Rey Laca

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
CASE DIGESTS COMPILATION
SUBMITTED TO:
Judge Melita Amylesha Macaraeg
SUBMITTED BY:
JD-4C
STABLE OF CONTENTS
TOPIC PAGE
1 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND CIVIL ACTIONS 2
2 JURISDICTION OF A PROBATE COURT/PROBATE JURISDICTION 17
3 PARTITION AS A MODE OF SETTLING THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED 37
PERSON
4 PROBATE OF A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL 61

5 PROBATE OF A NOTARIAL WILL 86
6 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION 120
7 EXECUTORS 145
8 ADMINISTRATORS 178
10 TRUSTEES RELATING TO WILLS 227
11 CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE 253
12 PAYMENT OF DEBTS OF ESTATE 291
14 ESCHEAT 334
15 GUARDIANSHIP 354
16 TRUSTEES RELATING TO WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS OTHER THAN A 380
WILL
17 ADOPTION 408
18 RESCISSION OF ADOPTION 420
19 REVOCATION OF ADOPTION 427
20 HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE PERSONS 445
21 HABEAS CORPUS 458
22 WRIT OF AMPARO 490
23 HABEAS DATA 514
24 CHANGE OF NAME/CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN 526
CIVIL REGISTRY
25 DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATION 569

26 FILIATION 580
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27 CASES MENTIONED IN THE LECTURES 642
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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND CIVIL ACTIONS
PATRICIA NATCHER vs. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF

GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO - LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO -
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO
FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001
An action is a formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the
court by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established
rules. The term “special proceeding” may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish
the status or a right of a party or a particular fact. Usually, in a special proceedings, no formal
pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy
is granted generally upon an application or motion.
FACTS: Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esgeurra were registered owners of a parcel
of land located in Manila and covered by TCT No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951,
Graciano together with his six children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s estate
adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under
the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of
the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980
was issued in the name of Graciano and the six children. Further, on February 9, 1954 said heirs
executed and forged an “Agreement of Consolidation– Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver
of Rights” where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980
into several slots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his
interest in the land leaving only a portion registered under Graciano’s name, as covered by TCT
No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two
separate lots where the first lot was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot was
registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but
retained the ownership over the second lot.
On March 20, 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT
No. 186059 was issued in the latter’s name. On October 7, 1985, Graciano died leaving his second
wife and six children by his first marriage as heirs. In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075
before the RTC of Manila, Br. 55, herein private respondent alleged that upon Graciano’s death,
Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No.
107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated June 25, 1987 in favor
of herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No.
186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said
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complaint that as consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
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In her answer, Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano and thus, under the law,
she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during
Graciano’s lifetime, he already distributed in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein
private respondent may not anymore claim against Graciano’s estate or against herein petitioner’s
property. After trial, RTC Manila rendered a decision holding the Deed of Sale as prohibited by
law and thus, a complete nullity. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the lower court’s
decision.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC can adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of the
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to
any of the heirs.
RULING: No.
There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal
demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court by the law. It is
the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term “special
proceeding” may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or a right of a
party or a particular fact. Usually, in a special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless
the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceases person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the natures of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rule as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within
the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. The RTC in
the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render adjudication and
resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher,
inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of the title with damages is
not the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the
RTC of Manila was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner
Natcher.
LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH

MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI
CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER
JD-4C
G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009
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A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the
plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish
a status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a
declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party.
FACTS: In May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died leaving petitioners Luisa Kho, his wife and
his three children as heirs to his estate. Five years later, a complaint for judicial partition of
properties of Alejandro Sr was filed before the Shari’a District Court by Liling Disangcopan and
Almahleen Liling S. Montañer, who claimed that Alejandro Sr. was a Muslim and that they were
his first family.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of Lack of Jurisdiction of the
Shari’a District Court, alleging that the decedent was a Roman Catholic. They also argued that the
proceeding before the district court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person. Said court
dismissed the complaint holding that the deceased was not a Muslim and the court’s jurisdiction
extends only to settlement of estate of deceased Muslims.
Private respondent Liling filed a Motion for Reconsiderations which was granted by the Shari’a
District Court. It reconsidered its dismissal and allowed the respondents to adduce further
evidence. Later, it ordered the continuation of the trial on merits. This was questioned by the
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the proceeding instituted by the respondents in the Shari’a District Court for the
settlement of the estate is an ordinary civil action.
RULING: No.
The underlying assumption in petitioners’ argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a District
Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of
the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding
before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or
defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action.
The SC reiterates that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court
has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased Muslim. In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to
be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right
to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.
Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and,
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subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his
heirs, if such is the case in fact.
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Petitioners’ argument that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party
defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of
the deceased is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special
proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding,
respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong"
necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the
other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a
particular fact," has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status,
right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that
the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding,
the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON VS. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a

particular fact; a declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as
the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right
FACTS: Magdaleno Ypon died intestate, leaving behind lots covered by two TCTs. Respondent,
Gaudioso Ricaforte (aka Gaudioso Ypon), claimed to be the sole heir of Magdaleno and executed
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. After which, caused the cancellation of the TCTs and had the
lots transferred to his name. The transfer led to Petitioners filing a case for Cancellation of Title
and Reconveyance, alleging that Magdaleno died childless; and that Gaudioso‘s transfer of
property is prejudicial to their rights as successors-in-interests.
The RTC held in favor of Gaudioso, being able to prove through his Birth Certificate that he is the
son of Magdaleno. Petitioners also failed to show they had a cause of action against Gaudiso,
Petitioners not having proved that they are Magdaleno‘s compulsory heirs; albeit, being able to
prove their relationship to Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters
of administration. After the motion for reconsideration of Petitioners was denied, they sought
direct recourse to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioners had a proper cause of action against Respondent.
RULING: No, Petition DENIED Petitioners allege that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno,
and if proven to be true, would warrant the cancellation and reconveyance they seek. However,
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jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
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made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property.
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship
in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by
which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made
only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case
had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding
the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be
re-opened. In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. v. HON. RODRIGUEZ
GR No. 192828 November 28, 2011
FACTS: The respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and Stroghold Insurance
Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic
Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming
rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon).
The Complaint was captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and
Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of
Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary
Injunction."
In the complaint, the respondents alleged that (1) they are the heirs of Antonio Ching and that
Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonios son when he was, in fact, adopted and his birth
certificated merely simulated; (2) Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime suspect and prior
to the conclusion of the investigations, Ramon made an inventory of the formers estate and illegally
transferred to his name the titles to Antonios properties; (3) Ramon sweet-talked respondent
Mercedes into surrendering to him a Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of
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Antonio and the TCTs of two condo units registered under Ramons name; (4) Ramon illegally
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transferred to his own name through a forged document 40,000 shares in Po Wing Corporation;
(5) Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating solely to
himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents; and (6) Ramon sold Antonio's
two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another
parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu
Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismissred the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged
ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners
argued that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the
latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit
partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity.
Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an ordinary
court.
The RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss with regard to the issues
which could only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action.
RULING: No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that
the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper.
Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the
disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now under
Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a
special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by
the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from an
ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a
complaint should be filed.
In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case
No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was
instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon . In the event
that the RTC will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only
consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio.
Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the
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administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of
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a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91
of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound,
because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from
Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the
RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of
respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated
therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.
DR. NIXON L. TREYES v. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO L. LARLAR,

HEDDY L. LARLAR, ET AL.
G.R. No. 232579 September 08, 2020
FACTS: Rosie Larlar Treyes, the wife of Dr. Nixon Reyes, died without any children and without
a will. Rosie left behind seven (7) siblings, who in this case are the private respondents.
At the time of Rosie’s death, she owned 14 real estate properties with Dr. Nixon as their conjugal
properties. Subsequently, Dr. Nixon executed two(2) affidavits of self-adjudication, transferring
the estate of Rosie unto himself, claiming that he was the sole heir.
Hence, the private respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a Complaint for
annulment of the Affidavits, cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of ownership and possession,
partition and damages.
Dr. Nixon filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter and corollarily, lack of real parties in interest.
ISSUE: Whether a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate
special proceeding a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and
possession of property.
RULING: No. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that the rights of succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Therefore, the heir is legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance
at that very moment, and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution.
The Civil Code identifies certain relatives who are deemed compulsory heirs and intestate heirs.
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Article 1001 states that brothers and sisters, or their children, who survive with the widow or
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widower, shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, while surviving spouse shall be entitled
to the other half.
Hence, subject to the required proof, without any need of prior judicial determination, the private
respondents who are siblings of Rosie, by operation of law, are entitled to one-half of the
inheritance of the decedent.
Given the clear dictates of the Civil Code, and the various Court En Banc and Division decisions,
the rule laid down in Ypon v. Ricaforte et.al, Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, Portugal v. Portugal-
Beltran, Reyes v. Enriquez, and other cases which require a prior determination of heirship in a
separate special proceeding as a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action involving heirs is
abandoned.
This case establishes the rule which is: Unless there is a pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent’s estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate
heirs may commence an ordinary civil action for to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument,
and for recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights
acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration
of their status as such.
Ordinary Civil Actions vis-a-vis Special Proceedings
In the main, Ypon, citing certain earlier jurisprudence, held that the determination of a decedent's
lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding, precluding the RTC in an
ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance from making the same.
According to Rule 1, Section 3(c) of the Rules, the purpose of a special proceeding is to establish
a status, right, or particular fact. As held early on in Hagans v. Wislizenus, a "special proceeding"
may be defined as "an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact." In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or
motion.
The main point of differentiation between a civil action and a special proceeding is that in the
former, a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right which the party claims
he/she is entitled to, such as when a party-litigant seeks to recover property from another,while in
the latter, a party merely seeks to have a right established in his/her favor.
Applying the foregoing to ordinary civil actions for the cancellation of a deed or instrument and
reconveyance of property on the basis of relationship with the decedent, i.e., compulsory or
intestate succession, the plaintiff does not really seek to establish his/her right as an heir. In truth,
the plaintiff seeks the enforcement of his/her right brought about by :his/her being an heir by
operation of law.
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Restated, the party does not seek to establish his/her right as an heir because the law itself already
establishes that status. What he/she aims to do is to merely call for the nullification of a deed,
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instrument, or conveyance as an enforcement or protection of that right which he/she already
possesses by virtue of law.
Moreover, it is likewise noted that ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity of a document,
nullity of title, recovery of ownership of real property, or reconveyance are actions in personam.
And thus, they only bind particular individuals although they concern rights to tangible things.
Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Hence, any decision in
the private respondents' ordinary civil action would not prejudice non-parties.
To emphasize, any holding by the trial court in the ordinary civil action initiated by the private
respondents shall only be in relation to the cause of action, i.e., the annulment of the Affidavits of
Self-Adiudication, executed by petitioner Treves and reconveyance of the subject properties, and
shall only be binding among the parties therein.
HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 150206 MARCH 13, 2009
It is undisputed that the subject property was owned by the deceased during his lifetime.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made
in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action
is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
FACTS: Lot 3095 C-5 was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint
before the RTC, Lourdes alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the
same from her deceased mother, Hermogena, who she claimed as the only child of Juan and his
wife, Laureana. Lourdes alleged that upon the death of Juan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his
brother, Teofilo, and Teofilo's wife, Rita, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her
death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena's death,
Lourdes also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the
subject property.
In their answer, petitioners denied that Lourdes's claim. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan
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died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two
sisters, namely: Teofilo, Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs inherited the subject
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land from Juan Gabatan and have been in possession thereof in the concept of owners for more
than fifty (50) years. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by Lourdes against
Teofilo's wife, Rita, but the case was dismissed for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended
that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long
prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.
ISSUE: Whether the issue on Lourdes’s heirship can be resolved in the same civil action for
recovery of ownership and possession of property.
RULING: The Lourdes’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property was owned by the deceased during
his lifetime. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery
of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery
of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
In the case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters
relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a
special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. The status of an
illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.
However, in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in
a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, since the
only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues
it defined during pre-trial. Thus, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented
by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-
trial.
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense
with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of Lourdes as the sole heir
of Juan Gabatan, especially since the parties to civil case, had voluntarily submitted the issue to
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the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in the proceeding.
Also, the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
As to proof of heirship, two conflicting birth certificates of Lourdes were presented at the RTC.
Even assuming that the birth certificate presented by Lourdes is a reliable document, the same on
its face is insufficient to prove Lourdes's filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan.
Lourdes's mother's birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of Hermogena's
relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did Lourdes
present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogena's
relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Lourdes’s cause of action accrued in 1933, but she and her mother did not assert their rights as
such since it is only in 1978 that Lourdes filed her first complaint to recover the subject property
against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan. However, that case was dismissed without
prejudice forfailure to prosecute. Again, Lourdes waited until 1989 to refile the present case,
claiming that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because
Rita was then already old. The reason is unacceptable, because it is precisely the advancing age of
Rita (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) that should have
urged the Lourdes to exert every effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her
claim.
Thus, Lourdes dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the
property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that
(a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright
spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of
her own cause of action.
ALAN JOSEPH SHEKER VS ESTATE OF SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA
GR NO. 157912 DECEMBER 13, 2007
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints
and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the
payment of filings fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate
proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person as in the present case.
FACTS: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O Sheker and thereafter
issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance,
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petitioner filed a contingent claim for agent’s commission due him amounting to approximately
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P206,250.00 as reimbursement for expenses incurred or to be incurred by petitioner in the course
of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The respondent moved for the dismissal of money claim against the estate on the ground that: The
requisite docket fee as prescribed in Sec 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid;
Petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and
Petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served
personally.
RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds
advanced by respondents. Petitioner insist that S2 R72 of ROC provides that rules in ordinary
actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s contingent money claim against
respondent estate for failure of the petitioner to attach in his motion a certification against non-
forum shopping
RULING: S2 R72 of the Rules of Court provides that in the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.
The word practicable is defined as possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in
ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically
say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints
and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing and the payments
of filing fees for money claims against as estate would not in any way obstruct probate
proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as settlement of estate of a
deceased person as in the present case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005
FACTS: Apolinaria Jomoc filed a petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of her
absent spouse Celemente P. Jomoc for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage. The
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Regional Trial Court granted the petition. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General
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souht to appeal the order by filing of a notice of appeal but it was denied since the trial court noted
that no record of appeal was filed and served which is required for a special proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for declaration of presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding
RULING: Yes, a petition for declaration of presumptive death is in the nature of a special
proceeding except when the purpose of the petition is for the contracting of a subsequent marriage
which makes it a summary proceeding..
The rules provided that a civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. On the other hand, a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. The
rules provided that one of the special proceedings is the declaration of absence and death which
requires not only the notice of appeal but also the record of appeal when appealing. However, the
rules likewise provided that if the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of absent spouse
is for the contracting of a subsequent valid marriage, it is a summary proceeding provided under
Article 41 of the Family Code and a notice of appeal will suffice.
In this case, Apolinaria Jomoc filed the petition for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage, thus, it is not a special proceeding as provided in the Rules of Court which requires the
filing of a Record on Appeal but a summary proceeding in which the filing of notice of appeal is
sufficient.
PACIFIC BANKING CORP. EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION vs. COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. NO. 109373 March 20, 1995
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which
one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is
distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one
against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where
a party-litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his
purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding
to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for : an appointment of guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be
classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the
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enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It
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does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party’s wrongful act or omission nor
state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
FACTS:On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for
short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday
pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent
of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC.
On September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union.
On September 16, 1991, the Liquidator received a copy of the order.
On October 16, 1991, He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order.
On December 6, 1991, the Judge modified his September 13, 1991 but in effect denied the
Liquidator’s motion for reconsideration.
The following day, He filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit
Record on Appeal.
On February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator’s Notice of Appeal on the
ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his
September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied
reconsideration.
On March 27, 1992, he granted the Union’s Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.
On September 30, 1992 he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on
October 2, 1992.
On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of granting the Union’s Motion
for issuance of a writ of execution and denied Motion for reconsideration. However, the judge
ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed without
authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
The Liquidator filed petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals
to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of
Union.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth
Division held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial court was a special
proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered
therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his
receipt of the decision granting the Union’s claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth
Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due course
to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing.
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ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for liquidation under sec 29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature
of a special proceeding.
If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of
appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a
liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the
decision or final order appealed from.
RULING:
Yes. The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:
19. Period of Appeals. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in paragraph (b) hereof,
must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award
appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other
cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a
record on appeal being required.
Further, Action is an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. While in Special
Proceeding, every other remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.
The Court made the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding:
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one
seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished
from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against another,
while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party-litigant
seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to
seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish
the fact or status of insanity calling for : an appointment of guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be
classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the
enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It
does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party’s wrongful act or omission nor
state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation’s insolvency so that its
creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation’s debts and
obligations.
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JURISDICTION OF A PROBATE COURT/PROBATE JURISDICTION
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF REYNALDO GUZMAN; ANITA

ONG TAN VS ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ ET AL
GR. No. 230404 January 31, 2018
Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the CFI in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a
special court is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question
involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate court exercises
limited jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to ownership when the claimant and all other
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of
the question to the probate court for adjudgment.
FACTS: Respondents Rolando Rodriguez, RacquelGegajo, Rosalinda Landon, Reynaldo

Rodriguez, Jr., Ester Fulgencio, Rafael Rodriguez and Reynest Rodriguez are children of Reynaldo
Rodriguez and Ester Rodriguez, who died in 2008 and in 2004 respectively.
Reynaldo and Ester left several properties to their surviving children. In 2009, respondents
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Reynaldo and Ester. On the other
hand, petitioner Anita Ong Tan is a co-depositor in a Joint Account under the name Anita Ong Tan
and Reynaldo in the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
When Reynaldo passed away, joint account continued to be in active status. When Anita decided
to withdraw her funds, BPI required her to submit an extrajudicial settlement of the heirs of
Reynaldo. To comply, Anita approached respondents and asked them to sign a waiver of rights to
the joint account. Respondents refused to sign the waiver as they believed that the funds in the
joint account belonged to their father.
Anita filed before the trial court a petition for the settlement of the Intestate Estate of the late
Reynaldo and issuance of letters of administration to any competent neutral willing person, other
than any of the heirs of Reynaldo. Anita alleged that the funds used to open the BPI joint account
were her exclusive funds, which came from her East West Bank account. To prove her claim, she
presented as evidence a Debit Memo from East West Bank, which was used for the issuance of a
Manager's Check in the amount of P 1,021,868 which exact amount was deposited to the BPI joint
account. Anita presented the testimony of a Branch Manager of East West to corroborate her
testimony.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita and held that Anita sufficiently adduced evidence to rebut the
presumption that the funds deposited under the BPI joint account of Anita and Reynaldo were
owned by them in common.
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The CA however reversed the ruling of the RTC. In giving credence to respondents' contention,
the CA maintained that the presumption of co-ownership as regards the nature of joint accounts
was not sufficiently overturned, as Anita failed to prove that she is indeed the sole owner of the
funds therein.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in declaring Anita and Reynaldo as co-owners of the subject bank
deposits despite the evidence submitted by Anita to prove otherwise.
RULING: Yes. In this case, the Court notes that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the
intestate court insettling the issue of the ownership of the joint account. While respondents filed a
Motion to Dismiss, which hypothetically admitted all the allegations in Anita's petition, the same
likewise sought affirmative relief from the intestate court. The affirmative relief is embodied in
respondents' claim of ownership over the funds in said joint account to the exclusion of Anita,
when in fact said funds in the joint account was neither mentioned nor included in the inventory
of the intestate estate of the late Reynaldo.
Therefore, respondents impliedly agreed to submit the issue of ownership before the trial court,
acting as an intestate court, when they raised an affirmative relief before it. To reiterate, the
exercise of the trial court of its limited jurisdiction is not jurisdictional, but procedural; hence,
waivable.
MANUELA AZUCENA MAYOR VS. EDWIN TIU AND DAMIANA CHARITO MARTY
G.R. No. 203770 November 23, 2016
FACTS: Marty, the alleged adopted daughter of the decedent Rosario, filed a verified urgent
manifestation and motion before the Regional Trial Court and averred that until the alleged
holographic will of Rosario is probated, an order be issued for the immediate inventory of all
properties subjected to the proceedings, that the tenants located at Primrose Hotel remit their
rentals to the estate of Rosario, for Rosario and Primrose are one and the same person being a
closed family corporation majority owned by Rosario , for the depository banks to freeze the
accounts of Rosario/ Primrose Corporation and to lock up the Primrose Hotel to preserve the
property until disposition of the court. The court applied the piercing the veil of corporate fiction
and determined that Rosario has no other properties than that of Primrose and hence approved the
manifestation and an order was issued against the banks and tenants. This was assailed by
Remedios and Manuela claiming that the probate court has no jurisdiction over the properties
claimed by Marty since these are owned and under the name of Primrose Corporation, a separate
and distinct personality from Rosario.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court has jurisdiction to determine ownership of properties to be
included in the inventory of estate properties.
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RULING: Yes, a probate court has limited jurisdiction to pass upon the title over the property for
the purpose of determining whether such property should be included or not in the inventory of
estate properties and such determination is not conclusive but merely provisional which is to be
resolved by finality in a separate action to resolve the title. The exception to this is when the
claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or
impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests
of third persons are not thereby prejudiced
In this case, the subject properties and the land where the Primrose Hotel is erected are registered
under the Torrens Title and the presumptive conclusiveness accorded to properties under the
Torrens Title should be given due weight and absence of any contrary evidence the holder is
considered the owner of the property in controversy. Likewise, the application of the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction does not apply in this case since the doctrine does not call for
application based on mere ownership of a single stockholder, that it must be based on clear and
convincing evidence and that the doctrine is used for determining liability and not of jurisdiction
which requires that the subject corporation should be properly impleaded which is not present in
this case.
GILDA JARDELEZA, (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY:

ERNESTO JARDELEZA, JR., TEODORO MARIA JARDELEZA, ROLANDO L.
JARDELEZA, MA. GLENDA JARDELEZA-UY, AND MELECIO GIL JARDELEZA -
versus- SPOUSES MELECIO AND ELIZABETH JARDELEZA, JMB TRADERS, INC.,
AND TEODORO JARDELEZA
G.R. No. 167975 June 17, 2015
Jurisdiction of RTC as a probate court relates only to matters on settlement of estate and probate
of will of a deceased person and does not extend to the determination of a question of ownership
that arises during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to
the estate unless the claimants to the property are all heirs of the deceased and they agreed to
submit the question for determination by the probate or administration court and the interests of
third parties are not prejudiced or unless the purpose is to determine whether or not certain
properties should be included in the inventory in which case the probate or administration court
may decide prima facie the ownership of the property, but such determination is not final and is
without prejudice to the right of interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a proper
action.
FACTS: Sps. Gilda and Ernesto commenced a civil action against Sps Melecio and Elizabeth,
JMB Traders and Teodoro Jardeleza raffled to Branch 33 of the RTC. However during the
pendency of the case Ernesto died. Hence special proceedings were commenced in RTC Branch
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38 and Teodoro was appointed as administrator. Teodoro in his capacity as administrator filed a
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motion to dismiss on the civil action on the ground that Melecio was also an heir of Ernesto thus
the properties subject to the action for reconveyance should be advances to inheritance and the
action for reconveyance be heard in the special proceedings. Motion to dismiss was granted. Gilda
contended that the in RTC as probate court cannot determine ownership of the property, thus
motion to dismiss should have been dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC as probate court can resolve issue of ownership.
RULING: No. The determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action to resolve title by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, the determination of
Branch 38 of RTC in the special proceedings with regard to ownership shall be for the purpose of
inventory and the determination is not final is without prejudice to the right of interested parties to
ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action.
THELMA M. ARANAS vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO et. al,
G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife,
Teresita V. Mercado, and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado,
Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two
children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M.
Aranas.
The deceased inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He also owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation and Cebu Emerson Transporation Corporation. He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in
Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty.
In June 1991, petitioner filed with RTC Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio’s estate, which the RTC granted. Teresita submitted an inventory of the
estate indicating that the at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only
personal properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25 in all.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it, which
was granted by the RTC.
In an order by the RTC, the court found that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
properties that should be included.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March
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14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian,
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Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of
assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.
RTC denied. Upon appeal, CA partly granted Teresita’s petition disposing that Teresita, et al. had
properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of
properties was interlocutory.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that
such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir
Realty by the decedent during his lifetime.
RULING: NO.
First, the SC clarified that the assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the
approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration
were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a
final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant
determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were
provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of
their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its
determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as
the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties
had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the
decedent during his lifetime.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, Rule 78, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which
has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to
the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1
allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong
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to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited.
The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed
to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered
by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. ·
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the
estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then
the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
LEO C. ROMERO AND DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO AND VITTORIO C. ROMERO
G.R. No. 188921 April 18, 2012
FACTS: Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death, their mother, Aurora Romero, was
appointed as legal guardian who held several real and personal properties in trust for her children.
Since that year until the present, she continues to be the administrator of the properties, businesses,
and investments comprising the estate of her late husband.
Sometime in 2006, Leo and Amando discovered that several Deeds of Sale were registered over
parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal properties of their parents. Petitioners claim that
sometime in August 2005, their brother Vittorio – through fraud, misrepresentation and duress –
succeeded in registering the properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed by Aurora.
Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat upon her, and even administered drugs that rendered
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her weak and vulnerable. Thus, Aurora signed the Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their
22
contents. Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and
Conveyance of Title (Amended) against Aurora and Vittorio. The RTC rendered its Resolution
dismissing petitioners’ complaint.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering the said Resolutions,
petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA rendered the assailed judgment
dismissing the Petition, ruling that the properties involved in this case are part of the estate left to
the heirs of Judge Romero, the partition of which is already subject of an intestate proceeding filed
in the then CFI. The CA based its judgment on the findings of the RTC that the inventory of the
estate of Judge Romero submitted to the CFI included the same parties, properties, rights and
interests as in the case before it.
Petitioners now come to the Court on a Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the probate court may rule
on issues pertaining to title over property only in a provisional capacity.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC’s jurisdiction sitting as a probate or intestate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons or the appointment of
executors, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.
RULING: In Coca v. Borromeo, this Court allowed the probate court to provisionally pass upon
the issue of title, precisely because the only interested parties are all heirs to the estate, subject of
the proceeding, viz:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality
not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice
"which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or
intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
In the case of In re Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs. Luisa
Garcia, et al., 67 Phil., 353, this court held:
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A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie
to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without
prejudice to the right of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the ownership
or existence of the right or credit.
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners’ claim that the issues raised in the case at bar pertain to
title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated in a separate civil action. The issue before
the court is not really one of title or ownership, but the determination of which particular properties
should be included in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed the
properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties of their parents and, therefore,
part of the estate that was illegally sold to the respondent. Some of these real properties identified
seem to be the same real properties that form part of the inventory of the estate in the intestate
proceedings.
Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they also seek to be the
owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor their claim, they argue that the properties
are conjugal in nature and hence form part of their inheritance. For his defense, Vittorio contends
that the lots are the paraphernal properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio
subsequently redeemed.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that the determination of whether a
property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests
with the probate court:
xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the
ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate
courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the
estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. Thereafter,
distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him.
The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring
into the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a
necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the
properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are
before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to
the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership certain of the
properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily
has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is
to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings.
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24
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the allegedly illegal sale are
conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory
of the estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can
competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the
probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the heirs, after
the debts of the estate have been paid.
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP vs.

SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE
SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO,
G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP vs.

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE
SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO
G.R. No. 177192
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are
all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
FACTS: On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114,
Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin
Agtarap. The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City
without any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages,
first with Lucia Garcia and second with Caridad Garcia. Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three children--Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa ). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9,
1926. They also had three children--Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements Joseph, a
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25
grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating
for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special administrator
to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of
a regular administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring
the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b)
apportioning and allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance
with law; and (c) entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession those parts
of the estate individually awarded to them.
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing and
directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in the
petition, and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots
belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia's death in April
1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence
was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to
the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong's Restaurant) was
built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment
of Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to
do so; (2) his interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They
claimed that the best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular
administrator.
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator
of Joaquin's estate. Consequently, it issued him letters of administration.
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective proposed
projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition
Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, can determine
questions of ownership, which properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
RULING: YES.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special
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and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate
26
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title.
Exceptions to the general rule:
1) the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question
of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the
final determination of ownership in a separate action.
2) If the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the
resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject
properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of
Joaquin
CAROLINA CAMAYA vs. BERNARDO PATULANDONG
G.R. No. 144915 February 23, 2004
FACTS: On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she
devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Mangulabnan. The pertinent portion of her
will reads:
The testatrix’s son Bernardo Patulandong, respondent herein, was in the will appointed as the
executor.
During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her will before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI). The CFI admitted the will to probate.
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27
On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying her will in this wise. On May 14,
1988, the testatrix died. Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of
the title to Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to heed the request, however, in view of the codicil
which modified the testator’s will.
Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong with the Regional Trial Court
On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the partition case, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties and the defendant to deliver the
copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089.
However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the court holds that the partition is
without prejudice [to]... the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court. On July
17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a petition for probate
of the codicil of the testatrix, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 218.
On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan caused the
cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT-2157507 was issued
in his name. Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a Deed of
Sale dated February 19, 1991.
On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision in Sp. Proc. No. 218 admitting the codicil to
probate and declaring the Deed of sale and the TCT in favour of Camaya to be Void.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and
ordered the cancellation of the tcts of petitioners and the deed of sale;
RULING: YES.
In Cuizon v. Ramolete, this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a probate court, to wit:
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties
and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third
parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no
authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property.
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28
Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of
sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession
and ownership of the property.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES,

THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES v. CESAR R. REYES
Gr No. 139587 Nov. 22, 2000
FACTS: The spouses Ismael and Felisa Reyes owned two parcels of land (Lot A and Lot B)
collectively referred to as the Arayat properties located in Arayat, Cubao, Quezon City.
In 1973, Ismael died intestate. He was survived by his wife Felisa, his children Oscar Reyes, Cesar
Reyes, and five other children. Before his death however, Lot A was forfeited in favor of the
government due to his failure to pay the tax.
In 1976, Oscar was able to redeem the said property.
In 1982, Lot B was also forfeited again in favor of the government due to Felisa’s failure to pay
taxes. In 1986, Oscar was again able to redeem Lot B.
In 1989, Cesar (brother of Oscar) filed a petition to be the administrator of the estate of Ismael
which consists of the 50% of the Arayat properties. Oscar filed his opposition thereto on the ground
that the estate Ismael was no longer the owner of the said properties and that in fact Oscar became
the owner because he was the one who redeemed the Arayat properties; that the other heirs
abandoned their shares; that Cesar’s petition was filed belatedly because he only filed it 16 years
after the death of their father.
The probate court however allowed the petition of Cesar and approved the inclusion of the Arayat
properties into the estate of Ismael.
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the probate court is proper.
RULING: Yes. The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with
the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and
removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is as a
rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title.
JD-4C
29
The foregoing rule however provides for an exception, that is: if the claimant and all other parties
having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced. In this case, not all parties, not all heirs, gave their consent to the probate court.
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
GR NO. L-62952 OCTOBER 9, 1985
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible
and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
Applying the ruling in Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449, a will of this nature, no matter how valid
it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine
the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
FACTS: Martin Jugo died in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament wherein the testator
named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his
estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez
by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been
estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife.
In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.
Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised
to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his
entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and asked for the issuance to her of letters
testamentary.
The legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter
alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of
the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and
that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in
integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his
Will to cohabiting with the petitioner, the Will's admission to probate will be an idle exercise
because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
JD-4C
30
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court. The respondent court set aside the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent
court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void
pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in a
resolution dated December 28, 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring
the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner?
RULING: The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in
favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible
and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner
as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no
matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings
to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained.
On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations
that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77
Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the
proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court
does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
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SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. AND MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ETAL.
31
GR NO. L-56340 June 24, 1983
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic
validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76,
Section 9.)
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot
resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.
FACTS: Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (Pastor, Sr.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City survived by his
Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children
Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor, Jr.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, not
natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada. Pastor, Jr. is a Philippine citizen, having been
naturalized in 1936.
Sofia is a Spanish subject. Quemada is a Filipino by his mother's citizenship. On November 13,
1970, Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of
Pastor, Sr. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The will contained only one testamentary
disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor, Sr.'s 42% share in the
operation by ATLAS Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some
mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
On November 21, 1970, the probate court, upon motion of Quemada and after an ex parte hearing,
appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor, Sr., whether or not covered or
affected by the holographic will. He assumed office as such on December 4, 1970 after filing a
bond of P 5,000.00.
Quemada as special administrator, instituted against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for
reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the
legacy and which were in the names of the spouses Pastor, Jr. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval
de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. Pastor,
Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing
Quemada as special administrator.
The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals,
the order was affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. L-46645 dismissed the petition in a minute resolution. For two years after remand of
the case to the probate court, Quemada filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his
legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. Pastor, Jr. and Sofia opposed these
pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu
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Court of First Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the probate court.
32
The probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor,
Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March
25. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to
how much inheritance Quemada was entitled to receive under the wig. Pursuant thereto, Pastor.
Jr. and Sofia submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April 10, which in effect showed
that determination of how much Quemada should receive was still premature. Quemada submitted
his Position paper dated April 20, 1980. ATLAS, upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn
statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group of tsn from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to
February 1980.
On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the probate court issued
the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the
royalties’ payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.
The order being "immediately executory", Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution
and Garnishment on September 4, 1980, and in serving the same on ATLAS on the same day.
Notified of the Order on September 6, 1980, the oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the
same date primarily on the ground that the probate court gravely abused its discretion when it
resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of Quemada's legacy
after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. In the meantime, the probate court
ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor, Jr. and/or his assignees until
after resolution of oppositors' motion for reconsideration. Before the Motion for Reconsideration
could be resolved, however, Pastor, Jr., this time joined by his wife Ma. Elena Achaval De Pastor
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition. The petition was denied.
On December 9, 1980, Pastor, Jr. and his wife moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's
decision of November 18, 1980, calling the attention of the appellate court to another order of the
Probate Court dated November 11, 1980, by which the oppositors' motion for reconsideration of
the Probate Court's Order of August 20, 1980 was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review by
certiorari with prayer for a writ of pre y injunction, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 18, 1980 as well as the orders of the Probate Court dated August 20, 1980,
November 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, Med by petitioners on March 26, 1981, followed by
a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order.
ISSUE: Whether the Probate Court was correct when it ruled on the issues of the intrinsic validity
of the will and ownership of the mining claims.
RULING: No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted
to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed
the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1;
Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate
Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass
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upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
33
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order of
December 5, 1972 which allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining
properties. Nowhere in the dispositive portion of the questioned order is there a declaration of
ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not
resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and
propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win
"with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate administration
aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and
possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of
Cebu." Then again, the Probate Order conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect
must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner
does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue
of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved.
Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing Quemada to remain as special
administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this
(Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or
not to allow and approve the aforestated will.” It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing
Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the
mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of
the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
ERLINDA PILAPIL vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMO BRIONES
G.R. No. 150175 March 10, 2006
The proceeding for probate is one in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons
interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by sec. 630 C. P. C.; and any order
that may be entered therein is binding against all of them. A final order of distribution of the estate
of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the 34alutary34es.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary
period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the
instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed
and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
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In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata
managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino,
34
registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata
and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register
the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2
October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones. Respondents, on the other hand,
are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones.
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino
died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate with the
Cebu City Court of First Instance (CFI). On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued Letters of Administration
appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate. She submitted an Inventory of
Maximino’s properties.
The CFI awarded ownership of the questioned real properties to Donata. On 27 June 1960, Donata
had the said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, and by virtue
thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted with the RTC a
petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio,
were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the
RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted
by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect
rentals from Maximino’s properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside
the Order, dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the said properties were already under his and
his wife’s administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of
Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property. They alleged that
Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in
breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name
the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.
In their Answer to the Complaint, the heirs of Donata raised, as affirmative and special 35alutary,
among others, that even granting arguendo that plaintiffs have the right to question the transfer to
the name of the late Donata Ortiz Briones the titles of the said lots any action of that effect has
definitely prescribed for more than 30 years have already occurred when the titles to said lots were
transferred to the name of the late Donata Ortiz Briones
ISSUE:Whether the heirs of Maximino may still assail the intestate proceedings. (NO)
RULING: If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene, still
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they would be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but as the
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distribution of the estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, “The
proceeding forprobate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over all
persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by sec. 630 C. P. C.; and any
order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them.” (See also in re Estate of Johnson,
39 Phil. 156) “A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the
land of the estate in the 36alutary36es.” (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45
Phil. 895) There is no reason why, by analogy, these 36alutary doctrines should not apply to
intestate proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary
period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the
instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed
and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to
be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including
the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. There
being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same
should have been dismissed.
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36
PARTITION AS A MODE OF SETTLING THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED PERSON
JESUSA DUJALI BUOT vs. ROQUE RASAY DUJALI

G.R. No. 199885 October 2, 2017
Section 1 of Rule 74 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of
partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take
a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use
made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed
the word shall as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character.
FACTS: Jesusa Dujali Buot filed for administration of estate of deceased Gregorio Dujali, who died
intestate. Buot alleged she was a surviving heir along with Roque Dujali, and other heirs. Buot asked that
(1) an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio's estate; (2) a final inventory of the properties be
made; (3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate be ordered distributed in accordance with law
among the legal heirs.
Dujali opposed and asked for dismissal, arguing Buot had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings
because she failed to attach any document, such as a certificate of live birth or a marriage certificate, to
prove her filiation. Buot argued only ultimate facts should be included in an initiatory pleading. The
marriage certificate and certificate of live birth which Dujali demands are evidentiary matters that ought to
be tackled during trial.She attached a copy of the necrological services program where she was listed as
one of Gregorio's heirs, a certification from the municipal mayor that she is Gregorio's child, and a copy of
the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement which includes both Buot and Dujali as Gregorio's heirs. Notably,
this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement pertained to parcels of land not included in the list of properties
annexed in Buot's petition.
The RTC sided with Dujali. It held that under the law, there are only two exceptions to the requirement that
the settlement of a deceased's estate should be judicially administered: (1) extrajudicial settlement and (2)
summary settlement of an estate of small value. In this case, administration has been barred by the fact that
Gregorio's estate has already been settled extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended Extrajudicial
Settlement. It also noted that Gregorio had no creditors since Buot failed to allege it in her petition.
ISSUE Whether the RTC properly dismissed the petition on the ground that there has already been an
extrajudicial settlement of certain properties of the estate
RULING: Yes.
When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration
proceedings. There are, however, several exceptions. One such exception is provided for in Section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
According to this provision, when the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the
heirs may divide the estate among themselves without judicial administration. The heirs may do so
extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. In case of
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disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for partition.
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Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration proceedings if
they have good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition.
Since such proceedings are always “long,” “costly,” “superfluous and unnecessary,” resort to judicial
administration of cases falling under Section 1, Rule 74 appears to have become the exception rather than
the rule. Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that “[w]here partition is possible, either in or out of
court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons.”
We have reviewed the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of her petition for letters of
administration and rule that these do not suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio’s estate to
administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover Gregorio’s entire
estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of the estate. Whether the extrajudicial
settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the
entire estate may be considered valid do not automatically create a compelling reason to order the
administration of the estate. Parties seeking to challenge an extrajudicial settlement of estate possess
sufficient remedies under the law and procedural rules.
As to Buot’s other allegations that: (1) there has been no effort to partition the estate; (2) that Dujali
challenges her status as an heir; (3) that other heirs have been deprived of the estate; and (4) these heirs are
amenable to the appointment of an administrator, we find that none of these allegations actually prevent the
filing of an ordinary action for partition. In fact, if it is indeed true that there has been no effort to partition
Gregorio’s entire estate, the filing of an action for partition before the proper court will leave his heirs with
no choice but to proceed. An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot’s entitlement to
participate in the proceedings as an heir. Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to
the properties that ought to be included in the partition and the true heirs entitled to receive their portions
of the estate, it is also the appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to ascertain
if partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO
substituted by VILLAFRIA vs.MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS
G.R. No. 187524 August 05, 2015
FACTS: On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his
children with his first wife the respondents leaving several properties to them. Thereafter, a complaint for
judicial partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was filed by the respondents alleging
that they discovered that their co-heirs sold the properties to the petitioners, who were now deceased and
duly represented by their son, without their consent.
The respondents also learned of a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was
published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over
the subject properties before the Register of Deeds and filed the said complaint.
The petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and
good faith in acquiring the subject properties. Petitioner Francisco further contended that what they
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purchased was only the resort. He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation,
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Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides that respondents’ co-heirs sold the family
home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby
Benita sold the resort to petitioners.
The trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to
irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well as the circumstances
Surrounding the execution of the same. CA affirmed hence, the petition where they alleged that since the
Respondents’ complaint alleged causes of action for settlement of estate under Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, therefore it is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition.
ISSUE: Whether the petition is for partition or for settlement of estate.
RULING: The court held that the complaint filed by the respondents was for judicial partition. It is true
that some of respondents’ causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro,
his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement
of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of
the suit, the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one for judicial partition
with annulment of title and recovery of possession.
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will,
leaving his estate without any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents
were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a special proceeding for
settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
extrajudicially.
SPS BENATIRO vs. HEIRS OF EVARISSTO CUYOS
Gr. No. 161220 July 30, 2008
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because it was notice after the fact of execution.
FACTS: When Evaristo Cuyos died in 1966, he left six parcels of land in Daanbantayan, Cebu.
Gloria, one of Evaristo’s nine children was appointed as administrator of his estate. Subsequently,
Atty. Taneo, the Clerk of Court of the CFI which granted the letters of administration to Gloria,
was appointed to act as Commissioner in charge to effect the agreement of the heirs and to prepare
the project partition of the estate.
In his report, Atty. Taneo stated that in a conference to arrive at an agreement for partition attended
by six out of nine heirs, it was agreed that the properties of the estate would be sold to one of the
Columba Cuyos Benatiro, one of the heirs of the decedent. Finding the terms of the agreement in
order, the CFI approved the compromise agreement embodied in the Commissioner’s Report.
Thus, to implement the agreement. Lope, the new administrator, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
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in favor of Columba. Later, the titles to the parcel of land acquired by Columba were subsequently
transferred to Sps. Renato and Rosei Benatiro, also herein petitioners.
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In February 1998, or nearly 20 years later, four of the heirs, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano and
Enrique filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the CFI order which approved
compromise agreement, claiming that the Commissioner’s Report practically deprived them of due
process, in that no meeting between the heirs ever took place and that they never received any
payment from the sale of their share in the inheritance. CA granted the petition and annulled the
CFI order, concluding that the conference was not held accordingly. It rationalized that the Report
never mentioned any of the names of thise present but only mentioned the names of those who
were absent’ and that no evidence of notice of the conference to the respondents was presented.
CA held that since the order stemmed from a void compromise agreement, the annulled order had
no legal effect.
ISSUE: Whether the order of the trial court approving the Commissioner’s Report on compromise
agreement without notice is valid
RULING: No. The assailed order which approved a void Commissioner’s Report is void for lack
of due process.
The procedure outlined in S1 R74 of the Rules of Court is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states however that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement
will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed
of settlement and or partition is agreed upon and not after such an agreement has already been
executed as what happened in the case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial
settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because it was notice after the fact of execution. This
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent’s estate. In this connection, the records
of the present documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the
present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and
the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
DE LEON vs DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 152862 July, 26, 2004
FACTS: An action for Partition filed by Pantaleon U. del Rosario and his son, respondent Vicente
B. del Rosario, before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 11 of Cebu City.
Plaintiffs therein, Pantaleon U. del Rosario and Vicente B. del Rosario, are cousin and nephew,
respectively, of the petitioner. Plaintiffs therein claimed that petitioner executed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario covering all of her shares in the properties sought to be
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partitioned. Petitioner claimed that she did not execute any deed of sale in favor of Vicente B. del
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Rosario. She further averred that the only portions of her inheritance she ever sold were her shares
in the Asinan and Negros properties, which she sold in favor of Pantaleon U. del Rosario, and the
late Vicente S. del Rosario. In December 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of
nullity of deed of sale with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Upon the filing
of the Complaint for declaration of nullity, petitioner moved for the suspension of the partition
proceedings. Complaint for declaration of nullity was eventually dismissed. The trial court
ratiocinated that the issue of ownership should be determined and resolved in the partition case. It
also noted that the filing of a separate action to determine the real owner of the properties in issue
and sought to be partitioned would result in multiplicity of suits. Petitioner sought the
reconsideration but the same was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court is correct in dismissing the complaint for declaration of nullity of
deed of sale.
RULING: To split the proceedings into declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and trial for the
partition case, or to hold in abeyance the partition case pending resolution of the nullity case would
result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay, as the lower court
observed. On the other hand, it would be in the interest of justice if the partition court hears all the
actions and incidents concerning the properties subject of the partition in a single and complete
proceeding.
After all, the issue of nullity can be properly ventilated before the partition court. Thus, even with
the dismissal of the action for nullity, petitioner is not without recourse. She can still dispute the
execution of the deed of absolute sale and assert her rights to the properties subject of the said
instrument in the partition case. There is no need for a separate case to resolve the matter.
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 115181 MARCH 31, 2000
In cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement
is possible, then ordinary action for partition may be resorted to.
FACTS: Maria Soccoro Avelino filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the
settlement of estate her father who died intestate. The other compulsory heirs from the second wife
of her father opposed the petition and filed a motion to convert the judicial proceedings to an action
for judicial partition. This was opposed by Soccoro claiming that judicial partition is not proper
since there was no determination yet of the character and extent of her father’s estate and that the
rules has not provided for conversion of a motion for issuance of letters of administration to an
action for judicial partition.
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ISSUE: Whether the motion for conversion of the judicial proceeding to letters of administration
is proper and allowed under the rules.
RULING: Yes, the conversion of the motion for issuance of letters of administration to judicial
partition is proper and allowed under the rules.
The rules provided that when a person died intestate or if testate failed to name an executor in the
will or the named executor is incompetent or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the required bond,
the court of competent jurisdiction shall appoint a qualified administrator, exceptions to this rule
are settlement through extrajudicial settlement or summary settlement of estates of small value.
However, if the heirs disagree in the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is
possible, an ordinary action for partition may be availed of. Moreover, complete inventory of the
estate may be done during partition proceedings.
In this case, since the majority of other heirs are agreeable to the expeditious remedy of judicial
partition, they may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. Thus, there was a
proper conversion of the judicial proceeding to judicial partition.
ARSENIO TABASONDRA, ET AL. vs. SPOUSES CONRADO CONSTANTINO AND

TARCILA TABASONDRA-CONSTANTINO, ET AL.
G.R No. 196403 December 7, 2016
FACTS: Arsenio Tabasondra and other heirs of Cornelio filed a petition for partition of a parcel
of land which are owned in common with the heirs of Valentina and Valeriana the sisters of
Cornelio where they aver that they were not given any share from the fruits of the said parcel of
land. The heirs of Valentina and Valeriana agreed with the petition but only with respect to the
share of Cornelio since their shares were acquired by them through an Absolute Deed of Sale
executed by Valentina and Valeriana in their favor.
ISSUE: Whether the partition of the parcel of land refers only to the share of Cornelio.
RULING: Yes, the partition should only pertain to the share of Cornelio.
The law provided that a property owned in common, the co-owners may alienate their share in the
undivided portion even without the consent of the other co-owners. Also, in an action for partition,
it has two stages, first an action for declaration of co-ownership and second is for the segregation
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.
In this case, it was properly determined that Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana, all deceased, co-
owns the parcel of land. Since the shares of Valentina and Valeriana were alienated by them for
their heirs, only the portion pertaining to the share of Cornelio will be subjected to partition. But,
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despite the determination of existence of co-ownership, there was no final order on the segregation
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and conveyance of the parcel of land which is remanded to the lower court for the segregation and
conveyance.
HEIRS OF ERNESTO MORALES v. ASTRID MORALES AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 224849 June 06, 2018
FACTS: The respondent, Astrid Morales Agustin, is a grandchild of Jayme Morales (Jayme), who
was the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, designated as Lot No. 9217-A,
and located at Barangay Sto. Tomas, Laoag City. The respondent initiated the instant complaint,
originally together with Lydia Morales, another one of Jayme's grandchildren and the respondent's
cousin, for the partition of Jayme's property. They alleged that they, together with the petitioners
and their other cousins, were co-owners of the subject property by virtue of their successional
rights as heirs of Jayme.
For clarity of the discussion, the heirs of Jayme and his wife, Telesfora Garzon, who both died
intestate, were their four (4) children:
1. Vicente Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) herein deceased defendant Ernesto
Morales (substituted by his heirs who are now petitioners herein); (b) Abraham Morales
(also deceased); (c) former plaintiff and, eventually, defendant Lydia Morales (now also
deceased); and (d) original defendant Angelita Ragasa;
2. Simeon Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) herein respondent Astrid Morales
Agustin; (b) Leonides Morales; (c) Geraldine Morales-Gaspar; and (d) Odessa Morales;
3. Jose Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) Victoria Geron; (b) Vicente Morales;
(c); Gloria Villasenor; (d) Amalia Alejo; (e) Juliet Manuel; (f) Rommel Morales; and (g)
Virgilio Morales (now deceased);
4. Martina Morales-Enriquez, who was survived by her children: (a) Evelina Lopez; (b)
Emeterio Enriquez; (c) Elizabeth Somera; and (d) Bernardita Alojipan
In response to the respondent's complaint, the heirs of Jose Morales filed an answer, which
admitted the allegations in the complaint, and interposed no objection to the partition, "provided
that their present positions on the subject property are respected."
On the other hand, Ernesto Morales, as one of the heirs of Vicente Morales, filed an Answer with
Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-claims. He alleged that herein respondent has no
cause of action against the petitioners because: (1) the proper remedy should not be a complaint
for partition but an action for the settlement of the intestate estate of Jayme and his wife; and (2)
herein respondent has no more right of participation over the subject property because the same
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has long been conveyed to Ernesto Morales (as substituted by herein petitioners) by the
respondent's parents, Simeon and Leonila Morales.
The RTC ruled that: (1) the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be partitioned without
need of any settlement or administration proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether an administration proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased is a
condition that has to be met before any partition of the estate and any distribution thereof to the
heirs could be effected.
RULING: While the Court does not agree with this assertion by the petitioners, the Court,
nonetheless, agrees that the trial court should have collated Jayme's other properties, if any, prior
to the promulgation of any judgment of partition in accordance with the laws on Succession.
Generally, an action for partition may be seen to simultaneously present two issues:
1. there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be
partitioned; and
2. assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue
of how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and defendants, i.e., what portion
should go to which co-owner.
The Court must emphasize, however, that this definition does not take into account the difference
between (1) an action of partition based on the successional rights of the heirs of a decedent, and
(2) an ordinary action of partition among co-owners. While oftentimes interchanged with one
another, and although in many ways similar, these two partitions draw legal basis from two
different sets of legal provisions in the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code).
To begin with, the laws governing the partition of inheritance draws basis from Article 777 of the
Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent. As such, from that moment, the heirs, legatees, and devisees' successional
rights are vested, and they are considered to own in common the inheritance left by the decedent.
Under the law, partition of the inheritance may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves
extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration
proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
A reading of the enumeration set above would reveal instances when the appointment of an
executor or administrator is dispensed with. One is through the execution of a public instrument
by the heirs in an extrajudicial settlement of the estate.
Another, which is the focal point of this case, is through the ordinary action of
partition.According to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the heirs may resort to an ordinary
action of partition of the estate of the deceased if they disagree as to the exact division of the
estate, and only "[i]f the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
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minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose."
The ordinary action for partition therefore is meant to take the place of the special proceeding on
the settlement of the estate. The reason is that, if the deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for the heirs
and the creditors, much less, the necessity to deprive the real owners of their possession to which
they are immediately entitled.
Thus, an action for partition with regard to the inheritance of the heirs should conform to the law
governing the partition and distribution of the estate, and not only to the law governing ordinary
partition. These pertinent provisions of the law could be found in Title IV (Succession), Chapter 4
(Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions), Section 6 (Partition and Distribution
of the Estate) of the Civil Code.
Particularly, according to Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts
of the deceased. Partition, the Civil Code adds, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing
held in common among those to whom it may belong. Thus, every act which is intended to put an
end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
In addition, and on account of this partition, Article 1061 of the Civil Code requires the parties to
collate the properties of the decedent which they may have received by way of gratuitous title prior
to the former's death, to wit:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during
the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition. (1035a) (Emphasis supplied)
On the procedural aspect, the partition of the estate based on the successional rights of the heirs,
as herein mentioned, is required by Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (Summary Settlement of Estate)
to follow the rules on "ordinary action of partition." This pertains to Rule 69 (Partition), Section
13 of the same rules, which states that:
Section 13. Partition of personal property. — The provisions of this Rule shall apply to
partitions of estates composed of personal property, or of both real and personal property,
in so far as the same may be applicable. (13) (Emphasis supplied)
Once legally partitioned, each heir is conferred with the exclusive ownership of the property, which
was adjudicated to him/her.
In contrast, an ordinary partition of co-owned property, specifically of real property, is governed

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by Title III of the Civil Code on Co-ownership.
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Article 484 of the Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. It further provides that no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership; each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. This partition may be made by
agreement between the parties, or by judicial proceedings,which, like the procedural aspect of the
partition by virtue of successional rights, is governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, while both partitions make use of Rule 69 as the procedural rule that would govern
the manner of partition, the foregoing disquisitions explicitly elaborate that the bases of the
ownership are different, and the subject matters concerned are also different—one speaks
of the partition of the estate to distribute the inheritance to the heirs, legatees, or devisees,
whereas the other speaks of partition of any undivided thing or right to distribute to the co-
owners thereof.
In the case at hand, the parties are the heirs of the late Jayme Morales. The land being sought
to be divided was a property duly registered under Jayme's name. Necessarily, therefore, the
partition invoked by the respondents is the partition of the estate of the deceased Jayme.
As such, when the petitioners alleged in their answer that there is yet another property that needs
to be partitioned among the parties, they were actually invoking the Civil Code provisions, not on
Co-ownership, but on Succession, which necessarily includes Article 1061 of the Civil Code—the
provision on collation. It is therefore proper for the trial court to have delved into this issue
presented by the petitioner instead of disregarding the same and limiting itself only to that singular
property submitted by the respondent for partition.
In case the defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff,
the court should not dismiss the plaintiff's action for partition but, on the contrary and in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not.
Nonetheless, lest it be misunderstood, the law does not prohibit partial partition. In fact, the Court,
in administration proceedings, have allowed partition for special instances. But the Court should
caution that this power should be exercised sparingly. This is because a partial partition and
distribution of the estate does not put to rest the question of the division of the entire estate.
In this case, the Court is of the opinion that there is no cogent reason to render the partition of one
of Jayme's properties and totally ignore the others, if any. Absent any circumstance that would
warrant the partial partition and distribution of Jayme's estate, the prudent remedy is to settle the
entirety of the estate in the partition proceedings in the court a quo. Besides, as stated by the Court
in Gulang, it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and
independent from that of partition originally instituted. This would entail wastage of additional
time and resources, which could already be avoided through consolidated proceedings in the
court a quo.
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FELICIDAD DADIZON, ILUMINADA B. MURGIA, PERLA B. MATIGA,
DOMINADOR M. BERNADAS, CIRILO B. DELIS, AND HEIRS OF MARCELINO
BERNADAS v. SOCORRO BERNADAS, SUBSTITUTED BY JEANETTE B.
ALFAJARDO, FELY BERNADAS, JULIET BERNADAS, GODOFREDO BERNADAS,
JR. AND SOFIA C. BERNADAS
G.R. No. 172367 June 05, 2009
FACTS: Petitioners and respondents are the children and representatives of the deceased children
of the late Diosdado Bernadas, Sr. who died intestate, leaving in co-ownership with his then
surviving spouse, Eustaquia Bernadas (deceased), several parcels of agricultural and residential
land situated in Naval, Biliran. Respondents filed a Complaint against petitioners to compel the
partition of the one-half conjugal share of the properties left by their late father (subject properties)
based on the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. Respondents alleged that Felicidad Dadizon was in
possession of the subject properties and refused to heed their demands to cause the partition of the
same.
During trial, both parties manifested that in view of the death of Eustaquia, they have an ongoing
negotiation for the extrajudicial partition of the subject properties to end their differences once and
for all. The counsel of respondents filed a Project of Partition. However, the same was not signed
by all of the heirs. On the hearing, the Project of Partition was discussed by both parties, and the
RTC ordered petitioners to submit their comment thereon within 15 days. Petitioners did not file
any comment. In its Order, the RTC noted that at the last pre-trial conference, both parties informed
the court that they already have an extrajudicial partition of the subject properties and ordered both
parties to submit the extrajudicial partition for its approval. The RTC issued another Order
reiterating its earlier Order directing both parties to submit the signed extrajudicial partition.
Respondents filed a Compliance. Respondents prayed that the submitted documents be considered
by the RTC relative to the subdivision of the estate left by their late father. The RTC issued an
Order approving the Project of Partition.
Hence, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA alleging, among others, that the RTC erred in
finding that their counsel agreed to the approved Project of Partition and that it should be noted
that the said document does not bear the signature of their counsel. The CA rendered its assailed
decision finding the appeal to be without merit.
ISSUE: Whether the order approving Project of Partition is valid
RULING: NO.
There are two stages in every action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
The first stage is the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition
is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the property.
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The second stage commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
There are, thus, two ways in which a partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under
Section 2, and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached under Sections 3
to 6.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 69 provide:
SECTION 2. Order for partition, and partition by agreement thereunder. — If after the trial the
court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition of the real estate among
all the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the partition
among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition
so agreed upon by all the parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court confirming
the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated.
(2a)
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SECTION 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. — If the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the
plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall
direct. (3a)
A careful study of the records of this case reveals that the RTC departed from the foregoing
procedure mandated by Rule 69.
In its Order, the RTC noted that both parties filed the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000
that it approved. In its Order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the RTC reiterated
that both parties filed the same. However, the records show that the Project of Partition was filed
only by respondents' counsel, and that the same was not signed by the respondents or all of the
parties.
The RTC noted that both parties have already agreed on the manner of partition of the subject
properties, and that they are seeking for the court's approval. On the issue of whether the RTC
erred in finding that petitioners acceded to the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000, the CA
sustained the RTC's finding and noted that both parties manifested to the RTC that they already
have an extrajudicial partition, and that petitioners did not file any comment or suggestion on the
manner of distribution of the subject properties despite being required by the RTC.
Even if petitioners did manifest in open court to the RTC that they have already agreed with the
respondents on the manner of partition of the subject properties, what is material is that only the
respondents filed the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 and that the same did not bear
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the signatures of petitioners because only a document signed by all of the parties can signify that
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they agree on a partition. Hence, the RTC had no authority to approve the Project of Partition
dated October 23, 2000, which did not bear all of the signatures of the parties, on the premise that
they had all agreed to the same. Likewise, the failure to file any comment or suggestion as to
manner of distribution of the subject properties does not justify the RTC's non-observance of the
procedure mandated by Rule 69. When the parties were unable to submit the signed Project of
Partition despite being ordered to do so, the RTC should have ordered the appointment of
commissioners to make the partition as mandated by Section 3, Rule 69.
In partition proceedings, reference to commissioners is required as a procedural step in the action

and is not discretionary on the part of the court. We have held in a number of cases that if the
parties are unable to agree on a partition, the trial court should order the appointment of
commissioners.
In De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, we held that the trial court cannot compel petitioner to sign the
extrajudicial deed of partition prepared solely by private respondents for the reason that if the
parties are unable to agree on a partition, the trial court must order the appointment of
commissioners.
In Patricio v. Dario III, we invalidated the order of the trial court ordering the sale by public
auction of the property subject of partition on the ground that since the parties were unable to agree
on a partition, the trial court should have ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section
3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. It is only after it is made to appear to the latter that the real estate,
or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, and
one of the parties interested asks that the property be sold instead of being assigned to one of the
parties, may the court order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale.
In Heirs of Zoilo Llido v. Marquez, we sustained the trial court's order appointing commissioners
to effect the partition in view of the failure of the parties to submit a project of partition.
In Honorio v. Dunuan, we struck down the order of the trial court approving a project of partition
filed by respondent upon the mere failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear at the hearing and
over his subsequent objection and directed the trial court to immediately constitute and appoint
commissioners.
In this case, that petitioners insist on a manner of partition contrary to the approved Project of
Partition dated October 23, 2000 that was filed and prepared solely by respondents all the way to
this Court makes it more manifest that the parties to this case are unable to agree on a partition.
SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-ZARAGOZA vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN
JD-4C
G.R. No. 106401 September 29, 2000
49
It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes
are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. Should a person make a partition
of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
FACTS: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the
Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He had four
children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964,
he died without a will and was survived by his four children. On December 28, 1981, private
respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint with CFI against Spouses Florentino and
Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871,
and for payment of damages. She alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited
properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in
advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists
of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because
of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the
Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was
executed in her favor covering these lots during her father’s lifetime.
Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent and the allegations on
the properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way
of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their father's
name, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for a valuable consideration. They denied knowledge
of the alleged intention of their father to convey the cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason
for his failure to do so because she became an American citizen. They denied that there was
partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.
ISSUE: Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties, which include
Lots 871 and 943, is valid.
RULING: YES.
The Court held that it is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for
as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. Should a person
make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
Thus, the court ruled that that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed
his properties among his three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of sale. A
deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an American
citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943
were inheritance shares of the private respondent. As to the alleged prejudice on legitimes, the
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Court stated that the legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in
Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of
the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime
of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of
inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore
be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable
parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes
were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS

AYING, DEMETRIO SIDA, FELOMINO AUGUSTO, FEDERICO ABING, AND
ROMEO AUGUSTO
G.R. No. 128102 March 7, 2000
A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it
be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; a partition which
includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such
person
FACTS: Aznar Brothers Realty Co. (Aznar) acquired a lot from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on
(heirs of Crisanta) by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale. Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of the land by
tolerance of Aznar provided that they leave in the event that Aznar needed land for their private
purposes. Later, Aznar entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development
Corporation for the development of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing subdivision
and beach resort. As a result, it requested the private respondents to leave the premises. AZNAR
filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case for unlawful detainer and
damages.
On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the successors and descendants of
the eight children of the late Crisanta Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered owners
in the Original Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. They had been residing and occupying the subject
portion of the land in the concept of owner since the time of their parents and grandparents, except
for Teodorica Andales who was not a resident in said premises. Private respondents claimed that
the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void ab initio for being
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51
simulated and fraudulent, and they came to know of the fraud only when AZNAR entered into the
land in the last quarter of 1991 and destroyed its vegetation.
On 1 February 1994, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering the private respondents to vacate the
land in question upon the finality of the judgment. The MTCC delved into the issue of ownership
in order to resolve the issue of possession. It found that petitioner AZNAR acquired ownership of
Lot No. 4399 by virtue of the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by the Heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on on 3 March 1964, which was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March 1964 as appearing on the face thereof.
RTC affirmed the decision and issued notice of demolition.
The CA reversed the decision noting that at the time AZNAR entered the property, the private
respondents had already been in possession thereof peacefully, continuously, adversely and
notoriously since time immemorial. There was no evidence that petitioner was ever in possession
of the property. Its claim of ownership was based only on an Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of
Absolute Sale, which private respondents, however, claimed to be null and void for being
simulated and fraudulently obtained. The Court of Appeals further held that where not all the
known heirs had participated in the extrajudicial agreement of partition, the instrument would be
null and void and therefore could not be registered.
ISSUE: Whether the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is null and void.
RULING: No.
The Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid. Under Art. 1104 of the Civil Code,
a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be
proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; but the latter shall be
proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him. In the present
case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to the two parties to the deed
who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in point; it provides:
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with
respect to such person.
In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void in its entirety but
only to the extent corresponding to them. The Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale
is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries
the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, EXECUTOR VS. CA ET AL.

JD-4C
GR No. 118671 January 29, 1996
52
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1)
after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate
tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of
them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the
date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to
creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died
but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one
of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation
in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued
the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all
children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real
properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate
was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's
will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate
of his father's holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate
and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,
Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue
influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street,
Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed
an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited
with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a
"Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of
Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties,
specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the
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provisions of the holographic will.
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On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of
the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the
titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent
Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent
Montes's motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider.
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release
of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to
collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance
the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court should order the release of the titles to certain heirs.
RULING: No. Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the
bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice
to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution
of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Nothwithstanding a pending controversy

or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon
such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected
by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the
conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable to
the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts,
to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
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the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
54
tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them
gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and
the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date
of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors,
not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the
taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those
obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that
the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion
to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties
of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months
after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic
validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated.
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the
probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his motion
for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. Therein, petitioner assailed the
distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of
his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide
that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive
shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary
cases.
MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, AND THE HEIRS

OF EDWARD T. MARCELO, NAMELY, KATHERINE J. MARCELO, ANNA
MELINDA J. MARCELO REVILLA, AND JOHN STEVEN J. MARCELO V. JOSE T.
MARCELO, JR.
G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014
No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made
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or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. In this
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case, the settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit it is at the
liquidation, partition and distribution stage. From all of the foregoing, it is apparent that the
intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate still requires a regular administrator to finally
settle the estate and distribute remaining assets to the heirs of the decedent.
FACTS: The facts herein occurred in two stages: (1) the first litigation between two of Jose
Marcelo, Sr.’s (Jose, Sr.) compulsory heirs, his sons, Edward, (ascendant of herein petitioners,
heirs of Edward T. Marcelo, Katherine J. Marcelo, Anna Melinda J. Marcelo Revilla, and John
Steven J. Marcelo) and respondent Jose, Jr., for the appointment of regular administrator of Jose,
Sr.’s estate; and (2) after Edward was appointed regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate and
Edward’s death in 2009, respondent Jose, Jr.’s revival of his pursuit to administer his father’s,
Jose, Sr.’s, estate. Decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four compulsory heirs:
(1) Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr. Initially, petitioner Marcelo
Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed Petition for the issuance of Letters of
Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr. before the RTC, Branch 76, Quezon City. At first, Helen,
along with her brother, Jose, Jr. separately opposed MIMCO’s petition; the two prayed for their
respective appointment as administrator. Edward opposed Helen’s and Jose, Jr.’s respective
petitions for issuance of Letters of Administration in their favor and Edward himself prayed for
his appointment as regular administrator.
Ultimately, MIMCO, George and Edward banded together: (1) opposed Helen’s and Jose, Jr.’s
petitions, and (2) prayed for Edward’s appointment as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Pending issuance of letters of administration, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose, Jr. as special
administrators.
RTC appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Taking issue with the RTC’s
Order and questioning Edward’s appointment, Jose, Jr. filed successive motions: (1) motion for
reconsideration of RTC’s decision; and (2) omnibus motion alleging the RTC Acting Presiding
Judge Efren Ambrosio’s (Judge Ambrocio) unusual interest and undue haste in issuing letters of
administration in favor of Edward. RTC, through Judge Ambrosio, denied Jose, Jr.’s motion for
reconsideration.
Then, RTC ruled on the Omnibus Motion, thus, after a re-examination of the evidence adduced by
the parties and a consideration of the arguments raised in the aforecited pleadings, this court arrived
at a conclusion that no substantial error was committed by then Acting Presiding Judge Ambrosio
which would warrant a reversal of the questioned orders, namely, the order dated December 13,
1991 and March 12, 1992. Adamant on his competence to better administer his father’s estate,
Jose, Jr. appealed Edward’s appointment as regular administrator to the Court of Appeals.
However, the appellate court affirmed in toto the Orders dated 1 October 1993, 13 December 1991
and 12 March 1992 of the intestate court.
The question of who between Edward and Jose, Jr. should administer their father’s estate reached
us in G.R. No. 123883 (Jose Marcelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals and Edward Marcelo). The Court
does not find reversible error in the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 43674 and
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affirmed the RTC’s and the appellate court’s separate rulings of Edward’s competence and better
56
suited ability to act as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Thereafter, Jose, Jr. persistently
opposed Edward’s actions as administrator and his inventory of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Anent the submission of complete list of stockholders of all the Marcelo group of companies
together with the number and current par value of their respective shareholding, suffice it to say
that as correctly pointed out by regular administrator Edward, the shares of stock of the decedent
will be
equally distributed to the heirs that there is no necessity therefor. Regular Administrator Edward
respectfully prays that the Liquidation, duly signed by all four (4) compulsory heirs, be approved
as the project of partition of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo Sr. and moved for the approval of the
Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose, Sr. as the project of partition of the Estate of
Jose, Sr.
RTC issued an Order approving the partition of Jose, Sr.’s estate as proposed by Edward. Finding
said liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. to bear the conformity of all
the heirs of the decedent and considering further that the period for filing of money claims against
the subject estate had already lapsed, the Court resolves to approve said liquidation of Inventory
as the project of partition of the estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. Petitioners MIMCO and heirs of
Edward, joined by George, opposed Jose, Jr.’s motion and nominated Atty. Henry Reyes as regula
administrator in Edward’s stead.
RTC issued the assailed Order, now appointing Jose, Jr. as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s
estate. The estate is left with no one who will administer the estate, i.e., to liquidate the estate and
distribute the residue among the heirs.
As well-settled, to liquidate means to determine the assets of the estate and to pay all debts and
expenses. Records clearly show that the estate taxes due to the government have not been paid.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the 6 January 2010 Order and now
moved for the appointment instead of George as administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. After Comment
on the Omnibus Motion, the RTC issued another Order dated 23 March 2010, denying the
Omnibus Motion and affirming the appointment of Jose, Jr. as new regular administrator.
Petitioners appealed the RTC’s twin Orders dated 6 January 2010 and 23 March 2010 before the
appellate court. This time around, the Court of Appeals affirmed Jose, Jr.’s appointment as new
regular administrator. Ruling that the selection of administrator lies in the sound discretion of the
trial court, the Court of Appeals held that the prior Order dated 13 December 1991 of the RTC
appointing Edward as regular administrator instead of Jose, Jr., which appointment was affirmed
by this Court in G.R. No. 123883, did not make a finding on Jose, Jr.’s fitness and suitableness to
serve as regular administrator Wholly, Jose, Jr. is competent and “not wanting in understanding
and integrity,” to act as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari ascribing grave error in the Court of Appeals’ Decision.
JD-4C
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of a regular administrator is still necessary at the liquidation,
partition and distribution stage of the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate.
57
RULING: The appeal is impressed with merit. The settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet
through and complete albeit it is at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court provides for the Distribution and Partition of the Estate.
The rule provides in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. – No distribution shall be allowed until
payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees,
or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
SEC. 3. By whom expenses of partition paid. – If at the time of the distribution the executor or
administrator has retained sufficient effects in his hands which may lawfully be applied for the
expenses of partition of the properties distributed, such expenses of partition may be paid by such
executor or administrator when it appears equitable to the court and not inconsistent with the
intention of the testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to their respective
shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall be settled and allowed by the court,
and, if any person interested in the partition does not pay his proportion or share, the court may
issue an execution in the name of the executor or administrator against the party not paying for the
sum assessed.
The Court observes that the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate, approved by the RTC in its
Order dated 16 February 2001, is not yet in effect and complete. The Court further notes that there
has been no manifestation forthcoming from any of the heirs, or the parties in this case, regarding
the completion of the proposed liquidation and partition of the estate. In fact, as all parties are
definitely aware, the RTC archived the intestate proceedings pending the payment of estate taxes.
For clarity, the Court refers to the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate, which was divided
into two (2) parts: (1) Settlement of the Claims against the Estate, and (2) After Settlement of the
Claims, distribution of the remaining assets of the estate to the four (4) compulsory heirs. The
same document listed payables and receivables of the estate dependent on a number of factors and
contingencies: Considering that the Estate as of June 3, 1999 has no sufficient cash to pay-off the
above claims of P6,893,425.33, Edward can work out an offsetting arrangement since the Estate
has also receivables or equity from these companies.
Although the Marcelo family, in particular the compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr., hold equity in the
corporations mentioned in the inventory, considering that the corporations are family owned by
the Marcelos’, these corporations are different juridical persons with separate and distinct
personalities from the Marcelo patriarch, the decedent, Jose, Sr.
More importantly, the liquidation scheme appears yet to be effected, the actual partition of the
estate, where each heir separately holds his share in the estate as that which already belongs to
him, remains intangible and the ultimate distribution to the heirs still held in abeyance pending
payment of estate taxes. Significantly, even the Liquidation of the Inventory of Jose, Sr.’s estate
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states that the valuation amount of the shares of stock as listed therein is based on par value, which
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may have varied given the passage of time. To date, more than a decade has passed since the
intestate proceedings were archived, thus, affecting the value of the estate’s assets.
From all of the foregoing, it is apparent that the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate
still requires a regular administrator to finally settle the estate and distribute remaining assets to
the heirs of the decedent.
CASILANG vs. CASILANG-DIZON
G.R. No. 180269 February 20, 2013
FACTS: Spouses Liborio and Francisca owns three parcels of land: (1) Lot No. 4676; (2)Lot No.
4618; (3) Lot No. 4704.
They had 8 children: Felicidad, Ireneo (deceased), Marcelina, Jacinta, Bonifacio(deceased),

Leonara, Jose (petitioner), Flora
Respondents are heirs of Ireneo: Rosario Casilang-Dizon, Mario, Angelo, Rodolfo Casilang.
Rosario filed with the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against her uncle Jose Casilang for
the lot he’s currently occupying, Lot No. 4618.
The decedent’s grandchildren petitioned to have Jose evicted and executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition over the lot.
In his answer he stated that he’s the lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and inactual possession of
said lot, which he acquired through intestate succession from his late father.
The MTC ruled in favor of Rosario and ordering Jose to remove his house and vacate thesaid lot.
That the lot was owned by Ireneo through extrajudicial partition and his heirs are entitled to the
land.
Petitioners (children of Liborio and Francisca), filed with the RTC a complaint for “Annulment
of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession with Damages” against respondents. They also
moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order which
was denied by the RTC.
Among the documents sought to be annulled was the 1997 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed
by Ireneo’s children over lot no. 4618.
The RTC affirmed Jose’s ownership and possession of Lot No. 4618.
CA reversed the RTC ruling mainly on the factual findings and conclusions of the MTC.
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ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim executed by the heirs of Ireneo
is valid.
RULING: No. It grossly violated the substantive right of Jose Casilang Sr. as direct compulsory
heir. Petition is granted and CA decision is reversed and set aside.
From the conclusion of the RTC is well supported that there was indeed a verbal partition among
the heirs of Liborio, pursuant to which each of his eight children received his or her share of his
estate, and that Jose’s share was Lot No. 4618.
The parties’ verbal partition is valid, and has been ratified by their taking possession of their
respective shares.
"An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition
of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds
has no operation in this kind of agreements for partition is not a conveyance of property but simply
a segregation and designation of the part of the property which belong to the co-owners."
Jose’s possession of Lot No. 4618 under a claim of ownership is well borne out claimant
establishes a better right
Tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
Jose is the lawful owner of the lot. He and his siblings were able to present sufficient evidence that
they entered into a verbal partition, while Rosario was unable to show any proof that her father
inherited the lot from Liborio.
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PROBATE OF A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
APOLONIA BANAYAD FRIANELA vs. SERVILLANO BANAYAD, JR.
G.R. No. 169700 July 30, 2009
FACTS: A petition for probate of the holographic will of the decedent uncle was filed by Apolonia
and alleges that the decedent died without issue and left her the properties. This was opposed by
the cousin of Apolonia claiming that 1985 will presented by Apolonia was actually revoked by the
1989 will. This was affirmed by the court but saying that the 1989 will revoked only the manner
of the estate distribution of the 1985 will. The decision was appealed until it reached the Supreme
Court and the court found that the petition should have been dismissed at the very beginning for
lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
RULING: Yes, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The law provided that jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and decide case which is
conferred by law in force at the time of institution of the action and such can be determined by the
allegations in the complaint.
Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC or MTC in probate proceedings depending on
the gross value of the estate which value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed.
For estate with gross value of more than P2,000.00, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction.
In this case, nowhere in the petition is the statement of the gross value of the estate be
found, hence, it cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction.
Therefore, the decisions of the lower court and all proceedings therein shall be considered null and
void. Moreover, the jurisprudence on Tijam (laches) cannot applyi n this case because the
discovery of lack of jurisdiction was made during the filing of petition and not on execution of
judgment which is the case in Tijam.
UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE
G.R. No. 176831 January 15, 2010
FACTS: Alleging that his father passed away and left a holographic will, which is now in the
custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for
mandamus with damages before the RTC of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so
that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had
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already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal
heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner alleged that the complaint be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition
precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original
holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies
of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able
to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in a civil case before the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably
settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit.
After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending
that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at
first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence,
the petition was dismissed.
Respondent appealed to CA who initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved
for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, issued the writ of mandamus, and
ordered the production of the will. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to SC
contending that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent to compel
petitioner to produce the holographic will.
RULING: No.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from
the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This
definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may
be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel
the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by
the Constitution.
More importantly, writ of mandamus can only be issued if there is no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.
In the instant case, mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent because there lies another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will.
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Rule 76, Section 1 and Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5 provides the adequate remedy that respondent Lee
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can avail. Rule 76, Section 1 provides that petition for allowance of will can still proceed regardless
of whether or not petitioner has the will in his possession. Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5 provides the
remedy for the production of the original holographic will.
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO vs. HON.

AMOR A. REYES, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
FACTS: The petitioners filed a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will of Segundo
Seangio which was denominated as “Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana.” The private respondents
moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document
purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of
the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
According to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result to
intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is
called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the
intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the
face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the
decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will;
(2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition
did not apply because Segundo’s will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion
of one or more compulsory heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition for
certiorari was filed.
ISSUE: Whether the document executed by Segundo is considered a holographic will.
RULING: Yes. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form,
and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms
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to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced
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from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the
latter’s property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other
words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those
who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession.
All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when
the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should
be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this
regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the
testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form
of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil
Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed
in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to
dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL
AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ AND RICHARD LOPEZ V. DIANA
JEANNE LOPEZ, ET. AL.
GR NO. 189984 November 12, 2012
FACTS: Enrique S. Lopez died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their 4 legitimate children,
namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez, Marybeth de Leon
and Victoria L. Tuazon as compulsory heirs. Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father’s
Last Will and Testament before the RTC. The respondents opposed the petition contending that
the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law. Richard
presented the attesting witnesses who testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the will
on each page, they also read and signed the same in the latter’s presence and of one another.
The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil
Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which
the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial
compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of
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pages is reflected somewhere else in the will. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the
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will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are
written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, the
RTC disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in accordance with law.
ISSUE: Whether the will complied with the formalities prescribed by law.
RULING: No. While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the
attestation clause, Richard failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of
the subject last will and testament that it “consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will
actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained
by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one
or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
The application of Article 809 must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied
by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether
the signatures appear in each page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was
notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages,
and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially
appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER vs. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER

(DECEASED), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MAKATI (BRANCH 59)
G.R. No. 160530 November 20, 2007
FACTS: Dr. Werner filed a petition for probate of his holographic will and for issuance of letters
testamentary to Atty. Nogales. The will was allowed. Upon the death of Dr. Werner, Atty. Nogales
filed a petition f or issuance of letters testamentary which was granted by the court but was opposed
by the surviving spouse of Dr. Werner claiming that the she was denied due process for not
receiving any notices by personal service since she owns the properties involved and that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the deceased is not a resident of the
Philippines and he left no real properties in the country and the petition lacked a certification
against forum-shopping.
ISSUES:
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a. Whether the surviving spouse was denied due process
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b. Whether the petition should be dismissed for lack of certification against forum-shopping
c. Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
RULING:
a. No, the surviving spouse was not denied due process.
The rules provided that if the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent
only to his compulsory heirs.
In this case, court records show that the surviving spouse and other compulsory heirs in the first
marriage of the deceased were duly notified by registered mail. Also, she appeared in court to file
a motion to dismiss the petition and motion for reconsideration on the denial of her motion to
dismiss. Thus, the surviving spouse was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause.
Moreover, the issue of her ownership on properties involved should be resolved in a separate
ordinary action.
b. No, the petition cannot be dismissed for lack of certification against forum-shopping.
The rules provided that a certification against forum-shopping is a requirement for initiatory
pleadings.
In this case, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary is a mere continuation of the original
petition for probate, hence, the lack of certification against forum-shopping is not a ground for
dismissal since the petition is not an initiatory pleading.
c. Yes, the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The rules provided that when the deceased is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, letters of administration granted and
his estate settled in the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had estate.
In this case, the lower courts duly established that the decedent is a resident of Las Piñas at the
time of his death, hence, the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter.
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL vs. EVANGELINE R.

CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS
G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999

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FACTS: Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of
the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of
the holographic will of the deceased.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased was of sound and disposing mind when she
executed the will, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of
the testator, and will was written voluntarily.
Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate,
alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an
impression that a “third hand” of an interested party other than the “true hand” of Matilde Seño
Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition
is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the
dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and
not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the
deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of
presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to
establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
ISSUE: Whether the holographic will can be probated.
RULING: No.
Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature
are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall
be required.
It provides as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three
witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that “shall” in a statute commonly
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word “shall,” when used in a statute is mandatory.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they
were familiar with the handwriting of testator.
We cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator,
which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that
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the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
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The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents,
who kept it even before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. A visual
examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with
other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is
not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will. The SC, therefore,
cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
CARMEN CAÑIZA REPRESENTED BY HER LEGAL GUARDIAN AMPARO

EVANGELISTA vs. CA, PEDRO ESTRADA ET. AL
GR. No. 110427 February 24, 1997
A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court".
An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance is
not inconsistent with the former's taking back of possession in the meantime for any reason deemed
sufficient. In the case, there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession. She
needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her,
arising from her extreme age.
FACTS: Being then 94 years of age, Carmen Cañiza was declared incompetent by judgment of
the RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. The latter
was appointed as the legal guardian of her person and estate.
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City. In relation thereto, she through her
Evangelista commenced a suit to eject spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. In
the complaint, it was alleged that Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question and
that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses to temporarily reside in her house, rent-
free. In the answer, the respondents declared that in consideration of their faithful service, they
had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic
will where she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
The MTC ruled in favor of Cañiza. The RTC, however, reversed this decision. The CA upheld the
RTC decision. In so ruling, it said that while said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the
proper court, could not be the basis of respondents' claim to the property, it is indicative of intent
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and desire on the part of Cañiza that respondents are to continue in their occupancy and possession
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so much so that Cañiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian
the right or authority to drive the respondents out. To this, Caniza alleges error on the part of the
CA for relying on a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will which is irrelevant to this case.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in taking into consideration the alleged will of Cañiza in deciding
the issue.
RULING: The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her
intention that they remain in possession thereof and legally incapacitated Evangelista from evicting
them therefrom since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will. This must fail.
A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever. No right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court". An owner's intention to confer
title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance is not inconsistent with the
former's taking back of possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. In the case
at bar, there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession. She needed to generate
income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her
extreme age.
SPS ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO vs. CA AND CLEMENTE SAND
GR. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
Unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The
lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
FACTS: The holographic will of Annie Sand who died on November 25, 1982 was submitted for
probate. Petitioners alleged that at the time of its execution, testator was of sound and disposing
mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to
dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested
the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed
that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
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Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to
probate.
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On appeal, said Decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and the petition for probate of
decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet
the requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and
814 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not complied
with.
RULING: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not
the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the
subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the
New Civil Code. In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is
the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided
under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus: A person may execute a holographic will which
must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Failure to
strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.

BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS v. AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
FACTS: Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of
Court;
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2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and
was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an
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instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the
decedent;
3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it
would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required
by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that “in the
case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that ‘in the matter of holographic
wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of
authenticity of said wills.”
And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla
died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will
to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to
that the decedent had discarded the alleged holographic will before his death.
Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to
forward the case to the SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.
ISSUE; Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means
of a photostatic copy.
RULING: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the
will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in
said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the
testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison
can be made by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator. The probate court
would be able to determine the authenticity of the handwriting of the testator.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that “the execution and the contents
of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who
have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no
effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8
of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity
of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court,”
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71
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO
LABRADOR, ET. AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Gr Nos. 83843-44 April 05, 1990
FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of
Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916
under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica,
Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a
holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador
and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the probate docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 922-I of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs),
and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been
extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that
is, before Melecio’s death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus
and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled
by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat
for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos.
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for
the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado
allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic
will executed on March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I,
being premised on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.
After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial court rendered a
joint decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of the holographic will and declaring
null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. The court a quo had also directed the respondents (the
defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I) to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00
representing the redemption price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with
legal interest thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to vendee a retro.
Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on March 10, 1988
modified said joint decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the will
for being undated and reversing the order of reimbursement. Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of
June 13, 1988. Hence, this petition.
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72
ISSUE: Whether the alleged holographic will of Melecio Labrador is dated, as provided for in Art.
810 of the Civil Code.
RULING: The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated,
although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810.
It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz:
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the
respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17 th day, in the
year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one
who made this writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will.
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his
beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about “the partitioning and assigning
the respective assignments of the said fishpond,” and was not the date of execution of the
holographic will; hence, the will is more of an “agreement” between the testator and the
beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus
a failure to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as “an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate,
to take effect after his death.”
Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the
will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner,
the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what
he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as
the testator’s instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware
of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act to
control the disposition of his estate.
The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is approved and allowed probate.
TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E.

GAN, vs. ILDEFONSO YAP
G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958

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73
The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the
bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity.
FACTS: On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the
University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of
Manila. On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the Manila court of first
instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left
any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. After hearing the parties and considering
their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-
page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due execution by the
statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan
Jimenez. From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had been suffering from
heart disease for several years before her death; that she had been treated by prominent physicians.
However, her ailment recurred, she suffered several attacks, the most serious of which happened
in the early morning of the first Monday of November 1951.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence. The trial judge had to accept the
oppositor's evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.
ISSUE: Whether a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator.
RULING: NO.
Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or
destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of
authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or
instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss
of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to
authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary)
deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts
on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with
the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to
lend themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not
receive anything on account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only one man could
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engineer the whole fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting
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and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and
read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would
in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost the forger may
have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and
the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will
may consist of two or three pages, and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the
unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected.
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would
be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will;
whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the
handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly
contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not
be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The loss of the
holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof. Even if oral testimony were
admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by
herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to
that “clear and distinct “proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.
FEDERICO AZAOLA vs. CESARIO SINGSON
G.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960
The three-witness provision in case of contested holographic wills is directory, not mandatory.
FACTS: Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957. Petitioner
submitted for probate her holographic will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir as
against the nephew, who is the defendant. Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to
testify on the handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more or less,
before the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife; and that it was in the testatrix’s
handwriting. He presented the mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and the general power
of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an affidavit to reinforce his statement. Two residence
certificates showing the testatrix’s signature were also exhibited for comparison purposes.
The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the
testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually
written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on
the will. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
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proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the
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writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented "did
not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because
the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily
require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic
will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.
ISSUE: Whether Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.
RULING: Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will
was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the
genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted to require
the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of
a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious
that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control
of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they
must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare
(truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the signature are in
the handwriting of the testator".
There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses
may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article
811 may thus become impossibility. This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows
the court to resort to expert evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness
may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to
testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the
deficiency. What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's
authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by
their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence.
On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing,
the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in
fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent
that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND

BIBIANE ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS, & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS vs.
ANDRES DE JESUS JR.
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GR No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
76
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution.
However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence
and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the
date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the
Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial
compliance.
FACTS: After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, special
proceeding entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas
de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus. Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. After Letters of Administration had been
granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that he found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana
R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children and
entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The
will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not
written by a lawyer.
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus
and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the
holographic Will of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting
of their mother and positively identified her signature. They further testified that their deceased
mother understood English, the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the
date "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their mother.
Respondent opposed the probate of the will claiming that alleged holographic will of the deceased
Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. Respondent
contended that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year of its
execution and that this should be strictly complied with.
ISSUE: Whether the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
RULING: YES.
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law on wigs in this
Project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving
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the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and
77
restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure
and influence upon the testator.
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although
compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by
such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator.
The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been expounded by this
Court in Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity.
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two
competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which
a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud
in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that
the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and
signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its
genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the
holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that
the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic
Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical
to be entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether
or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article
810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial.
ROSA K. KALAW v. HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI
of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

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78
FACTS: On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister,
Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December
24, 1968.
The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir.
She opposed probate alleging that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and
insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by
Article 814 of the Civil Code reading: Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or
alteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
ROSA’s position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and
probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will. Reconsideration denied.
ISSUE: Whether the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided
by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated
or not, with Rosa as sole heir.
RULING: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, … the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry
the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the
entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that
which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given
effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or
alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves
but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and
alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude.
IN RE: WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE DECEASED REVEREND SANCHO

ABADIA, SEVERINA A. VDA DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
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G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
79
Validity of a will is to be judged by the law enforced at the time the instrument was executed.
Although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about
the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at
the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
FACTS: On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed
a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A. He left
properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the
legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and
nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out
in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator)
signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the
document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name
at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses
after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last
page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors
did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing
and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force. Said trial court
admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The
oppositors are appealing from that decision ; and because only questions of law are involved in the
appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Should the will be admitted to probate?
RULING: No. The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides
that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by
the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit
"A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were
not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such
as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand
margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied
with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by
any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were
signed only by the testator. Failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin
of every page is radical and totally vitiates the testament.
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The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that
the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at
the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the
court but at the time the instrument was executed. Although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs
and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality,
the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will,
the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due
process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning,
when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements
at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
intestate. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate.
IN RE TESTATE INTESTATE OF THE DECEASED JOSE B. SUNTAY, ET. AL. vs. IN

RE INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE B. SUNTAY, ET. AL.
Gr Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954

FACTS: On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died
in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in
the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage
had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana,
Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria
Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.
Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI and after hearing letters of administration were
issued to Apolonio Suntay. After the latter’s death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator
of the estate.
The surviving widow filed a petition in the CFI for the probate of a last will and testament claimed
to have been executed and signed in the Philippines in November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay.
This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before
the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will.
An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the
evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings.
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After liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late
father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January
1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of
Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate
of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in
Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).
ISSUE: Whether the law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills was proved.
RULING: No. As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China,
the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the Rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be
allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for
allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so
allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the
courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and
the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The
law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.
The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul
General of the Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the
appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not
qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate
matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and
cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears
that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking
the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court
of Amoy does not purport to probate the will.
In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the
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Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter
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of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the deposition or to perpetuation of
testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the
subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were
known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the
interested parties residing in the Philippines.
The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to or come
up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties
and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as follows:
ORDER:
SEE BELOW
The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare that there
are no errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced in the court.
Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of the 35 th year of the Republic
of China in the Civil Section of the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.
HUANG KUANG CHENG

Clerk of Court
CHIANG TENG HWA

Judge
(Exhibit N-13, p. 89 Folder of Exhibits.) does not purport to probate or allow the will which was
the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be
said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and
principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated
transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed
and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will
referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.
As to the lost will, Rule 77, Sec. 6 provides:
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be
established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator
or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator
without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and
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certified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as
other wills are filed and recorded.
Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope
(Exhibit A) and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, his death, still the
testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of
the lost will must be “clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses.” Credible
witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay are
neither competent nor credible witnesses.
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PROBATE OF A NOTARIAL WILL
LETICIA ORTEGA vs. JOSEPHINA VALMONTE
GR. No. 157451 December 16, 2005
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with
it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity
or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it
has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age,
will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a
valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is
about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and
disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require
that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
FACTS: Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of
two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page
contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at
the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental
witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on
the left hand margin.
The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her there
are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She
attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the
notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew
whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s
family to live with him and they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and
mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
ISSUE: Whether Placido had mental capacity when he executed his will.
RULING: "The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or
less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity
of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be
considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the
proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this
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test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of
property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have
stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There
being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with
it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or
idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has
been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age,
will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a
valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he
is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and
disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that
a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."
MITRA vs. SABLAN – GUEVARRA ET AL.
Gr. No. 213994 April 18, 2018
What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite existence of omission is that such omission
must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence. An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation clause indeed failed
to state the number of pages comprising the will. However, as was the situation in Taboada, this
omission was supplied in the Acknowledgement.
FACTS: Margie Santos Mitra filed a petition for the probate of the notarial will of Remedios
Legaspi. Mirtra alleged she is a de facto adopted daughter of Legaspi and Legaspi left a notarial
will instituting Mitra along with Orlando Castro, Perpetua Sablan-Guevarra, and Remigio Legaspi
Sablan, as her heirs legatees and devisees.
Perpetua Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio Sablian opposed the petition. They aver that the will was
not executed in accordance with the formalities required by law since the last page of the will
which contained the Acknowledgment was not signed by Legaspit and her instrumental witnesses.
Further the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written.
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The number of pages was however supplied by the Acknowledgment portion.
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ISSUE: Whether failure to state the number of pages in the attestation clause will invalidate the
will
RULING:
No. It is a skewed stance in insisting that the testator Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses should
have signed on the last page of the subject will. When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the
testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is
where the last testamentary disposition ends. As the probate court correctly appreciated, the last
page of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the
Acknowledgment.
In Taboada vs. Hon. Rosal, the Court allowed the probate of a will notwithstanding that the number
of pages was stated not in the attestation clause, but in the Acknowledgment. In Azuela vs. CA,
the Court ruled that there is substantial compliance with the requirement, if it is stated elsewhere
in the will how many pages it is comprised of.
What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such
omissions must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence
aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."
An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation clause indeed failed to state the
number of pages comprising the will. However, as was the situation in Taboada, this omission was
supplied in the Acknowledgment. It was specified therein that the will is composed of four pages,
the Acknowledgment included.
ANTONIO BALTAZAR ET AL. vs. LORENZO LAXA
Gr. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent
was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state
is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner
provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 years old spinster when she made her last will and testament in the
Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was
read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at
the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
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Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is
Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and
treated Paciencia as his own mother. Six days after the execution of the Will, Paciencia left for
USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death.
Four years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration
in his favor. Antonio Baltazar, petitioner filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition and averred that
the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belongs to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-
interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins and that that
Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she would sometimes leave her wallet
in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. On cross examination, it was established that
Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was
based on her personal assessment.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will
on the grounds that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution,
that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threat and that the
execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by
Lorenzo.
Lorenzo testified that at the time of Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder
and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute. Lorenzo belied and denied having used force,
intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the
Philippines when the same was executed.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the will,
she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary
capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The
petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate.
RULING: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the
formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses
and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause
explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested
and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the
petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they
question of her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
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The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will
lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of
being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute
a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC
states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character
of the testamentary act.”
CYNTHIA ALABAN ET. AL vs. CA AND FRANCISCO PROVIDO
Gr. No. 156021 September 23, 2005
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned
in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the
publication of the notice of hearing.
FACTS: On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition for the
probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado ("decedent"),
who died on 26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the
decedent and the executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Iloilo allowed the probate of the will of the decedent and issued letters testamentary to respondent.
More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, petitioners filed a motion for the reopening
of the probate proceedings. Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the
decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the
intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice
to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1)
the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with law,
that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked
testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under
duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of
affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included
in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters
testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under
intestate succession.
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ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were notified of the petition for probate of the will
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RULING: Yes. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were
not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence
of the publication of the notice of hearing.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir
of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent
had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify
them of the same.
The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify
them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in
court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case
before the probate court.
TEODORO CANEDA ET. AL vs. CA AND WILLIAM CABRERA
GR. No. 103554 May 28, 1993
The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will
and to insure the authenticity thereof.
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the
twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence before 3 witnesses. He
was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad. In the will, it was declared that the testator
was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to several people all
of whom do not appear to be related to the testator. 4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed
a case seeking the probate of his last will and testament, but numerous postponements pushed back
the initial hearing of the probate court regarding the will. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed
away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Thereafter one of the legatees,
Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate. Thereafter,
the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition for
intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of the testator’s will and the appointment of
a special administrator for his estate. Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera
as special administrator and gave an order that the testate proceedings for the probate of the will
had to be heard and resolved first. In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the
allowance of the testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator
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was already in poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Also
the genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified that the testator
executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that
the testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his
will.
Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament
of the late Mateo Caballero. CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially
complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or can be cured
under the art. 809.
RULING: No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law. Ordinary or attested wills are
governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the attesting witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the
testator or even to the attesting witnesses. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts
surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation to the
fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. The
attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to
insure the authenticity thereof. It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will
failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will
and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. And the Court agrees. The attestation
clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the space provided for his
signature and on the left hand margin,” obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental
witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last will and testament.” Clearly
lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence
of the testator and of one another. That the absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect
or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to
be probated.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally omits the
fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with respect to the form or the language of
the attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will
itself which is clearly lacking in this case.
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate proceedings shall be
revived. Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the
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form or language of the will. This is because there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.
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FELIX AZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted
by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written
is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. A will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally
defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate.
FACTS: Felix Azuela, son of the cousin of the decedent, sought to admit to probate the notarial
will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized. The will, consisting of 2pages and written in the
vernacular Pilipino. The 3 named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand
margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.The probate petition
adverted to only 2 heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent. Petitioner now prays the will to be
allowed.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo, who represented herself as the attorney-in-
fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent claiming that the will is a forgery, and that the true
purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by
oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all
centering on petitioner’s right to occupy the properties of the decedent and the decedent was
actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs.
Geralda Castillo argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law
pointing out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will
was not properly acknowledged. It was also later found during the trial that the attestation clause
fails to state the number of pages of the will.
ISSUE: Whether the requirement that "the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the
attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory.
RULING: NO.
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written
remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state
the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. The
failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the
instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had
ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to.
There is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many
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pages it is comprised of. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance
with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or
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anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. Thus, denial of the
probate of the will is proper.
While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the
will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their
averments before the notary public.
An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses
signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures
cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear
on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every
page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence
of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these
elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause. Thus, the subject will cannot be
considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the
attestation clause.
Another fatal defect to the will is that the requirement that "every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with.
The express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely
subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important
legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An
acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and
the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and
subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. It also provides a further degree of assurance
that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons
he/she had designated in the will.
A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses
is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA v. LUCIA D. ABENA
G.R. No. 145545 June 30, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores while respondent was
the decedent's lifelong companion. A notarial will was made and Margarita died single and without
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any ascending or descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her, and
she was survived by her first cousins including the petitioner. Margarita executed a will where she
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bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of real property and left her personal properties to
Abena. According to petitioner, Margarita’s will is fatally defective for the reason that its
attestation clause states that the notarial will is composed of 3 pages while in truth and in fact, the
will consists of 2 pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will.
ISSUES: Is a will fatally defective because its attestation clause states that the will is composed
of 3 pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of 2 pages only since the attestation is not a
part of the notarial will?
RULING: NO, a will is not fatally defective just because its attestation clause states that the will
is composed of 3 pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of 2 pages only. While it is true
that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will,
is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation
clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is
consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility
of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief
that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause
and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal
interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads: In the absence of bad faith,
forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved
that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements
of Article 805.
GUERRERO v. BIHIS
G.R. No. 174144 April 17, 2007
FACTS: Upon the death of Felisa Tamio, petitioner Bella Guerrero filed a petition for the probate
of the will of her mother alleging that she was named as an executrix in the decedent’s will and
that she was capacitated to act as such. Respondent Bihis opposes her sister’s petition on the
grounds that it failed to comply with the formalities required by law because its attestation clause
and acknowledgment did not comply with the law. The court denied the probate by reason of
failure to comply with Article 806 of the Civil Code, because Atty. Directo a commissioned notary
public for and in Caloocan City notarized the will in Quezon City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acknowledgment made by Atty. Directo complied with the
requirements of formalities of a will?
RULING: NO. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a
notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
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witnesses. This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will.
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In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate. The Notarial law provides:
SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction. — The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be
co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be
co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the
limits of his jurisdiction. Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in
Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the testratix and the
instrumental witnesses. In the same vain, the testratix and the instrumental witnesses could not
have validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura’s last will
and testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA

RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO
PALAGANAS vs. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144 January, 26, 2011
FACTS: Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States
(U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California,
she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had
left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC a
petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her
estate. However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio
Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it.
RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent
Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the
will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
The CA affirmed stating that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate
and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will
already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.
ISSUE: Whether a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
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RULING: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although
the same have not yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will
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can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of
an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may
take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may,
at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented
for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the
Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a
will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as
binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established.
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the
means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their
inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless
the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS
G.R. No. 129505 January 31,2000
FACTS: Before his death, Dr. Arturo Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. Shortly after
the probate, he died. Patricia De los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix filed a petition for
issuance of letters testamentary before Branch 611 where the deceased filed a petition for probate
but later withdrew it. Subsequently, Patricia filed another petition which was raffled before Branch
65 and granted the letters testamentary. Octavio S. Maloles, claiming as the only child of the
deceased, filed a petition to intervene in the special proceeding alleging that the executrix misstated
the net worth of the deceased, that he is more fit to be the an administrator and that Branch 65 of
the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to grant letters testamentary instead it should be
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Branch 61 who shall take cognizance until partition of the estate.
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ISSUE: Whether other branches of the same level of court has jurisdiction to issue letters
testamentary after the will was probated.
RULING: Yes, other branches of the same level of court has jurisdiction to issue letters
testamentary after the will is probated.
It was held that a will can be probated by the testator during his lifetime and the probate court upon
death of the testator has no other duty but to issue letters testamentary however, it is not necessary
that the probate court has the sole jurisdiction to issue letters testamentary and settle distribution
of the estate since jurisdiction as conferred by law is vested in the court and not with the judge
hence the proceedings may continue in the same court level of another branch.
In this case, Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction.
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ vs. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE
Gr No. 76714 June 02, 1994
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions
on presumption of survivorship (if it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband
shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that
gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate
proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed,
arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills
were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York
law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate
proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were
in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New
York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE: Whether the reprobate of the wills should be allowed.
RULING:
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective
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in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
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Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside
of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign
laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will
has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the
first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign
country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF LEODEGARIA

JULIAN, ET. AL. vs. HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, ET. AL.
Gr No. L-39247 June 27, 1975, J. Aquino
FACTS: Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria
Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of
the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808).
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at
the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six
legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for probate dated February 27, 1973 of his
mother’s notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria
Julian declared as follows: (a) that she was the owner of the “southern half of nine conjugal lots
(par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her
father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her
heirs during her husband’s lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of
her properties (Par. IV).
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Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband’s death her paraphernal lands
and all the conjugal lands (which she described as “my properties”) should be divided and
distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal
lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband’s one half share of
the conjugal assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack
of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper
partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate
certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. dated
April 18, 1973 wherein the latter withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed
that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument
captioned “Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights” wherein he
manifested that out of respect for his wife’s will he “waived and renounced’ his hereditary rights
in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement,
which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be
partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
The lower court issued an Order giving effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr.
and “denied” the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. Meanwhile, another
lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix
Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Hermenegildo Cabreros), filed a motion for “leave of
court to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed
by intestate estate proceeding.” He prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the
proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding.
The lower court, acting on the motion of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice to
creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point and adopted the view that the will
was void. In an Order dated February 28, 1974, the lower court dismissed the petition for the
probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a
notice to creditors. Felix Balanay, Jr. assailed the authority of Atty. Montaña and moved for the
reconsideration of the trial court’s Order. The lower court subsequently denied the motion and
clarified that it declared the will void based on its own independent assessment of its provisions
and not because of Atty. Montaña’s arguments.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before
ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court is of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of
the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for
probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner’s authorization), the
trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal validity
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had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears
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to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid,
64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449).
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void
and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that
in its order of June 18, 1973, it gave effect to the surviving husband’s conformity to the will and
to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the
conjugal estate.
The rule is that “the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in
the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have
made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made” (Art. 792, Civil
Code). “Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be
upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or
interfering with the general testamentary scheme or doing injustice to the beneficiaries” (95 C.J.S.
873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the “southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary
to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro indiviso (Art.
143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal
declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded. Subject to the foregoing
observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may
be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and
partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net
income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband’s conformity to his wife’s will and
his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased
wife’s estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the
will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory
heirs.
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the
conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose
of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the
conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated. His
preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and
renounced his hereditary rights.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated
in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is
intrinsically void, it is the probate court’s duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will.
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Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74
Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428)
ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, ET. AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.
Gr No. L-40804 Jan. 31, 1978, J. Guerrero
FACTS: The late Eugenia Danila left a will wherein she instituted among others Adelaida Nista
as one of the instituted heirs. Nista petitioned before the court to admit the will to probate. The
petition was opposed by Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina Guerra. The two oppositors claimed
that they were the legally adopted children of Danila; that the said will sought to be probated by
Nista was obtained through fraud.
The two parties talked, and they came up with a compromise agreement which essentially stated
that Nista is admitting the invalidity of the will. The compromise agreement was approved by the
trial court BUT Rosario de Ramos et al – the other instituted heirs and devisees – intervened.
The trial court allowed the intervention and set aside the compromise agreement. Rosario de
Ramos et al alleged that the Guerras repudiated their shares when they abandoned Danila and
committed acts of ingratitude against her.
Eventually, the probate court admitted the will to probate. The decision was appealed by the
Guerras. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the probate court. The CA ruled that there
was a failure to prove that Danila was in the presence of the instrumental witnesses when she
signed the will – this was because two of the instrumental witnesses (Sarmiento and Paz) testified
in court that the will was already signed by Danila when they affixed their signatures. However,
Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public before whom the will was executed and who assisted
in the execution, vehemently assailed the testimony of the two witnesses. He affirmed Danila and
the three Instrumental witnesses were in each other’s presence when the will was signed by them.
Another lawyer, who was also present during the execution of the will, corroborated the testimony
of Atty. Barcenas.
ISSUE: Whether the CA is correct in not allowing the will to probate.
RULING: No. The attestation clause was signed by the instrumental witnesses. This serves as
their admissions of the due execution of the will and thus preventing them from prevaricating later
on by testifying against the will’s due execution.
The execution of the same was evidently supervised by Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom
the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended
by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to
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close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity. There is a presumption in the regularity of the performance
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of a lawyer with his duty as a notary public. There has been no evidence to show that Barcenas has
been remiss in his duty nor were there any allegations of fraud against him. In fact, the authenticity
of Danila’s and the witnesses’ signature was never questioned.
The attestation clauses, far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses.
Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence
of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public
who was all the time present during the execution.
Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they
may be biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the
prejudice of the others. As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses testify against the due
execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful
credibility, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of
other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the
manner required by law.
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent
attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the
instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate
in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to
prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney being conversant of the instrument, is more
likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents
in his memory.
DANILO ALUAD, ET AL. vs. ZENAIDO ALUAD

G.R. No. 176943 October 17, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the
childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots of Pilar Cadastre,
Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and thereafter, she executed a Deed
of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed
provided that such will become effective upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the
Donee should die before the Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded. Provided,
however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive,
they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land.
Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and
testament devising four (4) of the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few
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months after Matilde’s death. Thereafter, Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a
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complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and
donated to Zenaido, alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots
have been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. The lower court decided
in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which held
that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had
to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration, the present Petition for Review has been filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such deed
is valid.
If so, whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots in question to Zenaido Aluad.
RULING:
The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother) one of mortis causa, it having
the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive;
2. That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor
at will, ad nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR” admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s mother during the former’s lifetime. Further the statement,
“anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could
use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated,” means that
Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right
to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of
ownership. The phrase, “anyone of them who should survive” is out of sync. For the Deed of
Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase
could only have referred to the donor.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they
were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of
the Civil Code. It is void and transmitted no right to petitioner’s mother. But even assuming
arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was
transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and
testament, subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With respect to the conveyed
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lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.
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DE CASTRO vs. DE CASTRO
G.R. No. L-8996 October 31, 1956
FACTS: Marcelo de Castro died on April 22, 1954, in his residence at 35 Espana Extension,
Quezon, where he lived in company with all his brothers and sisters of half blood. Upon his death,
Marcelo did not leave any descendants or ascendants, his nearest surviving relatives being his
brothers of full-blood, the Oppositors herein, and his sisters, the Petitioners mentioned as heirs in
the will , and other brothers of half blood. The testator left properties of Quezon City, Manila and
in the province of Batangas evaluated at not more than P75,000.00, after deducting his debts
estimated at about P35,000. The order announcing the presentation of the petition for the probate
of said will was properly advertized in the newspaper “La Nacion” , in conformity with the
requirements of the Rules of Court and the hearing of the petition was therein set.
On June 22, 1954, Emilio and Alvaro de Castro filed their opposition praying that the petition for
probate be denied and that the alleged last will be disallowed with costs against the Petitioners.
They state, among other reasons:chanroblesvirtuallawli
(a) that the alleged last will sought to be admitted to probate was not executed and attested as
required by law; chan roblesvirtualawlib
(b) that at the time of the execution of the said alleged last will, Marcelo de Castro was mentally
and physically incapable of making a valid will, in view of his then serious illness and
paralysis; chan roblesvirtualawlib
(c) rarythat at the time of the execution of said will, the testator was not of sound and disposing
mind and memory by reason of his grave illness; chan roblesvirtualawlib
(d) ary that Marcelo de Castro was for a long time member of the U. S. Navy and knew how to
read and write, and the thumbmark he allegedly stamped on said supposed will, even granting
the same to be his own mark, was procured by improper pressure and influence or by fraud or
trick practiced upon him by Petitioners; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
(e) that granting that Marcelo de Castro had affixed his thumbmark on said alleged will, he did
not intend nor could he have intended that said instrument should be his last will.
RULING: We find nothing irregular, unusual or illegal in this attestation clause and the only
defect that could be pointed out, if that could be considered as a flaw, is that on the line intended
for the date of the execution of the will is written the sign “&”, instead of “21st” which is the real
date of the execution thereof; but we take it that the notary public who proposed the will did not
know the date it was to be executed and Attorney Heraclio H. del Pilar, who notarized it, forgot to
fill that the space left in blank. This flaw, however, is of no importance because a few lines over
the space and at the end of the will over the thumbmark of the testator appears that it was executed
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on the 21st day of April, 1953, in Quezon City, Philippines.
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The fact testified to by the witnesses for the Petitioners that in stamping his thumbmark, the
testator was helped by Atty. del Pilar and Dr. Banuelos, is not in conflict with the recitation of the
attestation clause that “the will was executed by the testator by affixing voluntarily his thumbmark
(right) at the bottom of the Will appearing on this page four and on the left hand margin of each
and every page of said WILL including the pages on which the attestation clause and
acknowledgement are written.”
It may be true that in the execution of the will Exhibit C there was no formalities required of the
witnesses either before or after the signing of the objected will, such as the raising of the hand on
the part of the witnesses, like in oath taking which seems to be the ceremony that the trial judge
alluded to and missed. But as counsel for the Petitioners properly observe, Article 806 of the New
Civil Code merely requires in very explicit and unmistakable terms that “every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses”, and to acknowledge is to
own as genuine, to assent to, to avow or admit. And when a person affixes his signature to an
instrument in the presence of a notary public, undoubtedly, he acknowledges it to be his own and
there is no need or provision that requires the hand raising ceremony as a prerequisite to the validity
of an acknowledgment. Even in cases of oath taking the hand raising is a mere formality which
does not go into the binding effect of the oath, for if a person says “I swear” before the proper
officer without raising his right hand he nevertheless “swears”.
Again the fact that the property situated at Tranca, municipality of Talisay, Batangas, bequeathed
to Angelita de Castro in paragraph First — (c) of the will, had been already been allegedly sold on
July 24, 1943, by Marcelo de Castro to the spouses of Emilio de Castro (one of the Oppositors)
and Leoncia Mercado, even if true, does not go against the allowance or probate of the will but
against the adjudication of said property to the person to whom it was bequeathed. At most, it
could cast some doubt as to the identity of the person who executed the will Exhibit C who was
supposed to know that he did not own said property any more and could not, therefore, bequeath
it to her half-sister Angelita de Castro. But even in the respect, We fail to understand why,
according to the declaration of the Oppositor Emilio de Castro, his deceased brother Marcelo sold
absolutely and definitely said property to him when what his said brother wanted was to redeem
the property from the bank. There would be no reason for this definite sale unless the sum needed
for the redemption of the property would be much less than the sum of P534.97 that Emilio and
his wife paid for it, a fact that we do not find established in the record.
It is claimed that the testator, who knew how to read and write, only impressed his thumbmarks
on the will instead of signing his name thereto, as he did in the list of voters Exhibits 5 and 5-A,
in the November 10, 1953 elections at Precinct 2 of Talisay, Batangas. Even assuming that the
testator voted in said election at said precinct this fact is of no consequence in the case at bar,
because it will be noted that on the date of the execution of the will (April 21, 1953) the testator
was sick and had to remain continuously at home. At that time, because of illness he was
incapacitated to sign his will and had to be helped in stamping his thumbmarks by the notary public
and Dr. Banuelos. But his health must have improved after that day, for he was even able to go to
Batangas and the fact that he stamped his thumbmarks and signed in the list of voters Exhibit 5, if
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106
he really was the one who stamped his thumbmark and signed in that list, does not prove that the
testator was able to sign his name on April 21, 1953.
Without giving much weight to this reasoning, we find that while the thumbmarks appearing on
the will Exhibit C have been positively identified as the testator’s by the three attesting witnesses
to the will (who seem to be entirely disinterested and without any reason for falsifying the truth),
as well as by Isabel de Castro and the Notary Public, there is no proof in the record to show that
the thumbmark on the fourth line of Exhibit 5-A is of said testator, and that even the signature
Marcelo de Castro appearing on Exhibit 4 (which Emilio de Castro said is the signature of his
deceased brother) do not indicate the firmness of the hand of the signer of the name Marcelo de
Castro on the fourth line of Exhibit 5-A, which strokes denote not only firmness and control of the
pen, but also a better style on the part of the writer. This difference between the visual characteristic
of the two signatures clearly indicates that both were not written by one and the same hand. By
preponderance of evidence we declare therefore, that document Exhibit C is the duly executed last
and only will and testament of the late Marcelo de Castro the testator in the case at bar.
It is to be noted at this juncture that the deceased Marcelo de Castro had no force heirs, for he left
only brothers of full and half blood and sisters of half blood, the Petitioners herein. Up to the time
of his demise he lived with his half brothers and sisters and yet he bequeathed all his properties
and possessions to his sisters of half blood, giving nothing to his brothers of full or half blood.
The half brothers attorney Jose P. Castro and Servilliano and Policarpio de Castro, have not
contested the will, though they lived with the testator, probably because they realized the intention
of their deceased brother. The circumstances surrounding this case lead us to conclude that if the
testator only favored his sisters in his will, it must have been due to the fact he considered them as
less prepared than his brothers to succeed in the struggle for securing the means necessary for
maintaining a licit and decent livelihood.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF

CONSUELO SANTIAGO GARCIA CATALINO TANCHANCO AND RONALDO
TANCHANCO, PETITIONERS, v. NATIVIDAD GARCIA SANTOS, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 204793 June 08, 2020
It is settled that "the law favors testacy over intestacy" and hence, "the probate of the will cannot
be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus,
unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered
nugatory. “In a similar way, "testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose."
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FACTS: Consuelo was married to Anastacio Garcia (Anastacio) who passed away on August 14,
1985. They had two daughters, Remedios Garcia Tanchanco (Remedios) and Natividad Garcia
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Santos (Natividad). Remedios predeceased Consuelo in 1985 and left behind her children, which
included Catalino Tanchanco (Catalino) and Ronaldo Tanchanco (Ronaldo, collectively
Tanchancos).
On April 4, 1997, Consuelo, at 91 years old, passed away6 leaving behind an estate consisting of
several personal and real properties. Catalino filed a petition before the RTC of Pasay City to settle
the intestate estate of Consuelo alleging that the legal heirs thereof are those whose names are
written in red below, and prayed, among others, for his appointment as the special administrator
of Consuelo’s estate. Natividad filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that she already filed a petition
for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Consuelo which they found from decedent’s
belongings. Natividad prayed that letters testamentary be issued in her favor as the named
executrix in the will. Petitioners filed an Opposition to Natividad’s petition for probate. They argue
that the will is fatally defective and prayed for the disallowance thereof and for the proceedings to
be converted into an intestate one. Among the contentions of the petitioner are as follows:
1. The will did not comply with the formalities required by law such that:
a. the will’s attestation clause did not state the number of pages; and
b. the will was written in Tagalog, not the English language usually used by Consuelo.
Substantial compliance is not applicable in this case because of indications of bad faith, forgery,
or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence in the execution of the will.
2. Consuelo’s signature was forged. Nobody among Consuelo’s relatives witnessed the execution
of the alleged will. The attesting witnesses are all lawyers.
3. Consuelo was physically incapable of executing the will at the alleged date and place of
execution thereof.
ISSUE: Whether the will should be allowed Probate.
RULING: Yes,
It is settled that “the law favors testacy over intestacy” and hence, the probate of the will cannot
be dispensed with. Testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent must take
precedence over intestate proceedings. The main issue which the court must determine in a probate
proceeding is the due execution or the EXTRINSIC validity of the will. The probate court cannot
inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the estate by the testator. Thus,
due execution is “whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law. If the will is contested, the burden of proof is upon those
who assail the validity of the will.
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In the instant case, the will of Consuelo should be allowed probate as it complied with the
formalities required by the law and the petitioners failed to prove that the same was executed
through force or under duress, or that the signature of the testator was procured through fraud.
The Court should respect the prerogative of the testator to name an executrix (in this case,
Natividad) in her will absent any circumstance which would render the executrix as incompetent,
or if she fails to give the bond requirement or refuses to execute the provisions of the will.
The will faithfully complied with the formalities required by law
The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is the due execution or the
extrinsic validity of the will123 as provided by Section 1, Rule 75124 of the Rules of Court. The
probate court cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the estate by
the testator. Thus, due execution is "whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law"125 as mandated by Articles 805 and 806
of the Civil Code.
In the instant case, the attestation clause indisputably omitted to mention the number of pages
comprising the will. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment portion of the will supplied the omission
by stating that the will has five pages, to wit: "Ang HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima
(5) na dahon, kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong
ito."131 Undoubtedly, such substantially complied with Article 809 of the Civil Code. Mere reading
and observation of the will, without resorting to other extrinsic evidence, yields the conclusion that
there are actually five pages even if the said information was not provided in the attestation clause.
Petitioners failed to disprove that Consuelo was more confortable to use the Tagalog dialect.
Notably, although wholly written in Tagalog, the will contained the English equivalent for the
other terms which relate to wills and succession.
Lawyers are not disqualified from being witnesses to a will; the subscribing witnesses testified to
the due execution of the will.
The attesting witnesses to the will in question are all lawyers equipped with the qualifications of a
subscribing witness as provided for in Article 820 of the Civil Code. Petitioners did not present
controverting proof to discredit them or to show that they were disqualified from being witnesses
to Consuelo’s will at the time of its execution. The Court is disposed to give credence to the lawyer-
witnesses testimonies that the will was duly executed by Consuelo who was of sound mind and
body at the time of signing.
The burden of proof is upon the Tanchancos to show that Consuelo could not have executed the
will or that her signature was forged. Bare allegations without corroborating proof that Consuelo
was under duress in executing the will cannot be considered.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL
AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPE, vs. DIANA JEANNE
LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L. TUAZON
G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012
or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
FACTS: On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez,
and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the
respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon
(Victoria) as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament on
August 10, 1996 and constituted Richard as his executor and administrator. On September 27,
1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the
RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed
the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as
required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of Richard. The said opposition was also adopted by Victoria. After submitting proofs of
compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard presented the attesting witnesses, namely:
Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes Manalo (Manalo); and the notary public
who notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco). The instrumental witnesses
testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the will on each and every page, they also read
and signed the same in the latter's presence and of one another. Photographs of the incident were
taken and presented during trial. Manalo further testified that she was the one who prepared the
drafts and revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the will was made.
Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more than 20 years. Prior to
August 10, 1996, the latter consulted him in the preparation of the subject will and furnished him
the list of his properties for distribution among his children. He prepared the will in accordance
with Enrique's instruction and that before the latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the
presence of one another, he translated the will which was written in English to Filipino and added
that Enrique was in good health and of sound mind at that time.
In the Decision dated August 26, 2005, the RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to
comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of
the number of pages used upon which the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same
Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule
only applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde
or extrinsic evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of
7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC
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observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will
for not having been executed and attested in accordance with law.
ISSUE: Whether the will executed is valid.
RULING: No.
The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil
Code provide: ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The testator or the person requested
by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number
of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. If the attestation clause is in a
language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. ART. 809. In the absence of
bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with
all the requirements of Article 805.
or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. While Article 809 allows
substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in
this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament
that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are
written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including
its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself
but through the presentation of evidence aliund. On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to wit: x x x The rule must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the
pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether
the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself
can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely
disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check
against perjury in the probate proceedings. Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of
the will.
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REMEDIOS NUGUID vs. FELIX NUGUID
Gr No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or
not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of
the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on
the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once
again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of
time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to
a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid
and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years
before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and
mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground
therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line —
were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto,
oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss. The court's
order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce
create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can delved into the intrinsic validity of the will? (YES)
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RULING: Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the
probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on,
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the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity,
and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, is the questions solely to
be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is
not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality
of any devise or legacy therein.
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or
not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of
the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on
the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once
again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of
time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to
a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will
in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
TAMPOY vs. ALBERASTINE
GR NO. L-14322, 1960
Since the will in question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, we
cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be
admitted to probate.
FACTS: This concerns the probate of a document which purports to be the last will and testament
of one Petronila Tampoy. The first first page of a will bore the signatures of the three instrumental
witnesses, but not the signature or the thumbmark of the testator. After the petition was published
in accordance with law and petitioner had presented oral and documentary evidence, the trial court
denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the first of the will does not bear the
thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling but the Court of Appeals certified
the case to the SC because it involves purely a question of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.
RULING: No. The law requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in
the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in
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the presence of the testator and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the
attestation clause. This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the
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validity of the will (Rodriguez vs. Alcala, 55 Phil., 150). Thus, it has been held that "Statutes
prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. As
stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, 'A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory
requirements; otherwise it is entirely void.' All these requirements stand as of equal importance
and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No power or
discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispence with those enumerated
in the statutes" (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407; See also Saño vs. Quintana, 48
Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481).
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA

PEREZ: APOLONIA TABOADA vs. HON. AVELINO ROSAL
G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual
forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. Thus, the law
is to be liberally construed in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes
but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent commission of fraud.
FACTS: A petition for probate was filed by Petitioner Apolonio Taboada before the Court of First
Instance, attaching therewith the last will and testament of Dorotea Perez. The will, written in
Cebuano-Visayan dialect, consisted of two (2) pages. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom of the page by Dorotea alone, and at the left
margin by three (3) witnesses. The second page contained the attestation clause and
acknowledgement is signed at the end of the attestation by three (3) witnesses and at the left margin
by Dorotea. Since no opposition was filed, the Court allowed the presentation of evidence.
However, the Court, under Judge Ramon Pamitian, issued an order denying the probate of the will
of Dorotea and ordered the submission of names of the intestate heirs. When a new judge was
assigned in the case, Respondent Judge Avelino Rosal, the Court again denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Apolonio because he failed to comply with the order requiring him to
submit the names of intestate heirs. It ruled that Art. 805 of the Civil Code provides that for a
notarial will to be valid, it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the end of the page, but also
the subscribing witnesses in the same place or at the end and of one another because attesting
witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of testator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 805 of the Civil Code must be strictly construed in order for a will to
be valid.
RULING: NO, the requirement of subscription was fully satisfied. Clearly, Art. 805 of the Civil
Code stated that the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator, or by testator’s
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name written by another person in his presence, or by his express direction, and attested and
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subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
However, the signatures of the witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not
only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual
forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. Thus, the law
is to be liberally construed in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes
but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent commission of fraud.
LEE vs. TAMBAGO
544 SCRA 393 February 12, 2008
FACTS: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with
violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged
to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr.
and two other witnesses. In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to
his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena
Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30,
1965.Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificateof the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.Furthermore, the signature of the testator
was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation which supposedly contained his
purported signature. Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and
in the deed of donation were “in any way entirely and diametrically opposed from one another in
all angle[s].
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported
witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely
copied from their respective voters’ affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives
division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture
and the Arts (NCCA).
ISSUE: Was the will spurious?
ISSUE: Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal profession.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object
of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to
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avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
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A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The will in question was
attested by only two witnesses. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This
is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory
laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise
requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby
the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and
deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s
wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he
intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the
conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay
and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate
in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent
invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe
the formalities of a will and those of notarization. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be
disregarded.
ERNESTO GUEVARA vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA
G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole
world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Although not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the
testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress,
menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only
then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed
by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested
copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the
province in which the land lies.
It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the
court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a person who neglects his
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duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not
presenting it, he may be committed to prision and kept there until he delivers the will.
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FACTS: Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, legitimate son and natural daughter,
respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their inheritance from
the latter. The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by Rosario Guevara to recover from
Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict legitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of
the deceased. The defendant answered the complaint contending that whatever right or rights the
plaintiff might have had, had been barred by the operation of law.
It appears that Victorino L. Guevara executed a will apparently with all the formalities of the law,
wherein he made the several bequests and devices.
On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament, however, was
never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted
for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received
their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of
the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this
case. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara
appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have
disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and testament in
her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her
favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain
legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land
described in the will. But a little over four years after the testator's demise, she (assisted by her
husband) commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose
hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to
the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victorino
L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment
she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died
intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment
therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be
disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the procedure adopted by the plaintiff (respondent herein) Rosario
Guevara was legal.
RULING: NO.
We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in our
opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and
testament of the decedent. The Code of Civil Procedure, which was in force up to the time this
case was decided by the trial court, contains the following pertinent provisions:
Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. — No will shall pass either the
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real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal
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to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
Sec. 626.Custodian of Will to Deliver. — The person who has the custody of a will shall, within
thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will into the court which has
jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. — A person named as executor in
a will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within thirty days after
he knows that he is named executor, if he obtained such knowledge after knowing of the death of
the testator, present such will to the court which has jurisdiction, unless the will has been otherwise
returned to said court, and shall, within such period, signify to the court his acceptance of the trust,
or make known in writing his refusal to accept it.
Sec. 628.Penalty.— A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two proceeding
sections, unless he gives a satisfactory excuse to the court, shall be subject to a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars.
Sec. 629. Person Retaining Will may be Committed. — If a person having custody of a will after
the death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having
jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province
by a warrant issued by the court, and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will.
The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court, which took
effect on July 1, 1940.
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole
world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Although not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the
testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress,
menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only
then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed
by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested
copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the
province in which the land lies.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had
received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions
of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on
account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due
execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with
that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly
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provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be
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dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending
against public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means
provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said
heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an
action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under
the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition.
We therefore believe and so holds that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of Appeals,
do not sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent.
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LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
JESUSA DUJALI BUOT vs. ROQUE RASAY DUJALI
Gr. No.199885 October 02, 2017
proceedings. The exception is when there already has been (1) extrajudicial settlement and (2)
summary settlement of an estate of small value. Exception to the Exception: When there is a “good
and compelling” reason to still institute judicial administration proceedings.
FACTS: Jesusa Dujali Buot filed for administration of estate of deceased Gregorio Dujali, who
died intestate. Buot alleged she was a surviving heir along with Roque Dujali, and other heirs.
Buot asked that (1) an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio's estate; (2) a final
inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate be ordered
distributed in accordance with law among the legal heirs.
Dujali opposed and asked for dismissal, arguing Buot had no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings because she failed to attach any document, such as a certificate of live birth or a
marriage certificate, to prove her filiation. Buot argued only ultimate facts should be included in
an initiatory pleading. The marriage certificate and certificate of live birth which Dujali demands
are evidentiary matters that ought to be tackled during trial.She attached a copy of the necrological
services program where she was listed as one of Gregorio's heirs, a certification from the municipal
mayor that she is Gregorio's child, and a copy of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement which
includes both Buot and Dujali as Gregorio's heirs. Notably, this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement
pertained to parcels of land not included in the list of properties annexed in Buot's petition.
The RTC sided with Dujali. It held that under the law, there are only two exceptions to the
requirement that the settlement of a deceased's estate should be judicially administered: (1)
extrajudicial settlement and (2) summary settlement of an estate of small value. In this case,
administration has been barred by the fact that Gregorio's estate has already been settled
extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. It also noted that Gregorio
had no creditors since Buot failed to allege it in her petition.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC properly dismissed the petition on the ground that there has already
been an extrajudicial settlement of certain properties of the estat
RULING: When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to
judicial administration proceedings. The exception is provided in Section 1 of Rule 74 of ROC:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
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filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
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action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means
of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement,
whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir
who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with
and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of
deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under
oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be
filed under Section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor
files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. What constitutes good reason
depends on the circumstances of each case. Buot’s reason do not qualify as good and compelling
reason to submit Gregorio’s estate to administration proceedings. That the extra judicial settlement
in this case did not cover Gregorio’s entire estate is not sufficient reason to order the administration
of the estate.
EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides
at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where
the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
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domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
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domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile.
No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary.
FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with
whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions
to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and
a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence,
the case before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration
RULING: Yes, Felicidad has the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status that as a surviving wife of Felicisimo or his co-owner
under the Art. 144 of the Civil code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry the respondent in 1974, the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as he may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY

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G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
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FACTS: On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina married to Dr. Federico died intestate. In 1979,
their only son, Emilio Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of
her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including
herein petitioner Emilio Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I
was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: respondent, Isabel;
Margarita; and Emilio II. Emilio I’s first marriage was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio
I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay, by two different women.
Respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived separately from their father and
paternal grandparents. After her spouse’s death, Federico adopted their illegitimate grandchildren,
Emilio III and Nenita. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration in her favor. Federico filed his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina,
he is capable of administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator;
that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal
preference in the administration. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings
amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son,
Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf. The trial court granted Emilio
III’s Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. In the course
of the proceedings, Federico died. The trial court rendered a decision appointing herein petitioner,
Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. Aggrieved, respondent filed an
appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters
of Administration issued to Emilio III. The CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate
child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s
legitimate mother, the decedent.
ISSUE: Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of
the decedent’s estate.
RULING: The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to
the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will. The basis for
Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario
in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand,
and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives. Emilio III
was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both
acknowledged him as their grandchild. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled
to share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not
simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering
that the CA even declared that under the law, Federico, being the surviving spouse, would have
the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his
share in the conjugal partnership.
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Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
a. To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next
of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
b. If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next
of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing
to serve;
c. If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies
in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this
case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their
grandmothers, Cristina’s estate.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e.,
love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status
of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLOR
G.R. No. 174680 March 24, 2008
FACTS: Felicidad Tayag, one of the three (3) illegitimate children, filed a petition for issuance of
letters of administration on the estate of her father Ismael who died intestate. The estate of Ismael
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is composed of real properties and a motor vehicle which was sold by Victoria Tayag- Gallor, the
wife of Ismael, and gave the illegitimate children half of P100,000.00, the amount promised to
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them. As to the real properties, Victoria caused to annotate in the title the conveyace executed by
Ismael decalring it to be a paraphernal property. Hence, Victoria filed an opposition on the petition
as she claims sole ownership over the subject property and that the petition should be dismissed
for lack of cause of action and Felicidad’s allegation as an illegitimate child was not proven by
any evidence of voluntary recognition of her as an illegitimate child by Ismael.
ISSUE: Whether the motion to dismiss should be granted on the ground of lack of cause of action
for the petition for issuance of letters of administration.
RULING: No, the motion to dismiss should not be granted.
A petition for issuance of letters of administration must be based on the existence of an interest
over the estate of the decedent and a mere allegation in the petition that the person filing the petition
as an illegitimate child is a sufficient ground for the existence of such interest. The law provided
that illegitimacy can be proven through expressed voluntary recognition which appears in the birth
certificate or through a public or private handwritten instrument executed by the father, but if the
possession of illegitimacy has been open and continuous and the same was not contested by the
father, the death of the father bars any action to impugn the status of the illegitimate child. Also,
in cases where the person was not given an opportunity to prove by evidence her filiation to
establish interest on the estate as ground for issuance of letters of administration, such filiation
may be proven in the course of settlement proceedings.
In this case, the allegation of Felicidad is an illegitimate child suffices for a cause of action without
any need to state that she had been recognize and acknowledged as such. But such filiation can be
proven by her and can be opposed in the course of settlement proceedings.
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES MAGLAYA
Gr No. 153798 Sept. 02, 2005, J. Garcia
FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving
behind 4 parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Corazon
claims that as the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator. Petitioner Belen
claims, as Francisco’s second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made administratix of
Francisco’s estate. She claims that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although
she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not
signed by him. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of
Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed
parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. She also said that she and
Francisco adopted a child.
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Respondent in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to
December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the
alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. She also dismissed the
adoption as of little consequence, owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a
petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan. Respondent testified
having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four other
witnesses testified on her behalf, and she also offered in evidence her birth certificate which
contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to
Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word “Yes” appears on
the space below the question “Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”. Pictures taken during respondent’s
wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; a copy of her marriage contract, and her
scholastic and government service records, were also offered as evidence.
RTC ruled in favour of petitioner, CA ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether Maglaya is the legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva
Mercado?
RULING: No. The CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child is
a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However, the
presumption of legitimacy under Art. 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual
basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married, and that his/her conception or
birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Respondent failed to present evidence of
Francisco’s marriage to Genoveva, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted.
Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending physician making it only proof of the
fact of the birth of a child. The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself, it cannot
be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother
of the newborn child. None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or
recognition.
Further, RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen
of their child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following
the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is
the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein
respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been
judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become
res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent
or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the deceased.
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OF EDWARD T.MARCELO v. JOSE T. MARCELO, JR.
G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014
Marcelo, Sr.’s (Jose, Sr.) compulsory heirs, his sons, Edward, (ascendant of herein petitioners,
Jose, Sr.’s, estate. Decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four compulsory heirs:
Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition for the issuance of Letters of
Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr. before the RTC, Branch 76, Quezon City. At first, Helen,
along with her brother, Jose, Jr. separately opposed MIMCO’s petition; the two prayed for their
his appointment as regular administrator. Ultimately, MIMCO, George and Edward banded
together: (1) opposed Helen’s and Jose, Jr.’s petitions, and (2) prayed for Edward’s appointment
as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Pendingissuance of letters of administration, the RTC
appointed Helen and Jose, Jr. as special administrators.
RTC appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Adamant on his competence
to better administer his father’s estate, Jose, Jr. appealed Edward’s appointment as regular
administrator to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed in toto the Orders
dated 1 October 1993, 13 December 1991 and 12 March 1992 of the intestate court.
said liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. to bear the conformity of all
Edward, joined by George, opposed Jose, Jr.’s motion and nominated Atty. Henry Reyes as regular
administrator inEdward’s stead.
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Omnibus Motion and affirming the appointment of Jose, Jr. as new regular administrator
ISSUES:
1. Whether the appointment of a regular administrator is still necessary at the liquidation, partition
and distribution stage of the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate.
2. Whether Jose, Jr.’s previous non-appointment as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate bars
his present appointment as such even in lieu of Edward who is now dead.
RULING:
1. The appeal is impressed with merit. The settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and
complete albeit it is at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court provides for the Distribution and Partition of the Estate.
payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
intention of the testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to their
respective shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall be settled and allowed
by the court, and, if any person interested in the partition does not pay his proportion or share,
the court may issue an execution in the name of the executor or administrator against the party
not paying for the sum assessed.
definitely aware, the RTC archived the intestate proceedings pending the payment of estate taxes
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personalities from the Marcelo patriarch, the decedent, Jose, Sr. More importantly, the liquidation
scheme appears yet to be effected, the actual partition of the estate, where each heir separately
holds his share in the estate as that which already belongs to him, remains intangible and the
ultimate distribution to the heirs still held in abeyance pending payment of estate taxes.
Significantly, even the Liquidation of the Inventory of Jose, Sr.’s estate states that the valuation
amount of the shares of stock as listed therein is based on par value, which may have varied given
the passage of time. To date, more than a decade has passed since the intestate proceedings were
archived, thus, affecting the value of the estate’s assets.
2. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of
the trial court. The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment
and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.
The RTC did not err in appointing Jose, Jr. as the new administrator, even though his previous
prayer for appointment was denied. Notably, by virtue of Edward’s death, the office of the regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate was vacated, and it was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, as
probate court, to appoint a new administrator.
Evidently, the Court of Appeals like the RTC in its second order, closed its eyes on the facts
detailed by the RTC in the first order. Considering the two (2) sets of conflicting rulings of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals in the two stages of this litigation, The Court put into proper
perspective the 13 December 1991 Order of the RTC appointing Edward over Jose, Jr. as regular
administrator of their father’s estate, which Order was upheld by us in G.R. No. 123883
Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general disqualification of those who
wish to serve as administrator
SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators.— No person is

competent to serve as executor or administrator who: (a) Is a minor; (b) Is not a resident of the
Philippines; and (c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason
of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction
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of an offense involving moral turpitude.
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Section 6 of the same rule, on the other hand, lists an order of preference in instances when there
is a contest of who should be appointed administrator:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.— If no executor is named in the will,
intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving spouse, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving spouse, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving spouse, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the surviving spouse, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for the administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing
to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
Plainly, the RTC found Edward competent to serve as regular administrator, more competent than
Jose, Jr., preferred despite equal status in the Order of Preference, manifesting none of the
disqualifications set by law. Still and all, the same Order likewise judged Jose, Jr.’s suitableness
and fitness, or lack thereof, for the office of administrator, albeit in comparison with Edward and
not with the rest of Jose, Sr.’s children. Jose, Jr. was not what Edward was.
The Court notes that this case has been unnecessarily prolonged and resulted in added litigation
by the non-payment of estate taxes which is the ultimate responsibility of the heirs having inchoate
right in the estate, should there be assets remaining, to be partitioned and distributed. The
inheritance tax is an obligation of the estate, indirectly the heirs:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. – When the debts, xxx, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, xxx No distribution
shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned
for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
Given the factual considerations that led to the prior findings on the unfitness of Jose, Jr. to act as
regular administrator; the Affidavit of Helen preferring George as administrator; and the
conformity on record of the rest of Jose, Sr.’s heirs to George’s administration More importantly,
consistent with Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, not only is George the eldest son of Jose,
Sr. and, therefore, his most immediate kin, he has, moreover, been chosen by the rest of the heirs
of Jose, Sr. to perform the functions of an administrator. In this regard, in addition to George and
the heirs of Edward, Helen executed an Affidavit to manifest her opposition to Jose, Jr. and to
support the appointment of George and herself as joint administrators, a copy of which was given
to the Court of Appeals. Supreme Court thus issue Letters of Administration to George to facilitate
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and close the settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
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GLORIOSA V. VALARAO v. CONRADO C. PASCUAL AND MANUEL C. DIAZ
G.R. No. 150164 November 26, 2002
FACTS: FELICIDAD C. PASCUAL died at seventy-one (71) years, femme sole, leaving a
substantial inheritance for her querulous collateral relatives who all appear disagreeable to any
sensible partition of their windfall. To divide the disputed estate are five (5) groups of legal heirs
which include respondents Conrado C. Pascual, a brother of the deceased, and Manuel C. Diaz, a
nephew, son of her sister Carmen P. Diaz, and petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao who is the decedent's
niece. The bloodlines marking the groups of heirs are: (a) the legitimate children of her late sister
Leoncia P. Villanueva, including petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao; (b) the legitimate children of her
late sister Carmen P. Diaz including respondent Manuel C. Diaz; (c) the legitimate children of her
late brother Macario Pascual; (d) the legitimate children of her late sister Milagros P. de Leon;
and, (e) the decedent's surviving sister Augustia C. Pascual and brothers Leonardo C. Pascual and
Conrado C. Pascual, the latter being one of respondents herein.
Petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao initiated a special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor over the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual. Respondent Conrado C. Pascual
and some of his co-heirs, including respondent Diaz, filed with the same probate court a petition
for probate, of an alleged holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. The two (2) special proceedings
were consolidated. By agreement of the parties in the proceedings a quo, petitioner Valarao and
respondent Diaz were appointed joint administrators of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual.
RTC rendered a Decision which denied the probate of the alleged holographic will of the decedent
and giving due course to the intestate settlement of the estate.
In view of the appeal taken from the disallowance of the holographic will, petitioner Valarao
moved in the probate court for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Respondent
Diaz also asked for his designation as special co-administrator of the estate alongside petitioner.
Respondent Diaz moved for reconsideration of his rejection as special co-administrator of the
estate. He contested the allegation of petitioner Valarao that he had been remiss in his duties as
coadministrator. He cited as examples of his services the collection of rentals for properties
included in the estate, the payment of estate taxes and the deposit of about P4, 000,000.00 in a
joint bank account held in trust for the estate by him and petitioner as co-administrators.
Respondent Diaz further alleged that justice and equity demanded that his group of heirs be also
represented in the management of the estate.
On the other hand, petitioner reiterated the alleged uncooperative conduct of respondent Diaz in
discharging his tasks as co-administrator, and at the same time moved that he and his group of
sympathetic heirs be compelled to surrender to her as special administratrix the books and records
of a corporation where the estate owned substantial interests.
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The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered respondent Diaz and all the
heirs to respect the authority of petitioner Valarao as special administratrix, especially by
furnishing her with copies of documents pertinent to the properties comprising the estate.
Respondents Pascual and Diaz along with other heirs moved for reconsideration of the 11
September 2000 Order on the ground that petitioner Valarao as special administratrix was not
authorized to dispossess the heirs of their rightful custody of properties in the absence of proof that
the same properties were being dissipated by them, and that the possessory right of petitioner as
special administratrix had already been exercised by her "constructively" when the heirs on her
side took possession of the estate supposedly in her behalf. Respondents further alleged that the
motion was pending resolution by the probate court.
On 13 June 2001 respondents filed their supplemental petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
61193 seeking permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11
September 2000 also as they mandated the turnover of documents to petitioner Valarao.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision reversing and setting aside the Order of 7 June
2000 appointing petitioner Valarao as lone special administratrix. The appellate court explained
that since the heirs were divided into two (2) scrappy factions, justice and equity demanded that
both factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Valarao was proper.
RULING: Yes.
To begin with, the probate court had ample jurisdiction to appoint petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix and to assist her in the discharge of her functions, even after respondents had filed
a notice of appeal from the Decision disallowing probate of the holographic will of Felicidad C.
Pascual. This is because the appeal is one where multiple appeals are allowed and a record on
appeal is required. In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was
taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties may avail of, including the appointment
of a special administrator.
Moreover, there is nothing neither whimsical nor capricious in the action of the probate court not
to appoint respondent Diaz as special co-administrator since the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11
September 2000 clearly stipulate the grounds for the rejection. The records also manifest that the
probate court weighed the evidence of the applicants for special administrator before concluding
not to designate respondent Diaz because the latter was found to have been remiss in his previous
duty as co-administrator of the estate in the early part of his administration. Verily, the process of
decision-making observed by the probate court evinces reason, equity, justice and legal principle
unmistakably opposite the core of abusive discretion correctible by the special civil action of
certiorari under which the appellate court was bound to act. Finally, the extraordinary writ does
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not operate to reverse factual findings where evidence was assessed in the ordinary course of the
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proceedings since perceived errors in the appreciation of evidence do not embroil jurisdictional
issues.
We also rule that the probate court in issuing the Order of 11 September 2000 did not err in
commanding respondents to turn over all documents pertinent to the estate under special
administration and in enforcing such order by means of contempt of court. The powers of a special
administrator are plainly delineated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, vesting upon him the
authority to "take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed".
Contrary to respondents' assertion, there is nothing in Sec. 2 requiring a special administrator to

take possession of the estate only upon a prior finding that the heirs have been wasting properties
of the estate which are in their possession. The law explicitly authorizes him to take possession of
the properties in whatever state they are, provided he does so to preserve them for the regular
administrator appointed afterwards. Clearly, the special administrator enjoys not merely subsidiary
possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but the primary and independent
discretion of keeping them so they may be preserved for regular administration.
In any event, as we have held in De Guzman v. Guadiz, the partisan possession exercised by
litigants over properties of the estate differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special
administrator under the Rules of Court. Quite obviously, with this distinction, the possession of
portions of the estate by respondents as heirs necessarily excludes the possessory right over the
same properties inherent in the mandate of a special administrator.
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER VS. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER

(DECEASED), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MAKATI (BRANCH 59)
G.R. NO. 160530 November 20, 2007
FACTS: Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the
probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales. After hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an
order allowing the said holographic will, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition
for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s
surviving spouse, Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However, the
court in its Order denied Cynthia’s motion to dismiss, and granted respondent’s petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary.
Cynthia moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. Atty. Nogales
was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor. Cynthia appealed to the Court of
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Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary should have
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been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was
denied due process. The appellate court dismissed the appeal. Cynthia’s motion for reconsideration
of the aforequoted decision was denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of letters testamentary despite the lack of a certification against
forum-shopping is valid.
RULING: Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Court require
a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. However, in this
case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere
continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s
failure to include a certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON AND MARIA JENNIFER

QUIAZON v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF MARIA LOURDES
ELISE QUIAZON
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
FACTS: Eliseo died intestate. Elise, represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City. In her Petition, Elise claims that she
is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were
both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.
In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real and personal properties. In order to preserve
the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s
estate. In a Decision, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon
posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid
in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last
residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.
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On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In validating
the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence. For purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion
for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether Elise Quiazon has shown any interest in the petition for letters of administration
RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides
at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial
Court] in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Neither is the Court inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown
any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled
to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
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Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration
must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors,
of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An “interested party,” in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings,
the phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest
in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory
heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having
a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully
be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and

LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR., vs. RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M.
OCAMPO,
GR No. 187879 July 5, 2010
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will,
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(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty
(30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration
be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay, Vince, Melinda, and Leonardo, Jr. are the surviving wife and the
children of Leonardo Ocampo, who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings,
respondents Renato and Erlinda Ocampo are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses
Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate. Vicente and Maxima left several properties,
mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna.
On June 24, 2004, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings in the RTC, Branch 24,
Biñan, Laguna. The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and
their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents.
Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of
the total income generated from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo died,
respondents took possession, control and management of the properties to the exclusion of
petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the
estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion,
divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents. Respondents filed their
Opposition and Counter-Petition contending that the petition was defective as it sought the judicial
settlement of two estates in a single proceeding. They argued that the settlement of the estate of
Leonardo was premature, the same being dependent only upon the determination of his hereditary
rights in the settlement of his parents’ estate. In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that they
be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima.
The RTC appointed Renato and Dalisay as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and
Maxima. Later, however, RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratix and
substituted her with Erlinda. When the Petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate the Special
Administration, the RTC granted it and revoked and terminated the appointment of Renato and
Dalisay as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and appointed Melinda
as regular administratrix.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The CA rendered its assailed
Decision granting the petition based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
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revoking respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on their
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motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without
conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as such.
ISSUES: Whether the appointment of Melinda as regular administrator was proper.
RULING: No. The Court finds the RTC’s designation of Melinda as regular administratrix
improper and abusive of its discretion.
In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator, the following

provisions of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, state –
Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. – No person is competent to

serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness,
improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense
involving moral turpitude.
xxxx
Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda, as the
prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the motion for the termination of
the special administration. It may be mentioned that, despite the filing by respondents of their
Opposition and Comment to the motion to revoke the special administration, the prayer for the
appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the estate was not specifically traversed in the
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said pleading. Thus, the capacity, competency, and legality of Melinda’s appointment as such was
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not properly objected to by respondents despite being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and
was not threshed out by the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with the above mentioned
Rules.
Having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente and posting of
bond by Melinda, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs Melinda’s appointment
should be converted into one of special administration.
SUSA DUJALI BUOT VS ROQUE DUJALI
G.R. No. 199885 October 02, 2017
proceedings. The exception is when there already has been (1) extrajudicial settlement and (2)
summary settlement of an estate of small value. Exception to the Exception: When there is a “good
and compelling” reason to still institute judicial administration proceedings.
distributed in accordance with law among the legal heirs. Dujali opposed and asked for dismissal,
arguing Buot had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings because she failed to attach any
document, such as a certificate of live birth or a marriage certificate, to prove her filiation. Buot
argued only ultimate facts should be included in an initiatory pleading. The marriage certificate
and certificate of live birth which Dujali demands are evidentiary matters that ought to be tackled
during trial.She attached a copy of the necrological services program where she was listed as one
of Gregorio's heirs, a certification from the municipal mayor that she is Gregorio's child, and a
copy of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement which includes both Buot and Dujali as Gregorio's
heirs. Notably, this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement pertained to parcels of land not included in
the list of properties annexed in Buot's petition. The RTC sided with Dujali. It held that under the
law, there are only two exceptions to the requirement that the settlement of a deceased's estate
should be judicially administered: (1) extrajudicial settlement and (2) summary settlement of an
estate of small value. In this case, administration has been barred by the fact that Gregorio's estate
has already been settled extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. It
also noted that Gregorio had no creditors since Buot failed to allege it in her petition.
been an extrajudicial settlement of certain properties of the estate.
RULING: When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial
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administration proceedings. The exception is provided in Section 1 of Rule 74 of ROC: Sec. I.
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Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide
the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of
the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.
If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by
public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates
the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a
condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition,
or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an
amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the
parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under
Section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a
petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent. The fact
of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof When
the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate
among themselves without judicial administration. Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent
the heirs from instituting administration proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to
file an action for partition. Since such proceedings are always "long," "costly," "superfluous and
unnecessary,” resort to judicial administration of cases falling under Section 1, Rule 74 appears to
have become the exception rather than the rule. Where partition is possible, either in or out of
court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons. What constitutes good reason depends on the circumstances of each case.
Buot’s reasons do not qualify as good and compelling reason to submit Gregorio’s estate to
administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover Gregorio's
entire estate is not sufficient reason to order the administration of the estate.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER

QUIAZON, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
FACTS: Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
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Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo
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having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each
other.
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during
the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation
to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that
Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In
order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant
to Section1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was
properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.
ISSUE: Whether the venue was properly laid.
RULING: YES.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the
time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial
Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he
had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
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contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
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The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in
the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in
Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s
Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled.
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the
time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with
the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.
That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law
renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with
Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower
courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings
of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive
REPUBLIC vs MARCOS
595 SCRA 43 August 4, 2009

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FACTS: On January 11, 1996, the RTC, acting as a probate court, issued an Order granting letters
testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-
Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
The dispositive portion of the Order mentioned that upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued in solidum to Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos
and Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II, named executors therein.
Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner LiwaywayVinzons-Chato of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special Administrator
of the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos.
On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration in so far as the RTC Order granted letters testamentary to respondents. On the
other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity.
On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already
filed a bond in the amount of P50, 000.00 as directed by the RTC Order and that he took his oath
as named executor of the will on January 30, 1996.
On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration to BIR Commissioner
LiwaywayVinzons-Chato in accordance with an earlier Order dater, appointing her as Special
Administratrix of the Marcos Estate.
On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of
Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.
On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed
by petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda Marcos.
On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning
the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents.
The First Division of this Court issued a Resolution referring the petition to the CA. On March 13,
1997, the CA issued a Decision, dismissing the referred petition for having taken the wrong mode
of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely erred in dismissing the petition questioning the RTC Orders
granting letters testamentary on technical grounds despite the Supreme Court resolution
specifically referring said petition for a decision on the merits.
RULING: The petition is without merit.
When the assailed Orders granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents were issued by
the RTC, petitioner sought to question them by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
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45 of the Rules of Court.
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Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which was then in effect, reads:
2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. – Except in criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may
be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this
being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that "appeals to the Supreme Court
shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The pertinent portions of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 read:
The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided, in –
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive
order or regulation is in question;
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto;
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;
(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided, however, That
if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three
next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the
aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the
latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ
of certiorari; and
(5) Final awards, judgments, decision or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of Tax
Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission.
A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters
testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a direct
appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the "issues raised by petitioner do
not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court
should take cognizance of the instant case."
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EXECUTORS

MELINDA J. MARCELO REVILLA, AND JOHN STEVEN J. MARCELO vs. JOSE T.
MARCELO, JR.
G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014
No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made
or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. In this
case, the settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit it is at the
liquidation, partition and distribution stage. From all of the foregoing, it is apparent that the
intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate still requires a regular administrator to finally
settle the estate and distribute remaining assets to the heirs of the decedent.
Marcelo, Sr.’s (Jose, Sr.) Compulsory heirs, his sons, Edward, (ascendant of herein petitioners,
Jose, Sr.’s, estate. Decedent Jose, Sr. Died intestate. He was survived by his four compulsory heirs:
Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition for the issuance of Letters of
Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr. Before the RTC, Branch 76, Quezon City. At first, Helen,
along with her brother, Jose, Jr. Separately opposed MIMCO’s petition; the two prayed for their
his appointment as regular administrator.
petitions, and (2) prayed for Edward’s appointment as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Pending issuance of letters of administration, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose, Jr. As special
administrators.
RTC appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Taking issue with the RTC’s
Order and questioning Edward’s appointment, Jose, Jr. Filed successive motions: (1) motion for
reconsideration of RTC’s decision; and (2) omnibus motion alleging the RTC Acting Presiding
Judge Efren Ambrosio’s (Judge Ambrocio) unusual interest and undue haste in issuing letters of
administration in favor of Edward. RTC, through Judge Ambrosio, denied Jose, Jr.’s motion for
reconsideration.
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Then, RTC ruled on the Omnibus Motion, thus, after a re-examination of the evidence adduced by
the parties and a consideration of the arguments raised in the aforecited pleadings, this court arrived
at a conclusion that no substantial error was committed by then Acting Presiding Judge Ambrosio
which would warrant a reversal of the questioned orders, namely, the order dated December 13,
1991 and March 12, 1992. Adamant on his competence to better administer his father’s estate,
Jose, Jr. Appealed Edward’s appointment as regular administrator to the Court of Appeals.
However, the appellate court affirmed in toto the Orders dated 1 October 1993, 13 December 1991
and 12 March 1992 of the intestate court.
The question of who between Edward and Jose, Jr. Should administer their father’s estate reached
us in G.R. No. 123883 (Jose Marcelo, Jr. V. Court of Appeals and Edward Marcelo). The Court
does not find reversible error in the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 43674 and
affirmed the RTC’s and the appellate court’s separate rulings of Edward’s competence and better
suited ability to act as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Thereafter, Jose, Jr. Persistently
together with the number and current par value of their respective shareholding, suffice it to say
that as correctly pointed out by regular administrator Edward, the shares of stock of the decedent
will be equally distributed to the heirs that there is no necessity therefor. Regular Administrator
Edward respectfully prays that the Liquidation, duly signed by all four (4) compulsory heirs, be
approved as the project of partition of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo Sr. And moved for the approval
of the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose, Sr. As the project of partition of the Estate
of Jose, Sr.
said liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. To bear the conformity of all
Edward, joined by George, opposed Jose, Jr.’s motion and nominated Atty. Henry Reyes as regular
administrator in Edward’s stead.
RTC issued the assailed Order, now appointing Jose, Jr. As regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s
Omnibus Motion and affirming the appointment of Jose, Jr. As new regular administrator.
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Petitioners appealed the RTC’s twin Orders dated 6 January 2010 and 23 March 2010 before the
appellate court. This time around, the Court of Appeals affirmed Jose, Jr.’s appointment as new
regular administrator. Ruling that the selection of administrator lies in the sound discretion of the
trial court, the Court of Appeals held that the prior Order dated 13 December 1991 of the RTC
appointing Edward as regular administrator instead of Jose, Jr., which appointment was affirmed
by this Court in G.R. No. 123883, did not make a finding on Jose, Jr.’s fitness and suitableness to
serve as regular administrator Wholly, Jose, Jr. Is competent and “not wanting in understanding
and integrity,” to act as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari ascribing grave error in the Court of Appeals’ Decision.
ISSUES:
Whether the appointment of a regular administrator is still necessary at the liquidation, partition
and distribution stage of the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Whether Jose, Jr.’s previous non-appointment as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate bars his
present appointment as such even in lieu of Edward who is now dead.
RULING:
1. The appeal is impressed with merit. The settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and
complete albeit it is at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court provides for the Distribution and Partition of the Estate.
payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees,
or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
intention of the testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to their respective
shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall be settled and allowed by the court,
and, if any person interested in the partition does not pay his proportion or share, the court may
issue an execution in the name of the executor or administrator against the party not paying for the
sum assessed.
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definitely aware, the RTC archived the intestate proceedings pending the payment of estate taxes.
may have varied given the passage of time. To date, more than a decade has passed since the
intestate proceedings were archived, thus, affecting the value of the estate’s assets.
2. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of
the trial court. The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator
The RTC did not err in appointing Jose, Jr. As the new administrator, even though his previous
prayer for appointment was denied. Notably, by virtue of Edward’s death, the office of the regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate was vacated, and it was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, as
probate court, to appoint a new administrator.
Evidently, the Court of Appeals like the RTC in its second order, closed its eyes on the facts
detailed by the RTC in the first order. Considering the two (2) sets of conflicting rulings of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals in the two stages of this litigation, The Court put into proper
perspective the 13 December 1991 Order of the RTC appointing Edward over Jose, Jr. As regular
administrator of their father’s estate, which Order was upheld by us in G.R. No. 123883.
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Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general disqualification of those who
wish to serve as administrator:
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SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators.— No person is
competent to serve as executor or administrator who: (a) Is a minor; (b) Is not a resident of the
Philippines; and (c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason
of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction
of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Section 6 of the same rule, on the other hand, lists an order of preference in instances when there
is a contest of who should be appointed administrator:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.— If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving spouse, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving spouse, or next of kin, requests
to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
If such surviving spouse, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the surviving spouse, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for the administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person
as the court may select.
Plainly, the RTC found Edward competent to serve as regular administrator, more competent than
Jose, Jr., preferred despite equal status in the Order of Preference, manifesting none of the
disqualifications set by law. Still and all, the same Order likewise judged Jose, Jr.’s suitableness
and fitness, or lack thereof, for the office of administrator, albeit in comparison with Edward and
not with the rest of Jose, Sr.’s children. Jose, Jr. Was not what Edward was.
The Court notes that this case has been unnecessarily prolonged and resulted in added litigation
by the non-payment of estate taxes which is the ultimate responsibility of the heirs having inchoate
right in the estate, should there be assets remaining, to be partitioned and distributed. The
inheritance tax is an obligation of the estate, indirectly the heirs:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. – When the debts, xxx, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, xxx No distribution
shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned
for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
Given the factual considerations that led to the prior findings on the unfitness of Jose, Jr. To act as
regular administrator; the Affidavit of Helen preferring George as administrator; and the
conformity on record of the rest of Jose, Sr.’s heirs to George’s administration
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More importantly, consistent with Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, not only is George the
eldest son of Jose, Sr. And, therefore, his most immediate kin, he has, moreover, been chosen by
the rest of the heirs of Jose, Sr. To perform the functions of an administrator. In this regard, in
addition to George and the heirs of Edward, Helen executed an Affidavit to manifest her opposition
to Jose, Jr. And to support the appointment of George and herself as joint administrators, a copy
of which was given to the Court of Appeals.
Supreme Court thus issue Letters of Administration to George to facilitate and close the settlement
of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II v. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS
G.R. No. 129505 G.R. No. 133359
January 31, 2000
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his
right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire
to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of
his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
FACTS: On July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will. He claimed he
had no compulsory heirs and had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less
than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private
respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. On Feb. 16 1996, Makati RTC Branch-61 under judge
Gorospe issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will, the court found that the testator
was of sound mind and freely executed said will. Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr. De Santos
died.
Petitioner (testator’s nephew) claiming to be the only son of the deceased’s sister Alicia de santos,
filed a motion for intervention as the nearest of kin, and also as a creditor of the deceased.
Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Makati Branch 61, but then
withdrew the same. Later defendant then filed the motion in Makati RTC Branch 65. Petitoner
then filed a motion for intervention also with Branch 65, stating again he was a full blooded
nephew and that a case already related to the subject matter was pending in Branch 61.
Judge Abad Santos, referred the case to Branch 61. Meanwhile Judge Gorospe in Branch 61 denied
the petitioner’s motion to intervene, and denied taking cognizance of the case forwarded by Branch
65, because the case in Branch 65 involved the Estate of Decent Arturo De Santos, while the one
in Branch 61 was filed by Arturo de Santos Himself when he was alive and had already been
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decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed the will. Branch 65 did not want to take the case,
but reversed it’s decision and again took cognizance of the case to expedite proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right
to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
RULING: The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent
Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral
relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent
has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private
respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is,
therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one,
having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene,
and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.
[T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will, and the private
respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private respondents opposition, that the
petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to
the question of her competency to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires
only an allegation of the probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true value
can be determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.
Rule 79, 1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. - Any

person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not
issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon
notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed
for letters of administration with the will annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited
by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and
whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of
the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory
or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of
any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -

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(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
151
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the
testators will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that
he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is
incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court
appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.
THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,

CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO
G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
Executor or administrator to make inventory and render account Inventory Rendered within 3
months of appointment and includes an appraisal of all real and personal estate of the deceased
which has come into his possession or knowledge [Sec. 1, Rule 83]
The usage of the word “all” in Sec. 1, Rule 83 demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word “all” is qualified by the phrase
“which has come into his possession or knowledge,” which signifies that the properties must be
known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator.
Sec. 1 allows no exception, for the phrase “true inventory” implies that no properties appearing
to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.
Teresita V. Mercado, and their five children, namely: Allan, Felimon, Carmencita, Richard, and
Maria Teresita; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin and
petitioner Thelma.
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Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in
Mervir Realty Corporation and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation. He assigned his real
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properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian,
Cebu to Mervir Realty. On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate. The RTC granted the petition.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14,
1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time
of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal properties” worth
P6,675,435.25 in all. Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from
the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion. RTC issued an order finding and
holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included
and directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration of the estate of the
late Emigdio which had come to her possession.
ISSUE: Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
RULING: Negative. The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included
in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded
under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC
commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the
decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor
or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.”
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF

ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO
PALAGANAS vs. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011
Who May Petition For Probate; Persons Entitled To Notice:
The executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate,
may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the
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will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
153
Reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is
different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court.
Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. This rule applies only to
reprobate of a will. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the
foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
FACTS: Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, died single and childless. In
the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.Ernesto, another
brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his
appointment as special administrator of her estate.
However, Manueland Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta , opposed the petition on the ground that
Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it.
Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it
is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full
understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified toact as
administrator of the estate. Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign -based siblings, Gloria and Sergio,
were on separateoccasions in the Philippines for a short visit, Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC
for leave totake their deposition, which it granted.
The RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta’s
U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippiines.The RTC issued an order:
(a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointingernesto as special administrator at the
request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated inthe will; and (c) issuing the Letters of
Special Administration to Ernesto. Manuel and Benjaminappealed to the CA arguing that an
unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.cannot be probated for the first time
in the Philippines. The appellate court, in its decision,affirmed the order of the RTC, holding that
the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will,subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of
the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond.
The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate
Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed?
RULING: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although
the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign
will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will
of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.
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154
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the probate
of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and
allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first
time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.
Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be
made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the
findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
ATTY. RICARDO B. BERMUDO vs. FERMINA TAYAG-ROXAS
FERMINA TAYAG-ROXAS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. RICARDO

BERMUDO
G.R. No. 172879 G.R. No. 173364
February 2, 2011
Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas' counsel
in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest all the way up to
this Court to defend her rights to her uncle's estate. And Atty. Bermudo succeeded. Acting as
counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as administrator of the estate.
Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney's fees
FACTS: Atty. Ricardo Bermudo, as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator
of the estate of Artemio Hilario (Hilario) and for the allowance and probate of the latter's will. The
testator instituted Fermina Tayag-Roxas (Roxas) as his only heir but several persons, who claimed
to be Hilario's relatives, opposed the petition. The RTC rendered a decision, allowing the will and
recognizing Roxas as Hilario's sole heir.
When the decision constituting Roxas as the sole heir became final, Atty. Bermudo who also
served as counsel for her in the actions concerning her inheritance filed a motion to fix his legal
fees and to constitute a charging lien against the estate for the legal services he rendered. RTC
granted him fees equivalent to 20% of the estate and constituted the same as lien on the estate's
property. Roxas appealed the order to the CA.
The CA rendered a decision that modified the RTC Order, limiting Atty. Bermudo's compensation
as administrator to what Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court provides and making his lawyer's
fees 20% of the value of the land belonging to the estate. Atty. Bermudo subsequently filed a
motion with the RTC for execution and appraisal of the estate on which his 20% compensation
would be based. RTC granted the motion and ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo P12,
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155
644,300.00 as attorney's fees with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Roxas challenged the order
before the CA through a petition for certiorari.
On December 19, 2005, using a different valuation of the land of the estate, the CA ordered Roxas
to pay Atty. Bermudo a reduced amount of P4,234,770.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6%
per annum. Atty. Bermudo's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed a petition for
review before this Court in G.R. 172879. Roxas also filed a motion for partial reconsideration of
the CA decision and when this was denied, she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R.
173364.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled
to collect attorney's fees.
RULING: Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorney's fees but only to
compensation as administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.
But Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas'
counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest all the
way up to this Court to defend her rights to her uncle's estate. And Atty. Bermudo succeeded.
Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as administrator of the estate.
Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney's fees.
Besides, Atty. Bermudo's right to attorney's fees had been settled with finality in CA-G.R. CV
53143. This Court can no longer entertain Roxas' lament that he is not entitled to those fees.
SINFOROSO PASCUAL vs. PONCIANO S. PASCUAL, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-48140 May 4, 1942
FACTS: On September 14, 1940, while the proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased
Eduarda de los Santos were pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal plaintiff, Sinforoso
Pascual, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Ponciano S. Pascual and
others, an action for the annulment of a contract of sale of a fishpond situated in Lubao, Pampanga,
supposedly executed without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favor of the
defendants. The complaint alleges that plaintiff and defendants are all residents of Malabon, Rizal,
and are legitimate children of the testratix, Eduarda de los Santos. Defendants filed of a motion to
dismiss, alleging want of cause of action, limitation of action, wrong venue and pendency of
another action. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that the action should have been
brought by the executor or administrator of the estate left by the deceased, and directed the plaintiff
to amend his complaint within five days. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the amendment
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consisting in that "el demandado Miguel S. Pascual ha sido nombrado por el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Rizal albacea testamentario de los bienes de la finada Eduarda de los Santos. en el
156
asunto de la testamentaria de dicha finada." The trial court declaring that such amendment did not
cure the insufficiency of the complaint, dismissed the action. It is from this order of dismissal that
plaintiff interposed his appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the action should have been filed by the executor and not by the plaintiff-heir.
RULING: Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or
protection of the property or rights of the deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or
defended by his executor or administrator. Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate
proceedings the heirs have no standing in court in actions of the above character, except when the
executor or administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event to heirs may act in
his place. (Pomeroy on Code Remedies, p. 158, 11 R C. L. p. 262; 21 Am. Jur., 940) Here, the
fictitious sale is alleged to have been made to the defendants, one of them, Miguel S. Pascual,
being the executor appointed by the probate court. Such executor naturally would not bring an
action against himself for recovery of the fishpond. His refusal to act may, therefore, be implied.
And this brings the case under the exception. It should be noted that in the complaint the prayer is
that the fishpond be delivered not to the plaintiff but to the executor, thus indicating that the action
is brought in behalf of the estate of the deceased. The general rule is that questions as to title to
property cannot be passed upon in testate proceedings. (Bauermann vs. Casas, 10 Phil., 386;
Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil., 273; Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil., 61; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil., 664;
Adapon vs. Maralit, 40 Off. Gaz., 6th Sup., p. 84.) The court is, however, of the opinion and so
holds that, when as in the instant case, the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased claiming
title under him, the question as to whether the transfer made by the latter to the former is or is not
fictitious, may properly be brought by motion in the testate or intestate proceedings on or before
the distribution of the estate among the heirs. This procedure is optional to the parties concerned
who may choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience in the preparation or
presentation of evidence, and accordingly, the action brought by the appellant is not improper.
QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR ITS OWN BEHALF,
AND REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE vs. LCN
CONSTRUCTION CORP
G.R. No. 174873 August 26, 2008
FACTS: Raymond Triviere passed away on December 14, 1987. On January 13, 1988,
proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo
Triviere, before the RTC of Makati City Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and Atty. William H. Quasha of
the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere,
respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988. As
administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate
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taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation
expenses
In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of
their litigation expenses but the RTC denied the said motion in May 1955.
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata also of the Quasha Law Office,
took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the
settlement of the estate. On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion
for Payment, for their own behalf and for their respective clients.
On the other hand, LCN, the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late
Raymond Triviere filed its Comment on/Opposition to the Motion on 2. LCN countered that the
RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first
Motion for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to
submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the estate as required by the court.
Eventually, the RTC granted the second Motion for Payment; however, it reduced the sums to be
paid. LCN, then filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC. Recourse
was then resorted to the Court of Appeals. On May 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN. While the Court of Appeals conceded that Atty.
Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as the administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere,
were entitled toadministrator’s fees and litigation expenses, they could not claim the same from
the funds of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether the Quasha Law Office is entitled to payment of the expenses incurred as
executor or administrator of the estate of Triviere.
RULING: No. Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads: Section 7. What
expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator? Not to charge for services as attorney.
Compensation provided by will control unless renounced. When the executor or administrator is
an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered
by him.
The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and needs no statutory construction. Here, in
attempting to exempt itself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents
conflicting arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate. At one point, it
alleges that the award of attorney's fees was payment for its administration of the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere; yet, it would later renounce that it was an administrator.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, EXECUTOR vs THE COURT

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OF APPEALS (FORER SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES,
158
MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ
AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG
G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.
Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and
private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the
named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will. On June
29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes
who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,
influence. On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No. 2
Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons. On July 28,
1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion
for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of
Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the
Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the
holographic will. On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of
funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus
ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered
the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters
and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes's motion for
release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Despite petitioner's
manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to
Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible
from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles
to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of
first publication of the notice to creditors.
ISSUES:
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1. Whether the probate court has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate
for the support of the testator's grandchildren. (NO)
2. Whether the probate court should order the release of the titles to certain heirs. (NO)
3. Whether the probate court should grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor
of the will. (NO)
RULING:
1. On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec.
3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased
person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court,
such allowance as provided by law. Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and
the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support
during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the testator's three granddaughters
do not qualify for an allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of
legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states "children"
of the deceased which excludes the latter's grandchildren. It is settled that allowances for support
under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the
deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the
time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on
the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond
the age of majority. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from
the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children"
and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.
2. Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed
properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors.
An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate
which is allowed only under the following conditions: Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special
proceedings. — Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the
estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper
and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be
distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90
of these Rules. And Rule 90 provides that: Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. —
When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court,
on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
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hearing upon notice shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming
them and the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
160
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. No distribution shall be allowed
until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. In settlement of estate
proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts,
funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been
paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as
the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations. In the case at bar, the probate
court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments
to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the
notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of debts and
obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be
paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a
bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had
not yet been inventoried and appraised. It was also too early in the day for the probate court to
order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will
is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality
of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. The intrinsic
validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his
Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his motion for reconsideration
of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares
of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and
allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there
is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his
estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.
3. Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right
to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased
is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and expenses of administration," Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly
provides: Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer
estate not willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for
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the payment of the debts and expenses for administration. When petitioner moved for further
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release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate
court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and
payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of additional
funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him
to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further
money in his favor. It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with
it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not
deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such
funds. Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is
merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is
a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is
held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign
to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account
of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax,
all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
FELIX AZUELA -versus – COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO

substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006, Tinga, J.
FACTS: Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was
notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent. The will consisted
of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino. The three named witnesses to the will
affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of
the attestation clause. The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who
represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Geralda
Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery and that the will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with law. She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page
of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. The RTC admitted the will to probate.
The RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino
Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency
in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;" Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, reversed
the trial court’s decision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void
and undeserving of probate.
ISSUE: Whether the will by the executor complied with the requirements of the law and, hence,
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should be admitted to probate.
162
RULING: NO.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written
is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to
deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. The Supreme
Court held that upon examination of the will itself, it revealed a couple of even more critical defects
that should necessarily lead to its rejection. For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the
instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand
margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists
of their averments before the notary public. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts
attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it
must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an
act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their
participation. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental
witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such
signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that
do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal. It is the witnesses, and not
the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be
their signatures on the attestation clause. Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been
validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause. Also,
the requirement under Article 806 was not complied with which provides that "every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied
with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from
the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The
non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in
compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import. In lieu of an
acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."By no manner of contemplation
can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who
has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act
or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary
that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and
deed.
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EMNACE v. COURT OF APPEALS
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GR No. 126334 November 23, 2001
FACTS: Partners Emnace, Tabanao and Divinagracia decided to dissolve the partnership and
executed an agreement of partition and distribution consequent to the latter’s withdrawal.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao’s untimely demise in
1994, Emnace failed to provide the heirs of Tabanao any statement of assets and liabilities of the
partnership and to render accounting of the partnership’s finances. Emnace reneged on his promise
to turn over to Tabanao the 1/3 share in the assets, despite formal demand for payment thereof.
Emnace avers the capacity of the estate of Tabanao to sue. Emnace asserts that the surviving spouse
of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed as administratrix
or executrix of his estate. that The trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had a right to sue in
their own names, in view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs of Tabanao can sue the partnership in their own right.
RULING: The surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao does not need to be appointed as executrix
or administratrix of the estate before she can file for an action. She and her children are
complainants in their own rights as successors. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanaos death,
his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Whatever claims and rights
Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by
operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of
which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person
are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from
the moment Vicente Tabanao died. A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of
Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire
legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death,
they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death,
his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioners’ obligations as outlined in their
dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue
and seek the courts intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
SALONGA HERNANDEZ & ALLADO vs. OLIVIA SENGCO PASCUAL AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127165 May 2, 2006
FACTS: The case centers on two estate proceedings, that of Doña Adela Pascual (Doña Adela)
and the other, her husband Don Andres Pascual's (Don Andres), who predeceased her. Don Andres
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died intestate, while Doña Adela left behind a last will and testament, designating therein Olivia
Pascual as the executrix as well as the principal beneficiary of her estate. Olivia Pascual then
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engaged the services of petitioner Salonga Hernandez & Allado, a professional law partnership, in
connection with the settlement of the estate of Doña Adela.
The Probate Court rendered a Decision allowing probate of the Last Will and Testament of Doña
Adela and Letters testamentary were issued to Olivia Pascual. Petitioner filed a Notice of
Attorney's Lien equivalent to three percent (3%) of the total gross estate of the late Doña Adela S.
Pascual, pursuant to the retainer agreement signed by and between petitioner and Olivia S. Pascua.
Later, the he Intestate Court rendered a Decision finally giving judicial approval to the
Compromise Agreement, and partitioning the estate of Don Andres. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
Motion for Writ of Execution for the partial execution of petitioner's attorney's lien. Olivia Pascual
filed her comment and/or opposition to the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution on
attorney's fees. She argued that a lawyer of an administrator or executor should charge the
individual client, not the estate, for professional fees. Olivia Pascual also claimed that the counsel
claiming attorney's fees should give sufficient notice to all interested parties to the estate, and that
such was not accomplished by petitioner considering that no notices were given to the several
legatees designated in Doña Adela's will.
ISSUE: Whether the executor or administrator, and not the estate of the decedent, is primarily
liable for attorney's fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or
administrator in relation to the settlement of the estate.
RULING: Yes, the rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor or
administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his attorney's fees may be allowed as
expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for
payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator.
As a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for attorney's fees due
to the lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or administrator in relation to the
settlement of the estate. The executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for
the sums paid in attorney's fees if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the
benefit of the estate. However, if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorney's fees,
the lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the lawyer may file an action against the executor or
administrator, but in his/her personal capacity and not as administrator or executor. Second, the
lawyer may file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct the
payment of attorney's fees as an expense of administration. If the second mode is resorted to, it is
essential that notice to all the heirs and interested parties be made so as to enable these persons to
inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERDINAND R. MARCOS II AND IMELDA R.

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MARCOS
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G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 August 4, 2009
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as a probate court in a special proceeding issued
an Order granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Marcos upon their filing of the
bond. The petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration in so
far as the RTC Order granted letters testamentary to respondents. Petitioner anchored its opposition
to the grant of letters testamentary to respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1) want
of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that
respondents have been convicted of a number of cases and, hence, should be characterized as one
without integrity, or at the least, with questionable integrity.
The eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve four charges for violation of
Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges for violation of Section 50 (non-
payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC); whereas
Imelda Marcos was faced with two criminal convictions.
The RTC, however, ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate its allegation and issued an Order
denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether respondent’s conviction for failure to file income tax return rendered him
incompetent to serve as executor.
RULING: No, he is not incompetent to serve as executor. Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court defines who are incompetent to serve as executors and Marcos does not fall in any of those
grounds. Respondent Marcos does not specifically fall in the ground of “want of integrity” and
“conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude” since there are no evidence on record, oral or
documentary, to substantiate and support the said allegation that respondent Marcos has been
convicted of a number of cases.
Moreover, the "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the
mere omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the
individual. Thus, the Court holds that even if the conviction of respondent Marcos II is affirmed,
the same not being a crime involving moral turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his
disqualification.
IN RE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MONS. JUAN BAUTISTA PERFECTO

GORORDO, ET. AL. vs. MARIA GORORDO VDA. DE JAEN, ET. AL.
Gr No. L-43594 Feb. 08, 1937, J. Diaz
FACTS: Gorordo is a retired bishop of Cebu. When he died he left a will naming his heirs and
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executor. The respondent De Jean is the sister of Gorodo who is named as universal heirs including
his nieces, Telesfora and Cesorea Gorordo . The petitioner Fr Mercado was named in the will as
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the executor and in his absence, Fr. Espina (Mercado being the parish priest in San Nicolas, Cebu
and Espina being the parish priest in Cebu Central). The will was submitted for probate before the
CFI Cebu. It was allowed and duly probated. Fr. Mercado, as the executor named in the will, was
confirmed by CFI Cebu and he filed a bond of 5000. The Heirs opposed the order appointing Fr
Mercado as executor and prayed for suspension of said order.
The heirs alleged that even if Fr. Mercado is named as executor in the will, there is no need to
appoint him because the heirs are already of age and the estate has no debts. Mercado is also
incapable as executor because he is partial since his parish, San Nicolas was named as one of the
legatees in the will
ISSUE: Whether the court is bound to appoint Mercado as executor since he is named executor in
the will.
RULING: Yes. Under Section 641 of Act no. 190 (An Act Providing a Code of Procedure in Civil
Action and Special Proceedings in the Phil – now Section 4, Rule 78), once a will is probated, the
court is bound to issue letters testamentary thereon to the person so named as executor of the will
provided, he accepts the trust and files the required bond. While it may be true that such should
not be strictly interpreted, for the court may be deprived of its power to appoint another should the
executor so named is incapacitated, it is also true that incapacity must be manifest and real and not
merely imaginary.
Fr. Mercado was found to be fit as an executor for the estate. He further alleged that the parish of
San Nicolas is not the legatee but the poor people of San Nicolas.
When Gorordo chose Mercado as executor of his estate after his death, he must have had good and
sufficient reasons and as such, his will must be respected.
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.
Gr No. 115181 March 31, 2000, J. Quisumbing
FACTS: Maria Socorro Avelino (Maria) is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio
Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino. Respondents are likewise
compulsory heirs. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
Maria filed before the RTC of Quezon City Branch 78, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She
asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate. In return, the respondents filed their
opposition. The trial court converted petitioner’s action for letters of administration into a suit for
judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
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Petitioner submits that no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination
has yet been made of the character and extent of the decedent’s estate. She insists that the Rules
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of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration
to an action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally
inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in upholding the lower court’s finding.
RULING: When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the
Rules of Court, then the decedent’s estate shall be judicially administered, and the competent court
shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Rule 78, Sec. 6. The exceptions
to this rule are found in Rule 74, Secs. 1 and 2.
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did
not err in converting petitioner’s action for letters of administration into an action for judicial
partition. Nor can we sustain petitioner’s argument that the order of the trial court converting an
action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of Court,
hence procedurally infirm.
The basis for the trial court’s order is Rule 74, Sec. 1, of the Rules of Court. It provides that in
cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is
possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. The trial court
appropriately converted petitioner’s action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial
partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the
Court of Appeals when it found the trial court’s action procedurally in order.
EDUARDO AGTARAP vs. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, ET. AL.
Gr No. 177099 June 08, 2011, J. Nachura
FACTS: Decedent Joaquin contracted (2) marriages. First with with Lucia, bearing three children,
Jesus+, Milagros+, Jose+ (survived by three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa) and
then lastly when Lucia died, thereafter, with Caridad, with three children, Eduardo, Sebastian,
Mercedes.
Son Eduardo filed petition for settlement of Joaquin’s intestate estate and the RTC issued
resolution appointing Eduardo as administrator.
Gloria Agtarap de Santos, one of the children of compulsory heir Jose in the estate of Joaquin, died
on May 4, 1995, was later substituted in the proceedings above by her husband Walter de Santos.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene, alleging
that he is the surviving spouse of the compulsory heir Mercedes Agtarap and the father of Cecilia
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Agtarap Dagoro, and in his answer in intervention.
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Sebastian, one of the compulsory heirs, filed a motion to exclude Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de
Santos as heirs, but was denied by lower court. He points out that his motion was denied by the
RTC without a hearing.
ISSUE: Whether Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate
in representation of the Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.
RULING: Yes, Sebastian’s insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to
the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained.
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling reason to hold that both
courts erred in ruling that Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated in the
estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence to refute his and
Eduardo’s admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin,
and to timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately,
Sebastian failed to do so.
Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in
representation of the Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA,

executrix- appellant, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA vs. GREGORIA
VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and
HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ
G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"
FACTS: Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include
the appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was
named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of
his estate. In due course, said will was admitted to probate on January 14,1954. Gregorio
Ventura died. Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary
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was issued in her favor. On June 17,1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the
years 1955 to 1960, inclusive. Said account of administration was opposed by the spouses
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Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and by Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura. Both
oppositions assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true income of the estate and
the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses. The grounds of aforesaid joint
motions to remove the executrix Maria Ventura are: (1) that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that
she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the inventory;
(3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious relations with
the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply with
the Order of the Court of December 12, 1963, requiring her to file her accounts of administration
for the years 1961 to 1963 ; and (5) that she is with permanent physical defect hindering her
from efficiently performing her duties as an executrix.
On October 5, 1965, the court a quo, finds that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the
funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the
Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real
estate taxes of the estate. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.
RULING: Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: When and to whom letters of administration
granted.-
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while
the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of
kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to
the decedent's property. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the
estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a
class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between
next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred. "
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano.
Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the
illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the
aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed
administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as
nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court,
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in order to represent both interests.
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MILAGROS A. CORTES v. COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO A. RESELVA
G.R. No. 117417 September 21, 2000
FACTS: Respondent Menandro Reselva, Milagros Cortes, and Florante Reselva are brothers and
sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva..
During their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a house and lot consisting of 100 square
meters, more or less. Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter
executed a holographic will which was probated, with Milagros Cortes, as the appointed Executrix.
After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion before respondent
probate court praying that Menandro Reselva, the occupant of the property, be ordered to vacate
the property and turn over to said Executrix the possession. The RTC granted such motion.
ISSUE: Whether probate courts can adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part
of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties.
RULING: No. Menandro Reselva, who refused to vacate the house and lot being eyed as part of
the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an outside party for he is one of
the three compulsory heirs of the the decedent. As such, he is very much involved in the settlement
of Teodoro's estate. By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, when the parties are all
heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title
to property. Here, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. More so,
when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate action would be
most expensive and inexpedient.
Moreover, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedent since
the former's theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter. In the same way, when the
controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to
the decedent, the same is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily
has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is
to be distributed among the heirs.
More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of
Court, thus:
SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the marriage is dissolved by the death
of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated,
and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.
The court ordered that the case be returned to the probate court for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of Teodoro and Lucrecia prior to settlement of the estate of Teodoro.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF DR. MAXIMO BORROMEO.
JOHANNA HOFER BORROMEO, WIDOW-APPELLEE, vs. CANUTO O.
BORROMEO, EXECUTOR-APPELLANT
G.R. No. L-6363 September 15, 1955
FACTS: Maximo Borromeo died leaving his widow Johanna Hofer Borromeo, and a will wherein
he designated the Borromeo Bros. Estate Inc. as his sole heir and naming his brother Canuto as
executor.
Proceedings having been instituted, the CFI probated the will and granted letters testamentary to
Canuto.
Thereafter, the attorneys for the widow submitted an "Urgent Motion" whereby they prayed for
the removal of Canuto on the grounds of negligence in the performance of his duties and unfitness
to continue discharging the powers of the office.
Canuto withdrew, without authority from the court, the amount of P23,930.39 from a joint current
account of Canuto and Maximo in BPI and then deposited P24,244.39 of the sum thus withdrawn
in the joint account of said Canuto and his brother Exequiel. The court, for several reasons, one
of them the unauthorized withdrawal of funds, decreed the removal of Canuto. On motion for
reconsideration, Canuto's attorney prayed that the order be revoked or that at least, Canuto be
permitted to resign.
Later, the court modified its order in the sense that said executor was "relieved of (instead of
removed from) his commitments as such executor". Notwithstanding such modification Canuto
appealed, contending that the modified order should be revoked
ISSUE: Whether Canuto be relieved of his commitments as executor.
RULING: Yes, there were sufficient grounds therefor. One of which was the unauthorized
withdrawal. Attempting to justify his attitude, Canuto points out that, according to the joint deposit
agreement Exhibit H signed by Canuto and Maximo Borromeo.
He claims, in effect, that the money deposited was his at the time he withdrew it. But would the
Bank have allowed him to withdraw the whole amount if he were not the executor? He got it then
as executor. Instead, he deposited it in a joint account with his brother Exequiel, thereby placing
it at the latter's disposal, and hiding it from the widow.
Furthermore, and this is important, the agreement says provided that this last disposition is not
contrary to provisions of laws now in force * * * in the P.I." And under Art. 1413 of the Civil
Code, no alienation or agreement which the husband may make with respect to conjugal property
in fraud of the wife shall prejudice her or her heirs. There is at least some ground to doubt whether
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the stipulation could deprive the wife of her share in the conjugal assets. The validity of the
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agreement could properly be the subject of debate in court; yet this executor avoided or bypassed
judicial adjudication by getting the money.
Second reason. Canuto omitted to include in his report, as income of the estate, the sum which he,
had received from Hacienda Plaridel. Further, he received other sums as proceeds from the farm
of the deceased, but instead of depositing them in his name as executor, placed them in his joint
account with his brother Exequiel.
Third reason. Canuto claimed as his own certain shares of the Interisland Gas Service in the name
of Maximo, asserting that Maximo was merely his "dummy".
Conflict between the interest of the executor and the interest of the deceased is ground for removal
or resignation of the former, who was thereby become unsuitable to discharge the trust. (Section
2, Rule 83.)
"Reasons for rule.--'An executor is a quasi trustee, who should be indifferent between the estate
and claimants of the property, except to preserve it for due administration, and when his interest
conflicts with such right and duty the county court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may
remove him.'
It becomes unnecessary to examine the other reasons which induced the trial court to let this
executor go. The record discloses sufficient data justifying the order.
MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ vs. OSWALDO Z.

CRUZ
G.R. No. 173292 September 1, 2010
If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative fails
to appear within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order
the opposing party to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased. The reason for this rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the
intervening death, particularly the deceased and his estate.
FACTS: Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a Complaint against
her son, defendant-appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for "Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and
Damages." She claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased) Architect
Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Tabora corner Limay Streets, Bo. Obrero,
Tondo Manila; that the said lot was registered in her name under TCT No. 63467 at the Register
of Deeds of Manila; that sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to the said property
was transferred by appellee and the latter’s wife in their names in August 1991 under TCT No. 0-
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199377 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February 12, 1973; that the said deed was executed
through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void; that she, with the
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help of her husband’s relatives, asked appellee to settle the problem; that despite repeated pleas
and demands, appellee refused to reconvey to her the said property; that she filed a complaint
against appellee before the office of the Barangay having jurisdiction over the subject property;
and that since the matter was unsettled, the barangay issued a certification to file an action in court,
which is now the subject of controversy.
For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff’s reconveyance
action is a personal action which does not survive a party’s death, pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Court, and (2) to allow the case to continue would result in legal absurdity
whereby one heir is representing the defendant and is a co-plaintiff in this case.
On June 2, 1997, the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice to the prosecution thereof in
the proper estate proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether Memoracion Z. Cruz’s Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance
and Damages is a purely personal action which did not survive her death.
RULING: No. The Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages survived
the death of the petitioner.
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects
primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.8
If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death
of the plaintiff or petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato,9 we held that a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property and property rights, and
therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale
of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.
When a party dies during the pendency of a case, Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure necessarily applies, viz:
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30)
days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative
or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary
action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
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The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named
shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.
SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C. SALITICO vs. HEIRS OF

RESURRECCION* MARTINEZ FELIX, NAMELY: LUCIANO, CORAZON AND
CONCEPCION, ALL SURNAMED FELIX, RECAREDO P. HERNANDEZ, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF AMANDA H. BURGOS, AND
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
G.R. No. 240199 April 10, 2019
Under Section 91 of PD 1529, even without an order of final distribution from the testate/intestate
court and in anticipation of a final distribution of a portion or the whole of the property, the
Register of Deeds may be compelled to issue the corresponding certificate of title to the transferee
only when the executor/administrator of the estate submits a certified copy of an order from the
court having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate proceedings directing the
executor/administrator to transfer the property to the transferees.
FACTS: The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages
(Complaint) filed on February 15, 2011 by the petitioners Sps. Salitico against the respondents
Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix; namely: Luciano, Corazon, and Concepcion, all surnamed
Felix (collectively referred to as the respondents heirs); Recaredo P. Hernandez (Recaredo), in his
capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Amanda H. Burgos (Amanda); and the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan.
Amanda is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land registered in her name,
located in Bambang, Bulacan (subject property). By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin
ni Amanda H. Burgos, the subject property was inherited by the niece of Amanda, Resurreccion,
as a devisee. Thereafter, Resurreccion, as the new owner of the subject property, executed a
document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa, which transferred ownership over the parcel of land
in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. The latter then took physical possession of the subject
property.
Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the Huling Habilin was undertaken before the RTC,
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Branch 22 (Probate Court). Respondent Recaredo was appointed as the executor of the Huling
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Habilin. The latter then filed and presented the Huling Habilin before the Probate Court, which
approved it. The Probate Court likewise issued a Certificate of Allowance.
On March 9, 2010, the petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring them to vacate
the subject property and surrender possession over it to the respondent heirs. To protect their
interest over the subject property, the petitioners Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim, which was however denied registration by the respondent RD.
In their Complaint before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the delivery and return in
their favor of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 and the execution of the corresponding
Deed of Absolute Sale by way of confirming the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. They likewise prayed
that OCT P-1908 be cancelled and a new one be issued in their names. Lastly, they also demanded
payment of attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages, and reimbursement for litigation
expenses.
On February 11, 2013, the petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Summary Judgment,
which was, however, denied by the RTC. The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for
Reconsideration, which was partially granted by the RTC. The RTC then issued a partial summary
judgment in favor of Sps. Salitico, ordering the respondent RD to register the petitioners' Affidavit
of Adverse Claim. The Pre-Trial of the case was concluded on September 26, 2013. Thereafter,
trial ensued.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of petitioners Sps. Salitico's Complaint for Specific Performance
due to lack of cause of action was proper.
RULING: Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of the
inheritance are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Article 777 operates at
the very moment of the decedent's death meaning that the transmission by succession occurs at
the precise moment of death and, therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed
to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of declaration
of heirs, or partition, or distribution." Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her
hereditary share immediately after such death. The Court, early on in Teves de Jakosalem v.
Rafols, et al., explained that a sale made by a legal or intestate heir of his share in an inheritance
does not interfere with the administration of the estate.
As applied to the instant case, upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion became the absolute owner
of the devised subject property, subject to a resolutory condition that upon settlement of Amanda's
Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or excessive. Hence, there was no legal bar preventing
Resurreccion from entering into a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps. Salitico with respect to
the former's share or interest over the subject property.
In a contract of sale, the parties' obligations are plain and simple. The law obliges the vendor to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale to the vendee. Therefore,
as a consequence of the valid contract of sale entered into by the parties, Resurreccion had the
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obligation to deliver the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. Resurreccion already sold
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all of her interest over the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. Therefore, the
respondents heirs have absolutely no rhyme nor reason to continue possessing the owner's
duplicate copy of OCT P-1908. Nevertheless, the existence of a valid sale in the instant case does
not necessarily mean that the RD may already be compelled to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a
new title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
According to Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, with respect to the transfer of properties subject of testate or intestate
proceedings, a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee shall be issued by the Register
of Deeds only upon the submission of a certified copy of the partition and distribution, together
with the final judgment or order of the court approving the same or otherwise making final
distribution, supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case
may be.
Further, under Section 91 of PD 1529, even without an order of final distribution from the
testate/intestate court and in anticipation of a final distribution of a portion or the whole of the
property, the Register of Deeds may be compelled to issue the corresponding certificate of title to
the transferee only when the executor/administrator of the estate submits a certified copy of an
order from the court having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate proceedings directing the
executor/administrator to transfer the property to the transferees.
Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, it is only upon the
issuance by the testate or intestate court of the final order of distribution of the estate or the order
in anticipation of the final distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject property may
be issued in the name of the distributees.
In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the pendency of the settlement of the Estate of
Amanda, the Probate Court had issued an order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of
a final distribution, both of which the law deems as requirements before the RD can issue a new
certificate of title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
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ADMINISTRATORS
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005
The probate court may address the issue of filiation especially when the applicant for letters of
administration claims to be the decedent’s next of kin or heir.
FACTS: Petitioner Belen Angeles is the wife of the deceased while the respondent Aleli Maglaya
is the child of the deceased Francisco Angeles in his first wife. Francisco died intestate and the
respondent seeks administration of the estate of the deceased but opposed by the surviving wife
(2nd wife) alleging that the respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased.
Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she
was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed
by him. Respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, records of
marriages of the Civil Registrar where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place
were destroyed.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is illegitimate precluding her to become the administrator of the
deceased Francisco Angeles’s Estate.
RULING: No, respondent is not illegitimate.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.”
The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY

G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of the deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator.
FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died, leaving as heirs her husband Federico and her
grandchildren (3 legitimate and 2 illegitimate). Prior to her death, Cristina and Federico adopted
their 2 illegitimate grandchildren, one of whom was herein petitioner Emilio Suntay III). The
spouses were estranged from their 3 legitimate grandchildren.
Respondent Isabel Suntay (one of the legitimate grandchildren) filed a petition for the issuance of
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letters administration in her favor. Federico opposed on the ground that he should be the one
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appointed, considering that he is the surviving spouse. Thereafter, Federico nominated petitioner
Emilio III to be administrator in his stead.
ISSUE: Whether Emilio III should be appointed administrator.
RULING: Petitioner Emilio III and respondent Isabel Suntay should be co-administrators.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator of an estate. However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of
the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the
least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s,
estate.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of
the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions
be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and villafrla, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA

FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA vs. MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA.
FE RINOZA ALARAS
G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015
GR: When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the
Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court
shall appoint a qualified administrator the order established.
Exceptions:
1. When the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the
estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or partition without submitting the same for
judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by the court (Sec. 1,
Rule 74); and
2. Where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment
of an administrator to administer the estate for him and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled
FACTS: On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including
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his children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as
several properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354
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and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on which it
stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession dated September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they
discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold
the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now
deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent.
When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document
she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort
of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank. The document actually
evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87,352.62 releasing her and her late
husband’s indebtedness therefrom. Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed
respondents that he has no record of any transaction involving the subject properties, giving them
certified true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents went to the subject properties, they
discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. They were not, however,
able to enter as the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement
of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused
the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents
conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of
personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his
testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only
the resort. He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and
Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among others, that respondents’ co-heirs sold the
family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of
Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650,000.00.
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners and
spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well
as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial
Settlement was notarized by a notary public who was not duly commissioned as such on the date
it was executed. The Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left
blank, and the typewritten name “Pedro Riñoza, Husband” on the left side of the document was
not signed. The trial court also observed that both documents were never presented to the Office
of the Register of Deeds for registration and that the titles to the subject properties were still in the
names of Pedro and his second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of the
subject properties were not even presented as witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing and
execution of the documents of conveyance.
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ISSUE: Whether the action is for partition and not for settlement of intestate estate.
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RULING: YES. As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents
in their complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate.
Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with
their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial
representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known
heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5)
that Pedro’s estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the
decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is
clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition.
That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of the
estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to
name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails
to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent’s estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however, is
found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will
and no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary
action for partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies without
pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the
estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately
entitled.
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without
a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate to a special
proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.
OCAMPO vs. OCAMPO

Gr. No. 187879 July 5, 2012
In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator, the following
provisions of rule 78 of the rules of court, state –
Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. – no person is competent to
(a) is a minor;
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(b) is not a resident of the Philippines; and
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(c) is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness,
FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay, Vince, Melinda , and Leonardo, Jr. ( all surnamed Ocampo ) are the
surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo, who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo
and his siblings, respondents Renato Ocampo and Erlinda Ocampo are the legitimate children and
only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate. Vicente and Maxima
left several properties. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts. Five (5) months after the
death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled "In Re:
Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and
Leonardo M. Ocampo. Upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother
Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under such
circumstances, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total
income generated from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo died, respondents
took possession, control and management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The
petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo.
It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the
two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents.
The RTC granted petitioners’ Motion, revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and
Erlinda as joint special administrators. The RTC also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix.
The RTC likewise found that the judicial partition may proceed after Melinda had assumed her
duties and responsibilities as regular administratrix.
The CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition based on the finding that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators
without first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular
administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as
such.
ISSUE: Whether the Court finds the RTC’s designation of Melinda as regular administratrix
improper and abusive of its discretion.
RULING: Yes. In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator, the
following provisions of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, state –
Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. – No person is competent to
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
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(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness,
Xxxx
Further, on the matter of contest for the issuance of letters of administration, the following
provisions of Rule 79 are pertinent –
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of
the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
ELEUTERIO RIVERA vs. RAMIREZ

G.R No. 189697 June 27, 2012
Section 6 of rule 87 gives the administrator the right to the production and examination of specified
documents believe to be in possession of another person which tends to show the decedent’s right
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to real or personal property.
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FACTS: The spouses Adolfo Ramirez (Adolfo) and Rosita Rivera (Rosita) were married in 1942.
Their only child died in infancy. They acquired during their lifetime the Sta. Teresita General
Hospital and other properties. Rosita died and followed by her husband Adolfo. Petitioner
Eleuterio P. Rivera (Eleuterio) filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the
RTC. Covering the estate of Rosita, who allegedly died without a will and with no direct
ascendants or descendants. Eleuterio claimed that he was Rosita’s nephew, being the son of her
brother Federico. Eleuterio submitted to the intestate court a list of the names of the decedent’s
other nephews and nieces all of whom expressed conformity to Eleuterio’s appointment as
administrator of her estate.
RTC issued letters of administration appointing Eleuterio as Rosita’s estate administrator. Four
years later or on May 16, 2002 Eleuterio, as administrator of Rosita’s estate, moved for the revival
of the proceedings and requested anew the production and examination of documents in Robert’s
possession relating to Rosita’s estate.
The RTC apparently never got to act on the motion. Administrator Eleuterio moved for the joint
settlement in the same case of the estates of Rosita and her husband, Adolfo considering that the
spouses’ properties were conjugal. Eleuterio expressed willingness to co-administer the late
spouses’ estate with Adolfo’s heirs, namely, Raymond, Robert, and Lydia Ramirez. Robert agreed
to the joint settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses but insisted that the court also probate
the deceased Adolfo’s will of October 10, 1990 which Robert presented.
Eleuterio, as administrator of Rosita’s estate, reiterated his motion to compel examination and
production of the hospital’s documents in Robert’s possession. On February 12, 2007 the RTC
granted the administrator’s motion and ordered Robert to bring to court the books of account,
financial statements, and other documents relating to the operations of the Sta. Teresita General
Hospital. CA rendered judgment,annulling the RTC’s orders insofar as they granted the production
and examination of the hospital’s documents.
ISSUE: Whether the administrator has the authority to examine and secure evidence from persons
having knowledge of properties allegedly belonging to the decedent’s estate.
RULING: As for the right of the administrator of Rosita’s estate to the production and
examination of the specified documents believed to be in Robert’s possession, Section 6, Rule 87
of the Rules of Court provides that these can be allowed based on the administrator’s belief that
the person named in the request for subpoena has documents in his possession that tend to show
the decedent’s right to real or personal property. Thus:
Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. – If an
executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or other individual interested in the estate of the
deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of
having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods or chattels of the
deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance,
bond, contract or other writing which contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right, title,
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interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or the last will and testament of the
deceased, the Court may cite such suspected person to appear before it and may examine him on
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oath on the matter of such complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on
such examination or such interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for contempt,
and may commit him to prison until he submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put to
any such person, and his answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be filed in the clerk’s office.
The production and examination is nothing to be afraid of since the intestate court has no authority
to decide who the decedent’s heirs are in connection with such incident which is confined to the
examination of documents which may aid the administrator in determining properties believed to
belong to the decedent’s estate. What is more, that court has no authority to decide the question of
whether certain properties belong to the estate or to the person sought to be examined.
In fact, if after the examination the court has good reason to believe that the person examined is in
possession of properties that belong to the deceased, the administrator cannot detain the property.
He has to file an ordinary action for recovery of the properties. The purpose of the production and
examination of documents is to elicit information or secure evidence from persons suspected of
having possession of, or knowledge of properties suspected of belonging to the estate of the
deceased. The procedure is inquisitorial in nature, designed as an economical and efficient mode
of discovering properties of the estate.
TEODORA A RIOFERIO, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Gr No. 129008 January 13, 2004
While permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the
deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate
have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs
cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of
the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent
are violated or dissipated.
FACTS: Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. Died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and
real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. He also left a widow,
respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married and with whom he had seven children who
are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P.
Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P.
Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their
children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into
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an extra-marital relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza
sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.
Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that petitioner Teodora Rioferio and
her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim
involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City. Respondent Alfonso
"Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of Administration.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment
of an administrator.
RULING: Yes. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have
legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the
provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle
that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total
lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and
Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,this Court
recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent
under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits
on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules
are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate
have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs
cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of
the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent
are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if
the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the administrator
is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party defendant. Evidently,
the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling
when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator
but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property
of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third
being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
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MELINDA J. MARCELO REVILLA, AND JOHN STEVEN J. MARCELO vs. JOSE T.
MARCELO, JR.,
G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014
FACTS: On 24 August 1987, decedent Jose, Sr., died intestate. He was survived by his four
compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr. Initially,
petitioner Marcelo Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition for the
Issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate of Jose Sr. before RTC. Pending issuance of
letters of administration, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose, Jr. as special administrators.
However, Edward was the one appointed as regular administrator.
A project of partition was su7bmitted, Edward manifested that oppositor Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. had
already expressed his conformity to the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P.
Marcelo, Sr. as of July 26, 2000, as evidenced by his signature therein. He therefore prays that the
said document which bears the conformity of all (4) compulsory heirs of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. be
approved. RTC approved the proposed partition. However, the distribution was deferred pending
submission of proof of payment of estate taxes. At this stage, Edward died. Wasting no time, Jose
Jr. moved to revive the intestate proceedings involving his father’s estate. S.P> Proc. No. Q-88-
1448, and moved for his appointment as new regular administrator thereof, which was approved
by the RTC. Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and now moved for the
appointment instead of George as administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of regular administrator is still necessary at this liquidation,
RULING: Yes. The settlement of Jose Sr.’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit it is at
the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides for the
Distribution and Partition pf the Estate. The rule provides pertinent part: SECTION 1. When order
for distribution of residue made.-XXX No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributes, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs. The inheritance tax is an obligation of the estate, indirectly
the heirs.
ATTY. RICARDO B. BERMUDO -versus- FERMINA TAYAG-ROXAS

G.R. No. 172879 February 02, 2011, Abad, J.
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187
Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney's fees.
FACTS: Atty. Ricardo Bermudo, as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator
of the estate of Artemio Hilario (Hilario) and for the allowance and probate of the latter's will.
The testator instituted Fermina Tayag-Roxas (Roxas) as his only heir but several persons, who
claimed to be Hilario's relatives, opposed the petition. The RTC rendered a decision, allowing
the will and recognizing Roxas as Hilario's sole heir. When the decision constituting Roxas as the
sole heir became final, Atty. Bermudo who also served as counsel for her in the actions concerning
her inheritance filed a motion to fix his legal fees and to constitute a charging lien against the estate
for the legal services he rendered. RTC granted him fees equivalent to 20% of the estate and
constituted the same as lien on the estate's property. Roxas appealed the order to the CA.The CA
rendered a decision that modified the RTC Order, limiting Atty. Bermudo's compensation as
administrator to what Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court provides and making his lawyer's
fees 20% of the value of the land belonging to the estate. Atty. Bermudo subsequently filed a
motion with the RTC for execution and appraisal of the estate on which his 20% compensation
would be based. RTC granted the motion and ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo P12,
644,300.00 as attorney's fees with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Roxas challenged the order
before the CA through a petition for certiorari.On December 19, 2005, using a different valuation
of the land of the estate, the CA ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo a reduced amount of P4,
234,770.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6% per annum. Atty. Bermudo's motion for
reconsideration having been denied, he filed a petition for review before this Court in G.R. 172879.
Roxas also filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the CA decision and when this was denied,
she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. 173364.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect
attorney’s fees.
RULING: Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorney's fees but only to
compensation as administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.But
Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney's fees.Besides, Atty. Bermudo's right to
attorney's fees had been settled with finality in CA-G.R. CV 53143. This Court can no longer
entertain Roxas' lament that he is not entitled to those fees.
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188
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED
JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE
DE LA ROSA AND OTHER HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.
FACTS: On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of
Administration of the estate of deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia (died 1972
and 1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed by Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo,
claiming that they should be the beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then allowed Guillerma
Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed
the status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she should be the sole heir of the
estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the spouses were living together without
marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in this case. The
RTC appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the estates of the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the estate noting that Josefa
and Guillermo did not contract marriage.
RULING: The Court held, through the testimonies of the witnesses, that marriage between Josefa
and Guillermo never occurred. Although it is presumed that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, such testimonies
shall prevail. Since, no marriage had occurred between the two, the estate must be settled in
different proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa cannot be appointed as the sole administrator of the
estate of the deceased.
Further, the Supreme Court ruled that in the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does
not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 147561 June 22, 2006
FACTS: Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (Asahi) entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos,
Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a drainage
system in Asahi’s compound in Pasig City. Asahi was to pay JDS P5,300,000.00 for the
construction, which was supposed to be completed by JDS within 240 days. To guarantee the
faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings, JDS shall post a performance bond of
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P795,000. JDS executed solidarily with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (Stronghold) the
Performance Bond. During the construction, Asahi called the attention of JDS to the alarmingly
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slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished
within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded by JDS. Dissatisfied
with the progress of the work undertaken by JDS, Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract.
Because of the rescission, Asahi had to hire another contractor to finish the project, incurring an
additional P3,256,874.00. Asahi then sent a letter to SICI filing its claim under the performance
bond, but the letter went unheeded. Asahi eventually filed a complaint against JDS and Stronghold
for damages. However, Jose D. Santos, Jr. had already died and JDS Construction was no longer
at its registered address, with its whereabouts unknown. In its defense, On July 10, 1991,
Stronghold maintains that Asahi’s money claims against it and JDS have been extinguished by the
death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of Santos can be a defense of Stronghold. Otherwise stated,
Whether or not Stronghold’s liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished
by the death of Santos, the principal.
RULING: No. As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish
the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented
by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are
personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. In the present
case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with respondent
were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death
did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to
his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under
the performance bond. Consequently, Stronghold as surety cannot use his death to escape its
monetary obligation under its performance bond.
NILDA GABRIEL vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON

G.R. NO. 101512 AUGUST 7, 1992
FACTS: 9 months after Domingo Gabriel died, his son Roberto Gabriel filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for letters of administration. The court directed the publication of the order in
the newspaper "Mabuhay," once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. No opposition having been filed,
Roberto was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order
appointing Roberto as administrator. Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims
against the estate was published in the "Metropolitan News."
Aida Valencia, mother of Roberto, filed a claim alleging that the decision in a civil case between
her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said estate. The
oppositors herein, including the widow of the deceased, filed an opposition claiming that (I) they
were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for administration; (2) Nilda Gabriel, as
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the legitimate daughter, should be preferred over Roberto Gabriel; (3) Roberto Gabriel has a
conflicting and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his
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mother and (4) most of the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by way of
transfer of ownership to the oppositors herein and should not be included in the value of the estate
sought to be administered by private respondent.
The probate court denied the opposition since no proof was adduced to show that Roberto Gabriel
is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust.
The oppositors filed a certiorari before the CA claiming that the order of preference stated in the
Rules of Court provides that the surviving spouse, who in this case is Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, is first
in the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator
Also, as between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence Nilda
Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over Roberto Gabriel, who is an illegitimate
son
Roberto Gabriel contends that the preference in the Rules of Court may be disregarded by the court
where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for 30 days after the decedent's
death. In this case, the oppositors failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed administratrix by
reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of
her husband?
RULING: NO. In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas
Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the
order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause despite the mandatory
tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise
waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said
letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors."
On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as
administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator
Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would
entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides
the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.
WILSON S. UY vs, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 167979 March 15, 2006
FACTS: Jose K.C. Uy died intestate on and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok Ing Uy, and his five
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children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia, Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy
(Petitioner). A special proceeding was instituted and Lilia was appointed as special administrator
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of the estate of the deceased. Petitioner moved to reconsider the order appointing Lilia with prayer
that letters of administration be issued to him instead which was subsequently granted. Letters of
Administration were granted to petitioner. Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a motion
to intervene, praying that he be appointed as administrator of the estate in lieu of petitioner. He
alleged that he is the brother and a creditor of the deceased, and has knowledge of the properties
that should be included in the estate.
However, petitioner asserts that his appointment as a regular administrator is already final,
unassailable or res judicata; that the inferior court has no authority to re-open the issue of the
appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator; and that private
respondent is not only alien to the estate, but has a conflict of interest with it.
The trial court initially denied private respondent's motion to intervene, but it reconsidered it and
appointed private respondent as co-administrator of the estate. The trial court found that private
respondent substantially complied with the order directing him to bring into the estate properties
owned by or registered in the name of the deceased not subject of any adverse claim or controversy
when he listed the alleged properties suspected to be concealed, embezzled or conveyed away by
the persons named therein. Thus, it found no cogent reason to remove private respondent as co-
administrator
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of private respondent as co-administrator to the estate of
the deceased is proper.
RULING: Yes, his appointment as co-administrator is proper.
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances. It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason
disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the
deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may
appoint another person. The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of administrator
and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the
court below was in error.
Moreover, the practice of appointing co-administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited.
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been
upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times
to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties
or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is
large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons
satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5)
when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.
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192
EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743;
RODOLFO SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
FACTS: Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo) was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis (Felicidad), then surnamed
Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death.
Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions
to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration and held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It
also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
RULING: Yes, Felicidad has the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status that as a surviving wife of Felicisimo or his co-owner
under the Art. 144 of the Civil code.
Felicidad would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo
by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves
the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between
parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts
and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
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193
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Thus, even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry the respondent, the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as he may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
TERESITA DE LEON, ET. AL. vs COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.

Gr No. 128781 Aug. 06, 2002, J. Austria-Martinez
FACTS: Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael C.
Nicolas. Deceased spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner Teresita N. de
Leon, Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas (deceased husband of petitioner Zenaida Nicolas
and predecessor of the petitioners Heirs of Antonio Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas and Roberto Nicolas.
On September 19, 1994, private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, an oppositor–applicant in the
intestate proceedings, filed a “Motion for Collation,” claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas,
during his lifetime, had given real properties to his children by gratuitous title and that
administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent.
On September 27, 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing Ramon “to submit pertinent documents
relative to the transfer of the properties from the registered owners during their lifetime for proper
determination of the court if such properties should be collated and set it for hearing with notice
to the present registered owners to show cause why their properties may not be included in the
collation of properties.”
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order, to wit: “Acting on the Amended Motion for
Collation filed by oppositor-applicant Ramon G. Nicolas and the comment thereto filed by
petitioner-administratrix, the Court finds the following properties to be collated to the estate
properties under present administration, to wit: “Accordingly, the Administratrix is hereby ordered
to include the foregoing properties which were received from the decedent for collation in the
instant probate proceedings.
On November 18, 1994, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging
that the properties subject of the Order “were already titled in their names years ago”8 and that
titles may not be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. On February 23, 1995, the RTC
issued an Order denying said motion, ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to
determine whether titled properties should be collated. Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated February 23, 199510 which respondent opposed.11
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On November 4, 1996, the RTC removed petitioner from her position as administratrix on ground
of conflict of interest considering her claim that she paid valuable consideration for the subject
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properties acquired by her from their deceased father and therefore the same should not be included
in the collation;13 and, ordered the hearing on the collation of properties covered by TCT No. T-
V1211 and T-V-1210 only.
On November 28, 1996, acting on the impression that the collation of the real properties
enumerated in the Order dated November 11, 1994 is maintained by the RTC, petitioner Teresita
N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that her appointment as administratrix be
maintained; and that the properties be declared and decreed as the exclusive properties of the
registered owners mentioned therein and not subject to collation. The RTC denied said motion in
its Order dated December 23, 1996.
Petitioners Teresita N. de Leon, Zenaida Nicolas (the surviving spouse of Antonio Nicolas) and
the Heirs of Antonio Nicolas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
claiming that: After private respondent Ramon had filed his comment, and petitioners, their reply,
and after hearing the oral arguments of the parties, the Special Fourth Division of the Court of
Appeals found the petition devoid of merit, ruling that the Order dated November 11, 1994
directing the inclusion of the properties therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased Rafael
Nicolas had already become final for failure of petitioners to appeal from the order of collation;
that the appeal of the petitioner from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 3, 1996
removing petitioner as administratrix is timely appealed; and, observing that the notice of appeal
and record on appeal appear to be unacted upon by the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court can pass upon the question of title.
RULING: The SC found the petition partly meritorious. Contrary to the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the Order of November 11, 1994 had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal
therefrom in due time, we hold that said Order is interlocutory in nature.
Our pronouncement in Garcia v. Garcia supports this ruling: “The court which acquires jurisdiction
over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has
supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to
see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties,
rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance
with this duty the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of
the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person
interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention to the fact that
certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s
duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to
or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such
determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties.”
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally. The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party are expounded
in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals: “The patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and
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the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
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inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. “All that the said court could do
as regards said properties are determined whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the
ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for
a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.”
Guided by the above jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals committed an error in considering the
assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 as final or binding upon the heirs or third persons who
dispute the inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Nicolas.
Under the foregoing rulings of the Court, any aggrieved party, or a third person for that matter,
may bring an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims. What seems to be
a conflict between the above-quoted Rule and the afore–discussed jurisprudence that the Order in
question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more apparent than real. This is because the
questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an order of collation both by the RTC and the
appellate court.
For all intents and purposes, said Order is a mere order including the subject properties in the
inventory of the estate of the decedent. The Court held in Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals26 that the order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in
the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is
that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may
be instituted by the parties.
In the Rodriguez case, the Court distinguished between an order of collation and an order of
exclusion from or inclusion in the estate’s inventory, thus: “In this appeal, it is not proper to pass
upon the question of collation and to decide whether Mrs. Rustia’s titles to the disputed lots are
questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the stage of partition and distribution when
the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be determined.” Based thereon, we find that what
the parties and the lower courts have perceived to be as an Order of Collation is nothing more than
an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate which, as we have already discussed, is an
interlocutory order. The motion for collation was filed with the probate court at the early stage of
the intestate estate proceedings. We have examined the records of the case and we found no
indication that the debts of the decedent’s spouses have been paid and the net remainder of the
conjugal estate has already been determined, and the estates of the deceased spouses at the time
filing of the motion for collation were ready for partition and distribution. In other words, the issue
on collation is still premature. And even if we consider, en arguendo, that said assailed Order is a
collation order and a final order, still, the same would have no force and effect upon the parties. It
is a hornbook doctrine that a final order is appealable. As such, the Order should have expressed
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the laws on which it is based as mandated by Section
14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
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ERLINDA PILAPIL, ET. AL. v. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO BRIONES
Gr No. 150175 March 10, 2006, J. Chico-Nazario
FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata). Respondents, on the
other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino). Maximino was married to
Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata
instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband's estate with the Cebu City Court of First
Instance (CFI). On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the
administratrix of Maximino's estate. She submitted an Inventory of Maximino's properties. The
CFI awarded ownership of the questioned real properties to Donata. On 27 June 1960, Donata had
the said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, and by virtue
thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata's nieces, instituted with the RTC a
petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio,
were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata's intestate estate. On 21 January 1985,
Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. The
RTC also issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect rentals from
Maximino's properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order,
dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the said properties were already under his and his wife's
administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio's Letters of Administration for the
intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of
Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property. They alleged that
Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in
breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name
the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. In their Answer to the Complaint,
the heirs of Donata raised, as affirmative and special defenses, among others, that even granting
arguendo that plaintiffs have the right to question the transfer to the name of the late Donata Ortiz
Briones the titles of the said lots any action of that effect has prescribed for more than 30 years
have already occurred when the titles to said lots were transferred to the name of the late Donata
Ortiz Briones.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs of Maximino may still assail the intestate proceedings.
RULING: No. If the SC is to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene,
still they would be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but
as the distribution of the estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938,
probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested,
through the publication of the notice prescribed by sec. 630 C. P. C.; and any order that may be
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entered therein is binding against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156)
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"A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the
estate in the distributes." (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895)
There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines should not apply to intestate
proceedings. The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the
better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the
reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be,
as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and
executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to
be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including
the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. There
being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same
should have been dismissed.
BONIFACIA VANCIL v. HELEN BELMES

Gr No. 132223 June 19, 2001, J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
FACTS: Petitioner Bonifacia Vancil is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the
United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime,
Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G.
Belmes. Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City a guardianship proceeding over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and
Vincent. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year-old child. It is
claimed in the petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate
consisting of proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits with a probable value of
P100,000.00. On July 15, 1987, Petitioner was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the
persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.
On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to
the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for
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guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
City. Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the
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Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in
actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag,
Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an
improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140
Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes motion to
remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered
petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the
posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a reconsideration was likewise
dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988.
ISSUE: Whether a non-resident can be appointed as an administrator or guardian.
RULING: No. The Court agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being
the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian.
This ruling find support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides: Art. 211. The father
and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary. xxx. Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held: Of considerable importance is the rule long
accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the
natural rights incidents to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right
is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts but derives from the
nature of the parental relationship. Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of
Vincent. Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 214. In case of death,
absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. xxx.
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled: The law vests on the father and mother joint
parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parent’s
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority
only in case of death, absence, or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very
much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove,
in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however,
has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of
Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie
considering that her (respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being
now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding. Even assuming that
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respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute
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guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously,
she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact,
in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate,
like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify
as a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondent’s allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the Philippines
since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old age and her conviction of
libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-16884 filed by
one Danilo Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this
country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years is not certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not
within the jurisdiction of our courts for, they will find it difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero
vs. Teran, this Court held: Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the
theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this
question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons,
wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding
that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons
as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts
here.
TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA MANUEL Vda. DE BIASCAN v. ROSALINA C.

BIASCAN
Gr No. 138731 December 11, 2000, J. Gonzaga-Reyes
FACTS: On August 13, 1975, Rosalina was appointed regular administratrix of the intestate estate
of Florencio Biascan (and Timotea Zulueta).
Maria Vda de Biascan files a motion to intervene, a motion to set aside the appointment of Rosalina
as regular administratrix and a motion to have herself appointed as administratrix of Florencio's
estate.
The CFI Manila under Judge Serafin Cuevas issued an Order resolving that:
a. Maria is the lawful wife of Florencio
b. Rosalina and her brother German are the acknowledged natural children of
Florencio
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c. All 3 are the legal heirs of Florencio and are entitled to participate in the settlement
proceedings
d. Motion to set aside the Order appointing Rosalina administratrix of Florencio's
estate IS DENIED
e. Motion to approve inventory and appraisal of Rosalina is deferred
On June 6, 1981: Maria files her motion for reconsideration (MR), which Rosalina opposed. (58
days after receipt of Order)
On November 15, 1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was completely gutted by fire.
The records of the settlement proceedings were among those lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2,
1985, private respondent filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the said records.
Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it was only on April 30,
1985 that the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 issued an Order denying Maria’s June 6,
1981 Motion for Reconsideration.
Sometime thereafter, Maria died and her testate estate also became the subject of settlement
proceedings. Atty. Marcial F. Lopez was appointed as interim special administrator and engaged
the services of the Siguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices on Behalf of the estate.
On August 21, 1996, the law firm was allegedly made aware of and given notice of the April 30,
1985 Order when its associate visited Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to inquire
about the status of the case. The associate checked the records if there was proof of service of the
April 30, 1985 Order to the former counsel of Maria, Atty. Marcial F. Lopez, but he discovered
that there was none. He was able to secure a certification from the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 which stated that there was no proof of service of the Order dated
April 30, 1985 contained in the records of SP. Proc. No. 98037.
A Notice of Appeal dated April 22, 1996 was filed by petitioner from the Orders dated April 2,
1981 and April 30, 1985 of the trial court. While the said notice of appeal was dated April 22,
1996, the stamp of the trial court on the first page of the notice clearly indicated that the same was
received by the trial court on September 20, 1996. A Record of Appeal dated September 20, 1996
was likewise filed by petitioner.
On October 22, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioner’s appeal on the ground that
the appeal was filed out of time. The trial court ruled that the April 2, 1981 Order which was the
subject of the appeal already became final as the Motion for Reconsideration thereof was filed
sixty-five (65) days after petitioner received the same. In addition, the court ruled that the notice
of appeal itself was filed manifestly late as the same was filed more than 11 years after the issuance
of the June 11, 1985 Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 13, 1996 of petitioner was likewise denied by the trial court in
an Order dated February 12, 1997.
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201
Not satisfied with this decision, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Mandatory
Injunction with the Court of Appeals questioning the October 12, 1996 and February 12, 1997
Orders of the Regional Trial Court.
The First Division of the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari of petitioner.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate court.
ISSUES:
A. Based on subject matter, whether or not the Order issued in Apr 1981 is subject to appeal?
B. Whether or not the appeal was perfected on time?
RULING:
A. Yes. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the orders and judgments in special
proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal. Thus:
"Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested person may
appeal in a special proceeding from an order or judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court or a
Juvenile and domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
a) Allows or disallows a will;
b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive shares of
the estate to which such person is entitled;
c) Allows, or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and
f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of
the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for new trial
or for reconsideration."
An appeal is allowed in these aforesaid cases as these orders, decrees or judgments issued by a
court in a special proceeding constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties so
appealing. In contrast, interlocutory orders are not appealable as these are merely incidental to
judicial proceedings. In these cases, the court issuing such orders retains control over the same and
may thus modify, rescind, or revoke the same on sufficient grounds at any time before the final
judgment.
In the instant case, the Order dated April 2, 1981 of the trial court decreed, among others, that
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Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the lawful wife of the deceased Florencio Biascan, private
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respondent Rosalina Biascan and her brother, German Biascan, are entitled to participate in the
settlement proceedings. Moreover, the said Order likewise denied Maria’s motion to set aside the
order appointing private respondent as regular administratrix of the estate. These rulings of the
trial court were precisely questioned by Maria in her Motion for Reconsideration dated June 6,
1981.
The ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent Rosalina Biascan and German Biascan
were entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings falls squarely under paragraph (b),
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court as a proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the trial court
has effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the
same may be the proper subject of an appeal.
Similarly, the ruling of the trial court denying petitioner’s motion to set aside the order appointing
private respondent as the regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Bisacan is likewise a
proper subject of an appeal. We have previously held that an order of the trial court appointing a
regular administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final determination of the rights of the
parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable. This is in contrast with an order appointing a special
administrator who is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the
temporary character and special character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not advisable for
any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. Considering however that private respondent
has aleready been appointed as regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan, her
appointment as such may be questioned before the appellate court by way of appeal. The
appointment of a special administrator for a limited time or specific purpose should not be appealed
because of its temporary and special character.
It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper subject of an appeal in a special
proceeding. In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the
period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty (30) days, a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal being required. The appeal period may only be interrupted by the
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal
or a motion for reconsideration or new trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final.
B. No. It is well-settled that judgment or orders become final and executory by operation of law
and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or motion for reconsideration or new trial
is filed. The trial court need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final
by operation of law. In fact, the trial court could not even validly entertain a motion for
reconsideration filed after the lapse of the period for taking an appeal. As such, it is of no moment
that the opposing party failed to object to the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration or that
the court denied the same on grounds other than timeliness considering that at the time the motion
was filed, the Order dated April 2, 1981 had already become final and executory. Being final and
executory, the trial court can no longer alter, modify, or reverse the questioned order. The
subsequent filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the judgment or
order.
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203
Even if we assume that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner had the effect of
suspending the running of the appeal period for the April 2, 1981 Order, it is clear that petitioner’s
notice of appeal of the orders of the trial court was still filed out of time.
Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court then applicable, the time during which a motion to
set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial shall be deducted from the period from which to
make an appeal. The rule further states that where the motion was filed during office hours of the
last day of the appeal period, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which
the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.
The Order of the trial court denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the April 2, 1981
Order was issued on April 30, 1985. Allegedly, petitioner was only made aware of this April 30,
1985 Order on August 21, 1996 when it inquired from the trial court about the status of the case.
Giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt that it had indeed received notice of the order denying
its motion for reconsideration on August 21, 1996, it follows that petitioner only had until the
following day or on August 22, 1996 within which to perfect the appeal.
At this point, we note with disapproval petitioner’s attempt to pass off its Notice of Appeal as
having been filed on August 22, 1996. In all its pleadings before this Court and the Court of
Appeals, petitioner insists that its Notice of Appeal was filed the day after it secured the August
21, 1996 Certification from the trial court. While the Notice of Appeal was ostensibly dated August
22, 1996, it is clear from the stamp of the trial court that the same was received only on September
20, 1996. Moreover, in the Order dated October 22, 1996 of the trial court denying petitioner’s
appeal, the court clearly stated that the Notice of Appeal with accompanying Record on Appeal
was filed on September 20, 1996.
Considering that it is clear from the records that petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed on
September 20, 1996, the same was clearly filed out of time as it only had until August 22, 1996
within which to file the said pleading. And while the rules on special proceedings recognize that a
motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal and record of appeal may be granted.
LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and VITTORIO C. ROMERO
G.R. No. 188921 April 18, 2012
FACTS: Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death on 18 October 1974, their mother,
respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real and personal
properties in trust for her children. Since that year until the present, she continues to be the
administrator of the properties, businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her late
husband.
Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio – through fraud,
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misrepresentation and duress – succeeded in registering the properties in his name through of
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Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora. Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat upon
her, and even administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus, Aurora signed the
Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their contents.
On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title,
and Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio
C. Romero.
The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, citing Section 3, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
which bars an heir or a devisee from maintaining an action to recover the title or possession of
lands until such lands have actually been assigned.
Petitioners next contend that even if the probate court has the power to rule on their Complaint,
the submission of the issues in this case to the probate court is merely optional, and not mandatory
upon them. Hence, they argue, they still have the right to bring these issues in a separate civil
action, if they so choose. They argue further that Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court
is not applicable to the present case.
The said provision states that:
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. – When an executor or administrator is appointed
and assumes the trust, no action to recover the title or possession of lands or for damages done to
such lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court
assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain exceptions. They invoke the doctrine
that while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the recovery of property of the estate
represented by an administrator, these heirs may maintain such action if the administrator is
unwilling to bring the suit, or has allegedly participated in the act complained of.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners in this case may file a separate civil action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of title, despite the pendency of the settlement proceedings for the estate of the late
Judge Dante Y. Romero.
RULING: NO.
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of
title should be ventilated in a separate action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested
parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
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205
On the second contention, petitioners’ theory must again fail. There is nothing on the record that
would prove that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or entered into sale agreements in
violation of her trust. In fact, petitioners are really accusing a co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of
having acquired certain properties which they allege to be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate, Aurora Romero’s acts
as the administrator of the estate are subject to the sole jurisdiction of the probate court.
In fact, the Court has already made a pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate
court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action.
THELMA M. ARANAS vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,

CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO
G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
Teresita V. Mercado, and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado,
Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two
children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M.
Aranas.
The deceased inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He also owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation. He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in
Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty.
In June 1991, petitioner filed with RTC Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as
the administrator of Emigdio’s estate, which the RTC granted. Teresita submitted an inventory of
the estate indicating that the at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only
personal properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25 in all. Claiming that Emigdio had owned other
properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to
amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it, which was granted by the RTC.
In an order by the RTC, the court found that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
properties that should be included. Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the
reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties
affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that
the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and
registered in the name of Mervir Realty. RTC denied. Upon appeal, CA partly granted Teresita’s
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petition disposing that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order
of the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory.
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ISSUE: Whether the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the
inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged
for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime.
RULING: NO.
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of
their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its
determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as
the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at
the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the
person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC
becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of
the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit
the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule
83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months
after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance
tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties
of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come
into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1
allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong
to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the
decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor
or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should
be included in the inventory.
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IONA LERIOU, ELEPTHERIOS L. LONGA, AND STEPHEN L. LONGA v. YOHANNA
FRENESI S. LONGA (MINOR) AND VICTORIA PONCIANA S. LONGA (MINOR),
REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER MARY JANE B. STA. CRUZ
G.R. No. 203923 October 08, 2018
FACTS: Respondent minors Yohanna and Victoria Longa, represented by their mother, Mary Jane
B. Sta. Cruz, instituted a special proceeding entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Enrique T. Long Petition for Letters of Administration,” with the RTC of Muntinlupa City.
Respondents alleged that Enrique died intestate, survived by petitioner Eleptherios and Stephen
and respondents Yohanna and Victoria, his legitimate and illegitimate children, respectively; and
that Enrique left several properties with no creditors.
Acting Presiding Judge Villanueva issued an Order appointing Sta. Cruz as the administratix of
Enrique’s estate. The RTC issued the Letters of Administrator.
Petitioners then filed an Omnibus Motion to remove Jane Sta. Ana as Administratix and appoint
Eleptherios L. Longa or His Nominee as Administrator. Petitioners alleged that they were denied
due process of law because they did not receive any notice about the respondents’ Petition for
Letters of Administration.
Petitioners accuse respondent-administratix of: 1) neglect for failing to abide by the order of the
RTC for her to coordinate with the DFA for the proper service of Petition and Order dated July 4,
20117 to petitioners; and 2) two acts of misrepresentation for not disclosing all the assets of the
decedent and for pretending to be a pauper litigant.
Respondent-Administratix filed her Opposition to the Omnibus Motion alleging that she mailed
the Petition for Letters of Administration and the RTC Order to petitioners in the addresses that
the latter gave her, and that she coordinated with the DFA for the service of the said Petition to
petitioners as evidenced by the RTC Order bearing the stamp “RECEIVED” by the DFA Records
Division. Respondent-administratix also exchanged correspondences with petitioners and their
counsels about her decision to let the court settle Enrique’s estate as shown by her letter addressed
to petitioner’s counsels, and her electronic mails (e-mails) with petitioner Eleptherios. The RTC
issued Order denying petitioners’ Omnibus Motion. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the trial court denied in Order. The Appelate Court affirmed the RTC’s order and
subsequently denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether personal notice of the Petition for Letters of Administration to the petitioners is
jurisdictional requirement.
RULING: No. Contrary to petitioners’ argument that personal notice under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 is a
jurisdictional requirement, the Court in Alaban v. Court of Appeals, explained that it is just a matter
of personal convenience. Moreover, it should be emphasized that a testate or intestate settlement
of a deceased’s estate is a proceeding in rem, such that the publication under Section 3 of the same
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Rule, vests the court with jurisdiction over all persons who are interested therein. In the instant
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case, the Order dated July 4, 2007 was published for the consecutive weeks in Balita, a newspaper
of general circulation, on the following dates: July 27, 20078, August 3, 2007, and August 10,
2007. By such publication which constitutes notice to the whole world, petitioners are deemed
notified about the intestate proceedings of their father’s estate.
As elucidated in Alaban v. Court of Appeals, Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of
any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in
the world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S.

MEDINA-ADMINISTRATRIX
G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent
is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the
filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having
money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions. Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for
creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the
properties of the estate.
FACTS: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and issued an order
for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. Petitioner Alan Sheker filed a
contingent claim for agent's commission due him in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred
in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties. The respondent executrix of the Estate of Alice
O. Sheker moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1)
the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been
paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against nonforum shopping; and (3) petitioner
failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
The RTC dismissed the claim.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment
of docket fees upon filing of the claim? (YES)
RULING: It must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
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supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct. “Sec. 2. Applicability of rules
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of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings”. Stated differently, special
provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions
shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable. The word practicable is defined as
possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished. This
means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special
proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings.
Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are
inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written
explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims
against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to
special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person. The word
"practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done
or accomplished. This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions
may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an
obstacle to said proceedings.
Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are
inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written
explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims
against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to
special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's
contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a
certification against non-forum shopping? The Court rules in the affirmative. The certification of
non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred
in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading.
In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for
allowance of the decedent's will.
Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify
the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be
barred, subject to certain exceptions.5 Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more
akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper
disposition of the properties of the estate. A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main
action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the
claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein
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petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a
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certification against non-forum shopping. The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed
the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in
the interest of substantial justicete of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution
of her own cause of action.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ AND FLORENCE

SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements
or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. Included in the will of the decedent
are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among
the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the
said tractors. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: … This requirement is for
the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of
the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims
against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off
its debts and distribute the residue. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate
court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory
notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against
the petitioner.
FACTS: May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was intended
for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel
Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the
FCCC, the principal sum DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 47 payable
in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st
thereafter up to May 31, 1985. On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another
loan agreement, this time in the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the
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purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with
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accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such
promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan dated December
13, 1980. Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in
March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. On April 9, 1981,
Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his
sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2)
tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness
of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. On August
20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between
FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others,
assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Demand letters for the
settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund,
but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner
filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence,
before the RTC of Makati City. Summons were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his
address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down
to respondent Florence S. Ariola. On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her
Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by
the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint
agreement.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid. (NO)
2. Whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid. (NO)
RULING:
1. At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that
there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated: In testate
succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated.
The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated
and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will
may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as
touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities
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which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. This, of course, presupposes that the properties
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to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. In the present case, the deceased,
Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic will which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads
as follows: (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after
my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children. We agree with the appellate court that the above-
quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which
might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may
acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition
involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund
and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time
of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s
holographic will covering the said tractors. It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had
already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors.
To dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it
with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to
be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint
agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar,
court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that
part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the
identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in
the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the
will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the
decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves
the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors
who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
2. The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs
as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the
abovedescribed chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The assumption of
liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the
validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect
did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given
any force and effect. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with
the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides: Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions.
— All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
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the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in
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the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in
any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor
or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the
deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent,
instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may
be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the
defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as
though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings.
Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value. The filing of a money
claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage
case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: … This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate
of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling
him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and
the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires
the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle
the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. Perusing
the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
GARCIA-QUIAZON et al., v. BELEN

GR. No. 189121 JULY 31, 2013
FACTS: A petition for letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon, filed herein
respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter, was opposed by the petitioners
Amelia to whom Eliseo was married, who was joined by her children Jenneth and Jennifer; Eliseo
died intestate on December 12, 1992. Elise, represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City which was claimed by Amelia,
together with her children… that the venue of the petition was improperly laid and opposed the
issuance of the Letters of Administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The RTC
ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City which was also affirmed by
the CA.
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ISSUE: Whether Quiazon was a resident of Las Piñas and therefore, the petition for Letter of
Administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las Piñas City.
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RULING: No, because under Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for Letters of
administration of the Estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death.
“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its poplar sense, the personal, actual residence or
place of abode and signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay. Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As defined, Residence
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he or she resides
therein with continuity and consistency.
The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City because it is evident from the
records during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at Pillar Village, Las Piñas City; and for his reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
BUOT v. DUJALI
Gr No. 199885 October 2, 2017
FACTS: Buot filed before the RTC a petition for letters of administration of the estate of deceased
Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). Buot alleged that she was a surviving heir of Gregorio who died
intestate. She also claimed that since Gregorio’s death, there had been no effort to settle his estate.
And that Dujali purportedly continued to manage and control the properties to the exclusion of all
the other heirs. Buot further alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her request to settle
the estate. Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio’s estate;
(2) a final inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate
be ordered distributed in accordance with law among the legal heirs.
Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss. According to Dujali, when an estate has no
debts, recourse to administration proceedings is allowed only when there are good and compelling
reasons. Where an action for partition (whether in or out of court) is possible, the estate should not
be burdened with an administration proceeding.
Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for administration if they do
not, for good reason, wish to pursue an ordinary action for partition. In her case, she claims that
there are good reasons justifying her recourse to administration proceedings: (1) the Amended
Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to partition the
property; (3) Dujali seeks to challenge Buot’ s status as an heir; (4) other heirs have been deprived
of the properties of the estate; and (5) other heirs, particularly Constancia Dujali and Marilou
Dujali, have already manifested that they are amenable to the appointment of an administrator.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for letters of administration filed by Buot be granted.
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RULING: No, The Supreme Court held that the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant
of her petition for letters of administration do not suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio’s
estate to administration proceedings.
Buot’s allegation that the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover Gregorio’s entire estate
is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of the estate. Whether the
extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial settlement
that does not cover the entire estate may be considered valid do not automatically create a
compelling reason to order the administration of the estate
As to Buot’s other allegations that: (1) there has been no effort to partition the estate; (2) that Dujali
challenges her status as an heir; (3) that other heirs have been deprived of the estate; and (4) these
heirs are amenable to the appointment of an administrator, we find that none of these allegations
actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action for partition.
An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot’s entitlement to participate in the
proceedings as an heir. Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to the
properties that ought to be included in the partition and the true heirs entitled to receive their
portions of the estate, it is also the appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may be
necessary to ascertain if partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.
proceedings.There are, however, several exceptions.
If the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate
among themselves without judicial administration. The heirs may do so extrajudicially through a
public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. In case of disagreement, they also
have the option to file an action for partition.
Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition.
In the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez,
Section 1 of Rule 74 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even
if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
action of partition.
Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the
word may.
In Pereira v. Court of Appeals we refused to allow administration proceedings where the only
reason why the appointment of an administrator was sought so that one heir can take possession
of the estate from the other heir.
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SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
OCAMPO vs. OCAMPO,et al

Gr No. 187879 July 5, 2010
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control,
expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration
and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an speedy settlement. When
appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the
appointment. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve
the state until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit
of creditors and heirs, pursuant to section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E.
Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the
children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his
siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the
legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate
on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several
properties, mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts.
On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for
intestate proceedings, entitled In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo
and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo, in the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna,
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089. The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and
Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered
the estate of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share
consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate.
However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and management of the
properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of
Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an
administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the
decedents.
After long side by side filing of motions, petitions and oppositions, Renato and Erlinda were
appointed as special administrators but refused to give an inventory of properties as petitioned by
herein petitioners until after the court ruled in their petition for exemption in posting a bond.
Meanwhile, petitioners subsequently learned that respondents has disposed of real properties for
P2,700,000.00 saying it was only for P1,500,000.00 then move the court through a petition in
removing the respondents as administrators and proceed to partitioning the estate. The RTC ruled
in the affirmative and appointed Melinda as regular administrator conditioned with the posting of
P200,000.00 as bond which the later complied. The respondents appealed in the CA and they
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received a favorable decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC.
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ISSUE: Whether the CA have acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking and terminating
the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure
to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties
and responsibilities as special administrators and in appointing Melinda as regular administratrix,
subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00.
RULING: The court ruled that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking
the appointment of the respondents as special administrators and otherwise in appointing Melinda
as regular administrator opining and ordering that she should instead be appointed as special
administration as according to the rules.
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control,
expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration
and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of
the parties suggesting the appointment.
The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until
it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. While the RTC considered that
respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special
administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment.
It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by
the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may
appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or
unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be
proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised
without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by
higher courts is unwarranted.
The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory
and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Pursuant
to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an
administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial
orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court;
and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same
Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the decedents estate
requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels,
rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly
account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the
person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized
to receive them.
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Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the
administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the
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obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the
decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses
chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care,
management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature
of a qualification for the office of administration.
MANUNGAS vs. LORETO

Gr No. 193161 August 22, 2011
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate,
such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal
principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is
to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed.
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to
the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that
would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from
such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate
and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion.
FACTS: Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children. Instead,
they adopted Samuel David Avila. Florentino Manungas died intestate. While Avila predeceased
his adoptive mother. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. De Manungas. Engracia
Manungas was the administratrix in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas.
There, she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except
for herself, Avila and Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino
Manungas. Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case against the spouses
Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages the spouses
Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
The MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas, ordering the spouses to
vacate the premises and to restore possession to Engracia Manungas. RTC affirmed in toto the
decision of the MTC.
Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the Estate of
Engracia Manungas in his favor before the RTC. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas. The petition was opposed by Margarita
Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of
the Estate of Manungas claiming that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, he was not a
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creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a debtor of the estate having
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been found liable to Engracia Manungas for php 177,000 by virtue of a Decision issued by the
MTC.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling when the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002
Order, acting with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special administrator
of Engracia Manungas’ estate.
RULING: Yes. The CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 Order,
acting with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of
Engracia Manungas’ estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as Special
Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s contention that he is the illegitimate
child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related
to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate.
On the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still
alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of
her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the
decedent’s estate.
Hence, the Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as special
administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its power in a
despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must be
remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution.
With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an
illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not
entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate
and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special
administrator. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as
special administrator of the Estate of Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002
Order of the RTC.
MARGARITO R. JAMERO vs. THE HONORABLE ACHILLES L. MELICOR, IN

HISCAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
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TAGBILARAN CITY, BRANCH 4, ATTY. ALBERTO BAUTISTA, IN HIS CAPACITY

AS THE APPOINTED SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, AND ERNESTO R. JAMERO
220
G.R.No. 140929 May 26, 2005, Austria-Martinez, J.
Suffice it to be stated that indeed, the appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory,
discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-appealable. However, it may be subject of certiorari
if it can be shown that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction. As the Court held in Pefianco v. Moral, even as the trial court's order may merely be
interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same when it is
rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS: Petitioner filed Special Proceedings for the Administration and Settlement of the Estate
of his deceased mother Consuelo Jamero with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tagbilaran City.
Private respondent Ernesto R. Jamero, a brother of petitioner, opposed the latter's petition for
appointment as regular administrator of the estate. Upon motion of private respondent Ernesto and
over the objections of petitioner, the respondent court, in its Order dated December 4, 1998,
appointed Atty. Alberto Bautista as special administrator pending the appointment of a regular
administrator. The RTC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its Order dated February
26, 1999 which petitioner received on March 4, 1999.On April 21, 1999, and petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA denied the petition. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the appellate court denied in its Resolution, promulgated on November 24,
1999, to wit: The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution of dismissal dated
June 14, 1999, imploring us to use merciful discretion by relaxing the rules on technicality to effect
substantial justice, and citing the importance of the legal issues involved herein. We find the
motion devoid of merit. This Court has no authority to extend the definitive period fixed in Sec. 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. In any case, the appointment of a
special administrator is discretionary to the appointing court. Being an interlocutory order, the
same is neither appealable nor subject to certiorari. WHEREORE, the Motion for Reconsideration
is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.. The
petitioner alleged, among others, that the CA has decided in a way not in accord with law and
established jurisprudence when it ruled that the appointment of special administrator is
discretionary to the appointing court, and that being an interlocutory order the same is not
appealable nor subject to certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the appointment of special administrator is
discretionary to the appointing court and that being an interlocutory order, the same is not
appealable nor subject to certiorari.
RULING: No. As to the second issue, suffice it to be stated that indeed, the appointment of a
special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-appealable.
However, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion or lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. As the Court held in Pefianco v. Moral, even as
the trial court's order may merely be interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper
remedy to annul the same when it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
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221
VILMA C. TAN, ET AL. vs. HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., ET AL.
G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008
FACTS: On 4 October 2000, Gerardo Tan died intestate. Private respondents who claim to be the
children of Gerardo Tan filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
On the other hand, petitioners who claimed to be the heirs of Tan opposed the respondent’s
petition. Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator and prayed
that their attorney -in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners
filed an Opposition to private respondents Motion for Appointment arguing that none of the private
respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in the country.
Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or
competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan who was already acting as de facto
administratrix of his estate since his death. However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court
directive to account for the income of the estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as
special administrator. Petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
respondent Judge Gedorio. Later on, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and the same
was denied, hence the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection of a
special administrator.
RULING: No, the court did not err in in their selection of a special administrator.
The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of
the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable. Not being appealable,
the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a
term which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law.
The Court affirmed that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge
Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez's appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge
Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special administratrix of
Gerardo's estate, but decided against her appointment upon failure of Vilma to follow the court
directives. Assuming that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as special
administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, the latter's appointment, at best, would constitute a mere
error of judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is
one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable
only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained
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of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
222
with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court of
Appeals could not have reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.
GLORIOSA V. VALARAO vs. CONRADO C. PASCUAL AND MANUEL C. DIAZ

Gr No. 150164 November 26, 2002, J. Bellosillo
FACTS: FELICIDAD C. PASCUAL died at seventy-one (71) years, femme sole, leaving a
substantial inheritance for her querulous collateral relatives who all appear disagreeable to any
sensible partition of their windfall. To divide the disputed estate are five (5) groups of legal heirs
which include respondents Conrado C. Pascual, a brother of the deceased, and Manuel C. Diaz, a
nephew, son of her sister Carmen P. Diaz, and petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao who is the decedent's
niece.
The bloodlines marking the groups of heirs are: (a) the legitimate children of her late sister Leoncia
P. Villanueva, including petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao; (b) the legitimate children of her late sister
Carmen P. Diaz including respondent Manuel C. Diaz; (c) the legitimate children of her late
brother Macario Pascual; (d) the legitimate children of her late sister Milagros P. de Leon; and, (e)
the decedent's surviving sister Augustia C. Pascual and brothers Leonardo C. Pascual and Conrado
C. Pascual, the latter being one of respondents herein.
Petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao initiated a special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor over the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual. Respondent Conrado C. Pascual
and some of his co-heirs, including respondent Diaz, filed with the same probate court a petition
for probate, of an alleged holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. The two (2) special proceedings
were consolidated.
By agreement of the parties in the proceedings a quo, petitioner Valarao and respondent Diaz were
appointed joint administrators of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual. RTC rendered a Decision
which denied the probate of the alleged holographic will of the decedent and giving due course to
the intestate settlement of the estate.
In view of the appeal taken from the disallowance of the holographic will, petitioner Valarao
moved in the probate court for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Respondent
Diaz also asked for his designation as special co-administrator of the estate alongside petitioner.
Respondent Diaz moved for reconsideration of his rejection as special co-administrator of the
estate. He contested the allegation of petitioner Valarao that he had been remiss in his duties as
co-administrator. He cited as examples of his services the collection of rentals for properties
included in the estate, the payment of estate taxes and the deposit of about P4, 000,000.00 in a
joint bank account held in trust for the estate by him and petitioner as co-administrators.
Respondent Diaz further alleged that justice and equity demanded that his group of heirs be also
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represented in the management of the estate.
223
On the other hand, petitioner reiterated the alleged uncooperative conduct of respondent Diaz in
discharging his tasks as co-administrator, and at the same time moved that he and his group of
sympathetic heirs be compelled to surrender to her as special administratrix the books and records
of a corporation where the estate owned substantial interests.
The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered respondent Diaz and all the
heirs to respect the authority of petitioner Valarao as special administratrix, especially by
furnishing her with copies of documents pertinent to the properties comprising the estate.
Respondents Pascual and Diaz along with other heirs moved for reconsideration of the 11
September 2000 Order on the ground that petitioner Valarao as special administratrix was not
authorized to dispossess the heirs of their rightful custody of properties in the absence of proof that
the same properties were being dissipated by them, and that the possessory right of petitioner as
special administratrix had already been exercised by her "constructively" when the heirs on her
side took possession of the estate supposedly in her behalf. Respondents further alleged that the
motion was pending resolution by the probate court.
On 13 June 2001 respondents filed their supplemental petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
61193 seeking permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11
September 2000 also as they mandated the turnover of documents to petitioner Valarao. The Court
of Appeals promulgated its Decision reversing and setting aside the Order of 7 June 2000
appointing petitioner Valarao as lone special administratrix. The appellate court explained that
since the heirs were divided into two (2) scrappy factions, justice and equity demanded that both
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Valarao was proper.
RULING: Yes. To begin with, the probate court had ample jurisdiction to appoint petitioner
Valarao as special administratrix and to assist her in the discharge of her functions, even after
respondents had filed a notice of appeal from the Decision disallowing probate of the holographic
will of Felicidad C. Pascual. This is because the appeal is one where multiple appeals are allowed
and a record on appeal is required. In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only
over the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which
the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties may avail of, including
the appointment of a special administrator.
Moreover, there is nothing neither whimsical nor capricious in the action of the probate court not
to appoint respondent Diaz as special co-administrator since the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11
September 2000 clearly stipulate the grounds for the rejection. The records also manifest that the
probate court weighed the evidence of the applicants for special administrator before concluding
not to designate respondent Diaz because the latter was found to have been remiss in his previous
duty as co-administrator of the estate in the early part of his administration. Verily, the process of
decision-making observed by the probate court evinces reason, equity, justice and legal principle
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unmistakably opposite the core of abusive discretion correctible by the special civil action of
certiorari under which the appellate court was bound to act. Finally, the extraordinary writ does
224
not operate to reverse factual findings where evidence was assessed in the ordinary course of the
proceedings since perceived errors in the appreciation of evidence do not embroil jurisdictional
issues.
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, 12 Corona v. Court of
Appeals and Vda. De Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim,
these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special
co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the
cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also
two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises
such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound
discretion.
We also rule that the probate court in issuing the Order of 11 September 2000 did not err in
commanding respondents to turn over all documents pertinent to the estate under special
administration and in enforcing such order by means of contempt of court. The powers of a special
administrator are plainly delineated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, vesting upon him the
authority to "take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed".
Contrary to respondents' assertion, there is nothing in Sec. 2 requiring a special administrator to
take possession of the estate only upon a prior finding that the heirs have been wasting properties
of the estate which are in their possession. The law explicitly authorizes him to take possession of
the properties in whatever state they are, provided he does so to preserve them for the regular
administrator appointed afterwards. Clearly, the special administrator enjoys not merely subsidiary
possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but the primary and independent
discretion of keeping them so they may be preserved for regular administration.
In any event, as we have held in De Guzman v. Guadiz, the partisan possession exercised by
litigants over properties of the estate differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special
administrator under the Rules of Court. Quite obviously, with this distinction, the possession of
portions of the estate by respondents as heirs necessarily excludes the possessory right over the
same properties inherent in the mandate of a special administrator.
ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES vs LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, and

ANTONIO J. HENSON
G.R. No. 159130 August 22, 2008
FACTS: Ruby J. Henson filed a petition for the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J.
Henson, with the RTC of Manila. Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceased’s daughters and also a
respondent in this petition, opposed Ruby’s petition.
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She alleged that Ruby understated the value of their late mother’s estate and acted with
unconscionable bad faith in the management thereof. Lilia prayed that her mother's holographic
will be disallowed and that she be appointed as the Intestate Administratrix.
An Interim Special Administrator of the estate was appointed, however, Ferro, declined the
appointment. The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special
Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and
started the administration of the estate.
The court ordered the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to immediately conduct an audit of
the administration, and suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the
payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.
A Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus was filed by the respondents to CA. The
petition assailed the Order dated March 12, 2002 which appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo
& Co. as auditors and the Order dated April 3, 2002 which reiterated the appointment.
Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari, the heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal with
the RTC assailing the Order insofar as it directed the payment of Atty. Briones commission. They
subsequently filed their record on appeal.
The trial court, however, denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on the ground of
forum shopping. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:Whether the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy in assailing the commission of
executor.
RULING: No.
From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrators commission is no less a claim
against the estate than a claim that third parties may make.
Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this when it provides for Claim of Executor or
Administrator Against an Estate.
Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against the estate is
appealable as in ordinary cases. Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent
of the Special Administrators commission effectively, a claim by the special administrator against
the estate is the lower courts last word on the matter and one that is appealable.
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226
TRUSTEES RELATING TO WILLS
RINGOR vs. RINGOR

G.R No. 147863 August 13, 2004
FACTS: The controversy involves lands in San Fabian, Pangasinan, owned by the late Jacobo
Ringor. By his first wife, Gavina Laranang, he had two children, Juan and Catalina. He did not
have offsprings by his second and third wives. Catalina predeceased her father Jacobo who died
sometime in 1935, leaving Juan his lone heir of 3 lots owned by Jacobo.
Juan married Gavina and had 7 children with her. One of the children was Jose (the father and the
predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners). Jacobo applied for the registration of his lands under
the Torrens system. He filed 3 registration cases alone, with his son Juam, or his grandson Jose,
applying jointly with him.
Subsequently on a Compraventa dated November 3, 1928, Jacobo allegedly sold and transferred
to Jose his one-half undivided interest in Parcel 1 covered by OCT No. 25885. Jacobo’s
thumbmark appeared on the Compraventa.
During trial, witnesses attested that even after the decisions in the three land registration cases and
the Compraventas, Jacobo remained in possession of the lands and continued administering them
as he did prior to their registration. According to a witness Julio Monsis, Jacobo did not partition
the lands since the latter said that he still needed them. When Jacobo died on June 7, 1935, the
lands under the three registration applications, including those petitioners sought to partition in
their counterclaim before the trial court, remained undivided. Jose continued to function as
administrator over said land and promised to divide it equally. When he died sometime on 1971,
respondents demanded from Jose’s children, herein petitioners, the partition and delivery of their
share in the estate left by Jacobo and under Jose’s administration. The petitioners refused and
attempts at amicable settlement failed. On March 27, 1973, respondents filed a Complaint for
partition and reconveyance.
RTC desided in favor of the respondents, concluding that Jacobo created an express trust over his
entire property in favor of his grandchildren.; CA affirmed the lower Court’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether Jacobo Ringor established a valid express trust.
RULING: Yes.
Express trusts, sometimes referred to as direct trusts, are intentionally created by the direct and
positive acts of the settlor or the trustor – by some writing, deed, or will, or oral declaration. It is
created not necessarily by some written words, but by the direct and positive acts of the parties.
No particular words are required, it being sufficient that a trust was clearly intended. Unless
required by a statutory provision, such as the Statute of Frauds, a writing is not a requisite for the
creation of a trust. Such a statute providing that no instruments concerning lands shall be "created"
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or declared unless by written instruments signed by the party creating the trust, or by his attorney,
227
is not to be construed as precluding a creation of a trust by oral agreement, but merely as rendering
such a trust unenforceable.
Contrary to the claim of petitioners, oral testimony is allowed to prove that a trust exists. It is not
error for the court to rely on parol evidence, - - i.e., the oral testimonies of witnesses Emeteria
Ringor, Julio Monsis and Teofilo Abalos - - which the appellate court also relied on to arrive at
the conclusion that an express trust exists. What is crucial is the intention to create a trust. While
oftentimes the intention is manifested by the trustor in express or explicit language, such intention
may be manifested by inference from what the trustor has said or done, from the nature of the
transaction, or from the circumstances surrounding the creation of the purported trust.
Moreover, a trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another
cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Jose's
name did not vest ownership of the land upon him. The Torrens system does not create or vest
title. It only confirms and records title already existing and vested. The SC upheld the decision of
the lower courts in favoring the respondents’ claims.
RICHARD B. LOPEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE TRUST ESTATE OF

THE LATE JULIANA LOPEZ-MANZANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CORAZON
LOPEZ, FERNANDO LOPEZ, ROBERTO LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY LUZVIMINDA
LOPEZ, MARIA ROLINDA MANZANO, MARIA ROSARIO MANZANO SANTOS,
JOSE MANZANO, JR., NARCISO MANZANO (ALL REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT, MODESTO RUBIO), MARIA CRISTINA MANZANO RUBIO, IRENE
MONZON AND ELENA MANZANO
G.R. No. 157784 December 16, 2008
FACTS: The instant petition stemmed from an action for reconveyance instituted by petitioner
Richard B. Lopez in his capacity as trustee of the estate of the late Juliana Lopez Manzano (Juliana)
to recover from respondents several large tracts of lands allegedly belonging to the trust estate of
Juliana.
The decedent, Juliana, was married to Jose Lopez Manzano (Jose). Their union did not bear any
children. Juliana was the owner of several properties, among them, the properties subject of this
dispute.
Juliana executed a notarial will, whereby she expressed that she wished to constitute a trust fund
for her paraphernal properties, denominated as Fideicomiso de Juliana Lopez Manzano
(Fideicomiso), to be administered by... her husband. If her husband were to die or renounce the
obligation, her nephew, Enrique Lopez, was to become administrator and executor of the
Fideicomiso. Two-thirds (2/3) of the income from rentals over these properties were to answer for
the education of deserving but... needy honor students, while one-third 1/3 was to shoulder the
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expenses and fees of the administrator.
228
Juliana initiated the probate of her will five (5) days after its execution, but she died on 12 August
1968, before the petition for probate could be heard. The petition was pursued instead in Special
Proceedings (S.P.) No. 706 by her husband, Jose, who was the designated... executor in the will.
On 7 October 1968, the Court of First Instance, Branch 3, Balayan, Batangas, acting as probate
court, admitted the will to probate and issued the letters testamentary to Jose. Jose then submitted
an inventory of Juliana's real and personal properties with... their appraised values, which was
approved by the probate court.
Thereafter, Jose filed a Report dated 16 August 1969, which included a proposed project of
partition. In the report, Jose explained that as the only compulsory heir of Juliana, he was entitled
by operation of law to one-half (1/2) of Juliana's paraphernal properties as his... legitime, while
the other one-half (1/2) was to be constituted into the Fideicomiso.
The probate court issued an order approving the project of partition.
As to the properties to be constituted into the Fideicomiso, the probate court ordered that the
certificates of title thereto be cancelled, and, in lieu thereof, new certificates be... issued in favor
of Jose as trustee of the Fideicomiso covering one-half (1/2) of the properties listed under
paragraph 14 of the project of partition; and regarding the other half, to be registered in the name
of Jose as heir of Juliana.
The probate court, thus, directed that new certificates of title be issued in favor of Jose
Jose died on 22 July 1980, leaving a holographic will disposing of the disputed properties to
respondents. The will was allowed probate.
Pursuant to Jose's will, the RTC ordered on 20 December 1983 the transfer of... the disputed
properties to the respondents as the heirs of Jose. Consequently, the certificates of title of the
disputed properties were cancelled and new ones issued in the names of respondents.
Petitioner's father, Enrique Lopez, also assumed the trusteeship of Juliana's estate.
Petitioner instituted an action for reconveyance of parcels of land with sum of money before the
RTC of Balayan, Batangas against respondents. The complaint essentially alleged that Jose was
able to register in his name the disputed properties, which were the paraphernal properties of
Juliana, either during their conjugal union... or in the course of the performance of his duties as
executor of the testate estate of Juliana and that upon the death of Jose, the disputed properties
were included in the inventory as if they formed part of Jose's estate when in fact Jose was holding
them only in trust for the trust estate of Juliana.
The RTC rendered a summary judgment, dismissing the action on the ground of prescription of
action.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision denying the appeals filed by both petitioner
and respondents.
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Petitioner insists that an express trust was constituted over the disputed properties; thus the
registration of the disputed properties in the name of Jose as trustee cannot give rise to prescription
of action to prevent the recovery of the disputed properties by the beneficiary against the trustee.
ISSUE: Whether an implied trust was constituted over the disputed properties when Jose, the
trustee, registered them in his name.
RULING: The provision on implied trust governing the factual milieu of this case is provided in
Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
In Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,[8] the Court differentiated two kinds of implied
trusts, to wit:... x x x In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. These two
are differentiated from each other as follows:
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title
determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by
the parties. They arise from the nature of circumstances of the consideration... involved in a
transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity
to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created
by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands... of justice and prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold
A resulting trust is presumed to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which
is to be found in the nature of their transaction but not expressed in the deed itself.[10] Specific
examples of resulting trusts may be found in the Civil
Code, particularly Arts. 1448,[11] 1449,[12] 1451,[13] 1452[14] and 1453.
A constructive trust is created, not by any word evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by
operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of justice and to prevent unjust enrichment.[16] It
is raised by equity in respect of property, which has... been acquired by fraud, or where although
acquired originally without fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained by the person
holding it.[17] Constructive trusts are illustrated in Arts. 1450,[18] 1454,[19] 1455[20] and 1456.[
The right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute. It is
subject to extinctive prescription. An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in 10 years. This period is reckoned from... the date of the issuance of the original
certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. Since such issuance operates as a constructive
notice to the whole world, the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at that time.
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In the instant case, the ten-year prescriptive period to recover the disputed property must be
counted from its registration in the name of Jose on 15 September 1969, when petitioner was
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charged with constructive notice that Jose adjudicated the disputed properties to himself as the
sole heir of Juana and not as trustee of the Fideicomiso.
It should be pointed out also that Jose had already indicated at the outset that the disputed
properties did not form part of the Fideicomiso contrary to petitioner's claim that no overt acts of
repudiation may be attributed to Jose. It may not be amiss to state that in... the project of partition
submitted to the probate court, Jose had indicated that the disputed properties were conjugal in
nature and, thus, excluded from Juliana's Fideicomiso. This act is clearly tantamount to repudiating
the trust, at which point the period for... prescription is reckoned.
In any case, the rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted
to him until and unless he repudiates the trust applies only to express trusts and resulting implied
trusts. However, in constructive implied trusts, prescription may supervene... even if the trustee
does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a condition
precedent to the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, for the purpose of counting the ten-year
prescriptive period for the action to... enforce the constructive trust, the reckoning point is deemed
to be on 15 September 1969 when Jose registered the disputed properties in his name.
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA

COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS
Gr No. 113725 June 29, 2000, J. Purisima
FACTS: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a supplement to a will; an appendix) of Aleja Belleza,
was instituted devisee of Lot No. 1392 with an area of 511,855 square meters with the obligation
to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to herein private respondent every year during the latter's lifetime.
The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not only on the instituted heir but also to his
successors-in-interest and that in case of failure to deliver, private respondent shall seize the
property and turn it over to the testatrix's "near descendants."
The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall be
inherited by his children and spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of
export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina Cosculuella y Belleza, and should
he die, his heir shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall
later sell, lease, mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation
to deliver the piculs. Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children (pet).
In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of the
codicil (to deliver piculs of sugar) and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. A
memorandum of agreement to enforce the codicil was agreed but was only partially complied.
Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children, one of whom is herein petitioner.
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Private respondent, alleging failure of the heirs to comply with their obligation, filed a complaint
with the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the subject property to the surviving heirs of the
testatrix.
During the pre-trial, a compromise agreement was concluded between the parties wherein the
lessee of the property assumed the delivery of 100 piculs of sugar to private respondent; however,
only partial delivery was made.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that, “While there may
be the non-performance of the command as mandated, exaction from them (the petitioners), simply
because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does
not warrant the filing of the present complaint.”
The CA, reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the nature of a
modal institution and a cause of action in favor of private respondent arose when petitioner failed
to comply with their obligation under the codicil, and in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the
estate of testatrix. Thus, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent has a legally demandable right against the petitioner, as one
of the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.
RULING: YES. It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed
by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents,
and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of
law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them
from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to
the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every
year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of
which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint below.
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232
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix
intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded
that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to
deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the
said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property
shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself
that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as
modal and not conditional.
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only
a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the
right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of
the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such construction
as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100)
piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease,
mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the
event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize
the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said
obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the
instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case
of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-
in-interest.
HILARION, JR. AND ENRICO ORENDAIN V. TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF

DOÑA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ
Gr No. 168660 June 30, 2009, J. Nachura
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233
FACTS: On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila, leaving a
last will and testament. The will was admitted to probate. At the time of her death, the decedent
left no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, was completely free to dispose of her
properties, without regard to legitimes, as provided in her will. Some of Doña Margarita
Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the
properties and the income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.
Thus, the following pertinent items in the will paint the desire of the decedent:
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;
2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from specified properties, after the necessary
deductions for expenses, including the estate tax, be deposited in a fund with a bank;
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in trust for perpetual administration
(pangasiwaan sa habang panahon);
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the properties ought to be divided among,
and distributed to the different beneficiaries; and
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical support to certain beneficiaries,
to be deducted from the fund deposits in the bank mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3.
Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion
Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedent’s will, moved to dissolve the trust
on the decedent’s estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than twenty years, in
violation of Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
The trustees argued that the trust instituted may be perpetual citing the case of Palad, et al. v.
Governor of Quezon Province where the trust holding the two estate of one Luis Palad was allowed
to exist even after the lapse of twenty years.
The RTC dismissed their petition and held that:
“Art. 867 and 870 of the civil code find no application in the motion to dissolve the trust created
by the testatrix. There is no question that the testamentary disposition of Doña Margarita
Rodriguez prohibiting the mortgage or sale of properties mentioned in clause X of her Last Will
and Testament forevermore is void after the lapse of the twenty year period. However, it does not
mean that the trust created by testatrix in order to carry out her wishes under clauses 12, 13 and 24
will also become void upon expiration of the twenty year period. Hence, the trustees may dispose
of the properties left by the testatrix in order to carry out the latter's testamentary disposition. The
question as to whether a trust can be perpetual, the same finds support in Article 1013[,] paragraph
4 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the Court, at the instance of an interested party or its
motion, may order the establishment of a permanent trust so that only the income from the property
shall be used." In the present case, the testatrix directed that all the twenty five (25) pieces of
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property listed in the tenth clause should be placed under the trusteeship and should be perpetually
administered by the trustees and a certain percentage of the income from the trust estate should be
234
deposited in a bank and should be devoted for the purposes specifically indicated in the clauses
12, 13 and 24. The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be given effect.”
ISSUE: Whether the named trustees may be considered as heirs to the estate.
RULING: No. The Court affirmed the CA's holding that the trust stipulated in the decedent's will
prohibiting perpetual alienation or mortgage of the properties violated Articles 867 and 870 of the
Civil Code. However, it reversed the CA's decision which declared that that portion of the
decedent's estate, the properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, ought to be distributed based on
intestate succession, there being no institution of heirs to the properties covered by the perpetual
trust.
Apparent from the decedent's last will and testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set of
properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the
decedent intended any of the trust's designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. The
decedent's will did not institute any heir thereto.
Plainly, the RTC was mistaken in denying petitioners' motion to dissolve and ordering the
disposition of the properties in Clause 10 according to the testatrix's wishes. As regards these
properties, intestacy should apply as the decedent did not institute an heir therefor. Article 782, in
relation to paragraph 2, Article 960 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law. xxx xxx xxx
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (2) When the will does not institute an heir to,
or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take
place only with respect to the property of which the testator has not disposed.
We find as erroneous the RTC's holding that paragraph 4, Article 1013 of the Civil Code
specifically allows a perpetual trust, because this provision of law is inapplicable. Suffice it to state
that the article is among the Civil Code provisions on intestate succession, specifically on the State
inheriting from a decedent, in default of persons entitled to succeed. Under this article, the
allowance for a permanent trust, approved by a court of law, covers property inherited by the State
by virtue of intestate succession. The article does not cure a void testamentary provision which did
not institute an heir. Accordingly, the article cannot be applied to dispose of herein decedent's
properties.
The general rule remains that upon the expiration of the twenty-year allowable period, the estate
may be disposed of under Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition
of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than 20 years.
The Palad Case is not violative of such provision of the law by the trust constituted by Luis Palad
because the will of the testator does not interdict the alienation of the parcels devised. The will
merely directs that the income of said two parcels be utilized for the establishment, maintenance
and operation of the high school.
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Said Article 870 was designed to give more impetus to the socialization of the ownership of
property and to prevent the perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian troubles. The
trust involved in the Palad case covers only two lots, which have not been shown to be a large
landholding. And the income derived therefrom is being devoted to a public and social purpose –
the education of the youth of the land. The use of said parcels therefore is in a sense socialized.
In the present case, however, there is a different situation as the testatrix specifically prohibited
the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were definitely more than the two (2) properties,
unlike in the Palad case. The herein testatrix’s large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely
to a trust because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even in the
afterlife.
Apparent from the decedent’s last will and testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set of
properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the
decedent intended any of the trust’s designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. Therefore,
the probate court must admit the case to determine the properties to be subject to intestate
succession as well as the nearest relative of the deceased that may inherit the said properties under
the perpetual trust.
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ vs. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
FACTS: Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, USA.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Jose executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife “all the
remainder” of his real and personal property at the time of his death “wheresoever situated.” In the
event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren
with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and
testament and Dr. Rafael Jr. as substitute executor.
In his will, Dr. Jose provided that should he and his wife die under such circumstances that there
is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of their deaths, the presumption is that he died
first.
Four days later, Dr. Evelyn executed her own last will and testament, containing the same
provisions as that of her husband. Likewise, she provided that should she and her husband died
under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of their deaths,
it should be presumed that he died first.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Jose and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that
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gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills,
236
filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof in the Surrogate Court of the County of
Onondaga, New York. The wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in
his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn, filed with the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings
in New York. She also asked that she be appointed as special administratrix of the estate of the
deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan. She was granted
letters of special administration and posted bond in the amount of PHP 10,000.00. As special
administratrix, Salud consolidated the assets of the Cunanan spouses, including the bank deposits
of Dr. Jose.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose opposed and asked to be notified of the proceedings as heirs
of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan. But their status as heirs were disputed by Salud, who said that they were
only collaterals and not heirs as “heirship is only by institution” under a will or by operation of the
law of New York. Since the will of Dr. Jose provided a presumption that he predeceased his wife,
his estate passed on to his wife, Dr. Evelyn. Salud, being the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn, thus inherited
the estate of the Cunanan spouses.
The Cunanan heirs soon asked that the RTC proceedings be nullified and that the appointment of
Salud as special administratrix be set aside. They also asked that Dr. Rafael Sr., brother of Dr.
Jose, be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. They alleged
that the Cunanan heirs and Salud had entered into an agreement in the United States “to settle and
divide equally the estates.”
RTC issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of
petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the
property received by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and
academic. The RTC Judge reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on
procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were
executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the
presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the
Philippines.
Salud’s motion for reconsideration was granted. In another order, the RTC Judge held that the
documents presented did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of
wills but granted a motion to submit additional evidence to prove the law of New York. However,
the RTC Judge ruled that the probate of two wills in a single proceeding is not procedural.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the reprobate of the two wills in a single proceeding is procedural.
2. Whether or not the two wills probated outside the Philippines may be reprobated in the
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Philippines.
237
RULING:
Requirements for allowance of foreign wills for probate in the Philippines
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective
in this country upon compliance with the following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
“Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.”
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside
of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign
laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will
has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the
first and law requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign
country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on
evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a
purported will is probated or denied probate.
The separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be
probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in
singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate
proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such
view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise
that the rules shall be “liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the
administration of justice.
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person. In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed
separate wills. Since the two will contains essentially the same provisions and pertain to property
which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate.
As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a
single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.
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On the requirement of notice

238
Petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because
she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his
heirs of the filing of the proceedings.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall “cause notice thereof
to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance” means that with regards to
notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original will” or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76,
which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner,
are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner’s claim are entitled to notices
of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the “court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the
will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator,
…”
PILAPIL ET. AL. vs. HEIRS OF BRIONES

G.R. No. 150175 March 10, 2006
FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones. Respondents are the heirs of
the late Maximino Briones. Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any
children.
In 1952, Maximino died, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate
with the CFI Cebu City. CFI issued a Letters of Administration in favor of Donata who submitted
an inventory of Maximino’s properties included the disputed land. In same year 1952, CFI issued
order awarding ownership to Donata. In 1960, such order was recorded in Register of Deeds and
by virtue thereof, a new TCT was issued in her name.
In 1977, Donata died. Her niece, Erlinda, one of the Petitioners, instituted with the RTC a Petiton
for Administration of the Intestate Estate of Donata. RTC appointed her and her husband Gregorio
as Administrators of Donatoa’s estate.
In 1985, Silverio, Maximino’s nephew, one of the Respondents, filed with the RTC for Letters of
Administration for the Intestate Estate of Maximino which initially granted ordering him to collect
rentals from Maximino’s properties. But Gregorio filed a motion to set aside the Order claiming
that said properties were already under his and his wife’s administration as part of intestate estate
of Donata. Hence, Silverio’s Letters of Administration was subsequently set aside
. In 1987, Respondents filed a complaint with RTC against Petitioners for Annulment/Recovery
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of possession of real property. In 1992, Respondents amended their complaint alleging that
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Donata, as Administrarix of Maximino’s Estate, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of
trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real
properties belonging to the Intestate Estate of Maximino.
RTC favored Respondents and Ordered Petitioners to reconvey subject properties and render
Accounting to the former. Petitioners appealed to CA but the CA affirmed the RTC, hence, they
petitioned to SC.
ISSUE: Whether Respondents have rightful claim to recover their share from Maximino’s Estate
based on the alleged misrepresentation of Donata that eventually resulted to her being registered
the disputed estate properties.
RULING: No. Because Respondent’s cause of action had already been prescribed.
Assuming that Donata had employed misrepresentations that constitute fraud on her part that
resulted to her successful registration of the estate properties under her name, such act would
necessarily result to an imposition of an implied trust upon her provided under Art. 1456 of the
Civil Code.
There are two kinds of implied trusts. One is the resulting trust and the other one is the constructive
trust. Both are created by operation of law. But the latter is not created by any words, either
expressly or impliedly, evidencing a direct intention to create a trust, but only by construction of
equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice, as contradistinguished from the former which is
always presumed to have been contemplated by the parties and their intention thereto is traceable
in their transaction but not however expressed in any deed or instrument of conveyance and may
be proven by parole evidence as opposed to that of expressed trust (a trust relation created by
express of intention of the parties thereto).
The rule that an action to compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for
the benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe, only applies to express trust. Basis: the
possession of the trustee is not adverse. It may also apply to resulting trust so long as the trustee
has not repudiated the trust. But with respect to constructive trust, the rule is different,
prescriptibility applies.
While Respondent’s right to inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at the time of
Maximino’s death, their enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may be barred by
prescription of action.
Art. 1144 of the Civil Code provides that actions must be brought within ten (10) years from the
time the right of action accrues: Upon written contract; Upon an obligation created by law; Upon
a judgment.
Since implied trust is an obligation created by law (Art. 1456 CC), then, Respondents had ten (10)
years within which to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s estate
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ESTATE OF MARGARITA D. CABACUNGAN, REPRESENTED BY LUZ LAIGO-ALI
vs. MARILOU LAIGO, PEDRO ROY LAIGO, STELLA BALAGOT AND SPOUSES
MARIO B. CAMPOS AND JULIA S. CAMPOS
G.R. No. 17507 August 15, 2011
FACTS: Unknown to the other children of Margarita, the mother transferred the tax declarations
of her three (3) lands to her son, Roberto, to support his application for travel to the US. Upon
returning, Roberto married Estella and adopted her two children, Pedro and Marilou. Sometime
later, Roberto sold one of the lands to the spouses Campos, and separately sold the two remaining
lands to his two adopted children. Margarita came to know of the sale during the wake of Roberto.
Hence, Roberto’s siblings filed a complaint for annulment of the said sales and for the recovery of
ownership and ossession of the land.
The trial court ruled against the plaintiffs on the basis that there was no express trust between
Roberto and his mother. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether a trust was created between Margarita and her son Roberto.
RULING: Yes.
A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership of property and
another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former
entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.
Trusts are either express or implied.
Express or direct trusts are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing
or deed, or will, or by oral declaration in words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied
trusts - also called "trusts by operation of law," "indirect trusts" and "involuntary trusts" - arise by
legal implication based on the presumed intention of the parties or on equitable principles
independent of the particular intention of the parties. They are those which, without being
expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently
of the particular intention of the parties, as being inferred from the transaction by operation of law
basically by reason of equity.
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding that there was no evidence on record showing that
an implied trust relation arose between Margarita and Roberto, the SC find that petitioner before
the trial court, had actually adduced evidence to prove the intention of Margarita to transfer to
Roberto only the legal title to the properties in question, with attendant expectation that Roberto
would return the same to her on accomplishment of that specific purpose for which the transaction
was entered into. The evidence of course is not documentary, but rather testimonial.
It is deducible from the testimonies of Luz, Margarita's daughter and Hilaria, her niece that the
inscription of Roberto's name in the Affidavit of Transfer as Margarita's transferee is not for the
purpose of transferring ownership to him but only to enable him to hold the property in trust for
Margarita.
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241
As a trustee of a resulting trust, therefore, Roberto, like the trustee of an express passive trust, is
merely a depositary of legal title having no duties as to the management, control or disposition of
the property except to make a conveyance when called upon by the cestui que trust. Hence, the
sales he entered into with respondents are a wrongful conversion of the trust property and a breach
of the trust.
CASTORIO ALVARICO vs. AMELITA L. SOLA

G.R. No. 138953 June 6, 2002
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which
would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on
the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain.
Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since Amelita Solas title
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and
the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelitas title.
It follows that he cannot recover the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is
the rightful owner thereof.
FACTS: Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of respondent Amelita Sola while
Fermina Lopez is petitioner’s aunt, and also Amelitas adoptive mother. On June 17, 1982, the
Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of Fermina
over Lot 5, SGS-3451, with an area of 152 sq. m. at the Waterfront, Cebu City. On May 28, 1983,
Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over Lot 5 in favor of
Amelita, who agreed to assume all the obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon Fermina
under MSA Application No. V-81066. The document of transfer was filed with the Bureau of
Lands. Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands. She paid a total amount of
P282,900. On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights
and granting the amendment of the application from Fermina to Amelita. On May 2, 1989, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3439 was issued in favor of Amelita. On June 24, 1993, herein
petitioner filed Civil Case No. CEB-14191 for reconveyance against Amelita. He claimed that on
January 4, 1984, Fermina donated the land to him and immediately thereafter, he took possession
of the same. He averred that the donation to him had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer
to Amelita. For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina
was no longer the owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner, the property
having been transferred earlier to her. She added that the donation was void because of lack of
approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly acquired the land as Ferminas rightful
heir. She also denied that she is a trustee of the land for petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner has a legal standing to assail the validity of Amelita’s title. (NO)
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RULING: Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in
bad faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act.
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Thus: Sec. 101. All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead,
in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the
grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelitas title. It
follows that he cannot recover the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the
rightful owner thereof.
Anent petitioners contention that it was the intention of Fermina for Amelita to hold the property
in trust for him, we held that if this was really the intention of Fermina, then this should have been
clearly stated in the Deed of Self-Adjudication executed in 1983, in the Deed of Donation executed
in 1984, or in a subsequent instrument. Absent any persuasive proof of that intention in any written
instrument, we are not prepared to accept petitioner’s bare allegation concerning the donors state
of mind.
MELCHOR CARO vs. SUSANA SUCALDITO

G.R. No. 157536 May 16, 2005
The Court notes that the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC prays for the annulment of the free
patent issued in the respondent’s favor. Considering that the ultimate relief sought is for the
respondent to "return" the subject property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance. In
De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance
is that the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the
transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s
name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right." Indeed, in an action for reconveyance
filed by a private individual, the property does not go back to the State. Clearly then, a suit filed
by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not being the
owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered
as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.
FACTS: Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor’s Lot No. 160 from Ruperto
Gepilano as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated October 21, 1953. Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold
a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro, consisting of 70,124 square meters, and now
identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral survey of Nueva Valencia. Father and son executed a
Deed of Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512. On August 1, 1974, Melchor
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Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands covering the said area of the property
which he bought from his father.
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The application was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6, 1980, the
Regional Director rendered a Decision canceling the said application. On August 29, 1982, Susana
R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application for a Free Patent covering the said
lot, and was issued Free Patent. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. F-27162 in her favor. Sucaldito then filed a Petition for Writ of
Possession before the RTC of Iloilo City, which was granted in an Order dated May 7, 1984.
Thereafter, on February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint against Sucaldito for "Annulment of
Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession with Damages"
before the RTC of Iloilo City.
He later filed an amended complaint, alleging that he was the owner of the subject lot, and had
been in possession of the same "since 1953 and/or even prior thereto in the concept of owner,
adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously." He further alleged that the said lot had been
declared for tax purposes in his name and that of his predecessors-in-interest, and that the
corresponding land taxes had been paid therefor. He claimed that Assessor’s Lot No. 160 had
actually been divided into two lots, namely, Lot No. 4511 and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito had actually
been claiming Lot No. 989 (Lot No. 4512), which was located two kilometers away. He lamented
that despite the overwhelming evidence proving his ownership and possession of the said property,
the Bureau of Lands did not award it to him.
Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject lot in favor of
Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right whatsoever over the subject lot. Hence,
as a "trustee of a constructive trust," she was obliged to return the same to him as the lawful owner.
Citing the case of Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, the trial court ruled that Caro
had no personality to file the action for the annulment of the free patent issued in favor of Sucaldito,
which could only be brought by the Solicitor General. It held that "an applicant for a free patent
who is not the owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an action in court to recover the land, for the
court may not usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture to
dispose lands of the public domain through administrative proceedings under the Public Land Act,"
or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The trial court further stressed that the remedy of a
rivalapplicant for a free patent over the same land was through administrative channels, not
judicial, because even if the oppositor succeeds in annulling the title of the applicant, the former
does not thereby become the owner of the land in dispute.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has personality to file a suit for reconveyance. (NO)
RULING: The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and holds that the petitioner
has no personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject property. The Court notes that the
petitioner’s complaint before the RTC prays for the annulment of the free patent issued in the
respondent’s favor. Considering that the ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to "return" the
subject property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance.
In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance
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244
filed by a private individual, the property does not go back to the State. Reversion, on the other
hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government
under the Regalian doctrine.
Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or
one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit." Corollarily, legal standing
has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in
issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental
interest in the question involved.
Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the
petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent,
cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.
The Court, citing several of its holdings, expounded on this doctrine in Tankiko v. Cezar as
follows: … Thus, in Lucas v. Durian [102 Phil. 1157 (1957)], the Court affirmed the dismissal of
a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was obtained by fraudulent means and,
consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title.
The Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was the government, to which the
property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause
of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio [104 Phil. 126 (1958)] noted that the plaintiff,
being a mere homestead applicant, was not the real party-in-interest to institute an action for
reconveyance. …... Verily, the Court stressed that " … [i]f the suit is not brought in the name of
or against the real partyin-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action [Travel Wide v. CA, 199 SCRA 205, 209 (1991), per Cruz, J.
See also Suguister v. Tamayo, 176 SCRA 579, August 21, 1989]. In fact, a final judgment may be
invalidated if the real parties-in-interest are not included. This was underscored by the Court in
Arcelona v. CA [280 SCRA 20, October 2, 1997], in which a final judgment was nullified because
indispensable parties were not impleaded.
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. Therefore,
not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have
no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit.
In De la Peña v. Court of Appeals, the Court, in dismissing the petitioner’s imputation of fraud in
securing a free patent and title over a parcel of land, declared that reconveyance is a remedy granted
only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s name. The Court
further expounded: Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles
legally issued by the State [Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 (1936)].
In such cases, the real party-in-interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property
would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to
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the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with
245
the conditions imposed by the law. Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot
ask for reconveyance. In VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, where the private
respondents therein were mere lessees of the property in question, the Court ruled that as mere
lessees, they had "no present substantial and personal interest with respect to issues involving
ownership of the disputed property." The Court went on to declare: … The only interest they have,
in the event the petitioner’s title over the subject property is cancelled and ownership reverts to the
State, is the hope that they become qualified buyers of the subject parcel of land. Undoubtedly,
such interest is a mere expectancy. Even the private respondents themselves claim that in case of
reversion of ownership to the State, they only have "pre-emptive rights" to buy the subject
property; that their real interest over the said property is contingent upon the government’s
consideration of their application as buyers of the same.
It is settled that a suit filed by a person who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In fact,
Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 states – Section 101. All actions for the reversion to
the government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines. This provision was applied and discussed in
Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., a case on all fours with the present
one, as follows:
Under Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead may bring the action for reversion. Consequently, Sumail may not bring such action or any
action which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of
title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part
of the public domain. Furthermore, there is another reason for withholding legal personality from
Sumail. He does not claim the land to be his private property. In fact, by his application for a free
patent, he had formally acknowledged and recognized the land to be a part of the public domain;
this, aside from the declaration made by the cadastral court that lot 3633 was public land.
Consequently, even if the parcel were declared reverted to the public domain, Sumail does not
automatically become the owner thereof. He is a mere public land applicant like others who may
apply for the same. To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for
reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land to the government. The petitioner has
no personality to "recover" the property as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.
CAŃEZO v. ROJAS
GR No. 148788 November 23, 2007.
FACTS: The subject property is an unregistered land with an area of 4,169 square meters situated
at Naval, Biliran. In a complaint on 1997, petitioner Soledad Cañezo alleged that she bought such
parcel of land in 1939 from Crisogono Limpiado, although the sale was not reduced into writing.
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Thereafter, she immediately took possession of the property. In 1948, she and her husband left for
246
Mindanao and entrusted the said land to her father, Crispulo Rojas, who took possession of, and
cultivated the property. In 1980, she found out that the respondent, Concepcion Rojas, her
stepmother, was in possession of the property and was cultivating the same. She also discovered
that the tax declaration over the property was already in the name of his father.
Respondent asserted that it was her husband who bought the property from Limpiado, which
accounts for the tax declaration being in Crispulo’s name. After the hearing, MTC rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioner, making her the real and lawful owner of the land. Respondent
appealed to the RTC of Naval, Biliran, which reversed the MTC decision on the ground that the
action had already prescribed and acquisitive prescription had set in. However, acting on
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC amended its original decision and held that the
action had not yet prescribed considering that the petitioner merely entrusted the property to her
father. The ten-year prescriptive period for the recovery of a property held in trust would
commence to run only from the time the trustee repudiates the trust. The RTC found no evidence
on record showing that Crispulo Rojas ever ousted the petitioner from the property.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA, which reversed the amended decision of the
RTC. The CA held that, assuming that there was a trust between the petitioner and her father over
the property, her right of action to recover the same would still be barred by prescription since 49
years had already lapsed since Crispulo adversely possessed the contested property in 1948.Hence,
this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an existence of trust over the property – express or implied
between the petitioner and her father.
RULING: NONE. A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable
ownership of property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable
ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of
certain powers by the latter. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are those which
are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or
bywords evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being
expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently,
of the particular intention of the parties, as being superinduced on the transaction by operation of
law basically by reason of equity.
As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and
such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. The
presence of the following elements must be proved: (1) a trustor or settlor who executes the
instrument creating the trust; (2) a trustee, who is the person expressly designated to carry out the
trust; (3) the trust res, consisting of duly identified and definite real properties; and (4) the cestui
que trust, or beneficiaries whose identity must be clear.
Accordingly, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove the existence of the trust relationship. And
petitioner sadly failed to discharge that burden. The existence of express trusts concerning real
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property may not be established by parol evidence. It must be proven by some writing or deed. In
this case, the only evidence to support the claim that an express trust existed between the petitioner
247
and her father was the self-serving testimony of the petitioner. Although no particular words are
required for the creation of an express trust, a clear intention to create a trust must be shown; and
the proof of fiduciary relationship must be clear and convincing. The creation of an express trust
must be manifested with reasonable certainty and cannot be inferred from loose and vague
declarations or from ambiguous circumstances susceptible of other interpretations. In the case at
bench, an intention to create a trust cannot be inferred from the petitioner’s testimony and the
attendant facts and circumstances.
The petitioner testified only to the effect that her agreement with her father was that she will be
given a share in the produce of the property. This allegation, standing alone as it does, is inadequate
to establish the existence of a trust because profit-sharing per se, does not necessarily translate to
a trust relation. In light of the disquisitions, we hold that there was no express trust or resulting
trust established between the petitioner and her father. Thus, in the absence of a trust relation, we
can only conclude that Crispell’s uninterrupted possession of the subject property for 49 years,
coupled with the performance of acts of ownership, such as payment of real estate taxes, ripened
into ownership.
JOSE JUAN TONG, ET ALvs GO TIAT KUN, ET AL

G.R. No. 196023 April 21, 2014
FACTS: Juan Tong and Sy had 10 children. In 1957, Juan Tong informed his children of his
intention to purchase Lot 998 for the family,s lumber business. Since he was a Chinese citizen he
was disqualified from acquiring said lot, the title to the property will beregistered in the name og
his eldest son, Luis Sr., who at the time already of age and was the only Filipino citizen among
them. On May 1957, Juan Tong bought the land and was registered in the name of Luis Sr. years
later, Juan Tong and SyUn both died intestate.
On May 31, 1981, Luis sr. died and his heirs (Go Tiat Kun and children) claimed ownership over
Lot 998 by succession alleging that no trusts exist and it was Luis Sr. who bought Lot 998. They
subdivided the land and sold ½ (Lot 998-B) to third persons. On August 1995, petitioners
discovered the breach of trust committed by respondents resulting in their filing for annulment of
sales. RTC ruled in favour of petioners which was affirmed by CA and SC.
On February 2001, Go Tiat Kun executed a Deed of Sale over Lot 998-A in favor of her children.
Petitioners filed for nullification of titles claiming that they are owners of Lot 998-A.
Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners saying that Luis Sr. was a mere trustee and not the owner
of Lot 998. Therefore, respondents cannot appropriate the property among themselves. Thus all
previous titles and documents of reconveyance are null and void.
CA reversed the decision saying that an express trust was created because there was a direct and
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positive act from Juan Tong to create a trust. It also ruled that petitioners are still barred by
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prescription because said resulting trust was terminated upon death of Luis Sr. and was converted
into constructive trust. Thus, this petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was an implied resulting trust constituted over Lot 998 when Juan Tong
purchased the property and registered in the name of Luis Sr.
2. Whether the petitioners’ action was barred by prescription, estoppel and laches
RULING: A review of the records shows an intention to create a trust between the parties.
Although Lot 998 was titled in the name of Luis, Sr., the circumstances surrounding the acquisition
of the subject property eloquently speak of the intent that the equitable or beneficial ownership of
the property should belong to the Juan Tong family.
First, Juan Tong had the financial means to purchase the property for P55,000.00.
Second, the possession of Lot 998 had always been with the petitioners.
Third, from the time it was registered in the name of Luis, Sr. in 1957, Lot 998 remained undivided
and untouched by the respondents.
Fourth, respondent Leon admitted that up to the time of his father’s death, (1) Lot 998 is in the
possession of the petitioners, (2) they resided in the tenement in the front part of Juan Tong’s
compound, (3) Luis Sr. never sent any letter or communication to the petitioners claiming
ownership of Lot 998, and (4) he and his mother have a residence at Ledesco Village, La Paz,
Iloilo City while his brother and sisters also have their own residences.
Fifth, the real property taxes on Lot 998 were paid not by Luis Sr. but by his father Juan Tong and
the Juan Tong Lumber, Inc., from 1966 up to early 2008 as evidenced by the following: a) the
letter of assessment sent by the City Treasurer of Iloilo, naming Juan Tong as the owner of Lot
998; and b) the receipts of real property taxes paid by Juan Tong Lumber, and later by Juan Tong
Lumber, Inc., from 1997 to 2008.
Guided by the foregoing definitions, the Court is in conformity with the finding of the trial court
that an implied resulting trust was created as provided under the first sentence of Article 1448
which is sometimes referred to as a purchase money resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a)
an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable
consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a
resulting trust. Here, the petitioners have shown that the two elements are present in the instant
case. Luis, Sr. was merely a trustee of Juan Tong and the petitioners in relation to the subject
property, and it was Juan Tong who provided the money for the purchase of Lot 998 but the
corresponding transfer certificate of title was placed in the name of Luis, Sr.
The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot repudiate the
trust by relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A trust, which
derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between families, does
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not lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document.
249
Lastly, the respondents’ assertion that the petitioners’ action is barred by prescription, laches and
estoppel is erroneous.
As a rule, implied resulting trusts do not prescribe except when the trustee repudiates the trust.
Further, the action to reconvey does not prescribe so long as the property stands in the name of the
trustee.
EMILIA O'LACO and HUCO LUNA V. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT, O LAY KIA and
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 58010 March 31, 1993.
Rule 98 applies only to express trust, one which is created by will or written instrument, and not
to an implied trust, which is deducible from the nature of the transaction as a matter on intent, or
which are superinduced from the nature of the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
independent, of the particular intention of the parties.
FACTS: It involves half-sisters each claiming ownership over a parcel of land. While petitioner
Emilia O'Laco asserts that she merely left the certificate of title covering the property with private
respondent O Lay Kia for safekeeping, the latter who is the former's older sister insists that the
title was in her possession because she and her husband bought the property from their conjugal
funds.
The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., sold a parcel of land, with the Deed of
Absolute Sale naming Emilia O'Laco as vendee; thereafter a TCT was issued in her name.
Private respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Wa learned from the newspapers that
Emilia O'Laco sold the same property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila for
P230,000.00, with assumption of the real estate mortgage constituted thereon. Respondent-spouses
Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia sued petitioner-spouses Emilia O'Laco and Hugo Luna to
recover the purchase price of the land.
Respondent-spouses asserting that petitioner Emilia O'Laco knew that they were the real vendees
of the Oroquieta property sold in 1943 by Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd.,
and that the legal title thereto was merely placed in her name. They contend that Emilia O'Laco
breached the trust when she sold the land to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.Petitioner-
spouses deny the existence of any form of trust relation. They aver that Emilia O'Laco actually
bought the property with her own money; that she left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
corresponding title with respondent-spouses merely for safekeeping; that when she asked for the
return of the documents evidencing her ownership, respondent-spouses told her that these were
misplaced or lost; and, that in view of the loss, she filed a petition for issuance of a new title
ISSUE: Whether there is a trust relation between the parties in contemplation of law.
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RULING: Yes. We find that there is. By definition, trust relations between parties may either be
express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied
trusts are those which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of
equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts may either be
resulting or constructive trusts, both coming into being by operation of law.
the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a
to hold his legal title for the benefit of another.
On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy
the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one
who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he
ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. Unlike express trusts concerning immovables
or any interest therein which cannot be proved by parol evidence, implied trusts may be established
by oral evidence.
However, in order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should
be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic
document. It cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof. A resulting trust is
repudiated if the following requisites concur: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the cestui qui trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and convincing.
PABLO LORENZO, AS TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF THOMAS HANLEY,

DECEASED v. JUAN POSADAS, JR., COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937
A probate court may exercise sound judgment in appointing a trustee to carry into effect the
provisions of the will --- where a trust is actually created by the will by the provision that certain
of the property shall be kept together undisposed during a fixed period and for stated purpose.
FACTS: The plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley,
deceased against the defendant, Juan Posadas, Jr., then the Collector of Internal Revenue, for the
refund of the amount of P2,052.74, paid by the plaintiff as inheritance tax on the estate of the
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deceased, and for the collection of interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. Thomas
Hanley died leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal properties. Proceedings
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for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun. The will
was admitted to probate. The CFI of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests of their
estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to
Matthew Hanley ten years after the two executors named in the will, was appointed trustee. When
he resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in his stead.
ISSUE: In determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the
compensation due to trustees.
RULING: A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services. But from
this it does not follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the
net value of the estate subject to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires trustees'
commissions to be deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax.
Furthermore, though a testamentary trust has been created, it does not appear that the testator
intended that the duties of his executors and trustees should be separated. On the contrary, in
paragraph 5 of his will, the testator expressed the desire that his real estate be handled and managed
by his executors until the expiration of the period of ten years therein provided.
Judicial expenses are expenses of administration but, in State vs. Hennepin County Probate Court,
it was said: ". . . The compensation of a trustee, earned, not in the administration of the estate, but
in the management thereof for the benefit of the legatees or devises, does not come properly within
the class or reason for exempting administration expenses. . . . Service rendered in that behalf have
no reference to closing the estate for the purpose of a distribution thereof to those entitled to it, and
are not required or essential to the perfection of the rights of the heirs or legatees. . . . Trusts . . .
Of In determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the compensation
due to trustees the character of that here before the court, are created for the the benefit of those to
whom the property ultimately passes, are of voluntary creation, and intended for the preservation
of the estate. No sound reason is given to support the contention that such expenses should be
taken into consideration in fixing the value of the estate for the purpose of this tax.
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252
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO ET AL vs CA ET AL.
GR. No. 129008 January 13, 2004
The necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling
when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed
administrator, but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself. The
rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during
the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no
appointed administrator such as in the case.
FACTS: On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving
several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Calookan City. He
also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with
whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents. Apart from the respondents, the
demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour, Teodora Rioferio and their children.
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada, legitimate children of
Alfonso, discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties
of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City.
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra

Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles. Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid
complaint interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial
settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and
that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance, but the decedent had
managed to register them in his name.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased
after the commencement of the administration proceedings
RULING:YES. Article 777 of the New Civil Code “that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent.” The provision in turn is the foundation of the
principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. The above-quoted rules, while permitting an
executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit
the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an
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administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in
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which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no
administrator has been appointed.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, 1. If the

executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and 2. When the administrator is
alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party defendant.
BRIONES vs. HENSON – CRUZ
GR. No. 153130 August 22, 2008
The ruling on the extent of the special administrator’s commission – effectively, a claim by the
special administrator against the estate – is the lower courts last word on the matter and one that
is appealable
FACTS: Respondent Henson filed a petition for the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz
J. Henson. The trial court designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator
of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment. respondents filed with the Court of Appeals
(CA) a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus. Prior the filing of the petition for
certiorari, the heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC assailing the Order
insofar as it directed the payment of Atty. Briones' commission. They subsequently filed their
record on appeal.
ISSUE: Who determines the special administrator’s commission.
RULING: In contrast with the interlocutory character of the auditor's appointment, the second
part is limited to the Special Administrator's commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of
the estate. To quote from the Order: the court hereby. 2. Suspends the approval of the report of the
special administrator except the payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the
value of the estate." Under these terms, it is immediately apparent that this pronouncement on an
independently determinable issue - the special administrator's commission - is the court's definite
and final word on the matter, subject only to whatever a higher body may decide if an appeal is
made from the court's ruling. From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator's
commission is no less a claim against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section
8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this when it provides for "Claim of Executor or Administrator
Against an Estate." Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against
the estate "is appealable as in ordinary cases."
Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrator's
commission - effectively, a claim by the special administrator against the estate - is the lower
court's last word on the matter and one that is appealable.
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SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C. SALITICO, PETITIONERS vs.
HEIRS OF RESURRECCION* MARTINEZ FELIX, NAMELY: LUCIANO, CORAZON
AND CONCEPCION, ALL SURNAMED FELIX, RECAREDO P. HERNANDEZ, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF AMANDA H. BURGOS, AND
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
G.R. NO. 240199
FACTS: As narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision and based on the records of the instant
case, the essential facts and antecedent proceedings of the case are as follows:
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint[4] for Specific Performance with Damages
(Complaint) filed on February 15, 2011 by the petitioners Sps. Salitico against the respondents
Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix (Resurreccion); namely: Luciano, Corazon, and Concepcion,
all surnamed Felix (collectively referred to as the respondents heirs); Recaredo P. Hernandez
(Recaredo), in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Amanda H. Burgos (Amanda); and
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan (RD). The case was heard before the Regional Trial Comt of
Malolos City (RTC), Branch 20 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 73-M-2011.
Amanda is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land registered in her name
under Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-1908, located in Bambang, Bulacan (subject
property).
By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos[5] dated May 7, 1986
(Huling Habilin), the subject property was inherited by the niece of Amanda, Resurreccion, as a
devisee. The pertinent provision of the Huling Habilin provides:
Sa aking pamangkin nasi RESURRECCION MARTINEZ-FELIX, 'RESY', ay aking inaaboy ang

apat (4) na parselang lupang palayan na napapaloob sa mga titulong sumusunod:
x x x x[6]
Thereafter, Resurreccion, as the new owner of the subject property, executed a document entitled
Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa[7] dated November 10, 1998, which transferred ownership over the
parcel of land in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. The latter then took physical possession of
the subject property.
Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the was undertaken before the RTC, Branch 22
(Probate Court). Respondent Recaredo was appointed as the executor of the Huling Habilin. The
latter then filed and presented the Huling Habilin before the Probate Court, which approved it on
February 6, 2008. The Probate Court likewise issued a Certificate of Allowance on January 12,
2009.
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255
On March 9, 2010, the petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring them to vacate
the subject property and surrender possession over it to the respondents heirs. To protect their
interest over the subject property, the petitioners Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim dated March 17, 2009, which was however denied registration by the respondent RD on
November 3, 2009
In their Complaint before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the delivery and return in
their favor of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 and the execution of the corresponding
Deed of Absolute Sale by way of confirming the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. They likewise prayed
that OCT P-1908 be cancelled and a new one be issued in their names. Lastly, they also demanded
payment of attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages, and reimbursement for litigation
expenses.
On February 11, 2013, the petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Summary Judgment,[8]
which was, however, denied by the RTC in its Order[9] dated June 5, 2013. The petitioners Sps.
Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was partially granted by the RTC in its Order
dated September 18, 2013.[10] The RTC issued a partial summary judgment in favor of the
petitioners Sps. Salitico, ordering the respondent RD to register the petitioners' Affidavit of
Adverse Claim dated March 17, 2009. The Pre-Trial of the case was concluded on September 26,
2013. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Ruling of the RTC
On June 6, 2014, the RTC rendered its Decision[11] dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause of
action. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Complaint dated 7 February 2011 is hereby dismissed for
lack of cause of action.
SO ORDERED.[12]
In its Decision, the RTC found that Resurreccion had indeed validly sold the subject property
which she inherited from Amanda to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. Nevertheless, the RTC held that
the action filed by the petitioners Sps. Salitico is premature on the ground that it was not shown
that the Probate Court had already fully settled the Estate of Amanda, even as it was not disputed
that the Huling Habilin had already been allowed and certified. Hence, the RTC dismissed the
Complaint for the sole reason that the petitioners Sps. Salitico's cause of action had supposedly
not yet accrued, as the Estate of Amanda has not yet been fully settled by the Probate Court.
The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in the RTC's
Order dated May 26, 2015.[13]
Hence, on June 16, 2015, the petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Notice of Appeal, which was
granted by the RTC on June 18, 2015. The appeal was given due course by the CA.
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The Ruling of the CA
256
In the assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the appeal due to the pendency of the probate
proceedings before the Probate Court, citing Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states
that no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper
court. The CA also cited Rule 90, Section 1, which states that no distribution shall be allowed until
the payment of debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax have been made, unless the distributees or any of them give a bond in a sum
fixed by the court conditioned on the payment of the said obligations.
The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration dated November 9, 2017,[14]
which was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution.
Hence, this appeal via Petition for Review on Certiorari[15] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents heirs filed their Comment[16] dated November 9, 2018.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's Decision dated June 6, 2014 and Order
dated May 26, 2015, which dismissed the petitioners Sps. Salitico's Complaint for Specific
Performance due to lack of cause of action.
RULING: The instant Petition is partly meritorious.
It is not disputed that by virtue of the decedent Amanda's will, i.e., Huling Habilin, Resurreccion
inherited the subject property as the designated devisee. The respondents heirs themselves admit
that Resurreccion is a testamentary heir of Amanda.[17]
It is likewise not disputed that Resurreccion sold her interest over the subject property by executing
a document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico who then
proceeded to take physical possession of the subject property. In fact, in the assailed Decision, the
CA recognized that the RTC itselfhad held that "Resurreccion validly sold to [the petitioners Sps.
Salitico] all her rights in the [subject property] which she inherited from Amanda H. Burgos as
part of her undivided share in the estate of the latter."[18]
Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of the inheritance are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Article 777 operates at the very moment
of the decedent's death meaning that the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment
of death and, therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired
ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or
partition, or distribution."[19] Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her hereditary
share immediately after such death.[20] The Court, early on in Teves de Jakosalem v. Rafols, et
al.,[21] explained that a sale made by a legal or intestate heir of his share in an inheritance does
not interfere with the administration of the estate.
As applied to the instant case, upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion became the absolute owner
of the devised subject property, subject to a resolutory condition that upon settlement of Amanda's
Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or excessive. Hence, there was no legal bar preventing
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Resurreccion from entering into a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps. Salitico with respect to
the former's share or interest over the subject property.
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In a contract of sale, the parties' obligations are plain and simple. The law obliges the vendor to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale to the vendee.[22]
Therefore, as a consequence of the valid contract of sale entered into by the parties, Resurreccion
had the obligation to deliver the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. In fact, it is not
disputed that the physical delivery of the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico had been
done, with the latter immediately entering into possession of the subject property after the
execution of the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. Therefore, considering that a valid sale has been
entered into in the instant case, there is no reason for the respondents heirs to withhold from the
petitioners Sps. Salitico the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908. To reiterate, Resurreccion
already sold all of her interest over the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. Therefore,
the respondents heirs have absolutely no rhyme nor reason to continue possessing the owner's
duplicate copy of OCT P-1908.
Nevertheless, the existence of a valid sale in the instant case does not necessarily mean that the
RD may already be compelled to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new title in the name of the
petitioners Sps. Salitico.
According to Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, with respect to the transfer of properties subject of testate or intestate
proceedings, a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee shall be issued by the Register
of Deeds only upon the submission of a certified copy of the partition and distribution, together
with the final judgment or order of the court approving the same or otherwise making final
distribution, supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case
may be. The said provision provides:
Section 92. Registration of final distribution of estate. A certified copy of the partition and
distribution, together with the final judgment or order of the court approving the same or otherwise
making final distribution, supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom,
as the case may be, shall be tiled with the Register of Deeds, and upon the presentation of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title, new certificates of title shall be issued to the parties severally
entitled thereto in accordance with the approved partition and distribution.
Further, under Section 91 of PD 1529, even without an order of final distribution from the
testate/intestate court and in anticipation of a final distribution of a portion or the whole of the
property, the Register of Deeds may be compelled to issue the corresponding certificate of title to
the transferee only when the executor/administrator of the estate submits a certified copy of an
order from the court having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate proceedings directing the
executor/administrator to transfer the property to the transferees. The said provision provides:
Section 91. Transfer in anticipation of final distribution. Whenever the court having jurisdiction
of the testate or intestate proceedings directs the executor or administrator to take over and transfer
to the devisees or heirs, or any of them, in anticipation of final distribution a portion or the whole
of the registered land to which they might be entitled on final distribution, upon the filing of a
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certified copy of such order in the office of the Register of Deeds, the executor or administrator
may cause such transfer to be made upon the register in like manner as in case of a sale, and upon
258
the presentation of the owner's duplicate certificate to the Register of Deeds, the devisees or heirs
concerned shall be entitled to the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title.
The aforementioned sections of PD 1529 are in perfect conjunction with Rule 90, Section 1[23] of
the Rules of Court, which states that the actual distribution of property subject to testate or intestate
proceedings, i.e., the issuance of a new title in the name of the distributee, shall occur only when
the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate, have been paid. Only then can the testate or
intestate court assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same. Under Rule 90,
Section 1, the testate or intestate court may also order the distribution of the property pending the
final order of distribution if the distributees give a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned
upon the payment of the aforesaid said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.
Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, it is only upon the
issuance by the testate or intestate court of the final order of distribution of the estate or the order
in anticipation of the final distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject property may
be issued in the name of the distributees.
In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the pendency of the settlement of the Estate of
Amanda, the Probate Court had issued an order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of
a final distribution, both of which the law deems as requirements before the RD can issue a new
certificate of title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
To clarify, this holding does not go against Article 777 of the Civil Code whatsoever. What the
aforesaid Civil Code provision signifies is that there is no legal bar preventing an heir from
disposing his/her hereditary share and transferring such share to another person, inasmuch as the
right thereto is vested or transmitted to the heir from the moment of the death of the decedent or
testator. The rule, however, does not state that the transferee may already compel the issuance of
a new certificate of title covering the specific property in his/her name.
Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of PD 1529
and the Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another
person, before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering specific
property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of
the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first be had.
Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between Resurreccion and the petitioners
Sps. Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT
P-1908 in favor of the latter, pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any
order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution from the Probate Court,
the RD cannot be compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of title
in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
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WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated October 19,
2017 and Resolution dated June 7, 2018 of the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division and Former
Special Twelfth Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 105166 are PARTIALLY
REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents Heirs of Resurreccion
Martinez Felix to DELIVER the owner's duplicate copy of Owner's Certificate of Title No. P-1908
to the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
IONA LERIOU vs. YOHANNA LONGA
G.R. No. 203923 October 8, 2019
FACTS: Respondent-minors Yohanna and Victoria Longa, represented by their mother, Mary
Jane B. Sta. Cruz, instituted a petition for letters of administration. Respondents alleged that
Enrique died intestate, survived by petitioners and respondents. The RTC issued the Letters of
Administrator in favor of Mary Jane. Petitioners on the other hand, filed a motion to have Mary
Jane removed as the administratrix on the ground of negligence and misrepresentation. Mary Jane
denied any of it. In opposing petitioners’ preferential right to administer the estate, respondent-
administratrix averred that petitioners are disqualified to act as administrators because petitioner
Iona, a Greek national, is already divorced from Enrique and has already remarried as shown be
her name. Also, petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen are non-residents of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Who has the preferential right to be administrators of the estate of Enrique?
RULING: Here, petitioners cannot assert their preferential right to administer the estate or that
their choice of administrator should be preferred because they are the nearest of kin of the
decedent. It is worth emphasizing that the preference given to the surviving spouses, next of kin,
and creditors is not absolute, and that the appointment of an administrator greatly depends on the
attendance facts and circumstances.
In the instant case, petitioners are non-residents of the Philippines, which disqualify them from
administering the decedent’s estate pursuant to Rule 78, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court. We are
mindful that respondents are also disqualified by reason of their minority. In view of the evident
disqualification of petitioners and respondents and the lack of any known creditors, the parties
have no choice but to have somebody else administer the estate for them. Petitioners nominated
Juan Manuel Elizalde (Elizade) but failed to give adequate justification as to why Leters of
Administration should be issued in Elizalde’s favor. We fully agree with the ruling of the trial and
appellate courts in choosing respondent-administratrix over Elizalde. Compare to Elizalde whose
interest over the decedent’s estate is unclear, respondent-administratrix’s interest is to protect the
estate for the benefit of her children with Enrique. Indeed, it is respondents who would directly
benefit from an orderly and efficient management by the responde-administratrix. In the absence
of any indication that responde-administratrix would jeopardize her children’s interest, or that of
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260
petitioners in the subject estate, petitioners’ attempts to remove her as administratrix of Enrique’s
estate must fail.
QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE vs. LCN CONSTRUCTION
CORP.
G.R. No. 174873 August 26, 2008
FACTS: Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha of the Quasha Ancheta Pena and Nolasco Law Office
(Quasha Law Office) were appointed as administrators of the intestate estate of Raymond Triviere.
As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate
taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation
expenses. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their
litigation expenses. RTC denied said motion, citing their failure to submit an accounting of the
assets and liabilities of the estate under administration. Atty. Quasha died while the proceeding
was pending and the law office continued to represent the family of the deceased. After years,
Atty. Syquia and a new counsel, Atty. Zapata, filed for another Motion for Payment from the estate
for the shares of the children as well as their payment as administrators, which LCN opposed as
the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere.
The RTC granted the second Motion for Payment. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA
promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN, reasoning that the award of expenses
and fees in favor of executors and administrators is subject to the qualification that where the
executor or administrator is a lawyer, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees
for legal services rendered by him. The CA held that the attorney's fees due Atty. Syquia and the
Quasha Law Offices should be borne by their clients, the widow and children of the late Raymond
Triviere, respectively.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to its claims of attorney’s fees, reimbursement and
litigation expenses which are chargeable to estate.
RULING: Petitioner is entitled to its claims but not chargeable to the estate of the deceased.
The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers
substituted Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached pertain
to the issuance of letters of administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers
at any time after the demise of Atty. Quasha. The is thus inclined to give credence to petitioner's
contention that while it rendered legal services for the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere
since the time of Atty. Quasha's death in 1996, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting
that it was never even issued letters of administration.
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However, while petitioner Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the Triviere children from
the time of death of Atty. Quasha, is entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses, the same
may be collected from the shares of the Triviere children, upon final distribution of the estate, in
consideration of the fact that the Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as counsel (not anymore as
co - administrator), representing and performing legal services for the Triviere children in the
settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLA VIANO MAGLASANG AND SALUD ADAZA-
MAGLASANG vs. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171206 September 23, 2013
FACTS: Spouses Maglasang obtained a credit line from Manila Banking Corp. (MBC) secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage. When Flaviano Maglasang died, his son Edgar was appointed as atty-
in-fact by Flaviano’s heirs. He filed a petition for letters of administration of Flaviano’s intestate
estate which the probate court granted. The court issued a Notice to Creditors for filing of money
claims against the estate. MBC notified the court of its claim. When Court terminated the
proceedings and executed an extra-judicial partition over the properties, the loan obligations owed
to MBC remained unsatisfied though the court recognized the rights of MBC to foreclose the
mortgage. MBC extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage; however, after auction sale, a deficiency
remained on Maglasangs’ obligation. Thus, it filed a suit to recover the deficiency. The RTC ruled
in favor of MBC, so Maglasangs appealed to CA contending that under Remedies available to
MBC under Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC are alternative and exclusive, such that the election of one
operates as a waiver of the others and since MBC filed a claim in the probate court, it has
abandoned its right to foreclose the property and is barred from recovering any deficiency.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent may still file a claim deficiency against the estate after it
foreclosed the mortgage.
RULING: No, opting to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7,
Rule 86, respondent is already precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount.
Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured creditor
has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness.
In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate
of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the
deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and
foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any
deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the
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others. Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same includes the option of extra-
judicially foreclosing the mortgage under Act No. 3135, as availed of by respondent in this case.
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However, the plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his
right to recover any deficiency from the estate. Simply put, Section 7, Rule 86 governs the
parameters and the extent to which a claim may be advanced against the estate, whereas Act No.
3135 sets out the specific procedure to be followed when the creditor subsequently chooses the
third option – specifically, that of extra-judicially foreclosing real property belonging to the estate.
Sec. 7, Rule 86 lays down the options for the secured creditor to claim against the estate and,
according to jurisprudence, the availment of the 3rd option bars him from claiming any deficiency
amount. After 3rd option is chosen (under Sec. 7,Rule 86), the procedure governing the manner in
which the extra-judicial foreclosure should proceed would still be governed by the provisions of
Act No. 3135.
In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties
previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third
option. It did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners
assert, since it merely notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the
estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having unequivocally
opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent
is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount.
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER
Gr No. 157912 December 13, 2007, J. Austria-Martinez
FACTS: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter
issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him
amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred
and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money
claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section
7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification
against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the
money claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money
claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
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denied.
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Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and
the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the ROC
provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in
a suppletory manner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this
Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the ROC
ISSUES:
a) Must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-
forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?
b) Must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for
failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?
c) Must the contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure
to contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?
RULING:
A. NO; The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other
initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate
of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding
was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent’s will. Under
Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or
notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they
would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent
is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the
filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having
money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions. Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for
creditors’ claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the
properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained thus:
x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental
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matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
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independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause.
It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with
and dependent upon the principal remedy.xx
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent’s
estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action
for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner‘s contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
B. NO.; On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals[ that the trial
court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney’s fees) against an estate for services
rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even
without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the
judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the ROC, or the trial court may order the payment
of such filing fees within a reasonable time. After all, the trial court had already assumed
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of
filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a
money claim against the estate.
C. NO; With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De

Guzman Vda. de Macatangay is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed
if said rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action
or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate,
delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the
postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who,
wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing
pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time
to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from
the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse
party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming
it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court
the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or
filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service
was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause “whenever
practicable”.
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We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service
and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the
light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only
when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must
then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not
practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise
consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and
the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower
court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it
is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v.
Court of Appeals. the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not
been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its
discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest
of substantial justice.
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a
written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
GENOVEVA P. TAN V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
Gr No. 216756 August 08, 2018, J. Del Castillo
FACTS: In 2002, the Republic, through the Bureau of Customs, filed an Amended Complaint for
collection of sum of money with damages and prayer for injunctive writ against Mannequin
International Corporation (Mannequin)before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, on the
cause of action that Mannequin paid its 1995-1997 duties and taxes using spurious Tax Credit
Certificates (TCCs) amounting to P55,664,027.00.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-102639 and assigned to Branch 8 of the Manila RTC.
The original complaint was amended to include other individuals - among them Genoveva P. Tan
(Genoveva) as one of the defendants. After the Republic rested its case, Genoveva filed a demurrer
to evidence followed by an urgent manifestation with leave of court to allow her to change the
caption of her demurrer to that of a motion to exclude and drop her from the case and/or dismiss
the same as against her. The Manila RTC granted Genoveva's urgent manifestation and treated her
demurrer as a motion to exclude/drop her from the case. Subsequently, in a July 1, 2010 Order,
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the trial court resolved to grant Genoveva's motion to exclude.
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The Republic thus filed an original Petition for Certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA- G.R. SP
No.118442, on the contention that the Manila RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
Genoveva's motion to exclude/drop her from the case.
In a March 30, 2011 Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition for being tardy and for failing to
attach thereto relevant documents and pleadings. But, on motion for reconsideration, the petition
was reinstated. Genoveva took no action to question the reinstatement.
On July 29, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision granting the Republic's Petition for
Certiorari.
The instant Petition was thus instituted. On December 31, 2016, Genoveva passed away at the age
of 82. Her heirs are thus properly substituted in these proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether Genoveva should be dropped from the case.
RULING: NO. With Genoveva's death, Civil Case No. 02-102639 need not be dismissed. The
action against her survives as it is one to recover damages for an injury to the State.
Rule 87, Section 1 of the Rules of Court enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's
executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from
the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property
In effect, the only issue raised by petitioner relates to the CA's reinstatement of respondent's
Petition for Certiorari which it initially dismissed - with petitioner arguing that the reinstatement
was erroneous, and in her reply, attempts to impress upon this Court that her case was meritorious
- such that she may not be held personally liable for Mannequin's corporate liability, absent proof
of bad faith or wrongdoing on her part.
Notably, petitioner did not at all squarely address the CA's assailed pronouncements - particularly
its ruling that the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion in excluding/dropping
Genoveva from the case, the tardiness of her motion for reconsideration of its July 29, 2013
Decision, and the propriety of Atty. Simbillo's representation - which should be the very subjects
of the instant petition. This being the case, the Court cannot rule on these issues, because it is a
general rule of procedure that courts can take cognizance only of the issues pleaded by the parties.
The facts reveal that when the CA overturned its own March 30, 2011 Resolution dismissing
respondent's Petition for Certiorari for being tardy and lacking in the requisite attachments and
thus reinstated the same, petitioner took no action to question the reinstatement. She did not move
to reconsider; nor did she come to this Court for succor. Instead, she allowed the proceedings
before the CA to continue, and is only now - at this stage - raising the propriety of the reinstatement,
after participating in the whole process before the CA. This cannot be countenanced. As correctly
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ruled by the CA, petitioner may not, after participating in the proceedings before it, later question
its disposition when it turns out to be unfavorable to her cause.
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As for Genoveva's contention that the instant Petition should be granted for the reason that she has
a meritorious case, suffice it to state that the Court adopts the appellate court's pronouncement on
the matter. The CA denied Genoveva's plea to be dropped as defendant in Civil Case No. 02-
102639 because it found - by meticulous consideration of the extant evidence- that Genoveva was
"the principal orchestrator" of the scheme to use spurious TCCs to pay Mannequin's 1995-1997
duties and taxes; that such a finding was based on positive testimony of a witness presented in
court; that documentary evidence pointed to Genoveva's significant participation in Mannequin's
affairs during the time material to the suit; and that all the other defendants to the case seemed to
have absconded and suspiciously waived all their rights and properties in the country in favor of
Genoveva, who was then dropped from the suit
To repeat the appellate court's pronouncement:
It goes without saying then that x x x Genoveva's exclusion would virtually render the entire
proceedings a futile recourse as far as the petitioner is concerned. Verily, even if petitioner
Republic of the Philippines wins this case, the government will end up with a pyrrhic victory as it
cannot recover even a single centavo from the other defendants. On the other hand, it would be the
height of injustice, and surely unacceptable, that those who were responsible for this grand fraud
and benefited therefrom would laugh their way to the bank and enjoy their loot with impunity. It
was, thus, essential for the public respondent to exercise extreme caution in dealing with x x x
Genoveva's Motion to Exclude. In the end, though, the public respondent chose to mechanically
and blindly adhere to the presumption of regularity of public documents without due regard and
consideration to the palpable inconsistencies that those public documents, themselves, reveal.
There was obviously a failure to exercise sound, judicial discretion on the part of the public
respondent in this respect. (Emphasis in the original)
Adopting the CA's finding that Genoveva appears to have been the principal figure in the illegal
scheme, this Court cannot but reach the logical conclusion that she should not have been excluded
from the case.
RICARDO SIKAT, Judicial Administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Mariano
P. Villanueva vs. QUITERIA VIUDA DE VILLANUEVA, Judicial Administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased Pedro Villanueva
G.R. No. L-35925 November 10, 1932
FACTS: The present case was filed by Ricardo Sikat, as judicial administrator of the intestate
estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, against Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, as judicial administratrix of
the intestate estate of Pedro Villanueva, praying that the decision of the committee on claims and
appraisal in the intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the credit
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of the late Mariano P. Villanueva be confirmed by the court, and the defendant as judicial
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administratrix, be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,192.92, with legal interest from
July 15, 1919 until fully paid, and the costs.
In answer to the complaint, the defendant denied each and every allegation thereof, and set up a
special defense of prescription, and a counterclaim for P15,536.69 which she alleges the estate of
Mariano P. Villanueva owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva; and she prayed for judgment
absolving her from the complaint and sentencing the plaintiff to pay her said amount with interest
and costs.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the aforesaid claim of Mariano P. Villanueva's
estate against Pedro Villanueva estate has already prescribed.
RULING: NO, the trial court is correct.
The object of the law in fixing short special periods for the presentation of claims against the estate
of a deceased person is to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible in order to pay off the
debts and distribute the residue; and if a creditor having knowledge of the death of his debtor is
interested in collecting his credit as soon as possible; and if according to law the persons entitled
to the administration or to propose another person for administrator have thirty days from the death
within which to claim that right, after which time the court may appoint any creditor of the intestate
debtor: then the plaintiff herein as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, was guilty of
laches in not instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro Villanueva in the Court of First Instance
of Manila until after the lapse of three years after this court had set aside the intestate proceedings
begun in the Court of First Instance of Albay for lack of jurisdiction over the place where the
decedent had died, that is, from October 21, 1921, to June 18, 1925.
Wherefore, taking into account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and partition of estates,
and the fact that the administration of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate had knowledge of Pedro
Villanueva's death, and instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate
in the Court of First Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P. Villanueva's claim against it, which
was not allowed because this court held those proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction, the estate
of Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of laches in not instituting the same proceedings in the
competent court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, until after three years had elapsed, and
applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure by analogy, we declare the
claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed.
To hold otherwise would be to permit a creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep
the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely, by not instituting either testate or intestate proceedings
in order to present his claim, to the prejudice of the heirs and legatees. Even in the case of the
summary settlement of an estate under section 598, as amended by Act No. 2331, the Code of Civil
Procedure limits the time within which a creditor may file his claim to two years after the
settlement and distribution of the estate.
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WILLIAM ONG GENATO vs. BENJAMIN BAYHON, MELANIE BAYHON,
BENJAMIN BAYHON, JR., BRENDA BAYHON, ALINA BAYHON-CAMPOS, IRENE
BAYHON-TOLOSA, and the minor GINO BAYHON, as represented herein by his natural
mother as guardian-ad-litem, JESUSITA M. BAYHON
G.R. No. 171035 August 24, 2009
FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Bayhon obtained a loan from the petitioner amounting to
P1,000,000.00 to be paid monthly with 5% interest. The respondent executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of the petitioner to cover the loan which was conditioned upon the personal
assurance of the petitioner, the said instrument is only a private memorandum of indebtedness and
that it would neither be notarized nor enforced according to its tenor.
During the proceeding for the reconstitution of said real estate property before the RTC, Quezon
City, Branch 87 petitioner filed an Answer in Intervention in the said proceeding and attached a
copy of an alleged dacion en pago covering said lot. Respondent assailed the dacion en pago as a
forgery alleging that neither he nor his wife, who had died 3 years earlier, had executed it.
In separate case petitioner filed an action for specific performance, before the RTC, Quezon City.
In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent failed to pay the loan and executed on October
21, 1989 a dacion en pago in favor of the petitioner. The dacion en pago was inscribed and recorded
with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Petitioner further averred that despite demands,
respondent refused to execute the requisite documents to transfer to him the ownership of the lot
subject of the dacion en pago. Petitioner prayed, for the court to order the respondent to execute
the final deed of sale and transfer of possession of the said lot.
In the decision of the lower court, it stated that the dacion en pago was novated by the payments
made by the respondent and that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was void considering that
respondent’s wife was already dead during the execution of the deed.
On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the CA held that the real estate mortgage and the dacion
en pago were both void. The appellate court ruled that at the time the real estate mortgage and the
dacion en pago were executed, the wife of respondent Benjamin Bayhon was already dead. Thus,
she could not have participated in the execution of the two documents. The appellate court struck
down both the dacion en pago and the real estate mortgage as being simulated or fictitious contracts
pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code. During the appeal, respondent Benjamin Bayhon died.
The Court of Appeals held further that while the principal obligation is valid, the death of
respondent Benjamin Bayhon extinguished it. The heirs could not be ordered to pay the debts left
by the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs of the decedent can be ordered to pay the debt left by the deceased.
RULING: The Court held, with regards to the dacion en pago, the Court affirm the ruling of the
appellate court that the subject dacion en pago is a simulated or fictitious contract, and hence void.
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The evidence shows that at the time it was allegedly signed by the wife of the respondent, his wife
was already dead. This finding of fact cannot be reversed.
With regards to the appellate court extinguishing the obligation of respondent, as a general rule,
obligations derived from a contract are transmissible. According to Article 1311 of the Civil Code,
contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he
received from the decedent. The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the
case was pending before the Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to pay the
loan, the debt subsists against his estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be
transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has first been satisfied.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the obligation
to pay the principal loan and interest contracted by the deceased Benjamin Bayhon subsists against
his estate.
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO
G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013
FACTS: On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo.
Herein respondent filed an Answer, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel),
is already dead.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution, dated 18 January 2000, praying that Manuel be
substituted by his children as party-defendants, which was granted
However, on 7 October 2004, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the
following as grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or a real party
in interest; hence, the case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action; (2) that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court; (3) that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased
Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the
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trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion to dismiss despite
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discovery, during the trial of the case, of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal of
the case.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition based on the following grounds:
It should be stressed that when the complaint was filed, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already
dead. The complaint should have impleaded the estate of Manuel S. Toledo as defendant, not only
the wife, considering that the estate of Manuel S. Toledo is an indispensable party, which stands
to be benefited or be injured in the outcome of the case.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party, it is not necessary that
petitioner file its claim against the estate of Manuel.
RULING: The estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple
reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.
The collection case can proceed and the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by respondent only,
even without impleading the estate of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party to petitioner’s complaint for sum of money.
In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, the Court held that where two persons
are bound in solidum for the same debt and one of them dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved
against the estate of the latter, the decedent’s liability being absolute and primary. It is evident
from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 provides the procedure should the creditor desire to
go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision making
compliance with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the
surviving solidary debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could
be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors.
Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one of
the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. There is, therefore, nothing improper
in the creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of
instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim
could be filed.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party and the case can proceed
as against respondent only. That petitioner opted to collect from respondent and not from the estate
of Manuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss asserting that the case,
as against her, should be dismissed so that petitioner can proceed against the estate of Manuel.
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METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. ABSOLUTE
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170498 January 09, 2013
FACTS: SHCI filed a complaint for sum of money against AMC. SHCI alleged in its complaint
that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of plywood and plyboards, covered by
Metrobank checks. These checks were all crossed, and were all made payable to AMC. They were
given to Chua, AMC’s General Manager. Chua died and a special proceeding for the settlement of
his estate was commenced before the RTC. This proceeding was pending at the time AMC filed
its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint.
SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly undelivered items. Upon
investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from SHCI 18 Metrobank checks.
These were all payable to AMC and were crossed or “for payee’s account only[.]”
Metrobank filed a motion for bill of particulars, seeking to clarify certain ambiguous statements in
AMC’s answer. The RTC granted the motion but AMC failed to submit the required bill of
particulars. Hence, Metrobank filed a motion to strike out the third-party complaint. In the
meantime, Metrobank filed a motion to dismiss against AMC on the ground that the latter engaged
in prohibited forum shopping. According to Metrobank, AMC’s claim against it is the same claim
that it raised against Chua’s estate in a special proceedings the RTC. The RTC subsequently denied
this motion.
In an order, the RTC denied Metrobank’s motion. It likewise denied Metrobank’s motion for
reconsideration in an order. The RTC categorized Metrobank’s allegation in the fourth-party
complaint as a “cobro de lo indebido” – a kind of quasi-contract that mandates recovery of what
has been improperly paid. Quasi-contracts fall within the concept of implied contracts that must
be included in the claims required to be filed with the judicial settlement of the deceased’s estate
under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. As such claim, it should have been filed in Special
Proceedings No. 99-0023, not before the RTC as a fourth-party complaint. The RTC, acting in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction, does not have the authority to adjudicate the fourth-party
complaint. As a trial court hearing an ordinary action, it cannot resolve matters pertaining to special
proceedings because the latter is subject to specific rules.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling that Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint should have been filed
in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023. According to the CA, the relief that Metrobank prayed for
was based on a quasi-contract and was a money claim categorized as an implied contract that
should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
In its present petition for review on certiorari, Metrobank asserts that it should be allowed to file
a fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate in the proceedings before the RTC; its fourth-party
complaint was filed merely to enforce its right to be reimbursed by Chua’s estate in case Metrobank
is held liable to AMC. Hence, Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply.
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ISSUE: Whether Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate should be allowed.
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RULING:
Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed under Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court
In Maclan v. Garcia, Gabriel Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben Garcia the necessary
expenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia acquired the land as an heir of its previous
owner. He set up the defense that this claim should have been filed in the special proceedings to
settle the estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his claim arises from
law and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the settlement of the
estate of Garcia’s predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (now
Section 5, Rule 86).
The Court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent as previous possessor
of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben v. O’Brien, it explained that the term
“implied contracts,” as used in our remedial law, originated from the common law where
obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are both considered as implied contracts.
Thus, the term quasi-contract is included in the concept “implied contracts” as used in the Rules
of Court. Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as
claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is based on quasi-contract
Both the RTC and the CA described Metrobank’s claim against Chua’s estate as one based on
quasi-contract. A quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that the law creates on the basis of
certain voluntary, unilateral and lawful acts of a person, to avoid unjust enrichment. The Civil
Code provides an enumeration of quasi-contracts, but the list is not exhaustive and merely provides
examples.
According to the CA, Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint falls under the quasi-contracts
enunciated in Article 2154 of the Civil Code. Article 2154 embodies the concept “solutio indebiti”
which arises when something is delivered through mistake to a person who has no right to demand
it. It obligates the latter to return what has been received through mistake.
In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that Chua’s estate should reimburse it if it becomes
liable on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account upon Chua’s
instructions. This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti.
Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within the claims that should be
filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that
may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one
that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
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Court:
274
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. – All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited
in the notice[.] [italics ours]
Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court prevail over general provisions of
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
On this point, the Court supports the conclusion of the CA, to wit:
Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 and Section 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6 applies to ordinary civil actions while
Section 5, Rule 86 specifically applies to money claims against the estate. The specific provisions
of Section 5, Rule 86 x x x must therefore prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule
6[.]
In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the resolution points to the
affirmation of the assailed CA decision and resolution. Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party
complaint against Chua's estate is based on quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim that
depends on another event. Both belong to the category of claims against a deceased person that
should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court and, as such, should have been so
filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA
G.R. No. 200302
FACTS: Gerry was charged with the crime of Murder. He was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and
entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated on 26 October 2005,
and trial on the merits ensued.
the regional trial court renders judgment finding the accused GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
He was further adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the following amounts: Php 50,000.00
representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the accused; Php 120,550.00 representing the actual
damages incurred by the heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his death plus 12% interest per annum
computed from 6 September 2005 until fully paid; Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental
and emotional anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the death of Rolando Cueno; and Php
25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
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In a Resolution dated , the Supreme Court required the Quezon City Jail Warden to transfer Gerry
to the New Bilibid Prison and to report compliance within ten days from notice. The Quezon City
Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012, informed this Court that appellant passed away on
13 February 2011.
In view of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s decision, the Supreme Court
issued a Resolution which ordered the PAO to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the
estate of the deceased appellant as party; and to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution."
In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that: “Considering that the civil liability in the instant case
arose from and is based solely on the act complained of, murder, the same does not survive the
death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the abovecited ruling in People v. Jaime
Ayochok, G.R. No. 175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 324, citing People v. Rogelio Bayotas,
G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239, the death of the latter pending appeal of his
conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
ISSUE: Whether the civil liability arising from the act complained may be a claim against the
estate of the deceased accused
RULING: We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 and file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony
previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced."
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of action. If the act or
omission complained of arises from quasidelict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to
person or real or personal property, the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand,
if the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed
against the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death
of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed (civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.)"
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
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result of the same act or omission.
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3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription.
The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of
the death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to reflect
our ruling in Bayotas.
Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased
Appellant, Cueno died because of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through
deliberate acts. Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellant’s
death on 13 February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence
and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate
of the deceased for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case,"the current
Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in Bayotas, require the private offended party, or his heirs,
in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the
deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims
from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but
may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The separate civil action
proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of
evidence. The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the estate or legal
representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 3 in relation
to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case
instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil
case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno
should file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a
separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to the conclusion that,
a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded
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by the CA.
277
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLAN M. CHUA as
Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late ANTONIO M. CHUA and Mrs.
ASUNCION M. CHUA
G.R. No. 121597 June 29, 2001
Petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditor's option of extrajudicially foreclosing the
mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against
the estate of the deceased
FACTS: The spouses Antonio M. Chua and Asuncion M. Chua were the owners of a parcel of
land. Upon Antonio's death, the probate court appointed his son, private respondent Allan M. Chua,
special administrator of Antonio's intestate estate. The court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan
accommodation of five hundred fifty thousand pesos from petitioner Philippine National Bank to
be secured by a real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel of land.
Allan obtained a loan of P450,000.00 from petitioner PNB evidenced by a promissory note. To
secure the loan, Allan executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the aforesaid parcel of land.
For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage,
through the Ex-Officio Sheriff, who conducted a public auction of the mortgaged property
pursuant to the authority provided for in the deed of real estate mortgage. During the auction, PNB
was the highest bidder. Since PNB's total claim as of the date of the auction sale was P679,185.63,
the loan had a payable balance of P372,825.63. To claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action
with the RTC, Balayan, Batangas against both Mrs. Asuncion M. Chua and Allan Chua in his
capacity as special administrator of his father's intestate estate.
Despite summons duly served, private respondents did not answer the complaint. The trial court
declared them in default and received evidence ex parte.
The RTC rendered its decision, ordering the dismissal of PNB's complaint which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals
ISSUES: Whether it was error for the Court of Appeals to rule that petitioner may no longer pursue
by civil action the recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property
securing the same.
RULING: The case at bar, we must stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a
settlement of estate, wherein the administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of the
decedent, pursuant to an authority given by the probate court. As the Court of Appeals correctly
stated, the Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes into play decisively.
To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate
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mortgage is recorded in the proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order
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authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it has been
executed by the deceased himself.
Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually
exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction
of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary
claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by
prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.
In Perez v. Philippine National Bank it was held:
The ruling in Pasno vs. Ravina not having been reiterated in any other case, we have carefully
reexamined the same, and after mature deliberation have reached the conclusion that the dissenting
opinion is more in conformity with reason and law. Of the three alternative courses that section 7,
Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers the mortgage creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the mortgage and claim
the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) foreclose the mortgage
judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the mortgage
exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription, without right to
file a claim for any deficiency, the majority opinion in Pasno vs. Ravina, in requiring a judicial
foreclosure, virtually wipes out the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgage
creditor, and which would precisely include extra-judicial foreclosures by contrast with the second
alternative.
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to
recover any deficiency from the estate. Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes
extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any
further deficiency claim. The dissent in Pasno, as adopted in Perez, supports this conclusion, thus:
When account is further taken of the fact that a creditor who elects to foreclose by extrajudicial
sale waives all right to recover against the estate of the deceased debtor for any deficiency
remaining unpaid after the sale it will be readily seen that the decision in this case referring to the
majority opinion will impose a burden upon the estates of deceased persons who have mortgaged
real property for the security of debts, without any compensatory advantage.
Clearly, in our view, petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditor's option of extrajudicially
foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency
claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may no longer avail of the
complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner
foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further
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liability remains on the part of respondents and the late Antonio M. Chua's estate.
279
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS
CORPORATION
GR NO. 147561 JUNE 22, 2006
As a general rule, the death of the creditor or debtor does not extinguish the obligation.
Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law,
the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only the obligations that are
personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising
from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually
extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit before the court, which is
not then acting as a probate court.
FACTS: In 1989, Republic-Asahi entered into a contract with the proprietor of JDS Construction,
Jose D. Santos, Jr. The agreement involves the construction of roadways and a drainage system
where Republic-Asahi was to pay JDS P5, 300,000.00. To guarantee the performance of its
undertakings, JDS posted a performance bond, which JDS executed, jointly and severally with
Stronghold Insurance.
Dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken by JDS, Republic-Asahi extra-judicially
rescinded the contract. Such rescission, according to Article XV of the contract shall not be
construed as a waiver of Republic-Asahi right to recover damages from JDS and the latter’s
sureties.
Thereafter, Republic-Asahi sent a letter to Stronghold filing its claim under the bond. Republic
filed a complaint against JDS and Stronghold. The sheriff was not able to serve summons on Santos
since he was already dead.
Stronghold claimed that Republic-Asahi’s money claims against it and JDS have been
extinguished by the death of Santos.
ISSUE: Does the death of a party to a contract extinguish an obligation?
RULING: No, the death of a party to a contract does not extinguish an obligation. As a general
rule, the death of the creditor or debtor does not extinguish the obligation.
Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law,
the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only the obligations that are personal
or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims
arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not
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actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit before the court,
which is not then acting as a probate court.
In the case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with
Republic-Asahi were transmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence,
his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely
passed onto his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the
obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, Stronghold as a surety cannot use his death
to escape its monetary obligation under its performance.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SANTIBAÑEZ
GR No. 149926 February 23, 2005
The creditor of a deceased cannot claim directly from the heirs on the ground that obligations of
the deceased transmit to said heirs from the moment of death of the decedent.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of
the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property
to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. ‘The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
FACTS: In 1980, Efraim Santibañez entered into two loan agreements with First Countryside
Credit Corporation (FCCC). The loans were obtained to pay the tractors that he purchased. Efraim
died in 1981 leaving a holographic will and without fulfilling his obligations.
A testate proceeding has commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 7. The
heirs of the deceased, Edmund and Florence, executed a Joint Agreement distributing among
themselves certain properties, including the tractors that were financed by the subject loans. The
Agreement also provides that the heirs agree to assume the indebtedness pertaining to the
properties allotted to them.
Union Bank, the assignee of all the assets and liabilities of FCCC sent demand letters to Edmund
and Florence for the payment of the balance of the obligations but these remained unpaid. The
summons as to Edmund was not served as he was in the US at the time. Hence, Union Bank filed
a collection case against Florence before the Makati City RTC, Branch 63.
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The RTC dismissed the complaint since the case should have been filed with the probate court
where the testate proceeding is pending as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation
incurred by the said decedent.
Upon appeal, the CA found it without merit. It further held that the partition made in the agreement
was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the partition in the Joint Agreement executed by the heirs is valid
2. Whether the assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased by the heirs is binding
3. Whether the creditor of a deceased can claim directly from the heirs on the ground that
obligations of the deceased transmit to said heirs from the moment of death of the decedent
RULING:
1. No, the partition in the Joint Agreement executed by the heirs involving the properties embraced
in the will is void.
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
2. No, the assumption of indebtedness of the deceased is not binding.
The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir
shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent
on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel that they were each to receive.
The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor.
It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
3. No, the creditor of a deceased cannot claim directly from the heirs on the ground that obligations
of the deceased transmit to said heirs from the moment of death of the decedent.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
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rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. ‘The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
282
disposition of the claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
ALIPIO vs. JARING
Gr No. 134100 September 29, 2000
A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the
collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership. The proper remedy is
to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
FACTS: Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Bataan for five years. Before
the lease ended, 1987, he subleased it to spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses
Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel for an amount of P485, 600.00 payable in two instalments. The
second instalment was only partially fulfilled and they failed to settle the balance despite repeated
demands. Jaring filed a complaint for the collection of the amount in the RTC of Bataan and prayed
for the rescission of the sublease contract in case of failure to pay.
Prior to the institution of the complaint, Placido Alipio died. Purita moved to dismiss the complaint
citing Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which states that in an action for recovery of
money, debt or interests and the defendant dies before the Court of First Instance renders the final
judgment, the case shall be dismissed and prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these
rules.
The RTC denied Purita’s motion and ordered them to pay the unpaid balance. The new rule under
Rule 3, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that there is no longer need to
dismiss but to let the case continue until entry of final judgment. The case will then be pursued in
the manner provided by the rules on prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
Purita appealed to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed. It cited the following cases:
1. The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be dismissed
when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial court, does not apply
where there are other defendants against whom the action should be maintained (Climaco
vs. Siy-Uy); and
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2. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the
creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus,
if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death, her
liability is independent of and separate from her husband’s; she may be sued for the whole
debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her
husband should be made in the decedent’s estate (Imperial insurance Ins. vs. David).
Alipio filed a petition for review on certiorari questioning the applicability of the two cases.
ISSUE: Can a creditor sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the
collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership?
RULING: No, a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding
for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership. The proper
remedy is to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
In the case, when Placido died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and debts
chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule
73, 52 which states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved by the death
of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated,
and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.
HILADO vs COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 164108 May 8, 2009
Claims based on tort and civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims
to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are
civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 87.
FACTS: Roberto S. Benedicto, a well-known sugar magnate died intestate in 2000. He was
survived by his wife Julita and only daughter Francisca. At the time of his death, there were two
pending civil cases against Benedicto filed by Alfredo Hilado, et al. in one case, and Lopez Sugar
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Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation on the other. Both are pending before the
Bacolod City Regional Trial Court Branch 44.
Paulita filed before the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration in
her favour and it was granted. The petitioners on the two civil cases filed a Manifestation/Motion
Ex Abundanti Cautela before Manila RTC praying that they be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders on the intestate proceedings.
The Manila RTC denied the motion on the ground that the petitioners are not interested parties
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. They filed
a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed.
ISSUES:
1. Can the petitioners intervene in the estate proceedings?
2. Can their claims be filed under the notice to creditors under Rule 86 of the Rules of Court?
3. Can they be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court even if they
have no general right to intervene?
RULING:
1) No, the petitioners cannot intervene in the estate proceedings.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court x x x"
While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant."
The claims of petitioners are contingent or expectant since the civil cases are still pending before
another court. With this, the petitioners cannot intervene in the intestate proceedings
2) No, their claims cannot be filed under the notice to creditors under Rule 86.
The claims against Benedicto were based on tort and civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not
fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These
actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against
the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Hence, the petitioners’ claims must be settled in
the civil cases where they were raised, not in the intestate proceedings.
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3) Yes, they are allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court even if they have
no general right to intervene if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in
the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected.
This is the basis for the grant of the right of the petitioners to be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings
filed by the administrator of the estate.
ATTY. BERMUDO v. TAYAG-ROXAS
Gr. No. 172879 February 2, 2011
FACTS: Atty. Ricardo Bermudo (Atty. Bermudo), as executor, filed a petition for his appointment
as administrator of the estate of Artemio Hilario (Hilario) and for the allowance and probate of the
latter’s will before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City. The RTC rendered a decision,
allowing the will and recognizing Roxas as Hilario’s sole heir.
When the decision constituting Roxas as the sole heir became final, Atty. Bermudo who also
served as counsel for her in the actions concerning her inheritance filed a motion to fix his legal
fees and to constitute a charging lien against the estate for the legal services he rendered.
RTC granted him fees equivalent to 20% of the estate and constituted the same as lien on the
estate’s property. Roxas appealed the order to the CA in CA-G.R. CV 53143, which adjusted the
lawyer’s fees to 20% of the value of the land belonging to the estate. Atty. Bermudo subsequently
filed a motion with the RTC for execution and appraisal of the estate on which his 20%
compensation would be based.
The RTC granted the motion and ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo P12,644,300.00 as
attorney’s fees with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Roxas challenged the order before the
CA through a petition for certiorari.
On December 19, 2005, using a different valuation of the land of the estate, the CA ordered Roxas
to pay Atty. Bermudo a reduced amount of P4,234,770.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6%
per annum.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorney’s fees.
RULING: Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorney’s fees but only to
compensation as administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court. But
Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas’ counsel
this Court to defend her rights to her uncle’s estate. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was
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not part of his duties as administrator of the estate. Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his
attorney’s fees.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS

CORPORATION
Gr. No. 147461 February 22, 2006
FACTS: Republic Asahi Glass contracted with JDS for the construction of roadways and drainage
systems in RAG’s compound. JDS Construction does so and files the required compliance bond
with Stronghold Insurance acting as surety. The contract is P 5.3M the bond is 795k. JDS falls
woefully behind schedule, prompting RAG to rescind the contract and demand the compliance
bond.
The owner of JDS dies and JDS disappears. SHI refuses to pay the bond claiming that the death of
JDS owner extinguishes the obligation.
ISSUE: Whether the surety’s liability is extinguished by the death of the principal.
RULING: As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented
by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are
personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims
arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not
actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee's action or suit filed before the
court, which is not then acting as a probate court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts
with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law.
Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which
merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out
the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his
death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.
SALONGA HERNANDEZ & ALLADO vs. OLIVIA SENGCO PASCUAL

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G.R. No. 127165 May 2, 2006
287
FACTS: The case actually centers on two estate proceedings, that of Doña Adela Pascual (Doña
Adela) and the other, her husband Don Andres Pascual's (Don Andres), who predeceased her. Don
Andres died intestate, while Doña Adela left behind a last will and testament, designating Olivia
Pascual as the executrix.
In order to settle the estate of Dona Adela, Olivia Pascual then engaged the services of petitioner,
a professional law partnership. Their agreement as to the professional fees due to petitioner is
contained in a letter dated 25 August 1987, signed by Atty. Esteban Salonga in behalf of petitioner
and Olivia Pascual. It is stipulated therein, among others, that the final professional fee "shall be
3% of the total gross estate as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory of
the estate. Fruits shall be reckoned from the time of [Olivia Pascual's] appointment as executrix of
the estate. The 3% final fee shall be payable upon approval by the court of the agreement for the
distribution of the properties to the court designated heirs of the estate."
As such, petitioner commenced a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of Doña
Adela before the Probate Court. The petition was opposed by a certain Miguel Cornejo, Jr. and his
siblings, who in turn presented a purported will executed in 1985 by Doña Adela in their favor.
After due trial, on 1 July 1993, the Probate Court rendered a Decision allowing probate of the 1978
Last Will and Testament of Doña Adela and disallowing the purported 1985 Will. Letters
testamentary were issued to Olivia Pascual. Cornejo attempted to appeal this decision of the
Probate Court, but his notice of appeal was denied due course by the Probate Court, said notice
"not having been accompanied by any record on appeal as required under the Interim Rules and
by Rule 109 of the Rules of Court."
On 27 July 1993, petitioner filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien equivalent to three percent (3%) of
the total gross estate of the late Doña Adela S. Pascual as well as the fruits thereof based on the
court approved inventory of the estate, pursuant to the retainer agreement signed by and between
petitioner and Olivia S. Pascual, on 25 August 1987. In an Order dated 4 November 1993, the
Probate Court ruled that petitioner's "notice of attorney's lien, being fully supported by a retainer's
contract not repudiated nor questioned by his client Olivia S. Pascual, is hereby noted as a lien that
must be satisfied chargeable to the share of Olivia S. Pascual.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a motion to annotate Attorney’s lien on properties of the estate of
Dona Adela Vda. De Pascual.
The intestate court subsequently rendered its decision approving the compromise agreement, and
partitioning the estate Don Andres by adjudicating one-fourth (1/4) thereof to the heirs of Don
Andres and three-fourths (3/4) thereof to the estate of Doña Adela. The Intestate Court also
awarded attorney's fees to Atty. Jesus I. Santos, equivalent to 15% of the three-fourths (3/4) share
of the estate of Doña Adela. Olivia Pascual filed a petition for annulment of the award of attorney's
fees with the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the Attorney’s lien could be claimed to the estate of the decedent.
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RULING: The SC reiterates that as a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is
primarily liable for attorney's fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor
or administrator in relation to the settlement of the estate. The executor or administrator may seek
reimbursement from the estate for the sums paid in attorney's fees if it can be shown that the
services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate. However, if the executor or
administrator refuses to pay the attorney's fees, the lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the
lawyer may file an action against the executor or administrator, but in his/her personal capacity
and not as administrator or executor. Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the testate or
intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorney's fees as an expense of
administration. If the second mode is resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the heirs and
interested parties be made so as to enable these persons to inquire into the value of the services of
the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment.
Notwithstanding, there may be instances wherein the estate should not be charged with attorney's
fees. If the costs of counsel's fees arise out of litigation among the beneficiaries thereof themselves
or in the protection of the interests of particular persons, the estate generally cannot be held liable
for such costs, although when the administrator employs competent counsel on questions which
affect his/her duties as the administrator and on which he/she is in reasonable doubt, reasonable
expenses for such services may be charged against the estate subject to the approval of the court. It
has also been held that an administrator who brings on litigation for the deliberate purpose of
defrauding the legitimate heirs and for his own benefit is not entitled to reimbursement for
counsel's fees incurred in such litigation.
Clearly then, while the direct recovery of attorney's fees from the estate may be authorized if the
executor refuses to pay such fees, and claimed through the filing of the proper petition with the
probate court, such claim remains controvertible. This is precisely why Escueta and its progenies
require that the petition be made with notice to all the heirs and interested parties.
The fact that the prayer for attorney's fees was cast in a motion and not a petition should not impede
such claim, considering that the motion was nonetheless filed with the Probate Court. However,
the record bears that the requisite notice to all heirs and interested parties has not been
satisfied. Doña Adela's will designated 19 other individuals apart from Olivia Pascual, and four
(4) different institutions as recipients of devises or legacies consisting of real properties, jewelries,
and cash amounts. Yet only Olivia Pascual was served with a copy of the Motion for Writ of
Execution, the motion which effectively sought the immediate payment of petitioner's attorney's
fees. As early as 29 April 1994, Olivia Pascual, in opposing the Motion for Writ of Execution,
already pointed out that petitioner had failed to give sufficient notice to all interested parties to the
estate, particularly the several devisees and legatees so named in Doña Adela's will.
We reiterate that the direct claim against the estate for attorney's fees must be made with due notice
to the heirs, devisees, and legatees. The failure of petitioner to give such notice renders its present
claim inefficacious for now. Indeed, there is sufficient cause to dismiss outright petitioner's Motion
for Writ of Immediate Execution filed with the Probate Court, for its failure to notify therein the
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other persons interested in the estate of Doña Adela. Nonetheless, to authorize said outright denial
289
at this stage could unduly delay the settlement of the estate of Doña Adela, considering the
likelihood that petitioner would again pursue such claim for attorney's fees as the right to which is
affirmed by law and jurisprudence.
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PAYMENT OF DEBTS OF ESTATE
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE RELATIVE TO SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 28

PENDING AT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF HIMAMAYLAN, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 55, PRESIDED BY JUDGE JOSE AGUIRRE, JR.
AM. No. RTJ – 01 – 1624. March 26, 2001
Payment of debts and expenses of administration; execution in an improper remedy. A writ of
execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and
expenses or administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal
estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of
administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for the sale
or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator and with the written notice to all
the heirs, legatees and devices residing in the Philippines. According to Rule 89, Section 3, and
Rule 90, Section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the regulations
contained in rule 90, Section 7, should be complied with.
FACTS: Santiago Rementería y Aldamiz cogeascoa, the decedent, was a Spaniard and member
of the commercial partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria." he other members were the brothers,
Gavino and Jose, surnamed Aldamiz. Santiago Rementeria died and probate was instituted in the
same year in the Court of First Instance of Mindoro by Gavino Aldamiz represented by Atty. Juan
L. Luna.
Gavino Aldamiz was appointed administrator. After ten years from the date of his appointment,
Gavino Aldamizas administrator, through his attorney Juan L. Luna, submitted his accounts and
also a project of partition.
The court approved the accounts but refused to approve the project of partition unless all debts
including attorney’s fees be first paid. attorney’s fees, debts and incidental expenses would be
proportionately paid by the beneficiaries after the closure of the testate proceedings, but the court
refused to sanction this clause of the project. The respondent attorney wrote a petition to have his
professional fees fixed, and without previous notice to all the interested parties, submitted evidence
of his services and professional standing so that the court might fix the amount of his compensation
and the administrator may make payment thereof.
The Court, after considering the whole evidence presented, issued its order of January 21, 1947,
awarding respondent Attorney Luna, in payment of his professional services. The petitioner was
able to pay P5,000 only, and upon his failure to pay the balance of P23,000 after several demands
made upon him by the respondent attorney filed an ex-parte motion for execution. The respondent
Sheriff levied execution on two parcels of land belonging, not to the testate estate of Santiago
Rementeria y Aldamiz Cogeasca, but to the commercial partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria".
ISSUE: Whether the order of the respondent court issued on January 21, 1948, fixing the amount
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of respondent attorney’s fees is null and void.
291
RULING: Yes. The correct procedure for the collection of attorney’s fees, is for the counsel to
request the administrator to make payment and file an action against him in his personal capacity
and not as an administrator should he fail to pay. If judgment is rendered against the administrator
and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his account to the court.
The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an action, file a petition in the testate or intestate
proceeding "asking that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct
the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration." In the instant case, as above stated, no
written petition for the payment of attorney’s fees has ever been filed by respondent attorney and
the interested parties had not been previously notified thereof nor of the hearing held by the court.
Consequently, the order issued by the respondent court on January 21, 1947, and all subsequent
orders implementing it, are null and void, as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. We also
hold that the order of execution issued on April 19, 1948, is null and void, not only because it was
intended to implement the order of January 21, 1947, which in itself was null and void, but because
a writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of
debts and expenses of administration.
The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of
real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the
proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion
of the administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in
the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or mortgage
of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied
with. Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession
of their respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses
of administration and it is later ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in
which case "the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing,
settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person
shall contribute, and may issue execution if circumstances require" (Rule 89, section 6; see also
Rule 74, section 4; Italics ours). And this is not the instant case.
ERNESTO vs. MORALES

GR. NO. 224849 JUNE 6, 2018
FACTS: The respondent, Astrid Morales Agustin, is a grandchild of Jayme Morales (Jayme), who
was the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, designated as Lot No. 9217-A,
and located at Barangay Sto. Tomas, Laoag City.
The respondent initiated the instant complaint, originally together with Lydia Morales, another one
of Jayme's grandchildren and the respondent's cousin, for the partition of Jayme's property. They
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alleged that they, together with the petitioners and their other cousins, were co-owners of the
subject property by virtue of their successional rights as heirs of Jayme.
In response to the respondent's complaint, the heirs of Jose Morales filed an answer, which
admitted the allegations in the complaint, and interposed no objection to the partition, "provided
that their present positions on the subject property are respected."
On the other hand, Ernesto Morales, as one of the heirs of Vicente Morales, filed an Answer with
Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-claims. He alleged that herein respondent has no
cause of action against the petitioners because: (1) the proper remedy should not be a complaint
for partition but an action for the settlement of the intestate estate of Jayme and his wife; and (2)
herein respondent has no more right of participation over the subject property because the same
has long been conveyed to Ernesto Morales (as substituted by herein petitioners) by the
respondent's parents, Simeon and Leonila Morales.
The RTC ruled that: (1) the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be partitioned without
need of any settlement or administration proceeding; and (2) the RTC properly and lawfully
rendered summary judgment despite the absence of any motion from any of the parties praying for
the application of the rules thereon.
The CA ruled that summary judgment in this case is proper despite the absence of any motion from
any of the parties. In support hereto, the CA ratiocinated that the parties prayed for resolution of
all "pending motions/incidents" during the hearing on September 18, 2013, and acceded to the
RTC pronouncement therein that its resolution "shall be considered as a decision in the said case
for partition."
ISSUE: Whether or not an administration proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased is a condition that has to be met before any partition of the estate and any distribution
thereof to the heirs could be effected.
RULING: The Court does not agree with this assertion by the petitioners, the Court, nonetheless,
agrees that the trial court should have collated Jayme's other properties, if any, prior to the
promulgation of any judgment of partition in accordance with the laws on Succession.
Generally, an action for partition may be seen to simultaneously present two issues: first, there is
the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned; and
second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue
of how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and defendants, i.e., what portion should
go to which co-owner.
The Court must emphasize, however, that this definition does not take into account the difference
between (1) an action of partition based on the successional rights of the heirs of a decedent, and
(2) an ordinary action of partition among co-owners. While oftentimes interchanged with one
another, and although in many ways similar, these two partitions draw legal basis from two
different sets of legal provisions in the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code).
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According to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the heirs may resort to an ordinary action of partition
of the estate of the deceased if they disagree as to the exact division of the estate, and only "[i]f the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose."
Thus, an action for partition with regard to the inheritance of the heirs should conform to the law
governing the partition and distribution of the estate, and not only to the law governing ordinary
partition. Particularly, according to Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two or more
heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment
of debts of the deceased.
ALFREDO HILADO, ET AL. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
FACTS: Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate and survived by his wife, private respondent Julita
Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving
the petitioners. Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
in her favor which was granted by the RTC of Manila. The value of the assets of the decedent is
P5 Million, "net of liabilities." In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private
respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being
litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
The RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal
report pertaining to the estate. Then, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion
Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
The RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not
interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim have the right to participate
in the settlement proceeding by way of intervention under Rule 19.
(2) Whether or not the claims of petitioners can be filed under the notice to creditors required under
Rule 86.
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RULING:
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(1) No. Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not
extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
"intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims. Section 1 of Rule
19 requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language
of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate
proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must
be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."
(2) No. The claims that can be filed under Rule 86 are enumerated under Section 5 of the said rule.
Civil action for tort or quasi-delict is not among those enumerated. Hence, petitioners’ claims do
not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.
These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced
against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Hence, the merits of petitioners’ claims
against Benedicto are to be settled in civil cases where they were raised and not in the intestate
proceedings.
AUGUSTO GATMAYTAN, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPUTY SHERIFF MARVIN I.

BELMONTE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Quezon City, REGISTER OF DEEDS (of
Calamba), REGISTER OF DEEDS (of Mandaluyong, M.M.), and REGISTER OF DEEDS
(of Quezon City)
G. R. No. 132856 August 28, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner was hired as counsel for Preciosa B. Garcia (Preciosa) initially in connection
with a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of her late husband, Amado
G. Garcia. In a subsequent retainer agreement, petitioner undertook to represent Preciosa and her
daughter, Agustina Garcia in Special Proceedings No. Q-19738, entitled "In the Matter of the
Estate of Amado G. Garcia." Under the agreement, petitioner was entitled to payment of a
contingent fee of 30% of the entire estate.
On 18 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the trial court authorize the payment of
his attorney’s fees, the Court fixes the fee of Atty. Gatmaytan at thirty percent (30%) of whatever
inheritance may be received by Preciosa Garcia and Agustina Garcia in the proceedings. However,
as it does not appear that funds are available for payment of such fees, the payment thereof is
deferred until funds are available.
On 21 January 1993, the probate court issued an order granting petitioner’s motion for execution
pending appeal of the order of 30 April 1990, authorizing the payment to him of attorney’s fees at
30% of the inheritance.
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On 11 November 1994, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus before the Court of Appeals,
seeking the full execution of the writ dated 2 February 1993, particularly the payment of attorney’s
fees of thirty (30%) of the entire estate before distribution.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals acted correctly in denying the petition for mandamus
RULING: It is settled that an order of a probate court fixing the amount of fees is regarded as
interlocutory in nature, subject to modification or setting aside until the estate proceeding is
terminated and the case definitely closed, after which the order becomes final. In other words, an
order fixing the fees continues to be under the control of the probate court until the proceeding is
closed and until then it may increase or decrease the fees as facts and circumstances develop and
unfold which may justify modification of the order even if the fees have already been partially or
fully paid, as they may be ordered returned or reimbursed to the estate or a bond required to be
filed to guarantee their return or reimbursement.
Accordingly, in the mandamus case the Court of Appeals correctly appreciated that no clear legal
right exists to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus in favor of petitioner. The writ of
execution sought to be enforced through the petition for mandamus earlier served as the vehicle
for the implementation of the order of 30 April 1990 approving the award of attorney’s fees at
30% of the estate.
That order, however, was superseded by the order of 10 June 1994. As a consequence, it becomes
ineluctable that the order of 30 April 1990 can no longer be enforced even through a petition for
mandamus.
MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner of Internal RevenueHON. LORENZO C.

GARLITOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, and
SIMEONA K. PRICE, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Walter Scott
Price
G.R. No. L-18994 June 29, 1963
FACTS: In Melecio R. Domingo vs. Hon. Judge S. C. Moscoso, G.R. No. L-14674, January 30,
1960, this Court declared as final and executory the order for the payment by the estate of the
estate and inheritance taxes, charges and penalties, amounting to P40,058.55, issued by the Court
of First Instance of Leyte in, special proceedings No. 14 entitled "In the matter of the Intestate
Estate of the Late Walter Scott Price." In order to enforce the claims against the estate the fiscal
presented a petition dated June 21, 1961, to the court below for the execution of the judgment. The
petition was, however, denied by the court which held that the execution is not justifiable as the
Government is indebted to the estate under administration in the amount of P262,200.
the Court orders that the payment of inheritance taxes in the sum of P40,058.55 due the Collector
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of Internal Revenue as ordered paid by this Court on July 5, 1960 in accordance with the order of
the Supreme Court promulgated July 30, 1960 in G.R. No. L-14674, be deducted from the amount
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of P262,200.00 due and payable to the Administratrix Simeona K. Price, in this estate, the balance
to be paid by the Government to her without further delay.
The Court has nothing further to add to its order dated August 20, 1960 and it orders that the
payment of the claim of the Collector of Internal Revenue be deferred until the Government shall
have paid its accounts to the administratrix herein amounting to P262,200.00
ISSUE: Whether writ of execution of judgment is the proper remedy
RULING: NO
A writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of
debts and expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of
personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses
of administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs legatees and devisees residing in the
Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or mortgage
of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied.
Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of
their respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of
administration and it is later ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which
case "the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle
the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person shall
contribute, and may issue execution if circumstances require" (Rule 89, section 6; see also Rule
74, Section 4; Emphasis supplied.) And this is not the instant case.
The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestate proceedings to settle
the estate of a deceased person, the properties belonging to the estate are under the jurisdiction of
the court and such jurisdiction continues until said properties have been distributed among the
heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency of the proceedings all the estate is in custodia legis and
the proper procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in case of the court judgment, to seize the properties
but to ask the court for an order to require the administrator to pay the amount due from the estate
and required to be paid.
WILLIAM ONG GENATO vs. BENJAMIN BAYHON, ET AL.

GR No. 171035 August 24, 2009
When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of
final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
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person.
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FACTS: In 1989, Benjamin Bayhon obtained a loan amounting to P1, 000, 000.00 from William
Genato. To secure the loan, Benjamin executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 38052. The execution of such Deed was
conditioned upon the personal assurance by Genato that it is only a private memorandum of
indebtedness which would neither be notarized nor enforced according to its tenor.
Genato filed an action for specific performance. He alleged that Benjamin executed a dacion en
pago in favor of him. He averred that Benjamin failed to pay the loan and despite demands, the
latter refused to execute the requisite documents to transfer to Genato the ownership of the lot
subject of the dacion en pago.
The RTC upheld Benjamin’s liability but rendered the real estate mortgage invalid since at the
time of its execution, Benjamin’s wife was already dead. Benjamin could not have validly
mortgaged the property since it was not owned by Benjamin alone.
Pending appeal with the CA, Benjamin died. CA reversed the RTC’s decision on the ground that
both the real estate mortgage and dacion en pago were void. It further held that while the principal
obligation is valid, the death of Benjamin extinguished it. The heirs could not be ordered to pay
the debts left by the deceased.
ISSUES:
1) Was the obligation extinguished by the death of Benjamin?
2) What is the procedure in vindicating monetary claims involving a defendant who dies before
final judgment?
RULING:
1) No, the obligation was not extinguished.
Article 1311, par.1 of the Civil Code provides:
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he
received from the decedent.
Under our law, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible
to the successors. The heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his
obligations.
2) The procedure in vindicating monetary claims involving a defendant who dies before final
judgment is governed by Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure:
When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of
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final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the
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manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person.
Pursuant to this provision, Genato’s remedy lies in filing a claim against the estate of the deceased.
UNIONBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANTIBANEZ

Gr No. 149926 February 23, 2005
FACTS: Efraim Santibanez (Efraim) & his son Edmund, entered into 2 loan agreements for a 2
Ford Agricultural Tractor with First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) wherein Efraim
issued 2 promissory notes for both loans and an additional Continuing Guaranty Agreement
for the second loan. Efraim died leaving a holographic will where during the testate proceeding
Edmund and his sister, Florence, executed a joint agreement over the properties of their father
including the tractors to which they assumed the indebtedness to FCCC. Union Bank of the
Philippines, the assignee of the assets and liabilities of FCCC, filed a complaint for sum of money
against Edmund and Florence after the former’s demand letter for the settlement of the
account was unheeded by the latter.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid.
RULING: No, the assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent by Edmund and Florence is not
binding, since such assumption was conditioned upon an invalid agreement. Also, the court should
have filed it money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court under Section 5, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, it cannot go after Florence for she took no part in the
documents related to the tractors, specifically the promissory notes and the continuing
guaranty agreement; they should have gone after Edmund being a co-signatory to the promissory
notes and guaranty.
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PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE
CORAZON GREGORIO ET. AL vs. MADARANG ET AL

GR. No. 185226 February 11, 2010
The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate court to make a
provisional determination of ownership of lot 829-b-4-b. It bears stress that the question is one of
collation or advancement by the decedent to an heir over which the question of title and ownership
can be passed upon by a probate court.
FACTS: Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on June 3, 1995,
leaving real and personal properties with an estimated value of ₱200,000.00. He was survived by
his wife Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose, Ramiro, Vicente and
Corazon.In the intestate proceedings filed by the couple’s son Jose which was lodged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores was appointed as administratrix of
the intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr. Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties
of the decedent’s estate. Jose filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted six lots
including Lot 829-B-4-B located in Cebu City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 125429. She alleged that the six lots had been transferred during the lifetime of the decedent
by a Deed of donation executed in August 1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro, Sr. and
therefore, should no longer be included in the inventory.
ISSUE: Whether the properties subject to a deed of donation executed by the decedent during his
lifetime should be excluded from inventory of the estate of the deceased.
RULING: The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate court to
make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It bears stress that the question
is one of collation or advancement by the decedent to an heir over which the question of title and
ownership can be passed upon by a probate court.Vicente’s claim of ownership over Lot 829-B-
4-B rests upon a deed of donation by his father (decedent) and his mother. Article 1061 of the Civil
Code expressly provides:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during
the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition.
In relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 2. Questions as to
advancement to be determined. – Questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have been
made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction
of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir.
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By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been donated by the
decedent and his wife to their son-respondent Vicente, should not be excluded from the inventory
of the properties of the decedent.
EMILIO PACIOLES, JR. vs. MIGUELLA CHUATOCO-CHING

Gr. No. 127920 August 9, 2005
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court
relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased
persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate
court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether
or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely
incidental and provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title.
FACTS: Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties. She was survived by her husband,
petitioner herein, and their two minor children. petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for
the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his
name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs. Miguelita’s
mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to
petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of administration. Afterwards, she also filed a motion
for her appointment as special administratrix.
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and
material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving
spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half
of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would undertake whatever
business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners." petitioner filed with the
intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1)
payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3)
payment of attorney’s fees. Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the
partition and distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that there is yet
no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or
owned in a joint venture."
ISSUE: Whether a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate.
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RULING: A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court
relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased
persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear
and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property
should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
In Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, "x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties,
the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. "The Court of
Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to
conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the
key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon
questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory.
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON

G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006
FACTS:American citizens, spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey, were residents in
the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey
died in 1979 leaving a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of her
conjugal share in real estate in Forbes Park, a bank account, cash balance and shares of stock in
A/G Interiors.
Two years later, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard
died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to Candelaria, except for his shares in
A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal.
Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition
of the first wife’s estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).
Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate,
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filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s
302
estate. The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator
with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided
interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was
allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State
of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of
the testator in the property subject to the legacy.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is
situated.
(2) Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled.
RULING:
(1) Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However,
since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national
law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in
consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country where the property
maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife’s properties may be found in the Philippines, however
the successional rights over those properties are governed by the national law of the testator.
(2) A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate
in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final,
its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional cases, a final decree
of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. The Court ruled in
one case that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence
not imputable to negligence.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the
terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOURDES

EVERO PACANA
G.R. No. 150206 March 13, 2009
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subject property.
In their answer, petitioners denied that Lourdes's claim. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan
died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two
sisters, namely: Teofilo, Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs inherited the subject
land from Juan Gabatan and have been in possession thereof in the concept of owners for more
than fifty (50) years. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by Lourdes against
Teofilo's wife, Rita, but the case was dismissed for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended
that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long
prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue on Lourdes’s heirship can be resolved in the same civil action
for recovery of ownership and possession of property.
RULING: No, the issue on heirship cannot be resolved in the same civil action for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the
legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence
over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
LOLITA BAS CAPABLANCA vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS

G.R. No. 224144 June 28, 2017
FACTS: Pedro acquired Lot 2535 and later sold to Faustina. After the death of Faustina, her heirs
executed a notarized Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject
loot and it was conveyed to Alejandra. Alejandra sold the land through a Deed of Absolute Sale to
Edith N. Deen, who in turn sold it to Atty. Eddy A. Deen (Atty. Deen). Upon Atty. Deen's death,
an extra-judicial settlement of estate, which did not include Lot 2535, was executed by his heirs.
Later, they executed an Additional ExtraJudicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale, which
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sold the land for P10,000.00 to Norberto B. Bas (Norberto), who took possession of and built a
house on it. Norberto died without a will and was succeeded by Lolita.
Josefina Bas Espinosa (Josefina), who represented the Heirs of Pedro Bas filed a complaint for
Clarification of Ownership of Lot 2535 against Lolita. Later, Lolita sought to register her portion
in Lot 2535 but was denied by the Register of Deeds, citing the need for a court order. Lolita then
learned that TCT No. T-96676 had been partially cancelled and TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182,
T-100183, and T-100185 had been issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by
Josefina. Lolita filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for the cancellation
of the titles and the RTC ruled in favor of Lolita. However, the CA reversed the RTC decision and
dismissed the complaint. According to the CA, Lolita must first be declared as the sole heir to the
estate of Norbero in a proper special proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should first be declared an heir of Norberto in order to proceed
with the case.
RULING: No, there is no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of heirship in order to
resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of titles of the property.
The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the validity of the
sale of the property from Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer transactions
that culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the property, it
follows that there would be no more ownership or right to property that would have been
transmitted to his heirs.
Moreover, no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or
her right to the property of the deceased. This is upon the theory that the property of a deceased
person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact of death of his
predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the
deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract may be
imposed upon the deceased himself. Thus, it has been held that there is no legal precept or
established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding their status
as heirs to an intestate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the
legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right which
belonged to their ancestor.
In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special proceeding and to require it would be
superfluous considering that petitioner had already presented evidence to establish her filiation
and heirship to Norberto, which respondents never disputed.
TERESA R. IGNACIO vs. RAMON REYES, FLORENCIO REYES, JR., ET. AL.
JD-4C
Gr No. 213192 July 12, 2017, J. Peralta
305
FACTS: Angel Reyes and Oliva R. Arevalo filed before the then CFI of Rizal (now RTC of Pasig
City, intestate court) a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of their father Florencio
Sr.
Thereafter, Teresa became the administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate. Teresa executed several
lease contracts over properties in Baguio City.
Herein respondents filed before the RTC three complaints for partition, annulment of lease
contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against Teresa and the lessees of the subject Baguio properties. They alleged in their Complaints
that, with the exception of the lessees, the parties and the Florencio Sr. estate own one-tenth (1/10)
of each of the Session Road, Loakan and Military Cut-off, and Magsaysay properties. They
claimed that Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio Sr. estate is the sole owner of the properties
and leased the same to the other parties without their conformity. They also asserted in one of their
complaints that the Florencio Sr. estate is different from the Heirs of Florencio Sr. and Heirs of
Salud.
They averred that, as co-owners, they have not received their share in the monthly rentals of the
properties aforementioned.
RTC – manifested that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate court regarding the possible
distribution of the subject properties.
Intestate Court – denied respondent’s motion
The CA granted the petition and annulled and set aside the assailed Orders of the intestate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its decision.
RULING: No. Petition denied. CA affirmed with modification to resume trial to determine the
question of ownership and if partition is proper.
The assailed April 13, 2004 and June 14, 2012 Orders denying respondents' motion to allow the
distribution of the estate's and co-owners' shares in the subject properties were interlocutory. This
is because such denial was not a final determination of their alleged co-ownership. In fact, the
intestate court merely asserted its jurisdiction over the properties which were allegedly co-owned
with the Florencio Sr. estate.
Jurisprudence teaches that jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited
as it relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate
of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate.
Furthermore, the doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality" applies
with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar. Thus:
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"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong
to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."
Corollarily, in the case of Agtarap v. Agtarap, et al. 34 the Court enumerated the instances when
the intestate court may pass upon the issue of ownership, to wit:
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are
all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
From the foregoing, this Court holds that the general rule on the limited jurisdiction of the RTC as
intestate court is applicable in Special Civil Action Nos. 5.055-R and 5056-R. As to the Magsaysay
property in Special Civil Action No. 5057-R, it is evident from the certificate of title that the rights
of parties other than the heirs of Florencio Sr. will be impaired should the intestate court decide on
the ownership of the property.
Respondents presented certificates of title of the properties registered under their names and the
Florencio Sr. estate, and their respective shares. As such, they are considered the owners of the
properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. The co-
ownership of the said properties by virtue of the certificates of title is a common issue in the
complaints for partition led before the Baguio RTC. Thus, the intestate court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it asserted jurisdiction over the subject properties since its jurisdiction
relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
An action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is typically brought by a person
claiming to be the owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the
plaintiff recognizes to be his co-owners, and is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-
ownership between the parties.
In this regard, the RTC shirked from its duty when it deferred the trial to await a request order
from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution. In fact, it has not yet made a definite
ruling on the existence of co-ownership. There was no declaration of entitlement to the desired
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partition either because a co-ownership exists or a partition is not legally prohibited. As this Court
307
is not a trier of facts, it is for the trial court to proceed and determine once and for all if there is co-
ownership and to partition the subject properties if there is no legal prohibition. It is also best for
the Baguio RTC to settle whether the respondents are claiming ownership over the properties by
virtue of their title adverse to that of their late father and his estate and not by any right of
inheritance.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, EXECUTOR vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.
Gr No. 118671 January 29, 1996, J. Puno
properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate
was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's
will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate
of his father's holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate
and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,
influence.
Maria Angeline — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed
an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited
with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a
"Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of
Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties,
specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the
provisions of the holographic will.
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Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00. Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that
he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes's motion for release of rent payments which
opposition the court failed to consider.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the
estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority:
1. to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s
grandchildren;
2. to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and
3. to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
RULING:
1. No
Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of
the court, such allowance as are provided by law."
Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent’s estate. The
law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court’s order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of
the testator pending settlement of his estate.
2. No
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed
properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors.
An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate
which is allowed only under the following conditions:
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"Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Notwithstanding a pending controversy or
appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon
conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules."
"Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts,
to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
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3. No.
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to
take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased
is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and expenses of administration," Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly
provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not
willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of
the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of
the debts and expenses for administration.
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had
been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses
on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved
again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct
for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for
administration before releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of
the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding
rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere
trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to
the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to
himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account
of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax,
all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
ANITA REYES-MESUGAS v. ALEJANDRO AQUINO REYES

G.R. No. 174835 March 22, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Anita Reyes-Mesugas and respondent Alejandro A. Reyes are the children of
Lourdes Aquino Reyes and Pedro N. Reyes. Lourdes died intestate, leaving to her heirs, among
others, three parcels of land, including a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
24475.
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A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties whereby the estate of Lourdes was
partitioned. A decision dated September 13, 2000 was rendered by the RTC pursuant to the said
compromise agreement.
Petitioner then filed a motion to cancel lis pendens annotation for TCT No. 24475 in the RTC in
view of the finality of judgment in the settlement of the estate. Petitioner argued that the settlement
of the estate proceeding had terminated; hence, the annotation of lis pendens could already be
cancelled since it had served its purpose.
ISSUE: May the court act on the motion to cancel lis pendens?
RULING: No. Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on
matters pertaining to the estate but never on the rights to property arising from the contract. It
approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of
the Rules of Court. It is apparent therefore that when the RTC approved the compromise agreement
on September 13, 2000, the settlement of the estate proceeding came to an end.
More importantly, the order of the probate court approving the compromise had the effect of
directing the delivery of the residue of the estate of Lourdes to the persons entitled thereto under
the compromise agreement. As such, it brought to a close the intestate proceedings and the probate
court lost jurisdiction over the case, except only as regards to the compliance and the fulfillment
by the parties of their respective obligations under the compromise agreement.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MERCEDES

CANO. FLORANTE C. TIMBOL v. JOSE CANO
G.R. No. L-15445 April 29, 1961
FACTS: The intestate Mercedes Cano died, leaving as her only heir her son Florante C. Timbol
then only 11 years old. Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. Jose Cano,
filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator, also an uncle of the minor Florante C.
Timbol, proposing that the agricultural lands of the intestate be leased to the administrator Jose
Cano for an annual rental of P4,000, this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and
the payment of land taxes and dues to the government.
On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition was approved,
designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of the intestate.
On June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of Jose Cano and on
January 6, 1958 he presented a motion, which he modified in a subsequent one of January 8, 1958,
alleging among other things (a) that the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased
from 30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. The motions
were approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside to give opportunity to the
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former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his objections to the motions.
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Appellant argues that since the project of partition had already been approved and had become
final, the lower court has lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the
enlargement of the land to be converted into a subdivision.
ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction
RULING: Yes, the probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In
the case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been delivered to the
heirs as such heir.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE

SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005

FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was intended
for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel
Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the
FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May
31, 1981 and every May 31stthereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in
the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed
a ContinuingGuaranty Agreement for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981,
testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one
of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide
between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for
Edmund and one (1) tractorfor Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Demand letters
for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to
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Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, onFebruary 5, 1988, the
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petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of EfraimSantibañez, Edmund and
Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summons were issued against both, but the one intended
for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his
address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down
to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement
signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void;
hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
ISSUE: Whether the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid. (NO)
RULING: At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily
concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated:
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced
in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic will which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time
he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs
is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors
among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without
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the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
314
allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or
any other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of
an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot
just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant
case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the
decedent.
When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had
yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence
S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial
to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate
Secretary, respectively, of Philippines International Life Insurance Company, and
FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF
COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004
FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance
Company, Inc. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent
(90%) of the subscribed capital stock. On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife
(Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five
illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes
and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez,. Private respondent
Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of
administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special
administrator. Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and
Jose Ortañez joint special administrators of their father’s estate.
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an
inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other properties, 2,029 shares of stock
in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725%
of the company’s outstanding capital stock.
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315
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming that she owned 1,014
Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right to
repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by
its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of stock
within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its
name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortañez, acting in his personal capacity and
claiming that he owned the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share
in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG,
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year, petitioner FLAG
consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortañez failed
to repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate proceedings
at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City), Juliana Ortañez and her two children, Special
Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March
4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate
(including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the basis of the number
of shares separately sold by Juliana Ortañez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortañez
on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of petitioner FLAG.
Herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and her siblings (hereafter referred to as
private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of
Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez. The
intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et al. and appointed private
respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum
of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the partial
nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate. These motions were opposed by
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale
of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed by Special Administrator Jose
Ortañez.
Jose Ortañez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife
shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as special administratrix of the
Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any shares of stock for her to
administer. The intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez
for the approval of the deeds of sale.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs can sell a part of the estate during the pendency of the probate
proceeding without approval from the court. (NO)
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RULING: An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration
under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However,
an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of
the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall
have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an
heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In
the present case, Juliana Ortañezand Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and
1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do
pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it
would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It
is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of
the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void and
passes no title to the purchaser.
And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
It must be emphasized that the questioned properties fishpond were included in the inventory of
properties of the estate submitted by then Administratrix Fausta Carreon Herrera on November 14,
1974. Private respondent was appointed as administratrix of the estate on March 3, 1976 in lieu of
Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1, 1978, the questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was
executed between petitioner and private respondent without notice and approval of the probate
court. Even after the sale, administratrix Aurora Carreon still included the three fishponds as
among the real properties of the estate in her inventory submitted on August 13, 1981. In fact, as
stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner, at the time of the sale of the fishponds in question, knew
that the same were part of the estate under administration.
The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of the probate court which according to
our settled jurisprudence has the authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under
administration.
More emphatic is the declaration We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes where We stated that when
the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the
administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate
court.
OSCAR C. REYES vs. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, Branch 142,
ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES
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G.R. No. 165744 August 11, 2008
317
FACTS: Petitioner Oscar and respondent Rodrigo are two of the four children of the spouses
Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of
Zenith Insurance Corporation, a domestic corporation established by their family. Pedro died in
1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedro’s estate was judicially partitioned among his
heirs sometime in 1970s, no similar settlement and partition appear to have been made with
Anastacia’s estate, which included her shareholdings in Zenith. As of June 30, 1990, Anastacia
owned 136,598 shares of Zenith, Oscar and Rodrigo owned 8,715,637 and 4,250 shares,
respectively.
Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission against Oscar.
Rodrigo sough to obtain an accounting of Zenith’s funds which were formerly and presently in the
control, custody, or possession of Oscar. He also sought the determination of the shares of stock
of his parents. Rodrigo claimed that Oscar fraudulently appropriated their parents’ shares of stock.
In the meantime, the jurisdiction over the matter was transferred to the RTC. When R.A. No. 8799
took effect, the SEC’s exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of
PD No. 902-A was transferred to the RTC designated as a special commercial court. Thereupon,
Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint Nuisance or Harassment Suit, which the RTC partially
granted.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC of Makati, acting as a commercial court, have jurisdiction to settle the
estate of the deceased?
RULING: NO.
More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to accomplish through his
allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the distribution of Anastacia’s shareholdings without
prior settlement of her estate – an objective that, by law and established jurisprudence, cannot be
done. The RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle,
partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased. A relevant provision – Section 2 of Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Court – that contemplates properties of the decedent held by one of the heirs
declares:
Question as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may
be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on their heir.
Worth noting are this Court’s statement in the case of Natcher vs. Court of Appeals:
Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction
It is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resole to perform acts pertaining to a
special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules.
That an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to determine the extent and value of
Anastacia’s shareholdings will be undertaken by a probate court and not by a special commercial
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court is completely consistent with the probate court’s limited jurisdiction. It has the power to
318
enforce an accounting as a necessary means to its authority to determine the properties included in
the inventory of the estate to be administered, divided up, and distributed. Beyond this, the
determination of title or ownership over the subject shares (whether belonging to Anastacia or
Oscar) may be conclusively settled by the probate court as a question of collation or advancement.
We had occasion to recognize the court’s authority to act on questions of title or ownership in a
collation or advancement situation in Coca v. Pangilinan where we ruled:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality
not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice
"which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or
intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
to its final determination in a separate action.
impaired, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. [Citations
omitted. Emphasis supplied.]
In sum, we hold that the nature of the present controversy is not one which may be classified as
an intra-corporate dispute and is beyond the jurisdiction of the special commercial court to resolve.
In short, Rodrigo’s complaint also fails the nature of the controversy test.
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P.

ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO vs. FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL
PASCUAL
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010
The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-
collateral relatives
FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely:Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and
Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
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In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration,"
filed by Pascual before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, alleging that a donated parcel of land
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located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was transferred by the decedent to the Arellano may be
considered as their advance legitime.
The probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of
notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061
of the New Civil Code.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate.
The court of appeals sustained the probate court’s ruling that the property donated to petitioner is
subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division, We
hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation.
ISSUES
A. Whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation; and
B. Whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the
parties.
RULING:
A. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine
the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory
heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not
entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because
the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty
to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit.
His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger,"
chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the
donated property is not subject to collation.
B. The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-
collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in
equal shares.
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SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA
FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS
G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015
Action for partition premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not
subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in
mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.
FACTS: On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including
his children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as
several properties including a resort , each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home
both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession dated September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they
discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other children, had sold
the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now
deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent.
When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document
she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort
of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
The document actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of ₱87, 352.62
releasing her and her late husband’s indebtedness therefrom. Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds
of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction involving the subject
properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents went to
the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been
demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement
of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, They caused
the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents
conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of
personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his
testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only
the resort. He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and
Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family
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home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a Deed of Sale
whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for ₱650, 000.00.
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On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners and
spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioner’s .as
well as the circumstances Surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial
Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not duly commissioned as such on the date
it was executed. The Deed of Sale was Undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left
blank, and the Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left side of the document Was
not signed. The trial court also observed that both documents were never presented to the Office
of the Register of Deeds for registration and That the titles to the subject properties were still in
the names of Pedro and His second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of
the Subject properties were not even presented as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the
signing and execution of the documents of conveyance. On The basis thereof, the triaI court ruled
in favor of respondents.
ISSUES
A. Whether the action is for partition and not for settlement of intestate estate.
B. Whether the rtc has the power to annul the title of the petitioner in a partition proceedings.
RULING:
A. YES. the allegations of respondents in their complaint is a complaint for partition of real estate.
Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with
their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial
representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known
heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5)
that Pedro’s estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the
decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is
clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition.
That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of the
estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to
name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails
to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court,then the decedent’s estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however, is
found in the Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts
due from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition
without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and
to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without
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a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
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respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate to a special
proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.
B. YES. The fact that respondents’ complaint also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery
of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking
for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an action for
partition, as can be seen in cases where courts determine the parties’ rights arising from complaints
asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of
ownership and possession of property. In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas, wherein a complaint for
annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial court due to the impropriety of an action
for annulment as it constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title of the respondents
therein, this Court found the dismissal to be improper in the following manner:
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the existence
or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a
resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed
realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is
the certificate of title and not the title itself.
LILIA B. ADA, LUZ B. ADANZA, FLORA C. BA YLON, REMO BA YLON, JOSE BA

YLON, ERIC BA YLON, FLORENTINO BA YLON, and MA. RUBY BA YLON vs.
FLORANTE BA YLON
G.R. No. 182435 August 13, 2012
The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action
of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding
to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well
as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.
FACTS: This case involves the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon
(Spouses Baylon) who died on November 7, 1961 and May 5, 1974, respectively. Spouses
Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon (Spouses Baylon) who died on November 7, 1961
and May 5, 1974 were survived by their legitimate children namely, Rita, Victoria, Dolores,
Panfila, Ramon and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada (Lilia). Dolores died intestate and without issue
on August 4, 1976. Victoria died on November 11, 1981 and was survived by her daughter, herein
petitioner Luz B. Adanza. Ramon died intestate on July 8, 1989 and was survived by herein
respondent Florante Baylon (Florante), his child from his first marriage, as well as by petitioner
Flora Baylon, his second wife, and their legitimate children, namely, Ramon, Jr. and herein
petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby, all surnamed Baylon.
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323
The petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition, accounting and damages against
Florante, Rita and Panfila. They alleged therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, owned
43 parcels of land all situated in Negros Oriental. After the death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed
that Rita took possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from
the same. Using the income produced by the said parcels of land, Rita allegedly purchased two
parcels of land. The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a partition of the said parcels of
land.
In their Answer, Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted that they and the petitioners co-owned 22 out
of the 43 parcels of land mentioned in the latter's complaint, whereas Rita actually owned parcels
of land10 out of the 43 parcels which the petitioners sought to partition, while the remaining
parcels of land are separately owned by Petra Cafino Adanza, Florante, Meliton Adalia, Consorcia
Adanza, Lilia, and Santiago Mendez. They claimed that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706
were acquired by Rita using her own money. They denied that Rita appropriated solely for herself
the income of the estate of Spouses Baylon, and expressed no objection to the partition of the estate
of Spouses Baylon, but only with respect to the co-owned parcels of land.
During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997, conveyed
Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 to Florante. On July 16, 2000, Rita died intestate and
without any issue. Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the
petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading dated February 6, 2002, praying that the said donation
in favor of the respondent be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They
further alleged that Rita was already sick and very weak when the said Deed of Donation was
supposedly executed and, thus, could not have validly given her consent thereto.
The RTC held that the death of Rita during the pendency of the case, having died intestate and
without any issue, had rendered the issue of ownership insofar as parcels of land which she claims
as her own moot since the parties below are the heirs to her estate. Thus, the RTC regarded Rita
as the owner of the said 10 parcels of land and, accordingly, directed that the same be partitioned
among her heirs. Nevertheless, the RTC rescinded the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and
half of Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante. The CA held that before the petitioners may file an action
for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot
No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA
asserted, an action for rescission is premature. Further, the CA ruled that the petitioners' action
for rescission cannot be joined with their action for partition, accounting and damages through a
mere supplemental pleading.
ISSUES: Whether an action for partition may be joined with action for rescission
RULING: The actions of partition and rescission cannot be joined in a single action.
There was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners could
not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante.
Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the
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Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary
rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and
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in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being
tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct
of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each
particular cause of action.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. If there is no objection
to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no
bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.
Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of the petitioners'
action for rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent omission on the
part of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its
decision. The RTC validly adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission
filed by the petitioners.
It should be stressed that the partition proceedings before the RTC only covers the properties co-
owned by the parties therein in their respective capacity as the surviving heirs of Spouses Baylon.
Hence, the authority of the RTC to issue an order of partition in the proceedings before it only
affects those properties which actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon.
In this regard, if Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706, as unwaveringly claimed by Florante, are
indeed exclusively owned by Rita, then the said parcels of land may not be partitioned
simultaneously with the other properties subject of the partition case before the RTC. In such case,
although the parties in the case before the RTC are still co-owners of the said parcels of land, the
RTC would not have the authority to direct the partition of the said parcels of land as the
proceedings before it is only concerned with the estate of Spouses Baylon.
HEIRS OF DORONIO vs. HEIRS OF DORONIO

Gr No. 169454 December 27, 2007
The decedent’s net estate is ascertained by deducting all payable obligations and charges from
the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject
to collation would be added to it.
FACTS: Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered
owners of a parcel of land located in Pangasinan. They have children but the records fail to disclose
their number. Nevertheless, it is clear that Marcelino and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased,
were among them. The parties to this case are their heirs: Petitioners are heirs of Marcelino and
the respondents are the heirs of Fortunato.
In 1919, the spouses donated a parcel of land through a private deed of donation propter nuptias
to Marcelino and his wife. It was never notarized.
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325
Both parties were occupying the property for several decades but they have different theories
regarding its present ownership. Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino filed a
petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation. This led to the registration of the deed
of donation and the entire property was titled in the name of Marcelino heirs.
The heirs of Fortunato filed a petition to annul the registration of the private deed of donation and
the cancellation of the new title. It was dismissed since the decision has become final.
The heirs of Fortunato then filed an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction contending that the subject land is different from what was donated as the
descriptions of the subject property and under the private deed of donation were different.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Marcelino heirs. CA reversed it and held that the donation of the
entire property in favor of the spouses Marcelino are invalid as it impairs the legitime of
Fortunato’s predecessor.
ISSUE: How is the partible estate or net estate of a decedent ascertained?
RULING: The decedent’s net estate is ascertained by deducting all payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all
donations subject to collation would be added to it.
Further, when the partible estate is determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be
established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes.
QUASHA ANCHETA PENA & NOLASCO LAW OFFICE vs LCN CONSTRUCTION

CORP.
GR No. 174873 August 26, 2008
Under the law, the RTC has the discretion to permit an advance distribution of estate but only if it
satisfies the following conditions:
1). Only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the
subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 91); and
2). The distributes must post a bond , fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding
obligations of the estate (Section 1 (2), Rule 91).
FACTS: Raymond Triviere died intestate in 1987. His widow filed for the settlement of his
intestate testate before the Makati RTC. Atty. William Quasha and Atty. Enrique Syquia, the
appointed administrators, filed a motion for the release of funds to the heirs. The RTC ordered the
payment P450, 000.00 as share of the children of the deceased and P150, 000.00 as share of the
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widow.
326
LCN Construction Corporation, the only remaining claimant against the estate of Triviere filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. It contended that the awards violated Section
1, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court as there still exists its unpaid claim. The CA revoked the awards
of the shares by the RTC based on the rule that all obligations against the estate must be paid before
the residue of the estate may be distributed.
ISSUE: Was the advance distribution of the estate of the decedent valid?
RULING: No, the advance distribution of the estate was not valid.
While the awards were not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there is still
pending claim against the estate, still, they constitute a partial and advance distribution of the
estate.
Under the law, the RTC has the discretion to permit an advance distribution of estate but only if it
satisfies the following conditions:
1) Only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the
subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 91); and
2) The distributes must post a bond , fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding
obligations of the estate (Section 1 (2), Rule 91).
In the case, there was no showing that the RTC complied with the two requirements when it
awarded the shares to the heirs. It justified its grant on the fact that the heirs had not yet received
their respective shares from the estate. Taking into account that the claim of LCN amounted to
more than the reported total value of the estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in granting
the advance distribution of the same.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO-DEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009
FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz
Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding
for the settlement of her estate. During the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed
a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. Edmundo
S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.The RTC issued
an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate,
while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.
In 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order as well as
all other related orders. Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any
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Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the
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Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from the Honorable Court. The RTC issued an Omnibus
Order affirming its Order and denying private respondent's motion for reconsideration. In
the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order and
immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the subject estate.
The RTC also recalled its previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of
administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as
the administrator. Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the RTC . The RTC also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the
late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges
due thereon. Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one located in Makati City.
ISSUE: Whether the Omnibus Order ordering Silverio-Dee to vacate the property is an
interlocutory order.
RULING: Yes. In this case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on
the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property in Makati City. On that aspect,
the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the
heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is
partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir
may lay claim on a particular property. Although the right of an heir over the property of
the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law
allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.
It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only
deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec.
1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of
the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the
Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included
therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may
take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from
Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had
any real interest in the specific property. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be
considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.
MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. JOSE T.

MARCELO, JR.
JD-4C
G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014
328
FACTS: Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2)
George, (3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr. Initially, petitioner Marcelo Investment and
Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration
of the estate of Jose, Sr. At first, Helen, along with her brother, Jose, Jr. separately opposed
MIMCO’s petition; the two prayed for their respective appointment as administrator. Edward
opposed Helen’s and Jose, Jr.’s respective petitions for issuance of Letters of Administration in
their favor and Edward himself prayed for his appointment as regular administrator.
petitions, and (2) prayed for Edward’s appointment as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s
estate. Pending issuance of letters of administration, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose, Jr. as
special administrators.
RTC appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Taking issue with the
RTC’s Order and questioning Edward’s appointment, Jose, Jr. filed successive motions but
was denied. He appealed Edward’s appointment as regular administrator but the appellate court
affirmed in toto the Orders of the intestate court.
The question of who between Edward and Jose, Jr. should administer their father’s estate reached
the SC in G.R. No. 123883. The Court did not find reversible error in the appellate court’s decision
and affirmed the RTC and the appellate court’s separate rulings of Edward’s competence and better
suited ability to act as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Thereafter, Jose, Jr. persistently
together with the number and current par value of their respective shareholding, suffice it
to say that as correctly pointed out by regular administrator Edward, the shares of stock of the
decedent will be equally distributed to the heirs that there is no necessity therefor. Regular
Administrator Edward respectfully prays that the Liquidation, duly signed by all four (4)
compulsory heirs, be approved as the project of partition of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo
Sr. and moved for the approval of the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose, Sr.
as the project of partition of the Estate of Jose, Sr.
RTC approved the partition of Jose, Sr.’s estate as proposed by Edward. Finding said liquidation
of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. to bear the conformity of all the heirs of the
decedent and considering further that the period for filing of money claims against the subject
estate had already lapsed, the Court resolves to approve said liquidation of Inventory as the project
of partition of the estate of Marcelo, Sr., MIMCO and heirs of Edward, joined by George,
opposed Jose, Jr.’s motion and nominated Atty. Henry Reyes as regular administrator in
Edward’s stead.
distribute the residue among the heirs. Records show that the estate taxes due to the
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government have not been paid.
329
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of a regular administrator is still necessary at the liquidation,
RULING: Yes. The settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit
it is at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides for
the Distribution and Partition of the Estate.
payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
intention of the testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to their
respective shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall be settled and allowed
by the court, and, if any person interested in the partition does not pay his proportion or
share, the court may issue an execution in the name of the executor or administrator
against the party not paying for the sum assessed.
The Court observes that the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate, approved by the
RTC is not yet in effect and complete. The Court further notes that there has been no manifestation
forthcoming from any of the heirs, or the parties in this case, regarding the completion of the
proposed liquidation and partition of the estate. In fact, as all parties are definitely aware,
the RTC archived the intestate proceedings pending the payment of estate taxes.
Claims, distribution of the remaining assets of the estate to the four (4) compulsory heirs.
The same document listed payables and receivables of the estate dependent on a number
of factors and contingencies: Considering that the Estate as of June 3, 1999 has no sufficient
cash to pay-off the above claims of P6,893,425.33, Edward can work out an offsetting
arrangement since the Estate has also receivables or equity from companies.
Although the Marcelo family, in particular the compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr., hold equity
in the corporations mentioned in the inventory, considering that the corporations are family owned
by the Marcelos’, these corporations are different juridical persons with separate and distinct
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330
may have varied given the passage of time. To date, more than a decade has passed since
the intestate proceedings were archived, thus, affecting the value of the estate’s assets.
still requires a regular administrator to finally settle the estate and distribute remaining
assets to the heirs of the decedent.
HEIRS OF MARASIGAN vs. APOLONIO

G.R. No. 156078 March 14, 2008
FACTS: Central to the instant Petition is the estate of Alicia Marasigan. Alicia was survived by
her siblings: Cesar, Apolonio, Lilia, and Benito; Marissa, a sister-in-law; and the children of her
brothers who predeceased her: Francisco, Horacio, and Octavio. She died intestate and without
issue on 21 January 1995. On 17 December 1997, a Complaint for Judicial Partition of the Estate
of Alicia Marasigan was filed before the RTC by several of her heirs and private respondents
herein, namely, Apolonio, Lilia, Octavio, Jr., Horacio, Benito, Jr., and Marissa, against Cesar,
docketed as Special Civil Action No. P-77-97. According to private respondents, Alicia owned in
common with her siblings 13 parcels of land called Hacienda Sta. Rita in Pili and Minalabac,
Camarines Sur, with an aggregate area of 4,960,963 square meters or 496 hectares. Alicia left
behind her 2/21 shares of the 13 parcels of land.
As the parties could not agree on how they shall physically partition among themselves Alicia’s
estate, private respondents filed a Motion to Appoint Commissioners following the procedure
outlined in Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The RTC granted the Motion
and appointed Myrna V. Badiong, Assistant Provincial Assessor of Camarines Sur, as Chairman
of the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents nominated Sandie B. Dacara as the second
commissioner. Cesar failed to nominate a third commissioner despite due notice. Upon lapse of
the period given, only two commissioners were appointed.
After conducting the ocular inspection, the commissioners submitted their report stating that “The
undersigned Commissioners admit the 472,472.65 (47.2472.65) square meters representing the
2/21 pro-indiviso share of the deceased Alicia Marasigan and the 1/7 share of each of the heirs of
Alicia N. Marasigan equivalent to 67,496.09 square meters or 6.7496.09 hectares determined by
Geodetic Engineer Roberto R. Revilla in his Compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court
dated November 18, 1998. Considering that the physical division of the 2/21 pro-indiviso share of
the decedent, Alicia Marasigan cannot be done because of the different locations and conditions
of the properties, undersigned Commissioners hereby recommend that the heirs may assign their
1/7 share to one of the parties willing to buy the same (Sec. 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court)
provided he pays to the heir[s] willing to assign his/her 1/7 share such amounts the Commissioners
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have recommended and duly approved by the Honorable Court”.
331
Cesar opposed the said inspection contending that he did not receive any notice from the
Commissioners to attend the ocular inspection and he was, thus, not present on said occasion and
that he vehemently objects to the report of the commissioners. However, such recommendation by
the Commissioners was approved in toto by the RTC and subsequently by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the resort to the Commissioner to decide on the distribution and partition of
estate and there subsequent recommendation approved by the court was valid.
RULING: In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, the trial
court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists and that partition is proper, issues an
order for partition; and, second, the trial court promulgates a decision confirming the sketch and
subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if the parties reach an agreement) or by the
appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may be.
The delineations of these two phases have already been thoroughly discussed by this Court in
several cases where it explained:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether
or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that
a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents
and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case,
the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments
of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case – i.e., either
the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed – the order is a final one, and may
be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal
with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been
accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties
thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such an
order is, to be sure, final and appealable.
Since the parties were unable to agree on how the properties shall be divided, Commissioners were
appointed by the Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Section 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. - If the parties are unable
to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the
plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall
direct.
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332
While the lack of notice to Cesar of the viewing and examination by the Commissioners of the real
properties comprising Alicia’s estate is a procedural infirmity, it did not violate any of his
substantive rights nor did it deprive him of due process. It is a matter of record, and petitioners
cannot deny, that Cesar was able to file his Comment/Opposition to the Commissioners’ Report.
And after the RTC adopted and confirmed the Commissioners’ recommendations in its Order dated
22 June 2001, Cesar was able to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order. He had
sufficient opportunity to present before the RTC whatever objections or oppositions he may have
had to the Commissioners’ Report, including the valuation of his share in Alicia’s estate.
Inasmuch as the parties continued to manifest their desire to terminate their co-ownership, but the
co-heirs/co-owners could not agree on which properties would be allotted to each of them, this
Court finds that the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC did not act with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the
Commissioners’ recommendation that the co-heirs/co-owners assign their shares to one of them in
exchange for proper compensation.
This Court has consistently held that one of the purposes for which courts are organized is to put
an end to controversy in the determination of the respective rights of the contending parties. With
the full knowledge that courts are not infallible, the litigants submit their respective claims for
judgment, and they have a right at some time or another to have final judgment on which they can
rely over a final disposition of the issue or issues submitted, and to know that there is an end to the
litigation; otherwise, there would be no end to legal processes.
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333
ESCHEAT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, ELIZABETH LEE, and PACITA YU-LEE
G.R. No. 158230 July 16, 2008
FACTS: The subject of the escheat was the property of an alien which was already transferred to
his heirs who are Filipino citizen.
In March 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No. 398 with an area of 1, 574 square
meters from Vicenta Arcenas, Francisco, Carmen Ramon, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose,
and Manuel, all surnamed Dinglasan. In February 1944, Lee Liong died intestate and was survived
by his widow Ang Chia, and his sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting. On 30 June 1947, the
surviving heirs of Lee Liong extrajudicially settled the estate of the deceased and partitioned
among themselves Lot No. 398. When Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting died, Lot No. 398 was
transferred by succession to their respective wives, Elizabeth Lee and Pacita Yu-Lee.
On 7 September 1993, Elizabeth and Pacita filed a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No.
398 because the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. On 3
October 2001, the Court held that the trial court’s order of reconstitution was void for lack of
factual support because it was based merely on the plan and technical description approved by the
Land Registration Authority.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 1995, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City a Complaint for
Reversion of Title against private respondents and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City, praying
that (1) the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong be set aside for being null and void ab initio; and (2)
Lot No. 398 be reverted to the public domain for the State’s disposal in accordance with law.
As part of their defense, private respondents claimed that as Filipino citizen, they are qualified to
acquire Lot No. 398 by succession. The trial court in its decision ordered the reversion of Lot No.
398 to the State. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its reversing the trial court’s decision
and declaring private respondents as the absolute and lawful owners of Lot No. 398.
ISSUE: Whether the subject property could be a proper subject for escheat.
RULING: We do not subscribe to petitioner’s position. The circumstances of this case are similar
to the case of De Castro v. Teng Queen Tan, wherein a residential lot was sold to a Chinese citizen.
Upon the death of the alien vendee, his heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of the deceased and the subject land was transferred to a son who was a naturalized Filipino.
Subsequently, the vendor of the lot filed a suit for annulment of sale for alleged violation of the
Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens. Independently of the doctrine of in pari delicto,
the Court sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the
land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally
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qualified to own land.
334
Similarly, in this case, upon the death of the original vendee who was a Chinese citizen, his widow
and two sons extrajudicially settled his estate, including Lot No. 398. When the two sons died, Lot
No. 398 was transferred by succession to their respective spouses, herein private respondents who
are Filipino citizens.
We now discuss whether reversion proceedings is still viable considering that Lot No. 398 has
already been transfered to Filipino citizens. In the reconstitution case of Lee v. Republic of the
Philippines involving Lot No. 398, this Court explained that the OSG may initiate an action for
reversion or escheat of lands which were sold to aliens disqualified from acquiring lands under the
Constitution. However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact that it was already transferred to
Filipinos militates against escheat proceedings, thus:
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari
delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State,
subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is
now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has
been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein [Elizabeth Lee and
Pacita Yu Lee]. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to private respondents who are Filipino
citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can no longer be assailed. Hence, reversion proceedings
will no longer prosper since the land is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS

OF PASAY CITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002
FACTS: For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano
served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a
French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her
life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close
relative was available to tend to her needs.
Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of land.
Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found.
While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate
of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Since it was established that
there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower
court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
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335
In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she
had been looking for a long time. The Court of Appeals issued on 12 November 1998 the first of
its assailed Resolutions giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment and setting
the date for trial on the merits.
Petitioner insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of donation in favor of private
respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file claims before the court a quo as
set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court has set in.
The present controversy revolves around the nature of the parcels of land purportedly donated to
private respondent which will ultimately determine whether the lower court had jurisdiction to
declare the same escheated in favor of the state.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same escheated in favor of
the state.
RULING: YES. We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or
assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal
property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property
is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."5 Since
escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the
conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure
by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time
limit is imposed within which such action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years
from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if
sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the
estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever."6 The 5-year period is not a device
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly
prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise
they may lose them forever in a final judgment.
Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not being an heir but
allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of
the Revised Rules of Court? In this regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of
Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,7 is applicable at least insofar
as it concerns the Court's discussion on who is an "interested party" in an escheat proceeding -
In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and
exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property
sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for
escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to
have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be
the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under
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a contract legally entered with the former (underscoring supplied).
336
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27
June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private
respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her
right over the escheated properties militates against recovery.
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are not
parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown, "a judgment of escheat was held
conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the
part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure
him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-
year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed
"discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat judgment
which has long attained finality.
In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that
the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of its
jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been
previously donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court
for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in question."9 Where a person comes into
an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the
property and his right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject properties
were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed
properties was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear
and convincing proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private
respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least before the escheat, part of the estate of the
decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore
cannot perfunctorily presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's
estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on the strength of a belated allegation
that the same had previously been disposed of by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only
after a close scrutiny of every piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision
and unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations, conjectures and
unsubstantiated assertions.
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA vs. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC.
G.R. No. L-45460 February 25, 1938
FACTS: This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners in behalf of
the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim the Hacienda de San Pedro
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Tunasa by the right of escheat. The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., appeared specially and assailed the
337
petition upon the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide the case
and that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy prayed
for; and asked that the petition be finally dismissed. Carlos Young intervened and filed a motion
asking for the dismissal or the petition upon the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure, under
which the same was filed, is not applicable because it was not yet in force when the original owner
of the hacienda died, which was in April, 1596, and that the petition was irregularly docketed as
the applicants had paid at the docket fees which the clerk of court should collect.
The court overruled the objection to the appearance and intervention in the case by the Colegio de
San Jose and Carlos Young, and the court also entered the resolution from, dismissing the petition
for escheat, with the costs to the petitioners.
ISSUE: Did the court err in not excluding the respondents from the proceeding? W/N the escheat
proceeding should be dismissed
RULING: The court did not err in not excluding the respondents, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos
Young from the proceeding. The escheat proceeding should be dismissed.
Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person become the
property of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs.
In a special proceeding for escheat, the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party.
Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is
likewise and interest and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In
the present case the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a
material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa; and the former because it claims to be the
exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under a
contract legality entered with the former. In view of these allegations, it is erroneous to hold that
the said parties are without right either to appear in case or to substantiate their respective alleged
right.
Moreover, the essential facts which should be alleged in the petition, which are jurisdictional
because they confer jurisdiction upon the Court of First Instance, are:
1. That a person has died intestate or without leaving any will;
2. that he has left real or personal property;
3. that he was the owner thereof;
4. that he has not left any heir or person who is by law entitled to the property;
5. and that the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where deceased had his last
residence, or in case should have no residence in the country, the municipality where the
property is situated.
After publication, if the court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal
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property situated in the country and has not left any heirs or other person entitled thereto, it may
order, after the payments of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat, and in such case, it shall
338
adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his last place of
residence and the real property to the municipality or municipalities where they are situated.
When a petition for escheat does not state facts, which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed
from and even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there are no grounds for the court to
proceed to the inquisition provided by law, the court sees no reason to disallow an interested party
from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is untenable from all standpoints. And when the
motion to dismiss is entertained upon this ground, the petition may be dismissed unconditionally
and the petitioner is not entitled to be afforded an opportunity to amend his petition.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE

COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL BANK (Santa Ana Branch Davao City)
G.R. No. 95533 November 20, 2000
FACTS: A complaint for escheat was filed by petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, with the
Regional Trial Court against several banks which had branches within the jurisdiction of the said
court.
The complaint alleged that pursuant to Act No. 3936 as amended by P.D. 679, the respective
managers of the defendant banks submitted to the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines
separate statements prepared under oath which listed all deposits and credits held by them in favor
of depositors or creditors either known to be dead, have not been heard from, or have not made
depositors or withdrawals for ten years.
Petitioner submitted a manifestation to the lower court praying that the publication of the list of
the unclaimed balances be dispensed with. The trial court issued the following Order:
"WHEREFORE, this Court will not dispense with the publication of the list of unclaimed balances
and, unless the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, agrees to the publication
thereof as stated in the Order of this Court dated June 7, 1989, and shoulder the cost thereof as also
mentioned in said Order, and manifests its agreement to this Court in writing within thirty (30)
days from receipt thereof, this case will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the publication of the list of unclaimed balances.
RULING: No. The publication of the list of unclaimed balances is intended to safeguard the right
of the depositors, their heirs and successors to due process. This was made clear by the lower court
in its assailed Order, to wit:
Moreover, how would other persons who may have an interest in any of the unclaimed balances
know what this case is all about and whether they have an interest in this case if the amended
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complaint and list of unclaimed balances are not published? Such other persons may be heirs of
the bank depositors named in the list of unclaimed balances.
339
The fact that the government is in a tight financial situation is not a justification for this Court to
dispense with the elementary rule of due process.
VICENTE TAN vs. CITY OF DAVAO

GR No. L-44347 September 20, 1988
The court may declare an absentee presumptively dead in connection with an action for settlement
of the intestate estate of the absentee as they are, in effect, proceedings to settle her estate.
FACTS: In 1962, the City of Davao filed a petition to declare Dominga Garcia’s land escheated
in its favor. It alleged that since Dominga and her children are presumed to be dead and that she
left no heir or person by law entitled to inherit her estate, the same should be escheated pursuant
to Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
Pizzaro opposed the escheat petition on the ground that the courts are not authorized to declare
that a person is presumed to be dead and that Dominga Garcia’s being in Red China is not a
sufficient ground to deprive her of her property by escheat proceedings.
ISSUE: May the court declare an absentee presumptively dead in connection with an action for
settlement of the intestate estate of the absentee?
RULING: Yes, the court may declare an absentee presumptively dead in an escheat proceeding
as they are, in effect, proceedings to settle her estate
While a petition instituted for the sole purpose of securing a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead cannot be entertained if that were the only question or matter involved in the
case, the courts are not barred from declaring an absentee presumptively dead as an incident of, or
in connection with, an action or proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of such
absentee
Direct evidence proving that Dominga and her heirs are dead is not necessary because under the
Civil Code it may be presumed. Nevertheless, the evidence of the City of Davao preponderantly
shows that in 1923, Dominga and her heirs left the Philippines bound for China. Since then, until
the petition was filed in 1962, a period covering about 39 years, nothing had been heard of them.
MUNICIPALITIES OF MAGALLON, ISABELA, ET AL. VS. IGNATIUS HENRY

BEZORE, ET AL.
GR No. L-14157 October 26, 1960
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340
The jurisdiction acquired over escheat proceedings cannot be converted into one for the
distribution of the properties of the said decedents.
FACTS: The municipalities of Magallon, La Castellana and Isabela, Negros Occidental instituted
escheat proceedings against the estates of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon.
At the hearing, evidence was submitted that Anne and Thomas died in San Francisco, California
in 1936.
Ignatius Bezore filed an opposition. Elwood Knickerbocker and Mary Irene Fallon McCormick
Henry Bezore claim that he is the nephew of the decedents because his mother was their sister.
Elwood Knickerbocker also claims to be the sole legatee of his wife Loreta Knickerbocker, who
in turn, was the residuary legatee of Anne. Mary Irene Murphy McCormick likewise claims that
she is the niece of the decedents as her father was a brother of said decedents. Conformably to
their petitions, all the oppositors pray that the petition for escheat be dismissed and that the
properties of the decedents be disturbed among them
The trial court denied the petition for escheat of the properties of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy
and Thomas Fallon, for the reason that Thomas Fallon died with an heir his wife Julia Fallon, and
Anne Fallon Murphy, for her part, died leaving a will, in which she disposed of all her properties.
It also denied the prayers of the oppositors to declare them as heirs of deceased Thomas and Anne.
On appeal, the oppositors claimed the trial court erred in not declaring them heirs of the decedents
Anne and Thomas.
ISSUE: May the Bezore, et al. be declared heirs in the escheat proceedings?
RULING: No. While it is possible for the estates of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and
Thomas Fallon, who at the time of their death were residents of San Francisco, California, to be
settled, or more especially in Negros Occidental where they had properties, the proceedings were
instituted as escheat proceedings and not for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
The court acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for escheat by virtue of the publication of the
petition for escheat. The jurisdiction acquired cannot be converted into one for the distribution of
the properties of the said decedents.
For such proceedings (for the distribution of the estate of the decedents) to be instituted, the proper
parties must be presented and the proceedings should comply with the requirements of the Rule.
Hence, the trial court did not have the power to order, or to proceed with, the distribution of the
estates of the decedents in the escheat proceedings, and adjudicate the properties to the oppositors.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DAVID REY GUZMAN

G.R. No. 132964 February 18, 2000
JD-4C
FACTS: In this case, the subject of the controversy is the estate left by Simeon Guzman.
341
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman,
a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968 Simeon
died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located
in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to them all the property belonging to the estate
of Simeon. Subsequently, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and
conveying to her son David her undivided one-half interest on all the parcels of land subject matter
of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Simeon Guzman. David executed a Special
Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels of land subject
of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen and empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or
otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1 February 1990 Atty. Lolita G. Abela, upon instruction of Helen,
paid donor's taxes to facilitate the registry of the parcels of land in the name of David.
On 16 March 1994 a certain Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor General
and furnished it with documents showing that David's ownership of the one-half (1/2) of the estate
of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of David's interest
in each of the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. On 11 July 1995 the trial court
dismissed the petition holding that the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen Meyers
Guzman had no legal force and effect so that the ownership of the property subject thereof
remained with her.
On appeal, the Government asserts that “only” a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the
Philippines. The only instances when a foreigner can acquire private lands in the Philippines are
by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship. Petitioner therefore contends that the acquisition of the parcels of land by
David does not fall under any of these exceptions. It asserts that David being an American citizen
could not validly acquire one-half (1/2) interest in each of the subject parcels of land by way of
the two (2) deeds of quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos.
ISSUE:
Whether the deed of quitclaim constitute repudiation of inheritance.
Whether the nullity of repudiation will make the property a subject of escheat
RULING:
The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the parcels of land by Helen in favor of
David but its acceptance by David does not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special Power of
Attorney. Further, the records reveal no other instrument that evidences such acceptance and notice
thereof to the donor in an authentic manner. It is well-settled that if the notification and notation
are not complied with, the donation is void. Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been
complied with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land by way of donation inter
vivos.
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342
However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation made by Helen in favor of
David valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share
of the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two
(2) of them all the property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels
of land were registered in her and her son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11)
years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides
—
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable and cannot be impugned,
except when it was made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when an unknown will
appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon was made
through any of the causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of the existence of an
unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute
an instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-
half (1/2) share of the subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds
which she executed eleven (11) years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force
and effect.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of
land into res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no effect
whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although being an
American citizen, is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the litigation.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION vs. HI-TRI DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION AND LUZ R. BAKUNAWA
Gr No. 192413 June 13, 2012, J. Sereno
FACTS: Luz R. Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased ("Spouses Bakunawa") are
registered owners of six (6) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 324985 and 324986 of the
Quezon City Register of Deeds, and TCT Nos. 103724, 98827, 98828 and 98829 of the Marikina
Register of Deeds. These lots were sequestered by the PCGG.
Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan ("Millan"), through her representative, Jerry
Montemayor, offered to buy said lots for "₱ 6,724,085.71", with the promise that she will take care
of clearing whatever preliminary obstacles there maybe to effect a "completion of the sale". The
Spouses Bakunawa gave to Millan the Owner’s Copies of said TCTs and in turn, Millan made a
down payment of "₱ 1,019,514.29" for the intended purchase. However, for one reason or another,
Millan was not able to clear said obstacles. As a result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale
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and offered to return to Millan her down payment. However, Millan refused to accept back the
343
down payment. Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri
Development Corporation ("Hi-Tri") took out on October 28, 1991, a Manager’s Check from
RCBC-Ermita in the amount of ₱ 1,019,514.29, payable to Millan’s company Rosmil Realty and
Development Corporation ("Rosmil") c/o Teresita Millan and used this as one of their basis for a
complaint against Millan and Montemayor which they filed with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
99, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10719 in 1991.
On January 31, 2003, during the pendency of the abovementioned case and without the knowledge
of Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa, RCBC reported the "₱ 1,019,514.29-credit existing in favor of
Rosmil" to the Bureau of Treasury as among its "unclaimed balances" as of January 31, 2003.
Allegedly, a copy of the Sworn Statement executed by Florentino N. Mendoza, Manager and Head
of RCBC’s AMDSD was posted within the premises of RCBC-Ermita
On December 14, 2006, Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with
the RTC the action below for Escheat (Civil Case No. 06-244)
On April 30, 2008, Spouses Bakunawa settled amicably their dispute with Rosmil and Millan.
Instead of only the amount of "₱ 1,019,514.29", the spouses agreed to pay Rosmil and Millan the
amount of "₱ 3,000,000.00". But during negotiations and evidently prior to said settlement, Manuel
Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri inquired from RCBC-Ermita the availability of the ₱ 1,019,514.29
under RCBC Manager’s Check No. ER 034469. Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa were however
dismayed when they were informed that the amount was already subject of the escheat proceedings
before the RTC.
On 19 May 2008, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision declaring the deposits, credits, and
unclaimed balances subject of Civil Case No. 06-244 escheated to the Republic. Among those
included in the order of forfeiture was the amount of ₱ 1,019,514.29 held by RCBC as allocated
funds intended for the payment of the Manager’s Check issued in favor of Rosmil. Consequently,
respondents filed an Omnibus Motion dated 11 June 2008, seeking the partial reconsideration of
the RTC Decision insofar as it escheated the fund allocated for the payment of the Manager’s
Check. On 3 November 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of respondents.
On 26 November 2009, the CA issued its assailed Decision reversing the 19 May 2008 Decision
and 3 November 2008 Order of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic.
RULING: We find sufficient grounds to affirm the CA on the exclusion of the funds allocated for
the payment of the Manager’s Check in the escheat proceedings.
Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its sovereignty,
steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without there being an interested
person having a legal claim thereto. In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquires into the
status, custody, and ownership of the unclaimed balance to determine whether the inactivity was
brought about by the fact of death or absence of or abandonment by the depositor. If after the
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proceedings the property remains without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall
be reverted to the state "to forestall an open invitation to self-service by the first comers." However,
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if interested parties have come forward and lain claim to the property, the courts shall determine
whether the credit or deposit should pass to the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the state. We
emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for failing to deposit to or
withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding whereby the state compels the surrender to it of
unclaimed deposit balances when there is substantial ground for a belief that they have been
abandoned, forgotten, or without an owner.
An ordinary check refers to a bill of exchange drawn by a depositor (drawer) on a bank (drawee),
requesting the latter to pay a person named therein (payee) or to the order of the payee or to the
bearer, a named sum of money. The issuance of the check does not of itself operate as an
assignment of any part of the funds in the bank to the credit of the drawer. Here, the bank becomes
liable only after it accepts or certifies the check. After the check is accepted for payment, the bank
would then debit the amount to be paid to the holder of the check from the account of the depositor-
drawer.
There are checks of a special type called manager’s or cashier’s checks. These are bills of exchange
drawn by the bank’s manager or cashier, in the name of the bank, against the bank itself. Typically,
a manager’s or a cashier’s check is procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of
funds to be debited from the depositor’s account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank
the value of the check to be drawn. Since the bank issues the check in its name, with itself as the
drawee, the check is deemed accepted in advance. Ordinarily, the check becomes the primary
obligation of the issuing bank and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand.
Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a manager’s check does not ipso facto work as an automatic
transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case the procurer of the manager’s or cashier’s
check retains custody of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make
an effective delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered instruments under the
Negotiable Instruments Law applicable:
Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. – Every contract on a negotiable instrument is
incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto.
As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the
delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making,
drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown
to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the
property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a
valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively
presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature
appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.
Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur. An
order to debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the
Manager’s Check was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that
the allocated fund is still held by the bank. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part
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of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured the Manager’s Check. The doctrine that the deposit
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represented by a manager’s check automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because the
instrument – although accepted in advance – remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have
been informed that the deposit had been left inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be
subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.

Gr No. 138953 June 6, 2002, J. Quisumbing
Fermina Lopez is petitioner's aunt, and also Amelita's adoptive mother.
On June 17, 1982, the Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application
(MSA) of Fermina over Lot 5, SGS-3451, with an area of 152 sq. m. at the Waterfront, Cebu City.
On May 28, 1983, Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over Lot
5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all the obligations, duties, and conditions imposed
upon Fermina under MSA Application No. V-81066. The document of transfer was filed with the
Bureau of Lands.
Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands. On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of
Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and granting the amendment of the
application from Fermina to Amelita. On May 2, 1989, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
3439 was issued in favor of Amelita.
On June 24, 1993, herein petitioner filed Civil Case No. CEB-14191 for reconveyance against
Amelita. He claimed that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated the land to him and immediately
thereafter, he took possession of the same. He averred that the donation to him had the effect of
withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita.
For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina was no
longer the owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having
been transferred earlier to her. She added that the donation was void because of lack of approval
from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly acquired the land as Fermina's rightful heir.
She also denied that she is a trustee of the land for petitioner
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in
its decision dated March 23, 1999 reversed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner has a legal standing to assail the validity of Amelita’s title.
Thus: Sec. 101.—All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
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Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since Amelita Sola's title
grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelita's title. It
follows that he cannot "recover" the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is
the rightful owner thereof.
Anent petitioner's contention that it was the intention of Fermina for Amelita to hold the property
instrument, we are not prepared to accept petitioner's bare allegation concerning the donor's state
of mind.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

AND CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
Gr No. 73831 February 27, 1987, J. Cruz
FACTS: The property in dispute was among the lands taken over by the United States Government
under the Philippine Property Act of 1946 enacted by the American Congress. It was registered in
1930 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9509 of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga in the
name of Kantiro Koyama, a Japanese national, who has not been heard from since the end of World
War II. Under Section 3 of the said Act, the land was supposed to be transferred to the Republic
of the Philippines.
The transfer was never made, however, and the property remained registered in the name of
Koyama. Nevertheless, the lot has since 1978 been covered by Tax Declaration No. 42644 in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines with the Board of Liquidators as administrator.
Earlier, in 1976, the Republic of the Philippines had filed escheat proceedings against the said
property, claiming that the registered owner of the land "had been absent for the past ten years or
more and he, therefore, may be presumed dead for the purpose of appointing his successor." It also
alleged that since he left no heirs or persons entitled to the aforementioned property, the State
should inherit the same in accordance with Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
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347
The trial court declared the property — escheated to the State in favor of the City of Zamboanga
where the property is located for the benefit of public schools and public charitable institutions
and centers in the City of Zamboanga.
Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner elevated the same to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, where it was affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the property was properly escheated to the City of Zamboanga.
RULING: We rule for the petitioner. It is clear, and the respondent City of Zamboanga does not
deny it, that there was mere inadvertence on the part of the American government in omitting to
transfer the disputed land to the Republic of the Philippines. The obvious purpose of the Act was
to turn over to the Philippine government all enemy properties situated in its territory that had been
seized and were being held for the time being by the United States, which was then exercising
sovereignty over the Philippines. The transfer of such enemy properties to the Philippine Republic
was one of the acts by which the United States acknowledged the elevation of this country to the
status of a sovereign state on July 4, 1946.
While it is true that there are no records of such transfer, we may presume that such transfer was
made. The lack of such records does not mean that it was not made as this would run counter to
the mandate of the Philippine Property Act of 1946, which, to repeat, intended to vest title in the
Philippines enemy properties found in its territory. It would be more reasonable to suppose that
the President of the United States, or the person acting under his authority, complied with, rather
than neglected (and so violated) this requirement of Section 3 of the said Act, if only on the basis
of the presumption of the regularity of official functions. In the extreme, we can even say that this
section legally effected the transfer, to be evidenced later by the formality of the corresponding
deed, and that the lack of such deed does not mean that no transfer was made. Otherwise, we would
have to face the dubious conclusion that the said property is still owned and so still subject to
disposition by the United States.
We hold that where it comes to ordinary real properties the owners of which may be presumed
dead and left no heirs, the same may be escheated, conformably to Rule 91 of the Rules of Court,
in favor of the political subdivisions in which they are located. The said Rule, however, does not
cover properties taken from enemy nationals as a result of World War II and required to be
transferred to the Republic of the Philippines by the United States in accordance with its own
enactment commonly known as the Philippine Property Act of 1946. Such properties, including
the land in dispute, belong to the Philippine government not by virtue of the escheat proceedings
but on the strength of the transfer authorized and required by the said Act.
It may really be that, for practical reasons, the disputed property should be entrusted to the City of
Zamboanga, for the purposes indicated in the Rules of Court. That may still be effected. But this
will require a transfer of the land to the city by the Republic of the Philippines, to which it belongs
and which has the power to dispose of it.
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348
DIONISIO RELLOSA vs. GAW CHEE HUN
GR NO. L-1411 SEPTEMBER 29, 1953, J. BAUTISTA ANGELO
FACTS: On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land, together
with the house erected thereon, situated in the City of Manila. The vendor remained in possession
of the property under a contract of lease entered into on the same date between the same parties.
Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition that the vendee, being a Chinese
citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military Administration in accordance with
(seirei) No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943, by the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not been
obtained, and that, even if said requirement were met, the sale would at all events be void under
Article XIII, Section 5, of our Constitution. The vendor instituted the present action in the Court
of First Instance of Manila seeking the annulment of the sale as well as the lease covering the land
and the house above mentioned, and praying that, once the sale and the lease are declared null and
void, the vendee be ordered to return to vendor the duplicate of the title covering the property, and
be restrained from in any way dispossessing the latter of said property.
Defendant answered the complaint setting up as special defense that the sale referred to in the
complaint was absolute and unconditional and was in every respect valid and binding between the
parties, it being not contrary to law, morals and public order, and that plaintiff is guilty of estoppel
in that, by having executed a deed of lease over the property, he thereby recognized the title of
defendant to that property.
The court declared both the sale and the lease valid and binding and dismissed the complaint. The
CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the sale shall be declared null and void.
RULING: The sale in question having been entered into a violation of the Constitution, he next
question to be determined is, can petition have the sale declared null and void and recover the
property considering the effect of the law governing rescission of contracts? Our answer must of
necessity be in the negative following the doctrine laid down in the case of Trinidad Gonzaga de
Cabauatan, et al. vs. Uy Hoo, et al., 88 Phil., 103, wherein we made the following pronouncement:
"We can, therefore, say that even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution, or the doctrine
in the Krivenko Case, to set aside the sale in question, they are now prevented from doing so if
their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily parted with, because of their guilty
knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. They cannot escape this
conclusion because they are presumed to know the law. As this court well said: 'A party to an
illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.' The
rule is expressed in the maxims: 'Ex dolo malo non oritur actio,' and 'In pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis' (Bough and Bough vs. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40 Phil., 210, 216.)".
The doctrine above adverted to is the one known as In Pari Delicto. This is well known not only
in this jurisdiction but also in the United States where common law prevails. In the latter
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jurisdiction, the doctrine is state thus: "The propsosition is universal that no action arises, in equity
349
or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to
recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages
for its violation. The rule has sometimes been laid down as though it were equally universal, that
where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against
the other." (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 5th ed., p. 728.).
It is true that this doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely, "whenever public policy
is considered as advanced by allowing either party to use for relief against the transaction." In our
opinion, the contract in question does not come under this exception because it is not intrinsically
contrary to public policy, nor one where the illegality itself consist in its opposition to public
policy. It is illegal not because it is against public policy but because it is against the Constitution.
Nor may it be contended that to apply the doctrine of pari delicto would be tantamount to
contravening the fundamental policy embodied in the constitutional prohibition in that it would
allow an alien to remain in the illegal possession of the land, because in this case the remedy is
lodged elsewhere. To adopt the contrary view would be merely to benefit petitioner and not to
enhance public interest.
The danger foreseen by counsel in the application of the doctrine above adverted to is more
apparent than real. If we go deeper in the analysis of our situation we would not fail to see that the
best policy would be for Congress to approve a law laying down the policy and the procedure to
be followed in connection with transactions affected by our doctrine in the Krivenko case. We
hope that this should be done without much delay. And even if this legislation be not forthcoming
in the near future, we do not believe that public interest would suffer thereby if only our executive
department would follow a more militant policy in the conservation of our natural resources as
ordained by our Constitution. And we say so because there are at present two ways by which this
situation may be remedied, to wit, (1) action for reversion, and (2) escheat to the state. An action
for reversion is slightly different from escheat proceeding, but in its effects they are the same. They
only differ in procedure. Escheat proceedings may be instituted as a consequence of a violation of
article XIII, section 5 of our Constitution, which prohibits transfers of private agricultural lands to
aliens, whereas an action for reversion is expressly authorized by the Public Land Act (sections
122, 123, and 124 of Commonwealth Act No. 141).
The doctrine regarding the course of all titles being the same here as in the United States, it would
seem that if escheat lies against aliens holding lands in those states of the Union where common
law prevails or where similar constitutional or statutory prohibitions exists, no cogent reason is
perceived why similar proceedings may not be instituted in this jurisdiction.
Escheat is an incident or attribute of sovereignty, and rests on the principle of the ultimate
ownership by the state of all property within its jurisdiction. (30 C.J.S., 1164.)
... In American escheats belongs universally to the state or some corporation thereof as the ultimate
proprietor of land within its Jurisdiction. (19 Am. Jur., 382.)
An escheat is nothing more or less than the reversion of property to the state, which takes place
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when the title fails. (Delany vs. State, 42 N. D., 630, 174 N.W., 290, quoted in footnote 6, 19 Am.
Jur., 381.
350
As applied to the right of the state to lands purchased by an alien, it would more properly be termed
a "forfeiture" at common law. (19 Am. Jur., 381.)
In modern law escheat denotes a falling of the estate into the general property of the state because
the tenant is an alien or because he has died intestate without lawful heirs to take his estate by
successions, or because of some other disability to take or hold property imposed by law. (19 Am.
Jur., 381.)
With regard to an action for reversion, the following sections of commonwealth Act No. 141 are
pertinent:
Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefor by their charters.
Sec. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal decree, royal order, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regards to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any
other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
conveyed, except to persons, corporation or associations who may acquire land of the public
domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize
them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance
or acquisition by reason or hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent
courts; Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements
mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the
provisions of this Act, such persons, corporation, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said
lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise,
such property shall revert to the Government.
Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in
violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty,
one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of
this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of
annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or
confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements
to the State.
Note that the last quoted provision declared any prohibited conveyance not only unlawful but null
and void ab initio. More important yet, it expressly provided that such conveyances will produce
"the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit, originally issued,
recognized of confirmed, actually or presumptively", and of causing "the reversion of the property
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and its improvements to the State." The reversion would seems to be but a consequence of the
annulment and cancellation of the original grant or title, and this is so for in the event of such
351
annulment or cancellation no one else could legitimately claim the property except its original
owner or grantor — the state.

G.R. No. 157536 May 16, 2005
FACTS: Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land from Ruperto Gepilano as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale. Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro.
Father and son executed a Deed of Definite Sale.
Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands covering the said area of the
property which he bought from his father. The application was, however, opposed by Deogracias
de la Cruz. The Regional Director rendered a cancelled the said application.
In 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of the said lot, filed an Application for a Free Patent
covering the said lot, and was issued Free Patent. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo
City issued Original Certificate of Title in her favor. Sucaldito then filed a Petition for Writ of
Possession before the RTC of Iloilo City, which was granted.
Thereafter, Caro filed a Complaint against Sucaldito for "Annulment of Title, Decision, Free
Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession with Damages" before the RTC. He later
filed an amended complaint, alleging that he was the owner of the subject lot, and had been in
possession of the same "since 1953 and/or even prior thereto in the concept of owner, adversely,
openly, continuously and notoriously." He further alleged that the said lot had been
declared for tax purposes in his name and that of his predecessors-in-interest, and that the
corresponding land taxes had been paid therefor. He claimed that Assessor’s Lot No. 160 had
actually
been divided into two lots, namely, Lot No. 4511 and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito had actu
ally been
claiming Lot No. 989 (Lot No. 4512), which was located two kilometers away. He lame
nted that despite the overwhelming evidence proving his ownership and possession of the said
property, the Bureau of Lands did not award it to him.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the land to the
government.
RULING: No, the Court held that the petitioner has no personality to file a suit for
reconveyance of the subject property.
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352
patent issued in the respondent’s favor. Considering that the ultimate relief sought is for
the respondent to "return" the subject property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance.
In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance
filed by a private individual, the property does not go back to the State.
Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back
to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action
grantee.
Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in interest must be dismissed. In this case, the
cannot thus be considered as a party-in interest with personality to file an action for
reconveyance.
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. Therefore,
not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents
have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such
suit.
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353
GUARDIANSHIP
NELSON CABALES AND RITO CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

Gr No. 162421 August 31, 2007, C.J. Puno
FACTS: Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land located
in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving
wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property
to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for ₱2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The
three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each getting a share of
₱666.66.
On August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note "vale" from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of ₱300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered
their payment of ₱666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document
of sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including
his "vale" of ₱300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold
the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for ₱8,000.00.
The Deed of Sale provided in its last paragraph, thus: It is hereby declared and understood that the
amount of P2,286.00 corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito
Cabales who are still minors upon the execution of this instrument are held in trust by the VENDEE
and to be paid and delivered only to them upon reaching the age of 21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 17035 over the purchased land in the names of respondents-spouses.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back to his father’s
hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the
sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to redeem the subject land during a
barangay conciliation process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their respective shares in subject
property when they were minors, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were estopped from claiming any
right over subject property considering that (1) petitioner Rito had already received the amount
corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the sale of subject property, and (2) that petitioner
Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount of the redemption price necessary for legal
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redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of laches and prescription.
354
On August 11, 2000, the trial court ruled against petitioners. The Court of Appeals modified the
decision of the trial court. It held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Rito’s undivided share to
the property was unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the contract
was effectively ratified by petitioner Rito’s receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986.
ISSUE: Whether the sale made by a legal guardian on behalf of the minors were binding upon
them.
RULING: Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of court
appointment considering that the amount of his property or one-seventh of subject property was
₱1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1 provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. – A guardian appointed shall have the care and
custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the
estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the
management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in
which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It
does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as
legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not
have the legal authority to do so.
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito was unenforceable.
However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner
Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor
at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians
with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal
guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the
property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in its
entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and
not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson
and his mother retained ownership over their undivided share of subject property.
ELENA LINDAIN, ET. AL. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Gr No. 95305 August 20, 1992, J. Griño-Aquino
FACTS: When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already the registered owners of a parcel
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of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-63540. On November 7, 1966, their
mother, Dolores Luluquisin, then already a widow and acting as guardian of her minor children,
355
sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land to the defendants
spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the office
of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija. TCT No. NT-66311 was issued to the
vendees, Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila.
The defendants admitted that the property in question was sold to them by the mother of the minors
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale and although at first they were reluctant to buy the property as the
sale would not be legal, the registered owners thereof being all minors, upon advice of their
counsel, the late Atty. Arturo B. Pascual, and the counsel of Dolores Luluquisin, Atty. Eustaquio
Ramos, who notarized the documents, that the property could be sold without the written authority
of the court, considering that its value was less than P2,000, they bought the property and had it
registered in their names under Certificate of Title No. 66311.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the sale of the lot by their mother to the defendants is null and
void because it was made without judicial authority and/or court approval.
The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale was valid, as the value of the property was
less than P2,000, and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the youngest being 31 years old at
the time of the filing of the complaint, their right to rescind the contract which should have been
exercised four (4) years after reaching the age of majority, has already prescribed.
On May 25, 1989, the RTC of San Jose City rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs (now
petitioners).
Upon appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed and another one was entered dismissing the
complaint without pronouncement as to costs.
ISSUE: Whether judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minors' property by their
mother.
RULING: We find merit in the petition for review. Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was
already in force when the assailed transaction occurred, provides:
Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial) administrator
of the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the
property of said children without judicial approval. The powers and duties of the widow as legal
administrator of her minor children's property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled,
"General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators" are only powers of possession and
management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her
minor children must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires court authority
and approval.
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The private respondents' allegation that they are purchasers in good faith is not credible for they
knew from the very beginning that their vendor, the petitioners' mother, without court approval
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could not validly convey to them the property of her minor children. Knowing her lack of judicial
authority to enter into the transaction, the private respondents acted in bad faith when they went
ahead and bought the land from her anyway.
The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for "real actions over immovables
prescribe after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since the sale took place in 1966, the action
to recover the property had not yet prescribed when the petitioners sued in 1987.
SPS. JOSE UY, ET. AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND TEODORO L. JARDELEZA
Gr No. 109557 November 29, 2000, J. Pardo
FACTS: The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a
stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties.
Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of
herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza spouses was about
to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition before the RTC of Iloilo
City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the
guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical
and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently administering
his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas’ real and personal
assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed
therein that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent Gilda Ledesma
Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that in the meantime, no property
of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons,
particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo
City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.
On June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition docketed as Special
Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of
incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties, and authorization to sell the same. Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred
the physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then confined for intensive medical
care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctor’s Hospital. She signified to the court her desire to assume
sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husband’s
medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to several hundred
thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property,
specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court
to sell said property.
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On June 20, 1991, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding that it was convinced that Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties,
and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the
mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also made the pronouncement
that the petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and
that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under
Article 253 of the same Code.
While the motion for reconsideration filed by Teodoro Jardeleza was pending, Gilda Jardeleza
disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda
Jardeleza Uy, for P8,000,000.00, as evidenced by a Deed Absolute Sale.
On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the appealed
decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed of sale,
which was also declared void.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered
a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties,
and could not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a
parcel of land with its improvements.
RULING: In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code
govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one
where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld
or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject
spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply
to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes
sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of
Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal
property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians
under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code.
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JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V
CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN
B. RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Parañaque City, Branch 260; and
JOYCELYN D. PABLO GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994 G.R. No. 156254
June 28, 2005
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The principle of “best interest of the child” pervades Philippine cases involving adoption,
guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these
cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare
of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. Courts are mandated to take into
account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the children’s well-being and
development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent,
other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to the
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children. Among these factors are the
previous care and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral
uprightness, home environment and time availability; as well as the children’s emotional and
educational needs.
CRIN believes this case in inconsistent with the CRC. Although the Court correctly refers to the
best interest principle, as required by the Convention, they only cite it as the basis for the
presumption that the mother should be awarded custody of a young child, rather than assess which
parent’s custody would best serve the interests of the child.
FACTS: There are two consolidated cases in this case. The first is a Petition for Review filed by
Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 30, 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 70878. The second is a Petition for
Certiorari filed by Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, charging
the appellate court with grave abuse of discretion for denying his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the August 30, 2002 Decision.
Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto filed before the RTC of Paranaque City[1] a petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto with an ancillary prayer for the custody
pendente lite of their 4-year old son, Rafaello. Crisanto alleged thaJoycelyn took away their child
from their conjugal home and his school when she decided to abandon Crisanto. Despite efforts of
Crisanto, he failed to see his child. During the hearing on the custody pendente lite, the private
investigator hired by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn testified that Joycelyn was
having lesbian relations with a certain Noreen in Cebu City. This was corroborated by the house
helper of the spouses who stated that Joycelyn often leaves the house and on one occasion, she
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saw Joycelyn slap the child. The trial court awarded the custody of the minor pendente lite to
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Crisanto. After hearing, the trial court awarded the custody Crisanto, but it was reversed later,
awarding the custody to Joycelyn. The CA reversed the Order of the trial court and awarded
custody to the father pendente lite.
ISSUE: Whether lesbianism may warrant the separation of a child below the age of seven (7) from
the mother.
RULING: The Supreme Court said that the general rule that children under seven years of age
shall not be separated from their mother finds its reason in the basic need of minor children for
their mother’s loving care and that this rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a
mother has her baby torn away from her. Any exception to this rule can only be made for
‘compelling reasons’ for the good of the child, but such cases must indeed be rare.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive
Joycelyn of custody. The mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive
her of custody, but sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband
would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child.
It was held that in order to deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her
moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted her from
exercising proper parental care. It was, therefore, not enough for Crisanto to show merely that
Joycelyn was a lesbian, but he had to also demonstrate that she had carried on her purported
relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not
conducive to the child’s proper moral development. However, in the current case, there was no
evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper
moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, vs. HELEN G. BELMES
G.R. No. 132223. June 19, 2001
Section 7, Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso
facto guardian of their minor children without need of a court appointment and only for good
reason may another person be named.
FACTS: Petitioner Bonifacia Vancil is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the
USA who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two
children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
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Petitioner commenced before the RTC of Cebu City guardianship proceedings over the persons
and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time, Valerie was only six years old while
Vincent was a two-year old child.
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate
of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil, Jr.
On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to
the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for
guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a
Motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment with a Motion for the Removal of Guardian
and Appointment of New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors.
The trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as
guardian of Valerie and Vincent, Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the
office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The
subsequent attempt for reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
ISSUE: Who between the mother and grandmother of the minor children should be their guardian.
RULING: Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in
the absence of the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law on parental authority
under the Civil Code or P.D. No. 603 and now the New Family Code (Art. 225 of the Family
Code). Section 7, Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents
ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of a court appointment and only for good
reason may another person be names. Ironically, the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any
reason at all why the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any reason at all why Helen Belmes,
the biological mother, should be deprive of her legal rights as natural guardian of her minor
children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be an abdication and grave violation of
the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law and constitution on family solidarity.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify
as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of
Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required
of a guardian. In fact, in her petition she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone
else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
The appealed decision is affirmed, with modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained
the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.
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RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES RENATO MASBATE AND MARLYN
MASBATE, vs. RICKY JAMES RELUCIO.
G.R. No. 235498 July 30, 2018
The Family Code further provides in Article 216 that "[i]n default of parents or judicially
appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the
child in the order indicated: xxx (3) the child's actual custodian, over twenty- one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified.” The same order of preference with respect to substitute parental
authority is reiterated in Section 13 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, the "Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.”
FACTS: Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living
together with Renalyn's parents without the benefit of marriage. Three (3) years later, or in April
2015, the relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving Queenie behind in the
care and custody of her father, Ricky James.
Ricky James alleged that on November 7, 2015, Spouses Renata and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn's
parents) took Queenie from the school where he had enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie
back, Renalyn's parents refused and instead showed a copy of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
executed by Renalyn granting full parental rights, authority, and custody over Queenie to them.
Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody docketed as SP
No. FC-15-239 before the RTC (petition a quo). A hearing was conducted on December 3, 2015,
where Renalyn brought Queenie and expressed the desire for her daughter to remain in her custody.
In an Order dated December 4, 2015, the RTC ruled that the custody of three (3)year-old Queenie
rightfully belongs to Renalyn, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code,
which states that "[n]o child under seven [(7)] years of age shall be separated from the mother x x
x." The RTC likewise found that, while Renalyn went to Manila to study dentistry and left Queenie
in the custody of her parents, her intention was to bring Queenie to Manila at a later time. Thus, in
the fallo of said Order, the RTC declared that it will "NOT GIVEFURTHER DUE COURSE" to
the petition a quo.
Dissatisfied, Ricky James moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied in an Order dated
January 7, 2016, wherein the RTC emphasized that Queenie was born out of wedlock, for which
reason she shall be under the parental authority of her mother, Renalyn, pursuant to Article 176 of
the Family Code. In addition, the RTC faulted Ricky James for failing to present credible evidence
in court to demonstrate that Renalyn is unfit to take custody of their daughter.
Aggrieved, Ricky James filed an appeal before the CA. In a Decision dated January 12, 2017, the
CA set aside the assailed RTC Orders and remanded the case to the lower court for determination
of who should exercise custody over Queenie.
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Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the RTC Orders granting custody to Renalyn "pending the outcome
of the case, "stating that only Queenie's mother, Renalyn, has parental authority over her as she is
an illegitimate child.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, while Ricky James filed a motion for clarification.
In its Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017, the CA denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, insisting on its application of the case of Bagtas v. Santos, which
held that a trial is still necessary to determine the issue of custody despite the production of the
child. On the other hand, the CA ruled in favor of Ricky James' motion for clarification, granting
the latter what it calls a " limited and temporary custody" that will allow him to take Queenie out
once a month, or on the first Saturday of each month, for a period not exceeding twenty-four (24)
hours, but which shall not reduce his visitation days fixed at two (2) days per week. In so holding,
the appellate court cited "humane and practical considerations".
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari; on the ground that the purported
custodial right that Ricky James seeks to enforce in filing his petition has no legal basis.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for determination of who should exercise
custody over Queenie.
2. Whether the CA erred in granting Ricky James temporary custody for a limited period of
twenty-four (24) consecutive hours once every month, in addition to visitation rights, invoking
"humane and practical considerations," which were based solely on Ricky James' allegations.
RULING:
1. No. As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned,
Article176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority
of their mother. Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority
of their illegitimate children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's recognition of the
child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate
children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative
cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care. In addition, Article 213of
the same Code provides for the so-called tender-age presumption, stating that "[n]o child under
seven [(7)] years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise."
The choice of a child over seven (7) years of age (first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code) and over ten (10) years of age (Rule 99 of the Rules of Court) shall be considered in custody
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disputes only between married parents because they are, pursuant to Article 211 of the Family
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Code, accorded joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. On the other
hand, this choice is not available to an illegitimate child, much more one of tender age such as
Queenie (second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code), because sole parental authority is
given only to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit or unsuitable (Article 176 of the Family
Code). Thus, since the issue in this case is the application of the exception to the tender-age
presumption under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, and not the option
given to the child under the first paragraph to choose which parent to live with, petitioners' reliance
on Pablo-Gualberto vs. Gualberto V is grossly misplaced.
In addition, it ought to be pointed out that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code, which was the basis of the CA's directive to remand the case, does not even distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate children and hence, does not factor in whether or not the
parents are married in declaring that "[n]o child under seven [(7)] years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." "Ubi lex non
distinguit necnos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also
ought not to recognize any distinction." As such, petitioners' theory that Article 213 of the Family
Code is herein inapplicable and thus, negates the need for the ordered remand is not only premised
on an erroneous reading of jurisprudence, but is also one that is fundamentally off-tangent with
the law itself.
The Court cannot also subscribe to petitioners' contention that even if there are compelling reasons
to separate Queenie from her mother, Renalyn, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code, Ricky James would still not acquire custody over their daughter
because there is no provision of law granting custody rights to an illegitimate father. In the event
that Renalyn is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her daughter, Article 214 of the Family Code
mandates that substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
However, the same Code further provides in Article 216 that "[i]n default of parents or judicially
appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child
in the order indicated: xxx (3) the child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified.”
The same order of preference with respect to substitute parental authority is reiterated in Section
13 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, the "Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors.”
It was not disputed that Ricky James was in actual physical custody of Queenie when Renalyn left
for Manila to pursue her studies until the instant controversy took place. As such, Ricky James had
already assumed obligations and enjoyed privileges of a custodial character, giving him a cause of
action to file a case of habeas corpus to regain custody of Queenie as her actual custodian.
Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the Family Code has effectively disqualified the father
of an illegitimate child from exercising substitute parental authority under Article 216 even if he
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were the actual custodian of the child under the premise that no one is allowed to do indirectly
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what he is prohibited to do directly. However, the Court cannot adopt a rigid view, without running
afoul to the overarching consideration in custody cases, which is the best interest of the minor.
2. YES. It should be stressed that Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC provides for temporary
visitation rights, not temporary custody.
By granting temporary albeit limited custody ahead of trial, the appellate court overturned the
tender-age presumption with nothing but Ricky James' bare allegations, to which the Court cannot
give its imprimatur. As earlier intimated, the issue surrounding Renalyn's fitness as a mother must
be properly threshed out in the trial court before she can be denied custody, even for the briefest
of periods, over Queenie.
NILO OROPESA, PETITIONER, VS. CIRILO OROPESA, RESPONDENT
G.R. NO. 184528; APRIL 25, 2012
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at
issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is
not necessary and that the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."
FACTS: On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the
property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003
and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory were impaired and such has been evident after
his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the Cirilo was observed to have had lapses in
memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his
age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has
become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa
Agamata, his girlfriend.
On July 6, 2004, the respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August
3, 2004, the respondent filed his Supplemental Opposition.
ISSUE: Whether Cirilo is an incompetent person who should be placed under guardianship
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RULING: In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, it held out the nature and purpose of guardianship in
the following wise:
“A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a
"guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his
own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian.
It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.”
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is
proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care
of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship.
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear,
positive and definite evidence." We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must
be applied in the case at bar.
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister, who were claiming
interest in their father’s real and personal properties and their father’s former caregiver, who
admitted to be acting under their direction. These testimonies, which did not include any expert
medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action and
instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of
evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties
registered in his, his father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts
showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate
to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on
record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the
petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any
event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had
negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings
that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at
issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is
not necessary and that the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
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person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."
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DINAH B. TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL
G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002
FACTS: Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar
V. Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after,
Dinah left for the USA where she found a work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care
of her father and paternal grandparents.
Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin. The court granted the petition and
appointed Edgar as the legal guardian.
Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court set aside its original judgment and
allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Meanwhile, the court issued a resolution
granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the
resolution.
Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA let Gardin remain in the
custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged.
Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of Gardin, as
a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her
as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had
not, as of then, attained the age of seven.
ISSUE: Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship
proceeding?
RULING: In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-
being of the child.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into
a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition
for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess
the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason
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is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven
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years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent
should have the custody over her person.
For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain
with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-1 and NATIVIDAD

CRUZ-HERNANDEZ vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS
G.R. No. 166470
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and TERESA
C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS
G.R. No. 169217 August 7, 2009
FACTS: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the
spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to
complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal
uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
As the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties
from the San Juan family. Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10
years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her "violent personality," Lulu
stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate.3
Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to
exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took
over the task of administering Lulu's properties. In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of
her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had
been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of
petitioners’ Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of ₱400 for her
food and medication. On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship. She alleged
that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak
mind.
ISSUE: Whether the person is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian
over her person and property.
RULING: Yes.
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on
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the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians
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spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior
and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal.
Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person's state of mental
sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally
when she testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason
of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and
their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed
under guardianship.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES Y LAGUA
G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010
FACTS: In or about and sometime during the month of , in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being the adopting father of complainant who was then years of age, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with [AAA] by means of force and
intimidation and against the will of the complainant.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the parties
stipulated on the following facts:
AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;
Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and
AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife since AAA was one and a half
years old.
The trial court found that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime of rape
through the testimony of the victim, which the trial court deemed "straightforward, consistent and
credible." The trial court also established that appellant is the adoptive father of AAA since 1989
and that AAA was then a minor, as proven by the birth certificate, testimonies of witnesses, and
admission made by AAA. Finally, the trial court dismissed appellant’s defense of denial as self-
serving and which cannot prevail over AAA’s positive testimony.
ISSUE: Is the defendant considered a guardian of the victim to warrant appreciation of relationship
in the imposition of penalty?
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369
RULING: No, he is not considered a guardian.
Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of AAA.
However, the court cannot simply invoke this admission to consid er guardianship as a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of rape. "Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to
death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme
penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the
gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must
specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender."
Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward.
In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
specifically as one who, aside from the offended party, her parents or grandparents, is authorized
to file the sworn written complaint to commence the prosecution for that crime. In People vs. De
la Cruz, it was held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as
understood in the rules on civil procedure.
The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity
of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and
normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's
case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or
another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions
should he betray the trust. In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian
falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He
would not fall either in the category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the
same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA].
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI v. ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all

surnamed PABALE
G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
FACTS: Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land [Fernando] alleged that, a handwritten
"Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between him and [Nave]
involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on their agreement when the latter refused
to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she did not
want to sell her property to him anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave]
be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to pay attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and damages.
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[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to execute the
corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the following ground that she already
sold the property in good faith to the Pabale siblings after the complaint was filed against her but
before she received a copy thereof.
The proceedings in this case was suspended in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of
[Nave] with the Regional Trial Court,
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo, [Nave’s] sole heir, she being an orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for the issuance
of a writ of execution of the Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for
guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 with the court a quo.
[The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not made
a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision therein.
ISSUE: Whether the Pable siblings should be made party to the guardianship proceedings.
RULING: No. The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an
incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is
most qualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who
best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and most familiar
with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same province
and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent
be likewise identified and notified. The reason is simple: because their presence is not essential to
the proceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that
they will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into
contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts and keep the supposed minor or
incompetent obligated to comply therewith.
PATRIA PACIENTE vs. HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, PresidingJudge of the

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte and Southern Leyte; FELICIANA
CALLE,
G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982,
FACTS: In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres, and two minor
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children,Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land known as Lot No. 3085-G situated in Tacloban City.
371
On September 9, 19-76, Lilia S. Homeres, sold Lot No. 3085-G to Conchita Dumdum for
P10,000.00.On November 11, 1976, Lilia S. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship over the
persons and estate of the minors. The petition was granted on August 9, 1977.
On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold Lot No. 3085-G, which had been titled in her
name under, to petitioner Patria Paciente for the amount of P15,000.00. Consequently, Patria
Paciente was issued TCT No. T-13238 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
On December 27, 1978, the petitioner mortgaged the lot to the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation for P30,000.00. On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, filed a manifestation informing respondent court that Lot No. 3085-G which is the
subject of the guardianship proceedings had been registered in the name of the petitioner and that
it was mortgaged to the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to guarantee petitioner's loan of
P30,000.00.
Upon being thus informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent court issued an order on
November 14, 1980, directing the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation to appear before the court on January 21, 1981 and show cause why TCT No. T-
13238, covering a parcel of land co-owned by the minors, Shirley and Leandro Homeres, should
not be cancelled for having been alienated without authority from the court.
When January 21, 1981 came, the petitioner and the manager of Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation did not appear before the court. Instead, Conchita Dumdum appeared and explained
to the respondent court that she sold the lot which she acquired from Lilia S. Homeres to the
petitioner without obtaining the approval of the court because she was not aware of such
requirement regarding the properties of the minors. On the same date, the respondent court again
issued an order requiring the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation to explain why TCT No. T- 13238 should not be cancelled for their failure to first
secure judicial authority before disposing of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent court acting as a guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the
Register of Deeds to cancel the transfer certificate of title of petitioner and to order the issuance of
a new title to include the minors as co-owners. (YES)
RULING: Relying on the cases of Cui, et al. vs. Piccio, et al. 91 Phil. 712, and Parco and Bautista
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33152, January 30, 1982, petitioner contends that respondent
court in hearing a petition for guardianship is not the proper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens
Title. In the Cui case, this Court ruled:
... Out of the cases cited, the only one we find to have some relevancy is that of Castillo vs.
Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839. In this case, the court made a distinction between the provisions of
sections 709 and 593 of the Code of Civil Procedure which now correspond to section 6, Rule 88
and section 6 of Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. This Court in that case said in effect that while in
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administration proceedings the court under section 709 may only question the person suspected of
372
having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away property belonging to the estate, section 593 of
the same Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the Judge or the court to issue such orders as maybe
necessary to secure the estate against concealment, embezzlement and conveyance, and this
distinction is now given emphasis by respondents' counsel. the way we interpret section 573 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as now embodied in Rule 97, section 6 of the Rules of Court in the light
of the ruling laid down in the case of Castillo vs. Bustamante, supra, is that the court may issue an
order directing the delivery or return of any property embezzled, concealed or conveyed which
belongs to a ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and indisputable.
xxx xxx xxx
In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to issue his order of September
5, 1951, in the guardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver the rentals collected
by them to the guardian and authorizing the latter to collect rentals in the future, for the reason that
the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of
having embezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for the purpose of
obtaining information which may be used in action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect
the right of the ward; and that only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward
or where his title thereto has already been judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to
the guardian. and in the case of Parco and Bautista the ruling reads as follows:
In Cui vs. Piccio, et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship
proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed
the property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in
an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward. Generally, the
guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of
the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a categorical language
of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title
thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In
effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of
the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to
any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the
determination of said title or right whether in favor of the persons said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in a
guardianship proceedings.
Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or return of the property
conveyed are concerned, We find the orders of the respondent court valid. The petitioner's
contentions in this regard are untenable. Even the aforecited cases relied upon do not support her
argument. While it is true that in these two cases We ruled that where title to any property said to
be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question, the determination of said title or right whether
in favor of the ward or in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the
property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings,
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373
Wealso emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the property is clear and indisputable the
court may issue an order directing its delivery or return.
PILAR Y. GOYENA vs. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILLO
GR No. 147148 January 13, 2003
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with
the parties.
As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the
guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are
urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that
he has fallen into grievous error.
FACTS: In 1996, Amparo Ledesma-Gustillo, the younger sister of Julieta Ledesma filed a Petition
for Guardianship of the latter before the Makati RTC. Amparo alleged that Julieta has been a
patient in the Makati Medical Center where she is under medical attention for old age, general
debility, and a "mini"-stroke. She cannot get up from bed without outside assistance and has to be
moved by a wheelchair.
Pilar Goyena, a close friend of Julieta, filed an opposition. She interposed her objection to the
appointment of Amparo as guardian because she thinks that the latter dislikes her. Nevertheless,
not one of the nearest kin of Julieta opposed the petition. As a matter of fact, her sisters signified
their conformity thereto.
The trial court found Julieta "incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property"
and appointed Amaparo as guardian. It was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the lower courts erred in appointing Amparo as guardian
RULING: No. In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who
deals directly with the parties.
As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian,
and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the
interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen
into grievous error.
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In the case, Goyena has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
374
The Supreme Court also noted two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit:
1) Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of respondent as guardian before the trial
court because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked by respondent, a ground which does
not render respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and
2) Petitioner concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is
reflective of a lack of good faith.
EDUARDO ABAD vs. LEONARDO BIASON
G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012
FACTS: In this case is a petition for guardianship filed by Eduardo Abad over the person and
properties of Maura B. Abad. It was alleged in the petition that petitioner is Maura’s nephew. He
averred that Maura, who is single, more than ninety (90) years old and a resident of Rizal Street,
Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her
business affairs. Due to her advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to
take care of herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and
exploitation. The case was submitted for decision after the hearing. However, Leonardo Biason
(Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition and attached therewith his
Opposition to the Appointment of Eduardo Abad as Guardian of the Person and Properties of
Maura B. Abad. Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was
not notified of the pendency of the petition for the appointment of the latter’s guardian. He
vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad as Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform
his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan,
Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s guardian since he was previously
granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties.
The RTC rendered a Decision, denying Abad’s petition and appointing Biason as Maura’s
guardian. Such decision was affirmed by the CA. The CA ruled that “For one, the oppositor-
appellee, like petitioner-appellant, is also a relative, a nephew of the incompetent. There are no
vices of character which have been established as to disqualify him from being appointed as a
guardian”. The case was brought before the Supreme Court by Eduardo Abad challenging his
disqualification as a guardian on the sole basis of his residence. However pending the resolution
of the instant petition, Biason died. As such, Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and
academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the
guardianship be terminated.
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ISSUE: Whether the death of the guardian terminates the relationship of the guardian and the
ward.
RULING: In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated August 28,
2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his appeal from the Decision dated
September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. Basically,
he was challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as
guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to
proceed with resolving the merits of the petition.
It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by
the death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless
to delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura
has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or
anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.
PILAR Y. GOYENA, v. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO
G.R. No. 147148 - January 13, 2003
FACTS: Amparo filed at the RTC a "PETITION FOR LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP" over
the person and properties of her sister Julieta, who is confined to her bed and cannot get up from
bed without outside assistance, and she has to be moved by wheel chair.
Amparo alleged that she has extensive experience in business management of commercial,
agricultural and corporate enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where Julieta
Ledesma holds an interest, and that she is in a position to monitor and supervise the delivery of
vitally needed medical services to Julieta Ledesma whether in the Metro Manila area, or elsewhere.
Pilar, Julieta’s good friend, filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship alleging
that the petition lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and
there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property. She is very
able to take charge of her affairs, and this is clearly evident from her letters to the petitioner.
Petitioner is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of Julieta Ledesma since their interests are
antagonistic.
Pilar alleged that there is a special bond of friendship existing between Julieta and her.
ISSUE: Whether the nearest blood relative of Julieta shall be appointed as guardian.
RULING: Yes. By and large, the qualification of Amparo to act as guardian over the person and
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properties of Julieta has been duly established. As a sister, she can best take care of Julieta's
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concerns and well being. Now that Julieta is in the twilight of her life, her family should be given
the opportunity to show their love and affection for her without however denying Pilar Goyena
access to her considering the special bond of friendship between the two. Needless to say, the
oppositor at 90 years of age could not be said to be physically fit to attend to all the needs of Julieta.
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO

EVANGELISTA vs.COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO
ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA
G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997
FACTS: Carmen Cañiza, a 94-year old spinster, was declared incompetent by judgment of the
Regional Trial Court in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista.
She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts
in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her
person and estate.
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot, As her guardian, Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit
to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.
The amended Complaint alleged that plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in
question,; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren
and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already had urgent need
of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet
her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment.
Eventually, Carmen Cañiza died in 1994, and her heirs — the aforementioned guardian, Amparo
Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively — were by this Court's
leave, substituted for her.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring an eviction suit.
2. Whether Evangelista may continue to represent Cañiza after the latter's death.
RULING:
1. Yes, Evangelista, as the appointed guardian, has the authority to bring the suit. Evangelista was
appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt,
Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person
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and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take possession of
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the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to
perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties . . " By that appointment, it
became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual
needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and
friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's
property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to
possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's
estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains
it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to
attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by
Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. — A

guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and
profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward
and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the
guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply
to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.
2. Yes. As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The
Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death automatically
terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and
ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated
by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas.
Evangelista, as niece of Cañiza, is one of the latter's only two surviving heirs, the other being
Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. They were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar
in place of the deceased, in accordance
with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted
for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the
legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by
the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
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To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza's demise did not extinguish the
desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. 42 That action, not being a purely personal
one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal
at bar.
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TRUSTEES RELATING TO WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS OTHER THAN A WILL
LANDL & COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., ET. AL. V. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY
Gr No. 159622 July 30, 2004, J. Ynares-Santiago
FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money against Landl and Company (Phil.) Inc.
(Landl) and its
directors, Percival G. Llaban and Manuel P. Lucente before the RTC of Cebu City.
Respondent alleged that petitioner corporation is engaged in the business of selling imported
welding rods and alloys. On June 17, 1983, it opened Commercial Letter of Credit No. 4998 with
respondent bank. The letter of credit was opened to purchase various welding rods and electrodes
from Perma Alloys, Inc., New York, U.S.A., as evidenced by a Pro-Forma Invoice dated March
10, 1983. Petitioner corporation put up a marginal deposit from the proceeds of a separate clean
loan.
As an additional security, and as a condition for the approval of petitioner corporation's application
for the opening of the commercial letter of credit, respondent bank required petitioners Percival
G. Llaban and Manuel P. Lucente to execute a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of
respondent bank. To secure the indebtedness of petitioner corporation, respondent bank required
the execution of a Trust Receipt in an amount equivalent to the letter of credit, on the condition
that petitioner corporation would hold the goods in trust for respondent bank, with the right to sell
the goods and the obligation to turn over to respondent bank the proceeds of the sale, if any. If the
goods remained unsold, petitioner corporation had the further obligation to return them to
respondent bank on or before November 23, 1983. Upon arrival of the goods in the Philippines,
petitioner corporation took possession and custody thereof.
On November 23, 1983, the maturity date of the trust receipt, petitioner corporation defaulted in
the payment of its obligation to respondent bank and failed to turn over the goods to the latter. On
July 24, 1984, respondent bank demanded that petitioners, as entrustees, turn over the goods
subject of the trust receipt. On September 24, 1984, petitioners turned over the subject goods to
the respondent bank. On July 31, 1985, in the presence of representatives of the petitioners and
respondent bank, the goods were sold at public auction, the respondent bank as the highest bidder.
The proceeds of the auction sale were insufficient to completely satisfy petitioners' outstanding
obligation to respondent bank, notwithstanding the application of the time deposit account of
petitioner Lucente. Accordingly, respondent bank demanded that petitioners pay the remaining
balance of their obligation. After petitioners failed to do so, respondent bank instituted the instant
case to collect the said deficiency.
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ISSUE: Whether, in a trust receipt transaction, an entruster which had taken actual and juridical
possession of the goods covered by the trust receipt may subsequently avail of the right to demand
from the entrustee the deficiency of the amount covered by the trust receipt.
RULING: Petitioners' argument is bereft of merit. A trust receipt is inextricably linked with the
primary agreement between the parties. Time and again, we have emphasized that a trust receipt
agreement is merely a collateral agreement, the purpose of which is to serve as security for a loan.
The second paragraph of Section 7 provides a statutory remedy available to an entruster in the
event of default or failure of the entrustee to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the
trust receipt or any other agreement between the entruster and the entrustee. More specifically, the
entruster "may cancel the trust and take possession of the goods, documents or instruments subject
of the trust or of the proceeds realized therefrom at any time". The law further provides that "the
entruster in possession of the goods, documents or instruments may, on or after default, give notice
to the entrustee of the intention to sell, and may, not less than five days after serving or sending of
such notice, sell the goods, documents or instruments at public or private sale, and the entruster
may, at a public sale, become a purchaser. The proceeds of any such sale, whether public or private,
shall be applied (a) to the payment of the expenses thereof; (b) to the payment of the expenses of
re-taking, keeping and storing the goods, documents or instruments; (c) to the satisfaction of the
entrustee's indebtedness to the entruster. The entrustee shall receive any surplus but shall be liable
to the entruster for any deficiency."
PROSPERO RINGOR v. CONCORDIA
G.R. NO. 147863 August 13, 2004
FACTS: The controversy involves lands owned by the late Jacobo Ringor. By his first wife,
Gavina Laranang, he had two children, Juan and Catalina. He did not have offsprings by his second
and third wives. Catalina predeceased her father Jacobo who died sometime in 1935, leaving Juan
his lone heir.
Juan married Gavina Marcella. They had seven (7) children, including Jose, the father and
predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners.
Jacobo applied for the registration of his lands under the Torrens system. He filed three land
registration cases alone, with his son Juan, or his grandson Jose, applying jointly with him.
In the second application, Expediente 244, Jacobo named Jose as the applicant. The five (5) parcels
of land in Expediente 244 were adjudicated to Jose as a "donacion de su abuelo" (donation of his
grandfather). Thereafter, OCT No. 18797 was issued exclusively to Jose.
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During trial, witnesses attested that even after the decisions in the three land registration cases and
the Compraventas, Jacobo remained in possession of the lands and continued administering them
as he did prior to their registration. He unfailingly gave a share of the produce to all the 7 children
of his son Juan. When Jacobo died, the lands under the three land registration applications,
including those which petitioners sought to partition in their counterclaim before the trial court,
remained undivided. Jose, as the eldest grandchild, assumed and continued the administration of
the lands. He gave his 5 younger sisters and only brother Agapito, their share in the produce and
income from the lands. Herein respondents claim they repeatedly asked Jose for partitioning of the
land; however, every time they did, Jose always answered that it was not going to be easy because
there would be "big and small shares." Respondents explained that they did not zealously press for
the immediate partition of the lands because Jose constantly assured them that he would never
cheat them and because they respected him highly.
Jose died and respondents demanded from Jose's children, herein petitioners, the partition and
delivery of their share in the estate left by Jacobo and under Jose's administration. The petitioners
refused.
Respondents claimed that they are all grandchildren and/or great grandchildren of Jacobo and that
the late Jose Ringor had always been the administrator and trustee of Jacobo.
The trial nullified all the land title in Jose’s name.
Petitioners contend that in so far as Expediente 244 is concerned, the court a quo virtually nullified
all the land titles in Jose's name when it declared that the disputed lands belong to the intestate
estate of Jacobo and Jose and his siblings were co-owners thereof. This, petitioners aver, violates
the principle of res judicata and the indefeasibility of the Torrens title.
ISSUE: Whether the nullification of the land titles violates the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title.
RULING: No. A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another
cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Jose's
name did not vest ownership of the land upon him. The Torrens system does not create or vest
title. It only confirms and records title already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper
from the true owner. The Torrens system was not intended to foment betrayal in the performance
of a trust. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Where one does not
have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record
nothing. Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the lands in Jose's name nor in the name of
the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong result they seek. For Jose could not repudiate a
trust by relying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his co-heirs. The beneficiaries are entitled to
enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The intended trust must
be sustained.
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G.R. No. 138953 June 6, 2002 Quisumbing, J.

would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued
on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain.
Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.
Since Amelita Solas title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the
validity of Amelitas title. It follows that he cannot recover the property because, to begin with, he
has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.
Fermina Lopez is petitioner’s aunt, and also Amelitas adoptive mother.
On June 17, 1982, the Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application
(MSA) of Fermina over Lot 5, SGS-3451, with an area of 152 sq. m. at the Waterfront, Cebu City.
On May 28, 1983, Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over Lot
5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all the obligations, duties, and conditions imposed
upon Fermina under MSA Application No. V-81066. The document of transfer was filed with the
Bureau of Lands.
Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands. She paid a total amount of P282,900.
On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and granting
the amendment of the application from Fermina to Amelita. On May 2, 1989, Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 3439 was issued in favor of Amelita.
On June 24, 1993, herein petitioner filed Civil Case No. CEB-14191 for reconveyance against
Amelita. He claimed that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated the land to him and immediately
thereafter, he took possession of the same. He averred that the donation to him had the effect of
withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita.
For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina was no
longer the owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having
been transferred earlier to her. She added that the donation was void because of lack of approval
from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly acquired the land as Ferminas rightful heir. She
also denied that she is a trustee of the land for petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner has a legal standing to assail the validity of Amelita’s title. (NO)
Thus:
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Sec. 101.All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelitas title. It
follows that he cannot recover the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the
rightful owner thereof.
Anent petitioners contention that it was the intention of Fermina for Amelita to hold the property
instrument, we are not prepared to accept petitioner’s bare allegation concerning the donors state
of mind.
G.R. No. 157536 May 16, 2005, Callejo, Sr., J.
respondent to "return" the subject property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance.
In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "[t]he essence of an action for
reconveyance is that the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought
instead is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right." Indeed, in an action
for reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not go back to the State.
cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for
reconveyance.
FACTS: Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor’s Lot No. 160 from Ruperto
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Gepilano as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated October 21, 1953. Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold
a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro, consisting of 70,124 square meters, and now
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identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral survey of Nueva Valencia. Father and son executed a
Deed of Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512.
On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands covering
the said area of the property which he bought from his father. The application was, however,
opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6, 1980, the Regional Director rendered a
Decision canceling the said application.
On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application for
a Free Patent covering the said lot, and was issued Free Patent. Consequently, the Register of
Deeds of Iloilo City issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. F-27162 in her favor. Sucaldito
then filed a Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC of Iloilo City, which was granted in an
Order dated May 7, 1984.
Thereafter, on February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint against Sucaldito for "Annulment of
Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession with Damages"
before the RTC of Iloilo City. He later filed an amended complaint, alleging that he was the owner
of the subject lot, and had been in possession of the same "since 1953 and/or even prior thereto in
the concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously." He further alleged that
the said lot had been declared for tax purposes in his name and that of his predecessors-in-interest,
and that the corresponding land taxes had been paid therefor. He claimed that Assessor’s Lot No.
160 had actually been divided into two lots, namely, Lot No. 4511 and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito
had actually been claiming Lot No. 989 (Lot No. 4512), which was located two kilometers away.
He lamented that despite the overwhelming evidence proving his ownership and possession of the
said property, the Bureau of Lands did not award it to him.
Citing the case of Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, the trial court ruled that Caro
had no personality to file the action for the annulment of the free patent issued in favor of Sucaldito,
which could only be brought by the Solicitor General. It held that "an applicant for a free patent
who is not the owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an action in court to recover the land, for the
court may not usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture to
dispose lands of the public domain through administrative proceedings under the Public Land Act,"
or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The trial court further stressed that the remedy of a
rivalapplicant for a free patent over the same land was through administrative channels, not
judicial, because even if the oppositor succeeds in annulling the title of the applicant, the former
does not thereby become the owner of the land in dispute.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has personality to file a suit for reconveyance. (NO)
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RULING: The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and holds that the petitioner
has no personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject property.
respondent to "return" the subject property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance. In
De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance
filed by a private individual, the property does not go back to the State.
Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back
to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action
grantee.
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, or one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit." Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument,
as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.
cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.
H. P. HOSKYNS, as administrator of intestate estate of J. E. H. Stevenot, Plaintiff-

Appellee, vs. NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK
WELLS FARGO BANK AND UNION TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. L-1877 December 29, 1949
FACTS: J. E. H. Stevenot, a citizen of the United States, and of the State of California, died in
New Caledonia, while serving as an officer of the U. S. Army. He was survived by his widow and
two daughters, who are all at present in the United States. For more than ten years immediately
prior to his death, J. E. H. Stevenot had been a resident of the Philippines and upon his death left
real and personal properties situated therein, properties which he acquired during his married life.
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While in California, Stevenot executed a private written instrument, agreed to by his wife, in which
he appointed himself as trustor or trustee of his properties and declared that he was holding them
in trust for the beneficiaries named therein including his wife, daughters, and other relatives. The
deed of trust provided that Stevenot should himself have a life interest in the trust properties and
that after his death the income and corpus should go principally to his wife and family.
The trust indenture provided that upon Stevenot's death, Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co.
should succeed as trustee for the properties located in the United States and the National City Bank
of New York at Manila for the properties in the Philippines. Both of these trustees accepted the
trust.
After Stevenot's death, administration proceedings were commenced in the court of First Instance
of Manila, H. P. Hoskyns, plaintiff in the instant action, being appointed as administrator. The
application for Hoskyns' appointment as administrator was made by the present attorneys for the
defendant and appellant and intervenor and appellant on behalf of Stevenot's widow.
The action for declaratory relief prays that the court "determine the question of construction or
validity of the declaration of trust and for the declaration of the rights and duties of the defendant
hereunder
The defendant and the intervenor maintain that the declaration of trust is valid under the laws of
California where it was executed and should be recognized as valid in the Philippines, and pray,
upon the facts stated in the complaint, that the plaintiff be ordered to turn over to the trustees for
administration, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the declaration, in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the declaration of trust, all properties located in the Philippines and
subject to the said trust and which are now or which may at any time hereafter come into his
possession or under his control.
In a well written decision, Hon. Conrado Sanchez, Judge, held "that plaintiff H. P. Hoskyns, as
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased J. E. H. Stevenot, is entitled to the possession
of the properties under his administration and described in Annex B of the original complaint."
The decision is silent regarding the validity of the trust.
ISSUE: Whether the court can decide with regard to the validity of the trust agreement executed
between the parties.
RULING: No. The SC noted that the lower court properly declined or omitted to make
declarations regarding the validity of the trust agreement. Section 3 of Rule 66 enjoins that "when
declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which
will be affected by the declaration," while section 6 authorizes the courts to "refuse to exercise the
power to declare rights and to construe instruments where a decision under it would not terminate
the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action."
The persons not vitally if not solely affected by the validity or invalidity of the trust are the widow,
daughters, other heirs, and the creditors of the deceased. None of them are before the SC, and
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without them any decision on the validity or invalidity of the trust would not put an end to the
uncertainty or controversy which the administrator and the trustees wish to have clarified and
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adjudicated. Not being parties to this suit, the heirs and the creditors would not be bound by any
judgment holding the trust valid or invalid and might later "raised the identical issue and deprive
the declaration of that final and pacifying function it is calculated to subserve."
The parties should be referred to the intestate proceeding where this matter belongs and where the
purpose of the parties, which in effect is the removal or revocation of the appointment of the
plaintiff as administrator, can be more than conveniently accomplished with the simple device of
filing a motion or petition to that end. In fact, it is in that proceeding and in the court which
appointed him where the plaintiff could, with absolute propriety and without violating the
prescribed practice and procedure, obtain a ruling on his right to continue as administrator. If the
plaintiff does not want to move - as indeed he need not, since the initiative should come not from
him but from the trustees - a petition of the nature suggested above, filed by the trustees in the
intestate proceeding already commenced, will afford a complete remedy for the attainment of the
desired objective.
MARIA TORBELA vs. SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO

G.R. NO. 140528 December 7, 2011
FACTS: The spouses Eugenio and Marta Torbela received a parcel of land from Marta’s sister.
Upon the death of the spouses, the Land was adjudicated in equal shares among their children.
These children executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim over the land in favor of their nephew, Dr.
Rosario. Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim was executed, this time by Dr. Rosario,
acknowledging that he only borrowed the land and was already returning it to his aunts and uncles.
The latter Deed was notarized but was not immediately annotated on the title of the land; hence,
the title was still in the name of Dr. Rosario. Dr. Rosario mortgaged the land to Banco Filipino for
a loan. Dr. Rosario failed to pay the loan and the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed.
The children then filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of the subject land
against Dr. Rosario and Banco Filipino. The trial court ruled in their favor which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether an express trust was created in this case.
RULING: Yes. The Court held that “Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an
intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, “[n]o particular words are required
for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.” It is possible
to create a trust without using the word “trust” or “trustee.” Conversely, the mere fact that these
words are used does not necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each
case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which to
lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the relationship which he
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intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the
relationship which is called a trust.”
Dr. Rosario’s execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 28, 1964 containing his
express admission that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings, eventually
transformed the nature of the trust to an express one. The express trust continued despite Dr.
Rosario stating in his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim that he was already returning Lot No. 356-A to
the Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained registered in Dr. Rosario’s name under TCT No.
52751 and Dr. Rosario kept possession of said property, together with the improvements thereon.
HEIRS OF TRANQUILINO LABISTE vs. HEIRS OF JOSE LABISTE

G.R. NO. 162033 May 8, 2009
FACTS: On 29 September 1919, the late Epifanio Labiste on his own and on behalf of his brothers
and sisters who were the heirs of Jose Labiste, purchased from the Bureau of Lands Lot No. 1054
of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, with an area of 13,308 square meters. Subsequently, then Bureau
of Lands Director Jorge B. Vargas executed Deed of Conveyance No. 12536 selling and ceding
Lot No. 1054 to Epifanio and his brothers and sisters who were the heirs of Jose.
After full payment of the purchase price but prior to the issuance of the deed of conveyance,
Epifanio executed an Affidavit (Affidavit of Epifanio) in Spanish affirming that he, as one of the
heirs of Jose, and his uncle and petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, Tranquilino Labiste then co-
owned Lot No. 1054 because the money that was paid to the government came from the two of
them.
Tranquilino and the heirs of Jose continued to hold the property jointly. Lot No. 1054. On 2 May
1928, Engineer Espiritu Bunagan, Deputy Public Land Surveyor, subdivided Lot No. 1054 into
two lots: Lot No. 1054-A for Tranquilino and Lot No. 1054-B for Epifanio.
Subsequently, the heirs of Tranquilino purchased the 1/2 interest of the heirs of Jose over Lot No.
1054 for P300.00, as evidenced by the Calig-onan sa Panagpalit10 executed by the parties in the
Visayan dialect. The heirs of Tranquilino immediately took possession of the entire lot.
When World War II broke out, the heirs of Tranquilino fled to Cebu City and when they came
back they found their homes and possessions destroyed. The records in the Office of the Register
of Deeds, Office of the City Assessor and other government offices were also destroyed during the
war. Squatters have practically overrun the entire property, such that neither petitioners nor
respondents possess it.
In October 1993, petitioners learned that one of the respondents,Asuncion Labiste, had filed a
petition for reconstitution of title over Lot No. 1054. Petitioners opposed the petition at first but
by a compromise agreement between the parties, petitioners withdrew their opposition to expedite
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the reconstitution process. Under the compromise agreement, petitioners were to be given time to
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file a complaint so that the issues could be litigated in an ordinary action and the reconstituted title
was to be deposited with the Clerk of Court for a period of sixty (60) days to allow petitioners to
file an action for reconveyance and to annotate a notice of lis pendens.
The Register of Deeds of Cebu City issued the reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-7853,12 in the
name of "Epifanio Labiste, married to Tomasa Mabitad, his brothers and sisters, heirs of Jose
Labiste". However, respondents did not honor the compromise agreement. The RTC in a Decision
ruled in favor of petitioners. The RTC found that they are genuine and authentic as ancient
documents and that they are valid and enforceable. Moreover, it held that the action had not
prescribed as the complaint was filed about a year after the reconstitution of the title by
respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, while affirming petitioners’ right to the property, nevertheless
reversed the RTC’s decision on the ground of prescription and laches. It affirmed the RTC’s
findings that the Affidavit and the Calig-onan sa Panagpalit are genuine and authentic, and that the
same are valid and enforceable documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ action has been barred by latches
RULING: No. The Court of Appeals erred in applying the rules on prescription and the principle
of laches because what is involved in the present case is an express trust.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit
of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An express
trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. An implied trust comes into being
by operation of law.
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or
will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article
1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it
being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended."
The Affidavit of Epifanio is in the nature of a trust agreement. Epifanio affirmed that the lot
brought in his name was co-owned by him, as one of the heirs of Jose, and his uncle Tranquilino.
And by agreement, each of them has been in possession of half of the property. Their arrangement
was corroborated by the subdivision plan prepared by Engr. Bunagan and approved by Jose P.
Dans, Acting Director of Lands.
As such, prescription and laches will run only from the time the express trust is repudiated. The
Court has held that for acquisitive prescription to bar the action of the beneficiary against the
trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust it must be shown that: (a)
the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c)
the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.
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Respondents cannot rely on the fact that the Torrens title was issued in the name of Epifanio and
the other heirs of Jose. It has been held that a trustee who obtains a Torrens title over property held
in trust by him for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. The rule
requires a clear repudiation of the trust duly communicated to the beneficiary. The only act that
can be construed as repudiation was when respondents filed the petition for reconstitution in
October 1993. And since petitioners filed their complaint in January 1995, their cause of action
has not yet prescribed, laches cannot be attributed to them.
However, to recover the other half of the property covered by the private Calig-onan sa Panagpalit
and to have it registered on the title of the property, petitioners should have filed an action to
compel respondents, as heirs of the sellers in the contract, to execute a public deed of sale. A
conveyance of land made in a private document does not affect its validity.
ESTATE OF MARGARITA D. CABACUNGAN vs. MARILOU LAIGO, PEDRO ROY

LAIGO, STELLA BALAGOT AND SPOUSES MARIO B. CAMPOS AND JULIA S.
CAMPOS
G.R. No. 175073 August 15, 2011
FACTS: Unknown to the other children of Margarita, the mother transferred the tax declarations
of her three (3) lands to her son, Roberto, to support his application for travel to the US. Upon
returning, Roberto married Estella and adopted her two children, Pedro and Marilou. Sometime
later, Roberto sold one of the lands to the spouses Campos, and separately sold the two remaining
lands to his two adopted children. Margarita came to know of the sale during the wake of Roberto.
Hence, Roberto’s siblings filed a complaint for annulment of the said sales and for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the land.
The trial court ruled against the plaintiffs on the basis that there was no express trust between
Roberto and his mother. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC and the CA erred in finding that there is no evidence to support the
finding that there is an implied trust created between Margarita and her son Roberto.
RULING: Yes, the RTC and the CA erred in finding that there is no evidence to support the
finding that there is an implied trust created between Margarita and her son Roberto.
Trusts are either express or implied. Express or direct trusts are created by the direct and positive
acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by oral declaration in words evincing an
intention to create a trust. Implied trusts – also called "trusts by operation of law," "indirect trusts"
and "involuntary trusts" – arise by legal implication based on the presumed intention of the parties
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or on equitable principles independent of the particular intention of the parties. They are those
391
which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of
intent or, independently of the particular intention of the parties, as being inferred from the
transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity.
Implied trusts are further classified into constructive trusts and resulting trusts. Constructive trusts,
on the one hand, come about in the main by operation of law and not by agreement or intention.
They arise not by any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct intention to
create a trust, but one which arises in order to satisfy the demands of justice. Also known as trusts
ex maleficio, trusts ex delicto and trusts de son tort, they are construed against one who by actual
or constructive fraud, duress, abuse of confidence, commission of a wrong or any form of
unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment of questionable means, or who in any way against
equity and good conscience has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not,
in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy. They are aptly characterized as "fraud- rectifying
trust," imposed by equity to satisfy the demands of justice38 and to defeat or prevent the wrongful
act of one of the parties.39 Constructive trusts are illustrated in Articles 1450, 1454, 1455 and
1456.
On the other hand, resulting trusts arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration
involved in a transaction whereby one person becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in
equity to hold his title for the benefit of another. This is based on the equitable doctrine that
valuable consideration and not legal title is determinative of equitable title or interest and is always
presumed to have been contemplated by the parties. Such intent is presumed as it is not expressed
in the instrument or deed of conveyance and is to be found in the nature of their transaction.
Implied trusts of this nature are hence describable as "intention- enforcing trusts." Specific
examples of resulting trusts may be found in the Civil Code, particularly Articles 1448, 1449,
1451, 1452 and 1453.44
Intention – although only presumed, implied or supposed by law from the nature of the transaction
or from the facts and circumstances accompanying the transaction, particularly the source of the
consideration – is always an element of a resulting trust and may be inferred from the acts or
conduct of the parties rather than from direct expression of conduct. Certainly, intent as an
indispensable element, is a matter that necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by evidence, even
circumstantial, of statements made by the parties at or before the time title passes. Because an
implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be evidenced by
writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of parole evidence to prove their
existence. Parole evidence that is required to establish the existence of an implied trust necessarily
has to be trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
JOSEPH GOYANKO JR. vs. UCPB

G.R. NO. 179096 February 06, 2013
JD-4C
392
FACTS: Joseph Goyanko, Sr. invested P2, 000,000.00 with Philippine Asia Lending Investors,
Inc. family, represented by petitioner, and his illegitimate family presented conflicting claims to
PALII for the release of the investment. Pending the investigation of the conflicting claims, PALII
deposited the proceeds of the investment with UCPB on under the name "Phil Asia: ITF (In Trust
For) The Heirs of Joseph Goyanko, Sr.". UCPB allowed PALII to withdraw P1,500,000.00 from
the Account, leaving a balance of only P9,318.76. When UCPB refused the demand to restore the
amount withdrawn plus legal interes, the petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC. In its answer
to the complaint, UCPB admitted, among others, the opening of the ACCOUNT under the name
"ITF . The Heirs of Joseph Goyanko, Sr.,"and the withdrawal on December 11, 1997. RTC
dismissed the petitioner’s complaint ruling that the words "ITF HEIRS" is not sufficient to charge
UCPB with knowledge of any trust relation between PALII and Goyanko‟s heirs. It concluded
that UCPB merely performed its duty as a depository bank in allowing PALII to withdraw from
the ACCOUNT, as the contract of deposit was officially only between PALII, in its own capacity,
and UCPB. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that no express trust was created between
the HEIRS and PALII.
ISSUE: Whether UCPB is liable for the amount withdrawn as a trust agreement existed between
PALII and UCPB, in favor of the HEIRS, when PALII opened the ACCOUNT with UCPB.
RULING: No.
The elements of an express trust include a competent trustor and trustee, ascertainable trust res,
and sufficiently certain beneficiaries. Each of the above elements is required to be established, and,
if any one of them is missing, it is fatal to the trust. There must be a present and complete
disposition of the trust property, notwithstanding that the enjoyment in the beneficiary will take
place in the future. It is essential, too, that the purpose be an active one to prevent trust from being
executed into a legal estate or interest, and one that is not in contravention of some prohibition of
statute or rule of public policy. There must also be some power of administration other than a mere
duty to perform a contract although the contract is for a third party beneficiary. A declaration of
terms is essential, and these must be stated with reasonable certainty in order that the trustee may
administer, and that the court, if called upon so to do, may enforce, the trust. Under these standards,
no express trust was created in the present case. First, while an ascertainable trust and sufficiently
certain beneficiaries may exist, a competent trustor and trustee do not. Second, UCPB, as trustee
of the ACCOUNT, was never under any equitable duty to deal with or given any power of
administration over it. On the contrary, it was PALII that undertook the duty to hold the title to the
ACCOUNT for the benefit of the HEIRS. Third, PALII, as the trustor, did not have the right to the
beneficial enjoyment of the ACCOUNT.
Finally, the terms by which UCPB is to administer the ACCOUNT was not shown with reasonable
certainty. While we agree with the petitioner that a trust’s beneficiaries need not be particularly
identified for a trust to exist, the intention to create an express trust must first be firmly established,
along with the other elements laid above; absent these, no express trust exists
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393
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. MERELO B. AZNAR, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 171805 May 30, 2011
FACTS: RISCO ceased operation due to business reverses. To rehabilitate RISCO, plaintiffs
contributed a total amount of P212,720.00 which was used in the purchase of the
three parcels of land situated in Cebu. After the purchase of the above lots, titles were issued
in the name of RISCO. The amount contributed by plaintiffs constituted as liens and encumbrances
on the aforementioned properties as annotated in the titles of said lots. Thereafter, the Notice of
Attachment and Writ of Execution in favor of PNB were annotated on the title. As a result, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, being the lone and highest bidder of the three
parcels of land known. A Final Deed of Sale in favor of PNB was also issued and a new certificate
of title was issued in the name of PNB.
Plaintiffs filed the case for the quieting of their supposed title to the subject properties, declaratory
relief, cancellation of TCT and reconveyance alleging that the subsequent annotations on the titles
are subject to the prior annotation of their liens and encumbrances. The RTC ruled against PNB
on the basis that there was an express trust created over the subject properties whereby RISCO
was the trustee and the stockholders, Aznar, et al. ,were the beneficiaries or the cestui que trust .
CA set aside RTC ruling and held that the monetary contributions made by Aznar,et al., to RISCO
can only be characterized as a loan secured by alien on the subject lots, rather than an express trust.
ISSUE: Whether the language of the subject Minutes created an express trust.
RULING: No.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the
benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An
express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. An implied trust comes into
being by operation of law. Express trusts, sometimes referred to as direct trusts, are intentionally
created by the direct and positive acts of the settlor or the trustor - by some writing, deed, or will
or a declaration. It is created not necessarily by some written words, but by the direct and positive
acts of the parties. This is in consonance with Article 1444 of the Civil Code, which states that
“[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a
trust is clearly intended.”
The creation of an express trust must be manifested with reasonable certainty and
cannot be inferred from loose and vague declarations or from ambiguous circumstances suscepti
ble of other interpretations.
In the present case, no such reasonable certitude in the creation of an express trust obtains. In fact,
a careful scrutiny of the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms used in the Minutes does not offer
any indication that the parties thereto intended that Aznar, et al., become beneficiaries under an
express trust and that RISCO serve as trustor.
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394
SOLEDAD CAÑEZO, substituted by WILLIAM CAÑEZO and VICTORIANO CAÑEZO
vs. CONCEPCION ROJAS
G.R. No. 148788 November 23, 2007
FACTS: On January 29, 1997, petitioner Soledad Cañezo filed a Complaint for the recovery of
real property plus damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naval, Biliran, against her
father’s second wife, respondent Concepcion Rojas. The subject property is an unregistered land
with an area of 4,169 square meters, situated at Higatangan, Naval, Biliran.
In her complaint, the petitioner alleged that she bought the parcel of land in 1939 from Crisogono
Limpiado, although the transaction was not reduced into writing. Thereafter, she immediately took
possession of the property. When she and her husband left for Mindanao in 1948, she entrusted
the said land to her father, Crispulo Rojas, who took possession of, and cultivated, the property. In
1980, she found out that the respondent, her stepmother, was in possession of the property and was
cultivating the same. She also discovered that the tax declaration over the property was already in
the name of Crispulo Rojas.
In her Answer, the respondent asserted that, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, it was her husband,
Crispulo Rojas, who bought the property from Crisogono Limpiado in 1948, which accounts for
the tax declaration being in Crispulo’s name. From then on, until his death in 1978, Crispulo
possessed and cultivated the property. Upon his death, the property was included in his estate,
which was administered by a special administrator, Bienvenido Ricafort. The petitioner, as heir,
even received her share in the produce of the estate. The respondent further contended that the
petitioner ought to have impleaded all of the heirs as defendants. She also argued that the fact that
petitioner filed the complaint only in 1997 means that she had already abandoned her right over
the property
The petitioner further posits that prescription and laches are unavailing because there was an
express trust relationship between the petitioner and Crispulo Rojas and his heirs, and express
trusts do not prescribe. Even assuming that it was not an express trust, there was a resulting trust
which generally does not prescribe unless there is repudiation by the trustee
ISSUE: Whether there exists a trust over the property – express or implied – between the petitioner
and her father
RULING: NONE
Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to
create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the
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nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently, of the particular intention of the
395
parties, as being superinduced on the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity.
An implied trust may either be a resulting trust or a constructive trust.
It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by prescription a
property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust. The following discussion is instructive:
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of property entrusted to
him, or that an action to compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the
benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe, or that the defense of prescription cannot be set
up in an action to recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of another, or that
property held in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time.
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the possession of a trustee
is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the property held in trust.
Thus, Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a
continuing and subsisting trust."
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may possibly apply to
resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust.
xxxx
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust
for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts
of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.
As a rule, however, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its
existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its
elements. The presence of the following elements must be proved: (1) a trustor or settlor who
executes the instrument creating the trust; (2) a trustee, who is the person expressly designated to
carry out the trust; (3) the trust res, consisting of duly identified and definite real properties; and
(4) the cestui que trust, or beneficiaries whose identity must be clear. Accordingly, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to prove the existence of the trust relationship. And petitioner sadly
failed to discharge that burden.
The existence of express trusts concerning real property may not be established by parol evidence.
It must be proven by some writing or deed. In this case, the only evidence to support the claim that
an express trust existed between the petitioner and her father was the self-serving testimony of the
petitioner. Bare allegations do not constitute evidence adequate to support a conclusion. They are
not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.
Although no particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, a clear intention to
create a trust must be shown; and the proof of fiduciary relationship must be clear and convincing.
The creation of an express trust must be manifested with reasonable certainty and cannot be
inferred from loose and vague declarations or from ambiguous circumstances susceptible of other
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interpretations.
396
In the case at bench, an intention to create a trust cannot be inferred from the petitioner’s testimony
and the attendant facts and circumstances. The petitioner testified only to the effect that her
agreement with her father was that she will be given a share in the produce of the property.
This allegation, standing alone as it does, is inadequate to establish the existence of a trust because
profit-sharing per se, does not necessarily translate to a trust relation. It could also be present in
other relations, such as in deposit.
What distinguishes a trust from other relations is the separation of the legal title and equitable
ownership of the property. In a trust relation, legal title is vested in the fiduciary while equitable
ownership is vested in a cestui que trust. Such is not true in this case. The petitioner alleged in her
complaint that the tax declaration of the land was transferred to the name of Crispulo without her
consent. Had it been her intention to create a trust and make Crispulo her trustee, she would not
have made an issue out of this because in a trust agreement, legal title is vested in the trustee. The
trustee would necessarily have the right to transfer the tax declaration in his name and to pay the
taxes on the property. These acts would be treated as beneficial to the cestui que trust and would
not amount to an adverse possession.
TEODORA SALTIGA DE ROMERO, PRESENTACION ROMERO MAMA,

Represented by SABDULLAH MAMA, LUCITA ROMERO PACAS, GLORIOSA
ROMERO RASONABLE and MINDALINA ROMERO NUENAY vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE SEVENTEENTH DIVISION
and LUTERO ROMERO and NATIVIDAD ROMERO and THE DEVELOPMENT
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ILIGAN BRANCH, ILIGAN CITY and THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF LANAO DEL NORTE
G.R. No. 109307 November 25, 1999
FACTS: On December 12, 1939 Eugenio Romero bought from spouses Celedonio Jaug and Sofia
Macan the latter's "rights, interest, participation, ownership and possession" of 12 hectares of land.
The land in question was then public land. When Eugenio Romero applied for a homestead patent
for said land, the same was disapproved by the Bureau of Lands because said Romero already had
applied for a homestead patent for 24 hectares and was disqualified from owning the additional 12
hectares.
Eugenio Romero placed the application in the name of his eldest son, Eutiquio Romero, allegedly
in trust for all the children of Eugenio. When Eutiquio got married and had children, his brothers
and sisters got worried that his heirs may claim the land so the application was transferred in the
name of Lutero Romero, the second son of Eugenio who was then still single. When Lutero in turn
got married, he relinquished the application in favor of his younger brother Ricardo through an
instrument dated July 5, 1952.
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397
ppellee Lutero Romero presented evidence to the effect that sometime in 1969 a policeman picked
him up and brought him to the office of Mayor Pablito Abragan of Kapatagan where he found his
mother Teodora and his three (3) sisters Gloriosa, Presentacion and Lucita and the respective
husbands of the latter two. He testified that when he arrived at the office, he was presented three
(3) affidavits for his signature. Said affidavits were to the effect that he sold three (3) hectares each
out of the 12 hectares of land to his sister Gloriosa, his brother-in-law Sabdullah Mama married to
Presentacion Romero, and to Meliton Pacas married to Lucita Romero for a consideration of
P3,000.00 each.
Appellee Lutero Romero testified that he told the mayor that he was not selling the land and that
he could not do so because the five-year period had not yet elapsed but the mayor told him to just
sign the affidavits because after five (5) years his sisters will get the land and pay for them and
that if they would not pay, the mayor will take steps to return the land personally to him. Lutero
stated that he has not been paid for the land by his sisters.
Lutero Romeo claimed that as early as 1940-1941 he had already been in occupancy of the 12
hectares in question when it was shown to him by this father who owned the adjoining parcel; and
that the said land had been titled in his name even while his father Eugenio was still alive. Indeed,
it appears that the title to the property, O.C.T No. P-2,261, had been issued to Lutero Romero as
early as April 26, 1967, after the homestead patent was issued in his favor on April 7, 1967. He
said that his three (3) sisters occupied portions of the property only in 1969, after he was forced to
sign the affidavits by Mayor Abragan.
Lutero Romero had thereafter repudiated the three (3) affidavits on August 12, 1974. Because of
this, estafa charges were filed against him by the three (3) parties concerned but said charges were
dismissed.
It further appears that Lutero Romero obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines on December 3, 1975 and mortgaged the land in question as collateral for said loan.
Appellants claim that only then did they know that the land had been titled in the name of Lutero
Romero. Thereafter, through a letter dated August 2, 1976, Lutero Romero asked his sisters to
vacate the land in question.
DBP filed its comment to the petition and seeks the dismissal of the case against it considering
that the agricultural loan in favor of LUTERO has been paid in full. DBP maintains that since the
mortgage was already cancelled, petitioners have no cause of action against it.
Petitioners contend that LUTERO merely holds Lot 23 Pls-35 in trust for the benefit of the heirs
of his father EUGENIO since it was actually EUGENIO who first applied for the homestead but
considering that EUGENIO was already granted a homestead, the application had to be placed in
the name of his eldest son EUTIQUIO. The application was subsequently transferred to the name
of LUTERO who later transferred the application in the name of Ricardo Romero (RICARDO),
his younger brother.
ISSUE: Whether LUTERO acquired Lot 23 Pls-35 in trust for the benefit of the heirs of
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EUGENIO.
398
RULING: No
"A trust is the legal relationship between a person having an equitable ownership in property and
entitling him to performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the
latter." Trust relations between parties may be express or implied. Express trusts are those which
are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by
words evidencing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which without being
express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as a matter of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts,
both coming into by operation of law.
the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a
to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created
by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or hold the legal right to property, which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold.
However, it has been held that a trust will not be created when, for the purpose of evading the law
prohibiting one from taking or holding real property, he takes a conveyance thereof in the name of
a third person.
In the present case, the petitioners did not present any evidence to prove the existence of the trust.
Petitioners merely alleged that LUTERO, through fraudulent means, had the title of Lot 23 Pls-35
issued in his name contrary to the alleged agreement between the family that LUTERO would
merely hold the lot in trust for the benefit of EUGENIO's heirs. The alleged agreement was not
proven and even assuming that the petitioners duly proved the existence of the trust, said trust
would be of doubtful validity considering that it would promote a direct violation of the provisions
of the Public Land Act as regards the acquisition of a homestead patent. A homestead applicant is
required by law to occupy and cultivate the land for his own benefit, and not for the benefit of
someone else. Furthermore, under Section 12 of The Public Land Act (CA 141), a person is
allowed to enter a homestead not exceeding twenty-four (24) hectares. In the present case, it is not
disputed that EUGENIO already applied for a homestead patent for twenty-four (24) hectares of
land and was disqualified from applying for an additional twelve (12) hectares. If we uphold the
theory of the petitioners and rule that a trust in fact existed, we would be abetting a circumvention
of the statutory prohibitions stated under the Public Land Act. We therefore find no legal or factual
basis to sustain the contention of the petitioners that LUTERO merely held Lot 23 Pls-35 in trust
for the benefit of the heirs of EUGENIO.
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399
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. NO. 144516 February 11, 2004
An employee’s trust is a trust maintained by an employer to provide retirement, pension or other
benefits to its employees. It is a separate taxable entity established for the exclusive benefit of the
employees.
FACTS: On February 20, 1980, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Board of
Governors adopted Resolution No. 794 creating the DBP Gratuity Plan and authorizing the setting
up of a retirement fund to cover the benefits due to DBP retiring officials and employees under
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended. The Gratuity Plan was made effective on June 17, 1967
and covered all employees of the Bank as of May 31, 1977.
On February 26, 1980, a Trust Indenture was entered into by and between the DBP and the Board
of Trustees of the Gratuity Plan Fund, vesting in the latter the control and administration of the
Fund. The trustee, subsequently, appointed the DBP Trust Services Department (DBP-TSD) as the
investment manager thru an Investment Management Agreement, with the end in view of making
the income and principal of the Fund sufficient to meet the liabilities of DBP under the Gratuity
Plan.
In 1983, the Bank established a Special Loan Program availed thru the facilities of the DBP
Provident Fund and funded by placements from the Gratuity Plan Fund. The program was
suspended in 1986 but was revived in 1991 thru DBP Board Resolution No. 066 dated January 5,
1991.
Pursuant to the investment scheme, DBP-TSD paid to the investor-members, the payments were
disallowed by the Auditor under Audit Observation Memorandum No. 93-2 dated March 1, 1993,
on the ground that the distribution of income of the Gratuity Plan Fund (GPF) to future retirees of
DBP is irregular and constituted the use of public funds for private purposes. AOM No. 93-2 did
not question the authority of the Bank to set-up the Gratuity Plan Fund and have it invested in the
Trust Services Department of the Bank.
In a letter, former DBP Chairman Alfredo C. Antonio requested then COA Chairman Celso D.
Gangan to reconsider AOM No. 93-2. Chairman Antonio alleged that the express trust created for
the benefit of qualified DBP employees under the Trust Agreement (Agreement), gave the Fund a
separate legal personality. The Agreement transferred legal title over the Fund to the Board of
Trustees and all earnings of the Fund accrue only to the Fund. Thus, Chairman Antonio contended
that the income of the Fund is not the income of DBP.
ISSUE: Whether the created express trust creates a separate juridical personality which should not
be added to the income of DBP for taxation
RULING: The COA alleges that DBP is the actual owner of the Fund and its income, on the
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following grounds: DBP made the contributions to the Fund, the trustees of the Fund are merely
administrators, and DBP employees only have an inchoate right to the Fund.
400
The DBP counters that the Fund is the subject of a trust, and that the Agreement transferred legal
title over the Fund to the trustees. The income of the Fund does not accrue to DBP. Thus, such
income should not be recorded in DBPs books of account.
A trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence of equitable
duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of
another. A trust is either express or implied. Express trusts are those which the direct and positive
acts of the parties create, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to
create a trust.
In the present case, the DBP Board of Governors Resolution No. 794 and the Agreement executed
by former DBP Chairman Rafael Sison and the trustees of the Plan created an express trust,
specifically, an employees trust. An employees trust is a trust maintained by an employer to
provide retirement, pension or other benefits to its employees. It is a separate taxable
entity established for the exclusive benefit of the employees.
In a trust, one person has an equitable ownership in the property while another person owns the
legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the performance
of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter. A person who establishes a trust
is the trustor. One in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of another is
the trustee. The person for whose benefit the trust is created is the beneficiary.
In the present case, DBP, as the trustor, vested in the trustees of the Fund legal title over the Fund
as well as control over the investment of the money and assets of the Fund.
The trustees received and collected any income and profit derived from the Fund, and they
maintained separate books of account for this purpose. The principal and income of the Fund will
not revert to DBP even if the trust is subsequently modified or terminated. The Agreement states
that the principal and income must be used to satisfy all of the liabilities to the beneficiary officials
and employees under the Gratuity Plan.
The Agreement transferred legal title over the income and properties of the Fund to the Funds
trustees. Thus, COAs directive to record the income of the Fund in DBPs books of account as the
miscellaneous income of DBP constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The income of the Fund does
not form part of the revenues or profits of DBP, and DBP may not use such income for its own
benefit. The principal and income of the Fund together constitute the res or subject matter of the
trust. The Agreement established the Fund precisely so that it would eventually be sufficient to
pay for the retirement benefits of DBP employees under RA 1616 without additional outlay from
DBP.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, INC. (as successor-in-interest of the

banking operations of Global Business Bank, Inc. formerly known as PHILIPPINE
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BANKING CORPORATION) v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF RIVERSIDE MILLS
401
CORPORATION PROVIDENT AND RETIREMENT FUND, represented by ERNESTO
TANCHI, JR., CESAR SALIGUMBA, AMELITA SIMON, EVELINA OCAMPO and
CARLITOS Y. LIM, RMC UNPAID EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., and THE
INDIVIDUAL BENEFICIARIES OF THE PROVIDENT AND RETIREMENT FUND OF
RMC
G.R. No. 176959 September 8, 2010
A trust is a "fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence of
equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit
of another." A trust is either express or implied. Express trusts are those which the direct and
positive acts of the parties create, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an
intention to create a trust.
FACTS: On November 1, 1973, RMC established a Provident and Retirement Plan for its regular
employees. Under the Plan, RMC and its employees shall each contribute, the contributions shall
form part of the provident fund which shall be held, invested and distributed by the Commercial
Bank and Trust Company. Paragraph 13 of the Plan likewise provided that the Plan "may be
amended or terminated by the Company at any time on account of business conditions, but no such
action shall operate to permit any part of the assets of the Fund to be used for, or diverted to
purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of the members of the Plan and their . beneficiaries.
In no event shall any part of the assets of the Fund revert to RMC before all liabilities of the Plan
have been satisfied."
On October 15, 1979, the Board of Trustees of RMCPRF entered into an Investment Management
Agreement with Philbank (now, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company). Pursuant to
the Agreement, petitioner shall act as an agent of the Board and shall hold, manage, invest and
reinvest the Fund in Trust Account No. 1797 in its behalf. The Agreement shall be in force for one
year and shall be deemed automatically renewed unless sooner terminated either by petitioner bank
or by the Board.
In 1984, RMC ceased business operations. Nonetheless, petitioner continued to render investment
services to respondent Board. In a letter, petitioner informed respondent Board that Philbank's
Board of Directors had decided to apply the remaining trust assets held by it in the name of
RMCPRF against part of the outstanding obligations of RMC.
Subsequently, respondent RMC Unpaid Employees Association, Inc., representing the terminated
employees of RMC, learned of Trust Account No. 1797. Through counsel, they demanded
payment of their share in a letter. When such demand went unheeded, the Association, along with
the individual members of RMCPRF, filed a complaint for accounting against the Board and its
officers.
On June 2, 1998, during the trial, the Board passed a Resolution in court declaring that the Fund
belongs exclusively to the employees of RMC. It authorized petitioner to release the proceeds of
Trust Account No. 1797 through the Board, as the court may direct. Consequently, plaintiffs
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amended their complaint to include the Board as co-plaintiffs.
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On June 27, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents. The trial court declared
invalid the reversion and application of the proceeds of the Fund to the outstanding obligation of
RMC to petitioner bank.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court. It held that the Fund is distinct from RMC's account in
petitioner bank and may not be used except for the benefit of the members of RMCPRF. Citing
Paragraph 13 of the Plan, the appellate court stressed that the assets of the Fund shall not revert to
the Company until after the liabilities of the Plan had been satisfied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the proceeds of the RMCPRF may be applied to satisfy RMC's debt to Philbank.
RULING: A trust is a "fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence
of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit
of another." A trust is either express or implied. Express trusts are those which the direct and
positive acts of the parties create, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an
intention to create a trust.
Here, the RMC Provident and Retirement Plan created an express trust to provide retirement
benefits to the regular employees of RMC. RMC retained legal title to the Fund but held the same
in trust for the employees-beneficiaries. Thus, the allocation under the Plan is directly credited to
each member's account.
The trust was likewise a revocable trust as RMC reserved the power to terminate the Plan after all
the liabilities of the Fund to the employees under the trust had been paid. Paragraph 13 of the Plan
provided that "in no event shall any part of the assets of the Fund revert to the Company before all
liabilities of the Plan have been satisfied." Relying on this clause, petitioner, as the Fund trustee,
considered the Fund to have "technically reverted" to RMC, allegedly after no further claims were
made thereon since November 1984.
Employees' trusts or benefit plans are intended to provide economic assistance to employees upon
the occurrence of certain contingencies, particularly, old age retirement, death, sickness, or
disability. They give security against certain hazards to which members of the Plan may be
exposed. They are independent and additional sources of protection for the working group and
established for their exclusive benefit and for no other purpose. Here, while the Plan provides for
a reversion of the Fund to RMC, this cannot be done until all the liabilities of the Plan have been
paid. And when RMC ceased operations in 1984, the Fund became liable for the payment not only
of the benefits of qualified retirees at the time of RMC's closure but also of those who were
separated from work as a consequence of the closure.
RICHARD JUAN vs. GABRIEL YAP SR.

G.R. No. 182177 March 30, 2011
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Formal holders of title were deemed trustees obliged to transfer title to the beneficiaries in whose
favor the trusts were deemed created. We see no reason to bar the recognition of the same
obligation in a mortgage contract meeting the standards for the creation of an implied trust.
FACTS: On 31 July 1995, the spouses Maximo and Dulcisima Cañeda (Cañeda spouses)
mortgaged to petitioner Richard Juan (petitioner), employee and nephew of respondent Gabriel
Yap, Sr. (respondent), two parcels of land in Talisay, Cebu to secure a loan of ₱1.68 million,
payable within one year. The Contract was prepared and notarized by Atty. Antonio Solon (Solon).
On 30 June 1998, petitioner, represented by Solon, sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. Although petitioner and respondent participated in the auction sale, the properties were
sold to petitioner for tendering the highest bid of ₱2.2 million. No certificate of sale was issued to
petitioner, however, for his failure to pay the sale’s commission.
On 15 February 1999, respondent and the Cañeda spouses executed a memorandum of agreement
(MOA) where (1) the Cañeda spouses acknowledged respondent as their "real mortgagee-creditor
x x x while Richard Juan [petitioner] is merely a trustee" of respondent; (2) respondent agreed to
allow the Cañeda spouses to redeem the foreclosed properties for ₱1.2 million; and (3) the Cañeda
spouses and respondent agreed to initiate judicial action "either to annul or reform the [Contract]
or to compel Richard Juan to reconvey the mortgagee’s rights" to respondent as trustor. Three days
later, the Cañeda spouses and respondent sued petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
(trial court) to declare respondent as trustee of petitioner vis a vis the Contract, annul petitioner’s
bid for the foreclosed properties, declare the Contract "superseded or novated" by the MOA, and
require petitioner to pay damages, attorney’s fees and the costs. The Cañeda spouses consigned
with the trial court the amount of ₱1.68 million as redemption payment.
In his Answer, petitioner insisted on his rights over the mortgaged properties. Petitioner also
counterclaimed for damages and attorney’s fees and the turn-over of the owner’s copy of the titles
for the mortgaged properties.
ISSUE: Whether an implied trust arose between petitioner and respondent, binding petitioner to
hold the beneficial title over the mortgaged properties in trust for respondent
RULING: Implied Trust in Mortgage Contracts
An implied trust arising from mortgage contracts is not among the trust relationships the Civil
Code enumerates.14 The Code itself provides, however, that such listing "does not exclude others
established by the general law on trust x x x."15 Under the general principles on trust, equity
converts the holder of property right as trustee for the benefit of another if the circumstances of its
acquisition makes the holder ineligible "in x x x good conscience [to] hold and enjoy [it]." As
implied trusts are remedies against unjust enrichment, the "only problem of great importance in
the field of constructive trusts is whether in the numerous and varying factual situations presented
x x x there is a wrongful holding of property and hence, a threatened unjust enrichment of the
defendant."
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Applying these principles, this Court recognized unconventional implied trusts in contracts
involving the purchase of housing units by officers of tenants’ associations in breach of their
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obligations, the partitioning of realty contrary to the terms of a compromise agreement, and the
execution of a sales contract indicating a buyer distinct from the provider of the purchase money.
In all these cases, the formal holders of title were deemed trustees obliged to transfer title to the
beneficiaries in whose favor the trusts were deemed created. We see no reason to bar the
recognition of the same obligation in a mortgage contract meeting the standards for the creation of
an implied trust.
RODOLFO TIGNO AND SPOUSES EDUALINO and EVELYN CASIPIT vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND EDUARDO TIGNO
G.R. No. 110115 October 8, 1997
It is clear that an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in accordance with
Article 1456 does not prescribe unless and until the land is registered or the instrument affecting
the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds the land and operates
constructive notice to the world
FACTS: Margarita Cabacungan (Margarita) owned three parcels of unregistered land in Paringao
and in Baccuit, Bauang, La Union, each measuring 4,512 square meters, 1,986 square meters and
3,454 square meters.
Sometime in 1968, Margarita’s son, Roberto Laigo, Jr. (Roberto), applied for a non-immigrant
visa to the United States, and to support his application, he allegedly asked Margarita to transfer
the tax declarations of the properties in his name.For said purpose, Margarita, unknown to her
other children, executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property whereby the subject properties
were transferred by donation to Roberto.Not long after, Roberto’s visa was issued and he was able
to travel to the U.S. as a tourist and returned in due time. In 1979, he adopted respondents Pedro
Laigo (Pedro) and Marilou Laigo (Marilou), and then he married respondent Estella Balagot.
In July 1990, Roberto sold the property in Baccuit to the spouses Mario and Julia Campos. Then
in August 1992, he sold lots in Paringao, respectively, to Marilou and to Pedro.Allegedly, these
sales were not known to Margarita and her other children.
It was only in August 1995, at Roberto’s wake, that Margarita came to know of the sales as told
by Pedro himself. In February 1996, Margarita, represented by her daughter, Luz, instituted the
instant complaint for the annulment of said sales and for the recovery of ownership and possession
of the subject properties as well as for the cancellation of Ricardo’s tax declarations. Margarita
admitted having accommodated Roberto’s request for the transfer of the properties to his name,
but pointed out that the arrangement was only for the specific purpose of supporting his U.S. visa
application. She emphasized that she never intended to divest herself of ownership over the subject
lands and, hence, Roberto had no right to sell them to respondents and the Spouses Campos. She
likewise alleged that the sales, which were fictitious and simulated considering the gross
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inadequacy of the stipulated price, were fraudulently entered into by Roberto. She imputed bad
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faith to Pedro, Marilou and the Spouses Campos as buyers of the lots, as they supposedly knew all
along that Roberto was not the rightful owner of the properties. Hence, she principally prayed that
the sales be annulled; that Roberto’s tax declarations be cancelled; and that the subject properties
be reconveyed to her.
The Spouses Campos advanced that they were innocent purchasers for value and in good faith,
and had merely relied on Roberto’s representation that he had the right to sell the property; and
that, hence, they were not bound by whatever agreement entered by Margarita with her son. They
posited that the alleged gross inadequacy of the price would not invalidate the sale absent a
vitiation of consent or proof of any other agreement. Further, they noted that Margarita’s claim
was already barred by prescription and laches owing to her long inaction in recovering the subject
properties. Finally, they believed that inasmuch as Roberto had already passed away, Margarita
must have, instead, directed her claim against his estate.
In much the same way, Marilou and Pedro,1 who likewise professed themselves to be buyers in
good faith and for value, believed that Margarita’s cause of action had already been barred by
laches, and that even assuming the contrary, the cause of action was nevertheless barred by
prescription as the same had accrued way back in 1968 upon the execution of the affidavit of
transfer by virtue of which an implied trust had been created. In this regard, they emphasized that
the law allowed only a period of ten (10) years within which an action to recover ownership of real
property or to enforce an implied trust thereon may be brought, but Margarita merely let it pass.
ISSUE: Whether an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in accordance with
Article 1456 does prescribes within 10 years.
RULING: A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership of
property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the
former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the
latter. Trusts are either express or implied. Express or direct trusts are created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by oral declaration in words
evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts – also called "trusts by operation of law,"
"indirect trusts" and "involuntary trusts" – arise by legal implication based on the presumed
intention of the parties or on equitable principles independent of the particular intention of the
parties. They are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the
transaction as matters of intent or, independently of the particular intention of the parties, as being
inferred from the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity.
It is settled that an action for reconveyance based on a constructive implied trust prescribes in 10
years likewise in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Yet not like in the case of a
resulting implied trust and an express trust, prescription supervenes in a constructive implied trust
even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. In other words, repudiation of said trust is
not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.
From the foregoing, it is clear that an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust
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in accordance with Article 1456 does not prescribe unless and until the land is registered or the
instrument affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds the
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land and operates constructive notice to the world. In the present case, however, the lands involved
are concededly unregistered lands; hence, there is no way by which Margarita, during her lifetime,
could be notified of the furtive and fraudulent sales made in 1992 by Roberto in favor of
respondents, except by actual notice from Pedro himself in August 1995. Hence, it is from that
date that prescription began to toll. The filing of the complaint in February 1996 is well within the
prescriptive period. Finally, such delay of only six (6) months in instituting the present action
hardly suffices to justify a finding of inexcusable delay or to create an inference that Margarita has
allowed her claim to stale by laches.
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ADOPTION
IN THE MATTER OF ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

Gr No. 148311 March 31, 2005
There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, to use, as middle
name her mother’s surname.
FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child, Stehanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. Stephanie was born on June 26,1994 and since then,she was using her mother’s
middle name and surname, Astorga and Garcia respectively. Honorato, now a widower, then
prayed that Stephanie’s middle name “Astorga” be changed to “Garcia”, her mother’s surname
and that her surname “Garcia” and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig”, his
surname. The trial court granted the petition and ruled that pursuant to Article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Almost a month later,
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/ or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. The trial court denied the
motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname
of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, Honorato filed this petition.
ISSUE: Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING: Yes, an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. The following are reasons why the court ruled
the same:
a. First, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the Family
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of
the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter."
What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon the issuance of the decree of adoption.
b. Second, the underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child. Adoption is
defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general,
the rights accorded to a legitimate child.It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship
of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. Being
a legitimate child by virtue of adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
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provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
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to bear the surname of her father and her mother. Moreover, Stephanie’s continued use of her
mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption)
provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie
can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
c. Lastly, it is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and
welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law. Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we
find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM -versus - ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and

minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS
G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006, CALLEJO, SR., J.
Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted" children are
considered dependent children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the
Court cannot consider her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
FACTS: Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on
December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for
death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise
survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991.
Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them
as claimant.
According to one of the witnesses, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna; she was just
taken in by the spouses because for a long time they could not have children; however, there were
no legal papers on Janet’s adoption
ISSUE: Whether Janet is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo (NO)
RULING: Here, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but
merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janet’s adoption did not undergo
any legal proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act
No. 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted" children are considered dependent children. Absent
any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider her a dependent
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child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
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DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR NO. 164948 JUNE 27, 2006, J. CALLEJO, SR.
FACTS: On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of USA, of Filipino parentage
and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos,
Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos.The minors are the natural children of Manuel
Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the
children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she
left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner
and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000.
The minors have given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by
the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully
employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA,
where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines
to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors.
Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s custody.
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III,
Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, recommending that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D.
Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision
granting said petition. On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision reversing the ruling of the
RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos.
RULING: The petition is denied for lack of merit. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent
of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
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(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said
adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree
of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act
No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will
suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned
them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds
presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to
have existed at the time of adoption.
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO and JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO,

A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" and "JAYROSE M. CASTRO vs. JOSE
MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO and ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO
G.R. No. 188801 October 15, 2014
FACTS: The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jed)
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and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged
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husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M.
Castro (Joanne).
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their marriage
had allegedly been troubled. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the
incompatibilities between them. Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario
gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year
even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during
weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had
homosexual tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years
despite their separation."
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Batac,
Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with
Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper. This
was approved by the trial court and attained finality.
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule
47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16,
2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in 2005.
They allege that Rosario’s affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh. K," was
fraudulent. They also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates showed different sets of
information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue that
one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office
certificates shows the father to be Larry, Jose’s driver and alleged lover. It was further alleged that
Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth
and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decree of adoption should be annulled on the ground that the wife and
the legitimate child of the adopter never consented to such adoption?
RULING: Yes, the decree of adoption should be annulled on the ground that the wife and the
legitimate child of the adopter never consented to such adoption.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action." As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is
Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but
also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent
of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock. The provision is mandatory.
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As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child
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to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks
to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally
married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario
must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario’s
consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered
compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the
proceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit.
Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older.
The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the
prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to
share their parent’s love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was over 10 years
old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the
adoption to be valid. To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court
that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the
proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal
service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure
that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this
case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory
rights. Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM

G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim
(Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them
by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and
Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children
were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely
eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. Michael
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was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August
1983.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to
exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel
Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under
Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus,
on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time
of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.
Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle
and Michael.
The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
RULING: NO
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have
no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura
lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 provides that:
xx Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
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414
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the
children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario
are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not
suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He
must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living
in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country
as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the
legitimate children of petitioner.
HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
FACTS: Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's
extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from
Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna,
reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert
contests the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of
adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the
children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary.
It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the
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Court.
415
ISSUE: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
RULING: No, the children cannot be legally adopted without the written consent of the natural
parent on the ground that he abandoned them, in this case.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly.
The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the
finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or interests. In
reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct
of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in
the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support
for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters
and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Further, it is evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such requirement
is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE

ESTATE OF DECEASED ALFREDO E. JACOB, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO
PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR,
AND JUAN F. TRIVINO AS PUBLISHER OF "BALALONG,"
G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob
and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo. Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab
initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.
Appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr.
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Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present
416
the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr.
Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. Based on the evidence presented,
the trial court ruled for Pilapil sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of
deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent.
CA affirmed trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE: Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob
RULING: No, he is not.
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of Judge
Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption
that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave
credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the assessment of the credibility
of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court.”
The SC. disagrees. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and
respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not
applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who
heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses Thus, the Court examined the records and found
that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion." Hence, the present case is an exception
to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned
Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented,
one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondent’s
expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. Clearly, Judge Moya could not
recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over
his name, he positively declared that it was not his.
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF JAN AUREL MAGHANOY BULAYO WITH

APPLICATION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF ADOPTEE FROM “JAN AUREL
MAGHANOY BULAYO” TO “JAN AUREL BULAYO KIMURA”
Gr No. 205752 October 1, 2019
An illegitimate child of the spouse of an adopting alien falls within the ambit of the clause,
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“relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree” under RA No. 8552, Domestic
417
Adoption Act of 1998 as Section 7 (b)(i) and (iii) of RA 8552 should extend and apply even to
illegitimate children.
FACTS: Spouses Mary Jane Kimura, a Filipino national, and Yuichiro Kimura, a Japanese
national, got married on June 12, 2004. Prior to said marriage, Mary Jane gave birth a son, named
Jan Laurel. However, she was not married to her biological son’s father, thus making Jan Aurel
her illegitimate child. The spouses then filed a joint petition for adoption of Jan Aurel. submitting
all the requisite documents for domestic adoption. The RTC however denied the petition on the
ground that Yuichiro did not comply with the residency and certification requirements, which are
required to be submitted by a foreign national.
ISSUE: Whether an illegitimate child of the spouse of an adopting alien falls within the ambit of
the clause, “relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree” under RA No.
8552, Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
RULING: Yes, an illegitimate child of the spouse of an adopting alien falls within the ambit of
the clause, “relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree” under RA No.
8552, Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 as Section 7 (b)(i) and (iii) of RA 8552 should extend and
apply even to illegitimate children.
Pursuant to Articles 963 to 966 of the New Civil Code, an illegitimate child is a relative within the
first degree of consanguinity of his biological mother. Unlike a nephew and niece, an illegitimate
child belongs to the direct maternal lineage, which is never uncertain, and which is not as remote
as the nephew and niece. The word “child” referred to in Article 966 is used in a general term and
is without qualification. This is so because the provision contemplates blood relation, not status.
When the provision does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate relatives, we too, must
not. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus, where the law does not distinguish, nor
the interpreter must distinguish.
RA 8552 intended to include Jan Aurel, the biological child of Mary Jane, in the term “relatives”
under Section 7(b)(iii) because he was her relative within the first civil degree. Finding otherwise,
would engender a situation where the alien adopter would be able to undergo a speedy and less
expensive adoption process by being able to adopt, say, his Filipina spouse’s nephew or niece
instead of the Filipino spouse’s own child. The law clearly covered both legitimate and illegitimate
relatives as long as they were within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
SPOUSES JOON HYUNG PARK AND KYUNG AH LEE, PETITIONERS, v. HON.

RICO SEBASTIAN D. LIWANAG
G.R. No. 248035 November 27, 2019
FACTS: The petitioners are American citizens residing and working in the Philippines. They took
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under their care Innah, a child rescued from trafficking. She was a little over one year old when
418
her care and custody was officially given by the DSWD to the petitioners through a Pre-Adoption
Placement Authority.
The DSWD issued an Affidavit of Consent and instructed the petitioners to file a petition for
domestic adoption. The RTC found that since both petitioners are foreigners, then the Petition for
Adoption with Change of Name should be a case of inter-country adoption.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s Petition for Adoption should be referred to the Inter-Country
Adoption Board.
RULING: No. The Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 applies to aliens who permanently reside
abroad. The petitioners, who are both American citizens, have been residing and have been
gainfully employed in the Philippines since the year 2007 (in the case of petitioner Park) and since
2009 (in the case of petitioner Lee), and are thus living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, as required by the Domestic
Adoption Act.
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately
filed under the Domestic Adoption Act in order for the appropriate Family Court or RTC to take
cognizance thereof.
Furthermore, the Court also took cognizance of the agreement entered into between the Supreme
Court and the ICAB regarding the treatment of foreigners who reside in the Philippines and who
file a petition for adoption through the courts. Thus, said agreement which is incorporated in the
DSWD's Memorandum dated June 1, 2018, Re: Domestic Adoption by Foreigners Habitually
Residing in the Philippines which states that if ever their cases will endorsed to ICAB by the courts,
ICAB will file a manifestation on this matter so that the domestic adoption could be pursued.
Since the case properly falls under the Domestic Adoption Act, it is for the best interest of the
child that the instant case be speedily disposed by continuing the proceedings in the trial court for
the determination of whether petitioners are indeed qualified to adopt the child, instead of
inappropriately refering the instant domestic adoption case to the ICAB where the proceedings
may have to start anew and might be referred back to the trial court for the continuation of the
domestic adoption proceedings.Settled is the rule that in adoption proceedings, the welfare of the
child is paramount interest.
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419
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN -versus - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006, CALLEJO, SR., J.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
adoption.
FACTS: On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America
(USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was
born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The
minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,7 the
children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she
left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner
and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner
desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent to the adoption; she is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own
who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in
her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server.
She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written
consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial
income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s
custody.
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.
Trial court granted the petition. CA reversed.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos Pablo (NO)
RULING: The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure
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the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
420
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree
of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who
arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the
Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require
Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the
petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer
necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back.
The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal
relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the
biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was
by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that
Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the
DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social
worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act
No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will
suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned
them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
Also, merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown
to have existed at the time of adoption.
Amelia sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents who
share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other
paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of minors
up to present.
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently
sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial
constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine
herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia
continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to
what her affluent in-laws provide.
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421
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of
severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same
shall then be vested on the adopter. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of
parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally
abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given
to an adopting parent. Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR.

MELVIN S. LAHOM")
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
FACTS: A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972,
the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name
Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite her pleas and that of her husband, their
adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of
Article VI).
These turns of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern
prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption
previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a
new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on
March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall
not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee
for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE: May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be rescinded by an adopter after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
RULING: No, the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, may not be revoked or rescinded
by the adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an
action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated
and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree
of adoption. So, the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA
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8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
422
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right
to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled
to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption
has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but
rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be
taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons
cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying
him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SSS & SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

Gr No. 192531 November 12, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
FACTS: John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina
P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La
Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009 addressed to petitioner,
denied the claim, stating: We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim
because you are no longer considered as the parent of John Colcol as he was legally adopted by
Cornelio Colcol based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed
the ruling of the SSS.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the
parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
RULING:
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1. Yes. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor
in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted
in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that
adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,
who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority
of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the
adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such
a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the
estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of
an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision
on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents
and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that
certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which,
the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
2. Yes. The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner
of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given
Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died,
then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO,

A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," v. JOSE
MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO
G.R. No. 188801 October 15, 2014
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice
and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it appears
that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate
children must be personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough that
they be deemed notified through constructive service.
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FACTS: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which denied
the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court
sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted Rs’ decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated
later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage
bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to
congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, a petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina
were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study
Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the
TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Petitioner alleged that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also alleged that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates
shows disparity. One set shows that the father to be Jose, while another set of NSO certificates
shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time
of their birth. CA denied the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled
that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter . . .
should be personally notified of the hearing.” CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the identities of
the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of
judgment. The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an
action for annulment of judgment.
ISSUE: Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is
required?
RULING: Republic Act No. 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of
wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
(Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides
for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her
own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse
seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally
married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario
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425
must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was
ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older
(ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552). For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by
Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been affected on the spouse and
all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely
on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it
never validly acquired jurisdiction. Republic Act No. 8552 fails to provide any provision on the
status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners
also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552 since rescission of adoption
can only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law
other than the annulment of the judgment.
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426
REVOCATION OF ADOPTION
HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998, Romero, J.
of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then
in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
FACTS: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27,
1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23,
1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long
thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma
Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimonypendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu
which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that
they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board."
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the
Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that
also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation
at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In
1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
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427
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 a month a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his children's expenses
and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings
for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The
petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna
Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal
obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had
been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United
States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally
hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental
rights" over the children.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara
Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too meager"
compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental
authority over his beloved children."
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his
children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of
their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the
children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed
the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of adoption
in favor of the respondents.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that it
would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted, among others, that the petition for adoption was
fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because he did not have a written
consent to the adoption and he never abandoned his children.
ISSUE: Whether the father has abandoned his minor children and thus, his consent for the adoption
of minors is no longer needed. (NO)
RULING: This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
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428
of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children."
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in
the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support
for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters
and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased

Alfredo E. Jacob vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
"Balalong,"
G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999, Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support
of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L.
Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor
of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, herein defendant-
appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's
adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between
appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with
damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. Appelant
questioned, among others, whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased
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Jacob.
429
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special Proceedings
No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased
Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the Order
granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01
October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial
proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since he
was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and genuineness
of Judge Moya's signature.
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document Examiner.
Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with the
questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and "significant fundamental differences in
handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the "standard" signature"
and concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT
written by one and the same person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee presented the
comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief Document
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge
Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty.
Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within
allowable variation of writing characteristics between the standard and the questioned signatures
and concluded that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting
the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui
declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining his claim
as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed
Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent."
ISSUE: Whether Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob. (NO)
RULING: In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature
of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the
presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court
also gave credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the assessment of the
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credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court . . . "
430
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect
by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to
note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not
applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who
heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found
that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion." Hence, the present case is an exception to the
general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned
Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented,
one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondent’s
expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly,
when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements.
At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense
counsel, he even read a document shown to him. Indeed, we find no reason – and the respondent
has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner
Bienvenido Albacea.
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without
any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s expert
witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was
purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not
dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases,
in which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was
assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain
this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own
alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed
thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro
Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the
alleged adoption of respondent.
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431
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN
MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE
G.R. No. 117209 ebruary 9, 1996, REGALADO, J.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected
under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or
as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is
unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the
surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not
lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
FACTS: On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and
Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a Petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly
alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption,
their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and
by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition,
private respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph,
the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by
which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he
arrived at private respondents' residence.
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name
in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated
its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a
single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings.
Trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other,
being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs,
namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the giver or proper name of the adoptee,
the respective proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the substantive and
procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule
99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule
103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with
ISSUE: Whether the petition for adoption can include a petition for change of name (NO)
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432
RULING: Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's
surname to follow
that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must
remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship
does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered Christian or first
name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond
the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case,
cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings
in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be
so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded
in the civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized
without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is
simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the
statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such
change.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing
therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying
with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor
can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the
province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by
the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state
that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at
least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the
name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the
Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such
hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the
reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be
changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar
of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
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adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its
own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it
433
as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and
significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO

Gr No. 143989 July 14, 2003, J. Vitug
FACTS: The childless spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom took into their care
Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and brought him up as their own. For years, Dr. and Mrs.
Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a
petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the
more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the
court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose
Melvin Lahom."
Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption before the RTC, Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred that respondent
refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly
her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke
respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with his further
request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent
in the future. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and
uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings,
knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged
rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent
filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love
and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be
the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more
basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation.
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552,
also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law
the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition. However, the petitioner averred, by way of
opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases
where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 of the
Civil Code and Article 192of the Family Code.
The RTC held that the petition be ordered dismissed.
ISSUE: May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an
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adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
434
RULING: The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption
was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to
favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most
importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but
also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption
decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an
action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated
and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree
of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA
8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right
to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled
to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption
has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but
rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be
taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons
cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying
him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
V
KARL WILLIAM YUTA MAGNO SUZUKI A.K.A. YUTA HAYASHI vs. OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERA.
G.R. No. 212302 September 02, 2020
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FACTS: Petitioner was born on April 4, 1988 in Manila to Mr. Sadao Kumai Suzuki, a Japanese
national, and Ms. Lorlie. Lopez Magno (Lorlie), a Filipino citizen. Petitioner's parents were
435
married on December 29, 1987.5 Based on Identification Certificate No. 08-19540,6 issued by the
Bureau of Immigration on March 31, 2008, petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
On June 12, 1997, petitioner's parents divorced. On December 6, 2002, Lorlie married another
Japanese national, Mr. Hikaru Hayashi (Hayashi), in San Juan City, Metro Manila.
On November 9, 2004, petitioner, then 16 years old, was adopted by Hayashi based on Japanese
law. This was reflected in Hayashi's Koseki or Family Register.9 The Koseki and its English
translation were both authenticated at the Philippine Consulate General on May 15, 2007.
At 24 years old, petitioner sought to be recognized in the Philippines his adoption by Hayashi
under Japanese law. Thus, on May 24, 2013, he filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Adoption Decree before the RTC of Marikina City.RTC assailed the order.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC was erroneous in their ruling
RULING: The RTC erroneously ruled that a foreign judgment of adoption of a Filipino citizen
cannot be judicially recognized based on the view that such recognition would render nugatory the
Philippine laws on adoption. It bears to emphasize that there are two parties involved in an
adoption process: the adopter and the adoptee. The RTC in this case failed to consider that Hayashi,
the adopter, is a Japanese citizen.
Article 15 of the Civil Code states that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad." Owing to this nationality principle, the Philippine laws on adoption are thus binding
on petitioner. However, with respect to the case of Hayashi, who is a Japanese citizen, it bears
stressing that the Philippine courts are: precluded from deciding on his "family rights and duties,
or on [his] status, condition and legal capacity" concerning the foreign judgment to which he is a
party. Thus, as to the foreign judgment of adoption obtained by Hayashi, if it is proven as a fact,
the Philippine courts are limited to the determination of whether to extend its effect to petitioner,
the Filipino party.
By definition, adoption is "the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child." It is a juridical act, a proceeding in
rem which creates a relationship that is similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation.34 The process of adoption therefore fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More
technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally
existing between persons not so related by nature.
REYES vs. HON. SOTERO

G.R. No. 167405 Feb 16, 2006
FACTS: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and
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settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who
436
died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties were allegedly in the possession
of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of
Lising and the latter’s husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only
heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the certification of
her adoption from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered therein
and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree
was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on
Petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain “badges of fraud.”
The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the petitioner
to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since,
“imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud
of doubt.”
ISSUE: Whether petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of
irregularities.
RULING: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which
she had already presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records, the
official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of
individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the
local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which are
entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the
Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere “imputations of
irregularities” will not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption decree since the certifications and
its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
CECILIO DELA CRUZ AND EUSTAQUIA DELA CRUZ vs. MANUEL JESUS DELA
CRUZ
Gr No. L-19391 September 29, 1964
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437
The proceedings for adoption and revocation of adoption are separate and distinct from each
other. In the first what is determined is the propriety of establishing the relationship of parent and
child between two persons not so related by nature. In the other proceeding either the adopting
parent or the adopted seeks to severe the relationship previously established, and the inquiry refers
to the truth of the grounds upon which the revocation is sought. Once the proper court has granted
a petitioner for adoption and the decree has become final the proceedings is terminated and closed.
A subsequent petition for revocation of the adoption is neither a continuation of nor an incident in
the proceeding for adoption. It is an entirely new one, dependent on facts which have happened
since the decree of adoption.
FACTS: Manuel J. Aquino was declared the legally adopted child of the spouses Cecilio dela
Cruz and Eustaquio dela Cruz. Seven years later, the adopting parents filed in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan a petition to have the decree of adoption revoked on the ground that
the adopted minor had definitely repudiated the adoption by open display of defiance, animosity,
revulsion, and disobedience and had abandoned his parents’ home by living with his natural
mother, Felicidad Dasalla in Ilocos Sur. The counsel for the minor filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, that it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the minor, that the venue was improperly laid, and that there is lack
of cause of action. The court granted the motion stating that since the initial proceedings were to
totally had in the CFI of Ilocos Sur, then the revocation of adoption may also be filed in the same
action. As such, the court added by implication that it has no power to interfere with the judgment
of another court. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the action was proper
RULING: No. The provisions of the Civil Code on revocation of adoption do not specify the court
where the proceedings should be filed. The Rules of Court designate the venue of a proceeding for
adoption, which is the place where the petitioner resides (Section 1, Rule 99), but is silent with
respect to the venue of proceeding for rescission and revocation of adoption (Rule 100). It is clear
that the two proceedings are separate and distinct from each other. In the first what is determined
is the propriety of establishing the relationship of parent and child between two persons not so
related by nature. For that purpose, the court inquiries into the qualifications and disqualifications
of the adopter; the personal circumstances of the person to be adopted; the probable value and
character of his estate; the other proceeding either the adopting parent or the adopted seeks to
severe the relationship previously established, and the inquiry refers to the truth of the grounds
which the revocation is sought.
Once the proper court has granted a petition for adoption and the decree has become final the
proceeding is terminated and closed. A subsequent petition for revocation of the adoption is neither
a continuation of nor an incident in the proceeding for adoption. It is an entirely new one, defendant
on facts which have happened since the decree of adoption. The venue of this new case, applying
Rule 99 in a suppletory character, is also the place of the residence of the petitioner. In the present
instance of the residence of the petitioner. In the present instance petitioners reside in Pangasinan,
having moved there from their former residence in Ilocos Sur.
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RULE ON ADOPTION
SECTION 19 – 23 DOMESTIC ADOPTION
Section 19. Rescission of Adoption of the Adoptee. – The petition shall be verified and filed by
the adoptee who is over eighteen (18) years of age, or with the assistance of the Department, if he
is a minor, or if he is over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, by his guardian or
counsel.
The adoption may be rescinded based on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter:
1) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite having undergone counseling;
2) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
3) sexual assault or violence; or
4) abandonment or failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interests of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter.
However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code.
Section 20. Venue. – The petition shall be filed with the Family Court of the city or province
where the adoptee resides.
Section 21. Time within which to file petition. – The adoptee, if incapacitated, must file the
petition for rescission or revocation of adoption within five (5) years after he reaches the age of
majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of the adoption, within five (5) years after recovery
from such incompetency.
Section 22. Order to Answer. – The court shall issue an order requiring the adverse party to
answer the petition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof. The order and copy of
the petition shall be served on the adverse party in such manner as the court may direct
Section 23. Judgment. – If the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall
render judgment ordering the rescission of adoption, with or without costs, as justice requires.
The court shall order that the parental authority of the biological parent of the adoptee, if known,
or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated and declare that the reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter and the adoptee
to each other shall be extinguished.
The court shall further declare that successional rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption,
as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission
shall be respected
It shall also order the adoptee to use the name stated in his original birth or foundling certificate.
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439
The court shall further order the Civil Registrar where the adoption decree was registered to cancel
the new birth certificate of the adoptee and reinstate his original birth or foundling certificate.
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,

REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR.,
EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
Generally, the birth of the legitimate child of the adopter disqualifies such adopter from adopting
except when the adoption is not contested within a reasonable time.
FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later,
on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel,
all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista,
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged
successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on
March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent
provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who
have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and
Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this
argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
ISSUE: Whether the adoption of Delia and Edmundo can be annulled on the ground that Teodoro
and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter
RULING: NO
It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory.
That was way back in 1967. Assuming the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have
done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that
disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they
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should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although
Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
440
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the
Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL
and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the
revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided
by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that
the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding
to the present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive
heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the
Civil Code.
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR

MARITIME SERVICES, INC
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
FACTS: John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he
was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately,
on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which
led to his untimely death the following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La
Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009 addressed to petitioner,
denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that we cannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer
considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL
based on documents you submitted to us.
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s
entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be
considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth
were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by
virtue of the Decision in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated
February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.
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441
The dependent parent referred to under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, relates to the
legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not
considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr.
Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the status as the legitimate parent
of the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent
RULING: Yes
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to
those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in
the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that
the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the
deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental
authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after
the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under
such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological
parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is
not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. – If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights
and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis
added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned. The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds
for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the
adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such
a tender age.
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442
Nevertheless, we are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552 wherein
the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this
disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for
his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform
his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the
absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to
perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling find support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by
virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely
eliminated.
ANTONIO RAGUDO and EUGENIA PAREDES, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. EMELITA R.

PASNO, represented by her Father, ENRIQUE R. PASNO as her guardian ad-litem,
defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-16642 April 18, 1962
It is argued for the appellees that under Art. 348 of the New Civil Code, fraud is not one of the
grounds for revocation of an adoption. The appellants reply, quite correctly, that those grounds
refer only to an adoption validly decreed — not to an adoption void from the beginning because
tainted with fraud. Anyway, this is an argument that should be submitted when the case is
considered on the merits.
FACTS: In the Quezon Court of First Instance, the spouses Antonio Ragudo and Eugenia Paderes
filed this complaint on October 12, 1959, to annul the order of the justice of the peace of Tayabas,
same province, declaring Emelita R. Pasno their adopted child, which order, dated July 31, 1959,
was already final.
The spouses alleged substantially that they had been induced by Emelita's parents to believe that
the adoption proceeding in the justice of the peace court "was merely for the purpose of transferring
to 8-year old Emelita some guerilla educational benefits available to Antonio Ragudo."Plaintiffs
further alleged that the adoption had been secured "thru fraud and misrepresentation used by
defendant Enrique Pasno (father of Emelita) upon the plaintiffs, as the latter never intended to
adopt" Emelita "as their child".
Instead of answering, the defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint, arguing that as the
justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance to take
cognizance of adoption cases, the latter has no jurisdiction to interfere or annul the order issued in
said adoption proceeding. Upholding defendants' contention, the judge dismissed the case. Hence,
this appeal.
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ISSUE: Whether fraud is a ground for revocation of an adoption.
443
RULING: It is argued for the appellees that under Art. 348 of the New Civil Code, fraud is not
one of the grounds for revocation of an adoption. The appellants reply, quite correctly, that those
grounds refer only to an adoption validly decreed - not to an adoption void from the beginning
because tainted with fraud. Anyway, this is an argument that should be submitted when the case
is considered on the merits.
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444
HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE PERSONS
PILAR Y. GOYENA v. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO

G.R. No. 147148 January 13, 2003, Carpio Morales, J.
As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the
guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are
urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear
that he has fallen into grievous error.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
FACTS:
1. On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a "PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
GUARDIANSHIP" over the person and properties of her sister Julieta, the pertinent allegations of
which read:
2. That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in the
Makati Medical Center where she is under medical attention for old age, general debility, and a
"mini"-stroke which she suffered in the United States in early 1995;
3. That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get up from bed without outside
assistance, and she has to be moved by wheel chair;
4. That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal properties in Metro Manila and in Western
Visayas, with an aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million Pesos[;]
5. That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself, and that she needs the assistance of
a guardian to manage her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises;
6. That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of the full blood, namely, petitioner
Amparo Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of the Religious of the
Assumption, and Loreto Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given their consent to the filing of this
petition as shown by their signatures at the bottom of this petition[;]
7. That petitioner has extensive experience in business management of commercial, agricultural
and corporate enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where Julieta Ledesma holds an
interest, and that she is in a position to monitor and supervise the delivery of vitally needed medical
services to Julieta Ledesma whether in the Metro Manila area, or elsewhere.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship. She later filed an Amended
Opposition on August 15, 1996 reading in part:
2.03 The petition lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and
there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property. She is very
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445
able to take charge of her affairs, and this is clearly evident from her letters to the petitioner. Copies
of her recent letters are herewith attached as Annexes "A" to "E."
xxx - xxx - xxx
2.05 Petitioner is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of Julieta Ledesma since their interests are
antagonistic (Sudler v. Sudler, 121 Md. 46. 49 L.R.A. 800, as cited in vol. V-B Francisco Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 93, Section 4, p. 414).
xxx - xxx - xxx

3.01 The above captioned petition should be dismissed for utter lack of legal and/or factual basis.
By Decision of October 4, 1996, the trial court found Julieta "incompetent and incapable of taking
care of herself and her property" and appointed respondent as guardian of her person and
properties, ratiocinating as follows:
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner (Amparo) is 72 years of age, the youngest sister of
Julieta. Admittedly, the Oppositor Pilar Goyena, 90 years of age has been the close friend and
companion of Julieta for 61 years. Julieta was with Oppositor when she suffered her first stroke in
Makati in 1991 which was the reason why Julieta had to give up the management of their hacienda
in Bacolod. It is also not disputed that Julieta was with Pilar when she had her second stroke in the
U.S. In short, the special bond of friendship existing between Julieta and the Oppositor cannot be
denied. Now that Julieta is unable to manage her personal life and business concerns due to senility
and "vascular dementia," the oppositor wants to be appointed her guardian or else Bart Lacson,
Fely Montelibano and Jose T. Revilla.
It is interesting to note that the oppositor has interposed her objection to the appointment of
Amparo as guardian because she thinks that the latter dislikes her. She further added that there
were a number of letters allegedly written by Julieta to Amparo which showed Julieta's sentiments
regarding certain matters. Nevertheless, not one of the nearest of kin of Julieta opposed the petition.
As a matter of fact, her sisters signified their conformity thereto. Thus, Ms. Goyena's mere
conjecture that Amparo dislikes her is no sufficient reason why the petition should be denied.
Neither does it make Amparo unsuitable and unfit to perform the duties of a guardian. On the
contrary, it is Ms. Goyena who could be considered as to have an adverse interest to that of Julieta
if it is true that 50% of Julieta's holdings at the Makati Medical Center has been transferred to her
as alleged in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit A.
By and large, the qualification of Amparo to act as guardian over the person and properties of
Julieta has been duly established. As a sister, she can best take care of Julieta's concerns and well
being. Now that Julieta is in the twilight of her life, her family should be given the opportunity to
show their love and affection for her without however denying Pilar Goyena access to her
considering the special bond of friendship between the two. Needless to say, the oppositor at 90
years of age could not be said to be physically fit to attend to all the needs of Julieta.
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ISSUE: Wheter the RTC erred in appointing the Respondent as guardian. (NO)
446
RULING: In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals
directly with the parties. As this Court said:
As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian,
and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the
interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen
into grievous error.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v. Sotelo with respect to the existence of antagonistic
interests between respondent and Julieta. In that case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as creditor
and mortgagee of the minor-wards' properties (a house and lot) is antagonistic to the interest of the
wards as mortgagors, hence, Gabriel's appointment as guardian was erroneous. For while he sought
to foreclose the wards' properties as creditor and mortgagee on one hand, he had to, on the other
hand, endeavor to retain them for the wards as their guardian. Added to that was Gabriel's
appointment as guardian without him informing the guardianship court that he held a mortgage on
the properties. Furthermore, he deliberately misinformed the said court that the first mortgagee
was the Santa Clara Monastery when it was him. None of the said circumstances obtain in the
present case.
NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA

G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012
FACTS: The petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, a petition for him
and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the
(respondent) Cirilo Oropesa.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1,
2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident
after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had
lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that
due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely,
and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms.
Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
The respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. Thereafter, the petitioner
presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa
Bennett, and the respondent’s former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya. After presenting evidence, the
petitioner filed a manifestation resting his case. The petitioner failed to file his written formal offer
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of evidence.
447
ISSUE: Whether respondent is considered an "incompetent" person as defined under section 2,
rule 92 of the rules of court who should be placed under guardianship
RULING: Respondent is not considered an "incompetent" person as defined under section 2, rule
92 of the rules of court who should be placed under guardianship. In a guardianship proceeding, a
court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an
incompetent.
Finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence.
Where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the observations
of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice.
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O.
Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On
the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states
that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2)
is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report
concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired
abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is
still sharp, alert and able.
CHIN AH FOO (ALIAS CHAN FOO WOO) AND YEE SHEE (ALIAS YEE SUI YENG),
WIDOW OF CHIN AH KIM V. PEDRO CONCEPCION AND LEE VOO
Gr No. 33281 March 31, 1930, J. Malcolm
FACTS: On November 15, 1927, a case was filed against Chan Sam (alias Chin Ah Woo) in the
CFI of Manila for the murder of Chin Ah Kim.
Court found Chin Ah Woo not responsible for the crime (insanity plea), BUT required his reclusion
for treatment in San Lazaro Hospital (article 8 of the Old Penal Code) and won’t be permitted to
leave there without court permission
Chin Ah Woo was confined for approximately two years in San Lazaro Hospital.
During this period, efforts to obtain his release were made induced by the desire of his wife and
father-in-law to have him proceed to Hongkong. Opposition to the allowance of the motions came
from the wife and children of the murdered man, who contended that Chan Sam was still insane,
and that he had made threats that if he ever obtained his liberty he would kill the wife and the
children of the deceased and probably other members of his own family who were living in
Hongkong
To conclude issue of his mental health, the court tasked Doctors Domingo and De los Angeles to
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examine and certify the mental condition of Chin Ah Woo. After the report had been submitted,
counsel for the oppositors challenged the jurisdiction of the court. However, the respondent judge
448
sustained the court’s right to make an order in the premises and allowed Chan Sam to leave the
San Lazaro Hospital to be turned over to the attorney-in-fact of his wife so that he might be taken
to Hongkong to join his wife in that city.
Judge decided according to Article 8 of the Penal Code, that among those exempt from criminal
liability are:
An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during the lucid interval.
When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony, the
court shall order his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which
he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
Section 1048 of the Administrative Code, which, it is argued, has superseded or supplemented
article 8 of the Penal Code, provides as to the discharge of a patient from custody from a hospital
for the insane the following:
"When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in any Government hospital or other
place for the insane is temporarily or permanently cured, or may be releases without danger, he
may discharge such patient, and shall notify the Judge of First Instance who ordered the
commitment, in case the patient is confined by order of the court."
An examination of article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses that the permission of the
court who orders the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a
prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution. The respondent judge has based his action
in this case on this provision of the law. On the other hand, section 1048 of the Administrative
Code grants to the Director of Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an
insane asylum. There is no pretense that the Director of Health has exercised his authority in this
case, or that the head of the Philippine Health Service has been asked to express his opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Judge who ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum
has the power to permit the insane person to leave the asylum without the acquiescence of the
Director of Health.
RULING: No. Contrasting the two provisions of Philippine law which have been mentioned, it is
self-evident that for section 1948 of the Administrative Code to prevail exclusively it would be
necessary to find an implied repeal of a portion of article 8 of the Penal Code. But it is a well-
known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express repeal none is presumed to be
intended.
Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative
Code. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed
so that both can stand together. Considering article 8 of the Penal Code as in force and construing
this article and section 1048 of the Administrative Code, we think that the Attorney-General was
right in expressing the opinion that the Director of Health was without power to release, without
proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the
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provisions of article 8 of the Penal Code. We think also that the converse proposition is equally
449
tenable, and is that any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with
article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody in an insane asylum until the views
of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily or
permanently cured or may be released without danger. In other words, the powers of the courts
and of the Director of Health are complementary each with the other. As a practical observation,
it may further be said that it is well to adopt all reasonable precautions to ascertain if a person
confined in an asylum as insane should be permitted to leave the asylum, and this can best be
accomplished through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of Health in proper cases.
After thorough discussion, our view is that while the respondent Judge acted patiently and
cautiously in the matters which came before him, yet he exceeded his authority when he issued his
orders of December 26, 1929, and March 17, 1930, without first having before him the opinion of
the Director of Health.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA

Gr No. 225599 March 22, 2017, J. Velasco. Jr.
FACTS: A resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur, accused [Roa] is known to have
suffered mental disorder prior to his commission of the crime charged. While his uncle, Issac
[Mejaro], attributes said condition to an incident in the year 2000 when accused was reportedly
struck in the head by some teenagers, SPOl [Nelson] Ballebar claimed to have learned from others
and the mother of the accused that the ailment is due to his use of illegal drugs when he was
working in Manila. When accused returned from Manila in 2001, Issac recalled that, in marked
contrast to the silent and formal deportment with which he normally associated his nephew, the
latter became talkative and was observed to be "always talking to himself' and "complaining of a
headache."
On September 27, 2001, accused had a psychotic episode and was brought to the [Don Susana J.
Rodriguez Mental Hospital] DSJRM by his mother and Mrs. Sombrero. Per the October 10, 2005
certification issued by Dr. Benedicto Aguirre, accused consulted and underwent treatment for
schizophrenia at the [Bi col Medical Center] BMC in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005.
In her Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. [Edessa Padre-]Laguidao also stated that accused was
prescribed antipsychotic medication which he was, however, not able to continue taking due to
financial constraints. Edgar [Sapinoso] and Rico [Ballebar], who. knew accused since childhood,
admitted hearing about the latter's mental health issues and/or his treatment therefor. Throughout
the wake of an unnamed aunt sometime in March 2007, it was likewise disclosed by Issac that
accused neither slept nor ate and was known to have walked by himself all the way to Bagumbayan,
Bula.
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ISSUE: Whether there is sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant for the
offense of Murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. However, there being
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no contest that accused-appellant perpetrated the stabbing of the victim, which caused the latter's
death, the resolution of the present issue hinges on the pleaded defense of insanity.
RULING: The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of fact and law by the CA. Hence,
the assailed Decision affirming the conviction of accused-appellant for murder must be upheld.
Insanity as an exempting circumstance is provided for in Article 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRES MAGALLANO
G.R. No. L-32978 October 30, 1980
FACTS: The accused was charged before the Court of First Instance of Davao City with parricide
for having killed his lawful wife, Exequiela Costa, on September 29, 1968. Upon motion by the
counsel de oficio for the accused asserting the accused's insanity, the latter was referred to the
Chief of the Davao General Hospital for examination. The Director was ordered to file the
necessary petition for hospitalization of the accused if in his opinion it served the public welfare
or the welfare of the person concerned.
Acting on the motion, the trial court on March 29, 1969 ordered that accused be again sent to the
regional mental hospital to be examined by an internist of that institution in collaboration with Dr.
Corazon San Pedro to determine once and for all the mental condition of the accused and to find
out whether he was fit for arraignment.
In the three interviews done, subject was observed to be in good contact with his environment. No
odd behavior was observed. He answered questions coherently and relevantly. No hallucinations
or delusions elicited. He is well oriented to the date, place and person. He can give his personal
data and other circumstances in his life. He can relate the event that led to his confinement in jail.
Having been satisfied that the accused was fit and ready for trial on the basis of the two medical
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reports, the trial court proceeded to arraign him.
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After trial wherein the main issue was the sanity or insanity of the accused during the commission
of the crime, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was legally insane at the commission of the crime
RULING: NO
After a review and analysis of the evidence on record, this Court agrees with the State's contention
that the defense has failed to prove that the accused was legally insane at the commission of the
crime.
Indeed, the evidence presented by the defense does not outweigh the certifications submitted by
government psychiatric doctors who had closely observed the accused for a month and a half, and
found that the accused was in good contact with his environment; that he did not manifest any odd
behavior for in fact he could even relate the circumstances that led to his confinement.
While there is evidence tending to show that the accused in some instances had displayed some
unusual behavior, at most these could only be eccentricities which do not mean complete
deprivation of intelligence or discernment. The presumption of sanity is not overcome by mere
abnormality of behavior.
"In the eyes of the law," as held in the case of People vs. Renegado, "insanity exists when there is
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of
reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will; mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as
an exempting circumstance and he must prove it by clear and positive evidence."
THE UNITED STATES vs. EVARISTO VAQUILAR
G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472 March 13, 1914
There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a
frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get into
a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if
not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane.
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The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non
compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before indicated, one witness
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testified that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not
crazy he would not have killed his family." That witness' conception of the word "crazy" evidently
is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person would not think of doing.
Another witness testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy, because he would cut everybody
at random without paying any attention to who it was." It is not at all unnatural for a murderer,
caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously at
those who attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said "he must have been crazy because
he cut me." This is another illustration of the popular conception of the word "crazy," it being
thus used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.
FACTS: The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the
manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The commission of these crimes
is not denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf,
testifying that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to the commission
of the crimes. They also testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and stomach
prior to the killing.
Our attention has been directed to the following testimony: Martin Agustin, witness for the
prosecution, testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a noise, and that he refused
into the house and saw the appellant kill his wife and daughter; that he was cut by the appellant;
that there "were seven, including the small boys and girls who were cut by him;" that he did not
know of any disagreement between the appellant and the two deceased; that on the morning before
she was killed that the appellant had 'felt pains in his head and stomach." The witness further stated
that the appellant's "eyes were very big and red and his sight penetrating" at the time he was killing
his wife and daughter, and that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because
if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family — his wife and child."
The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found that the
appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other wounds on her hands;
and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side to the other." The witness
stated that he made a slight examination of the defendant in the jail and that he did not notice
whether defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was suffering from any
mental derangement or not.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term crazy is synonymous to insane or non-compos mentis.
RULING: There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up
into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons
who get into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry
man, often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive
that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms
"insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before
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indicated, one witness testified that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me, he was crazy
453
because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family." That witness' conception of the
word "crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person
would not think of doing. Another witness testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy, because
he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was." It is not at all
unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and
strike promiscuously at those who attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said "he must have
been crazy because he cut me." This is another illustration of the popular conception of the word
"crazy," it being thus used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.
In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the defendant was indicated for an assault
with intent to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental condition which would involve
no guilt." The Supreme Court on appeal in this decision distinguished between passion and insanity
as follows:
But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend to
persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal responsibility. Those who
have not lost control of their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and
restrain their persons, and are liable to the law if they do not. Where persons allow their anger to
lead them so far as to make them reckless, the fact that they have become at last too infuriated to
keep them from mischief is merely the result of not applying restraint in season. There would be
no safety for society if people could with impunity lash themselves into fury, and then to desperate
acts of violence. That condition which springs from undisciplined and unbridled passion is clearly
within legal as well as moral censure and punishment. (People vs. Finley, 38 Mich., 482; Welch
vs. Ware, 32 Mich., 77.)
In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court said: "The court very properly continued with an
explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred,
or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under such conditions, responsible
for the crime, because a large share of homicides committed are occasioned by just such motives
as these.' "
Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is pleaded in defense of criminal actions,
we quote as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am. Rep., 262, 265):
But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there is a presumption that the accused is sane,
which certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact. (State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If
the killing and nothing more appears, this presumption, without other proof upon the point of
sanity, is sufficiently to support a conviction and as the State must prove every element of the
crime charged "beyond a reasonable doubt," it follows that this presumption affords such proof.
This presumption however may be overthrow. It may be shown on the part of the accused that the
criminal intent did not exist at the time the act was committed. This being exceptional is a defense,
and like other defenses must be made out by the party claiming the benefit of it. "The positive
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existence of that degree and kind of insanity that shall work a dispensation to the prisoner in the
454
case of established homicide is a fact to be proved as its affirmed by him." (State vs. Stark, 1 Strob.,
506.)
The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts of an enlarged
criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of unsound mind at the time he
committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each information having been proven, and the
penalty imposed being in accordance with the law, the judgments appealed from are affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.
THE UNITED STATES vs. SIMEON GUENDIA
G.R. No. L-12462 December 20, 1917

FACTS: Simeon Guendia was convicted for frustrated murder before the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Iloilo.
There is no doubt that an assault with intent to kill was committed by the defendant at the time and
place mentioned in the record upon the person of his querida; but the proof shows, that the
defendant was crazy at the time and has remained so since. He has been committed by order of the
Governor-General to the San Lazaro Hospital for confinement and treatment.
The trial judge believe that the defendant is crazy; or appeared so, at least, during his trial. The
action of the trial judge in passing sentence upon the defendant must have been in part due to a
desire to keep a dangerous insane person in confinement until proper disposition might be made
of him.
It is clear from the evidence submitted at the trial that the defendant was insane at the time of the
perpetration of the act, and he therefore exempt from criminal liability under subsection 1 of article
8 of the Penal Code. It results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed and the
defendant acquitted.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court has a discretion as to whether a preliminary investigation into the
prisoner's sanity shall be made.
RULING:Yes. In Webber vs. Commonwealth (119 Pa. St. Rep., 223; 4 Am. St. Rep., 634), it was
likewise held that the making of a preliminary inquiry into the sanity of the prisoner before the
trial upon the criminal charge is begun is discretionary with the court. It was there said:
The existence of the doubt as the prisoner's present insanity is a matter which, by the very necessity
of the case, could only be determined by the court itself. Up to the time of pleading there is no
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other tribunal which has the prisoner in charge, and there is no other which can say whether there
455
is a doubt upon that subject. It is one of the functions which must be entrusted to the court, and it
is not to be presumed that it will in any case be abused.
The conclusion to which we arrive is that when a judge of first instance is informed or discovers
that an accused person is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his
discretion to investigate the matter, and if it be found that by reason of any such affliction the
accused could not, with the aid of his counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to
suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties
are recovered. If, however, such investigation is considered unnecessary, and the trial proceeds,
the court will acquit the accused if he be found exempt from criminal responsibility by reason of
imbecility or lunacy. In such case an order for his commitment to an asylum should be made
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 8 (1) of the Penal Code.
Judgment reversed and defendant acquitted, with costs of both instances de officio. But the
defendant shall be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital, or such other hospital for the
insane as the Director of Health may direct, and shall not be permitted to depart therefrom without
the prior approval of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ

G.R. No. 45130 February 17, 1937
FACTS: Celestino Bonoan was with the crime of murder. On arraignment, the defense counsel
objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at
the time confined in the Psychopathic Hospital.
The court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital to render a report on the
mental condition of the accused.
Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution
and the defense asked the court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to
the mental condition of the accused, or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer
observation.
The trial court then issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or
an assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent
submission of a report as to the true mental condition of the patient.
Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report stating
that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof, the case was suspended
indefinitely.
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On January 21, 1936, Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be discharged
from the hospital and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On February 27,
456
1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had. After trial, the lower court
found the defendant guilty of the offense charged
ISSUE: Whether the court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has
commission of the offense.
RULING: Yes. Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or
eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State
should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In
the case at bar, however, we are not concerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to
show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a
particular and isolated attack, beginning with the demonstration of symptoms thereof prior to the
commission of the crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately
following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and
circumstances of record which cannot be overlooked.
Evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that the herein
defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to
January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from
a disease diagnosed as dementia praecox. His confinement during these periods, it is true was long
before the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which
tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of the occurrence of the crime is not
entirely lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.
According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms
of dementia praecox, in certain periods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depressive
psychosis and, in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes
affected by this kind of disease, either dementia praecox or manic depressive psychosis, during the
period of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts."
Further the defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on
the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempts were made by detectives
to secure a statement from him, he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital
the day following the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police authorities
themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the accused, which doubt found confirmation in the
official reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.
In the view of the foregoing, judgment is reversed and defendant acquitted. But the defendant shall
be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital, or such other hospital for the insane as the
Director of Health may direct, and shall not be permitted to depart therefrom without the prior
approval of the Court.
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457
HABEAS CORPUS
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN

DOE and JANE DOE
G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000
Husband cannot be forced to live with his wife by Habeas Corpus
FACTS: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband
Potenciano alleging that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband.
The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition
for habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the
custody of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife.
Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation rights.
ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their
conjugal dwelling.
RULING: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person
continuous unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the subject of
visitation rights against free choice. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation
rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any
other mesne process.
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458
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG
KO VINGSON YU, SHIRLY VINGSON SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP –versus- JOVY
CABCABAN,
UDK No. 14817 January 13, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Shirly Vingson alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu her 14-year-old daughter,
ran away from home. Shirly then went to the police station in Bacolod City upon receipt of
information that Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Jovy Cabcaban, a police officer in
that station. Since Cabcaban refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the
National Bureau of Investigation to rescue her child. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura informed Shirly
that Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was staying with a private organization called
Calvary Kids. Pura told her, however, that the child was fine and had been attending school.
This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against respondent Cabcaban
and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals (CA) rather than the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City citing as reason several threats against her life in that city.
The CA denied the petition for its failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko. The CA
also denied petitioner Shirly’s motion for reconsideration.
In her Comment, respondent Cabcaban claimed that police officers found Shang Ko crying outside
a church. When queried, the latter refused to give any information about herself. Thus, they
indorsed her case to the Bacolod City Police Women and Children Protection Desk that Cabcaban
headed. After the initial interview, Cabcaban referred Shang Ko to Balay Pasilungan , a temporary
shelter for abused women and children.
Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that on the next day, a social worker sat with the minor who
said that her mother Shirly had been abusive in treating her and that Shang Ko pleaded with the
police and the social worker not to return her to her mother. As a result, the Bacolod City Police
filed a complaint against petitioner Shirly for violation of Republic Act 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act.
Respondent Cabcaban then decided to turn over Shang Ko to the Calvary Kids, a private
organization that gave sanctuary and schooling to abandoned and abused children. She further
claimed that one year later, she accompanied the NBI agents to Calvary Kids to talk to the
institution’s social worker, school principal, and director. Shang Ko herself told the NBI that she
would rather stay at Calvary Kids because she was afraid of what would happen to her if she
returned home. As proof, Shang Ko wrote a letter stating that, contrary to her mother’s malicious
insinuations, Cabcaban actually helped her when she had nowhere to go after her family refused
to take her back.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for writ of habeas corpus proper. (NO)
RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available,
not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
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but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should
459
have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents,
rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and
well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are
liberated from such parents and properly counseled.
Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod City, it
would be best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city. Meantime, considering
the presumption that the police authorities acted regularly in placing Shang Ko in the custody of
Calvary Kids the Court believes that she should remain there pending hearing and adjudication of
this custody case. Besides she herself has expressed preference to stay in that place. With this, the
Supreme Court seat aside the Court of Appeals Resolutions and ordered the custody case
forwarded to the Family Court of Bacolod City for hearing and adjudication as the evidence
warrants. Meantime until such court orders otherwise the Court held that the minor Shang Ko
Vingson remain in the custody of Calvary Kids of Bacolod City.
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON,
JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF
INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON
G.R. No. 182497 June 29, 2010
The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of one’s detention, meaning, if there is
sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if there is none to discharge him at once. For
habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom which must be actual and effective, not nominal or moral.
FACTS: Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan
Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police to report
to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The
latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial
Office of Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April
2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a
Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1
Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by
Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted
where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations
Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga
of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig,
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460
head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turned-
over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.
Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the
release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor
of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito
Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.
This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC of Manila, Branch
37.
Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being illegally detained
by the respondents despite the order of release of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated
April 21, 2008. They further claim that as of April 23, 2008, no administrative case was filed
against PO1 Ampatuan.
ISSUE: Is the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus proper?
RULING: No, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus not proper.
The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of one’s detention, meaning, if there is
sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if there is none to discharge him at once. For
habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom which must be actual and effective, not nominal or moral.
The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this
Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. Essentially, a writ of habeas
corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty.
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful.
If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention
as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application. The writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody
over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid
argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring
of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form
of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is
neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a
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permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned
461
are always accounted for. Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is the
administrative case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.
ANITA MANGILA vs. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013
FACTS: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with
syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the RPC, in relation to PD No. 1689, and with
violations of Section 7(b) of RA 8042 were filed in the MTCC in Puerto Princesa City. The
complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to
the private complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection
of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without
lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
On the following day, Judge Pangilinan , Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary
investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants,
Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On the
next day, the entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the
City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action in
accordance with the prevailing rules.
Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation;
that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant
of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or
without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for
habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas
corpus was available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall
the warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of
the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant.
The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release
of Mangila from detention?
RULING: THE SUPREME COURT AFFIRMED THE CA’S FINDING. The high prerogative
writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s
function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
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merits.
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Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for
the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause
of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not
act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be
the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and
the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the
custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the
petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the
detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however,
is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of record.
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her
cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered
to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge
Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the
restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process,
could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed
irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant
for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct
access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge
Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. We agree with the
CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available
remedy.
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh

Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.
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It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy.
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Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. It must be
stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
FACTS: Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from respondent and
presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed on the other hand that she
is the natural mother of the child.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus. On appeal,
the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed
its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor.
RULING: Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by the
rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus
is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter
be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It must be stressed out that in habeas corpus
proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumption,
including those as identity of the person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and by
the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there
are no clinical records, log book or discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly
born were presented. Strong evidence directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband",
was not capable of siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after
almost 15 years of living together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore
no offspring.
The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas
Lopez, the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician
or midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of
the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed
with the LCR within 30 days after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth
certificate were typed in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted
that she is a "common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the
two had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical
records and testimony of the midwife who attended Bienvenida's childbirth.
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464
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child
SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON VS. ADELFA FRANCISCO
THORNTON,
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving
a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations
that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte
nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the child’s privacy and
emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil
sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced
FACTS: Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in
the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave
birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton. However, after
three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her
old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In
fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends,
leaving her daughter in the care of the house help. Petitioner admonished respondent about her
irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways.
On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without
notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta.
Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this
was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then
went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did
not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification
that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls
from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner
then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue
a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA
7902(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
ISSUE: Whether has CA jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors
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RULING: Yes.
465
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by
giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to
be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive"
apparently cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they
cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which
seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy.
This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the
Family Courts Act of 1997.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that
RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving
a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations
that the legislature seeks to avoid.
First, the welfare of the child is paramount.
Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the child’s
privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result
in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child’s welfare and well being will be
prejudiced.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any
day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized
by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance,
or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only
within his judicial district.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
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may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
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From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
involved.
MARTIN GIBBS FLETCHER vs. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF

CORRECTIONS OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE
UDK-14071 July 17, 2009
The writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without
sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by
virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
It is undisputed that petitioner was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. 95-995. On June 24,
1996, he was sentenced to imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and
four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with payment of actual damages of ₱102,235.56.
FACTS: Petitioner Martin Gibbs Fletcher seeks his release from prison in this petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was
commuted by then President Fidel V. Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had already served 14
years, three months and 12 days, including his good conduct allowance, his continued
imprisonment is illegal. In its return to the writ, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posited
that the petition should be denied for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. In particular, the petition was neither signed nor verified by petitioner or a person on his
behalf or by his purported counsel. Moreover, it was not accompanied by a copy of the cause of
petitioner’s detention or commitment order.
ISSUES:
I. Whether petition should be denied for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court (NO)
II. Whether the writ of habeas corpus should be granted (NO)
RULING:
I. We disagree with the OSG insofar as it argues that the petition should be dismissed for failure
to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with the technical
requirements for a habeas corpuspetition as provided in the Rules of Court may be dispensed with
where the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out a case for habeas corpus. In
Angeles v. Director of New Bilibid Prison, we held that the formalities required for petitions for
habeas corpus shall be construed liberally. The petition for the writ is required to be verified but
the defect in form is not fatal. Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,this Court
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declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if there is evidence that a person is unjustly
restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no application therefor. So long as
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this Court sits, technicality cannot trump liberty. Therefore, a petition which is deficient in form,
such as petitioner’s petition-letter in this case, may be entertained so long as its allegations
sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.
The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as
an effective defense of personal freedom.
Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very entity tasked to ensure
the liberty of all persons (citizens and aliens alike) within its jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant
in extending the habeas corpusremedy to one who invokes it. To strictly restrict the great writ of
liberty to technicalities not only defeats the spirit that animates the writ but also waters down the
precious right that the writ seeks to protect, the right to liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees
protection to the right is to negate the right itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly confine the writ
of habeas corpus in the prison walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its constitutional
mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
II. The writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned
without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person
is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
It is undisputed that petitioner was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. 95-995.On June 24,
1996, he was sentenced to imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and
four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with payment of actual damages of ₱102,235.56.
Based on petitioner’s prison records, he began serving his sentence on July 24, 1997. He claims
that after having served good conduct time allowance for 14 years, three months and 12 days, he
should now be released from prison.
We disagree.
A convict may be released on parole after serving the minimum period of his sentence. However,
the pendency of another criminal case is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from
being released on parole. Unfortunately, petitioner is again on trial in Criminal Case No. 94- 6988
for estafa. The case was filed as early as 1996 but he was arraigned only on October 6, 2008.
Hepleaded not guilty to the charge against him. Pre-trial was set on January 26, 2009. Clearly, he
is disqualified from being released on parole and consequently must serve out the entirety of his
sentence.
We note the issuance of a warrant for petitioner’s arrest on March 8, 1996, the date he was first set
for arraignment in Criminal Case No. 94-6988. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, the writ cannot be issued and petitioner cannot be discharged since he has been charged
with another criminal offense. His continued detention is without doubt warranted under the
circumstances.
Petitioner asserts that his sentence in Criminal Case No. 95-995 was commuted by then President
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Ramos. However, he presented no proof of such commutation. Other than indorsements by the
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Chief Justice, Public Attorney’s Office and Undersecretary of the Department of Justice no
document purporting to be the commutation of his sentence by then President Ramos was attached
in his petition and in his subsequent missives to this Court. His barren claim of commutation
therefore deserves scant consideration, lest we be accused of usurping the President’s sole
prerogative to commute petitioner’s sentence in Criminal Case No. 95-995.
Having established that petitioner’s continued imprisonment is by virtue of a valid judgment and
court process, we see no need to discuss petitioner’s other arguments.
.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF THE

PERSON OF ARMY MAJOR JASON LAUREANO AQUINO, PA MARIA FE S.
AQUINO, vs. LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, AFP,* IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE ARMY, AND THE CUSTODIAL OFFICER
OR COMMANDER, ARMY DETENTION CENTER, G2-21D, CAMP CAPINPIN,
TANAY, RIZAL
G.R. NO. 174994 August 31, 2007
While it is true that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire
into questions of violations of constitutional right this Court, however, does not find the conditions
of Major Aquino’s confinement to be a proper subject of inquiry in the instant Petition.
This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of
confinement.
FACTS: The facts leading to the arrest of Major Aquino, as set forth in the Solicitor General's
brief, show that on 3 February 2006, Major Aquino, along with several military men, allegedly
met at the resthouse of Captain Aldomovar near Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan to plot a
breach of the Camp Defense Plan of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo and to take over Camp
Aquinaldo, as well as the Headquarters of the Philippine Army.
On 26 February 2006, in the wake of the group's alleged withdrawal of support from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines chain of command and the current administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Major Aquino was ordered arrested and confined at the Intelligence Service
Group of the Philippine Army in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, upon the order of Lt. Gen. Hermogenes
C. Esperon, (Lt. Gen. Esperon) who was then the Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
On the same day, Lt. Gen. Esperon ordered the Army Inspector General to conduct an investigation
to determine: the circumstances attending Major Aquino's alleged withdrawal of support; the
veracity of reports anent the alleged troop movement of some Philippine Military personnel from
their respective stations to Manila to join the protest march at Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue on
24 February 2006 with Brigadier General Danilo Lim (Brig. Gen. Lim); and the participation,
responsibility and culpability of all Philippine Military personnel involved, if any.
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469
Petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Court of Appeals, praying that the AFP Chief
of Staff and the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, or whoever are acting in their place
and stead, be directed to immediately produce the body of Major Aquino and explain forthwith
why he should not be set at liberty without delay. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
95341.
After hearing, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 31 August 2006, denying the
Petition for Habeas Corpus. Basic is the rule that once a person detained is duly charged in court,
he may no longer question his detention via a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for writ of habeas corpus prosper
RULING: No, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will not prosper.
While it is true that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire
into questions of violations of constitutional right, this Court, however, does not find the conditions
of Major Aquino's confinement to be a proper subject of inquiry in the instant Petition. This Court
has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement.
As a rule, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus does not extend into questions of conditions of
confinement; but only to the fact and duration of confinement. The high prerogative writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, and if found illegal, to order
the release of the detainee. It is not a means for the redress of grievances or to seek injunctive relief
or damages.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners
from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention
and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be
reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or
damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However,
habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas
corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.
NOEL B. BAGTAS vs. HON. RUTH C. SANTOS, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 72, Antipolo City, and ANTONIO and ROSITA GALLARDO
G.R. No. 166682 November 27, 2009
FACTS: Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo) are the parents of Maricel S. Gallardo
(Maricel). Two weeks after graduating from high school in April 2000, Maricel ran away to live
with her boyfriend. Maricel became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy S. Gallardo (Maryl Joy).
Maricel’s boyfriend left her.
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In February 2002, Maricel returned to her parents. On the same day, Maricel ran away again and
lived with Noel B. Bagtas (Bagtas) and Lydia B. Sioson (Sioson) at Ma. Corazon, Unirock,
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. Maricel went to Negros Occidental and left Maryl Joy in the
custody of Bagtas and Sioson. In a letter dated 5 February 2001, Maricel relinquished her rights
over Maryl Joy to Bagtas and his wife.
In April 2002, the Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of Maryl Joy from Bagtas and
Sioson. Bagtas and Sioson refused. Unable to settle the matter, the Spouses Gallardo filed with the
RTC a petition for habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Did the CA err when it affirmed the RTC’s decision that the allegation in the petition for
habeas corpus show that the sole purpose for the filing thereof is to cause the production before
the court of the person in whose favor it was filed and in ruling that with the delivery of the child
for whom the petition was filed, the petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic?
RULING: Yes, it did. The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the RTC’s 9 December 2002
and 21 April 2003 Orders.
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled thereto. In
cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to the production
of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas corpus is to determine
who has the rightful custody over the child.
the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather,
it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl Joy was
produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine who had the rightful
custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the petition for habeas
corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without sufficient basis.
In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the child’s welfare is the most important
consideration. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child.
In Sombong v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus
involving minors:
(1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor,
(2) the respondent is withholding the rightful custody over the minor, and
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(3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she be in the custody of the petitioner.
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In the present case, these requisites are not clearly established because the RTC hastily dismissed
the action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without conducting any
trial.
ADONIS vs TESORO
Gr No. 182855 June 5, 2013
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.
The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as
an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief
for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the
person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
FACTS: Alexander Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for libel.
While serving sentence, another case of libel was filed against him. Months later, the Board of
Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the Discharge on Parole of seven (7) inmates in
various jails in country and this includes Adonis. Meanwhile, the Court issued a new circular which
modifies the penalties of libel cases. Pursuant to the circular, Adonis filed a motion to reopen his
case praying for his immediate release from detention and for the modification of his sentence to
payment of fine. Adonis then moved for his provisional release and the same was granted and
Adonis was allowed to post bail. Following such, Adonis filed a petition for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that his liberty was restrained with no valid reason.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
RULING: The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of
obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not
issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed or
discharge authorized, to wit:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.― If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or
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of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
472
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17. Since his detention was
by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his
sentence
when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007. While it is
true that a convict may be released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period
of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification
of such convict from being released on parole. Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the
second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even when the instant petition
was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ under such
circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate
release at that time.
CABALLES vs CA
GR No. 163108 February 23, 2005
function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error.
the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the
cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus
does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is
alleged to be the unlawful authority.3Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved
is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty.
FACTS: Glen Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor. Because such is a non-bailable
offense, Caballes was detained. After the direct examination of the prosecution’s witnesses were
finished, the schedule of hearings of the case were repeatedly moved and rescheduled prompting
Caballes to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to speedy trial was violated. The
judge trying the case filed a motion to inhibit from the case to avoid being misunderstood. The
case was then re-raffled to another branch. The trial court where the case was re-assigned then
denied the motion to dismiss filed by Caballes reasoning that the delays were not the fault of the
prosecution alone. Caballes then filed with the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari
and Ptohibition. Pursuant to this, the CA issued a resolution requiring Caballes to inform the court
of his choice of remedy and Caballes chose that his petition be treated as a petition for habeas
corpus without prejudice to the concomitant application of certiorari if the court considered the
same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas corpus. The CA dismissed the
petition ruling that habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to the case. In line with such, Caballes
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filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
473
ISSUES/RULING :
First Issue: Whether the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy in
this case.
Ruling: No. As correctly held by the CA, Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas
corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss
the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.
function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error.
the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause
of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not
act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be
the unlawful authority.Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the
person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the
custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty" is a prerogative writ which
does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however,
a writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is to inquire into the
criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act,
and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.3The primary, if not the only
object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint
under which a person is held.
The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be treated as a petition for
habeas corpus. Even then, the CA rightly dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to
establish his right to the writ. The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence
of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Second Issue: Whether the proper remedy from the denial of a petition for habeas corpus is
petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Ruling: No. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from the
judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the
judgment appealed from. While the said provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Court approved Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule
41of the said Rules, which took effect on July 15, 2001, thus:
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SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases.—The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
474
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus
cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for
reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the
aggrieved party’s remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason
being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence
and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for
certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive. An appeal in this case would still have been
a speedy and adequate remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court,
the decision of the CA was already final and executory.
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF KUNTING

Gr No. 167193 April 19, 2006
The court reiterated the ruling in the case of Bernarte v. Court of Appeals stating that "once the
person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
FACTS: In 2001, Ashraf Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Security
Act. Two years later, the Royal Malaysian Police turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task
Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants of arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela
City, Basilan wheein Kunting was charged for four (4) couts of Kidnapping for Ransom and
Serious Illegal Detention. The RTC then issued an order directing the police officers to
immediately tune-over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation. Almost a month later, the PNP-IG director wrote a letter to the chief state
prosecutor requesting for representation and transfer of venue of trial from Basilan to Pasig city
due to the several intelligence reports that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP. Moreover, there is a big possibility that
Kunting may be recovered by the ASG due to the inadequate security facility in Basilan.
Meanwhile, the RTC rendered a decision against Kunting’s co-accused in the criminal actions
pending before said court. After such, the RTC issued an order denying Kunting’s motion to set
the case for prelimary investigation since PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting but it reiterated its
order to turn-over Kunting to the Court. One of the officers of PNP-IG’s legal division filed with
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the RTC aa motion to defer implementation of the order because of the pending petition to transfer
475
venue. Pursuant to these happenings, Kunting filed a petition for habeas corpus contending the he
has been illegally detained as the trial court has not taken any action over his case.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to
"all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy
of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found
illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then
the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or
of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was
arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC,
Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
was thus authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In
accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot
be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals
holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E.

RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, -versus – LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and
TERESITA R. PABELLO,
G.R. No. 169482 January 29, 2007
FACTS: Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of
mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. She was living with petitioner, her nephew,
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since 2000. He acted as her guardian.
476
In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took
Eufemia from petitioner Veluz’ house. He made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but
these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a
petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals.
In their comment, respondents stated that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and
her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their adoption, respondent Luisa was Eufemia’s
halfsister while respondent Teresita was Eufemia’s niece and petitioner’s sister.
Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not
the other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and
other household needs.
Furthermore, respondents alleged that sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as the
"encargado" or administrator of the properties of Eufemia as well as those left by the deceased
Maximo. As such, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and transacted business
with third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory
heirs of the late Maximo.
In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the
properties entrusted to petitioner. These demands were unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the
respondents were compelled to file a complaint for estafa against petitioner in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health,
respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005. The latter willingly went
with them. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that
respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of
her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her
legal guardian. Thus, the Court of Appeals denied his petition. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was also denied
ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus is proper. (NO)
RULING: In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus,
in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. "The
writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the
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cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter
477
found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to
state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory
operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be
clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to
the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty
will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining
the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed in
this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her
liberty. It found that she was not for there is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained
of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by respondents.
On the contrary, respondents, being Eufemia’s adopted children, are taking care of her.
SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES -versus - FERNANDO L.

DIMAGIBA
G.R No. 151876 June 21, 2005, Panganiban, J.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue
of a valid judgment. However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant:
(1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2)
the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive,
thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already
become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent
should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in
another forum.
FACTS: Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks
which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were
dishonored for the reason "account closed."6 Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts
of violation of BP 227 under separate Complaints filed with the MTCC. After a joint trial, the
MTCC rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases.
RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction. There being no further appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the RTC issued a Certificate of Finality of the Decision.
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the
service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution
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to enforce his civil liability.
478
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He
prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that
the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. The
arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of
Execution filed on February 28, 2001.
In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed
the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba. On September 28, 2001, he was arrested
and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.
On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus shall prosper (NO)
RULING: The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in
which individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those
who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them
from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under
which a person is detained.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue
of a valid judgment. However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant:
(1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2)
the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive,
thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in Vaca and
on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment,
for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby
effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive. From his allegations, the
Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ.
However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a
Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC’s Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial
Quashal of the Writ of Execution. Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no
power or authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invoked in the
said Motions. We believe that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity.
The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he
should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the
action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition for a writ
of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and
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executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have
resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum.
479
The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus.
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ET. AL. vs. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA,
ET AL.
Gr No. 162734 August 29, 2006, J. Quisumbing
FACTS: Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C.
Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie
Antonette’s parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws
problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie
Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from
seeing his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City.
The RTC directed respondents to produce and bring before the court the body of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla. Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.
Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is proper.
RULING: Yes, Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from
a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner
Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody.
Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated
by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still
entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent’s cause of action is the
deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas
corpus is available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody,
among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but
merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is
prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-
SC that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file
answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the
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minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.
480
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and
serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a
counter argument for private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing
the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or
visiting his child under seven years of age.
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M.

CADA V. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA
Gr No. 210636 July 28, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
FACTS: Respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition
for writ of habeas corpus petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the court
respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada, and to return to her the custody over
the child. Additionally, respondent indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses where
she can be served with summons and other court processes.
The RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child to court.
The Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving to the petitioner so he left copies of the court
processes at petitioner’s Caloocan residence, as witnessed by respondent’s counsel and barangay
officials. The petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC-Caloocan.
Meanwhile the petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the
RTC. Respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping before the Office of the City Prosecutor –
Quezon City against petitioner and her counsel.
The RTC-Quezon City dismissed the guardianship case due to the pendency of the habeas corpus
petition before RTC-Caloocan. The petitioner moved for the quashal of the writ and dismissal of
the habeas corpus petition, claiming that she was not personally served with summons.
The RTC said that since the sheriff was able to personally serve petitioner a copy of the writ, albeit
in Quezon City, the RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over her person. CA held that
jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed the habeas corpus petition before the
designated Family Court in Caloocan City
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition.
RULING: Yes
The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance of the habeas corpus petition. Subsequently, it
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was served with a copy of the writ in Quezon
City.
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481
The petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family
Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon as
its presiding judge returns to duty.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial region
where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted,the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
The respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City
and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan
can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is
immaterial in view of the above rule
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANTv JUDGE NORMA C.

PERELLO, FORMER CLERK OF COURT LUIS C. BUCAYON II, COURT
STENOGRAPHERS THELMA A. MANGILIT, CECILIO B. ARGAME, MARICAR N.
EUGENIO, AND RADIGUNDA R. LAMAN AND INTERPRETER PAUL M.
RESURRECCION, ALL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 276,
MUNTINLUPA CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952 December 24, 2008
FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted judicial audit in all seven (7)
branches of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City, including Branch 276 then presided by
herein respondent Judge Norma C. Perello (Judge Perello). The audit was prompted by reports of
perceived irregular disposition of petitions for habeas corpus by the said court. The audit team
reported that for the period 1998-2004, a total of 219 petitions for habeas corpus were assigned to
Branch 276 but the records for 22 of these cases were not presented to the audit team, while the
case folders of about a hundred cases did not contain copies of the decisions of conviction. The
audit team also noted a huge disparity in the number of petitions for habeas corpus raffled in
Branch 276 as against those raffled in the other branches, which led the team to doubt if the raffle
had been conducted with strict regularity considering the fact that Judge Perello was the Executive
Judge that time.
The audit team likewise reported several substantive and procedural lapses relative to the
disposition of habeas corpus cases in Branch 276. Finally, the audit team observed that in some of
the petitions for habeas corpus, respondent Judge Perello erred in ordering the release of the
prisoners before they have served the full term of their sentence. Thus, the audit team
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482
recommended to the OCA to consider the judicial audit report as an administrative complaint
against Judge Perello and her staffs for gross inefficiency.
In her Comment, Judge Perello opined that that the prisoners she released were all convicted under
the old law, R.A. No. 6425, and not under the new law, R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 which imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to
death regardless of the quantity of the drug involved. She maintains that the provisions of R.A.
No. 9165 cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as these prisoners are concerned for the main
reason that it would not be favorable to them.
Thus, according to Judge Perello, the provisions of R.A. No. 6425, as interpreted in the case of
People v. Simon, must be applied to the released prisoners. Citing the Simon case, she insisted that
the maximum imposable penalty for violation of R.A. No. 6425 where the quantity involved is 750
grams or less is six (6) months only, which was the reason why she ordered the immediate release
of the prisoners because they had already served two (2) years of imprisonment. The then Court
Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. submitted the recommendations of respondent Judge
Norma C. Perello be FOUND GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE and be meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for three (3) months without salary
and benefit.
ISSUE: Whether the orders granting the writs of habeas corpus proper. (NO)
RULING: While the Supreme Court agreed with respondent judge that R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
retroactively applied to the prisoners involved in the cases audited, however, the Court was not
impressed with Judge Perello's justification in granting the writs. Such ratiocination on her part
betrays a lack of understanding of the rule on graduation of penalties. Nowhere in the cited case
of Simon does it state that the maximum penalty shall be six (6) months where the quantity is less
than 750 grams.
The Simon case clarified the penalty to be imposed vis-à-vis the quantity of the drug involved,
such that prision correccional shall be imposed if the drug is below 250 grams; prision mayor if
the quantity is from 250 to 499 grams; and reclusion temporal if the drug is from 500 to 750 grams.
The same case likewise declared that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no
case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than
prision correccional.
As found by the audit team, Judge Perello considered only the minimum period of prision
correccional in granting the writs for habeas corpus such that when the prisoners had served
imprisonment for a period of two (2) years, she immediately ordered their release. This is clearly
erroneous because the petition for habeas corpus cannot be granted if the accused has only served
the minimum of his sentence as he must serve his sentence up to its maximum term. The maximum
range of prision correccional is from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. This is the period
which the prisoners must have served before their applications for writs of habeas corpus may be
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granted.
483
In obstinately granting the writs of habeas corpus even if the convicted prisoners had only served
the minimum period of their sentence, Judge Perello displayed a blatant disregard of the rule on
graduation of penalties as well as settled jurisprudence tantamount to gross ignorance of the law.
As a trial judge, respondent is the visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, she is expected to be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence." Judges are expected to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence. He
should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the
personification of justice and the Rule of Law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it
to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Perello must thereby have more than a cursory knowledge of the law on graduation of
penalties and the imposable penalty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Indeed, the facts
obtaining in this case speak of other dubious circumstances affecting Judge Perello's integrity and
competence too glaring to ignore
Notably, the record shows that Judge Perello granted the writs of habeas corpus even without the
pertinent copies of detention and judgment of conviction.This is contrary to the provisions of
Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Requisites of application therefor. - Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and
verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, of by some person in his behalf, and
shall set forth:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without
impairing the efficiency of the remedy; xxx.
The Rules clearly require that a copy of the commitment or cause of detention must accompany
the application for the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, Judge Perello deviated from the
guidelines laid down in Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. It must be emphasized that
rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind
them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should therefore administer their office
with due regard to the integrity of the system of law itself, remembering that they are not
depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law. Indeed, Judge Perello's
stubborn unwillingness to act in accordance with the rules and settled jurisprudence shows her
refusal to reform herself and to correct a wrong, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR MICHAEL LABRADOR ABELLANA

vs. HON. MEINRADO P. PAREDES,
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G.R. No. 232006 July 10, 2019

484
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, wherein petitioner pleaded
not guilty.
Petitioner was found guilty by the RTC and issued a warrant of arrest because he failed to surrender
himself 15 days after the promulgation of judgement.
Petitioner avers that he has been deprived of his right to due process because of lack of notice of
the proceedings in the trial court due to the negligence of his former counsel, Atty. Albura.
He avers that the RTC submitted the case for decision on April 30, 2009 for failure of petitioner
and his counsel to appear during the scheduled hearing on the same date for initial presentation of
the evidence for the defense. However, petitioner claims that he was not notified of said hearing.
He likewise claims that he was not given the notice setting the promulgation of judgment on July
29, 2009.
Petitioner, through Atty. Acosta, filed a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
He claims that a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus may be availed of as a post-
conviction remedy in such cases when a person is deprived of his Constitutional rights during the
court proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
RULING: The petition should be denied.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
examined and determined by a court of justice and to have it ascertained whether he is held under
lawful authority.
the person entitled thereto. Thus, the most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ is that the
individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under
some form of illegal restraint.
Concomitantly, if a person's liberty is restrained by some legal process, the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing. The writ cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent
court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not ousted of this jurisdiction
through some irregularity in the course of the proceedings.
However, jurisprudence has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of as a
post-conviction remedy when, as a consequence sentence as to circumstance of a judicial
proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: 1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
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sentence as such excess. Here, petitioner is invoking the first circumstance.
485
Nevertheless, it must be noted that when the detention complained of finds its origin in what has
been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably
narrowed. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes from the exceptional circumstances listed
above, the threshold remains high. Mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not
enough. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings. This,
petitioner failed to show.
MANGUILA v. JUDGE PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013
FACTS: Anita Mangila, petitioner, was charged with seven of syndicated estafa. The complaint
against her arose from recruiting and promising employment to private complainants as overseas
contract workers in Toronto, Canada without lawful authority from POEA. By reason of the
charged against petitioner, a warrant of arrest was issued against her. She was arrested. She then
filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA alleging that she is deprived of the remedy of a
motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest because Judge Pangilinan (Judge who
issued the warrant) had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who
had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. CA denied the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in denying the petition.
RULING: No.
Habeas corpus is a speedy and effective remedy devised to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
Petitioner’s restraint in this case in NOT unlawful. She had been arrested and detained by virtue
of the valid warrant issued for her arrest. The objective of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release
of the detainee. Equally well-settled, however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in
whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. Her
proper remedy was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the (preliminary
investigation) and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor
for appropriate action.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF LAURENTE C.

ILAGAN, ANTONIO B. ARELLANO, and MARCOS D. RISONAR, JR., Integrated Bar
of the Philippines [IBP]; Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG] and Movement of Attorneys
For Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc., [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN
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PONCE ENRILE, Minister of National Defense; LT. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, Acting
486
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; BRIG. GEN. DIONISIO TAN-GATUE,
PC-INP Regional Commander for Region XI, Camp Catitipan, Davao City
G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985
If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no
preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information
on grounds provided by the Rules, or to ask for an investigation/reinvestigation of the
case. Habeas Corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on
the basis of the Information filed against the accused
FACTS: Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Free Legal Assistance Group on behalf of Attorneys
LaurenteIlagan, Antonio Arellano, and Marcos Risonar filed a petition for Habeas Corpus. The
three lawyers were arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan solely on the basis of a Mission Order
signed by Gen. Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander of the Ministry of National Defense.
The petition was then filed on the ground that the arrests were illegal and violative of the
Constitution, because arrest cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders and there appears to
be a military campaign to harass lawyers who are involved in national security cases.
The respondents contended that the attorneys were arrested on the basis of a Decree issued by the
President. Respondents further allege that the detained attorneys played active roles in organizing
mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front.
The court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the recognizance of
the principal counsel of petitioners, namely retired Chief Justice Concepcion and retired Associate
Justice J.B.L Reyes. However, despite the Order of the Court, the detained attorneys were not
released. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration stating that the suspension of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case.
Furthermore, the respondents allege that information for Rebellion was filed against the detained
attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary investigation, and that they were denied the
constitutional right to due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of information is a bar to a petition for Habeas
Corpus.
RULING: The case was dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners were
detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in
relation to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court. The detained
attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigation
has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before
the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds provided by the
Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case.
Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis
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of the Information filed against the accused. Preliminary investigation was also unnecessary since
487
the detained attorneys were lawfully arrested without a warrant. Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure and Section 5, Rule 113 of the same Rules enumerates the instances
when an arrest without warrant is lawful.
FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN vs. FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN

G.R. No. 159374 July 12, 2007
RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke
the jurisdiction of the CA and the SC to issue said writ. Said law should be read in harmony with
the provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and BP 129 (the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980) — that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and
the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. This is in fact affirmed
by Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated April 22, 2004.
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the
conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna
subsequently.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their 2 minor sons on the
ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mother’s care.
Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children
and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA
8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas
corpus filed by respondent.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling, that
under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors. Petitioner challenges the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction
over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving
custody of minors.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals
should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors.
The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said
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cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that:
488
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
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489
WRIT OF AMPARO
IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO

GR NO. 183533 September 25, 2012
FACTS: On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege
of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of
place and production of documents.[5] In the... petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted
and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise
prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his
activities and for his name to be... excluded from the order of battle and other government records
connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writ of amparo
commanding the respondents to make a verified return, and referred the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for hearing and decision.
During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was
always being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel" pretended
peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner's store.
On July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision,[7] denying on formal and substantial grounds the
reliefs prayed for in the petition and dropping former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a
respondent.
There was no attempt at all to clarify how petitioner came to know about Zaldy Osio's presence at
their pier if the former had not gone home since the petition was filed and what Zaldy Osio was
doing there to constitute violation or threat to violate petitioner's... right to life, liberty or security.
This Court cannot just grant the privilege of the writs without substantial evidence to establish
petitioner's entitlement thereto. This Court cannot grant the privilege of the writs applied for on
mere speculation or... conjecture
Both the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data (Section 17, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and
Section 16, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) provide that the parties shall establish their claims by
substantial evidence. Not only was petitioner unable to establish his entitlement to the... privilege
of the writs applied for, the exigency thereof was negated by his own admission that nothing
happened between him and Joel after July 21, 2007.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the ca committed reversible error in dismissing the petition and dropping gloria
macapagal arroyo as party respondent.
Whether or not the notarial officer's omission of requiring from the petitioner identification cards
relative to the latter's execution of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping justifies
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the denial of the petition.
490
Whether or not the ca committed gross abuse of discretion when it failed to conclude from the
evidence offered by the petitioner the fact that by being placed in the order of battle list, threats
and violations to the latter's life, liberty and security were actually committed by the respondents.
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo
proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military,
can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced... disappearances.
We rule in the affirmative.
RULING:
In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. The petitioner made specific allegations
relative to his personal circumstances and those of the... respondents. The petitioner likewise
indicated particular acts, which are allegedly violative of his rights and the participation of some
of the respondents in their commission.
Anent the documents sought to be the subject of... the writ of habeas data prayed for, the Court
finds the requirement of specificity to have been satisfied. The documents subject of the petition
include the order of battle, those linking the petitioner to the CPP and those he signed involuntarily,
and military... intelligence reports making references to him.
The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights.[19] Thus, despite the lack... of certain contents, which the Rules on the Writs
of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their absence under exceptional
circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible to outright
dismissal.
With the foregoing in mind, the Court still finds that the CA did not commit a reversible error in
declaring that no substantial evidence exist to compel the grant of the reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner. The Court took a second look on the evidence on record and... finds no reason to
reconsider the denial of the issuance of the writs prayed for.
In the hearing before the CA, it was claimed that "Joel" once inquired from the petitioner if the
latter was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim cannot establish with certainty
that the petitioner was being monitored. The encounter happened... once and the petitioner, in his
pleadings, nowhere stated that subsequent to the time he was asked about his involvement with
ANAKPAWIS, he still noticed "Joel" conducting surveillance operations on him.
The petitioner and the respondents have conflicting claims about what transpired thereafter. The
petitioner insisted that he was brought against his will and was asked to stay by the... respondents
in places under the latter's control. The respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was the
petitioner who voluntarily offered his service to be a military asset, but was rejected as the former
still doubted his motives and affiliations.
Be that as it may, in the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to
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discharge the burden of proof... imposed upon him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot
491
be overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data
expressly include in their coverage even threatened violations against a person's right to life,
liberty... or security. Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will although not
involving invasion of bodily integrity nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in
the sense of "freedom from threat"
It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on the surrounding
circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats
against his life, liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in the military's... order of battle, the
surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to
compel him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of
protection of the writs of amparo and habeas... data, in the petitioner's case, the restraints and
threats allegedly made allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and
credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds.
The existence of an order of battle and inclusion of the petitioner's name in it is another allegation
by the petitioner that does not find support on the evidence adduced. The Court notes that such
allegation was categorically denied by respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon,... Jr. who, in his
Affidavit dated March 31, 2008, stated that he "does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) 'order of battle' which allegedly lists the petitioner as a member of the
CPP."[
Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner's mobility was never curtailed. From the time
he was allegedly brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he sought the assistance of
KARAPATAN-ST, there was no restraint upon the petitioner to go home, as... in fact, he went
home to Mindoro on several instances.
The respondents also belied the petitioner's claim that they forced him to become a military
informant and instead, alleged that it was the petitioner who volunteered to be one.
The petitioner also harps on the alleged "monitoring" activities being conducted by a certain "Joel",
e.g., the latter's alleged act of following him, pretending to peddle pandesal and asking him about
his personal circumstances. Such allegation by the petitioner,... however, is, at best, a conclusion
on his part, a mere impression that the petitioner had, based on his personal assessment of the
circumstances. The petitioner even admitted in his testimony before the CA that when he had a
conversation with "Joel" sometime in July 2007,... the latter merely asked him whether he was still
connected with ANAKPAWIS, but he was not threatened "with anything" and no other incident
occurred between them since then.[
Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his claims, the
reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted.
Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of
command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be... committed, is being
committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of
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492
responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either
before, during, or immediately after its commission.
Knowledge of... the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts
are widespread within the government official's area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been
repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
immediate... staff or office personnel are involved.
The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his
allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of
rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the... petitioner merely included the
President's name as a party respondent without any attempt at all to show the latter's actual
involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations.
In the instant case, the defective verification was not the sole reason for the CA's denial of the
petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Nonetheless, it must be stressed
that although rules of procedure play an... important rule in effectively administering justice,
primacy should not be accorded to them especially in the instant case where there was at least
substantial compliance with the requirements and where petitioner himself testified in the hearings
to attest to the veracity of... the claims which he stated in his petition.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, -VERSUS – RAYMOND MANALO
AND REYNALDO MANALO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
FACTS: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to
the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. During the 18
months of detention, they were subjected to torture. On August 13, 2007, the brothers were able
to escape. Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with
their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. However, petitioners dispute respondents'
account of their alleged abduction and torture. Petitioners averred that the Manalo brothers were
not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under
the custody by the military. Thus, ten days after their escape, the Manalo brothers filed a Petition
for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and
agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos
subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo
petition. On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.
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The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’
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custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and
produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the Supreme Court
under Rule 45, questioning the appellate court's assessment and assailing the December 26, 2007
Decision.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ of amparo proper.
RULING: Yes. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while
respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they
are not "free in every sense of the word"as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that
people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond)
are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly
connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten
respondents' rights to life, liberty and security." (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they
are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct
violation of their right to security of person. Elaborating on the "right to security, in general,"
respondents point out that this right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an
"expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment."
Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987
Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado
detention and solitary detention places fall under the general coverage of the right to security of
person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive
recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the
1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to
security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile that "the right to liberty may
be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that
liberty" such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a
deprivation of liberty" or being put under "monitoring and surveillance."
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now
determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security. First, the
violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families,
including them, would be killed.
In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first
time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to
see him before he was killed, spared him. This time, respondents have finally escaped. The
condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free
from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by
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their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007
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when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them
that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. The possibility of respondents being
executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing
threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers
in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known
to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by
private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free
will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are
being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence
of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and
security.
Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and
this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a writ of Amparo. Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence
to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee
of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection
on the part of the military.
IIN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS IN FAVOR OF ALICIA JASPER S. LUCENA; RELISSA SANTOS
LUCENA AND FRANCIS B. LUCENA vs. SARAH ELAGO, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE; ALEX DANDAY, NATIONAL SPOKESPERSON OF
ANAKBAYAN; CHARY DELOS REYES, BIANCA GACOS, JAY ROVEN BALLAIS
VILLAFUENTE, MEMBERS AND RECRUITERS OF ANAKBAYAN; AND ATTY.
MARIA KRISTINA CONTI
G.R. 252120 September 15, 2020
FACTS: Petitioners are the parents of Alicia Jasper (AJ) Lucena. AJ enrolled in FEU and then
joined the FEU Chapter of Anakbayan. After several months, AJ started to leave her home and
never came back. She dropped out of FEU and joined Anakbayan’s cause as well as to campaign
for the Kabataan Partylist and Neri Colmenares.
In line of several subsequent events, Respondents held a press conference where AJ appeared and
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stated that she voluntarily joined Anakbayan.
495
Petitioners then prayed that the Court issue a writ of amparo in their favor as well a protection
order.
ISSUE:nIs the remedy of the petitioners proper?
RULING: No. A petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy that covers extrajudicial killings,
enforced disappearances, and to threats thereof. The concept of “enforced disappearances” as
defined must have the following elements:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the Amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.
The remedy is not proper as AJ does not qualify either as an actual or threatened enforced
disappearance. Further, Anakbayan and its officers are not agents or organizations acting on behalf
of the State.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO OF VIVAN A.

SANCHEZ VIVAN A. SANCHEZ vs. PSUSPT. MARC ANTHONY D. DARROCA, et al.
G.R. No. 242257 October 15, 2019
FACTS: Sanchez learned that her estranged husband, Labinghisa, was gunned down by the PNP
in an operation and tagged as an alleged member of the New People’s Army. Sanchez then went
to the funeral home to verify the news of her husband’s death. When she arrived, members of the
police took photos of her without her consent. The same photo was then circulated at the police
station.
Sanchez then returned to the funeral home only to be threatened by the police officers and badgered
into answering questions. Sanchez then hurried home. Soon after, she was able to identify the
cadaver. After doing so, Sanchez and her daughter noticed police cars and police officers
surveilling their residence and tailing their moves. Fearing for their safety, Sanchez filed before
the RTC a petition for Writ of Amparo. The RTC issued a writ of amparo and a TRO, but after the
required hearing, dismissed the action stating that Sanchez was unable to prove that her security
is being threatened, and that all her claims are baseless allegations.
ISSUE: Is Sanchez entitled to the protection of a writ of amparo, considering that her statements
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were mere allegations?
496
RULING:
Yes. Under the writ of amparo, the quantum of evidence needed is only substantial. Even hearsay
evidence, which is normally inadmissible, may be considered in the proceeding if required by the
circumstances of the case. What is determined is the “totality of the obtaining situation” to
determine if a petitioner is entitled to a writ of amparo.
REVEREND FATHER REYES vs. GONZALES

Gr No. 182161 December 3, 2009
When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for a Writ of Amparo shall be
filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
FACTS: Reverend Father Robert Reyes was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel
siege on 2007. Reverend Reyes, together with 50 others, were brought to Camp Crame to await
inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors conducted
inquest proceedings for trial charged of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion. Days later, upon
request of DILG, DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued a Hold Departure Order (HDO) ordering
the Commissioner of Immigration to include the name of Reverend Reyes and of the others in th
Hold Departure List. The panel of prosecutors found probable cause and filed an information
before the RTC of Makati City. The RTC dismissed the case against Reverend Reyes and 17 others
for lack of probable cause as the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy. Reverend Reyes’s
counsel then wrote DOJ Secretary Gonzales requesting the lifting of the HDO in view of the
dismissal of the case. Gonzales, however, refused to act on the matter as he asks for a clarification
as another counsel who represented himself as counsel of Reyes also sent a letter. Reyes then filed
a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo on the ground that his constitutional right to travel
is violated.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by
the issuance of the HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
RULING: No. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that the petition for a writ
of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The right to life covers the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life.
Meanwhile, liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include
"the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
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dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
497
embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. Lastly, security is freedom
from fear.
In the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom
from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section
1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of
the provision.
However, the court found the recourse of the petitioner as inappropriate, considering the provision
of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which provides that when a criminal action has
been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall
be available by motion in the criminal case.
Pursuant to this, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in
Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift
the DOJ’s HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case.
Lastly, it is important to note that petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his
apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.Petitioner’s apprehension is at
best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.
CALLO vs. COMMISSIONER MORENTE

Gr No 230324 September 19, 2017
For the issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is even not
sufficient to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the required
quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to
acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing persons.
FACTS: Daniel Tan Parker, also known as Daniel Nopuente and Isabelle Nopuente, was charged
for deportation for being in violation of Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. It was alleged that
she was a fugitive from justice in the US with an outstanding arrest warrant issued against her.
Pursuant to a SDO issued by the Bureau of Immigration, Daniel was arrested and taken to the
Immigration Detention Facility in Taguig City. Daniel’s deportation then cannot be carried
because of a pending case for falsification and use of falsified documents filed against her in an
MCTC in Davao City. On September 2014, Parker filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
RTC of Pasig City. The RTC then dismissed the petition finding that the detention of Parker was
legal. Parker appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC finding that Parker
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failed to prove that she was a Filipino citizen to warrant judicial intervention through habeas
498
corpus. On March 2017, Lorie Callo filed this petition for writ of amparo with a prayer to issue
interim reliefs of immediate release of Daniel from detention.
ISSUE: Whether that writ of amparo should be issued in this case.
RULING: No. The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief
to violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically,
to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In Navia v. Pardico, this Court clarified that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional right to life,
liberty, and security, but also on a concrete statutory definition of"enforced or involuntary
disappearance."
Further, elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly
laid down by this Court, viz:
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fute or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.
It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case. There is also
no threat of such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a detention carried out by the State
through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and fourth elements are not present. There is no
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to give information on the
whereabouts of Parker because as Callo admits, Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention
Facility of the Bureau of Immigration. Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary
disappearance, or any threats thereof, that would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo. For
the issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is even not sufficient
to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the required quantum of
proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to acknowledge the same
or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing persons. In this case, Parker lias
not disappeared. Her detention has been sufficiently justified by the Bureau of Immigration, given
that there is an SDO and a pending criminal case against her.
Moreover, Callo has no legal standing to file this petition. Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the
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following order:
499
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the
aggrieved party
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned Citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member
of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
This case falls short of any allegation of Callo’s relationship to Daniel. Thus, while "any person"
may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a petition for the writ of amparo, the order of
priority on who can file the petition should be strictly followed.
SPOUSES ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN AND CLAUDINE MARGARET

SANTIAGO V. RAFFY TULFO, BEN TULFO, AND ERWIN TULFO
Gr No. 205039 October 21, 2015 J. Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS: While the petitioners lodged a complaint before the Cebu Pacific complaint desk for their
baggage that were transferred to a different flight, they noticed a man taking photos of Claudine
with his phone. Raymart approached the man who was later identified Ramon "Mon" Tulfo (Mon)
who allegedly punched and kicked Raymart, forcing the latter to fight back. Claudine was likewise
allegedly kicked and pushed her back against the counter. They were brought to the Airport Police
Department for investigation.
The petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo against Raffy, Ben, and Erwin
Tulfo (respondents), brothers of Mon, after they aired on their TV program comments and
expletives against petitioners, and threatened that they will retaliate.
Judge Singh, dismissed the petition and ordered the dissolution of the TPO which was granted by
JudgeVargas. It held that the petition is not a proper subject of a writ of amparo since the rules
were intended to apply solely to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, noting
that the purpose of the law is to, among others, ascertain the whereabouts of an aggrieved party,
recover evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition, and
determine the facts surrounding the death or disappearance of a missing person.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC's dismissal of petitioners' amparo petition was correct.
RULING: Yes. A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC states that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life,
liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail of it, the same law qualifies that the protection
of such rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof, which are more concrete cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and
security.
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500
Petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or
enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad
invocation of respondents' purported violation of their right to life and security, carried out by
private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government participation. Thus, it is
apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce,
must fail.
MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., ARIEL

MALANA, NARDING AGGANGAN, JOMARI SAGALON, JUN CINABRE,
FREDERICK BALIGOD, ROMMEL ENCOLLADO, JOSEPH TUMALIUAN, and
RANDY DAYAG,–versus- LEOMAR BUENO
G.R. No. 191416 February 7, 2017
A writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor notwithstanding that he has already been
released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the punishment of
those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and action.
FACTS: On June 13, 2009, the canteen owned by Emelita N. Mamba (Emelita) in Tuao, Cagayan
was robbed. On June 14, 2009, several members of the Task Force, Malana, Aggangan and
Sagalon, together with barangay officials Cinabre and Encollado, went to the. house of the
Respondent, then still a minor, to invite him for questioning on his supposed involvement in the
robbery. The respondent and his mother, Maritess Bueno (Maritess ), acceded to the invitation.
Thereupon, the respondent was brought to the Tuao police station.
The Respondents alleged that at around 3:00 p.m. of June 14, 2009, Tumaliuan and Dayag, both
members of the Task Force, upon the order of Baligod, then Municipal Administrator of Tuao,
fetched the respondent from the police station and brought .him to Mayor Mamba's house.
Sometime in the evening of even date, the respondent was made to board a white van driven by
Aggangan. Inside the van, he was beaten with a gun by Malana, who later threatened him that he
would be killed. Thereafter, he was brought back to Mayor Mamba's house.
Meanwhile, Maritess went to the Tuao police station to look for her son; she was told that the
respondent was brought to Mayor Mamba's house. However, when Maritess went to Mayor
Mamba's house, she was not permitted to see her son. The PNP Cagayan Regional Office was then
preparing a case for habeas corpus when the respondent was released on June 18, 2009 to the local
SWD office. Maritess then sought the assistance of the Regional Office of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) in Cagayan as regards the case of the respondent.21 On August 25, 2009,
the respondent, assisted by the CHR, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with the
CA. On September 14, 2009, the CA, gave due course to the petition and directed the issuance of
the writ of amparo.
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ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo. (NO)
501
RULING: In the seminal case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., the Court
emphasized that the writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation
and action.
Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor notwithstanding that he has
already been released from detention. In such cases, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the
punishment of those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and action.
More importantly, the writ of amparo likewise covers violations of the right to security. At the
core of the guarantee of the right to security, as embodied in Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person, i.e.,
houses, papers and effects, against unwarranted government intrusion. Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution not only limits the State's power over a person's home and possession, but more
importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.
JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY

CARAM versus- Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B.
CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with
Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s
child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into
believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her
pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home
for Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial
MedicalCenter, Marikina City.Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses.
On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment to the DSWD.
On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died without knowing about the
birth of his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she
and the deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial
embarrassment. Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with
Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.
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502
On November 27, 2009, theDSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate
declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for Adoption." A local matching conference was held
on January 27, 2010 and on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel
and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial
custody then commenced. On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the
adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption
proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together. On May 28, 2010, the DSWD,
through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary
Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for
adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the
Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made
Baby Julian a ward of the State.
The said Memorandum was noted by respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal
Service, DSWD. On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to
Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA
Analysis Laboratory at the University of the Philippines. On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary
Cabrera sent a letter to Noel Constantino stating that it would not allow Baby Julian to undergo
DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that the procedures followed
relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption and the child’s subsequent
placement to prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the
position to stop the adoption process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera further stated that should
Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process,
she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to regain her
parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523. On July 27,
2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon
City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary
Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD. in her petition, Christina argues
that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or threatened by the respondent
DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun
and Moon. She claims thatshe had been "blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD
officers and Sun and Moon’s representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the
"forced separation" of the said infant from his mother. Furthermore, she also reiterates that the
respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when they deprived her of
Baby Julian’s custody
ISSUE: Whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child. (NO)
RULING: Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
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503
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.In the
landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., this Court held
The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or
to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances"
are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons
outside the protection of law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada,
Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo
is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof.
As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g)
of R.A. No. 9851to wit:\
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
,(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation"
from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context
of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never
concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28,
2018 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses
when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review
on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the
hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010.There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance"
as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing. Christina's
directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter
up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the
child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her
parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
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504
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and
the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual.
It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons,
free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
TAPUZ vs. DEL ROSARIO

GR No 182484 June 17, 2008
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari against the issuance of the writ of amparo and habeas data
filed by Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, et al.(Petitioners), against the presiding judge who issued said
writs (Judge Elmo Del Rosario, RTC of Kalibo, Br. 5).
Private Respondents Sps. Sanson (Gregorio and Ma. Lourdes) filed with the MCTC of Aklan a
complaint for forcible entry with damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of prelim
mandatory injunction against petitioners. Said court, rendered judgment in favor of Private
Respondents. Petitioners, appealed said judgment to RTC.
The case was appealed with RTC Br. 6 of Kalibo. On appeal, Private Respondents filed a motion
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. After complying with all the
requirements for the issuance of said writ, Respondent issued the same. Petitioner moved to
reconsider the issuance of said writ, while the Private Respondents, on the other hand, filed a
motion for demolition which petitioner also opposed. Respondent denied the opposition against
the motion for demolition and the same issued a writ of demolition Petitioners thereafter filed with
the CA a petition for review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and the Order of Demolition.
After that, Petitioners also filed herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with prayers for the
issuance of the writs of habeas data and amparo.
Petitioners to support the issuance of said writs alleged factual positions contrary and opposed to
the MCTCs findings and legal reasons. (Note: Contrary to MCTCs findings, actually, said court
found the factual situation in the contrary to Petitioners’s contention. Petitioners contends that they
had prior possession of the subject real property; and Private Respondents intrude and took away
their possession of the same by force and violence).
ISSUE: Whether Petitioners have a basis for the issuance of the prayed writs to his favor?
RULING: The petitions herein for the issuance of the writs of habeas data and amparo are fatally
defective both as to its substance and form.
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WRIT OF AMPARO
505
Such writ, as held by the Court in this case: “ the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to
the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It
is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.
The alleged acts of violence made by Petitioner Respondent against Petitioner were disproved at
the proceedings with the MCTC – through a full-blown trial.
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the
violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed
land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally
accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on
the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
BALAO ET. AL. v. ERMITA

G.R. No. 186050-59 August 1, 2017
FACTS: The present matter arose from a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo filed by the
relatives of James M. Balao (James) before the RTC, alleging that he was abducted by five (5)
unidentified men on September 17, 2008 in La Trinidad, Benguet because of his activist/political
leanings as founding member of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA). The RTC granted the
privilege of the writ of amparo, thereby commencing the conduct of several investigations by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to determine the
whereabouts and the circumstances behind the disappearance of James.
In its Formal Report, the PNP stated that they encountered problems in gathering evidence that
would lead to the resolution of the case, and thus, proposed that their investigation be terminated.
Meanwhile, the AFP overturned the suspicions behind the involvement of an active service officer
of the army, i.e., Major Ferdinand Bruce Tokong, in James's abduction, which likewise led to a
standstill in its own investigation. As a result, the RTC recommended, among others, the archiving
of the case, considering that the ongoing investigation had reached an impasse. In a Resolution,
the Supreme Court partially adopted the RTC's recommendations, and accordingly: (a) rejected
the recommendation of the RTC to archive the cases; (b) relieved the AFP and the Commission
on Human Rights from their respective obligations to investigate James's abduction; and (c)
directed the PNP to further investigate the angle presented by Bryan Gonzales (Gonzales) and to
ascertain the identities of "Uncle John" and "Rene" who are persons of interest in these cases.
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506
The Court held that while it may appear that the investigation conducted by the AFP had reached
an impasse, records disclosed that the testimony of Gonzales, an asset of the Military Intelligence
Group and a cousin of James, alluded to the possibility that James could have been abducted by
members of the CPA. In the same testimony, "Uncle John" and "Rene" were mentioned as CPA
members who were James's housemates. Thus, there was still an active lead worth pursuing by the
PNP, which means that the recommendation to archive the case was premature. On June 20, 2017,
the RTC submitted its Report to the Court. The RTC concluded that the investigation has reached
another impasse for failure to uncover relevant leads, and once more recommended to archive the
cases, to be revived upon motion by any of the parties should a significant lead arise. Further, the
RTC asked the Court to relieve the PNP of its mandate to investigate the matter and to submit
reportorial requirements until new witnesses or relevant evidence appear or are discovered.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court should adopt the recommendations of the RTC in its Report
relative to these cases.
RULING: Yes. As mentioned in the Court's Resolution, "archiving of cases is a procedural
measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is
expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive
case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action thereon can be
taken. To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it is impelled by
a valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their lives or to similar
analogous causes that would prevent the court from effectively hearing and conducting the amparo
proceedings x x x." Section 20 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, entitled "The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo," reads:
Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall
archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of
petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.
A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio
or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition
shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2) years
from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case. The clerks of court shall submit to the
Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later
than the first week of January of every year.
Based on the report submitted by the RTC, it appears that the PNP had indeed conducted the
required investigation on the angle presented by Gonzales and further attempted to ascertain the
identities of "Uncle John" and Rene" who are persons of interest in these cases. This
notwithstanding, none of the material witnesses, namely, Gonzales himself, Luken, and Fontanilla,
could provide any information on the identities of these persons, despite having been presented
with various photographs of James and his companions. As such, the investigation of the PNP on
James's case has once more reached an impasse without, this time, any other active leads left to
further pursue. Given this situation, the Court therefore concludes that the archiving of the case is
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now appropriate and perforce, adopts and approves the recommendations of the RTC in its June
13, 2017 Report.
GADIAN v. AFP CHIEF OF STAFF IBRADO ET. AL

G.R. No. 188163 October 3, 2017
FACTS: Lt. SG Gadian was a commissioned officer of the Philippine Navy. At the time material
to this case, she served as the Officer-In-Charge of the Civil Military Operations (CMO) Fusion
Cell for the RP-US Balikatan Exercises 2007. As such, she was responsible for the allocation of
Balikatan funds and the planning and preparation of the Civil Military Operations component of
the RP-US Balikatan Exercises 2007. On February 14, 2007, the CMO held the opening ceremony
where the funds for food allowance were distributed to the participants. In May 2007, Lt. SG
Gadian was asked about the status of the funds during the staff conference presided by Col. Ibañez.
When she reported that the funds had been distributed to the recipients who were grateful for the
support, Col. Ibañez shouted: You are not authorized to distribute the funds! You should tell the
people at GHQ that they should follow the proper channel! She was then required to submit a fund
utilization report, but Lt. Col. Crespillo told her not to submit the report to Col. Ibañez because
only the Exercise Directorate could require them to submit such report.
Thereafter, at the behest of Retired Lt. General Eugenio Cedo (Gen. Cedo) to the Office of the
Inspector General, Lt. SG Gadian was investigated for: (a) lavish spending; (b) misuse of funds;
and (c) willful disobedience. She was absolved from liability by prosecution witnesses. The case
was submitted for decision in April 2009. Lt. SG Gadian filed her resignation from the AFP
effective May 1, 2009. Fearing for her life after her resignation, Lt. SG Gadian went into hiding.
Since then, Lt. SG Gadian received text messages from concerned individuals warning her that
people were conducting surveillance at their house. Two attempts were even made to 'snatch' her
en route to the hearing in Manila. All these were testified to by her family members and people
who were with her throughout her struggle. An apprehension order was released for Lt. SG
Gadian's arrest, along with a "48 hour ultimatum" for her surrender. Again, concerned individuals
told her that there was a verbal shoot to kill order to silence her. She was also not unaware of other
unsolved cases similar to the case of Ensign Philip Andrew Pestaño's death after giving
information of his superior's engagement in drugs, illegal logging and gun running.
Thus, on May 19, 2009, Nedina Gadian-Diamante, alleging herself as the older sister of Lt. SG
Mary Nancy P. Gadian (Lt. SG Gadian), brought to the Supreme Court a petition for the issuance
of a writ of amparo in behalf of the latter, impleading as respondents various officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), including then AFP Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado (Gen.
Ibrado). On May 21, 2009, the Court issued the writ of amparo, and directed the CA to hear and
decide the petition. The respondents denied knowledge of any existing threats against Lt. SG
Gadian's life, but did not present controverting evidence. On his part, respondent Gen. Cedo
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averred that he had had no participation in the issuance of the apprehension order and the shoot-
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to-kill order against her; and that he had retired from the service in September 2007 and had not
been interested in her whereabouts.
In its decision, the CA concluded that Lt. SG Gadian had presented substantial evidence to prove
the existence of a threat on her life, liberty and security but had not established the source of the
threats thus granted the writ of amparo. The parties then respectively appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ of amparo warranted by the circumstance.
RULING: Yes. A writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy to provide immediate
judicial relief for the protection of a person's constitutional right to life and liberty. When a person
is consumed by fear for her life and liberty that it completely limits her movement, the writ may
be issued to secure her. Note, however, that the source of this fear must be valid and substantiated
by circumstances, and not mere paranoia. Thus, in resolving the necessity of issuing a writ of
amparo and the corresponding protection order, the courts must look at the overall circumstance
surrounding the applicant and respondents. Moreover, the writ of amparo is both preventive and
curative. It is preventive when it seeks to stop the impunity in committing offenses that violates a
person's right to live and be free. It is curative when it facilitates subsequent punishment of
perpetrators through an investigation and action. Thus, the writ of amparo either prevents a threat
from becoming an actual violation against a person, or cures the violation of a person's right
through investigation and punishment.
The CA has correctly determined the existence of the justification to warrant the issuance of the
writ of amparo in favor of Lt. SG Gadian, stating:
In brief, prior to the filing of the present Petition, petitioner and aggrieved party's evidence of
threat to the latter's life, liberty and security are their receipt of short messaging service or text
messages warning them of the giving of "shoot to kill order." Taken alone, such messages may not
lead a reasonable mind to consider seriously the existence of threat to life, liberty and security but
when receipt of such messages come at a time when claims of anomalies in the holding of military
exercises participated in by a foreign country affecting several individuals and involving
significant amount of money are being announced publicly, the situation differs, The aggrieved
party is a junior officer in the military, with the rank of the lieutenant senior grade. The anomalies
reported refer to the conduct of military exercises involving the Philippines and United States of
America. The officers claimed to be involved are officers far more senior than the aggrieved party.
There is a claim of the aggrieved party that she has resigned from her commission, an act which
could be viewed, rightfully or wrongfully, as intended to evade the restrictions of military
discipline.
Evidence was likewise presented that after public announcements were made by aggrieved party
about the said anomalies, unidentified persons came to their house in Polomolok, South Cotabato
asking for information about the aggrieved party and her family. No mention was made that the
purpose of their visit was to serve a legal process, such as arrest warrant.
After the present petition was filed, an attempt to abduct the aggrieved party, to be attested to [sic]
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by Armando Matutina and Roy Lirazan, was committed. The Court finds these sufficient to
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establish for purposes of the present proceedings, threat to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party. Threat or intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time
of the commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule. While it is conceded that Lt. SG
Gadian's life was in actual danger, the possibility of danger must be acknowledged to exist. The
reason, as she claims, was her expose of the Balikatan Funds anomaly. Consequently, she has
hereby sought a preventive writ of amparo. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court recognized that as of
today the danger to the life and security of Lt. SG Gadian had already ceased, if not entirely
disappeared thus the appeals were dismissed for being now moot and academic.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR/HEAD OF

THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION GROUP (CIDG), PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE(PNP) vs. REGINA N. CA YANAN AND SPOL ROLANDO V.
PASCU
G.R. No. 181796 November 7, 2017
Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving petitions for the Writ of Amparo. The
respondent must show in the return the observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced
disappearance is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies should be tasked
to assiduously investigate and determine the disappearance, and, if warranted, to bring to the bar
of justice whoever may be responsible for the disappearance.
FACTS: On August 16, 2007, Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the R TC alleging that
Pablo, her husband, was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG; that on July
9, 2007 a group of armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG, led by Pascua,
had forcibly arrested Pablo on Magalang Street, East A venue, Diliman, Quezon City without any
warrant of arrest, and had then detained him at the office of the CIDG in Camp Crame, Quezon
City; that Pablo had not been found or heard from since then; and that despite repeated demands
by her and her relatives, the CIDG operatives had not produced the body of Pablo.
On October 24, 2007, Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas
corpus, amended her petition to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo.
On October 24, 2007, the RTC issued the writ of amparo.
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued the first assailed resolution, disposing thusly:
Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:
1) The Court hereby maintains the Writ of Amparo earlier issued;
2) For respondent CIDG Chief/Director to continue the investigation it earlier conducted;
3) For SP02 Rolando V. Pascua to appear to the proper forum;
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4) The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent;

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5) And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed of by the petitioner is hereby
retained until the finality of the case/cases related thereto.
ISSUE: Whether the writ of amparo is proper
RULING:
Substantial evidence existed to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the nature of the writ of amparo as a remedy
against enforced disappearances or threats to life, liberty and personal security, viz.:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies the degree of proof required from the
petitioner as a respondent named in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit:
Section 1 7. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish
their claims by substantial evidence.
xxxx
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence to establish the
allegations of the petition for the writ of amparo and to warrant granting the privilege of the writ
of amparo, to wit:
Section 18. Judgment. - x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence,
the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. This standard was applied in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, the
first ruling by the Court relating to the remedy of the writ of amparo.
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, a case involving the propriety of the trial court's issuance of the writ
of amparo, the Court expounded on the need for substantial evidence to support the petition for
the writ of amparo, viz.:
We see no merit in the petitioners' submitted position that no sufficient evidence exists to support
the conclusion that the Kasim evidence unequivocally points to some government complicity in
the disappearance x x x. We painstakingly ruled:
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we
should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every
piece of evidence - even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
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511
evidence - taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can
use as basic minimum admissibility requirement x x x.
Likewise, we see no merit in the petitioners' claim that the Kasim evidence does not amount to
substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is not a new issue; we
extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved it in our December 3, 2009 Decision. At this
point, we need not go into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary
standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the
substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for
flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances
of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we merely
relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards
of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering
the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other
available evidence in the case.
Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in the three cited cases are applicable to the present
case. There is the evidence of ineffective investigation in Manalo and Velasquez Rodriguez, while
in all three was the recognition that the burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through
the use of circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical inference); the requirement for
direct evidence to establish that an enforced disappearance occurred -- as the petitioners effectively
suggest -- would render it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual has
been made to disappear. In these lights, we emphasized in our December 3, 2009 Decision that
while the need for substantial evidence remains the rule, flexibility must be observed where
appropriate (as the Courts in Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas did) for the protection of the
precious rights to life, liberty and security. This flexibility, we noted, requires that 'we should take
a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of
evidence - even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence - taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can
use as basic minimum admissibility requirement.' From these perspectives, we see no error that we
should rectify or reconsider.
We declare that Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial evidence in support of her
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO

CARBONEL, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY a.k.a. DARWIN
REYES, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, a
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certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT. EDGAR B. ROQUERO, ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
512
G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most,
be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to
address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise
remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the
Writ of Amparo.
However, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents
preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings
under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
FACTS: Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging
to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station
at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her
daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp.
Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a
writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of
gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued
during her incumbency. Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against
the President, et al. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
RULING: The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his
co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the
matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the
President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not
be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or
law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the Amparo case against other respondents for failure of
the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
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disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.
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HABEAS DATA
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA vs. ST.
THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an
alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the
existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other. Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ
may be extended. Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational
privacy, a habeas data petition will not prosper.
FACTS: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC),
uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne
Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero.
Escudero, through a student’s Facebook account, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She
showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from
“marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC
enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said
students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus,
have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Thus, Escudero violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. The Facebook accounts of the children were
intruded upon;
The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
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They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies
of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s
right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
RULING: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing
or enforced disappearance; and
The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the
business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business
of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools,
and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy
(right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy
tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall”
(profile page):
Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any
setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this
case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their
classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their
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classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it
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appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely
delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline
their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents
agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER DEYTO, AND RUBEN SAPITULA

vs. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty
or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received
on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals
in her earlier quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just
mere jokes if they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work
"betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture
unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
FACTS: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at
the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned,
denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO.
KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it,
respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National
Police.
By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing,
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directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS
Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and
516
threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise
[her] safety and security.
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President
and Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested
for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the
"punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel
from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on
job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts
on the alleged threats to her security.
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued
failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which
MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a
violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent
thus prayed for the issuance of a writ
ISSUE: May an employee invoke the remedies available under writ of habeas data where an
employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted
therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation
it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof? (NO)
RULING:
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age
of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
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liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
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Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the writs of
amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefore are vague or doubtful. Employment
constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is
evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern
respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law
with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty
or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received
on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier
quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the
real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes
that the issue is labor-related.
RODRIGUEZ vs. ARROYO

G.R. 191805 November 15, 2011
FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez claims that the military tagged Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP) as an enemy of the State, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. On September 2009, he was forcibly taken by 4 men and brought to a camp where
they forced him to confess to being a member of the NPA. He later learned that the camp belonged
to the military. He was coerced and tortured.
When he was finally released, he noticed that several suspicious-looking men are following him
and his girlfriend. This prompted him to file a petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for
Habeas Data, which was granted by the Supreme Court on December 15, 2009.
In the Return of the respondents, they claimed that Rodriguez surrendered to the military and he
has been put under surveillance. They claim that Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA
operating in Cagayan Valley, and that he asked for protection from the military in exchange for
his help in giving out information.
ISSUES:
Was the Court correct in granting the Writ? And what is the nature of the writ?
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Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and
habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
RULING:
Yes, the Court was correct in granting the writ as it can be clearly seen from the petition that the
petitioners right to privacy, among others, was violated.
The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding one’s self, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. This does not entail the finding of any criminal,
civil or administrative culpability.
Grant of interim reliefs
In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection
order. It must be underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary
protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may
be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
We held in Yano v. Sanchez that "these provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before
it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only
be granted before a final... adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored
that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the
aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no...
need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. The order restricting
respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
Command responsibility in amparo proceedings
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that
the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo,
command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility... of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international
wars or domestic conflict."Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the
command... responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights
abuses.
Thus, it is our... view that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings
seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico
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It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command... responsibility doctrine now
constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most,
be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to
address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable... the Court to devise
remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ
of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez
in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of... remedies that
should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and... who carry the burden of
disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no
determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the... doctrine of command
responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within
these foregoing definitions.
JEANY-VI G. KIANI V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION

(BID), ET. AL
Gr No. 160922 February 27, 2006, J. Callejo, Sr.
FACTS: Javed Kiani reported to the Rodriguez, Rizal Police Station that his friends, Iqbal Singh
and Balbir Singh, had been forcibly taken by 4 armed men from their residence in Rizal. A couple
of days later, then Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the BID issued Mission Order to conduct
verification/validation of the admission status and activities of Javed Kiani, and, if found to have
violated the Philippine Immigration, to immediately place him under arrest.
Javed Kiani was arrested in Rizal. The arresting officers, Eduardo Cabrera, Eliseo Exconde and
Jose Vale, Jr., operatives of the Bureau of Intelligence of the BID, relied on information from Iqbal
and Balbir Singh, who pointed to Javed Kiani as the one who had furnished them with fake Alien
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Certificate Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate Registration (ICR). Apparently, the
forms used were not official BID forms.
The BID Prosecutor filed a Charge against "Javed Kiani alias Ahmad Singh" for violation of the
Philippine Immigration. He was positively identified by Indian nationals Balbir Singh and Iqbal
Singh.
Javed Kiani’s wife, Jeany-Vi, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus for and in behalf of her
husband before the RTC. She prayed that the court issue a writ of habeas corpus to produce the
person of Javed Kiani before it "in the soonest time possible and to show the cause or legal
justification for the latter’s detention and imprisonment, if any. She further alleged that her
husband had intervened in the arrest of Iqbal and Balbir Singh, and that the arresting officers
resented such intervention. She insisted that the arrest and detention of her husband were bereft of
factual and legal basis, since at the time, no deportation order had yet been issued against him.
The RTC granted the bail for Javed Kiani but BID Intelligence Officers refused to release Kiani
because Javed Kiani was lawfully charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act; hence,
the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC was valid.
The CA dismissed the appeal declaring that the Writ of Habeas Corpus can no longer be allowed
since the party sought to be released had been charged before the BSI.
ISSUE: Whether the Habeas Corpus is not the correct or proper remedy available to the petitioner.
RULING: The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error
that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus
proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for
any reason, null and void.
Habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued
and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are
extant. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention
through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be
allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court"
includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
The Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens. Thus, a party aggrieved
by a Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even
via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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JIMMY T. GO A.K.A. JAIME T. GAISANO V. BUREEAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION AND ITS COMMISIONERS AND LUIS T. RAMOS
Gr No. 191810 June 22, 2015, J. Peralta
FACTS: A complaint-affidavit for deportation was initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen but in fact
not. Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “Chinese.”
Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and
Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of
Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that
in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to
cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations,
was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
ISSUE: May the bail bond cancellation be assailed through a petition for habeas corpus?
RULING: No. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding
governed by Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through
a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the
party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The cancellation of his bail cannot
be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of
Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the RTC
has no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no
law authorizing it.
DR. JOY MARGARTE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A ILAGAN

G.R. No. 203254 October 8, 2014
FACTS: In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan
alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners.
Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter's condominium, rested for a while and thereafter,
proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing. On
August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter's office regarding a purported sex video
(subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman.
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Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During the
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confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked
away. Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against
Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known
as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the
subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and
uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also
that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data dated June 25,
2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as
well as the negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified
written return within five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.
In a Decision dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject
video to him, and enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
favor of Ilagan.
RULING: As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as "a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party." Thus, in
order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule
essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, "[t]he manner the right
to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party." In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy
in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the
suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded
in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest
and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive
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versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke,
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alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life,
liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account
certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
LEILA M. DE LIMA vs. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. DUTERTE

G.R. No. 227635 October 15, 2019
FACTS: By petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data petitioner Senator Leila M. de Lima
(Sen. De Lima) seeks to enjoin respondent Rodrigo Roa Duterte, the incumbent Chief Executive
of the Philippines, from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security.
On August 2, 2016, Sen. de Lima delivered a privilege speech on the floor of the Senate calling a
stop to the alleged extrajudicial killings committed in the course of the crackdown, and urging her
colleagues in the Senate to conduct investigations of the alleged victims.
In response, President Duterte issued a number of public statements against Sen. De Lima,
including denunciations of her corruption and immorality. The statements prompted her to initiate
this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against President Duterte.
ISSUE: May the incumbent Chief Executive be haled to court even for the limited purpose under
the Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data?
RULING: The petition must be dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of
immunity from suit.
With regard to the submission that the President must first invoke the privilege of immunity before
the same may be applied by the courts, Sen. De Lima quotes from Soliven where the Court said
that "this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf."65 But
that passage in Soliven was made only to point out that it was the President who had gone to court
as the complainant, and the Court still stressed that the accused therein could not raise the
presidential privilege as a defense against the President's complaint. At any rate, if this Court were
to first require the President to respond to each and every complaint brought against him, and then
to avail himself of presidential immunity on a case to case basis, then the rationale for the privilege
– protecting the President from harassment, hindrance or distraction in the discharge of his duties
– would very well be defeated. It takes little imagination to foresee the possibility of the President
being deluged with lawsuits, baseless or otherwise, should the President still need to invoke his
immunity personally before a court may dismiss the case against him.
Sen. De Lima posits that her petition for habeas data will not distract the President inasmuch as
the case can be handled by the OSG. But this is inconsistent with her argument that the attacks of
the President are purely personal. It is further relevant to remind that the OSG is mandated to
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appear as counsel for the Government as well as its various agencies and instrumentalities
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whenever the services of a lawyer is necessary; thus, a public official may be represented by the
OSG when the proceedings arise from acts done in his or her official capacity. The OSG is not
allowed to serve as the personal counsel for government officials. If Sen. De Lima's position that
the acts complained of are not related to the official functions of the President, then it also
necessarily follows that the OSG can no longer continue to represent him.
Besides, any litigation, whether big or small, naturally serves as a distraction to a party-litigant.
Even while represented by counsel, a litigant is still responsible for certain facets of the case, like
presenting evidence and disputing claims, and cannot simply leave the course and conduct of the
proceedings entirely to the discretion of his or her chosen counsel.
Sen. De Lima hinges her allegations of violations of her rights on the Magna Carta of Women, as
well as on Republic Act No. 6713. Although she claims that her present recourse does not seek to
hold the President administratively, civilly, or criminally liable, it will be impossible for the Court
to enable her cause of action to be established without first determining whether or not said laws,
which carry penal sanctions, had been violated. Any ruling on her petition will necessarily entail
a judgment on whether or not the President violated said laws.
Finally, Sen. De Lima asserts that for every right violated, there must be a remedy. No one can
dispute the validity of her assertion. We agree with her, but at the same time we must remind her
that this ruling will not deny her any available remedy. Indeed, the Constitution provides remedies
for violations committed by the Chief Executive except an ordinary suit before the courts. The
Chief Executive must first be allowed to end his tenure (not his term) either through resignation
or removal by impeachment. Being a Member of Congress, the petitioner is well aware of this, and
she cannot sincerely claim that she is bereft of any remedy.
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CHANGE OF NAME / CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LORENA SALI

G.R. No. 206023 April 3, 2017
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned.
FACTS: Sali filed a Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, before
the RTC alleging that the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte erroneously entered her name as
“Dorothy” instead of Lorena, and her birthday as June 24, 1968 instead of April 24, 1968. The
RTC granted her petition. The OSG appealed to the SC arguing that the petition was actually a
petition for change of name. The first name being sought to be changed does not involve the
correction of a simple clerical, typographical or innocuous error such as a patently misspelled
name, but a substantial change in Sali's first name. Even if Rule 108 was applicable, she failed to
exhaust the administrative remedies pursuant to RA 9048.
ISSUE: Whether the grant of the Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 was correct
RULING:
First Name: No. Sali’s petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the
Rules but for correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical
errors which were committed in the recording of her name and birth date. The evidence presented
by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using the name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she
never had any intention to change her name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical
fault or error in her first name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name she grew up with.
Under RA 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In
this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the
RTC's primary jurisdiction. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should have
dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name.
Date of Birth: Yes. On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June 24,
1968" to "April 24, 1968," R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15, 2012 that
R.A. No. 10172 was signed into law amending R.A. No. 9048. As modified, Section 1 now
includes the day and month in the date of birth and sex of a person.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-
MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG)
G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011
FACTS: Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng-Magpayo filed before the RTC of Quezon City a
petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. He claimed that
his parents were never legally married as shown by certifications from the National Statistics
Office and Julian’s academic records.
After due notice and publication and no opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of
general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed Julian to present evidence ex
parte. The RTC subsequently granted the petition and ordered the correction of Julian’s birth
certificate by deleting the entry for the date and place of marriage of his parents thereby changing
Julian’s last name to Coseteng. The name of Julian’s father was likewise deleted in his birth
certificate.
In opposition thereto, the Republic of the Philippines filed the present petition contending that the
deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of Julian’s parents from his birth certificate
has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate. Any change in civil status
of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether the change in Julian’s legitimacy is a substantial change thereby making Rule
103 of the Rules of Court inapplicable
RULING: Yes. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 using valid and meritorious
grounds such as: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. In the
case at bar, Julian’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
the above recognized grounds. The change he seeks goes so far as to affect his legal status in
relation to his parents. As such, Rule 103 would not suffice to grant Julian’s supplication. Instead,
Rule 108 should be made applicable since Julian’s desired change affects his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate. Such is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR
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G.R. No. 18657 August 11, 2010
FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz is a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. On January 18, 2005, he married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He then left for
Canada after the wedding. When he returned to the Philippines to surprise Daisylyn, he was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
he returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce which was granted. 2 years after the divorce,
Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. As such, he went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the NSO informed him that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine laws and that to be
enforceable the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court. Accordingly, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC.
The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition, holding that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy
under the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether aliens may petition a court in the Philippines for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree
2. Whether the recognition of the divorce decree will authorize the cancellation of entry
RULING:
1. Yes. The unavailability of the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according to the rules on evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert. Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before the
Philippine courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, it has been
previously declared that a divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
2. No. The recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding contemplated under the Rules of Court for the cancellation
of entries in the civil registry.
It must be pointed out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring 2 separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry: one for recognition
of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
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Rules of Court. Instead, it means that the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
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in a Rule 108 proceeding itself since the object of a special proceeding is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. It must be noted that Rule 108 can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY

G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
FACTS: Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of
Live Birth with only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City impleaded as respondent. Her
Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is “Anita Sy” when in fact she is allegedly known
to her family and friends as “Norma S. Lugsanay.” Her school records, PRC Board of Medicine
Certificate and passport show so. She also claimed that she had to follow the surname of her mother
since she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married. Furthermore, she
contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese. In connection therewith, she allegedly
filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Gingoog City to effect the mentioned corrections. This was supposedly granted. However, the
National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes.
The RTC issued an order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and set the
case for hearing with the directive that the said order be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for
3 consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished to
the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office. Respondent complied with the publication requirement.
The RTC then issued an order in favor of respondent and directed the City Civil Registrar of
Gingoog City to effect the correction or change of the entries. The CA affirmed the same, finding
that the respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication
of the order.
ISSUE: Whether the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties
RULING: Yes. The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court mandates two sets of notices to different
potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other
persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties. Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to
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comply with the requirements of fair play and due process in order to afford the person concerned
the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. In the case at bar, respondent seeks the
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correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her
citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Considering the foregoing, she should have impleaded
and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as they have interest
in and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make It must be noted that
when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation and
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected
by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open,
the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
FRANCLER P. ONDE V. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF

LAS PIÑAS CITY
G.R. No. 197174 September 10, 2014
FACTS: Onde filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the
RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole
respondent. He alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and
Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth
certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler.
The RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground that it is insufficient in form
and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is
substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It further held that
the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048.
Petitioner argues that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of entries in
the civil registry. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly
dismissed the petition. I argued that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be corrected
thru administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. While the correction of the entry on
petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married to "not married" is a substantial
correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where
all interested parties are impleaded.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the RTC is correct in ruling that the correction on the first name of Onde and his mother
can be done by the city civil Registrar under RA No. 9048.
2. Whether the RTC is correct in ruling that correcting the entry on Onde’s birth certificate that his
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parents were not married is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings.
530
RULINGS:
1. Yes. The SC agreed with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing
in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. Indeed,
under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register
can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without
need of a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus, petitioner can avail of this administrative
remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first name.
2. Yes. The SC ruled that such correction is substantial correction requiring adversarial
proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a
legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, the SC held that corrections of entries in
the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy
of marriage, involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceedings.
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR

CHILD, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA V. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND CARLOS VILLENA BORBON
G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002
The proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction
sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, the procedure to be adopted is summary. On the
other hand, if the rectification is deemed substantial as if it affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding under Rule 108 requires that the following be made
parties to the proceeding: (a) the civil registrar and (b) all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby. Moreover, upon the filing of the petition, the Court should: (a)
issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (b) cause the order for
hearing to be published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
FACTS: Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the RTC seeking to correct the following
entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: (a) the surname "Borbon" to "Eleosida";
(b) the date of the parents' wedding to be left blank; and (c) the informant's name as "Ma. Lourdes
B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged
that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock and that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were
never married. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena
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Borbon as respondents.
531
The trial court issued a notice of hearing directing the Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Solicitor General to file their opposition thereto, if any, within 15 days from
notice of the petition or from the last date of publication of such notice. After the expiration of the
said period, it issued another order setting the date for the presentation of evidence on the part of
the petitioner to show compliance with the jurisdictional requirements considering that there is no
opposition filed despite notice. However, the Court eventually dismissed the petition for lack of
merit, stating that only the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature may be
allowed and not those that may affect the civil status, nationality or citizenship of the persons
involved.
ISSUE: Whether corrections of entry in the certificate of live birth may be allowed under Rule
108 even if the errors to be corrected are substantial.
RULING: Yes. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under the said rule may either be
summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical,
the procedure to be adopted is summary. On the other hand, if the rectification is deemed
substantial as if it affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, the procedure to be
adopted is adversary.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel has been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered. Under Rule 108, in order to make the proceedings adversary,
it is required that the following be made parties to the proceeding: (a) the civil registrar and (b) all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Moreover, upon the filing
of the petition, the Court should: (a) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the
petition, and (b) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. If all these procedural requirements have
been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if
filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
summary.
In the case at bar, the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless
errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and
Carlos Borbon as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. As the procedural
requirements stated above were complied with, the Court is not correct in dismissing the petition
motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition. It must
be noted that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the
hearing and ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three 3 consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation as well as its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The
notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during the said hearing and all other persons
having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any reason why the
petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of
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532
Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing
together with a copy of the petition.
ANACLETO BALLAHO ALLANIS III VS. CA, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY AND HON.
GREGORIO Y. DELA PEÑA III
G.R. NO. 216425
Legitimate Child May Use the Surname of the Mother.
FACTS: Abdulhamid Ballaho was born and registered as Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III. He is a
legitimate child of Mario Alanis and Jarmila Ballaho. However, he never used his registered name.
In fact, in all his records growing up, he had been using the name Abdulhamid Ballaho. He filed a
petition in court seeking to change his name and surname so that he may be officially known as
Abdulhamid Ballaho.
The Regional Trial Court denied his petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. It was ruled
that he cannot change his first name because doing so will only create more confusion. He cannot
change his last name because according to Article 174 of the Family Code, the use of surnames
must be in accordance with the Civil Code. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides that legitimate
and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. According to the trial
court, Abdulhamid’s remedy was to correct his other records to conform with his birth certificate.
ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate child may use as surname the surname of his or her mother.
RULING: Yes. Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall “principally” use the
surname of the father, but “principally” does not mean “exclusively.” This gives ample room to
incorporate into Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and
men before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it.
Section 14, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution provides: The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Article II, Section 14 implies the State’s positive duty to actively dismantle the existing patriarchy
by addressing the culture that supports it. Courts, like all other government departments and
agencies, must ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law. Accordingly,
where the text of a law allows for an interpretation that treats women and men more equally, that
is the correct interpretation.
Anent Abdulhamid’s prayer to change his registered surname – it is granted. One of the grounds
to allow a change in registered name is if it avoids confusion. Certainly, to force Abdulhamid to
use his registered name despite the fact that he never used it before will only create confusion.
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533
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CARLITO I. KHO
G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007
FACTS: Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of various details in their
birth certificate. Kho petitioned for (1) change the citizenship of his mother from “Chinese” to
“Filipino”; (2) delete “John” from his name; and (3) delete the word “married” opposite the date
of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth
certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on Republic Act No. 9048,
which allows first name and nickname in birth certificates without judicial order. The Municipal
officer approved of the change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground that
the correction not merely clerical but requires an adversarial proceeding. The Court of Appeals
found in favor of Kho.
ISSUE: Whether an adversarial proceeding is necessary since the changes sought by respondents
were substantial in nature in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respondents’
parents, should have been notified or impleaded
RULING: No. An adversarial proceeding is not necessary. When all the procedural requirements
under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect
substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. What is meant by “appropriate
adversary proceeding?” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.
The obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048 enacted in March 2001 is to make possible the
administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname
in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil
registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of Carlito’s
wife from “Maribel” to “Marivel.” The mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not
only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding considering that the name reflected
in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is “Marivel.”
The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in Carlito’s birth
record was proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of
Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction
prayed for, which certainly was not respondents’ fault, does not in any way change the adversarial
nature of the proceedings. Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito’s siblings
uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as “Filipino.” To disallow the correction in Carlito’s
birth record of his mother’s citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal
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circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the same mother and father.
534
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of marriage shows that
indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. Given the evidence
presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors were illegitimate at birth; hence, the
correction would bring about no change at all in the nature of their filiation. With respect to
Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness stand that she was not married to
Juan Kho who died in 1959. Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor. The
documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito’s and his siblings’ birth certificates of
the entry “Married” opposite the date of marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a
certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van
Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living together as common law couple since
1935 but have never contracted marriage legally. A certification from the office of the city
registrar, which was appended to respondents’ Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no
record of marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania. Under the circumstances, the deletion of the
word “Married” opposite the “date of marriage of parents” is warranted.
With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name from “Carlito John” to
“Carlito,” the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly
pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls
under letter “o” of the provision of Section 2 of Rule 108. Hence, while the jurisdictional
requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with,
observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for. More
importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record from the Urious College in Butuan City,
certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, and voter registration record
satisfactorily show that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to
arise from the dropping of the second name.
In Barco v. CA, this Court held that the publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule
108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party. The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule
108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. Thus, it becomes
unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or respondents’ parents should have been impleaded as
parties to the proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing on
January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise
any objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to correct
the entries in her children’s birth certificates, especially since the notices, orders and decision of
the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and the children.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO

G.R. No. 207074 January 17, 2018
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535
FACTS: Michelle Soriano Gallo filed a Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of Live
Birth, seeking to effect the following changes by way of Rule 108.
Her name from Michael to Michelle, her biological sex from Male to Female, and the inclusion of
her middle name, her mother’s middle name, and her father’s middle name, as well as the date of
her parents’ marriage
Her petition was granted by the RTC, and the State appealed.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General now avers that the applicable rule
should be Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and not Rule 108. The CA denied such appeal on the
ground that the corrections sought were clerical, harmless and innocuous. It further stated that the
proceedings under Rule 108 may be summary if the changes sought are clerical or adversary if it
affects substantial corrections.
ISSUE: Whether the changes sought are substantial or clerical, and whether the proceeding sought
is appropriate
RULING:The changes are merely clerical. A clerical error pertains to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil
register that is harmless and innocuous, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding,
and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records. Michelle in
this case is merely seeking the correction of an obvious mistake, as she has been using the spelling
Michelle all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her records to conform to her true
given name.
However, take note that the Court held that even if the change sought is merely clerical, Rule 108
is not applicable but RA 9048. Rule 9048 will also govern the clerical changes as to the middle
name of her parents and date of marriage. But as to the sex of Michelle, being substantial and not
covered under RA 9048, the proper remedy is Rule 108.
*The Court held that before the advent of RA 10172, which amended RA 9048, a person would
have to file an action in court under Rule 103 for substantial changes in the given name or surname,
or Rule 108 for corrections of clerical errors. Further, Rule 108 can also be used to allow
substantial changes in other entries like citizenship, civil statues, and paternity provided that the
proceeding is adversary.
*RA 10172 also added errors as to biological sex.
Thus:
 If substantial change of name or surname – Rule 103 (exclusive grounds)
 If clerical changes of first name and nickname – RA 9048/RA 10172
 If substantial changes of other details – Rule 108 (adversarial proceedings)
 If clerical changes of birthday and sex. – RA 9048/RA 10172 (it must not involve any change of
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nationality, age and status).
536
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLYN MERCADERA
G.R. No. 186027 December 8, 2010
FACTS: Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-
in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her
Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction
unless a court order. Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some
Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the RTC. Several
photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera
never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions.
The RTC granted Mercadera’s petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of
Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao
Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. CA affirmed this decision.
The OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an
innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a
modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires
compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
ISSUE: Whether the petition to correct the name should be granted
RULING: Yes. In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right
under Rule 108 such as patently misspelled name
The petition filed by Mercadera correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of
a misspelled given name. Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or
error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to
conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN."
The use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what appears as
"Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled.
The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix- up that blemished
Mercadera’s Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same.
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IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
537
CARULASAN WANG ALSO KNOWN AS JULIAN LIN WANG, TO BE
AMENDED/CORRECTED AS JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG VS CEBU
CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
FACTS: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-
Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married
they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s
name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his
current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking
whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in
Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce
it as "L." It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be
changed to Julian Lin Wang.
RTC rendered denied the petition because the reason did not fall within the grounds recognized by
law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child.
The OSG filed its Comment positing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of
name.
ISSUE: Should the petition to change the surname be granted? And does the law allow one to drop
the middle name from his registered name?
RULING: No. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a
given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate
child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a
public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his
middle name and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child
or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
The registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name
be indicated in the certificate.
The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier
and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
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appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
538
LEE VS. CA
G.R. 118387 October 11, 2001
FACTS: The private respondents in this case are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful
wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, while the petitioners are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine,
Tiu Chuan. The respondents filed petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries (under
Rule 108) in the records of birth of the petitioners seeking to correct the erroneous entries and to
change the birth mother from Keh Shiok Cheng to Tiu Chan. It was alleged that every time the one
of the petitioners were born, Lee Tek Sheng made it appear in the birth records that Keh Shiok
Cheng was the mother.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss assailing that that resort to Rule 108 is improper to assail the
legitimacy and filiation of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether substantial changes can be made under Rule 108.
RULING: Yes. There is nothing in the law that excludes recourse to Rule 108 to effect substantial
changes or corrections in the entries of the civil register. The only requirement is that the
proceedings be an adversarial one as the interest of other parties may be effected.
In this case, the Court reiterated that the passing of RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108
the correction of clerical errors. This is to remove the confusion under Rule 108 as regards the use
of a summary procedure for harmless changes and the use of adversary proceedings for substantial
changes. Thus, now, RA 9048 is the summary procedure, while Rule 108 is the appropriate
adversary proceeding.
REPUBLIC V. MILLER OMANDAM UNABIA

G.R. No. 213346 February 11, 2019
FACTS: Miller Omandam Unabia filed a Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of
Live Birth under Rule 108, seeking to correct the errors on his name “Mellie” when it should have
been “Miller” and the gender that was entered as “female” when it should be male, and his father’s
middle initial entered as “U” when it should have been “O”. When he filed his case, only RA 9048
was in effect.
His petition was granted by the RTC, and the State appealed, claiming that the change is substantial
and not merely clerical. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. In doing so, the CA applied the
provisions of RA 10172 in defining clerical errors, particularly that it included the change of sex.
The State now assails the decision of the CA.
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539
ISSUE: Whether the CA is correct in applying RA 9048 as amended by RA 10172 to the instant
case, even if the proceeding filed was under Rule 108?
RULING: Yes, the CA is correct. RA 10172, being remedial in nature, can be applied
retroactively. In fact, RA 9048 itself provides for retroactive application insofar as it does not
prejudice vested rights.
The other problem here is that the procedure availed of is a petition with the court and not RA
9048. The SC however noted that when the petition was filed, RA 9048 has no provision for
correcting mistakes in the civil registry entries of individuals as to the sex. It is then correct for
Unabia to avail of Rule 108, but in construing what a clerical error is, the Court used RA 10172.
Nonetheless, it must be laid down as a rule that when there is a medical finding that the petitioner
in a case for correction of erroneous entry as to gender is phenotypically male or female, the no-
sex change or transplant certification becomes mere surplusage.
Finally, suffice it to state that, as correctly declared by the CA, respondent was actually using the
name Miller Omandam Unabia; that "Miller" and "Mellie" and "Omandam" and "Umandam" were
confusingly similar; and that respondent's medical certificate shows that he is phenotypically male.
The CA thus properly held that respondent's birth certificate contained clerical errors in its entries
necessitating its rectification.
REPUBLIC V. CHARLIE MINTAS FELIX A.K.A. SHIRLEY MINTAS FELIX

G.R. No. 203371 June 30, 2020
FACTS: Charlie Felix filed a Petition for Correction of Entries on 2007 with the RTC of La
Trinidad. He was born on October 1, 1976 and his birth is registered with two Local Civil
Registrars – in Itogon and in Nueva Ecija. In Itogon, his birth certificate indicates the name as
“Shirley”, gender as “female”, and his father’s surname as “Filex”. In Nueva Ecija, his birth
certificate bears the correct entries – Charlie, male and Felix.
When he requested an authenticated birth certificate from the National Statistics Office, what was
released is his erroneous certificate coming from the LCR of Itogon. Thus, he prayed for the
correction of the entries.
The RTC granted the petition and ordered the LCR of Itogon to effect the changes. It also ordered
the LCR of Nueva Ecija to cancel from its record the birth certificate of Charlie.
The State now questions the jurisdiction of the RTC of La Trinidad to order the LCR in Nueva
Ecija to cancel Charlie’s second birth registration.
ISSUE:Whether the RTC of La Trinidad has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case?
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540
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the order of the court cancelling the second birth
registration of Charlie as the same is merely an incident or necessary consequence of the action to
correct the entries.
In addition to jurisdiction, the Court also mentioned in this case that RA 9048 does not divest the
RTC of jurisdiction over petitions for correction of entries in the civil registry.
For better understanding:
1. Charlie filed the case when RA 9048 was not yet amended. He seeks to change clerical errors
of his name, which is under RA 9048. But he also seeks to change his sex, which is not under RA
9048. Therefore, the Court allowed the filing of ONE case with the RTC under RULE 108, instead
of filing an administrative case under RA 9048 for the change of name, and another with the RTC
under Rule 108 for the change of his sex – this is to prevent a splitting of a cause of action.
2. What if RA 10172 was already passed when he filed the case? Then now, he can file his action
administratively, because SEX was already included the coverage by RA 10172.
3. What if RA 10172 is in effect, and yet, Charlie filed the case with the RTC under Rule 108?
In here, the Court held that RA 10172 did not divest the RTC of its jurisdiction over petitions for
correction of entries via Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This means that the action filed with the
RTC is valid. However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies shall apply. In
Republic v. Gallo, the Court held that an action to change clerical errors can be filed with the courts
under Rule 108 only if an administrative action was filed under RA 9048 and failed.
BUT! The Court again held that failure to observe the doctrine does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived.
REPUBLIC V. VIRGIE L. TIPAY

G.R. No. 209527 February 14, 2018
FACTS: Virgel sought the correction of several entries in his birth certificate in a petition filed
sometime in 2009 with the RTC of Lupon, Davao Oriental. Virgel alleged that the following entries
are erroneous: his gender (female), his first name (Virgie) and his month and date of birth.
The petition was found sufficient in form and substance, and trial ensued. The RTC ordered the
LCR of Davao Oriental to effect the following changes in the Certificate of Live Birth of Virgie
L. Tipay – the first name from Virgie to Virgel, sex from Female to Male, date of birth from “no
entry” to February 25, 1976.
The Republic filed a Notice of Appeal claiming that the procedure should have been under Rule
103, not 108 as the summary procedure under Rule 108 is confined to the correction of clerical
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errors which excludes one’s name or date or birth.
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ISSUE: Whether the procedure filed by Virgel is the correct one?
RULING: While it is true that initially, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are for the correction of
clerical or harmless errors, jurisprudence gave room for the correction of substantial errors
provided that the issues are properly threshed out in an appropriate adversarial proceedings.
Moreover, RA 9048 essentially left substantial corrections in the civil registry to Rule 108.
In summary:
Virgel filed a petition with the Court even when RA 9048 is already in effect. This is proper
because under RA 9048, SEX is not included as a clerical error. Virgel would have to file two
cases, first an administrative one under RA 9048 to correct his name, then another with the courts
to correct his entries as to sex and date of birth under Rule 108. This will not be in consonance
with the prohibition of splitting of causes of action, so the proper remedy is to commence the
appropriate adversarial proceedings with the RTC under Rule 108 to correct all changes.
But if RA 10172 was already in effect, then he can institute an administrative proceeding to have
everything changed as RA 10172 added clerical errors as to the SEX and DATE of BIRTH in the
scope of RA 9048. If such is denied, then he can still proceed under RULE 108.
Can he go straight to RULE 108?
As a rule no, following the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. But if he did, and it
was not timely objected to, then the action can prosper. (look at above case, Republic v. Felix
Mintas)
GRACE M. GRANDE V. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO

GR No. 206248 February 18, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife. Antonio has two sons with a different woman,
Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his
own. The parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United
States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial
Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the RTC in Cagayan, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of
the children.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio. On appeal, CA modified the
decision and decreed that the surname be changed to "Antonio.
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ISSUE: Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of
respondent?
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RULING: Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child
is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive
and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
The use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate
father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they will be known.
We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged 13 and 15 years old, to this Court
declaring their opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio." However, since these letters
were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight
to sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner. A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the
evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE,

G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007
A petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding; it cannot be decided
through a summary proceeding
The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. All the requirements to make a
proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties were afforded the opportunity to
contest the petition.
FACTS: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change
of name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged
that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he
was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him
use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time
Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him]
on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of
how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s
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surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his
543
continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his
status as natural child; and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor.
Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course
to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition,
respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed
commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower
court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision
ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of
error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the
proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision
ordering the change of name.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s
decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable
parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s
change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.
2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?
3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?
4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?
RULING:
1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with
all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he
was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A
change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his
best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial
proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103
cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall
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under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or
544
typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil
registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in
the entry is also required to reflect the change in name.
3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper
of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG
a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG.
The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected
to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely
accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition
nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now
complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.
4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition
through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified
and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave
due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a
proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as
represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition
ERIC SIBAYAN CHUA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 231998 November 20, 2017
FACTS: Eric filed a petition for change of surname from "Kiat" to "Chua." Eric alleged that he
was born to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. However, after his birth, his father allegedly
secured a favorable judgment allowing him to change his surname from "Kiat" to "Chua." Thus,
Eric adopted the new surname of his father, "Chua," and had been using the name "Eric Sibayan
Chua" in all of his credentials. Eric likewise averred in his petition that he is known in their
community as "Eric Chua" instead of "Eric Kiat."
Melania also testified in support of the petition, claiming that Cheong used the surname "Kiat" in
China, but used "Chua" in the Philippines; that "Chua" is the surname Cheong used when they
married; that it was her uncle who erroneously caused the registration of Eric's name as "Eric
Kiat;" and that when Eric was 16, Cheong, who was already weak, returned to China and contacted
them no longer.
The asseveration that Eric is known in their community as "Eric Chua" was corroborated by his
neighbor, Avelino Fernandez. However, Eric's evidence fell short of preponderant, his petition for
change of name must necessarily be dismissed, so the CA ruled.
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545
ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in disallowing petitioner from officially changing his
name.
RULING: Yes. There is legal and factual basis for granting Eric's petition for change of name. To
recall, his petition is not only anchored on his father's alleged change of surname from "Kiat" to
"Chua," but also on the fact that he (Eric) had been using the surname "Chua" in all of his
credentials. Thus, it may be that Eric and Melania's testimonies are not preponderant proof of
Cheong's change of surname, but this should not foreclose the possibility of granting the petition
on a different ground.
As Eric has established, he is known in his community as "Eric Chua," rather than "Eric Kiat."
Moreover, all of his credentials exhibited before the Court, other than his Certificate of Live Birth,
bear the name "Eric Chua." Guilty of reiteration, Eric's Certificate of Baptism, Voter Certification,
Police Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation Clearance, Passport, and High School Diploma
all reflect his surname to be "Chua." Thus, to compel him to use the name "Eric Kiat" at this point
would inevitably lead to confusion. It would result in an alteration of all of his official documents,
save for his Certificate of Live Birth. His children, too, will correspondingly be compelled to have
their records changed. For even their own Certificates of Live Birth state that their father's surname
is "Chua." To deny this petition would then have ramifications not only to Eric's identity in his
community, but also to that of his children.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition be granted. Additionally,
public respondent failed to demonstrate that allowing petitioner to change his surname will
prejudice the State, strengthening Our resolve to grant the sought-after relief.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
FACTS: Merlinda L. Olaybar requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage in order to
comply with one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of 5 years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National,
on June 24, 2002 at the Office of the MTCC, Palace of Justice. Olaybar denied having contracted
said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband, that she did not appear before
a solemnizing officer and that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She,
thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract especially the entries in
the wife portion thereof. She impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City as well as her
alleged husband as parties to the case. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage
contract was not that of Olaybar, the RTC granted the petition for cancellation of entries in her
marriage contract.
ISSUE: Whether the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
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marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
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RULING: Yes. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If
the correction is clerical, the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial therefore the procedure to
be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic vs. Valencia in 1986, the Court has
repeatedly ruled that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition
filed under Rule 108 with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding
is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite
party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
The proceeding in Rule 108 requires publication of the petition and mandates the inclusion as
parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or
correction. It also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if
any. Moreover, it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is
after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. As
long as these procedural requirements are followed, it is considered as an appropriate adversary
proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
personal circumstances of Olaybar. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and
she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. With the testimonies
and other evidence presented, the trial court made a categorical conclusion that Olaybar’s signature
in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that,
as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent the circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code and other related laws.
It is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts as a petition
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the RTC where the
corresponding civil registry is located. A Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
While Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, the proceedings before
the RTC cannot be fully nullified where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest
the allegations of Olaybar, where all the procedures were followed and where all the evidence of
the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought not the
nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of
such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
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547
ONDE VS. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PINAS
CITY
G.R. No. 197174 September 10, 2014
FACTS: Onde filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the
RTC and named the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pinas City as the sole respondent.
Onde alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents but his birth certificate stated that his
parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely instead
of Matilde and that his first name is Franc Ler. The RTC dismissed the petition for correction of
entries on the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must
be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature and would affect Onde’s status as a
legitimate child. On the other hand, the correction in the first name of Onde and his mother can be
done by the city civil registrar under RA No. 9048. To this, Onde argues that Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court allows a substantial correction of entries in the Civil Registry. Meanwhile, the OSG
contends that the RTC correctly dismissed the petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of Onde and his mother
can be done by the city civil Registrar under RA No. 9048.
2. Whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on Onde’s birth certificate that his
parents were not married is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings
RULING:
1. Under Section 1 of RA No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register
can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil Registrar
without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by RA No. 10172, now reads:
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical
or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of
birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or
mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules
and regulations.
2. The correction on the entry in Onde’s birth certificate that his parents were not married is
substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate
one. In Republic v. Uy, it was held that corrections of entries in the civil register including those
on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial
alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
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proceedings.
548
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body,
he consulted several doctors and underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought
to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex
from "male" to "female."
ISSUE: Whether or not ROMMEL is entitled to the relief asked for.
RULING: No.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law
is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless
an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise
lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
The petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not
within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name
does not prejudice him at all.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of
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Sex Reassignment
549
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there
is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity
of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.
It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-
to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131
of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
FACTS: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname Gemma
Astorga Garcia. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her
mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname which
was granted by the trial court allowing the minor to be known as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG.
Honorato then prays that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name.
ISSUE: Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father
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RULING: Yes. The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth
or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled
is fixed by law.
However, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. The middle name or the mother’s
surname is only considered in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
The Underlying Intent of Adoption is in Favor of the Adopted Child
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V
of RA 8552. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will
maintain her maternal lineage. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living
together. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and
"Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s
surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes in Favor Of Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are
of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, there is no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY

G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
FACTS: Dr. Norma Uy, illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay, filed a Petition for
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Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth where her Certificate of Live Birth shows that
551
her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma
S. Lugsanay."
She sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first
name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction to reflect the name which she has been
known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and
professional records. She relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the
surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese."
The RTC and CA ruled in favor or Norma Uy and the failure to implead other indispensable parties
was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing.
ISSUE: Whether the failure to implead was cured by publication
RULING: No. Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. However, the changes sought by Norma Uy are obviously not mere clerical
as they touch on filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the
surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes
her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino,
the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen
and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks
the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her
citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not
only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest
and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading
of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of
notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another
given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting
the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected
or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were
made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise
excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there
is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party is
inadvertently left out.
It is clear that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
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substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or

filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
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Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through
mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set
open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the
Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made
use of the available evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks
of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.”
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna
a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan
to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical
certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate
is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female
but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus
has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding
the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme
Court made use of the available evidence presented in court including the fact that private
respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male.”
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The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE

A.K.A. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE
G.R. No. 160597 July 20, 2006
FACTS: A petition for change of name was commenced by Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also
known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. In her petition before the RTC, she alleged, among other
things, the following:
1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and
Paula B. Bringas and a resident since birth of Bangued, Abra;
2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her
registered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can
remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;
3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and
private
4. records; and
5. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.
Thus, to prevent confusion, Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to the
name she has always carried and used.
ISSUE: Whether the desired change of name should be granted. (YES)
RULING: The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of
identification. Changing one’s name is a privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can be
authorized to change his name appearing in his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing
not only of reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name.Among these
are:
a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
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b) when the change will avoid confusion;
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c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
and was unaware of alien parentage;
d) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public
interest.
In the case at bar, Bolante’s submission for a change of name is with proper and reasonable reason.
She has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa.
Her records in government offices including that of her driver's license and professional license
all attest to her having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. As such,
the imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted.
PLATON AND LIBRADA CERUILA VS. ROSILYN DELANTAR, REPRESENTED BY

HER GUARDIAN, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT
G.R. No. 140305 December 9, 2000
FACTS: Spouses Platon and Librada Ceruila filed an action with the RTC for the annulment and
cancellation of the birth certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar. Prior to this, sometime in
1996, Rosilyn complained her father, Simplicio Delantar, for child abuse, particularly for
prostitution. As a result, the latter was incarcerated and the former was committed in favor of
DSWD as the whereabouts of the Librada, her mother, was unknown.
In the petition filed by Spouses Ceruila as stated above, they claimed that the birth certificate of
Rosilyn was used as an instrument to the crime of simulation of birth and therefore was invalid
and spurious considering that:
1. Simplicio Delantar, the biological father therein, is merely the foster father and co-
guardian in fact of Rosilyn. The name of real natural father is unknown;
2. The parents reflected in said certificate as married were actually full blood brother
and sister and therefore marriage between the two is virtually impossible;
3. The status of Maria Rosilyn is a legitimate child
ISSUE: Whether the Spouses Ceruila complied with the requirements of Rule 108. (NO)
RULING:
Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, states that:
When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
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As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito, unless all possible indispensable parties were duly
notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules. In the case at bar, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the
cancellation of Rosilyn’s birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date
of birth are at stake and her hereditary rights may be adversely affected thereby. The petitioners’
claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the proceeding, it is enough that her
name was included in the caption of the petition, is without merit. Moreover, it must be noted that
only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who, however, did not participate in the
proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient to comply with the requirements laid down by the
rules. The petitioners’ claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by the publication of
the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation, is also untenable.
Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to
comply with the requirements of fair play and due process. This is but proper to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses. Although there were instances
where the Court ruled that the satisfaction of the publication requirement cured the same defect, it
must be remembered that earnest efforts were employed in those cases in bringing to court all
possible interested parties. Such is not the case at bar.
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR

CHILD, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA VS. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND CARLOS VILLENA BORBON
G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002
FACTS: Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the RTC seeking to correct the following
entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: (a) the surname "Borbon" to "Eleosida";
(b) the date of the parents' wedding to be left blank; and (c) the informant's name as "Ma. Lourdes
B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged
that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock and that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were
never married. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena
Borbon as respondents. The trial court issued a notice of hearing directing the Offices of the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General to file their opposition thereto, if any,
within 15 days from notice of the petition or from the last date of publication of such notice. After
the expiration of the said period, it issued another order setting the date for the presentation of
evidence on the part of the petitioner to show compliance with the jurisdictional requirements
considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice. However, the Court eventually
dismissed the petition for lack of merit, stating that only the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature may be allowed and not those that may affect the civil status,
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nationality or citizenship of the persons involved.
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ISSUE: Whether corrections of entry in the certificate of live birth may be allowed under Rule
108 even if the errors to be corrected are substantial. (YES)
RULING: Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under the said rule may either be
summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical,
the procedure to be adopted is summary. On the other hand, if the rectification is deemed
substantial as if it affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, the procedure to be
adopted is adversary.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel has been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered. Under Rule 108, in order to make the proceedings adversary,
it is required that the following be made parties to the proceeding:
(a) the civil registrar and
(b) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Moreover, upon
the filing of the petition, the Court should:
(a) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and
(b) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province. If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a
petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and
conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as summary.
In the case at bar, the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless
errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and
Carlos Borbon as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. As the procedural
requirements stated above were complied with, the Court is not correct in dismissing the petition
motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition. It must
be noted that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the
hearing and ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three 3 consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation as well as its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The
notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during the said hearing and all other persons
having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any reason why the
petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing
together with a copy of the petition.
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MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA AND JANELLE ANN
BRAZA VS. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMALAYAN CITY. NEGROS
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OCCIDENTAL, MINOR PATRICK ALVIN TITULA BRAZA, REPRESENTED BY
LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR, AND LUCILLE TITULAR
G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
The allegations of the petition clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between
Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection
with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. As such, the petition
must fail because in a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. These are governed
not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC and Art. 17118 of the Family Code which provides
that the corresponding petition should be filed in a Family Court. Moreover, it is well- accepted
principle that the validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as
the petition filed in the present case.
FACTS: Ma. Cristina Torres Braza and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. were married on January 4, 1978.
The union bore 3 children. After some time, Pablo died in a vehicular accident in Indonesia.
During Pablo’s wake in the Philippines, Lucille Titular began introducing minor Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza as her and Pablo's son. Consequently, Ma. Cristina made inquiries in the course of
which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental. Such birth certificate stated, among others, that Patrick was acknowledged by
Pablo and was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents on April 22, 1998.
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of the marriage contract between Pablo and Lucille.
Considering the foregoing, Ma. Cristina filed a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of
Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille
and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between
Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth
record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the
use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his
paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry,
the court, which is not acting as a Family Court, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected
to a DNA test. The controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, in this case, may rule upon the validity of marriage between Pablo
and Lucille and answer questions regarding Patrick’s legitimacy.
RULING: No. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the
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procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and
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other innocuous errors. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding that is made by a clerk or a transcriber in copying or writing resulting in a harmless
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent. In contrast thereto, substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed
only in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded and due process is
properly observed.
In the case at bar, the allegations of the petition clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
As such, the petition must fail because in a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule
108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
These are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Art. 17118 of the Family
Code which provides that the corresponding petition should be filed in a Family Court. Moreover,
it is well- accepted principle that the validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral
attack such as the petition filed in the present case.
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION VS. ATTY. FELINA S. DASIG

G.R. No. 172776 December 17, 2008
The procedure under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court was not applicable to the students who only
wanted to correct entries in their academic records to conform to their birth certificates.
FACTS: Respondent Felina Dasig (Dasig) was the Chief Education Program Specialist of the
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, of petitioner Commission on
Higher Education (CHED). She had also served as the officer-in-charge of the Legal Affairs
Service (LAS) of the CHED.
In a Memorandum dated 9 October 1998,4 the Director of the LAS brought to the attention of the
CHED several complaints on the alleged anomalous activities of Dasig during her stint as the
officerin-charge of LAS. Attached to the memorandum were the sworn affidavits of the
complainants. The complainants consisted of Rosalie Dela Torre (Dela Torre), Rocella Eje (Eje)
and Jacqueline Ng (Ng), students who applied to have their names corrected in their scholastic
records to conform with their birth certificates; Maximina Sister (Sister), the CHED Human
Resource Management Assistant assigned to the Records Unit; and Don Cesar Mamaril (Mamaril),
Leysamin Tebelin (Tebelin), Joemar Delgado (Delgado), and Ellen Grace Nugpo (Nugpo), all
from the CHED LAS staff. All the students alleged that Dasig tried to exact money from them
under the pretense of attorney's fees in connection with their requests for correction of names in
their academic records. Dasig's former staff at the LAS corroborated the allegations of the students.
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They also alleged that Dasig attempted to persuade them to participate in anomalous activities.
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Sister, in turn, claimed that Dasig refused to return the Official Record Book of the CHED which
the latter borrowed from her.
Dasig submitted a Memorandum and a Counter-Affidavit to answer the charges against her. In her
memorandum, she denied all the charges against her. She alleged that it was not within the CHED's
power to entertain the request for change of name so she advised the students to file petitions in
court. Dasig denied that the alleged closed-door meeting on 3 September 1998 with her former
staff at the LAS in which she tried to persuade them to accept P20,000.00 from Ng had ever taken
place for she was then allegedly in the Office of the Chairman for the Investigation and
Performance Audit of Dr. Jaime Gellor, then President of the Central Mindanao University. As to
the charge that she improperly took the Official Record Book on 7 September 1998 at around 3:00
p.m. and refused to return the same, Dasig insisted that she was inside the LAS hearing room
during that time conducting the preliminary conference on the administrative complaint filed by
Dr. Aleli Cornista against Dr. Magdalena Jasmin, Dr. Perlita Cabilangan, Dr. Arsenia Lumba, and
Dr. Teresita de Leon, all from CHED Region 3, together with Special Investigators Buenaventura
Macatangay (Macatangay) and Eulando Lontoc (Lontoc).
In her counter-affidavit, Dasig explained that she had not offered her services as a lawyer to any
person and that she had never represented any clients other than the immediate members of her
family ever since she was admitted to the bar. Dasig denied the allegation that she had offered to
look for a lawyer for the petitioners since it was inconceivable to have a lawyer who would accept
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The CHED formed a hearing committee and designated the members to investigate the complaints
against Dasig in Resolution No. 166-98.9 The hearing committee concluded that there was
substantial evidence on record to hold Dasig liable for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and recommended that she be dismissed. The Civil
Service Commission upheld the decision of the CHED12 and denied Dasig's motion for
reconsideration. Dasig filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals. While
the case was pending before the appellate court, this Court came out with a Resolution dated 1
April 2003 which ordered the disbarment of Dasig. Several high-ranking officers of the CHED
filed an administrative case for disbarment against Dasig, charging her with gross misconduct in
violation of the Attorney's Oath "for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED" with one of the grounds for disbarment being
Dasig's exaction of money from Dela Torre, Eje and Ng.
ISSUE: Whether or not correction of entries in the school records of students is within the ambit
or Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING: No.The Court of Appeals erred when it found that Dasig had merely attempted to
practice law while employed at the CHED in offering her services to the three students for the
correction of their names through judicial proceedings under Rule 108. The procedure under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court was not applicable to the students who only wanted to correct entries in
their academic records to conform to their birth certificates. Rule 108 is for the purpose of
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correcting or canceling entries in the civil registry involving (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths;
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(d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children;
(j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. Hence,
there is no justification for Dasig to ask for money under the guise of attorney's fees and litigation
expenses when it was her duty as the officer-in-charge of LAS to either approve or disapprove the
students' request to change entries in their academic records to conform to their birth certificates.
RAMON CORPUS TAN VS. OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE
CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 211435 April 10, 2019
FACTS: Petitioner alleged that he was born on November 13, 1965 at St. Paul Hospital in the City
of Manila; that his birth was duly registered in the civil registry of Manila; that he had been using
his real name "Ramon Corpuz Tan" during his lifetime; that when he later secured a copy of his
Certificate of Live Birth, he discovered that his name was entered as "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko"
instead of his true and correct name which is "Ramon Corpuz Tan"; that the aforesaid material
errors and mistakes in the entries of his Certificate of Live Birth were due to inadvertence and
error of the hospital personnel who prepared the subject certificate; that "Ko," which was the first
name of his father, was inadvertently included in his last name; and that the mistake was not
immediately rectified because he only discovered the same, after having his own children.
In support of his claim and prayer, petitioner appended the following documents to his petition:,
(a) Diploma from the Philippine Chung Hua School; (b) Certification from the Philippine Chung
Hua School stating that petitioner completed his kindergarten course therein; (c) Secondary Report
Card from the Philippine Chung Hua School; (d) COMELEC Voter's Identification Card; (e)
COMELEC Voter's Affidavit; (f) BIR Tax Identification Number and Identification Card (g)
Community Tax Certificate issued by Quezon City; and (h) Certificate of Marriage to Maria Teresa
Gatuz.
In its assailed Order dated December 27, 2011, the RTC dismissed the subject petition for
correction of entry. The RTC ratiocinated that the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements
of an adversarial proceeding noting that the correction sought for, is a substantial correction and
is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which is not summary, but an adversarial
proceeding.
The appellate court concurred with the trial court that the error sought to be corrected is a
substantial one which requires an adversarial proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred when they ruled that the petitioner failed to
observe the requirements of an adversarial proceeding in this case.
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561
RULING: Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court governs the proceeding for the cancellation or
correction of any entry concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Valencia, the Court declared that a petition for correction of entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court covers not only clerical errors, but also substantial changes.
The difference lies only on the procedure which would govern the correction sought. "If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary."
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made
by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
On the other hand, substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
Substantial and controversial alterations include those which may affect the citizenship, legitimacy
of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage.
Corrections in the name, whether of the owner of the Certificate of Live Birth or any of the parents
indicated therein, may also involve substantial and controversial matters which would require an
adversarial proceeding.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY (CHANGE OF

FAMILY NAME IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA AS
APPEARING IN THE RECORDS OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE),
FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 211724 August 24, 2016
FACTS: For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela."
However, when he requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the National Statistics Office
(NSO), he was surprised to discover that he was registered as "Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe
Almojuela." Thus, he filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in his NSO birth certificate before
the RTC, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 1345.
Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 in Pandan, Catanduanes and is the
acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela (Jorge), fonner governor of the said province,
and Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased. He averred that while his parents did not
marry each other, he has been known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been
using the said surname in all of his official and legal documents, including his school records from
elementary to college, certificate of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) membership,
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government service records, appointment as Provincial General Services Officer, report of rating
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in the First Grade Entrance Examination of the Civil Service Commission, Philippine Passport,
Marriage Contract, and Certificate of Compensation Payment/Tax Withheld. In support of his
petition, he also presented a copy of his birth certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered
full name.
The R TC granted the petition and accordingly, directed the Municipal Civil Registrar .of Pandan,
Catanduanes to cause the correction of entry of the facts of petitioner's birth by changing his
surname from "Condeno" to "Almojuela" and to furnish the Civil Registrar General with a copy
of the corrected birth certificate.
The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Decision and Order, and nullified the RTC's order
for the correction of entry in petitioner's birth certificate. It held that although petitioner correctly
invoked Rule 108 of the Rules of Court in filing his petition, he, however, failed to strictly comply
with the requirements thereunder when he omitted to implead the Local Civil Registrar and his
half-siblings, who stand to be affected by the corrections prayed for, as parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on petitioner's birth
certificate on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
RULING: The petition is bereft of merit.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial changes in
the civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding. An adversary proceeding is defined
as one "having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it."
Sections 3, 4, and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court state:
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential
oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and another given to other persons who are
not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
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parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction of an entry in the civil registry
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should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to
have any interest that would be affected thereby.
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court emphasized that in a petition for a substantial
correction or change of entry in the civil registry under Rule 108, it is mandatory that the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby be made respondents for the reason that they are indispensable parties. Thus, the Court
nullified the order to effect the necessary changes for respondent's failure to strictly comply with
the foregoing procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Citing Labayo-Rowe v.
Republic, the Court held therein:
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been
made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well,
together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely
affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her
status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will
bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial
and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule
would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify
substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.
MATRON M. OHOMA VS. OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL LOCAL CIVIL

REGISTRAR OF AGUINALDO, IFUGAO AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 239584 June 17, 2019
FACTS: This case stemmed from a petition filed by petitioner Matron M. Ohoma (Matiorico M.
Ohomna; petitioner) before the RTC on March 26, 2014, seeking the cancellation of his Certificate
of Live Birth with Registry Number 45-86 (first birth certificate). He averred that: (a) he was born
on May 13, 1986 in Aguinaldo, Ifugao; (b) his birth was belatedly recorded with the Local Civil
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Registrar of Aguinaldo, Ifugao (LCR-Aguinaldo) on February 8, 2000 under Certificate of Live

Birth with Registry Number 2000-24 (second birth certificate); (c) unknown to him, his birth had
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been previously registered with the LCR-Aguinaldo on June 13, 1986 under the first birth
certificate; (d) the first birth certificate contained erroneous entries, i.e., (i) his first name was
erroneously recorded as Matron instead of Matiorico and (ii) his last name was erroneously
recorded as Ohoma instead of Ohomna; (e) he has been using the first name Matiorico and the last
name Ohomna, and has been known by such first and last names both in his public and private
transactions; and (f) the second birth certificate reflects the true and correct data of petitioner;
hence, must be the one retained.
In a Resolution dated June 9, 2015, the RTC granted the petition and ordered the LCR-Aguinaldo
and the National Statistics Office (NSO; now Philippine Statistics Authority) to cancel petitioner's
first birth certificate, finding that the same contains errors that caused confusion as to the identity
of petitioner.
In a Decision dated February 1, 2018, the CA annulled and set aside the RTC ruling. It ruled that
there can be no valid late registration of petitioner's birth considering that the same had already
been lawfully registered with the LCR-Aguinaldo within thirty (30) days from the time of his birth,
as required under Office of the Civil Registrar-General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1983
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error when it annulled and set aside the RTC
ruling ordering the cancellation of petitioner's first birth certificat
RULING: The petition is denied.
Under Office of the Civil Registrar-General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1983, as
amended, the birth of a child shall be registered within 30 days from the time of birth in the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of the city/municipality where it occurred. In this case, petitioner's
birth had already been reported by his mother, Antonia Maingit (Antonia), and duly recorded in
the civil register of the LCR-Aguinaldo on June 13, 1986. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the
CA, there can be no valid late registration of petitioner's birth as the same had already been lawfully
registered within 30 days from his birth under the first birth certificate. Consequently, it is the
second birth certificate that should be declared void and correspondingly cancelled even if the
entries therein are claimed to be the correct ones.
However, while the petition specifically prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's first birth
certificate and the retention of his second birth certificate, the ultimate objective was to correct the
erroneous entries pertaining to petitioner's first and last names, i.e., from Matron Ohoma to
Matiorico Ohomna, as he claimed that people in the community know him by the latter name rather
than the former. Rule 108 implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. The role of the Court under
Rule 108 is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein.
The action filed by petitioner before the RTC seeks to correct a supposedly misspelled name, and
thus, properly falls under Rule 108. To correct simply means "to make or set a right; to remove the
faults or error from." Considering that petitioner complied with the procedural requirements under
Rule 108, the RTC had the jurisdiction to resolve the petition which included a prayer for "[o]ther
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reliefs just and equitable x x x."A general prayer for "other reliefs just and equitable" appearing
565
on a petition enables the court to award reliefs supported by the complaint or other pleadings, by
the facts admitted at the trial, and by the evidence adduced by the parties, even if these reliefs are
not specifically prayed for in the complaint. Consequently, the CA erred in holding that petitioner
has to refile another petition before the trial court could resolve his claim.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that his father's last name
was Ohomna and not Ohoma through competent evidence, i.e., the latter's birth certificate, the
certificate of his marriage to petitioner's mother, Antonia, on January 30, 1986, or a government-
issued identification card or record. On this score alone, the correction of petitioner's first and last
names should be denied. While the first name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
the last name to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. Although petitioner's Elementary School
Permanent Record and Professional Driver's License identify him as Matiorico Ohomna, the same
are insufficient to grant the petition. It pears stressing that the real name of a person is that given
him in the Civil Register, not the name by which he was baptized in his Church or by which he
was known in the community, or which he has adopted.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CHARLIE MINTAS FELIX, A.K.A. SHIRLEY

MINTAS FELIX
G.R. No. 203371 June 30, 2020
FACTS: In his Petition for Correction of Entries dated July 30, 2007, respondent Charlie Mintas
a.k.a. Shirley Mintas Felix essentially alleged that he was born on October 1, 1976 in Itogon,
Benguet. his birth was registered with the Local Civil Registrar (LCR)-Itogon, Benguet where his
birth certificate bore the following erroneous entries: his first name "Shirley" instead of "Charlie,"
his gender "female" instead of "male," and his father's surname "Filex" instead of "Felix". but he
has another birth certificate carried the correct entries" his first name as Charlie, his gender as
male, and his father's surname as "Felix".
In all his subsequent official transactions, he used the birth certificate registered with LCR-
Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija. But when he subsequently requested for authenticated copy of his birth
certificate from the National Statistics Office (NSO), what it officially released to him was the
erroneous birth certificate with LCR-Itogon, Benguet.
He, thus, prayed for correction of his birth certificate with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet and
cancellation of his second birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicior General (OSG), prayed for the
dismissal of the petition on ground that the RTC-La Trinidad, Benguet did not have jurisdiction
over the LCR-Carranglan, nueva Ecija which ought to implement the directive for cancellation of
respondent's second birth certificate, should be the same be granted by the trial court.
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Following compliance with the requisite publication, notices and posting, the case was heard on
the merits. Respondent testified on his petition and offered his two (2) certificates of birth and
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other documents including the corresponding medical certificate and scrotal ultrasound result
indicating that respondent is male.
By Decision dated July 23, 2009, the trial court granted the petition
By Decision12 dated April 23, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It ruled that the RTC-La
Trinidad, Benguet had jurisdiction over the petition for correction of entries in respondent's first
birth certificate with the LRC- Itogon, Benguet. The consequent cancellation of his second birth
certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija was merely incidental to and a necessary
consequence of his action for correction of entries.
ISSUES:
Whether the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it rejected the Republic's challenge
against the trial court's jurisdiction to direct the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to cancel
respondent's second birth certificate as a consequence of its order to correct respondent's first birth
certificate?
Whether the Republic Act No. 9048 (RA 9048) as amended by Republic Act No. 10172 (RA
10172) divest the regional trial courts of jurisdiction over petitions for correction of entries in the
civil registry?
RULING: The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the trial court's jurisdiction to order the LCR-
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to cancel respondent's second birth certificate.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the main case embraces all incidental matters arising therefrom
and connected therewith under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
Here, the trial court has jurisdiction over respondent's petition for correction of entries in his first
birth certificate on file with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet. The trial court has jurisdiction, as well, to
direct the cancellation of respondent's second birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva
Ecija as an incident or as a necessary consequence of the action to correct the entries sought by
respondent. Indeed, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of,
the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court
and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even
though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of
action, would not he within its cognizance.
Here, respondent resorted to judicial proceedings when he sought the correction of the entries in
his birth certificate. For while RA 9048 allowed the administrative correction of respondent's first
name and the typographical error in his father's surname, it did not allow correction of the entry
pertaining to respondent's biological sex.
For it was only on October 24, 2012 that the amendatory law RA 10172 took effect long before
respondent initiated his petition with the court. Had RA 10172 taken effect on or before he initiated
his petition, he could have resorted to the administrative process under these twin laws just for the
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purpose of correcting all at once the three (3) entries in his birth certificate.
567
The next question is - Does RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172 divest the regional trial courts of
its jurisdiction over petitions for correction of entries under BP 129 in relation Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court?
Republic v. Gallo bears the answer, viz:
Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the
Regional Trial Court. The trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province. After the hearing, the trial court may grant or
dismiss the petition and serve a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar.
However, Republic Act No. 9048 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively
removing clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them
under the jurisdiction of the civil register.
Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name
through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition
has been filed and later denied.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all
administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative
officer concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her
jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these
remedies refer to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in court.
However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect
the court's jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno:
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only
effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action,
which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed
waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.
Verily, even with the advent of RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172 prescribing the administrative
remedy for correction of entries with the civil registry, the regional trial courts are not divested of
their jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for correction of entries "Even the failure to observe
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court."
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568
DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATION
RAMON REYES AND CLARA PASTOR VS BANCOM DEVELOPMENT CORP

G.R. No. 190286 January 11, 2018
The revocation of Bancom’s certificate of registration does not justify the abatement of these
proceedings. The clear terms of agreements cannot be negated and deemed non-binding simply on
the basis of a self-serving testimony of one of the guarantors of the loan.
FACTS: The dispute in this case originated from a Continuing Guaranty executed in favor of
respondent Bancom by Angel E. Reyes, Sr., Florencio
Reyes, Jr., Rosario R. Du, Olivia Arevalo, and the two petitioners herein, Ramon E. Reyes and
Clara R. Pastor (the Reyes Group), agreed to guarantee the full and due payment of obligations
incurred by Marbella under an Underwriting Agreement with Bancom. These obligations included
certain Promissory Notes issued by Marbella in favor of Bancom.
Marbella was unable to pay back the notes at the time of their maturity. After issuing four sets of
replacement Promissory Notes and defaulting on the payment each time, Bancom filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money with a prayer for damages against (a) Marbella as principal debtor;
and (b) the individuals comprising the Reyes Group as guarantors of the loan.
Marbella and the Reyes Group argued that they had been forced to execute the documents against
their will and that the documents should be interpreted in relation to the earlier Marbella II
contracts entered into by Bancom; that the Promissory Notes were not meant to be binding, given
that the funds released to Marbella by Bancom were not loans, but merely additional financing.
Also, they pointed out that the Certificate of Registration issued to Bancom had been revoked by
the SEC, and that no trustee or receiver had been appointed to continue the suit.
The RTC held Marbella and the Reyes Group solidarily liable to Bancom.
The CA denied the appeal.
The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the present suit should be deemed abated by the revocation by the SEC of the
Certificate of Registration issued to Bancom. -No
2. Whether the petitioners are liable to Bancom. -Yes
RULING:
The revocation of Bancom's Certificate of Registration does not justify the abatement of these
proceedings
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569
Corporation Code provides that a corporation whose charter is annulled, or whose corporate
existence is otherwise terminated, may continue as a body corporate for a limited period of three
years, but only for certain specific purposes enumerated by law. These include the prosecution and
defense of suits by or against the corporation, and other objectives relating to the settlement and
closure of corporate affairs.
Based on the provision, a defunct corporation loses the right to sue and be sued in its name upon
the expiration of the three-year period provided by law. Jurisprudence, however, has carved out an
exception to this rule. In several cases, this Court has ruled that an appointed receiver, an assignee,
or a trustee may institute suits or continue pending actions on behalf of the corporation, even after
the winding-up period.
A receiver or an assignee need not even be appointed for the purpose of bringing suits or continuing
those that are pending.
Since its directors are considered trustees by legal implication, the fact that Bancom did not convey
its assets to a receiver or assignee was of no consequence. It must also be emphasized that the
dissolution of a creditor-corporation does not extinguish any right or remedy in its favor.
Sec. 145. Amendment or repeal. - No right or remedy in favor of or against any corporation, its
stockholders, members, directors, trustees, or officers, nor any liability incurred by any such
corporation, stockholders, members, directors, trustees, or officers, shall be removed or impaired
either by the subsequent dissolution of said corporation or by any subsequent amendment or repeal
of this Code or of any part thereof.
As guarantors of the loans of Marbella, petitioners are liable to Bancom.
The obligations of Marbella and the Reyes Group under the Promissory Notes and the Continuing
Guaranty, respectively, are plain and unqualified. Under the notes, Marbella promised to pay
Bancom the amounts stated on the maturity dates indicated. The Reyes Group, on the other hand,
agreed to become liable if any of Marbella's guaranteed obligations were not duly paid on the due
date. There is absolutely no support for the assertion that these agreements were not meant to be
binding. The clear terms of these agreements cannot be negated and deemed non-binding simply
on the basis of the self-serving testimony of Angel Reyes, one of the guarantors of the loan.
STO. CRISTO CATHOLIC SCHOOL, INC. vs. MONSIGNOR JESUS ESTONILO

G.R. No. 207594 November 20, 2019
FACTS: A certain group of from the Board of Trustees of Sto. Cristo, dubbed as the “Bote Group”,
claimed that they comprise the majority members of the Board and filed a Petition before the SEC
for the voluntary dissolution of the Sto. Cristo Catholic School. The group claimed that Msgr.
Estonilo and Gregoria Bautista had taken control of the school and had created an unauthorized
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Board of Trustees.
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The respondents Estonilo and Bautista moved for the dismissal of the petititon and claimed that
they were members of the legitimate Board of Trustees and that the Board did not approve of the
dissolution.
The SEC required the Bote Group to submit the following documents in support of their petition:
- Resolution duly approved by the majority of the Board of Trustees and
adopted by at least 2/3 of the members;
- Latest audited financial statements;
- BIR Tax Clearance;
- Names of creditors, addresses and amount of indebtedness and schedule
of liabilities;
- Inventory of assets/properties;
- Publisher’s affidavit and notice of dissolution for 3 consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation;
- Cases pending before the Courts, Commission or any administrative
office of the government.
Failing to submit the required documents, the SEC denied the petition for dissolution.
Aggrieved, the Bote Group appealed and claimed that it was unjust and unreasonable for the SEC
to dismiss the petition for dissolution because the SEC failed to act on their subpoena to produce
the documents from the opposing party.
ISSUE: Whether the SEC was correct in dismissing their petition for dissolution
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the SEC is the administrative agency vested with the
powers and has jurisdiction and supervision over all corporations. As the SEC is the agency
responsible for regulating corporations, it has the competence to ascertain whether the documents
submitted to it are sufficient. The courts cannot interfere with this function.
It is within the SEC’s jurisdiction to determine whether the Bote Group failed to substantiate their
petition. Also, given their claim that the group is the legitimate Board of Trustees, it is surprising
that they cannot produce the requirements required by the SEC.
ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. ALABANG HILLS VILLAGE

ASSOCIATION and RAFAEL TINIO
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G.R. No. 187456 June 2, 2014
571
In the present case, petitioner filed its complaint not only after its corporate existence was
terminated but also beyond the three-year period allowed by section 122 of the corporation code.
Thus, it is clear that at the time of the filing of the subject complaint petitioner lacks the capacity
to sue as a corporation. To allow petitioner to initiate the subject complaint and pursue it until
final judgment, on the ground that such complaint was filed for the sole purpose of liquidating its
assets, would be to circumvent the provisions of section 122 of the Corporation Code.
FACTS: The case traces its roots to the Complaint for Injunction and Damages filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City on October 19, 2006 by [herein petitioner,
Alabang Development Corporation] ADC against [herein respondents, Alabang Hills Village
Association, Inc.] AHVAI and Rafael Tinio (Tinio), President of AHVAI.
The Complaint alleged that [petitioner] is the developer of Alabang Hills Village and still owns
certain parcels of land therein that are yet to be sold, as well as those considered open spaces that
have not yet been donated to [the] local government of Muntinlupa City or the Homeowner's
Association. Sometime in September [2006], ADC learned that AHVAI started the construction
of a multi-purpose hall and a swimming pool on one of the parcels of land still owned by ADC...
without the latter's consent and approval, and that despite demand, AHVAI failed to desist from
constructing the said improvements. ADC thus prayed that an injunction be issued enjoining
defendants from constructing the multi-purpose hall and the swimming pool at the Alabang Hills
Village.
On January 4, 2007, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, rendered judgment dismissing
herein petitioner's complaint on the grounds (1) that the latter has no personality to file the same;
(2) that the subject property "is a reserved area for the beneficial use of the homeowners, as
mandated by law;" and (3) that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), not the
RTC, has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between petitioner and respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in relying on the case of "Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Court Of Appeals" in resolving petitioner's lack of capacity
RULING: It is to be noted that the time during which the corporation, through its own officers,
may conduct the liquidation of its assets and sue and be sued as a corporation is limited to three
years from the time the period of dissolution commences; but there is no time... limit within which
the trustees must complete a liquidation placed in their hands. It is provided only (Corp. Law, Sec.
78 [now Sec. 122]) that the conveyance to the trustees must be made within the three-year period.
It may be found impossible to complete the work of... liquidation within the three-year period or
to reduce disputed claims to judgment. The authorities are to the effect that suits by or against a
corporation abate when it ceased to be an entity capable of suing or being sued (7 R.C.L., Corps.,
par. 750); but trustees to whom the... corporate assets have been conveyed pursuant to the authority
of Sec. 78 [now Sec. 122] may sue and be sued as such in all matters connected with the liquidation.
The import of this Court's ruling in the cases cited by petitioner is that the trustee of a corporation
may continue to prosecute a case commenced by the corporation within three years from its
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dissolution until rendition of the final judgment, even if such judgment is rendered... beyond the
572
three-year period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code. However, there is nothing in
the said cases which allows an already defunct corporation to initiate a suit after the lapse of the
said three-year period. On the contrary, the factual circumstances in... the abovecited cases would
show that the corporations involved therein did not initiate any complaint after the lapse of the
three-year period. In fact, as stated above, the actions were already pending at the time that they
lost their corporate existence.
As to the last issue raised, the basic and pivotal issue in the instant case is petitioner's capacity to
sue as a corporation and it has already been settled that petitioner indeed lacks such capacity. Thus,
this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the CA finding it unnecessary to
delve on the other issues raised by petitioner.
TEODORO B. VESAGAS, AND WILFRED D. ASIS V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS AND DELFINO RANIEL AND HELENDA RANIEL
G.R. No. 142924 December 5, 2001
FACTS: Spouses Delfino and Helenda Raniel are members of the Luz Village Tennis Club, Inc.
Teodoro B. Vesagas, who claims to be the club’s duly elected president, with Wilfred D. Asis,
who, in turn, claims to be its duly elected vice-president and legal counsel, allegedly summarily
stripped them of their lawful membership, without due process of law. Thereafter, the spouses
filed a Complaint with the SEC against the Vesagas and Asis. The spouses Raniel asked the SEC
to declare as illegal their expulsion from the club as it was allegedly done in utter disregard of the
provisions of its by-laws as well as the requirements of due process. They likewise sought the
annulment of the amendments to the by-laws, changing the annual meeting of the club from the
last Sunday of January to November and increasing the number of trustees from nine to fifteen.
Finally, they prayed for the issuance of a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The application for TRO was denied. Vesagas and Asis filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the SEC lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case but was denied. Unperturbed,
they filed a petition for certiorari with the SEC En Banc seeking a review of the hearing officer’s
orders which was again denied for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the verdict, Vesagas and Asis promptly sought relief with the CA contesting the
ruling of the Commission en banc. The appellate court, however, dismissed the petition for lack
of merit in a Decision. Then, in a resolution rendered similarly denied their motion for
reconsideration. Vesagas and Asis filed the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the club has already ceased to be a corporate body.
RULING: By their own admission contained in the various pleadings which they have filed in
the different stages of this case, Vesagas and Asis themselves have considered the club as a
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corporation. Vesagas and Asis were therefore well aware of the incorporation of the club and even
573
agreed to get elected and serve as its responsible officers before they reconsidered dissolving its
corporate form.
At the time of the institution of the case with the SEC, the club was not dissolved by virtue of an
alleged Board resolution. The Corporation Code establishes the procedure and other formal
requirements a corporation needs to follow in case it elects to dissolve and terminate its structure
voluntarily and where no rights of creditors may possibly be prejudiced.
Section 118 (Voluntary dissolution where no creditors are affected) of the Corporation Code
provides that “If dissolution of a corporation does not prejudice the rights of any creditor having a
claim against it, the dissolution may be effected by majority vote of the board of directors or
trustees and by a resolution duly adopted by the affirmative vote of the stockholders owning at
least 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock or at least 2/3 of the members at a meeting to be held
upon call of the directors or trustees after publication of the notice.
A copy of the resolution authorizing the dissolution shall be certified by a majority of the board of
directors or trustees and countersigned by the secretary of the corporation. The SEC shall
thereupon issue the certificate of dissolution.” To substantiate their claim of dissolution, Vesagas
and Asis submitted only two relevant documents: The Minutes of the First Board Meeting and the
Board Resolution which declared “to continue to consider the club as a non-registered or a non-
corporate entity and just a social association of respectable and respecting individual members
who have associated themselves for the purpose of playing the sports of tennis.” These two
documents will not suffice. The requirements mandated by the Corporation Code should have been
strictly complied with by the members of the club.
CONSUELO METAL CORPORATION VS. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, ET.

AL.
G.R. No. 152580 June 26, 2008
The SEC has jurisdiction to order the dissolution of a corporation but jurisdiction over the
liquidation of the corporation pertains to the appropriate regional trial courts.
Republic Act No. 8799 (RA 8799) transferred to the appropriate regional trial courts the SEC’s
jurisdiction defined under Section 5(d) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A. Section 5.2 of RA 8799
provides: The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Sec. 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes
submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of
this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of
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payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
574
FACTS: On 1 April 1996, CMC filed before the SEC a petition to be declared in a state of
suspension of payment, for rehabilitation, and for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver or
management committee. The SEC assumed jurisdiction over CMC’s petition for suspension of
payment and issued a suspension order on 2 April 1996 after it found CMC’s petition to be
sufficient in form and substance. While CMC’s petition was still pending with the SEC as of 30
June 2000, it was finally disposed of on 29 November 2000 when the SEC issued its Omnibus
Order directing the dissolution of CMC and the transfer of the liquidation proceedings before the
appropriate trial court.
ISSUE: Is the transfer of the liquidation proceedings before the trial court proper?
RULING: Yes. The SEC has jurisdiction to order the dissolution of a corporation but jurisdiction
over the liquidation of the corporation pertains to the appropriate regional trial courts. Republic
Act No. 8799 (RA 8799) transferred to the appropriate regional trial courts the SEC’s jurisdiction
defined under Section 5(d) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A. Section 5.2 of RA 8799 provides:
The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the
Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission
shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final
resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases
filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
The SEC’s jurisdiction does not extend to the liquidation of a corporation. While the SEC has
jurisdiction to order the dissolution of a corporation, jurisdiction over the liquidation of the
corporation now pertains to the appropriate regional trial courts. This is the reason why the SEC,
in its 29 November 2000 Omnibus Order, directed that “the proceedings on and implementation
of the order of liquidation be commenced at the Regional Trial Court to which this case shall be
transferred.” This is the correct procedure because the liquidation of a corporation requires the
settlement of claims for and against the corporation, which clearly falls under the jurisdiction of
the regular courts. The trial court is in the best position to convene all the creditors of the
corporation, ascertain their claims, and determine their preferences.
AXIA POWER HOLDINGS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 230847 October 14, 2020
FACTS: Marubeni Energy Services Corporation (MESC) filed with the BIR its annual Income
Tax Return (ITR) for year ending 2007. Later, the Board of Directors of MESC approved its
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merger with Axia, Marubeni Pacific Energy Holdings Corporation (MPEHC) and Marubeni
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Pacific II Energy Holdings Corporation (MPEHCII), with Axia as the surviving entity which was
approved by SEC. The Certificate of Filing of Articles and Plan of Merger specifically mentioned
that the entire assets and liabilities will be transferred to and be absorbed by Axia. MESC filed
with CIR a written claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate of its unutilized CWT for
the CY ending December 31, 2007 by filing Petition for Review with CTA.
Petitioner argues that while Art. 79 of the Corporation Code states that a corporation shall cease
to exist upon the issuance by the SEC of a Certificate of Merger, under Sec. 235(e) of the NIRC
the constituent corporations in a merger shall not be dissolved until they have been cleared of any
tax liability. Sec. 52(C) of the NIRC, as amended, provides that a Certificate of Tax Clearance is
necessary before the SEC issues a Certificate of Dissolution to a company.
The circumstances of these case reveals that there are conflicting provisions involved wherein
MESC is considered dissolved under Sec. 79 of the Corporation Code as of March 29, 2010, but
not insofar as Sec. 235(e) of the NIRC is concerned, since it had not obtained a tax clearance prior
to dissolution.
ISSUE: Whether the MESC is already dissolved by the issuance of SEC of the Certificate of
Merger
RULING: No. A merger is the union of two or more existing corporations in which the surviving
corporation absorbs the others arid continues the combined business. Indeed, Sec. 80 of the
Corporation Code provides that one of the effects of merger is the cessation of the separate
existence of the constituent corporations. The merger dissolves the non-surviving corporations.
Hence, upon approval by the SEC of the merger in this case, MESC's legal personality was
dissolved.
The purpose of the tax clearance requirement under Sec. 52(c) of the NIRC is to ensure that a
corporation contemplating dissolution does not renege on its tax liabilities and thereby irreparably
deprive the government of much needed revenues. Consequently, Sec. 235 (e) prevents the
corporation from being dissolved without having been cleared by the BIR.
In light of the purpose of the law, MESC is considered not dissolved prior to its obtaining a tax
clearance, but only for tax purposes. This interpretation is within the spirit of the NIRC, it is also
similar to Sec. 122 of the Corporation Code which allows a corporation whose corporate existence
has been terminated to nonetheless continue performing limited activities for a period of 3 years
from its dissolution.
MESC was not yet dissolved for tax purposes prior to its obtaining a tax clearance, and thus had
legal personality as of April 15, 2010 to file a claim for tax refund or issuance of tax credit with
the BIR. In this view, petitioner is considered to have exhausted administrative remedies.
MESC indeed has been permanently dissolved, bµt its rights, immunities, powers, duties and
liabilities survived in petitioner. Sec. 80 of the Corporation Code is clear on the effects of merger
or consolidation. Although there is a dissolution of the absorbed or merged corporations, there is
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no winding up of their affairs or liquidation of their assets because the surviving corporation
automatically acquires all their rights, privileges, and powers, as well as their liabilities.
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Hence, MESC may have been dissolved, but its assets were not liquidated nor its affairs wound
up. As the surviving corporation to the merger, Axia stepped into the shoes of MESC. It is a
corporate personality possessed of derivative rights and obligations. In fact, Sec. 80 of the
Corporation Code allowed petitioner to maintain this proceeding that MESC commenced. Having
succeeded to the rights and obligations of MESC, Axia cannot obtain what MESC itself could not
have obtained under the law.
ASIS V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 142924 December 5, 2001
FACTS: Spouses Delfino and Helenda Raniel are members in good standing of the Luz Villaga
Tennis Clud, Inc. (club). They alleged that petitioner Teodoro B. Vesagas, who claims to be the
club's duly elected president, in conspiracy with petitioner Wilfred D. Asis, who, in turn, claims
to be its duly elected vice-president and legal counsel, summarily stripped them of their lawful
membership, without due process of law.
The spouses filed a complaint before the SEC where they asked the Commission to declare as
illegal their expulsion from the club as it was allegedly done in utter disregard of the provisions of
its by-laws as well as the requirements of due process, among others.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the SEC lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. Petitioners contend that since its inception in the 1970's, the club in practice has
not been a corporation. They add that it was only the respondent spouses, motivated by their own
personal agenda to make money from the club, who surreptitiously caused its registration with the
SEC. They then assert that, at any rate, the club has already ceased to be a corporate body.
ISSUE: Whether the corporation has already been dissolved by virtue of a Board resolution
RULING: The SC ruled that the argument of petitioner is devoid of merit.
They claim in gratia argumenti that while the club may have been considered a corporation during
a brief spell, still, at the time of the institution of this case with the SEC, the club was already
dissolved by virtue of a Board resolution.
Section 118 of the Corporation Code establishes the procedure and other formal requirements a
corporation needs to follow in case it elects to dissolve and terminate its structure voluntarily and
where no rights of creditors may possibly be prejudiced.
In the case, petitioners submitted only two relevant documents: the Minutes of the First Board
Meeting held on January 5, 1997, and the board resolution issued on April 14, 1997 which declared
"to continue to consider the club as a non-registered or a non-corporate entity and just a social
association of respectable and respecting individual members who have associated themselves,
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since the 1970's, for the purpose of playing the sports of tennis.” Obviously, these two documents
will not suffice. The requirements mandated by the Corporation Code should have been strictly
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complied with by the members of the club. The records reveal that no proof was offered by the
petitioners with regard to the notice and publication requirements. Similarly wanting is the proof
of the board members' certification. Lastly, and most important of all, the SEC Order of
Dissolution was never submitted as evidence.
VITALIANO N. AGUIRRES II and FIDEL N. AGUIRRE vs. FQB+7, INC., NATHANIEL

D. BOCOBO, PRISCILA BOCOBO and ANTONIO DE VILLA
G.R. No. 170770 January 9, 2013
FACTS: On October 5, 2004, Vitaliano filed, in his individual capacity and on behalf of FQB+7,
Inc. (FQB+7), a Complaint for intra-corporate dispute, injunction, inspection of corporate books
and records, and damages, against respondents Nathaniel D. Bocobo (Nathaniel), Priscila D.
Bocobo (Priscila), and Antonio De Villa (Antonio).
The Complaint asked for an injunction against them and for the nullification of all their previous
actions as purported directors, including the GIS they had filed with the SEC. The Complaint also
sought damages for the plaintiffs and a declaration of Vitaliano’s right to inspect the corporate
records.
The respondents sought, in their certiorari petition, the annulment of all the proceedings and
issuances in SEC Case No. 04-111077 on the ground that Branch 24 of the Manila RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, which they defined as being an agrarian dispute.
The CA determined that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it issued the
writ of preliminary injunction to remove the respondents from their positions in the Board of
Directors based only on Vitaliano’s self-serving and empty assertions.
On the second issue, the CA postulated that Section 122 of the Corporation Code allows a
dissolved corporation to continue as a body corporate for the limited purpose of liquidating the
corporate assets and distributing them to its creditors, stockholders, and others in interest. It does
not allow the dissolved corporation to continue its business. That being the state of the law, the
CA determined that Vitaliano’s Complaint, being geared towards the continuation of FQB+7,
Inc.’s business, should be dismissed because the corporation has lost its juridical personality.
Moreover, the CA held that the trial court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an intra-corporate
dispute when the corporation is already dissolved.
ISSUE: Whether the Complaint seeks to continue the dissolved corporation’s business
RULING: The Petition is partly meritorious.
Section 122 of the Corporation Code prohibits a dissolved corporation from continuing its
business, but allows it to continue with a limited personality in order to settle and close its affairs,
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including its complete liquidation, thus
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Sec. 122. Corporate liquidation. – Every corporation whose charter expires by its own limitation
or is annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other purposes is
terminated in any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3)
years after the time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and
convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business
for which it was established.
The Court fails to find in the prayers above any intention to continue the corporate business of
FQB+7. The Complaint does not seek to enter into contracts, issue new stocks, acquire properties,
execute business transactions, etc. Its aim is not to continue the corporate business, but to
determine and vindicate an alleged stockholder’s right to the return of his stockholdings and to
participate in the election of directors, and a corporation’s right to remove usurpers and strangers
from its affairs. The Court fails to see how the resolution of these issues can be said to continue
the business of FQB+7.
Neither are these issues mooted by the dissolution of the corporation. A corporation’s board of
directors is not rendered functus officio by its dissolution. Since Section 122 allows a corporation
to continue its existence for a limited purpose, necessarily there must be a board that will continue
acting for and on behalf of the dissolved corporation for that purpose. In fact, Section 122
authorizes the dissolved corporation’s board of directors to conduct its liquidation within three
years from its dissolution. Jurisprudence has even recognized the board’s authority to act as trustee
for persons in interest beyond the said three-year period. Thus, the determination of which group
is the bona fide or rightful board of the dissolved corporation will still provide practical relief to
the parties involved.
The same is true with regard to Vitaliano’s shareholdings in the dissolved corporation. A party’s
stockholdings in a corporation, whether existing or dissolved, is a property right which he may
vindicate against another party who has deprived him thereof. The corporation’s dissolution does
not extinguish such property right. Section 145 of the Corporation Code ensures the protection of
this right, thus:
Sec. 145. Amendment or repeal. – No right or remedy in favor of or against any corporation, its
stockholders, members, directors, trustees, or officers, nor any liability incurred by any such
corporation, stockholders, members, directors, trustees, or officers, shall be removed or impaired
either by the subsequent dissolution of said corporation or by any subsequent amendment or repeal
of this Code or of any part thereof.
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579
FILIATION
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR V. EDNA G. SIASAT

G.R. No. 200169 January 28, 2015, J. Del Castillo
FACTS: Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died,
intestate and without debts and left two parcels of land.
The petitioner alledged that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. He
discovered that the subject titles were missing so he filed a Petition for the issuance of second
owner’s copy of Certificate of Title, which the respondent edna Siasat opposed; and that during
the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two missing owner’s duplicate copies of
the subject titles. Petitioner prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be ordered
to surrender to him the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession.
The respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses,
but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart.
Petitioner also offered the testimonies that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses. On the other
hand, the respondent testified that she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his name
from her aunt; that she is not related by consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that her aunt
executed an affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her husband
Alfredo Aguilar’s estate; that the certificate of titles were entrusted to her by her aunt. Respondent
likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera who testified that that she does not know
petitioner; that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses.
The RTC decided that the petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this action to
be considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction and damages
prayed for. CA affirmed its decision.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses.
RULING: Yes.The petitioner has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses.
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records
covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which
necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS
Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") – to prove filiation.
The filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required.
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580
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses, then he is as
well heir to the latter's estate. Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her aunt
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar's. estate, since succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending
direct line.
ROMEO F. ARA AND WILLIAM A. GARCIA V. DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO AND

HENRY ROSSI
Gr. No. 187273 February 15, 2017, Leonen, J
For a claim of filiation to succeed, it must be made within the period allowed, and supported by
the evidence required under the Family Code. If filiation is sought to be proved under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, the action must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent. Josefa passed away in 2002. After her death, petitioners could no longer be
allowed to introduce evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa. The only
evidence allowed under the law would be a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private signed,
handwritten instruction by Josefa.
FACTS: Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña. He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where,
despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed
marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents
to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single. Tina
finally agreed to marry Eduardo. They got married; It appeared in their marriage contract that
Eduardo was "single." The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life.
Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home.
However, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a
year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Eduardo
took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. Sometime
in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an
NSOcertified copy of the marriage contract. She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she
learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.
The court rendered judgment finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Eduardo
further testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. Eduardo further
claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide
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unless he did so.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Eduardo is guilty of bigamy.
RULING: Yes. For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove
the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage
without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and
such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.
The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after
the effectivity of the Family Code. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that
when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first
wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should
have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his
first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the
Family Code. With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before
the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice
to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
RICHELLE P. ABELLA, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR DAUGHTER, MARL

JHORYLLE ABELLA V. POLICARPIO CABAÑERO
G.R. No. 206647 August 9, 2017, Leonen, J
An integrated determination of filiation is "entirely appropriate" to the action for support filed by
petitioner Richelle for her child. An action for support may very well resolve that ineluctable issue
of paternity if it involves the same parties, is brought before a court with the proper jurisdiction,
prays to impel recognition of paternal relations, and invokes judicial intervention to do so. Thus,
it was improper to rule here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was impossible to entertain
petitioner's child's plea for support without her and petitioner first surmounting the encumbrance
of an entirely different judicial proceeding.
FACTS: Petitioner Richelle alleged that while she was still a minor in the years 2000 to 2002, she
was repeatedly sexually abused by respondent Cabañero inside his rest house at Barangay Masayo,
Tobias Fornier, Antique. 9 As a result, she allegedly gave birth to a child on August 21, 2002.
Richelle added that on February 27, 2002, she initiated a criminal case for rape against Cabañero,
This, however, was dismissed. Later, she initiated another criminal case, this time for child abuse
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under Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act. This, too, was dismissed. Richelle prayed for the child's monthly
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allowance in the amount of P3,000.00. RTC dismissed Richelle’s Complaint without prejudice, on
account of her failure to implead her minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff. CA sustained. It ruled that
filiation proceedings should have first been separately instituted to ascertain the minor child’s
paternity and that without these proceedings having first resolved in favour of the child’s paternity
claim, petitioner’s action for support could not prosper.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in ruling that filiation proceedings should have first been separately
instituted to ascertain the minor child’s paternity and that without these proceedings having first
resolved in favour of the child’s paternity claim, petitioner’s action for support could not prosper.
RULING: Yes. While it is true that the grant of support was contingent on ascertaining paternal
relations between respondent and petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was unnecessary for petitioner's
action for support to have been dismissed and terminated by the Court of Appeals in the manner
that it did. Instead of dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to
the Regional Trial Court. There, petitioner and her daughter should have been enabled to present
evidence to establish their cause of action inclusive of their underlying claim of paternal relations
against respondent. Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely appropriate" to the
action for support filed by petitioner Richelle for her child. An action for support may very well
resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the same parties, is brought before a court
with the proper jurisdiction, prays to impel recognition of paternal relations, and invokes judicial
intervention to do so. This does not run afoul of any rule.
To the contrary, and consistent with Briz v. Briz, this is in keeping with the rules on proper joinder
of causes of action. This also serves the interest of judicial economy avoiding multiplicity of suits
and cushioning litigants from the vexation and costs of a protracted pleading of their cause. Thus,
it was improper to rule here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was impossible to entertain
petitioner's child's plea for support without her and petitioner first surmounting the encumbrance
of an entirely different judicial proceeding. Without meaning to lend credence to the minutiae of
petitioner's claims, it is quite apparent that the rigors of judicial proceedings have been taxing
enough for a mother and her daughter whose claim for support amounts to a modest P3,000.00
every month. When petitioner initiated her action, her daughter was a toddler; she is, by now, well
into her adolescence. The primordial interest of justice and the basic dictum that procedural rules
are to be "liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding"impel us to grant the present Petition.
NARCISO SALAS V. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM

GR No. 180284 Sep. 11, 2013
FACTS: Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against
Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court.
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Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on
December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only
24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an... apartment where
respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of
caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioner's family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned... respondent and her child and
left them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support
Petitioner filed his answer[4] with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He
described respondent as a woman of loose morals.
Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except
genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware
of respondent's chicanery and deceit designed to "scandalize" him in exchange for financial favor.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his "kumadre" Felicisima de
Guzman.
During their subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a widower and he has no more
companion in life because his children... are all grown-up. She also learned that petitioner owns a
rice mill, a construction business and a housing subdivision
Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her former
boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of her and marry
her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought that she and her child will
have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her money for her
child. When she became pregnant with petitioner's child, it was only then she learned that he is in
fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he wanted to
have another child.
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she stayed with a
housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December 28,
1994
Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying
he had not done this to his wife. She filled out the form for the child's birth certificate and wrote
all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills
and drove... her baby home. He was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is
his "look-alike," and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner
of the apartment unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the baby's birth, petitioner
went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife
was also informed about his having sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt
the baby and just give respondent money so she can go... abroad. When she refused this offer,
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petitioner stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the
help of relatives and friends.
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Murillo corroborated respondent's testimony as to the payment by petitioner of apartment rental,
his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his presence during and after delivery
of respondent's baby, respondent's attempted suicide through sleeping pills... overdose and
hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting
with petitioner's wife at the headquarters.
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision[8] in favor of respondent the CA dismissed
petitioner's appeal.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court's ruling that respondent satisfactorily
established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was
committed by the trial court in granting respondent's prayer for support.
ISSUE: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent's evidence
sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
RULING: We grant the petition. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth[24] (Exhibit "A-1") of Christian Paulo Salas in
which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him.
Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the... said document though
she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate.[25] Thus, if the father did... not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity.[26] Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument[27]
and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.[28]
As to the Baptismal Certificate[29] (Exhibit "B") of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner
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as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
585
they can only serve as evidence of the administration of... the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
child's paternity.
The rest of respondent's documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital
bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive
evidence to prove paternity.[31] Exhibits "E" and "F"[32] showing petitioner and respondent
inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant... evidentiary value. The Statement of Account[33]
(Exhibit "C") from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated
as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding... petitioner's admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the
delivery of respondent's child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes[34] (Exhibits "D" to "D-13") of petitioner and respondent showing
their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish
Christian Paulo's filiation to petitioner as they were not... signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes
were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code
which admits as competent evidence of... illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.[38] Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent's evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo,
petitioner's financial support while respondent lived in Murillo's apartment and his regular visits
to her at the said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the "overwhelming
evidence, documentary and testimonial" presented in Ilano.
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent
proof of paternity and the totality of respondent's evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo's
filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may
be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued... only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
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586
JOANIE SURPOSA UY VS JOSE NGO CHUA
G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition1 for
the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. The Complaint was docketed
as Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who
was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had
two children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the
latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that petitioner’s birth
certificate be filled out with the following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as father and
"IRENE DUCAY" as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and
Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner
and Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she got
married. He also provided her with employment. It turned out that prior to instituting Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for
the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent.
Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by RTC-Branch 9.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid as to bar the subsequent filing of the
petition for filiation on the ground of res judicata.
RULING: NO. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The Compromise
Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by
RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an
illegitimate child of respondent.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000
between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations.
It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the
parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said contract
valid and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize
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what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise
587
Agreement that was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was executed and
submitted for approval by both parties.
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata,
since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondent’s Compromise Agreement, which
was contrary to law and public policy
GLENN MILLER, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING LEGAL HEIRS, V. JOAN

MILLER AND THE LCR OF SORSOGON
G.R. 200344 February 28, 2019
FACTS: When John Miller died, he left several heirs, including petitioner Glen Miller. Joan
Miller, on the other hand, alleges that she is an illegitimate child of John Miller, and that John
Miller had expressly recognized her filiation when he (John Miller) executed a holographic will.
Joan through her mother filed a petition for partition and accounting of John’s estate, presenting a
Certificate of Live Birth which showed that John is the registered father.
Glenn Miller now filed a separate petition praying that Joan’s Certificate of Live Birth be
cancelled, and that the Local Civil Registrar of Gubat Sorsogon be directed to replace Joan’s
surname from Miller to Espenida, the name of Joan’s mother. This action is for the correction
which in turn falls under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:Whether the procedure filed by Glenn Miller is the correct one?
RULING: No, the remedy sought by Glenn Miller is not the appropriate one.
Here, Glenn Miller sought the correction of Joan’s surname, seeking to stop her from using Miller
and use Espenida instead, claiming that Joan was not an acknowledged illegitimate child of John.
This change is not merely clerical, but substantial as it will affect Joan’s identity and successional
rights. In effect, Glenn Miller is seeking to assail the filiation of Joan collaterally by Rule 108.
Legitimacy and filiation can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through a collateral attack via a petition for correction of entries.
INGRID HILARIO VS. MIRANDA AND IRENEA BELLOC

G.R. 196499 November 28, 2018
JD-4C
588
FACTS: When a certain Antonio Belloc died, he left several properties but no legitimate family.
Instead, he had several illegitimate children, one of which is Magdalena, the mother of Ingrid
Hilario who filed a petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration.
The RTC, found that Magdalena is indeed an illegitimate child who is entitled to the estate of
Antonio. The CA, however, found that Magdalena was not able to prove that she was
acknowledged by Antonio as an illegitimate child. The CA went on to show that under the Family
Code, the filiation of an illegitimate child must be proved by the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned, both of which Magdalena was not able to produce.
Further, Magdalena cannot establish her filiation by the second paragraph of Art 172 because the
putative father is already dead.
ISSUE: Is the CA correct in saying that because Magdalena was not able to show that Antonio
recognized her as an illegitimate child, she is not entitled to inherit from him?
RULING: No, the CA is incorrect in its decision.
The law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his or her birth. Proof of filiation
is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned. It is settled that Magdalena
was an illegitimate child of Antonio, and she does not need to file an action to establish her filiation
in the absence of any claim or action to impugn her filiation.
The evil sought to prevent in placing a time limit to prove filiation if the grounds fall under
paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Family Code, namely, to protect the legitimate family does not
exist in the case of Magdalena. Antonio never had a legitimate family and there was no other claim
to his estate other than that of Magdalena.
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, ET. AL. V. ANACLETO ALCORAN

AND ELENETTESUNJACO
Gr No. 163362 July 8, 2015, J. Bersamin
FACTS: Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado (Joaquina), and their
marriage produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran (Nicolas). In turn, Nicolas married Florencia
Limpahan (Florencia), but their union had no offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas
had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to respondent Anacleto
Alcoran (Anacleto). Anacleto married Elenette Sunjaco.
Some of their relative namely Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed in
the RTC a complaint for recovery of property and damages against Anacleto and Elenette who
they claim is not entitled to the property since Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious
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child during Nicolas' lifetime.
589
The defendants (respondents herein) countered that Anacleto was expressly recognized by Nicolas
as the latter's son, a fact evidenced by the certificate of birth of Anacleto; that Anacleto thus had
the right to inherit the properties from Nicolas.
RTC decided against the plaintiffs which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran.
RULING: Yes. The birth certificate of Anacleto showed that Nicolas had himself caused the
registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing
in the column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births.
Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth
certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully
warranted.
Anacleto's baptismal certificate was of no consequence in determining his filiation. Baptismal
certificate it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified
but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity, thus inadmissible in evidence
as proof of filiation. The picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she stood
beside the coffin of the departed Nicolas was also undeserved.
The school records of Anacleto, which evinced that Joaquina was the guardian of Anacleto in his
grade school years, and the marriage contract between Anacleto and Elenette , which indicated
that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did not have the evidentiary value
accorded by the RTC and the CA.
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative evidence notwithstanding,
Anacleto 's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate child remained beyond question in view of the
showing that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
LIYAO v. LIYAO
G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002
FACTS: William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother
(Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda
Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be
entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the
decedent during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon G. Garcia is legally
married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of
the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up
to the time of William’s untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the
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company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage. On the other hand, one of
590
the children of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that
her parents were not separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE: Whether thRUe petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the
estate of the deceased.
RULING: Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from
a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is
not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article
255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses
shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused: 1)By the impotence of the husband; 2) By the fact that
husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the
serious illness of the husband.
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the
time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the
child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper
cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs
for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity
or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none – even his heirs
– can impugn legitimacy; that would amount of an insult to his memory.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by
the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
ANTONIO PERLA vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA

JD-4C
G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012
591
“An order for x x x support x x x must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence.
FACTS: Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for two years. As a result of
said cohabitation, Randy was born. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned
them and failed to give any support to his son. Mirasol and Randy, thus aksing that Antonio be
ordered to support Randy.
Antonio answered that he is married and has a family of his own, denying having fathered Randy.
Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, however she never became his common-law wife
nor was she treated as such. And Mirasol had been intimidating and pestering him with various
suits by insisting that Randy is his son.
During trial, Mirasol testified that Antonio was her first boyfriend and she became pregnant while
they were sweethearts, and Antonio assured her that he would support her. She presented Randy’s
Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the
child. Randy also testified that he knew Antonio as his father that during an encounter, he called
Antonio as "Papa". and when he asked him for support, Antonio promised that he would support
him. Randy further testified that during his one-week stay in his Aunt Lelita’s place, the latter
treated him as a member of the family.
Antonio denied what Mirasol and Randy testified except that he has sexual intercourse with
Mirasol only once and all the certificates presented has several inaccuracies in the entries thereon.
ISSUE: Whether Respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to Antonio.
RULING: A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence."
The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code which
provide as follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
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the same evidence as legitimate children.
592
Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father has no probative value to
establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since it was not signed by the latter. It is settled that "a
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate."In addition, the several unexplained discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances
in the birth certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. "[T]o prove open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity.1âwphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction
of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally, but continuously." Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly
hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous
possession of the status of a child. “The father’s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist." Here, except for that singular occasion in which they met,
there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son.
While a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with
respect to the child’s paternity. Thus, baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as
proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same.
HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN, NAMELY: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO

GABATAN, PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND
JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA AND FREIRA GABATAN vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LOURDES EVERO PACANA
G.R. No. 150206 March 13, 2009, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
It is undisputed that the subject property was owned by the deceased during his lifetime.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
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593
subject property. In their answer, petitioners denied that Lourdes's claim. Petitioners maintained
that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one
brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo, Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs
inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in possession thereof in the concept
of owners for more than fifty (50) years. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed
by Lourdes against Teofilo's wife, Rita, but the case was dismissed for lack of interest. Finally,
petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the
same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.
ISSUE: Whether the issue on Lourdes’s heirship can be resolved in the same civil action for
recovery of ownership and possession of property.
RULING: The Lourdes’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property was owned by the deceased during
his lifetime. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery
of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery
of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
However, in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in
a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, since the
only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case could and had already in fact
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594
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues
it defined during pre-trial. Thus, the trial
court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render
a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense
with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of Lourdes as the sole heir
of Juan Gabatan, especially since the parties to civil case, had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in the proceeding.
Also, the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
As to proof of heirship, two conflicting birth certificates of Lourdes were presented at the RTC.
Even assuming that the birth certificate presented by Lourdes is a reliable document, the same on
its face is insufficient to prove Lourdes's filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan.
Lourdes's mother's birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of Hermogena's
relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did Lourdes
present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogena's
relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Lourdes’s cause of action accrued in 1933, but she and her mother did not assert their rights as
such since it is only in 1978 that Lourdes filed her first complaint to recover the subject property
against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan. However, that case was dismissed without
prejudice for failure to prosecute. Again, Lourdes waited until 1989 to refile the present case,
claiming that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because
Rita was then already old. The reason is unacceptable, because it is precisely the advancing age of
Rita (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) that should have
urged the Lourdes to exert every effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her
claim.
Thus, Lourdes dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the
property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that
(a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright
spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of
her own cause of action.
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T.
BRAZA vs THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by L`EON
TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR
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G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009, Carpio Morales, J.
595
The allegations of the petition clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between
Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection
with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. As such, the petition
must fail because in a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. These are governed
not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC and Art. 17118 of the Family Code wich provides
that the corresponding petition should be filed in a Family Court. Moreover, it is well- accepted
principle that the validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as
the petition filed in the present case.
FACTS: Ma. Cristina Torres Braza and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. were married on January 4, 1978.
The union bore 3 children. After some time, Pablo died in a vehicular accident in Indonesia.
During Pablo’s wake in the Philippines, Lucille Titular began introducing minor Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza as her and Pablo's son. Consequently, Ma. Cristina made inquiries in the course of
which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental. Such birth certificate stated, among others, that Patrick was acknowledged by
Pablo and was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents on April 22, 1998.
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of the marriage contract between Pablo and Lucille.
Considering the foregoing, Ma. Cristina filed a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of
Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille
and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between
Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth
record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the
use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his
paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry,
the court, which is not acting as a Family Court, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected
to a DNA test.
The controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, in this case, may rule upon the validity of marriage between Pablo
and Lucille and answer questions regarding Patrick’s legitimacy. (NO)
RULING: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
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understanding that is made by a clerk or a transcriber in copying or writing resulting in a harmless
596
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent. In contrast thereto, substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed
only in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded and due process is
properly observed.
In the case at bar, the allegations of the petition clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
As such, the petition must fail because in a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule
108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
These are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Art. 17118 of the Family
Code which provides that the corresponding petition should be filed in a Family Court. Moreover,
it is well- accepted principle that the validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition
filed in the present case.
UYGUANGCO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 76873 October 26, 1989.
FACTS: Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children,
and a considerable property. Claiming to be an illegitimate son and having been left out in the
extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition
against all the petitioners.
Graciano alleged that he was born to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao. He received
support from his father while he was studying at the Medina High School. He was also assigned
by his father, without objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store
in Mananom.
At the trial, Graciano admitted that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to
show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. The petitioners thereupon moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his
alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code. Graciano insisted that he has a
right to show under Article 283 that he is "in continuous possession of the status of a child of his
alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family."
ISSUE: Whether Graciano should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed
father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil
Code.
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597
RULING: Illegitimate child is now allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
Graciano, however, seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second
paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows:
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action
is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Hence, He can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the
means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario
Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate
filiation.
NOTE: Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that unlike
legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and
raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can
be sure of their filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the
illegitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should
thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if
he or she is already dead."
LIGAYA GAPUSAN-CHUA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 46746 March 15, 1990
FACTS: Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue. Neither her surviving
spouse, Prospero Parcon, nor her other known relatives — three (3) sisters and a nephew - made
any move to settle her estate judicially. Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged
natural daughter of Felisa Gapusan Parcon, instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of the
estate.
The surviving husband denied that Ligaya was an acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife
and applied for his own appointment as administrator. Ligaya contends that the sworn statement
of assets and liabilities, a public document submitted by the decedent pursuant to a legal
requirement therefor, and the latter’s application for life insurance were in law indubitable
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recognition by her mother of her status as an acknowledged natural child, voluntarily made, and
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were adequate foundation for a judicial declaration of her status as heir. These statements, she
alleges, were "authentic writings" in contemplation of Article 278 of the Civil Code.
Parcon alleged that no action to compel recognition was instituted prior to the death of Felisa, thus,
proof of the "authentic document" in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate was
inefficacious as basis for a declaration of filiation or heirship.
ISSUE: Whether Felisa's sworn statement of assets and liabilities and her application for insurance
are "authentic writings" which effectively operated as a recognition of Ligaya Gapusan-Chua as
her natural child, even if no action was brought by the latter to compel the former, during her
lifetime, to recognize her as such.
RULING: Judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor is effected, not through a
record of birth or in a will but through a statement in a court of record or an authentic document.
It is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily made: 1) of a person who is of age, only his consent
being necessary; or 2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of birth or in a
will.
The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is clearly intended for the benefit of
the minor. "The lack of judicial approval cannot impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment
made. The judicial approval is for the protection of the minor against any acknowledgment made
to his prejudice." Therefore, the lack or insufficiency of such approval is not a defect available to
the recognizing parent but one which the minor may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the
minor consents to the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should make no difference.
Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be shown (e.g.,) by such acts as keeping, even after
reaching the age of majority, the acknowledgment papers, and the use of the parent’s surname."
Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory.
Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of paternity or maternity by
the presumed parent, expressed in the form prescribed by the Civil Code. Its essence lies in the
avowal of the parent that the child is his; the formality is added to make the admission
incontestable, in view of its consequences." The form is prescribed by Article 278 of the Civil
Code, earlier adverted to; it provides that a voluntary recognition "shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing."
Compulsory recognition is sometimes also called judicial recognition, to distinguish it from that
which is a purely voluntary act of the parent. It is recognition decreed by final judgment of a
competent court. It is governed by Articles 283 and 284, setting forth the cases in which the father
or mother, respectively, is obliged to recognize a natural child, and Article 285, providing that
generally, the action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents.
"An ‘authentic writing’ for purposes of voluntary recognition is understood as a genuine or
indubitable writing of the father" or mother, including "a public instrument (one acknowledged
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before a notary public or other competent official with the formalities required by law), and, of
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course, a public or official document in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
The sworn statement of assets and liabilities filed by Felisa Parcon is a public document, having
been executed and submitted pursuant to a requirement of the law. It is in any case a categorical
avowal by Felisa that Ligaya is indeed her daughter, an admission entirely consistent with the two
other authentic writings executed by her in which she acknowledges Ligaya to be her daughter
without qualification. Moreover, if these three (3) writings are considered in conjunction with the
undisputed fact that Ligaya had been continuously treated by Felisa as her daughter, the
proposition that Ligaya was indeed Felisa’s daughter becomes well-nigh conclusive.
It is also evident that Ligaya’s recognition as Felisa’s daughter was not made in a record of birth
or a will, a circumstance which would have made judicial approval unnecessary, only her own
consent to the recognition being required.
Assuming that she was a minor at the time of her recognition, and therefore judicial approval of
the recognition was necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her ratification of that recognition,
after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of the proceedings for the settlement of
her deceased mother’s estate on the claim precisely that she was the decedent’s acknowledged
natural daughter.
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO vs. KAREN SANTOS

G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015
FACTS: On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of
possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her
father.
The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir – being the legitimate child – of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad). It found that respondent’s
filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in evidence.
ISSUES:
1. That the Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, when it allowed the introduction of secondary evidence and rendered
judgment based thereof notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence if birth
certificate.
2. That the Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it ruled that petitioners have no personality to impugn respondent’s
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legitimate filiation.
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RULING: We grant the petition.
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate court itself ruled that the
irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the
informant made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature
of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the document questionable.
To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities on
her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the following circumstances
surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate, viz.:
1. The identity of one Emma Daño, whose name was superimposed as the informant regarding the
birth of respondent, remains unknown.
2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant of the Department of Education
in Bulacan, proved that the deceased Caridad did not have any maternity leave during the period
of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984 as shown by her Service Record as an
elementary school teacher at Paombong, Bulacan. This was corroborated by a certification from
Dr. Teofila R. Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent, that she did not file any maternity
leave during her service. No testimonial or documentary evidence was also offered to prove that
the deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or 13 years into the marriage of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. When respondent was born, Caridad was already 40 years
old. There are no hospital records of Caridad’s delivery, and while it may have been possible for
her to have given birth at her own home, this could have been proven by medical or non-medical
records or testimony if they do, in fact, exist.
4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for herself in the instant case.
Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a
quo does not sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child
of the deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of
her putative parents because she was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they
supported her and her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her
GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate
left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as
his legal heirs.
In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva which incisively discussed its parallelisms
and contrasts with the case of Benitez- Badua v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the presence of a
similar set of circumstances – which were relied upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in
the case at bar – does not establish that one is a child of the putativeparents. Our discussion in
the Rivera case is instructive, viz.:
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601
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove that she was
the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate,
income tax returns and an information sheet for membership in the Government Service Insurance
System of the decedent naming her as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified that
she had been reared and continuously treated as Vicente’s daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua's alleged parents had been unable
to beget children, the siblings of Benitez-Badua's supposed father were able to rebut all of the
documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was counted against Benitez-Badua
was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten years
of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by
the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants
in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth
certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
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602
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.

Gr No. 163604 May 6, 2005, J. Carpio-Morales
FACTS: The RTC granted the petition of Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc for the declaration of
presumptive death of absentee of spouse Clemente P. Jomoc on the basis of the Commissioner’s
Report and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years
earlier, presumptively dead.
The trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said
article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent
spouse. The Office of the Solicitor General appealed the case.
The trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served as required by and pursuant to
Section 2(a) of Rule 41, the present case being a special proceeding, disapproved the notice of
appeal.
The Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s order of disapproval had been
denied. Petitioner contended that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article
41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring
a record on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of
a special proceeding, thus, a record on appeal is needed.
RULING: No. As defined in Section 3(c) of special proceeding "a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the
enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
There is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc is a summary proceeding under the Family
Code and not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court which requires a record on
appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a notice of appeal from the trial
court’s order sufficed.
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MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE V. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR.
603
G.R. No. 188400 March 8, 2017, Leonen, J.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for
the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of
the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home. However, Manuel started making
himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever
she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not
return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. Sometime in August 2001, Tina became
curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned
that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSOcertified copy of the marriage
contract. She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact
already married when they exchanged their own vows. The court rendered judgment finding
Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Eduardo further testified that he declared he
was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his
first marriage before marrying Tina. Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his
first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so.
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. In the present case, the prosecution proved that
the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity;
hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married
the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code. It was the burden
of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was
of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for
more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised
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Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. With the effectivity of the Family Code,
604
the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced
to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he
or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
FACTS: Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001 by being
then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-
MANUEL. MANUEL being the one who filed the complaint who does not know the existence of
the first marriage.
the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his
first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law
upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable
belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his
first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still
alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by
operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The
petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted of the crime of bigamy because of his
belief in good faith that his first marriage was already dissolved.
RULING: NO. The prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the
effectivity of the Family Code.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as
he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence
a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial
declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal
intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be
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held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
605
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death
of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of
bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
In order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent
for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances
stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a
judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present
spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in
the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
latter’s reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal
prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial
declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in
contracting a second marriage is already established.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. REMAR QUIÑONEZ

G.R. 237412 January 06, 2020
FACTS: Remar Quinonez filed a petition for the Declaration of Presumptive Death alleging that
he has not seen his wife for almost 10 years. Remar worked as a security guard at the National
Food Authority Warehouse in Bislig City, then transferred to Cebu City. He then learned that
Lovelyn went to Manila for a vacation but then their communications went stale.
Remar during this time transferred to Surigao City. By then, someone informed him that his wife
was already living with another man and would no longer be coming back.
Remar then travelled to several places to search for his wife, talked to relatives, but was not able
to find her. In his petition however, Remar was not able to explain the details of his search and the
conversations between the relatives. Further, Remar did not seek the help of the authorities.
ISSUE: Whether the Petition for Remar should be granted.
RULING: No, the petition should not be granted because Remar was unable to prove that he has
a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.
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The requisites for a declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage are as follows:
606
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.
A well-founded belief presupposes that the present spouse had exerted diligent and reasonable
efforts to locate the absent spouse. A mere passive search will not suffice. In this line, there was
no well-founded belief on the part of Remar, but only the likelihood that the absentee spouse is
living with another man and she does not want to be found.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NILDA B. TAMPUS

GR No. 214243 March 16, 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS: Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante L. Del Mundo (Dante) in Cebu.
Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went to Jolo,
Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children.
Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante,. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts
proved futile so she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the
purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of
communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead. She averred that she intends
to remarry and move on with her life.
RTC declared Dante as presumptively dead for all legal purposes, without prejudice to the effect
of his reappearance. OSG filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC Decision.
However, CA affirmed the RTC Decision declaring Dante as presumptively dead.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision declaring Dante as presumptively
dead.
RULING: Yes. The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed
under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or
general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
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607
She made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP
headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek
the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Therefore, Nilda failed to actively look
for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents,
relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a
"well-founded belief of his death.
Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could have
corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource persons were
not even named.
Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to
support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears from
the facts as established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without
actively and diligently searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as constituting a
"well-founded belief that her husband is dead.
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Gr No. 230751 April 25, 2018, J. Velasco, Jr.
FACTS: The petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the RTC of Tarlac City a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias (Wilfredo). Alleging
amoung other that Wilfredo never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since
1979 and he never made contact or communicated with the petitioner nor to his relatives.
According to the service record of Wilfredo issued by the National Police Commission, Wilfredo
was already declared missing since 1979.
The Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding her
beloved husband, but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, neither did
they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place frequented
by the New People's Army;
After more than 3 decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been tough
on her, especially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for
her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive. Subsequently, the
OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of the Philippines.
The CA stated that the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed
by the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the Wilfredo was correctly declared presumptively dead.
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RULING: No. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an
action that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the
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presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid
subsequent marriage under the said law.
In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same
was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is
because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any
authority to take cognizance of the same.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CATUBAG

G.R. No. 210580 April 18, 2018
FACTS: Prior to their marriage in 2003, Ludyson Catubag and Shanaviv had been cohabiting with
each other as husband and wife. Their union begot two children. To meet the needs of the family,
Ludyson took work overseas while Shanaviv stayed in the Philippines to tend to the children.
On 2003, Ludyson and Shanaviv got married. Ludyson returned overseas to continue his work. On
2006, while working abroad, Ludyson was informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their house
and never returned. The relatives took care of the children. Ludyson came back to the country to
look for his wife. He proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends
and relatives, but they too could offer no help. He travelled as far as Bicol, where Shanaviv was
born and raised, but he still could not locate her. Ludsyon subsequently sought the help of Bombo
Radyo Philippines, one of the more well-known radio networks in the Philippines, to broadcast the
fact of his wife's disappearance. After almost 7 years of waiting and with the desire to marry again,
Ludsyon filed a petition to have his wife declared presumptively dead.
ISSUE: Whether Ludyson complied with the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code.
RULING: Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4) requisites under
Article 41 of the Family Code that must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive death
to prosper:
1. The absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391 of the Civil Code
2. The present spouse wishes to remarry.
3. The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.
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4. The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee
609
Notably, the records reveal that Ludyson has complied with the first, second, and fourth requisites.
Thus, what remains to be resolved is whether or not private respondent successfully discharged
the burden of establishing a well-founded belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.
In Republic vs. Orcelino-Villanueva,the Court expounded on the required diligence: The well-
founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was
the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse
(even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive,
mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief” which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not
only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead.
In the case at bar, Ludyson first took a leave of absence from his work in the United Arab Emirates
and returned to the Philippines to search for Shanaviv. He then proceeded to inquire about his
wife's whereabouts from their friends and relatives in Cagayan and Bicol. Next, he aired over
BomboRadyo Philippines, a known radio station, regarding the fact of disappearance of his wife.
Finally, he claims to have visited various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao City and
nearby municipalities.
The Court finds that Ludyson's efforts fall short of the degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, he failed to present any of these alleged friends or relatives to corroborate these "inquiries."
Moreover, no explanation for such omission was given. As held in jurisprudence, failure to present
any of the persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made tends to belie a claim of a diligent
search.
Second, he did not seek the help of other concerned government agencies, namely, the local police
authorities and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In Cantor, the Court reasoned that
while a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation, it would still be
prudent for the present spouse to seek the aid of the authorities in searching for the missing spouse.
Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the present spouse cannot be said to
have actively and diligently searched for the absentee spouse.
Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager, Ludyson bases his "well-founded
belief” on bare assertions that he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife. Again, the
present spouse's bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short of the
diligence required to engender a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 210929 July 29, 2015
FACTS: Edna and Romeo were married in Iligan City. Edna worked as domestic helper in
Singapore. Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their conjugal home without
reason or information as to his whereabouts. Thus, Edna returned to the country to look for Romeo.
She inquired from her parents-in-law and common friends and relatives. Still, she found no leads
as to his whereabouts or existence. Edna then filed before the RTC a petitionto declare Romeo
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness. RTC granted the petition on the basis of
her well-founded belief of Romeo’s death. The OSG filed a petition for certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in finding that Edna had a well-founded belief that
Romeo, her absent spouse, was dead.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented by Edna, which merely consisted of bare and
uncorroborated assertions, never amounted to a diligent and serious search required under
prevailing jurisprudence.
RULING: YES.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive death may
be granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead. In this case, Edna failed. The RTC and the CA overlooked Edna’s patent noncompliance
with the said requirement.
The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the
spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still
alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would
not suffice. The Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of
complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged
upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the
absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead
This strict standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws in light of
the State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Courts should never allow
procedural shortcuts but instead should see to it that the stricter standard required by the Family
Code is met. Accordingly, in a string of cases, this Court has denied petitions for the declaration
of presumptive death on the said basis.
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611
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of the
death of the absent spouse depends upon inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of an absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by the present spouse.
Applying the standard set forth by the Court, Edna’s efforts failed to satisfy the required well-
founded belief of her absent husband’s death. Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries
remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence
on record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired about the whereabouts
of her husband. She did not even present her children from whom she learned the disappearance
of her husband. In fact, she was the lone witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is
not evidence and is not equivalent to proof, the Court cannot give credence to her claims that she
indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate her husband.
Verily, it makes sense to conclude that her efforts were not diligent and serious enough to give
meaning to her well-founded belief that Romeo was already dead. Suffice it to state that her
petition should have been denied at the first instance. The RTC, however, granted it, reasoning
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR

G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013
FACTS: Maria and Jerry were married and lived together as husband and wife in South Cotabato.
Sometime, the couple had a violent quarrel about: (1) inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever
she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the
respondent’s father. After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time
that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything
from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
More than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, Maria filed to RTC a petition for
her husband’s declaration of presumptive death claiming that she had a well-founded belief that
Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-
law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding
Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a
hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the
petition in court.
RTC granted her petition which was opposed by the Republic.
ISSUES:
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(1) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in
petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
RULING:
(1) YES. Certiorari Lies to Challenge the Decisions for the Declaration of Presumptive Death.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. However, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. Therefore, Petitioner for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the
RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.
(2) NO. The well-founded belief of Edna fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of
diligence required.
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead.
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of
the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the
burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances
of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able
to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result
of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already
dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death
of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by [the] present spouse.
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In the case, the "well-founded belief" anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" fell short of the
"stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence. She merely engaged in a
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"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form
a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by Court in
locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been
times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry
knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that
those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the summary nature of its
proceedings.
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614
ABSENTEE
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, V. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR.

G.R. No. 188400 March 8, 2017, Leonen, J.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for
the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of
the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home. However, Manuel started making
himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever
she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not
return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. Sometime in August 2001, Tina became
curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned
that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSOcertified copy of the marriage
contract. She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact
already married when they exchanged their own vows. The court rendered judgment finding
Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Eduardo further testified that he declared he
was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his
first marriage before marrying Tina. Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his
first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so.
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. In the present case, the prosecution proved that
the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity;
hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married
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the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code. It was the burden
of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was
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of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for
more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. With the effectivity of the Family Code,
the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced
to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he
or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

(TENTH DIVISION), AND ALAN B. ALEGRO
G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005, Callejo, Sr., J.
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines requires the spouse present to institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse, for the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage. The
spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
wellfounded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract
a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief.
FACTS: Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence
that he and Lea were married and that one evening, Lea arrived home late and he berated her for
being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would
be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported
for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day,
Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’ house. However,
Lea did not return to their house anymore. Alan further testified that one day, after his work, he
went to the house of Lea’s parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there.
He also went to the house of Lea’s friend, Janeth Bautista, but he was informed by Janette’s
brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for Manila. When Alan went back to the
house of his parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house but
that she left without notice. Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised
to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.
He decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta
of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did not
show up. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked
where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts
despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free
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time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan and again
looked for his wife but failed. Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. The
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police authorities issued an Alarm Notice.Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
RULING: No. Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines requires the spouse present to
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse, for the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-
grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or
circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of
life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as
it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence
evidence on the ultimate question of his death. In this case, the respondent failed to present Janeth
Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about
Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned
to the house of his parents-in-law, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that
she left without notice. The respondent declared that Lea left their abode after he chided her for
coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for
her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal
abode and never returned. Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the
conjugal abode because of her resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a
month after their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries
from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could
have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law
about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS. The
respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea,
but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition
in the RTC. In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a
well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton
was already dead.
TADEO-MATIAS V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018
FACTS: Petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias and Wilfredo N. Matias entered into a lawful marriage
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on January 1, 1968. After the marriage, the couple put up their conjugal home in San Miguel,
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Tarlac City. Wilfredo continued to serve the Philippines as a member of the Philippine
Constabulary and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to again serve the
Philippine Constabulary. Wilfredo never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga
since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated with the petitioner. According to the
records of the National Police Commission, he was already declared missing since 1979. Petitioner
claimed that she constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding
Wilfredo, but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, neither did they have
any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the
New People's Army. After more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the petitioner is still hopeful,
but the times had been tough on her, especially with a meager source of income coupled with her
age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to
survive; thus she petitioned for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo to claim the
benefits arising from the death of the latter. On January 15, 2012, the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac City, Branch 65 (RTC) granted the petition when it ruled as follows: “WHEREFORE in
view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purpose of claiming
financial benefits due to him as former military officer. On appeal of the Republic, the Court of
Appeals (CA) annulled the decision of the RTC and set aside the petition on the ground that the
RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the Family
Code when the purpose of the petitioner was not to remarry; the RTC should have invoked Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 41 of the Family Code applies in the instant case – the declaration
of presumptive death for purposes of claiming benefits?
RULING: No. Article 41 does not apply in the case at bar. The Court ruled that the petition for
the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted
the application of Article 41 of the Family Code which shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage
under the said law. Thus: “Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code,
an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.”
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death
of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive
death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely
to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended. Given that her petition for the declaration
of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on
the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of
her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding
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presumptions of death for any civil purpose. Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its
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basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The
petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil
Code, and not on Article 41 of the Family Code.
RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF ABSENCE OF ROBERTO L. REYES.

ERLINDA REYNOSO REYES -VERSUS - HON, JOSE P. ALEJANDRO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH II,
CAVITE CITY
G.R. No. L-32026 January 16, 1986
FACTS: In a petition filed on October 25, 1969 Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of
the absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their
conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and his whereabouts
unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left no will nor any property in his name
nor any debts. The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition established that she
and Roberto L. Reyes were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in April 1962 her husband
left the conjugal home due to some misunderstanding over personal matters; that since then
petitioner has not received any news about the whereabouts of her husband; that they have not
acquired any properties during their marriage and that they have no outstanding obligation in favor
of anyone; that her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of her husband,
invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code.
After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L. Reyes left
no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an absentee.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not declaring Roberto Reyes as an absentee.
RULING: NO. A perusal of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court on absentees reveals that it is based
on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on absence. And the reason and purpose of
the provisions of the New Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381 to 396) are: (1) The interest of the
person himself who has disappeared; (2) The rights of third parties against the absentee, especially
those who have rights which would depend upon the death of the absentee; and (3) The general
interest of society which may require that property does not remain abandoned without someone
representing it and without an owner. It will thus be noted that said provisions of the New Civil
Code are concerned with absence only with reference to its effects on property. Article 384, New
Civil Code, which is reproduced from Article 184 of the old Code, and relied upon by herein
petitioner, refers to the second period or stage of absence, and specifically indicates the precise
moment when the same may begin. Thus, this article provides that after the lapse of two (2) years
without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five (5) years in case
the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may be
declared by the Court. The primordial purpose of this declaration is to provide for an administrator
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of the property of the absentee. It cannot be said that because of the comma (,) between the words
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'news' and 'and', the two-year period mentioned in the first part of the law has no reference to or
bearing on the property of the absentee. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence
made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent
for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead
and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
DAYA MARIA TOL-NOQUERA V. HON. VILLAMOR AND DIOSDADO TOL

G.R. 84250 July 20, 1992
FACTS: Daya Maria Tol-Noquera seeks the appointment of her person as administratix of the
property of the absentee Remigio Tol.
Diosdato Tol opposed the petition claiming that Daya Maria Tol was not an acknowledged natural
child of the absentee and as such, she is an illegitimate child of Remigio Tol and prohibited to
inherit ab intestate from the relatives of her father.
ISSUE: Whether Daya Maria Tol-Noquera is disqualified from being appointed as administratix
of the property of his absent father because she is illegitimate?
RULING: No, Daya is not disqualified. The purpose of the rules on the appointment of an
administrator of the properties of an absentee is for the protection of the interests of the absentee
and not for the benefit of the administrator. Whether the administrator may or may not inherit the
property administered is not controlling. What is important is that the administrator is one who is
allowed by law to seek the declaration of absence of the absentee and whether he or she is
competent to be appointed as and administrator of the estate.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth

Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and
APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC
G.R. NO. 163604 May 6, 2005
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court granted the petition for declaration of presumptive death and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead.
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In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code.
Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the
spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial court's order
by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served
"as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present
case being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, it contending that the
declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special
proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
a special proceeding.
RULING: No. A petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary ordinary proceeding
and not a special proceeding.
The Republic insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code
is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives,
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
x x x ‰lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant
of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
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For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the
absent spouse.
By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her
desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary
proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
There is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court
appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary
proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed.
Not being a special proceeding, the petition therefore does not need a record of appeal to perfect
the appeal. Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of Court provide that a record f appeal is
only needed in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law
or these Rules so require.
CELERINA J. SANTOS v. RICARDO T. SANTOS

G.R. No. 187061 October 08, 2014
FACTS: Ricardo Santos filed a petition for the declaration of absence of his wife Celerina for the
purpose of remarriage alleging that they lived together in Tarlac but because their business did not
prosper, Celerina worked as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Ricardo claims that despite efforts
to locate her, he never heard of Celerina since she left for Hong Kong for almost 12years. The
RTC granted the petition and declared Celerina presumptively dead.
Accordingly to Celerina, she only found out about the petition of Ricardo when she could no longer
avail of the remedies of the new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment. Thus, Celerina
filed a Petition for annulment of judgment alleging that she never left the country and that she had
never been absent for 12 years. She claims that it was Ricardo that left the conjugal dwelling to
cohabit with another woman. The CA dismissed Celerina’s petition stating that the proper remedy
was for her to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her reappearance.
ISSUE: Whether the CA err in dismissing the petition for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently
obtained judgment declaring presumptive death?
RULING: YES. Celerina filed her petition less than 2 years from the decision declaring her
presumptively dead and about a month after her discovery of the decision. The petition was
therefore filed within the period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud and before the action is
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barred by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.
622
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for 4 consecutive years
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead,
that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.
When subsequent marriage are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. The
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. The
second marriage as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the
first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing validity of second marriage.
The court recognized the conditional nature of the reappearance as a cause for terminating the
subsequent marriage. However, the provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to
effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared
presumptively dead from availing of other remedies existing in law. The court recognizes that a
subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing an action in court to prove the reappearance
of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.
In the case, Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination
of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance
is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify
the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but
also nullifying the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and subsequent marriage,
mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina’s choice to file an action
for annulment of judgment will lie.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR

G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where
she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to
conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief
that her husband was already dead.
FACTS: The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato.
Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent
ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything
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from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
623
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death. She
claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had
inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors
and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to
check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the
respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
The RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and declaring Jerry presumptively
dead.
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision,
the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part,
and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order. The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45
petition before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
RULING: We grant the petition.
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’ directory,
hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
(1) First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the
records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were
unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital
visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these
attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
(2) Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities
to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in
which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it
proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the
authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.
(3) Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
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inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he
624
inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as
witnesses.
(4) Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she
conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-
founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her
husband’s whereabouts.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search"
where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed
to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth

Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and
APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC
G.R. NO. 163604 May 6, 2005
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court granted the petition for declaration of presumptive death and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code.
Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the
spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial court's order
by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served
"as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present
case being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, it contending that the
declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special
proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
a special proceeding.
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RULING: No. A petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary ordinary proceeding
and not a special proceeding.
625
The Republic insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code
is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:
x x x ‰lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant
of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the
absent spouse.
By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her
desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary
proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
There is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court
appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary
proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed.
Not being a special proceeding, the petition therefore does not need a record of appeal to perfect
the appeal. Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of Court provide that a record f appeal is
only needed in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law
or these Rules so require.
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626
CELERINA J. SANTOS v. RICARDO T. SANTOS
G.R. No. 187061 October 08, 2014
FACTS: Ricardo Santos filed a petition for the declaration of absence of his wife Celerina for the
purpose of remarriage alleging that they lived together in Tarlac but because their business did not
prosper, Celerina worked as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Ricardo claims that despite efforts
to locate her, he never heard of Celerina since she left for Hong Kong for almost 12years. The
RTC granted the petition and declared Celerina presumptively dead.
Accordingly to Celerina, she only found out about the petition of Ricardo when she could no longer
avail of the remedies of the new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment. Thus, Celerina
filed a Petition for annulment of judgment alleging that she never left the country and that she had
never been absent for 12 years. She claims that it was Ricardo that left the conjugal dwelling to
cohabit with another woman. The CA dismissed Celerina’s petition stating that the proper remedy
was for her to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her reappearance.
ISSUE: Whether the CA err in dismissing the petition for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently
obtained judgment declaring presumptive death?
RULING: YES. Celerina filed her petition less than 2 years from the decision declaring her
presumptively dead and about a month after her discovery of the decision. The petition was
therefore filed within the period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud and before the action is
barred by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for 4 consecutive years
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead,
that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.
When subsequent marriage are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. The
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. The
second marriage as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the
first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing validity of second marriage.
The court recognized the conditional nature of the reappearance as a cause for terminating the
subsequent marriage. However, the provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to
effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared
presumptively dead from availing of other remedies existing in law. The court recognizes that a
subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing an action in court to prove the reappearance
of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.
In the case, Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination
of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance
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is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify
the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
627
Celerina is correct. Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but
also nullifying the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and subsequent marriage,
mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina’s choice to file an action
for annulment of judgment will lie.
RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF ABSENCE OF ROBERTO REYES, ERLINDA

REYNOSO REYES VS. HON. JOSE P. ALEJANDRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH II, CAVITE CITY, R
G.R. No. L-32026 January 16, 1986
The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have
to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil
Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or
his wife is asking the Court that the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be
transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code). The petition to declare the husband an absentee and
the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be
combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings.
FACTS: In a petition filed on October 25, 1969 Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the
absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their
conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and his whereabouts
unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left no will nor any property in his name
nor any debts.
The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition established that she and Roberto L.
Reyes were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in April 1962 her husband left the conjugal
home due to some misunderstanding over personal matters; that since then petitioner has not
received any news about the whereabouts of her husband; that they have not acquired any
properties during their marriage and that they have no outstanding obligation in favor of anyone;
that her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of her husband, invoking the
provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code.
After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L. Reyes left
no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an absentee.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not declaring Roberto Reyes as an absentee.
RULING: No.A perusal of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court on absentees reveals that it is based on
the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on absence. And the reason and purpose of the
provisions of the New Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381 to 396) are: (1) The interest of the person
himself who has disappeared; (2) The rights of third parties against the absentee, especially those
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who have rights which would depend upon the death of the absentee; and (3) The general interest
628
of society which may require that property does not remain abandoned without someone
representing it and without an owner.
It will thus be noted that said provisions of the New Civil Code are concerned with absence only
with reference to its effects on property. Article 384, New Civil Code, which is reproduced from
Article 184 of the old Code, and relied upon by herein petitioner, refers to the second period or
stage of absence, and specifically indicates the precise moment when the same may begin. Thus,
this article provides that after the lapse of two (2) years without any news about the absentee or
since the receipt of the last news, and five (5) years in case the absentee has left a person in charge
of the administration of his property, his absence may be declared by the Court. The primordial
purpose of this declaration is to provide for an administrator of the property of the absentee. It
cannot be said that because of the comma (,) between the words 'news' and 'and', the two-year
period mentioned in the first part of the law has no reference to or bearing on the property of the
absentee.
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time
of the celebration of the marriage.
REPUBLIC VS. JOSE SAREÑOGON, JR.

G.R. No. 199194 February 10, 2016
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances
of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able
to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result
of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
FACTS: On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition before
the RTC of Ozamiz City for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon
(Netchie).
The RTC set the Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the publication
of said Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta,
all in the province of Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition. Trial then followed.
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629
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991. They later became
sweethearts and on August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall.
However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a
seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he did not receive
any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While still
abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin,
Misamis Occidental. He returned home after his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie’s
relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. Because
of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the
RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt,
Consuelo Sande. These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and
wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations abroad.
These two added that they had no information regarding Netchie’s location.
The RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the
relief prayed for under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared
for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this action.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC properly granted Jose’s Petition
RULING: NO. In Republic v. Cantor, the Court has held that:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites extended
discussion), the holding is that the – mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by
the law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee
spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not
suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon
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the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-
founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-
630
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more
importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose has "well-founded belief" that Netchie was already dead
upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie’s parents while he was still out of the country, but did
not reach them as they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home, he was
not able to obtain any information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie’s relatives and friends;
(3) Jose’s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed dead,
was corroborated by Jose’s older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt, both of whom testified that he
(Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month and that after this, there
had been no information as to Netchie’s whereabouts.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the family’s
foundation and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties.
x x x [I]t has not escaped this Court’s attention that the strict standard required in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only
to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage
and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify
this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires
in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code."
Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the
RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code,
in reference to the "well-founded belief" standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts
to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged
friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific
individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough,
determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years
were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he
visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of
his search.
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631
DAYA MARIA TOL-NOQUERA V. VILLAMOR
G.R. No. 84250 July 20, 1992
FACTS: Daya Maria Tol filed a petition alleging that she was the acknowledged natural child of
Remigio Tol, who had been missing since 1984. She claimed that a certain Diosdado Tol had
fraudulently secured a free patent over Remigio's property and had obtained title thereto in his
name. She was seeking the administration of the absentee's estate in order that she could recover
the said property.
The petition was opposed by Diosdado Tol, who argued that Daya Maria Tol was not an
acknowledged natural child of the absentee and that the property sought to be administered was
covered by an original certificate of title issued in his name.
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was a collateral attack on a Torrens title.
The court also declared in effect that it was useless to appoint an administrator in view of the claim
of a third person that he was the owner of the absentee's property.
ISSUE: Whether Daya Maria Tol be denied being appointed administratrix in view of the claim
of a third person that he was the owner of the absentee's property.
RULING: No. It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate
from and prior to a petition for administration. In Reyes v. Alejandro, the Court declared that the
petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the
conjugal properties in the hands of the wife could be combined and adjudicated in the same
proceeding. The purpose of the cited rules is the protection of the interests and property of the
absentee, not of the administrator. Thus, the question of whether the administrator may inherit the
property to be administered is not controlling. What is material is whether she is one of those
allowed by law to seek the declaration of absence of Remigio Tol and whether she is competent to
be appointed as administratrix of his estate.
The issue of whether or not the property titled to Diosdado Tol is really owned by him should be
resolved in another proceeding. The right of Daya Maria Tol to be appointed administratrix cannot
be denied outright by reason alone of such issue.
ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180863 September 8, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971,
petitioner gave birth to the spouses’ only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio
argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March
1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return but,
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finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents’ home in Bancay 1st, Camiling,
Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at
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Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed
a document to that effect. That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didn’t
hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985.
Subsequently, however, Virgilio’s application for naturalization filed with the United States
Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was
subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling,
Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit.
The RTC held that Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio
Polborosa was already dead."
ISSUE: Whether the petition for declaration of presumptive death should prosper.
RULING: Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time
of the celebration of the marriage.
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings
independent of the settlement of the absentee’s estate.
JACINTO J. BAGAPORO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 211829 January 30, 2019
FACTS: In this case, petitioner, Jacinto Bagaporo, was legally married to Dennia Dumlao.
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However, without the marriage having been dissolved, he contracted a second marriage with
Milagros Lumas.
633
Petitioner was indicted for Bigamy in an Information dated May 31, 2006, worded as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of September 1991, in the Municipality of Calauag, province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Jacinto
Bagaporo, being then legally married to one Dennia Dumlao in a marriage ceremony solemnized
on March 10, 1986 at Quezon City by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr., and without said marriage having
been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there wilfully[,] unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second and subsequent marriage with Milagros Lumas.
The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal for failure to file the required appellant’s brief. Entry of
Judgment then followed after the dismissal became final on August 31, 2013.
ISSUE: Whether the crime of bigamy may attach when the spouse present did not obtain a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before entering into a subsequent marriage.
RULING: There can be no quibbling over whether or not the elements of bigamy were
successfully proven by the prosecution. Petitioner does not deny that he contracted a second
marriage without a judicial declaration that his absent spouse from a prior marriage may be legally
presumed dead. The gist of petitioner's claim is alleged good faith and that there is no need for a
judicial declaration of a disputable presumption (of death of the absent spouse) that has already
been provided by law.
According to petitioner, it was the prosecution's burden to prove that his absent wife was still alive
when he contracted his second marriage. Petitioner essentially asks, what if his absent spouse was
in fact already dead, which is undeniably possible? It is argued that there is no substantial
distinction between such a situation and that of a present spouse who contracts a subsequent
marriage with the knowledge that the absent spouse is already dead.
The legal questions raised are not novel. As discussed in Manuel v. People of the Philippines:
x x x Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and
would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed
to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death
of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of
bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution, "the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good
morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every
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safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. The
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laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the
proceedings.
A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient
ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly
on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to
innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure
the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive
death of the absent spouse after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means
is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief
of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim
of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties
believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not
by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective
condition of individuals. Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit
second marriages. Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of
marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts
easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the
absent spouse.
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ADVANCE DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
TERESA R. IGNACIO vs. RAMON REYES, FLORENCIO REYES, JR., ROSARIO R.

DU and CARMELITA R. PASTOR,
G.R. No. 213192 July 12, 2017
FACTS: On July 11, 1967, Angel Reyes and Oliva R. Arevalo filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal (now RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151) (intestate court) a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the Estate of their father Florencio Reyes, Sr. (Florencio Sr.) who died on June
23, 1967, and enumerated therein the surviving heirs, namely: Oliva, Francisca Vda. de Justiniani
, Angel, Amparo R. Avecilla , Ramon Reyes (Ramon), Teresa, Rosario R. Du, Jose Reyes, Soledad
Reyes, Carmelita5 R. Pastor, and Florencio Reyes, Jr. (Florencio Jr.). On July 15, 1967, the
intestate court appointed Oliva as the special administratrix of the estate of Florencio Sr. (Florencio
Sr. estate), and then as the regular administratrix in an Order dated November 23, 1967.6 Florencio,
Jr. replaced Oliva in 1982. Thereafter, Teresa became the administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate
on August 8, 1994.
On December 5, 1994, Teresa executed a lease contract over a 398 square meters (sq. m.) parcel
of land located at Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-59201 (Magsaysay property) in favor of Gonzalo Ong, Virginia Lim, Nino Yu, Francisco
Lim and Simona Go. In an Order9 dated July 15, 1996, the intestate court approved the lease
contract upon Teresa's motion dated June 4, 1996.
Likewise, on September 26, 1996, the intestate court allowed Teresa to enter into a lease contract
over the parcel of land located at ·session Road, Baguio City with a total area of 646 sq. m. covered
by TCT No. T-26769 (Session Road property) to Famous Realty Corporation (FRC). Thus, on
October 29, 1996, Teresa leased the Session Road property to FRC for the period of July 1, 1996
to June 30, 2003, with a monthly rental of ₱135,000.00.
Sometime in January 1997, Teresa also leased the properties located at Loakan Road, Baguio City
covered by TCT Nos. T-26770 and T-26772 (Loakan and Military Cut-off properties), in favor of
ATC Wonderland, Inc. and, subsequently, to Gloria de Guzman and Sonshine Pre-School for a
period often years, effective September 1, 1996 to August 31, 2006.
On September 25, 2001, herein respondents Ramon, Florencio Jr., Rosario and Carmelita, and the
Heirs of Amparo, Intestate Estate of Soledad, Jose and Intestate Estate of Angel (plaintiffs) filed
before the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 3 (Baguio RTC), three complaints for partition, annulment
of lease contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against Teresa and the lessees of the subject Baguio properties.
The plaintiffs alleged in their Complaints that, with the exception of the lessees, the parties and
the Florencio Sr. estate own one-tenth (1/10) of each of the Session Road, Loakan and Military
Cut-off, and Magsaysay properties. They claimed that Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio
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Sr. estate is the sole owner of the properties and leased the same to the other parties without their
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conformity. They also asserted in one of their complaints that the Florencio Sr. estate is different
from the Heirs of Florencio Sr. and Heirs of Salud.
They averred that, as co-owners, they have not received their share in the monthly rentals of the
properties aforementioned due to Teresa's failure to duly account for the same. Thus, they are
asking for the partition of the properties, for the accounting of all the rentals, income or profits
derived, and deliver the same to the plaintiffs, for the annulment of the lease contracts and order
the lessees to vacate the premises, and for the payment of damages.
ISSUE:Whether motion before intestate court praying for the issuance of an order allowing the
distribution of the heirs' aliquot shares in the co-owned properties be granted.
RULING: Jurisprudence teaches that jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special
and limited as it relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to
belong to the estate.
Furthermore, the doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality" applies
with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong
to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."
In this regard, the Baguio RTC shirked from its duty when it deferred the trial to await a request
order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution. In fact, it has not yet made a
definite ruling on the existence of co-ownership. There was no declaration of entitlement to the
desired partition either because a co-ownership exists or a partition is not legally prohibited. As
this Court is not a trier of facts, it is for the trial court to proceed and determine once and for all if
there is co-ownership and to partition the subject properties if there is no legal prohibition. It is
also best for the Baguio RTC to settle whether the respondents are claiming ownership over the
properties by virtue of their title adverse to that of their late father and his estate and not by any
right of inheritance.
QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR ITS OWN BEHALF,
AND REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE v. LCN
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CONSTRUCTION CORP.
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G.R. No. 174873 August 26, 2008
FACTS: Raymond Triviere passed away Proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were
instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the Regional Trial Court. Atty. Enrique
P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office, representing
the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators
of the estate of the deceased. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses
for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of
the estate, as well as litigation expenses.
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation
expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under
administration, the RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha.
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for their
respective clients.
LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere,
filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion on 2 October 2002
The RTC granted the second Motion for Payment; however, it reduced the sums to be paid, to wit:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED. The sums to be
paid to the co-administrator and counsel for the heirs of the deceased Triviere are however reduced.
Accordingly, the co-administrator Atty. Syquia and aforenamed counsel are authorized to pay to
be sourced from the Estate of the deceased as follows:
a) P450,000.00 as share of the children of the deceased who are represented by the Quasha,
Ancheta, Pena, Nolasco Law Offices;
b) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses for said law firm;
c) P150,000.00 as share for the widow of the deceased Amy Consuelo Triviere; and
d) P100,000.00 for the Co-administrator Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and for litigation costs and
expenses.
LCN filed a Motion for Reconsideration
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN.
The appellate court revoked the P450,000.00 share and P150,000.00 share awarded by the RTC to
the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, on the basis that Section 1,
Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court proscribes the distribution of the residue of the estate until
all its obligations have been paid.
ISSUE: Whether the honorable court of appeals erred in ruling that the award in favor of the heirs
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of the late Raymond Triviere is already a distribution of the residue of the estate.
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RULING: No. Although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance
distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: [1]
only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject
of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by
the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (second paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 90). There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children
and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with
these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration. Its Order of 12 June
2003 is completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single sentence
which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their respective shares from
the estate after all these years. Taking into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the
late Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess of
the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in
approving the advance distribution of the same.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ v. CA

G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.
Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and
private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the
named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will. On June
29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes
who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,
influence.
Maria Angeline — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons. On July 28, 1993, petitioner
Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for
Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk
of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of
Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will."
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Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
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Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00. Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that
he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes's motion for release of rent payments which
opposition the court failed to consider.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court should order the release of the titles to certain heirs.
RULING: No. Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the
bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice
to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution
of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Nothwithstanding a pending controversy
or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon
conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. —When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable to
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice shall assign
the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there
is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
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the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. In
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settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1)
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the
probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his motion
for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. Therein, petitioner assailed the
distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of
his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide
that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive
shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary
cases.
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CASES MENTIONED IN THE LECTURES
DR. NIXON L. TREYES VS. ANTONIO LARLAR, ET AL.

G.R. No. 232579 September 08, 2020
FACTS: Rosie Larlar Treyes, the wife of Dr. Nixon Treyes, died without any children and without
a will. Rosie left behind seven siblings, the private respondents.
At the time of her death, Rosie owned 14 real estate conjugal properties. Subsequently, Dr. Nixon
executed two affidavits of Self Adjudication transferring the estate of Rosie unto himself, claiming
that he was the sole heir. The private respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for annulment
of the Affidavits, cancellation of TCTs, conveyance of ownership and possession, partition, and
damages. Dr. Nixon filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter and lack of real parties in interest.
ISSUE: Whether a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate
special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action seeking for the protection and
enforcement of ownership rights given by the law of succession.
RULING: No.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations
in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action.
In the instant case, it is readily apparent from the allegations in the Complaint filed by the private
respondents that the action was not instituted for the determination of their status as heirs, as it was
their position that their status as heirs was already established ipso jure without the need of any
judicial confirmation. Instead, what the Complaint alleges is that the private respondents’ rights
over the subject properties, by virtue of their being siblings of the deceased, must be enforced by
annulling the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication and ordering the reconveyance of the subject
properties.
In Pacific Banking Corp. Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals,[71] the Court made the
crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding:
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one
seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished
from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against another,
while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party-litigant
seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to
seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish
the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.
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Applying the foregoing to ordinary civil actions for the cancellation of a deed or instrument and
reconveyance of property on the basis of relationship with the decedent, i.e., compulsory or
intestate succession, the plaintiff does not really seek to establish his/her right as an heir. In truth,
the plaintiff seeks the enforcement of his/her right brought about by his/her being an heir by
operation of law.
Restated, the party does not seek to establish his/her right as an heir because the law itself already
establishes that status. What he/she aims to do is to merely call for the nullification of a deed,
instrument, or conveyance as an enforcement or protection of that right which he/she already
possesses by virtue of law.
Moreover, it is likewise noted that ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity of a document,
nullity of title, recovery of ownership of real property, or reconveyance are actions in
personam. And thus, they only bind particular individuals although they concern rights to tangible
things. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.Hence,
any decision in the private respondents’ ordinary civil action would not prejudice non-
parties.
To emphasize, any holding by the trial court in the ordinary civil action initiated by the
private respondents shall only be in relation to the cause of action, i.e., the annulment of the
Affidavits of Self-Adjudication executed by petitioner Treyes and reconveyance of the
subject properties, and shall only be binding among the parties therein.
The Transmission of the Rights of Heirs atthe Precise Moment of Death of theDecedent under the
Civil Code... the enforcement of their rights already granted by law as intestate heirs finds basis in
Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights of succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent.
The transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, the heir is
legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance at that very moment,
"and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution."
In fact, in partition cases, even before the property is judicially partitioned, the heirs are already
deemed co-owners of the property.
Thus, in partition cases, the heirs are deemed real parties in interest without a prior separate judicial
determination of their heirship.
Article 1001 states that brothers and sisters, or their children, who survive with the widow or
widower, shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, while the surviving spouse shall be
entitled to the other half:
Hence, subject to the required proof, without any need of prior judicial determination, the private
respondents siblings of Rosie, by operation of law, are entitled to one-half of the inheritance of the
decedent.
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Thus, in filing their Complaint, they do not seek to have their right as intestate heirs
established, for the simple reason that it is the law that already establishes that right.
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What they seek is the enforcement and protection of the right granted to them under Article 1001
in relation to Article 777 of the Civil Code by asking for the nullification of the Affidavits of Self-
Adjudication that disregard and violate their right as intestate heirs.
"a prior declaration of heirship in a special proceeding should not be required before an heir may
assert successional rights in an ordinary civil action aimed only to protect his or her interests in
the estate. Indeed, the legal heirs of a decedent should not be rendered helpless to rightfully protect
their interests in the estate while there is yet no special proceeding."... the successional rights of
the legal heirs of Rosie are not merely contingent or expectant — they vest upon the death of the
decedent. By being legal heirs, they are entitled to institute an action to protect their ownership
rights acquired by virtue of succession and are thus real parties in interest in the instant case.
Given the clear dictates of the Civil Code that the rights of the heirs to the inheritance vest
immediately at the precise moment of the decedent's death even without judicial declaration of
heirship, and the various Court En Banc and Division decisions holding that no prior judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary before an heir can file an ordinary civil action to enforce
ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession through the nullification of deeds divesting
property or properties forming part of the estate and reconveyance thereof to the estate or for the
common benefit of the heirs of the decedent, the Court hereby resolves to clarify the prevailing
doctrine.
Accordingly, the rule laid down in Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes, Heirs of Gabatan v. Court
of Appeals, and other similar cases, which requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate
special proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce
ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, is abandoned.
Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the
decedent's estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may
commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for
recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights
acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial
declaration of their status as such.
JESUSA DUJALI BUOT, PETITIONER v. ROQUE RASAY DUJALI, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 199885 October 02, 2017
distributed in accordance with law among the legal heirs.
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Dujali opposed and asked for dismissal, arguing Buot had no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings because she failed to attach any document, such as a certificate of live birth or a
marriage certificate, to prove her filiation. Buot argued only ultimate facts should be included in
an initiatory pleading. The marriage certificate and certificate of live birth which Dujali demands
are evidentiary matters that ought to be tackled during trial. She attached a copy of the necrological
services program where she was listed as one of Gregorio's heirs, a certification from the municipal
mayor that she is Gregorio's child, and a copy of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement which
includes both Buot and Dujali as Gregorio's heirs. Notably, this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement
pertained to parcels of land not included in the list of properties annexed in Buot's petition.
The RTC sided with Dujali. It held that under the law, there are only two exceptions to the
requirement that the settlement of a deceased's estate should be judicially administered: (1)
extrajudicial settlement and (2) summary settlement of an estate of small value. In this case,
administration has been barred by the fact that Gregorio's estate has already been settled
extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. It also noted that Gregorio
had no creditors since Buot failed to allege it in her petition.
been an extrajudicial settlement of certain properties of the estate.
RULING: When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial
administration proceedings. There are, however, several exceptions. One such exception is
provided for in Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. This Section states:
Sec. I . Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means
of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement,
whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir
who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with
and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of
deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under
oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be
filed under Section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor
files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
According to this provision, when the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all
of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves without judicial administration.
The heirs may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the
Register of Deeds. In case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for
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partition.
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Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition.
In Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez, we said:
[S]ection 1 [of Rule 74] does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings,
even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves
as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so
if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or
compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention
were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other
provisions that are mandatory in character.x x x (Italics in the original.)
Since such proceedings are always "long," "costly," "superfluous and unnecessary,"28 resort to
judicial administration of cases falling under Section 1, Rule 7 4 appears to have become the
exception rather than the rule. Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that "[w]here
partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons."29
In Pereira v. Court of Appeals, we had the opportunity to explain what the "good reason
exception" means. What constitutes good reason depends on the circumstances of each case. We
said:
"Again the petitioner argues that 'only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the
hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate
because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property
belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir."
We have reviewed the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of her petition for letters
of administration and rule that these do not suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio's estate
to administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover
Gregorio's entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of the estate.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF

ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND BENJAMIN GREGORIO
PALAGANAS VS. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
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G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011
646
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same
have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can
be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an
alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country
FACTS: Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States
(U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California,
she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had
left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the a petition
for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.
However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas
(Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should
not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it.
The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent
Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the
will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
The CA affirmed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will.
The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate
Philippines. The present case is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated
and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.
ISSUE: Whether a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
RULING: Yes.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take
cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may,
at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known
to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
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property of the estate; (d) the Page 2 of 2 name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e)
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if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it.
Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death
in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or reauthentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented
for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the
Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a
will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as
binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established.
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the
means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their
inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless
the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004
FACTS: On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving
several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. He
also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with
whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada,
Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada,
Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada. Apart from
the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children. They
are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital
relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and
co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June
29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent
located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates
of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners. Respondents also found out that
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petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by
executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.
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As such, the respondents filed a complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Titles. Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint
interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement
pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the titles
thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register
them in his name. Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real
parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the
administration proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the
deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceeding.
RULING: YES
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to
bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of
the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights
and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total
lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3and
Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young, this Court
recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent
under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits
on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules
are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no
rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of
an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such
instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait
further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights
and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties
of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the
executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the administrator is
alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party defendant. Evidently,
the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling
when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator
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but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
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All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property
of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third
being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS III VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 216425 11 November 2020
Courts, like all other government departments and agencies, must ensure the fundamental equality
of women and men before the law. Accordingly, where the text of a law allows for an interpretation
that treats women and men more equally, that is the correct interpretation.
The Regional Trial Court's application of Article 364 of the Civil Code is incorrect. Indeed, the
provision states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the surname of the father, but
"principally" does not mean "exclusively."
The purpose of the law in allowing change of name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103
of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to provide
his best interest. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully his petition, which is not
whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
FACTS: Petitioner Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch 12, to change his name. He alleged that he was born to Mario
Alanis y Cimafranca and Jarmila Imelda Ballaho y Al- Raschid, and that the name on his birth
certificate was "Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III." However, he wished to remove his father's surname
"Alanis III," and instead use his mother's maiden name "Ballaho," as it was what he has been using
since childhood and indicated in his school records. He likewise wished to change his first name
from "Anacleto" to "Abdulhamid" for the same reasons.
The RTC denied the Petition, holding that petitioner failed to prove any of the grounds to warrant
a change of name. The mere fact that petitioner has been using a different name and has become
known by it is not a valid ground for change of name. To allow him to drop his last name was to
disregard the surname of his natural and legitimate father, in violation of the Family Code and
Civil Code, which provide that legitimate children shall principally use their fathers' sumames.
The RTC also acknowledged that confusion could exist here, but found that granting his petition
would create more confusion; that, instead of seeking to change his name in his birth certificate
simply because either he erroneously and inadvertently or even purposely or deliberately used an
incorrect first name and surname in his private and public records, petitioner should have had the
other private and public records corrected to conform to his true and correct name. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but was denied.
On Appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) denied the Petition, It noted that the trial court did not
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gravely err in denying petitioner's Record on Appeal for having been filed out of time. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, which was also denied. Thus, he filed this Petition for Certiorari.
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Delving on the substantive issue, petitioner maintains that he has the right to use his mother's
surname despite his legitimate status, as recognized in Alfon v. Republic.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has established a recognized ground for changing his name.
RULING: Yes. The Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it held that legitimate children
cannot use their mothers' surnames. In denying the herein petition, this Court brings to the attention
of the petitioner that, our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right
to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname
of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
father's surname. Legitimate children, such as the petitioner in this case, has the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
Surnames, and it is so provided by law that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
use the surname of the father. The Regional Trial Court's application of Article 364 of the Civil
Code is incorrect. Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the
surname of the father, but "principally" does not mean "exclusively." This gives ample room to
incorporate into Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and
men before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it.
In Alfon v. Republic: The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change
her surname is that as legitimate child of Filomena Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should
principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word
"principally" as used in the codal-provision is not equivalent to "exclusively”; so that there is no
legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother
to which it is equally entitled. "The following may be considered, among others, as proper or
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name: (a) when the name
is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
As summarized in the Record on Appeal, the petition to change name was filed to avoid confusion.
A mere correction of his private and public records to conform to the name stated in his Certificate
of Live Birth would create more confusion because the petitioner has been using the name
Abdulhamid Ballaho since grade school until finishing his law degree. The purpose of the law in
allowing change of name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is
to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his best interest. There
is therefore ample justification to grant fully his petition, which is not whimsical but on the
contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
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Aside from being unduly restrictive and highly speculative, the trial court's reasoning is also
contrary to the spirit and mandate of the Convention, the Constitution, and Republic Act No. 7192,
which all require that the State take the appropriate measures to ensure the fundamental equality
of women and men before the law.
Patriarchy becomes encoded in our culture when it is normalized. The more it pervades our culture,
the more its chances to infect this and future generations.
The trial court's reasoning further encoded patriarchy into our system. If a surname is significant
for identifying a person's ancestry, interpreting the laws to mean that a marital child's surname
must identify only the paternal line renders the mother and her family invisible. This, in turn,
entrenches the patriarchy and with it, antiquated gender roles: the father, as dominant, in public;
and the mother, as a supporter, in private.
DIONISIO RELLOSA vs. GAW CHEE HUN

G.R. No. L-1411 September 29, 1953.
FACTS: On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land, together
with the house erected thereon, situated in the City of Manila, Philippines, for the sum of P25,000.
The vendor remained in possession of the property under a contract of lease entered into on the
same date between the same parties. Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition
that the vendee, being a Chinese citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military
Administration in accordance with (seirei) No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943, by the Japanese
authorities, and said approval has not been obtained, and that, even if said requirement were met,
the sale would at all events be void under article XIII, section 5, of our Constitution, the vendor
instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking the annulment of the
sale as well as the lease covering the land and the house above mentioned, and praying that, once
the sale and the lease are declared null and void, the vendee be ordered to return to vendor the
duplicate of the title covering the property, and be restrained from in any way dispossessing the
latter of said property.
Defendant set up as special defense that the sale referred to in the complaint was absolute and
unconditional and was in every respect valid and binding between the parties, it being not contrary
to law, morals and public order, and that plaintiff is guilty of estoppel in that, by having executed
a deed of lease over the property, he thereby recognized the title of defendant to that property.
ISSUES:
A. Whether the sale is valid.
B. Whether an action for reversion or escheat to the state is the proper remedy in the instant case.
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RULING: The sale in question is null and void for it is against the Constitution, but plaintiff is
barred from taking the present action under the principle of pari delicto.
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There are at present two ways by which this situation may be remedied, to wit, (1) action for
reversion, and (2) escheat to the state. An action for reversion is slightly different from escheat
proceeding, but in its effects they are the same. They only differ in procedure. Escheat proceedings
may be instituted as a consequence of a violation of article XIII, section 5 of our Constitution,
which prohibits transfers of private agricultural lands to aliens, whereas an action for reversion is
expressly authorized by the Public Land Act (sections 122, 123, and 124 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141).
In the United States, as almost everywhere else, the doctrine which imputes to the sovereign or to
the government the ownership of all lands and makes such sovereign or government the original
source of private titles, is well recognized (42 Am. Jur., 785). This doctrine, which was expressly
affirmed in Lawrence v. Garduño, G. R. No. 16542, and which underlies all titles in the
Philippines, (See Ventura, Land Registration and Mortgages, 2nd ed., pp. 2-3) has been enshrined
in our Constitution (article XIII). The doctrine regarding the course of all titles being the same here
as in the United States, it would seem that if escheat lies against aliens holding lands in those states
of the Union where common law prevails or where similar constitutional or statutory prohibitions
exist, no cogent reason is perceived why similar proceedings may not be instituted in this
jurisdiction.
"Escheat is an incident or attribute of sovereignty, and rests on the principle of the ultimate
ownership by the state of all property within its jurisdiction.’ (30 C.J.S., 1164.)
". . . America escheats belong universally to the state or some corporation thereof as the ultimate
proprietor of land within its Jurisdiction." (19 Am. Jur., 382.)
"An escheat is nothing more or less than the reversion of property to the state, which takes place
when the title fails." (Delany v. State, 42 N. D., 630, 174 N.W., 290, quoted in footnote 6, 19 Am.
Jur., 381.)
"As applied to the right of the state to lands purchased by an alien, it would more properly be
termed a ’forfeiture’ at common law." (19 Am. Jur., 381.)
"In modern law escheat denotes a falling of the estate into the general property of the state because
the tenant is an alien or because he has died intestate without lawful heirs to take his estate by
succession, or because of some other disability to take or hold property imposed by law." (19 Am.
Jur.,
With regard to an action for reversion, the following sections of Commonwealth Act No. 141 are
pertinent:
"SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefor by their charters."
"SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
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ordinance, royal decree, royal order, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
653
Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realenqos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any
other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public
domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize
them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance
or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent
courts; Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements
mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the
provisions of this Act, such persons, corporation, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said
lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise,
such property shall revert to the Government."
"SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed
in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty,
one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of
this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of
annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or
confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements
to the State."
Note that the last quoted provision declared any prohibited conveyance not only unlawful but null
and void ab initio. More important yet, it expressly provides that such conveyances will produce
"the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit, originally issued,
recognized of confirmed, actually or presumptively", and of causing "the reversion of the property
and its improvements to the State." The reversion would seem to be but a consequence of the
annulment and cancellation of the original grant or title, and this is so for in the event of such
annulment or cancellation no one else could legitimately claim the property except its original
owner or grantor — the state.
By following either of these remedies, or by approving an implementary law as above suggested,
we can enforce the fundamental policy of our Constitution regarding our natural resources without
doing violence to the principle of pari delicto. With these remedies open to us, we see no justifiable
reason for pursuing the extreme unusual remedy now vehemently urged by the amici curiae.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION V. HI-TRI DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION AND LUZ R. BAKUNAWA
Gr No. 192413 June 13, 2012, J. Sereno
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FACTS: Luz R. Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased ("Spouses Bakunawa") are
registered owners of six (6) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 324985 and 324986 of the
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Quezon City Register of Deeds, and TCT Nos. 103724, 98827, 98828 and 98829 of the Marikina
Register of Deeds. These lots were sequestered by the PCGG.
Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan ("Millan"), through her representative, Jerry
Montemayor, offered to buy said lots for "₱ 6,724,085.71", with the promise that she will take care
of clearing whatever preliminary obstacles there maybe to effect a "completion of the sale". The
Spouses Bakunawa gave to Millan the Owner’s Copies of said TCTs and in turn, Millan made a
down payment of "₱ 1,019,514.29" for the intended purchase. However, for one reason or another,
Millan was not able to clear said obstacles. As a result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale
and offered to return to Millan her down payment. However, Millan refused to accept back the
down payment. Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri
Development Corporation ("Hi-Tri") took out on October 28, 1991, a Manager’s Check from
RCBC-Ermita in the amount of ₱ 1,019,514.29, payable to Millan’s company Rosmil Realty and
Development Corporation ("Rosmil") c/o Teresita Millan and used this as one of their basis for a
complaint against Millan and Montemayor which they filed with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
99, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10719 in 1991.
On January 31, 2003, during the pendency of the abovementioned case and without the knowledge
of Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa, RCBC reported the "₱ 1,019,514.29-credit existing in favor of
Rosmil" to the Bureau of Treasury as among its "unclaimed balances" as of January 31, 2003.
Allegedly, a copy of the Sworn Statement executed by Florentino N. Mendoza, Manager and Head
of RCBC’s AMDSD was posted within the premises of RCBC-Ermita
On December 14, 2006, Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with
the RTC the action below for Escheat (Civil Case No. 06-244).
On April 30, 2008, Spouses Bakunawa settled amicably their dispute with Rosmil and Millan.
Instead of only the amount of "₱ 1,019,514.29", the spouses agreed to pay Rosmil and Millan the
amount of "₱ 3,000,000.00". But during negotiations and evidently prior to said settlement, Manuel
Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri inquired from RCBC-Ermita the availability of the ₱ 1,019,514.29
under RCBC Manager’s Check No. ER 034469. Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa were however
dismayed when they were informed that the amount was already subject of the escheat proceedings
before the RTC.
On 19 May 2008, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision declaring the deposits, credits, and
unclaimed balances subject of Civil Case No. 06-244 escheated to the Republic. Among those
included in the order of forfeiture was the amount of ₱ 1,019,514.29 held by RCBC as allocated
funds intended for the payment of the Manager’s Check issued in favor of Rosmil. Consequently,
respondents filed an Omnibus Motion dated 11 June 2008, seeking the partial reconsideration of
the RTC Decision insofar as it escheated the fund allocated for the payment of the Manager’s
Check. On 3 November 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of respondents.
On 26 November 2009, the CA issued its assailed Decision reversing the 19 May 2008 Decision
and 3 November 2008 Order of the RTC.
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ISSUE: Whether the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic.
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RULING: We find sufficient grounds to affirm the CA on the exclusion of the funds allocated for
the payment of the Manager’s Check in the escheat proceedings.
Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its sovereignty,
steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without there being an interested
person having a legal claim thereto. In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquires into the
status, custody, and ownership of the unclaimed balance to determine whether the inactivity was
brought about by the fact of death or absence of or abandonment by the depositor. If after the
proceedings the property remains without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall
be reverted to the state "to forestall an open invitation to self-service by the first comers." However,
if interested parties have come forward and lain claim to the property, the courts shall determine
whether the credit or deposit should pass to the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the state. We
emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for failing to deposit to or
withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding whereby the state compels the surrender to it of
unclaimed deposit balances when there is substantial ground for a belief that they have been
abandoned, forgotten, or without an owner.
An ordinary check refers to a bill of exchange drawn by a depositor (drawer) on a bank (drawee),
requesting the latter to pay a person named therein (payee) or to the order of the payee or to the
bearer, a named sum of money. The issuance of the check does not of itself operate as an
assignment of any part of the funds in the bank to the credit of the drawer. Here, the bank becomes
liable only after it accepts or certifies the check. After the check is accepted for payment, the bank
would then debit the amount to be paid to the holder of the check from the account of the depositor-
drawer.
There are checks of a special type called manager’s or cashier’s checks. These are bills of exchange
drawn by the bank’s manager or cashier, in the name of the bank, against the bank itself. Typically,
a manager’s or a cashier’s check is procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of
funds to be debited from the depositor’s account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank
the value of the check to be drawn. Since the bank issues the check in its name, with itself as the
drawee, the check is deemed accepted in advance. Ordinarily, the check becomes the primary
obligation of the issuing bank and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand.
Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a manager’s check does not ipso facto work as an automatic
transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case the procurer of the manager’s or cashier’s
check retains custody of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make
an effective delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered instruments under the
Negotiable Instruments Law applicable:
Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. – Every contract on a negotiable instrument is
incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto.
As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the
delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making,
drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown
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to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the
656
property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a
valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively
presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature
appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.
Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur. An
order to debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the
Manager’s Check was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that
the allocated fund is still held by the bank. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part
of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured the Manager’s Check. The doctrine that the deposit
represented by a manager’s check automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because the
instrument – although accepted in advance – remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have
been informed that the deposit had been left inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be
subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.
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657

Rey Laca

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II

Judge Melita Amylesha Macaraeg

4 PROBATE OF A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL 61

25 DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATION 569

27 CASES MENTIONED IN THE LECTURES 642

PATRICIA NATCHER vs. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF

LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH

G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON VS. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013

A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a

RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. v. HON. RODRIGUEZ

GR No. 192828 November 28, 2011

DR. NIXON L. TREYES v. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO L. LARLAR,

G.R. No. 232579 September 08, 2020

Ordinary Civil Actions vis-a-vis Special Proceedings

HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 150206 MARCH 13, 2009

ALAN JOSEPH SHEKER VS ESTATE OF SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA

GR NO. 157912 DECEMBER 13, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005

PACIFIC BANKING CORP. EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION vs. COURT OF

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF REYNALDO GUZMAN; ANITA

GR. No. 230404 January 31, 2018

FACTS: Respondents Rolando Rodriguez, RacquelGegajo, Rosalinda Landon, Reynaldo

G.R. No. 203770 November 23, 2016

GILDA JARDELEZA, (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY:

G.R. No. 167975 June 17, 2015

THELMA M. ARANAS vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO et. al,

G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014

LEO C. ROMERO AND DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO vs. HON. COURT OF

G.R. No. 188921 April 18, 2012

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP vs.

G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011

SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP vs.

G.R. No. 177192

Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA but was denied.

Exceptions to the general rule:

CAROLINA CAMAYA vs. BERNARDO PATULANDONG

G.R. No. 144915 February 23, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES,

Gr No. 139587 Nov. 22, 2000

In 1976, Oscar was able to redeem the said property.

ISSUE: Whether the decision of the probate court is proper.

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

GR NO. L-62952 OCTOBER 9, 1985

We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):

ERLINDA PILAPIL vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMO BRIONES

G.R. No. 150175 March 10, 2006

JESUSA DUJALI BUOT vs. ROQUE RASAY DUJALI

SPS BENATIRO vs. HEIRS OF EVARISSTO CUYOS

Gr. No. 161220 July 30, 2008

DE LEON vs DEL ROSARIO

G.R. NO. 152862 July, 26, 2004

MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 115181 MARCH 31, 2000

ARSENIO TABASONDRA, ET AL. vs. SPOUSES CONRADO CONSTANTINO AND

G.R No. 196403 December 7, 2016

HEIRS OF ERNESTO MORALES v. ASTRID MORALES AGUSTIN

G.R. No. 224849 June 06, 2018

In contrast, an ordinary partition of co-owned property, specifically of real property, is governed

by Title III of the Civil Code on Co-ownership.