rd

3 Floor, Philippine Nurses Association,

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CIVIL LAW
Handout No. 26

SUCCESSION

Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not
named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor
assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited — tacitly depriving the heir
of his legitime.

Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies,
devises, or advances on his legitime. In other words, preterition is the complete and total
omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express
disinheritance. (Morales vs. Olondriz, 783 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 198994 February 3, 2016)

Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the
institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are
not impaired.

Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory
heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy. In the present case, the decedent’s will
evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent’s
illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show
otherwise, Francisco’s omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition. (Morales
vs. Olondriz, 783 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 198994 February 3, 2016)

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to
questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will’s
formal validity and due execution.

However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate court’s jurisdiction
to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances
When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even
before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue. (Morales vs. Olondriz, 783 SCRA
151, G.R. No. 198994 February 3, 2016)

Successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of
law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the
widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of
law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them

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CIVIL LAW
Handout No. 26

SUCCESSION
from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. (Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals,
334 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000)

Inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his
death.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. (Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals,
334 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000)

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the
heir or heirs first instituted.

Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another
heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce
the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her
property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another
or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. (Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 522,
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000)

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by
reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.

In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix’s near
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be
seized and turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants. (Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals, 334
SCRA 522, G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000)

In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property
and to transmit the same later to the second heir; Without the obligation to preserve clearly
imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution.

In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate
the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix.

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Handout No. 26

SUCCESSION
Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly
imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second
heir. “Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution.” Also, the near descendants’ right to inherit from the testatrix is
not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill
the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent. (Rabadilla vs. Court of
Appeals, 334 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000)

A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to
the second heir.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article
863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is
therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
(Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000)

Distinction between modal institution and conditional testamentary disposition.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A “mode” imposes an obligation
upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the
other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled
in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a
resolutory condition. (Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 113725 June 29,
2000)

In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself
that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered
as modal and not conditional. (Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 113725
June 29, 2000)

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Handout No. 26

SUCCESSION
Interpretation of Wills

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words
of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted. (Rabadilla vs.
Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000)

A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property,
to take effect after his death.

Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed,
the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject
of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
(Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000)

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.

These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit: Art. 805.
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another. The testator or the person requested by him to
write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the
will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. If the
attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the Office of the Clerk of Court. (Baltazar vs. Laxa, 669 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012)

The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to
render him unfit to execute a Will.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make
a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not

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CIVIL LAW
Handout No. 26

SUCCESSION
equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states: Art. 799.
To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or
other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know
the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of
the testamentary act. (Baltazar vs. Laxa, 669 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012)

A purported will is not to be denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has
been duly executed in fact, whether it will be probated would have to depend largely on the
attitude of those interested in the estate of the deceased.

It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and
substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said allegations. Furthermore,
“a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been
duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have to depend largely on the
attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased].” (Baltazar vs. Laxa, 669 SCRA 249,
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012)

The very existence of the Will is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testatrix has willed
that her estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the
state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the
parties affected thereby.

It bears stressing that “[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the
authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is
the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling.”
“The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has
willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon
the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of
the parties affected thereby.” This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with
Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total
lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us
to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate. (Baltazar
vs. Laxa, 669 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012)

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