XXX HO# 27 - Civil Law - Property and Land Registration

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3 Floor, Philippine Nurses Association,

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CIVIL LAW
Handout No. 27
PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION
Other than the statutory definition, jurisprudence recognizes that the term “nuisance” is so
comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights
of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort.
There is a nuisance when there is “any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2)
annoys or offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4)
obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.” But other than the statutory definition,
jurisprudence recognizes that the term “nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been applied
to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property,
the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort. (Cruz vs. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc., 778 SCRA
385, G.R. No. 188213 January 11, 2016)
Classifications of Nuisance
A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2) according to its
susceptibility to summary abatement. As for a nuisance classified according to the object or
objects that it affects, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which “affects a
community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal”; or (b) a private nuisance, or
one “that is not included in the foregoing definition” which, in jurisprudence, is one which
“violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few persons.” A nuisance may
also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in which case, it
may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of persons and
property, which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity; or (b) a nuisance
per accidens, which “depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being
a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to
decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance”; it may only be so proven in a
hearing conducted for that purpose and may not be summarily abated without judicial
intervention. (Cruz vs. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc., 778 SCRA 385, G.R. No. 188213 January 11,
2016)
Nuisance Per Accidens
In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a factual finding that the basketball ring was
a nuisance per se that is susceptible to a summary abatement. And based on what appears in the
records, it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose an
immediate effect upon the safety of persons and property, the definition of a nuisance per se.
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Culling from examples cited in jurisprudence, it is unlike a mad dog on the loose, which may be
killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people;
nor is it like pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs which are inherently
pernicious and which may be summarily destroyed; nor is it similar to a filthy restaurant which
may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health. A basketball ring, by itself, poses
no immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its
nature, injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may
not be abated as a nuisance without the benefit of a judicial hearing. (Cruz vs. Pandacan Hiker's
Club, Inc., 778 SCRA 385, G.R. No. 188213 January 11, 2016)
Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including one without judicial proceedings,
of a public nuisance is the responsibility of the district health officer.
Under Article 702 of the Code, the district health officer is also the official who shall determine
whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public
nuisance. The two articles do not mention that the chief executive of the local government, like
the Punong Barangay, is authorized as the official who can determine the propriety of a summary
abatement. (Cruz vs. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc., 778 SCRA 385, G.R. No. 188213 January 11,
2016)
Requisites to be Entitled to an Easement of Right-of-Way.
To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites should be met: “1. The
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; 2. There is payment of proper indemnity; 3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; and 4. The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.” (Calimoso vs. Roullo, 781 SCRA 624,
G.R. No. 198594 January 25, 2016)
Dominant Estate; Servient Estate
The immovable in whose favor the easement is established is called the dominant estate, and
the property subject to the easement is called the servient estate. Here, the respondent’s lot is
the dominant estate and the petitioners’ lot is the servient estate. That the respondent’s lot is
surrounded by several estates and has no access to a public road are undisputed. The only
question before this Court is whether the right-of-way passing through the petitioners’ lot
satisfies the fourth requirement of being established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate. (Calimoso vs. Roullo, 781 SCRA 624, G.R. No. 198594 January 25, 2016)
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Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be established at
the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate,
the right-of-way must be established on the tenement where the distance to the public road or
highway is shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest
distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have held in the past that the
least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance criterion. (Calimoso vs. Roullo,
781 SCRA 624, G.R. No. 198594 January 25, 2016)
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside
the commerce of man.
It cannot be the object of prescription because prescription does not run against the State in its
sovereign capacity. However, when property of public dominion is no longer intended for public
use or for public service, it becomes part of the patrimonial property of the State. When this
happens, the property is withdrawn from public dominion and becomes property of private
ownership, albeit still owned by the State. The property is now brought within the commerce of
man and becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and prescription. (Republic vs.
Tan, 783 SCRA 643, G.R. No. 199537 February 10, 2016)
While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in
an application for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree (PRD), it does not suffice for the purpose of prescription under the Civil Code.
Before prescription can even begin to run against the State, the following conditions must concur
to convert the subject into patrimonial property: 1. The subject lot must have been classified as
agricultural land in compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution; 2. The land
must have been classified as alienable and disposable; 3. There must be a declaration from a
competent authority that the subject lot is no longer intended for public use, thereby converting
it to patrimonial property. Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public
and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner. (Republic vs. Tan, 783 SCRA
643, G.R. No. 199537 February 10, 2016)
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity.
The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of possession. In
Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 (2000), an action for quieting of title is essentially
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a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit: x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its
purpose is to secure “. . . an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse
to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may
be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.” In an action for quieting of title, the
competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants, “. . . not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights
to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he
who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse
the property as he deems best. x x x.” (Emphasis in the original)
In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may
also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein. Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property. (Heirs
of Delfin and Maria Tappa vs. Heirs of Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 187633 April 4, 2016)
Requisites for an action to quiet title
The rule that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to
be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance.—For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. (Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa vs. Heirs
of Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 187633 April 4, 2016)
The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be
public in character and have passed to private ownership.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no
legal effects, whatsoever. Private ownership of land — as when there is a prima facie proof of
ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants — is not affected by the
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issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands
of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that
have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership. (Heirs of Delfin and
Maria Tappa vs. Heirs of Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 187633 April 4, 2016)
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.
Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as 1948, and
paid the real property taxes (evidenced by real property tax payment receipts in the name of
Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961). Spouses Tappa were likewise shown to pay the real
property taxes from 1961 to 2000. Similarly, respondents also declared their respective portions
of Lot No. 3341 for taxation in their names in 1994, and paid real property taxes on those portions
from 1967 to 2004. Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner,
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property. (Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa vs. Heirs of Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13, G.R. No.
187633 April 4, 2016)
A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim
or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and
in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated) or
barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.
The 1963 Affidavit is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is dated and appears
to be executed and signed by Delfin, his mother and sisters. It is also notarized by a public notary.
It states that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-half (1/2) of which is
actually owned by Irene as a coheir. This is contrary to the claim of Spouses Tappa that the
property was solely Lorenzo’s. Respondents’ argue that this affidavit evidences the title of their
predecessor-in-interest over Lot No. 3341 and effectively, theirs. The 1963 Affidavit however,
was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceble, or extinguished (or
terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA correctly found that Spouses Tappa’s
claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the 1963 Affidavit was ‘‘unsubstantiated.” The
CA pointed out that, “[a]side from the testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was
presented to prove the claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving.” Also,
the 1963 Affidavit was duly notarized and, as such, is considered a public document, and enjoys
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the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution. (Heirs of Delfin and Maria
Tappa vs. Heirs of Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 187633 April 4, 2016)
Section 48 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, provides that “[a] certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.”
The certificate of title was not collaterally attacked. Section 48 of PD 1529, provides that “[a]
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” This rule is not applicable in this
case. We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 544 (1998), where
we stated that, “[w]hat cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title.
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds x x x. By title, the law
refers to ownership which is represented by that document.” Ownership is different from a
certificate of title, the latter being only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used. (Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa vs. Heirs of
Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 187633 April 4, 2016)
Properties of Local Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property for public use or
patrimonial property.
There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari-saristore on government property.

Properties of Local Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property for public use or
patrimonial property. Article 424 of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two
classifications: Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,
consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed
by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. (Emphasis supplied) From the
foregoing, the barrio road adjacent to Alolino’s house is property of public dominion devoted to
public use. (Alolino vs. Flores, 788 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 198774 April 4, 2016)
To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the Local Government Unit
(LGU) to enact an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members,
permanently closing the road.
In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a resolution. The
difference between an ordinance and a resolution is settled in jurisprudence: an ordinance is a
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law but a resolution is only a declaration of sentiment or opinion of the legislative body. (Alolino
vs. Flores, 788 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 198774 April 4, 2016)
A barrio road is outside the commerce of man and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable or
disposable; (2) it is not subject to registration under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 and
cannot be the subject of a Torrens title; (3) it is not susceptible to prescription; (4) it cannot be
leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract; (5) it is not subject to attachment and
execution; and (6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary easements.
Properties of the local government that are devoted to public service are deemed public and are
under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of these
properties unless specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case with Section 21 of the LGC.
In exercising this authority, the LGU must comply with the conditions and observe the limitations
prescribed by Congress. The Sanggunian’s failure to comply with Section 21 renders ineffective
its reclassification of the barrio road. As a barrio road, the subject lot’s purpose is to serve the
benefit of the collective citizenry. It is outside the commerce of man and as a consequence: (1) it
is not alienable or disposable; (2) it is not subject to registration under Presidential Decree No.
1529 and cannot be the subject of a Torrens title; (3) it is not susceptible to prescription; (4) it
cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract; (5) it is not subject to attachment
and execution; and (6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary easements. (Alolino vs. Flores,
788 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 198774 April 4, 2016)
An easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another

immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one (1) or
more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong
Continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by virtue of a title or by prescription of

ten years. Meanwhile, continuous but non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones can
only be acquired by virtue of a title. Used in this sense, title refers to a juridical justification for
the acquisition of a right. It may refer to a law, a will, a donation, or a contract. (Alolino vs. Flores,
788 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 198774 April 4, 2016)
An easement of a right-of-way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired through prescription.
On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription counting
from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner
from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate. Notably, Alolino had not
made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the respondents prior to their
construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement of light and view through
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prescription. Thus, only easements created by law can burden the respondents’ property.
(Alolino vs. Flores, 788 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 198774 April 4, 2016)
Section 3 (Articles 649-657) governs legal easements of right-of-way.
The provisions on legal easements are found in Book II, Title VII, Chapter 2 of the Civil Code whose
specific coverage we list and recite below for clarity and convenience. Section 3 (Articles 649-
657) governs legal easements of right-of-way. Article 649 creates a legal easement in favor of an
owner or any person entitled to use any immovable, which is landlocked by other immovables
pertaining to other persons without an adequate access to a public highway. Article 652 creates
a legal easement in favor of an isolated piece of land acquired by sale, exchange, partition, or
donation when it is surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or
donor. Article 653 grants the same right-of-way, in favor of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or
donor when his property is the one that becomes isolated. Article 656 grants the owner of an
estate, after payment of indemnity, a right-of-way to carry materials through the estate of
another when it is indispensable for the construction or repair of a building in his estate. Finally,
Article 657 governs right-of-way easements for the passage of livestock. (Alolino vs. Flores, 788
SCRA 92, G.R. No. 198774 April 4, 2016)
Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from
committing nuisance.
Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right-of-way over the
respondents’ property or the barrio road it stands on. This does not mean, however, that the
respondents are entitled to continue occupying the barrio road and blocking the rear of Alolino’s
house. Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from
committing nuisance. Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, the respondents’ house is evidently a
nuisance: Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2)
Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. (Alolino vs. Flores, 788 SCRA 92, G.R. No.
198774 April 4, 2016)
The occupation and use of private individuals of public places devoted to public use constitute
public and private nuisances and nuisance per se.
A barrio road is designated for the use of the general public who are entitled to free and
unobstructed passage thereon. Permanent obstructions on these roads, such as the respondents’
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illegally constructed house, are injurious to public welfare and convenience. The occupation and
use of private individuals of public places devoted to public use constitute public and private
nuisances and nuisance per se. (Alolino vs. Flores, 788 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 198774 April 4, 2016)
Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act itself allows the demolition of illegal
structures on public roads and sidewalks because these nuisances are injurious to public
welfare.
The CA clearly erred when it invoked Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act as a
ground to deny the demolition of respondents’ illegal structure. The invoked provision reads: Sec.
28. Eviction and Demolition.—Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction
or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations: a) When persons or
entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;
x x x x (c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. x x x (Emphasis supplied) The
invoked provision itself allows the demolition of illegal structures on public roads and sidewalks
because these nuisances are injurious to public welfare. Evidently, the respondents have no right
to maintain their occupation and permanent obstruction of the barrio road. The interests of the
few do not outweigh the greater interest of public health, public safety, good order, and general
welfare. (Alolino vs. Flores, 788 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 198774 April 4, 2016)
The following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered, namely: (1) that
the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current
of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Baytion’s contention that he owns that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced. Article 457
of the New Civil Code provides: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belongs the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. Inother
words, the following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered, namely:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks
of rivers. (Daclison vs. Baytion, 789 SCRA 56, G.R. No. 219811 April 6, 2016)
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention.
In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. To begin with,
the land came about not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The deposits were
artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current from the creek adjacent to his
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property. Baytion failed to prove the attendance of the indispensable requirement that the
deposit was due to the effect of the current of the river or creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive
work of nature and not a result of human intervention. Furthermore, the disputed property
cannot also be considered an improvement or accession. Article 445 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following
articles. (Daclison vs. Baytion, 789 SCRA 56, G.R. No. 219811 April 6, 2016)
As a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a coheir or co-owner as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual
possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse because a
co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not
run in favor of a coheir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a
clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is
imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common
property. (Heirs of Feliciano Yambao vs. Heirs of Hermogenes Yambao, 789 SCRA 361, G.R. No.
194260 April 13, 2016)
Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s.
In order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other
co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; (2) that such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners;
and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. (Heirs of Feliciano Yambao vs.
Heirs of Hermogenes Yambao, 789 SCRA 361, G.R. No. 194260 April 13, 2016)
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot
repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.
When Feliciano registered the subject property in his name, to the exclusion of the other heirs of
Hermogenes, an implied trust was created by force of law and he was considered a trustee of the
undivided shares of the other heirs of Hermogenes in the property. As trustees, the heirs of
Feliciano cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. “A trustee
who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot repudiate the
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trust by relying on the registration.” (Heirs of Feliciano Yambao vs. Heirs of Hermogenes Yambao,
789 SCRA 361, G.R. No. 194260 April 13, 2016)
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others. Before the
partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion thereof.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title
to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.” “Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the
co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.” “In case of foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission only of whatever
rights the seller had over of the thing sold.” (Inalvez vs. Nool, 789 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 188145 April
18, 2016)
A co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is
mortgaged by another co-owner without the farmer’s knowledge and consent as in the case at
bar.
The mortgage of the inherited property is not binding against coheirs who never benefited. As
correctly emphasized by the CA, the petitioners’ right in the subject property is limited only to
their share in the co-owned property. When the subject property was sold to and consolidated
in the name of TDB, the latter merely held the subject property in trust for the respondents.
When the petitioners and Spouses Baluyot bought back the subject property, they merely
stepped into the shoes of TDB and acquired whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.
(Inalvez vs. Nool, 789 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 188145 April 18, 2016)
Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another
person during registration proceedings constitutes actual fraud.
The trial court’s reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right of a holder
of a registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, considering that the respondents were
almost deprived of their dominical rights over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad
faith on the part of the petitioners. Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual
physical possession by another person during registration proceedings constitutes actual fraud.
Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the
prejudice of a third person. (Inalvez vs. Nool, 789 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 188145 April 18, 2016)
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CIVIL LAW
Handout No. 27
It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title itself.
Contrary to the petitioners’ argument that the respondents’ claim is a collateral attack upon their
title which is impermissible, the Court had categorically ruled that a resolution on the issue of
ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral
attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself. “Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does
not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may
have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.”
The alleged incontrovertibility of title cannot be successfully invoked by the petitioners because
certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and cannot be used as a shield
for the commission of fraud. (Inalvez vs. Nool, 789 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 188145 April 18, 2016)
In order for an action for quieting of title to prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have
legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject matter of the action.
Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. (Heirs
of Jose Extremadura vs. Extremadura, 793 SCRA 581, G.R. No. 211065 June 15, 2016)
Equitable title has been defined as [a] title derived through a valid contract or relation, and
based on recognized equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have
the legal title transferred to him.
In order that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title, he must show that the one from
whom he derives his right had himself a right to transfer. x x x.” In this case, Jose’s title to the
subject land was derived through a contract of sale, as evidenced by a notarized document
denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 18, 1984, whereby the previous
owner/s, Corazon, the widow of Alfredo, transferred the subject land and two (2) other adjoining
parcels to Jose for and in consideration of P6,000.00, for which Jose duly paid the required capital
gains tax. That Corazon had the right to transfer the land by virtue of her ownership thereof was
clearly established during the trial. (Heirs of Jose Extremadura vs. Extremadura, 793 SCRA 581,
G.R. No. 211065 June 15, 2016)
A person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive
possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument.
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Article 1477 of the Civil Code recognizes that the “ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.” Related to this article
is Article 1497 of the same Code which provides that “[t]he thing sold shall be understood as
delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.” Article 1498 of the Civil
Code lays down the general rule that the execution of a public instrument “shall be equivalent to
the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does
not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.” However, the execution of a public instrument gives
rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery, which is negated by the failure of the vendee
to take actual possession of the land sold. A person who does not have actual possession of the
thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a public
instrument. (Heirs of Jose Extremadura vs. Extremadura, 793 SCRA 581, G.R. No. 211065 June 15,
2016)
The owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of
the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy.
Case law teaches that “[i]t is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself
occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of
real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or
when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy,” as the parties in
this case. Notably, the fact that respondents delivered the produce of the land to Jose, which
Manuel admitted in open court, can only be construed as his recognition of Jose’s ownership of
the land despite his tenuous claim that he merely did so because Jose is his brother. (Heirs of Jose
Extremadura vs. Extremadura, 793 SCRA 581, G.R. No. 211065 June 15, 2016)
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession.
Not only did Jose exercise his right as owner of the subject land by receiving the fruits thereof,
he likewise performed his duties by paying taxes therefor, evidence of which he presented in
court during trial. “Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona
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Handout No. 27

fide claim of acquisition of ownership.” (Heirs of Jose Extremadura vs. Extremadura, 793 SCRA
581, G.R. No. 211065 June 15, 2016)
A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
In National Housing Authority v. CA, 456 SCRA 17 (2005), this Court upheld the usufructuary right
of respondent over the seven-hectare area granted under Proclamation No. 1670. However, the
Court also emphasized that the rights of respondent were circumscribed within the limits of the
seven-hectare area allotted to it: A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with
the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law
otherwise provides. This controversy would not have arisen had [respondent] respected the limit
of the beneficial use given to it. [Respondent’s] encroachment of its benefactor’s property gave
birth to the confusion that attended this case. To put this matter entirely to rest, it is not enough
to remind [petitioner] to respect [respondent’s] choice of the location of its seven-hectare area.
[Respondent], for its part, must vacate the area that is not part of its usufruct. [Respondent’s]
rights begin and end within the seven-hectare portion of its usufruct. This Court agrees with the
trial court that [respondent] has abused the privilege given it under Proclamation No. 1670. The
direct corollary of enforcing [respondent’s] rights within the seven-hectare area is the negation
of any of [respondent’s] acts beyond it. (Emphasis supplied) Since respondent had no right to act
beyond the confines of the seven-hectare area granted to it, and since it was fully aware of this
fact, its encroachment of nine additional hectares of petitioner’s property rendered it a possessor
in bad faith as to the excess. (National Housing Authority vs. Manila Seedling Bank Foundation,
Inc., 794 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 183543 June 20, 2016)
Under Article 549 in relation to Articles 546 and 443 of the Civil Code, a possessor in bad faith
has a specific obligation to reimburse the legitimate possessor for everything that the former
received, and that the latter could have received had its possession not been interrupted.
Under Article 549 in relation to Articles 546 and 443 of the Civil Code, a possessor in bad faith
has a specific obligation to reimburse the legitimate possessor for everything that the former
received, and that the latter could have received had its possession not been interrupted.
(National Housing Authority vs. Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc., 794 SCRA 1, G.R. No.
183543 June 20, 2016)
Both the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found that respondent had
exerted efforts and expended money to develop the excess and protect it from squatter
syndicates. These expenses would naturally fall under those defined as necessary expenses for
which respondent, even as a possessor in bad faith, is entitled to be reimbursed.
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Respondent shall be entitled to a refund of the necessary expenses it incurred. Necessary
expenses are those made for the preservation of the land occupied, or those without which the
land would deteriorate or be lost. These may also include expenditures that augment the income
of the land or those that are incurred for its cultivation, production, and upkeep. Both the CA and
the RTC found that respondent had exerted efforts and expended money to develop the excess
and protect it from squatter syndicates. These expenses would naturally fall under those defined
as necessary expenses for which respondent, even as a possessor in bad faith, is entitled to be
reimbursed (National Housing Authority vs. Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc., 794 SCRA 1,
G.R. No. 183543 June 20, 2016)
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. (Heirs of Rafael Gozo vs. Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church (PUMCO), 765 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 195990 August 5, 2015)
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the
government and not the Courts.
In the absence of such classification, the land remains as an unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine
that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. (Heirs
of Rafael Gozo vs. Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist Church
(PUMCO), 765 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 195990 August 5, 2015)
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should
show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by
law.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, all public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public
domain. As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that
the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or
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any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the land applied for is
alienable and disposable. (Heirs of Rafael Gozo vs. Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the
Seventh Day Adventist Church (PUMCO), 765 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 195990 August 5, 2015)
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073, remains to this day the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain, other than timber and mineral
lands.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands. (Heirs of Rafael
Gozo vs. Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist Church (PUMCO), 765
SCRA 304, G.R. No. 195990 August 5, 2015)
By virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code,
the President delegated to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Secretary the power to determine which of the unclassified lands of the public domain are (1)
needed for forest purposes and declare them as permanent forest to form part of the forest
reserves; and (2) not needed for forest purposes and declare them as alienable and disposable
lands.
By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code, the
President delegated to the DENR Secretary the power to determine which of the unclassified
lands of the public domain are (1) needed for forest purposes and declare them as permanent
forest to form part of the forest reserves; and (2) not needed for forest purposes and declare
them as alienable and disposable lands. (Heirs of Rafael Gozo vs. Philippine Union Mission
Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist Church (PUMCO), 765 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 195990
August 5, 2015)
It is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quad non
habet.
It is clear under the law that before compliance with the foregoing conditions and requirements
the applicant has no right over the land subject of the patent and therefore cannot dispose the
same even if such disposal was made gratuitously. It is an established principle that no one can
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give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. It is true that gratuitous disposal in
donation may consist of a thing or a right but the term right must be understood in a
“proprietary” sense over which the possessor has jus disponendi. This is because in true
donations there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his assets.
(Heirs of Rafael Gozo vs. Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist
Church (PUMCO), 765 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 195990 August 5, 2015)
It has been ruled that where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud
or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not
required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any
hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
The lack of respondents’ right over the property was confirmed when the Spouses Gozo had the
entire property, including the portion occupied by the church, surveyed and patented, and
covered by their homestead patent. Further, after a certificate of title was issued under their
names, the Spouses Gozo did not effect the annotation thereon of the supposed donation.
Registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
Indeed it has been ruled that where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any
cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is
not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for
any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule
were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens
system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. The public shall then be denied of
its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act. (Heirs of Rafael
Gozo vs. Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist Church (PUMCO), 765
SCRA 304, G.R. No. 195990 August 5, 2015)
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3 Floor, Philippine Nurses Association,

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

Nuisance Per Accidens

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

Requisites to be Entitled to an Easement of Right-of-Way.

Dominant Estate; Servient Estate

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

Requisites for an action to quiet title

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari-saristore on government property.

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

An easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another

Continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by virtue of a title or by prescription of

An easement of a right-of-way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired through prescription.

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

Section 3 (Articles 649-657) governs legal easements of right-of-way.

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

PROPERTY AND LAND REGISTRATION

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