t e the t h r e a t m u s t be mounted.

We also have e v a l u a t e d our own "friendly" situation. We

have a n a t i o n a l "Czar" w h o s e o f f i c e of the N a t i o n a l D r u g C o n t r o l
P o l i c y has largely i d e n t i f i e d (and in some cases marshalled) the
v a r i o u s r e s o u r c e s n e c e s s a r y to w a g i n g a long and b i t t e r campaign.
Equally, we appear to have d e c i d e d that the "center of g r a v i t y "
is the d e m a n d side, w i t h supply an i m p o r t a n t but lesser s t r a t e g i c
objective.
In a d d i t i o n to these key d e c i s i o n s on basic o r g a n i z a t i o n and
objectives, we appear near a w o r k i n g c o n s e n s u s in four o t h e r
c r i t i c a l areas a f f e c t i n g the s t r e n g t h of our effort.
First, our c o m m i t m e n t will have to be one for the long-haul.
In fact, that c o m m i t m e n t will p r o b a b l y e x t e n d for a l o n g e r time
than that of any single war (much less campaign) in our history.

1 NATiONAl DE : NSE UNIVERSITY

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 Second, we will have to accept that striking effective blows
a g a i n s t the narcotics traffickers will at some point d r a w
retaliation against not only the law e n f o r c e m e n t and m i l i t a r y
personnel engaged in c o u n t e r - n a r c o t i c operations, but also
a g a i n s t our senior civil, military, and national political
leadership (as well as their families).
The third area of attention is the role of the media. Here,
we will have to accept that progress in this "war" is likely to
be m e a s u r e d by new yardsticks which are both more subtle and less
adaptable to graphic p r e s e n t a t i o n than were either "body counts,"
"villages pacified," or "kilometers advanced."
The final area is political. A consensus appears to be
emerging that the necessary reduction in the n a r c o t i c s threat
must not be achieved at the expense of key national political
values or the sacrifice of essential civil liberties. This
still-forming consensus is also the initial basis for the "rules
of engagement" which will increasingly dictate the n a t u r e of
counter-narcotics actions within the United States.
But, despite a wealth of specific k n o w l e d g e on the t h r e a t
and an emerging unity in key public attitudes, a strategic design
is still missing. B. H. Liddell Hart's "indirect approach" is
one which offers to effectively m e l d the d i s p a r a t e elements into
a national counter-narcotic strategy.
"Furthermore, while the h o r i z o n of
grand strategy is bounded by the
war, grand strategy looks beyond
the war to the subsequent peace.
It should not only combine the
various instruments, but so r e g u l a t e
their use as to avoid damage to the
future state of peace - for its
security and prosperity."
Strateqy, page 336

"Strategy depends for success, first

and most, on a sound c a l c u l a t i o n and
c o o r d i n a t i o n of the end and the means.
The end must be p r o p o r t i o n e d to the
total means, and the means used in
gaining each intermediate e n d . . . m u s t

2
 be p r o p o r t i o n e d to the v a l u e and n e e d s
of that end - w h e t h e r it be to g a i n
an o b j e c t i v e or to fulfill a
c o n t r i b u t o r y purpose. An e x c e s s may be
as h a r m f u l as a d e f i c i e n c y . "
Strateqy, p a g e 336

The c o n t e n t of these two q u o t e s s u g g e s t s that, as we d e v e l o p

our strategy, we should c o n s i d e r the f u t u r e f o r m of t h r e e sets of
relationships: the individual A m e r i c a n and his civil rights; the
federal f r a m e w o r k linking state and c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t ; and, the
web of future r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n W a s h i n g t o n and t h o s e
countries involved in the c o u n t e r - n a r c o t i c s c a m p a i g n --
p a r t i c u l a r l y f r i e n d l y Latin A m e r i c a n and A s i a n states s e r v i n g as
u n w i l l i n g hosts to cartel operations. A v i c t o r y at the c o m p l e t e
expense of any of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s m a y be no v i c t o r y at all.
The quotes also e m p h a s i z e the i m p o r t a n c e of a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n
ends and means, w h i l e at the same t i m e h i g h l i g h t i n g L i d d e l l
Hart's p a r a l l e l c o n c e r n w i t h e v e n t u a l v e r s u s i m m e d i a t e results.
" . . . d e s t r u c t i o n (of the e n e m y force)
may not be e s s e n t i a l for a decision,
and for f u l f i l l m e n t of the w a r aim.
In the case of a state t h a t is s e e k i n g
not c o n q u e s t but the m a i n t e n a n c e of
its security, the aim is f u l f i l l e d
if the threat be r e m o v e d - if the
enemy is led to a b a n d o n his p u r p o s e . "
Strategy, page 338

T h e s e w o r d s suggest that the c o m p l e t e e l i m i n a t i o n of

narcotics trafficking isn't a r e a l i s t i c o b j e c t i v e for the s u p p l y
part of the "war." Instead it s u g g e s t s t h a t r e m o v i n g the t h r e a t
p o s e d by o r q a n i z e d n a r c o t i c s o p e r a t i o n s e x p o r t i n g and
distributing in q u a n t i t y may be m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e and a t t a i n a b l e .
More importantly (and indirectly), it s u g g e s t s that r e d u c i n g
d e m a n d is a m o r e p e r m a n e n t m e a n s of e n s u r i n g n a t i o n a l security.
I m p l i c i t l y then, we should c o n s i d e r a c c e p t i n g some low level of
n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g w i t h i n our b o r d e r s e v e n a f t e r c o m p l e t i o n of
a s u c c e s s f u l campaign.
 "(the s t r a t e g i s t ' s ) . . . t r u e aim is not
so m u c h to seek b a t t l e s as to seek a
s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n so a d v a n t a g e o u s
t h a t if it does not of itself p r o d u c e
the decision, its c o n t i n u a t i o n by a
b a t t l e is sure to achieve this. In
other words, d i s l o c a t i o n is the a i m
of strategy; its sequel may be e i t h e r
the e n e m y ' s d i s s o l u t i o n or his e a s i e r
d i s r u p t i o n in battle.
Strateqy, p a g e 339

In short, L i d d e l l Hart w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t we seek to create

situations overseas in w h i c h actions by f r i e n d l y h o s t n a t i o n s
t h e m s e l v e s cause d i s l o c a t i o n to cartel o p e r a t i o n s . At least
initially, such situations, in w h i c h we m i g h t w e l l t a k e an active
and c o m p l e m e n t a r y role, are u s u a l l y p r e f e r a b l e to u n i l a t e r a l
actions on our p a r t w h i c h m i g h t well h a r d e n r e s i s t a n c e r a t h e r
t h a n a c h i e v e the d e s i r e d d i s l o c a t i o n of d r u g o p e r a t i o n s . In a
m o r e c o n c r e t e vein, and p u r s u i n g the i n d i r e c t approach, both a
g r o w i n g E u r o p e a n c o n c e r n w i t h n a r c o t i c s p e n e t r a t i o n and the
onerous debt o w e d U.S. banks by m a n y L a t i n A m e r i c a n and A s i a n
nations may o f f e r a part of the leverage n e e d e d to c r e a t e
situations in the h o s t nations leading to the d e s i r e d
dislocation.
In the case of the demand side, a c t i o n s such as l e g a l i z a t i o n
of r a n d o m drug t e s t i n g by e m p l o y e r s w o u l d indirectly enlist
t h o u s a n d s of new "soldiers" in our ranks, and at the same time
b e g i n to d i s l o c a t e the cartels' s u p p o r t i n g s u p p l y and sales
n e t w o r k s w i t h i n our borders.
"The m o v e a r o u n d the enemy's front
a g a i n s t his r e a r . . . t a k e s the line
of least r e s i s t a n c e is the line of
least expectation. T h e y are the
two faces of the same c o i n . . . f o r
if we m e r e l y take the line of
least resistance, its o b v i o u s n e s s
will appeal to the o p p o n e n t also;
and this line may no longer be
that of least resistance...
 In studying the physical aspect we
must never loose sight of the
psychological, and only when both are
combined is the strategy truly an
indirect approach, calculated to
dislocate the opponent's balance...

...it is usually necessary for the

dislocating move to be preceded by
a move or moves, which can best be
described by the term "distract" in
its literal sense of "to draw a s u n d e r . "
The purpose of this d i s t r a c t i o n is to
deprive the enemy of his freedom of
action, and it should operate in both
the physical and p s y c h o l o g i c a l
spheres. In the physical, it should
cause a distention of his forces or
their diversion to u n p r o f i t a b l e
ends...so that they cannot interfere
with one's own d e c i s i v e l y intended
move. In the p s y c h o l o g i c a l sphere,
the same effect is sought by p l a y i n g
upon the fears of, and by deceiving,
the opposing c o m m a n d . . . t o m y s t i f y
and to m i s l e a d causes distraction,
while surprise is the essential cause
of dislocation. It is through the
distraction of the commander's m i n d
that the distraction of his forces
follows. The loss of his freedom
of action is the sequel to the
loss of his freedom of conception."
strategy, page 341

Clearly Liddell Hart's m e s s a g e for a c o u n t e r - n a r c o t i c s

strategy is to continually distract, dislocate, and strike at
traffickers by p a r a l y z i n g their judgement and p e r s p e c t i v e through
a constantly re-adjusted package of actions in both the
psychological and physical realms. In addition to f e e d i n g a
constant stream of advice, materiel assistance, training, and
intelligence support to c o o p e r a t i v e regimes, we m i g h t well
consider less obvious moves such as e s t a b l i s h i n g rival "STING"
operations in Latin America and Asia to d e s t a b i l i z e the
situation, begin price wars, and sow dissension. Collateral
actions might include simultaneous announcement by the United
States, European, and L a t i n A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s of h i g h b o u n t i e s
on the heads of s e l e c t e d drug lords.
In any case, the r e q u i r e m e n t is a c o m b i n a t i o n of c o o r d i n a t e d
and c o m p l e m e n t a r y actions w h i c h w o u l d d i v e r t d r u g o r g a n i z a t i o n
resources, p l a y on innate fears of b e t r a y a l and m i s t r u s t , strike
in s u p p o s e d l y safe and p r o t e c t e d areas, and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y m o v e
a g a i n s t d e m a n d through fears of loss of e m p l o y m e n t and r e l a t e d
initiatives. Such a c o m b i n a t i o n w o u l d be both i n d i r e c t and
effective.
"...to ensure r e a c h i n g an o b j e c t i v e
one should have a l t e r n a t e o b j e c t i v e s . . .
For if the enemy is c e r t a i n as to y o u r
p o i n t of aim, he has the best p o s s i b l e
chance of g u a r d i n g h i m s e l f - and
b l u n t i n g your weapon. If, on the
other hand, you take a line t h a t
t h r e a t e n s a l t e r n a t i v e objectives, you
d i s t r a c t his m i n d and forces."
Strategy, p a g e 343

The s u g g e s t i o n of a series of a l t e r n a t i v e objectives on a

single line of advance applies to e f f o r t s a g a i n s t d e m a n d as well
as supply. Clearly, the c o n c e p t stems d i r e c t l y from L i d d e l l
Hart's a d v o c a c y of "distract and d i s l o c a t e . " A well considered
c o u n t e r - n a r c o t i c s t r a t e g y e m b o d y i n g the i n d i r e c t a p p r o a c h t h e n
w o u l d also p r o v i d e for a c o n c e p t (or concepts) of e x e c u t i o n in
w h i c h m u l t i p l e o b j e c t i v e s w e r e c o n t i n u a l l y p l a c e d at r i s k so t h a t
even if the p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e r e s i s t s a c h i e v e m e n t at the d e s i r e d
moment, others are achievable. In short, we should try to
e c o n o m i z e on c o m m i t m e n t of scarce r e s o u r c e s w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g the
narcotics leadership on the horns of a c o n t i n u o u s and c o n f u s i n g
dilemma.
"Moreover, f i g h t i n g p o w e r is but one
of the i n s t r u m e n t s of g r a n d s t r a t e g y
- w h i c h should take a c c o u n t of and
apply the power of f i n a n c i a l pressure,
of d i p l o m a t i c pressure, of c o m m e r c i a l
pressure, and, not least of e t h i c a l
pressure, to w e a k e n the o p p o n e n t ' s will."
Strategy, p a g e 336

6
 "The e s s e n t i a l truth u n d e r l y i n g t h e s e
m a x i m s is that for s u c c e s s two m a j o r
p r o b l e m s m u s t be s o l v e d - d i s l o c a t i o n
and exploitation. One p r e c e d e s and one
follows the actual b l o w . . . y o u c a n n o t
h i t the enemy with e f f e c t u n l e s s y o u
h a v e first created the o p p o r t u n i t y ;
you c a n n o t m a k e the e f f e c t d e c i s i v e
u n l e s s you exploit the s e c o n d
o p p o r t u n i t y that comes b e f o r e he can
recover."
Strateqy, page 349

The t a s k is to d e v e l o p a strategy that r e f l e c t s the breadth

of r e s o u r c e s envisioned by L i d d e l l H a r t and at the s a m e t i m e is
characterized by a cycle of d i s l o c a t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n on the
two c e n t r a l axis of supply and demand. The intricacies of the
counter-narcotic effort, the v e r y h i g h n a t i o n a l security stake
involved, and the nature of the enemy and his facilities all
demand an indirect strategy constantly adjusted to a f l u i d
situation.