Leviste Management System Inc vs Legaspi Towers: As correctly pointed out by the private

respondent Legaspi, the air space wherein Concession 4 was built is not only above
Concession 3, but above the entire condominium building. The petitioner's [LEMANS']
ownership of Concession 3 does not necessarily extend to the area above the same, which is
actually the "air space" of the entire condominium building. The ownership of the air space
above Concession 3 is not a necessary incident of the ownership of Concession 3. Pursuant to
Secs. 2, 3(d) and 6 of R.A. No. 4726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, what a unit
includes is only the four walls, ceilings, windows and doors thereof. It certainly does not include
the roof or the areas above it. Arts. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are
inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the
builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject property (the Condominium Act),
and by contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).

Lim vs Moldex Land Inc: There is no provision in P.D. No. 957 which states that an owner-
developer of a condominium project cannot be a member of a condominium corporation. It is
erroneous to argue that the ownership must result from a sale transaction between the owner-
developer and the purchaser. Such interpretation would mean that persons who inherited a unit,
or have been donated one, and properly transferred title in their names cannot become
members of a condominium corporation.

Poole-Blunden vs Union Bank of the Philippines: Are outside spaces such as a terrace, and
common areas part of a condominium unit’s total area? No. Section 6. Unless otherwise
expressly provided in the enabling or master deed or the declaration of restrictions, the incidents
of a condominium grant are as follows: (a) The boundary of the unit granted are the interior
surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows and doors thereof. The following are
not part of the unit bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations and other common
structural elements of the building; lobbies, stairways, hallways, and other areas of common
use, elevator equipment and shafts, central heating, central refrigeration and central air-
conditioning equipment, reservoirs, tanks, pumps and other central services and facilities, pipes,
ducts, flues, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility installations, wherever located, except the
outlets thereof when located within the unit. Thus, the unit sold to petitioner was deficient in
relation to its advertised area.

United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc vs E. Ganzon Inc.: The remaining 28 units at EGI Rufino
Plaza comprises of "16 common areas, more specifically the lobbies on 8 floors in front of the
elevators, and 12 valet parking areas in the EGI Rufino Plaza." UCPB admitted that it is holding
the certificates of title over these areas for safekeeping and that these were not yet conveyed in
favor of the bank as the parties have not yet agreed on their valuation. In UCPB's answer, it
argued that common areas belong to all unit owners in the building, including the bank, and thus
cannot be appropriated by EGI for itself although it had secured titles under its name.128 The
contention of UCPB is meritorious. Common areas refer to "the entire [condominium] project
excepting all units separately granted or held or reserved. Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 4726
impliedly enumerated what the law considers as common areas by enumerating what are not
part of a condominium unit. Here, the 28 areas in dispute are considered common areas by the
Condominium Act. The law explicitly identified lobbies as common areas while the valet parking
slots, which are not offered for sale to unit owners in EGI Rufino Plaza, may also be inferred as
common areas due to their purpose and use. Having established the nature of the areas in
dispute, the Court shall now discuss the context of EGI's ownership over these areas in relation
to the provisions of the Condominium Act. In this regard, it is worthy to highlight salient
provisions of the law, Sections 6(c) and 7. Based on the foregoing, the developer cannot
transfer or convey the ownership of the common areas as these are held in common by the unit
owners. This rule applies even if the developer is the registered owner of the common areas. As
a rule, the common areas shall remain undivided and that judicial partition shall only be
permitted upon compliance with the conditions enumerated in Section 8 which governs the
judicial partition of the common areas. Thus, EGI cannot transfer the 28 common areas for
value to the prejudice of the unit owners. Though the corresponding certificates of title to these
areas were not included in the assets enumerated in the MOA, the apparent intention of the
parties to transfer these areas to a condominium corporation is reflected m the following
relevant provisions of the MOA. It is clear from the quoted provision that the common areas of
the building are meant to be held by a condominium corporation that EGI committed to organize
and establish. This construction is consistent Section 2 of R.A. No. 4726, the provision in the
Condominium Act that recognizes the necessity of the creation of condominium corporations to
hold the title to the common areas, including the land, or the appurtenant interests in such
areas. Furthermore, Section 6(d) of R.A. No. 4726 acknowledges the existence of a "non-
exclusive easement for ingress, [and] egress," which means that unit owners may freely use the
common areas for entrance or exit. To permit the developer to appropriate for itself, and later on
dispose the common areas as it pleases, will leave unit owners in a precarious and helpless
situation wherein they may be prevented from enjoying the use of their property. It would be
impossible for UCPB to use the condominium assets transferred in its favor without passing
through "the lobbies on eight (8) floors in front of the elevators, and 12 valet parking areas in the
EGI-Rufino Plaza." This would be repugnant to the objective of the Condominium Act of
safeguarding the common interest, safety, and the harmonious living conditions of the
occupants.

Rizal Cement Co. INc vs Villareal: As aptly found by the appellate court, it was respondents,
rather than petitioner, who possess the property in the concept of an owner. Being an attribute
of ownership, repondent’s possession of the land goes far to tip the scale in their favor. The
right to possess flows from ownership. No person will suffer adverse possession by another of
what belongs to him. Petitioner's evidence, in contract, merely consists of tax receipts, tax
declaration and a survey plan. They are not conclusive and indisputable basis of one's
ownership of the property in question. Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere
tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property upon the declarant. Settled is the rule
that neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes
sufficient evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty.

Wong vs Carpio: In this case, private respondent clearly possessed the land longer than
petitioner did and pursuant to a sale transaction ahead of the latter. Hence, private respondent
may be said to have been the one in actual and lawful possession of the land. Before November
1976, he did possess the same in good faith; however, upon receiving a copy of the complaint
for forcible entry, he may no longer be said to have possessed the land in good faith.

Somodio vs CA: Petitioner Somodio had priority possession. Following Art. 531 of the Civil
Code, it is sufficient that one was able to subject the property to the action of his will. Petitioner
took possession of the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut
trees, ipil- ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started the construction of a building on the
property. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for
employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently. Possession in the eyes of the
law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the
property to the action of his will. Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that
petitioner started introducing improvements on the land only in 1981, he still enjoyed priority of
possession because respondent Purisima entered the premises only in 1983.

Maglucot-Aw vs Maglucot: The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere
lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not
in the concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a
superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.

Cequena vs Bolante: We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did
not lose legal possession because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. To
all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal
possessor. However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent.
Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before
1985. The records show that the petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent and
her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land. Before 1985, the subject
land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's father (Sinforoso), who was the brother of
petitioners' father (Margarito). When Sinforoso died, Margarito took possession of the land and
cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her mother continued
residing on the lot. When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years
1932-1948. Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 and paid its realty taxes
beginning 1952. When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA, the
respondent and her mother were living on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985
when he was physically ousted by the respondent. Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the
respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of
the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other
hand, petitioners' father acquired it’s possession only in 1952.
Carbonilla vs Abiera: While Carbonilla may have proven his ownership of the land, he failed to
present any evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the
building. Carbonilla failed to prove that respondents’ possession was based on his alleged
tolerance. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. He must, at least, show overt acts
indicative of his or his predecessor’s permission to occupy the subject property. Mere tolerance
always carries with it "permission" and not merely silence or inaction for silence or inaction is
negligence, not tolerance. Hence, for Carbonilla’s failure to prove his ownership and right to
possess the building, the petition was dismissed without prejudice to the proper remedy
available to Carbonilla.

DepEd vs Heirs of Baguilan: Respondent’s cause of action was not yet barred by laches. In
this case, petitioner failed to establish the elements for laches for their possession over the
property was merely being tolerated by respondent and respondent’s predecessor in interest.
Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the Court consistently ruled that laches does not apply to
registered land covered by a Torrens Title because under the Property Registration Decree, no
title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.

Aragon vs Insular Government: Should the ownership and possession of the land along the
shores of the Manila Bay be granted to Aragon? Yes, the ownership and possession of the land
may still be adjudicated in favor of Aragon. If the Government is justified in disturbing the
possession of the applicants, it can only be on the ground that they have abandoned their
property, or that it has been totally destroyed and has now become a part of the public domain
by the erosive action of the sea. In this case, Aragon and his predecessors in interest have
never abandoned their possession under a claim of ownership of the land. There has been no
such destructive or total loss of the property as would justify a holding that the owners have lost
possession. Doubtless the property has been injured by the erosive action of the sea. Doubtless
the owners in order to profitably enjoy the possession of this property will be compelled to make
some relatively small expenditures by way of a "fill" or a retaining wall. The Government's claim
of ownership, on the ground that this is a part of the shore of Manila Bay, necessarily falls to the
ground. The owners of the land in question have never in fact nor in intent abandoned it, and
that keeping in mind its location and actual condition it cannot be said to have been totally
destroyed for the purposes for which it was held by them, so as to have become a part of the
shore of the Bay of Manila.

Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs CA: When the Court found that neither
of the claiming parties are entitled to the confirmation of imperfect title, the lots in question
remained part of the public lands. From the foregoing provision of the law, the real right of
possession of private respondents over the property was lost or no longer exists after the lapse
of 10 years that petitioner had been in adverse possession thereof. Thus, the action for recover
of possession of said property filed by private respondents against petitioner must fail. Hence,
the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents to be entitled
to the possession thereof. Said lots are part of the public domain.

Supapo vs Sps de Jesus: Whether or not the action for accion publiciana has already
prescribed after 10 years if the subject land is covered by a Torrens title? No. The action is
imprescriptible if the property in question is covered by a Torrens title. Lands covered by a title
cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession
Heirs of Cullado vs Gutierrez: Article 555 of the new Civil Code recognizes that a possessor
may lose his possession de facto by the possession of another when the latter's possession has
lasted longer than one year. However, his real right of possession is not lost until after the lapse
of 10 years. This same Article 555 thus recognizes the registered owner's remedy to institute an
accion publiciana within the said 10-year period. Thus, the doubt expressed in The Bishop of
Cebu was resolved in favor of the subsistence of accion publiciana. The issue in an accion
publiciana is the "better right of possession" of real property independently of title. This "better
right of possession" may or may not proceed from a Torrens title. Thus, a lessee, by virtue of a
registered lease contract or an unregistered lease contract with a term longer than one year,
can file, as against the owner or intruder, an accion publiciana if he has been dispossessed for
more than one year. In the same manner, a registered owner or one with a Torrens title can
likewise file an accion publiciana to recover possession if the one-year prescriptive period for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer has already passed.

EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp vs Santos: Actual delivery of the books having been
made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the
private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between
him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.
Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books,
these being movable property, Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to
buy them. It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice
sustained by EDCA as a result of its own negligence. Hence, EDCA is not said to have been
unlawfully deprived of the said books by the respondent so as to recover the books from the
latter.

De Garcia vs CA: Mrs. De Garcia’s possession was not in good faith. The controlling provision
is Article 559 of the Civil Code, as authoritative interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, the right of the
owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there was good faith by the acquisition by the
possessor. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the
possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price. Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond
ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found
in possession of the same. The owner can recover the same once she can show illegal
deprivation. Respondent Court of Appeals was so convinced from the evidence submitted that
the owner of the ring in litigation is such respondent.

Dizon vs Suntay: Suntay is entitled to the return of the ring. Nevertheless, one who has lost
any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its
return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.'

Ledesma vs CA: Respondent was not unlawfully deprived of the car by false pretenses. It is
clear that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such
ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of
the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid. Non-payment only creates a
right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of
bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will
effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another." There was a
perfected unconditional contract of sale between private respondent and the original vendee.
The former voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate of registration of the vehicle in the
name of the first vendee — even if the said vendee was represented by someone who used a
fictitious name — and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the certificate of registration to
the vendee’s alleged representative Title thereto was forthwith transferred to the vendee. The
subsequent dishonor of the check because of the alteration merely amounted to a failure of
consideration which does not render the contract of sale void, but merely allows the prejudiced
party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the contract, and to prosecute the impostor
for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. vs Fernandez: Whether the chips were stolen
from petitioner, and be subject to Art. 559 of the NC. No, hence Art. 559 shall stand. These
chips are paid for anyway; petitioner would not have parted with the same if their corresponding
representative equivalent - in legal tender, goodwill, or otherwise – was not received by it in
return or exchange. Given this premise - that casino chips are considered to have been
exchanged with their corresponding representative value - it is with more reason that this Court
should require petitioner to prove convincingly and persuasively that the chips it confiscated
from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen from it; if so, any Tom, Dick or Harry in possession
of genuine casino chips is presumed to have paid for their representative value in exchange
therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559 cannot apply; the presumption that
the chips were exchanged for value remains.

Azarcon and Adobo vs Eusebio: Whether it was lawful for herein petitioners to gather the
palay pending harvest even after the execution of the writ. Yes, petitioners had the right to
gather the palay under Art 545 of the NCC. Under the law a person who is in possession and
who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending harvest, has
the right to a part of the net harvest. While the court order of October 3, 1955 ordered the
defendant-appellant to move out from the premises, it did not prohibit them from gathering the
crop then existing thereon. As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the defendants-
appellants from gathering the pending fruits, which fruits were the result of their possession and
cultivation of the land, it cannot be said that the defendants-appellants committed an act which
is clear violation of the courts' order.

Cordero vs Cabral: They are possessors in bad faith. The defendants, by their own admission,
are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence that they were possessors in bad
faith. However, their good faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the
complaint. (Art. 528, Civil Code; Tacas vs. Tobon, 53 Phil. 356 [1929].) As possessors in bad
faith from the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those which
the legitimate possessor could have received, ... (Art. 549, Civil Code.) Therefore, defendants
shall vacate and surrender the land in question to the plaintiffs, and the defendants shall also
account for the fruits thereof pursuant to Article 549 of the Civil Code from the service of the
summons.

Mendoza & Enriquez vs De Guzman: Necessary expenses have been variously described by
the Spanish commentators as those made for the preservation of the thing as those without
which the thing would deteriorate or be lost as those that augment the income of the things
upon which they are expanded. Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for
cultivation, production, upkeep, etc. Here the plaintiffs have chosen to take the improvements
introduced on the land and are disposed to pay the amount of the necessary and useful
expenses incurred by the defendant. Inasmuch as the retentionist, who is not exactly a
posessor in good faith with in the meaning of the law, seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary
and useful expenditures, it is only just that he should account to the owners of the estate for any
rents, fruits, or crops he has gathered from it.

Robles and Martin vs Lizzaraga Hermanos, etc.: Article 434 provides that "good faith is
always presumed and the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the possessor rests upon
the person alleging it." Lizarraga Hermanos did not allege, nor prove in the first instance the bad
faith characterizing Evarista Robles' possession, who, as shown in the records and heretofore
stated, began to occupy the house by permission of the former owner, her mother Anastasia de
la Rama, and continued later in the occupation by the consent of her coheirs, and afterwards by
considering herself the future owner of the building by virtue of the contract with the present
owner, Lizarraga Hermanos. If the improvements are useful and Evarista Robles' possession
was in good faith, the conclusion set out in article If 453 of the Civil Code, supra, is inevitable;
Evarista Robles n is the owner of such improvements, and entitled to reimbursement therefor,
and to retain the building until the same is made.

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs CA: Additionally, under Article 546 of
the Civil Code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the
right of retention until reimbursed. In this case, MWSS is a builder in bad faith so it loses
whatever useful improvements it made without right to indemnity.

Sps. Garcia vs Santos: Article 673 states a special rule covering a situation wherein a
dominant estate has acquired a right "to have direct views, balconies or belvederes, overlooking
the adjoining property, the owner of the servient estate may not build on his own property
except at a distance of at least three meters from the boundary line," the two-meter distance as
provided in Article 670 is not enough. The distance between the structures erected on the
servient estate and the boundary line of the adjoining estate must be at least three meters. In
the instant case, the records show that Roberto Planton Baradas (Baradas), the construction
project engineer who supervised the construction of the Sps. Santos' house located on Lot 1,
testi6ed that "[t]here is a distance of two meters between [the Sps. Garcia's] fence and the wall
of [the respondents] spouses Santos." Simply stated, the distance between the structure
erected by the Sps. Santos on Lot 1 and the boundary line is only two meters, which is less than
the three-meter distance required under Article 673. Therefore, considering that the Sps. Garcia
have acquired by title an easement of light and view in accordance with Article 624 of the Civil
Code, the Sps. Santos should necessarily demolish or renovate portions of their residential
building so that the three-meter distance rule as mandated under Article 673 of the Civil Code is
observed.

Spouses Fernandez vs Spouses Delfin: Article 624 applies in case one person who owns two
properties established an apparent sign of an easement between them. When the ownership of
either property is transferred to another, the existence of the apparent sign of easement shall be
considered as a title over an easement, unless the contrary is provided in the deed of transfer,
or if the apparent sign is removed before the deed of transfer's execution. An easement need
not be annotated on the title before it may be acknowledged to exist. The front properties and
the back properties were all previously owned by petitioners, who created an apparent sign of
an easement on the front properties when: (1) they used a portion of the front properties to give
the back properties access to the national highway; and (2) they had it annotated on the front
properties' titles as an easement of right of way in favor of the back properties. When the front
properties were eventually transferred to the Philippine National Bank, the bank did not raise
any qualms or stipulated against the easement of right of way or the annotations. Thus, when
the front properties were sold, respondents' titles bore the same annotations as those of
petitioners. To clarify, the easement of right of way was not constituted when petitioners
annotated it on their titles. However, when the front properties were transferred to the Philippine
National Bank, the apparent signs of the easement�the path and the annotations�served
as a title over the easement. The title would not have been conferred if the contrary were so
provided in the deed of transfer, or if the path and annotations were removed before the deed of
transfer was executed. Here, there is no showing that the Philippine National Bank stipulated
against the easement. Thus, it is bound to respect the easement.

Valisno vs Adriano: The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant's land for the passage
of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of
Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue
using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code. The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included
the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata
Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano
Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest
and participations over the parcel of land. Hence, as an easement of waters in favor of the
appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or
wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to
deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

Ronquillo et al vs Roco: No. Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent
easements may be acquired by prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be
considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.
Hence, an easement of right of way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous
or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a
title.

Tanedo vs Bernad: The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is
not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement as provided in Article 631 of the
New Civil Code. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law as
provided in Art 624 because no abolishment or extinguishment was provided in the deed of
absolute sale. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tanks before he sold
the lots. Accordingly, the spouses Sim cannot impair, in any manner, the use of the servitude.

Costabella Corporation vs CA: The private respondent failed to prove that there is no
adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway. In the case at hand, the
respondent court committed a reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as a
compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners of the "dominant" estate, may
demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate. Apparently, the
CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate was never a gauge for the
grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity and not mere convenience for
the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Hence, when there is already an existing
adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for one
reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.

Encarnacion vs CA: Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of
way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2)
when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the case
at bar, although there is a dried river bed, it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no
egress or ingress from the highway and such access is grossly inadequate. For the jeep to
reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump 4-5 meters up. And during rainy season, it is
impassable due to the floods. When a private property has no access to a public road, it has the
right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With the non-availability of
the dried river bed as an alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate the needs
of the dominant estate.

Case vs Heirs of Tuason: It cannot be presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall,
and that it was not exclusively owned by the defendants, inasmuch as the latter have proven by
means of a good title that has not been impugned by the petitioner, that when one of their
ancestors and principals acquired the property the lot was already inclosed by the wall on which
the building was erected. It must therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property
the wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily included. The above documentary
evidence has not been overcome by any other presented by the petitioner, by apart from the
record discloses the existence of certain unquestionable signs. These consist of constructions
made by the petitioner himself on his own property which entirely destroy any presumption that
it is a party wall, and indeed gives rise to a presumption against it. Three openings have been
made in the wall, undoubtedly to allow the passage of air and light. Two of them are beveled on
the side toward the land of the objectors, and the third had recently imbedded in the wall on the
side of the property of the opponents. These things constitute exterior signs and were recorded
as the result of personal inspection by the trial court in company with the experts of both parties.
These signs positively and conclusively prove that the said wall is not a party wall, but the
exclusive property of the defendant.

Choco vs Santamaria: It appears from the evidence, that the window referred to is next to the
appellants’ lot. To judge from the photographic views, it opens on the boundary line between the
said lot and that of the appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a part of the wall that
belongs to the appellants. This opinion is corroborated by the testimony of the defendant’s
witness who took the said photographs, in so far as he said that "a part of the window in
question is in front of the plaintiffs’ property, and a person approaching the window may clearly
see the said lot." And certainly if it is in front of this lot, it is unquestionable that it directly
overlooks the same; but even though it did not and only a side or oblique view of the lot could
be obtained from it, it could not be kept open, since between it and the plaintiffs’ property there
does not intervene the distance required by law — that of two meters in the first case, and 60
centimeters in the second. In reality, there is no distance at all between the said window and the
plaintiffs’ lot because this window is perpendicular to the boundary line of the said lot. Thus,
because of the lack of the distance required by law, the window in question must be closed, and
consequently the judgment appealed from should be modified in this sense, as regards this
window. Therefore, the defendant is ordered to close finally and forever the window marked, the
judgment appealed from in so far as it refers to said window being thus modified, but affirmed in
all other respects.

Solid Manila Corporation vs Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc: The Court rejects the petitioner's
contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere right-ofway, it cannot be
separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence. Servitudes are merely
accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are possessed of a
separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they cannot, however, be alienated from the
tenement, or mortgaged separately. As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself
stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN
SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of the
neighboring estates. . ." and precisely, the former owner, in conveying the property, gave the
private owner a discount on account of the easement. Hence, albeit the private respondent did
acquire ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley –– as a result of the
conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions
thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed
to be open to the public. That no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in
favor of the private respondent corporation. Thus, in the case at bar, the defense of merger is,
clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger is not possible,
and secondly, the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement.

Floro vs Llenado: No, private respondents Llenados cannot claim entitlement to a right of way.
It is not disputed that Floro granted the Llenados verbal permission to pass through the Floro
Park Subdivision in going to and from the MacArthur Highway. Whether such permission, as
claimed by Floro, was for the month of March only, without compensation and as a neighborly
gesture for the purpose merely of enabling the Llenados to install stone monuments on their
land, or was in relation to the easement of right of way granted in their favor, as insisted by the
Llenados, the fact remains that no such contract of easement of right of way was actually
perfected between Floro and Llenado. Both Orlando and Wenifreda Llenado testified the
conditions of the easement of right of way were still to be up by Floro’s lawyer. Thus, no
compensation was agreed upon, and none was paid, for the passage through Floro’s property
during the month of March. The use of Road Lots 4 and 5 by the Llenados during the month of
March was by mere tolerance of Floro pending the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the
right of way. Furthermore, for the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of
way under the Civil Code, the preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must
be established. The Court found that private respondents have failed in this regard.

Quimen vs CA: Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of
way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest. Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if
it will not be the shortest. In applying Art. 650, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the
extreme right of petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared
to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's father which would mean
destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings
and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, the
Court accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong
materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer
will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.

De Jesus, et al. vs Howmart Corp, et al.: A reading of Article 684 shows that the duty of an
adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support is an absolute one. It does not depend on the degree of care and precaution made by
the proprietor in making the excavation or building on his land. Plaintiffs’ house which adjoins
the sevenstorey concrete building constructed by the defendants had sunk by about eight
inches. The sinking of the left side of the house of the plaintiffs was due to the weakening of
subjacent support and to the weight of the seven-storey concrete building constructed by the
defendant, as the excavation made necessarily disturbed the subjacent soil of the plaintiffs’
land. Defendants, having failed to provide the plaintiffs’ land and house with sufficient lateral
and subjacent support, are liable for damages.

La Vista Association Inc vs CA : A voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply
by will or agreement of the parties. From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the
parties and their respective predecessors-ininterest intended to establish an easement of right-
of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. The
parties concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan
Road and, like any other contract, the same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or
by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. The free ingress and egress along
Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is
thus legally with the corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same

Alcantara vs Reta, jr.: Under the law, petitioners were allowed to construct his house on the
land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal
easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code. The arrangement between respondent Reta and
petitioner Ricardo Roble allowing the latter to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from
where he gathered tuba would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Usufruct gives a right
to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless
the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides

Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. vs CA: In the case at bar, petitioner anchors its alleged
right to the preliminary mandatory injunction on the MOU. There is no question as to the
meaning of the terms "ingress" and "egress." They give petitioner the right to use the private
road as a means of entry into and exit from its property on the northwestern side of the
compound. The question concerns the meaning of the phrase "for whatever kind of passage."
The trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to make excavations on the
side of the access road in order to install a network of water pipes. The word "passage" does
not, however, "clearly and unmistakably" convey a meaning that includes a right to install water
pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of the word, as defined in Webster’s
Dictionary, is that it is "the act or action of passing: movement or transference from one place or
point to another." Its legal meaning is not different. It means, according to Black’s Law
Dictionary, the "act of passing; transit; transition." To achieve a meaning such as that which
petitioner proposes requires the consideration of evidence showing the parties’ intention in
using the word which can only be done during trial on the merits. Until such time, petitioner
cannot claim to have a "clear and unmistakable" right justifying the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction in this case. Thus, the trial court should have observed caution
and denied petitioner’s application for the preliminary writ.

Villanueva vs Velasco: The Court note that the subject easement of right of way originally was
voluntarily constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly
observed by the CA, the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a
voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal easement. The Court note that
the subject easement of right of way originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement
between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the CA, the easement in
the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an
easement by necessity or a legal easement.

National Irrigation Administration vs CA: The NIA is under no obligation to pay just
compensation for the easement of right of way. The TCT contained a reservation stating that the
title of the land shall be: “… and subject, further to such conditions contained in the original title
as may be subsisting.” Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and
condition that the land is subject to “all conditions and public easements and servitudes
recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections 109,110,111,112,113,
and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.” This reservation, unlike the other provisos
imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition. In
the present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of
the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by
free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which
case, just compensation must be paid for the taking ofa part thereof for public use as an
easement of a right of way. Hence, Manglapus is not entitled to just compensation for the
portion of his property taken for use as easement of right of way.

Alolino vs Flores: Alolino did not. An easement of light and view can be acquired through
prescription counting from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the
adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate.
Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the
respondents prior to their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement of
light and view through prescription

Castro vs Monsod: An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land,
but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute
property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in
excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbor’s land as to
cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or slide from its
position, the one so excavating is liable.
Reyes vs Valentin: Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. An easement of right of way is a real right.
When an easement of right of way is granted to another person, the rights of the property's
owner are limited. An owner may not exercise some of his or her property rights for the benefit
of the person who was granted the easement of right of way. In the case at hand, petitioner
failed to establish that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that the proposed
easement was the least prejudicial to respondents' estate.

Calimoso vs Roullo: Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding
the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement where the distance
to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If these
two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have
held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance criterion.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners’ lot would cause the
destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners’ property. Although this right-of-way
has the shortest distance to a public road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the
destruction pointed out, and that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any
damage, albeit longer, is available. We have held that "mere convenience for the dominant
estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement;" that "a
longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way."

Andres vs Sta. Lucia Realty & Development: That only lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development
of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership, may be alienated or disposed through any
of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. In the absence of such proof of
declaration in this case, petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject property based on
prescription necessarily crumbles. Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-
way from respondent for lack of personality.

Republic vs Santos III: The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as
an accretion that became respondent’s property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That
land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved
the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to
accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through
the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less
maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of
Lot 4998-B.

Hi-Lon Manufacturing INc vs COA: Being of similar character as roads for public use, a road
right-of-way (RROW) can be considered as a property of public dominion, which is outside the
commerce of man, and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of a contract, except
insofar as they may be the object of repairs or improvements and other incidental matters.
However, this RROW must be differentiated from the concept of easement of right of way under
Article 649 of the same Code, which merely gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal
interest on the property but grants no title thereto, inasmuch as the owner of the servient estate
retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same
in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement

City of Bacolod City vs Sugarland Hotel: Petitioners claimed that Sugarland Hotel's fourth
floor was illegally constructed and constituted public nuisance to justify summarily removing said
fourth floor, and then not compensating the latter. We agree that Sugarland Hotel's fourth floor
was not a nuisance that called for summary abatement. Bacolod Domestic Airport is not
covered by ICAO Rules, but by Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1967, which governs
domestic airports. Thus, the 1.6% gradient used by Villaruel in declaring Sugarland Hotel's
fourth floor as an aviation hazard is not mandatory upon the Bacolod Domestic Airport. Thus,
Sugarland Hotel's fourth floor did not constitute an obstruction to aerial navigation and there
was no impelling need for its demolition.
Frabelle Properties vs AC Enterprises Inc: The noise complained of by petitioner has already
been recognized by this Court in AC Enterprises not to be a nuisance per se. Noise can be
considered a nuisance only if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the
vicinity to an unreasonable extent. The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of
complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce
actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering
adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. The noise entering Frabella I Condominium is
not only from the blowers of Feliza Building, but a combination of noise naturally expected from
a very busy area where commercial activities are prevalent. While noise is expected given the
locality and character of the surroundings, it must not be more than those ordinarily expected.
Otherwise, it shall be considered a nuisance. We find that the sounds from the blowers of
Feliza Building are ordinarily to be expected in the Makati Central Business District and are
lawful to the conduct of respondent's business. The use of air-conditioning units in commercial
and office spaces, such as those in Feliza Building, is part of ordinary local business conditions
and is expected in the commercial rental industry, especially considering that the Philippines is
a tropical country with higher levels of heat intensity.

Hidalgo Enterprises Inc vs Balandan: Is the water tank considered an attractive nuisance?
No, the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as
well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the
mere water and its location.

Rana vs Wong: With respect to the elevation work, the Court finds that the same is not a
nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was
built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was
admittedly located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-
Ong properties. Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per se, it cannot be summarily
abated. Its summary demolition was thus not unwarranted.

Cruz vs Pandacan Hiker’s Club Inc: The basketball ring is not a nuisance per se which is
susceptible of summary abatement because it does not pose an immediate effect upon the
safety of persons and property. A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or danger
to anyone but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance
without the benefit of a judicial hearing. In any case, although it has been held that a nuisance
may be abated via an ordinance, petitioners could cite no barangay nor city ordinance that
would have justified their summary abatement through the exercise of police powers found in
the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. No barangay nor city ordinance was
violated; neither was there one which specifically declared the said basketball ring as a
nuisance per se that may be summarily abated. Clearly, the complete destruction of the
basketball ring by the petitioners is justified neither by law or ordinance nor even by equity or
necessity, which makes the act illegal and petitioners liable.
North Greenhills Association Inc vs Atty. Morales: The CA was not even sure that the
restroom has caused such annoyance to Morales or his family. Its declaration that the restroom
is a nuisance per accidens had no basis in evidence. There is nothing in the records which
discloses that Morales had introduced any evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove that
the restroom annoyed his senses, that a foul odor emanated from it, or that it posed sanitary
issues detrimental to his family's health. No certification by the City Health Officer was even
submitted to the HLURB to attest on such matters

DPWH vs City Advertising: Administrative Order 160’s mere existence absent a showing of
compliance to its instructions, gives no solace to petitioners. AO 160 expressed the Chief
Executive’s general directive for the abatement of billboards that pose a hazard to the general
welfare. In doing so, it did not give DPWH unbridled authority to dismantle all billboards and
signages. According to Article 699 of the New Civil Code provides that a public nuisance may
be prosecuted under the penal code or the any local ordinance by civil action or abatement. Any
person may abate a public nuisance which is specifically injurious to him by removing or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of
peace, or doing unnecessary injury. The Court finds that the continuous removal and
destruction of the respondent’s billboards without due notice and without following the
procedure provided under the law. No price can be placed on the deprivation of a person’s
property without due process of law.