Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Document (Recovered)
Document (Recovered)
no 102390
FACTS:
Spouses Hemedez filed a civil case against Nestle, Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos,
Pacifico Galasao, and Capt. Rey Laada, praying for indemnity for the death of their son,
actual compensation for the destruction of the car, moral and exemplary damages. The
defendants filed their respective Answers denying liability. Thereafter, the spouses
Hemedez served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of the facts set
forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents appended
thereto. Through their respective counsel, Nestle and Santos, Capt. Laada, and
Alimagno and Galasao filed their verified answer to the request for admission. Spouses
Hemedez sought the striking out of said answers contending that under Section 2 of
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court the parties themselves and not their counsel should
personally answer the request for admission and hence the answer filed by their
counsel in their behalf was by nature based on hearsay. On the other hand, the
defendants asserted that they observed the rules in filing their answers, through their
ISSUE:
Whether or not an answer to a request for admission signed and sworn to by the
counsel of the party so requested is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Rule 26
The issue in this case may be stated in this wise: should a person to whom a request for
the phrase the party to whom the request is directed. This is not the first time that the
Court is faced with the said issue. In PSCFC Financial Corporation v. CA, the following
“Section 21 of Rule 138 states that “an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client x x x” Furthermore, Section 23
of Rule 138 provides that “attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by
any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure x x x .” Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party
shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be restrictively construed to
mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his
behalf.”
FACTS:
Private respondents commenced a civil case for recovery of possession and ownership
of land with damages before Branch 1 of the RTC-Aklan. RTC-Aklan declared the
defendants, petitioners herein, as the absolute and lawful owners and possessors of
subject land. Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals
which reversed and set aside the same. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was to
no avail.
Petitioners found their way to this court via the Petition for Review on Certiorari under
consideration, docketed as G.R. No. 126112. But the same was denied in a Resolution,
The private respondents filed an Ex Parte Motion for Execution with RTC-Aklan, which
granted the said motion. The respondent court then issued the Writ of Execution
directing the Sheriff of the Province of Aklan or any of his deputies to implement subject
Decision. Execution was partially satisfied, as shown in the Officer's Return of Services.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of execution was invalid for private respondents’ ex-parte motion
RULING:
There is tenability in petitioners' contention that the Writ of Execution was irregularly
issued insofar as the Ex-Parte Motion for Execution of private respondents did not
Rules of Court, read: Sec. 4. Notice. — Notice of a motion shall be served by the
applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof,
together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers
accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter
notice, specially on matters which the court may dispose of on its own motion. Sec. 5.
Contents of notice. — The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall
state the time and place for the hearing of the motion.
The foregoing requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned,
and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if
not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not
comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the
court has no authority to act upon. The Court is not prepared, however, to invalidate the
Writ of Execution issued below. The petition is obviously a dilatory move on the part of
petitioners, designed to prevent the final disposition of the case. In People v. Leviste, it
While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15
should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, this
Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest
case. Litigations should, as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities.
In the case at bar, neither is there a showing that petitioners Nestle and Santos did not
authorize their respective counsel to file in their behalf the respective answers
requested of them by private respondents in the latters written request for admission.
As the Court has said, there is no reason to strictly construe the phrase the party to
whom the request is directed to refer solely or personally to the petitioners themselves.
GR no. 168208
RAMIREZ et, al,. v Mar Fishing Co, Inc., et. al., June 13, 2012
FACTS:
Mar Fishing Co., Inc. engaged in the business of fishing and canning of tuna, sold its
principal assets to co-respondent Miramar through public bidding. Proceeds of the sale
were paid to the Trade and Investment Corp. to cover Mar Fishing‘s outstanding
obligation in the amount of ₱ 897,560,041. In view of that transfer, Mar Fishing issued a
Memorandum informing all its workers that the company would cease to operate by the
end of the month. It notified the DOLE of the closure of its business operations.
Then, Mar Fishing‘s labor union, Mar Fishing Workers Union – NFL – and Miramar
absorb Mar Fishing‘s regular rank and file employees whose performance was
Unfortunately, petitioners, who worked as rank and file employees, were not hired or
given separation pay by Miramar, so they filed Complaints for illegal dismissal with
the LA’s Decision and ruled for the petitioners. The CA Dismissed the action for
certiorari against the 225 other petitioners without ruling on the substantive aspects of
the case in finding that only 3 of the 228 petitioners signed the Verification and
the rule that technical rules do not strictly apply to labor cases. The CA still denied
petitioners’ contentions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing their Petition for Review on the ground that
their pleading lacked a Verification and Certification against forum shopping? (NO)
RULING:
The Rules of Court provide that a petition for certiorari must be verified and
these mandatory requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Considering that only 3 of the 228 named petitioners signed the requirement, the CA
dismissed the case against them, as they did not execute a Verification and Certification
Petitioners invoke substantial compliance with procedural rules when their Manifestation
161 signatories. They heavily rely on Jaro v. Court of Appeals, citing Piglas-Kamao v.
However, this very case does not involve a failure to attach the Annexes. Rather, the
Certification against forum shopping. Addressing this defect squarely, we have already
ordered the dismissal of the special civil action for certiorari. The lack of certification
against forum shopping is not curable by mere amendment of a complaint, but shall be
Indeed, the general rule is that subsequent compliance with the requirements will not
excuse a party's failure to comply in the first instance. Thus, on procedural aspects, the
appellate court correctly dismissed the case. However, this Court has recognized that
the merit of a case is a special circumstance or compelling reason that justifies the
GR no. 179695
FACTS:
After the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan, the Regional Assembly of the ARMM, on
November 22, 2006, passed Autonomy Act No. 205 creating the Municipality of
Northern Kabuntalan in Shariff Kabunsuan. This new municipality was constituted by
Kabuntalan.
Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan,
Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay
Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer
of his registration record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the creation of North
Thereafter, the COMELEC approved petitioner’s application for the transfer of his voting
Kabuntulan. Consequently, Fermin filed his CoC for mayor of Northern Kabuntulan in
On April 20, 2007, private respondent Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen, another
mayoralty candidate, filed a Petition for Disqualification [the Dilangalen petition] against
Fermin, docketed as SPA (PES) No. A07-003 [re-docketed as SPA No. 07-372 before
the COMELEC] with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Shariff
Kabunsuan. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the period of
residency required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his
Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said
case. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor with
1,849 votes over Fermin’s 1,640. The latter subsequently filed an election protest
(Election Case No. 2007-022) with the RTC, Branch 13 of Cotabato City.
On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2nd Division, in SPA No. 07-372, disqualified Fermin
for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his declaration
that he is a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before
Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for
at least one year. The COMELEC En Banc, on September 20, 2007, affirmed the
Division's ruling. Thus, petitioner instituted G.R. No. 179695 before this Court and
contends that the Dilangalen petition is a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC
In his comment, private respondent counters that the petition it filed is one for
disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC which may be filed at any time after the
last day for filing of the CoC but not later than the candidate’s proclamation should he
During the pendency of G.R. No. 179695 with the Court, Dilangalen filed, on September
27, 2007, with the RTC of Cotabato a motion to dismiss Election Case No. 07-022. The
RTC, however, denied this motion on September 28, 2007. On motion for
reconsideration, the trial court remained steadfast in its stand that the election protest
was separate and distinct from the COMELEC proceedings, and that, unless restrained
Assailing the RTC’s denial of his motions, Dilangalen filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. On February 14, 2008, the COMELEC 1st Division set aside the aforesaid
orders of the trial court for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, prohibited
the said court from acting on and proceeding with the protest, and ordered it to dismiss
the same. The COMELEC En Banc, on March 13, 2008, denied petitioner’s motion for
the reconsideration of the division’s ruling on account of Fermin’s failure to pay the
required fees.
These developments prompted Fermin to file another certiorari petition before this
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 68 of the OEC. (NO)
RULING:
The petition contains the essential allegations of a "Section 78" petition, namely: (1) the
material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to
run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the
false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for
public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
candidate’s eligibility for public office, in this case, his possession of the oneyear
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is
not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of
the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC
that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation
in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due
course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or
confused with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different
therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the