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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

There is Implied Waiver of Immunity when the State Enters into a Contract in its Private Capacity

As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it
may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides.
On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation. However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically
mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability
only if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. However, when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity, no such waiver may be implied. Statutory provisions
waiving state immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of
sovereignty. Department of Health vs. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc., 691 SCRA 421, G.R. No. 182358
February 20, 2013

An Unincorporated Agency Performing Governmental Functions Can Invoke Immunity from Suit

The Department of Health, being an “unincorporated agency of the government” can validly invoke the
defense of immunity from suit because it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued.
Significantly, the Department of Health is an unincorporated agency which performs functions of
governmental character. Department of Health vs. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc., 691 SCRA 421, G.R. No.
182358 February 20, 2013

If a Complaint Seeks to Impose a Charge or Financial Liability, Non-Suability may be Invoked

In this case, PPI specifically prayed, in its Complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint, for the
DOH, together with Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit as well as Undersecretary Galon, to be held jointly
and severally liable for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Undoubtedly,
in the event that PPI succeeds in its suit, the government or the state through the DOH would become
vulnerable to an imposition or financial charge in the form of damages. This would require an appropriation
from the national treasury which is precisely the situation which the doctrine of state immunity aims to
protect the state from. Department of Health vs. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc., 691 SCRA 421, G.R. No.
182358 February 20, 2013

Suability of Official Depends on whether the Official was Acting within his Jurisdictional Capacity

The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official
or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a
charge or financial liability against the government. Otherwise stated, public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Department of Health vs. Phil. Pharmawealth,
Inc., 691 SCRA 421, G.R. No. 182358 February 20, 2013

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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

The Enumeration of Marginalized and Under-represented Sectors is NOT Exclusive

As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698
(2001), “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive.” The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection
and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled
that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA
7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s
morality, or lack thereof. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32, G.R.
No. 190582 April 8, 2010

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Reason behind the Ban on Midnight Appointments

Appointments are banned prior to the elections to ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the
appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections.
To this end, appointments within a certain period of time are proscribed by the Omnibus Election Code and
related issuances. After the elections, appointments by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under
the circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No. 010988, to avoid animosities between outgoing and
incoming officials, to allow the incoming administration a free hand in implementing its policies, and to
ensure that appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage or as a reward for
services rendered to the outgoing local officials. Nazareno vs. City of Dumaguete, 602 SCRA 578, G.R.
No. 181559 October 2, 2009

Exception to Ban on Midnight Appointments after the Elections

Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC Resolution No.
010988 does not purport to nullify all “mass appointments.” However, it must be shown that the
appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is
a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk. Nazareno vs. City of
Dumaguete, 602 SCRA 578, G.R. No. 181559 October 2, 2009

Probable Cause is the Allowable Standard of Proof for the President to Declare Martial Law

The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion;
2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the
President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion. The President needs only to satisfy probable
cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of
declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient
standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary
for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof,
which, in order to be met, would require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise

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of emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause is much simpler. It merely necessitates an
"average man to weigh the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He merely relies on common sense and needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the accused." Lagman
vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

Territorial Scope of Martial Law is NOT Limited to the Place where there is Actual Rebellion

It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of
actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical
dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination of
the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution
must have considered these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in
determining the territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public
safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the
present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless
elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming
from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where
there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise
thereof ineffective and useless. Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Locus Standi of People Suing as Taxpayer

For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are
disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity
is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. In light of the foregoing, it is
apparent that contrary to the view of the RTC, a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge
its validity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the
government. As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent “direct injury
test” bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking “transcendental importance,”
“paramount public interest,” or “far-reaching implications,” ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public
expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.
Mamba vs. Lara, 608 SCRA 149, G.R. No. 165109 December 14, 2009

To Exercise Judicial Power, there must be an Actual Case or Controversy

Thus, in Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, 560 SCRA 504 (2008), we have ruled that “where the issue has become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical
use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however
intellectually challenging.” In the present case, the acquittal of herein petitioner operates as a supervening
event that mooted the present Petition. Any resolution on the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the
order of suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer, for legally speaking he did
not commit the offense charged. Abdul vs. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), 711 SCRA 246, G.R. No.
184496 December 2, 2013

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Judicial Review does NOT Extend to the President’s Choice which among the Powers He Will Use

The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President's
decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation. To do so would be
tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the
prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President. Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017

The Jurisdiction of the SC under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is Sui Generis

The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated
as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen
may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in
Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision. Lagman vs.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

Sufficiency of Factual Basis does NOT mean Piecemeal Facts but the Totality of it

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should
look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should
the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as
the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to
the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly
burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically
necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him
within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course,
would not only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency
powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put
an end to the root cause of the emergency". Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the
correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could
have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail. Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R.
No. 231658, July 4, 2017

BILL OF RIGHTS

As an Exercise of Police Power, Payment of Just Compensation is NOT Necessary

The present case, thus, affords an opportunity for us to clarify Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 456 SCRA
414 (2005) and Carlos Superdrug Corporation, 526 SCRA 130 (2007). First, we note that the above-quoted
disquisition on eminent domain in Central Luzon Drug Corporation is obiter dicta and, thus, not binding
precedent. As stated earlier, in Central Luzon Drug Corporation, we ruled that the BIR acted ultra vires
when it effectively treated the 20% discount as a tax deduction, under Sections 2.i and 4 of RR No. 2-94,
despite the clear wording of the previous law that the same should be treated as a tax credit. We were,

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therefore, not confronted in that case with the issue as to whether the 20% discount is an exercise of police
power or eminent domain. Second, although we adverted to Central Luzon Drug Corporation in our ruling
in Carlos Superdrug Corporation, this referred only to preliminary matters. A fair reading of Carlos
Superdrug Corporation would show that we categorically ruled therein that the 20% discount is a valid
exercise of police power. Thus, even if the current law, through its tax deduction scheme (which abandoned
the tax credit scheme under the previous law), does not provide for a peso for peso reimbursement of the
20% discount given by private establishments, no constitutional infirmity obtains because, being a valid
exercise of police power, payment of just compensation is not warranted. Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs.
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, 711 SCRA 302, G.R. No. 175356
December 3, 2013

The Senior Citizen Discount is a Pricing Regulation which Constitutes an Exercise of Police Power

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to
be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in
purchasing basic commodities. It may not be amiss to mention also that the discount serves to honor senior
citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives on contributing to the development and
progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of honoring the elderly is an integral part of this
law. As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private
establishments to price their products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens,
for which the Constitution affords preferential concern. In turn, this affects the amount of profits or
income/gross sales that a private establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other words, the subject
regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment. However, it does not
purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of
private establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that matter, but merely
regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the amount of profits or income/gross sales that
such private establishments may derive from, senior citizens. Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, 711 SCRA 302, G.R. No. 175356 December 3,
2013

When a Regulation Has Gone Too Far, the Same may Amount to Taking under Eminent Domain

It should be noted though that potential profits or income/gross sales are relevant in police power and
eminent domain analyses because they may, in appropriate cases, serve as an indicia when a regulation
has gone “too far” as to amount to a “taking” under the power of eminent domain. When the deprivation or
reduction of profits or income/gross sales is shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory, then
the challenged governmental regulation may be nullified for being a “taking” under the power of eminent
domain. In such a case, it is not profits or income/gross sales which are actually taken and appropriated for
public use. Rather, when the regulation causes an establishment to incur losses in an unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory manner, what is actually taken is capital and the right of the business
establishment to a reasonable return on investment. If the business losses are not halted because of the
continued operation of the regulation, this eventually leads to the destruction of the business and the total
loss of the capital invested therein. But, again, petitioners in this case failed to prove that the subject
regulation is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, 711 SCRA 302, G.R. No. 175356 December 3, 2013

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Determination of Amount of Just Compensation is a Judicial Function

The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our
Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances
can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has
been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot “be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government.” Thus, we have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for
the method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere
guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. National Power Corporation vs. Zabala, 689 SCRA 554,
G.R. No. 173520 January 30, 2013

A Person Not Impleaded in a Case Cannot Be Prejudiced by its Ruling

“The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which
he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.” Thus, we agree
with the CA’s pronouncement that since respondent was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he could not
be bound by the decision rendered therein. Because he was not impleaded in said case; he was not given
the opportunity to present his case therein. But, more than the fact that O’Pallick was not impleaded in the
HLURB case, he had the right to vindicate his claim in a separate action, as in this case. As a prior purchaser
of the very same condominium unit, he had the right to be heard on his claim. Aguilar vs. O'Pallick, 702
SCRA 455, G.R. No. 182280 July 29, 2013

Administrative Due Process is Sufficiently Met when there is an Opportunity to be Heard

Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot
complain of deprivation of due process. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process,
the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her
interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. A formal trial-type hearing is
not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process — it is enough that the parties are given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting
evidence on which a fair decision can be based. “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court — one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be
heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. Demaala vs. Sandiganbayan
(Third Division), 717 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 173523 February 19, 2014

Equal Protection Requires that Laws Apply Equally to Persons, Regardless of Sexual Orientation

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBTs) have the
same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Elections, 618 SCRA 32, G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

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Freedom of Expression Applies also to those that Offend, Shock, or Disturb

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb.
Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any
compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32, G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

Non-Establishment Clause is Violated if Religious Matters are Utilized to Justify Exclusion

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32, G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

CPA Board Exams are Matters of Public Concern but Right to Information is Subject to Limitations

The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law". We are
prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public
concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in
the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are
admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be
not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning
of the art and science of accounting. On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to
limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere
convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation,
generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the
questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these
proceedings. They have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or
articulate the justification for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching
implications of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in
order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for
further proceedings. Antolin vs. Domondon, 623 SCRA 163, G.R. No. 165036 July 05, 2010

Freedom of Association does NOT Apply Only to Groups which Incite Violence

A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a political party incites
violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of
the freedom of association guarantee. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, 618
SCRA 32, G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

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Violation of Miranda Rights Renders Inadmissible the Extrajudicial Confession or Admission Only

While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the
customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the
Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as
evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,
555 SCRA 255 (2008), the Court categorically ruled that “the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights
render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.’
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are not otherwise excluded
by law or rules, are not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.” Ho Wai
Pang vs. People, 659 SCRA 624, G.R. No. 176229 October 19, 2011

Questioning by an Internal Affairs Manager of a Bank is NOT a Custodial Investigation

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial
interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under
custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz.: (1)
to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to
be informed of the two other rights above. In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an
uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following
are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal
affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial
investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written
statement. Tanenggee vs. People, 699 SCRA 639, G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013

Right to Counsel in Custodial Investigation is NOT Available in an Administrative Investigation

In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA 304 (2001), we declared that the right to counsel
“applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.” Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil
Service Commission, 630 SCRA 202 (2010): However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel
under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in
a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. Here, petitioner’s written
statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an
anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be
attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written
statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility. Tanenggee vs. People, 699 SCRA
639, G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013

Confession is Admissible when Voluntary Executed with the Assistance of Counsel

After a close reading of the records, this Court believes that Berry’s confession is admissible because it
was voluntarily executed with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel in the person of Atty.
Suarez. In point of fact Atty. Suarez testified that he thoroughly explained to Berry his constitutional rights

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and the consequences of any statements he would give. People vs. Constancio, 788 SCRA 132, G.R.
No. 206226 April 4, 2016

Right to Counsel is Guaranteed whether the Proceeding is Administrative, Civil, or Criminal

Aware that petitioners are not represented by counsel, the CA could have been more prudent by giving
petitioners time to engage the services of a lawyer or at least by reminding them of the importance of
retaining one. It is worthy to mention at this point that the right to counsel, being intertwined with the right
to due process, is guaranteed by the Constitution to any person whether the proceeding is administrative,
civil or criminal. The CA should have extended some degree of liberality so as to give the party a chance
to prove their cause with a lawyer to represent or to assist them. Polsotin, Jr. vs. De Guia Enterprises,
Inc., 661 SCRA 523, G.R. No. 172624 December 5, 2011

Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Duty Must Yield to the Presumption of Innocence

While as a rule we desist from disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial court especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, we must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt since the fundamental law presumes that the accused is
innocent. This presumption must prevail until the end unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling
evidence. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence. People vs. Abenes, 796 SCRA 56, G.R. No. 210878 July 7, 2016

CITIZENSHIP

Lucrative Trade/Profession Means that there is an Appreciable Margin of Income over Expenses

Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof
rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law. Based on
jurisprudence, the qualification of “some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation” means not
only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be
shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income
over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness,
or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income
should permit “him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the
prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
civilization.” Republic vs. Ong, 673 SCRA 485, G.R. No. 175430 June 18, 2012

Granting of a Petition for Naturalization does NOT Preclude the Reopening of the Case

A review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from
reviewing the factual existence of the applicant’s qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire
records of the naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal to this Court. Indeed, a
naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently categorized and given
special treatment. Unlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not
preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government another opportunity to present new
evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or

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reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already granted, on
the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised
in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. In the case at bar, there is even no need to present new
evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven his
possession of a “known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation” to qualify for naturalization.
Republic vs. Ong, 673 SCRA 485, G.R. No. 175430 June 18, 2012

Foreign Women Married to Philippine Citizens are Ipso Facto Philippine Citizens

Thus, it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at
the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from
similar laws in the United States which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section
15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization. Republic vs. Batuigas, 706 SCRA 746, G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013

False Declaration Under Oath is Proof of Lack of Good Moral Character

Respondent’s admitted false declaration under oath contained in the August 2001 deed of sale that he is a
Filipino citizen — which he did to secure the seamless registration of the property in the name of his wife
— is further proof of respondent’s lack of good moral character. It is also a violation of the constitutional
prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals. His defense that he unknowingly signed the deed
is unacceptable. First of all, as a foreigner living in a foreign land, he should conduct himself accordingly in
this country — with care, circumspect, and respect for the laws of the host. Finally, as an educated and
experienced businessman, it must be presumed that he acted with due care and signed the deed of sale
with full knowledge of its import. Republic vs. Huang Te Fu, 753 SCRA 562, G.R. No. 200983 March 18,
2015

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

An Administrative Offense Need NOT Be Related to a Public Officer’s Official Functions

Indeed, at the very least, the acts complained of constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, an administrative offense which need not be related to respondent’s official functions. As long as
the questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty
may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713) enunciates, inter alia, the State policy of promoting
a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4(c) of the Code commands
that “[public officials and employees] shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest. Balasbas vs. Monayao, 716 SCRA 190, G.R. No. 190524 February 17, 2014

Public Officers in Custody of Public Funds are Held to Highest Standards of Ethical Behavior

The oft-repeated phrase, “public office is a public trust” is not—and should not be—mere hortatory cliché.
A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity, and is
accountable to all those he or she serves. Public officers—particularly those in custody of public funds—
are held to the highest standards of ethical behavior in both their public and private conduct, and are

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expected to uphold the public interest over personal interest at all times. It is in this spirit that we convey
our deep disdain for all those whose actions betray the trust and confidence reposed in public officers, and
those who attempt to conceal wrongdoing through misdirection and blatantly belated explanations.
Hallasgo vs. Commission on Audit Regional Office No. X, 599 SCRA 514, G.R. No. 171340 September
11, 2009

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Reorganization Must Be Done in Good Faith to Effect a Valid Removal or Demotion

In this jurisdiction, a reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test
of good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy
more efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good faith. A
demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment
with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary,
is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it. Consequently, before a demotion may be effected
pursuant to a reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential.
Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission, 625 SCRA 251, G.R. No. 185215 July 22, 2010

Decisions of Government Agency Performing Adjudicatory Functions Have Res Judicata Effect

A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards that determine
the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same effect as a judgment of the court.
These decisions are binding, such that when they attain finality, they have the effect of res judicata that
even the courts of justice have to respect. As we have held in one case, “judicial or quasi-judicial function
involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with
respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of
their respective rights. In other words, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
function must be clothed with power and authority to pass judgment or render a decision on the controversy
construing and applying the laws to that end.” Villanueva vs. Palawan Council for Sustainable
Development, 691 SCRA 556, G.R. No. 178347 February 25, 2013

Decisions of Administrative Agency May Still Be the Subject of Judicial Review if Arbitrary

Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the Ombudsman’s decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. Indeed, in one case, the
Court went so far as to declare that in such cases, “it follows that the [Court of Appeals] has no appellate
jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse” the order or decision of the Ombudsman. But of course, the above
principles are subject to the rule that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and
unappealable by law are still “subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of
grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, or when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly
misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to
reverse the factual findings.” Orais vs. Almirante, 698 SCRA 88, G.R. No. 181195 June 10, 2013

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ELECTION LAW

Petition for Disqualification Should NOT be Filed Later than the Date of Proclamation

Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for disqualification should be
filed “any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.” Here, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013. Thus, the petition
in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013. Arnado vs. Commission on Elections,
767 SCRA 168, G.R. No. 210164 August 18, 2015

Dual Citizens May Now Run for Office after Making a Sworn Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship

Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from
running for any elective local position. In Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 (1999), it was clarified that
the phrase “dual citizenship” in said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”
Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and
to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run
for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time
of filing of their CoC. Arnado vs. Commission on Elections, 767 SCRA 168, G.R. No. 210164 August
18, 2015

Use of Foreign Passport Amounts to Repudiation of the Oath of Renunciation

In the case at bench, the COMELEC Second Division, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, ruled that
Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling
v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed
withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed
his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with
said second requirement. The COMELEC also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9,
2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been
belatedly executed. Arnado vs. Commission on Elections, 767 SCRA 168, G.R. No. 210164 August 18,
2015

Popular Vote does NOT Cure the Ineligibility of a Candidate

Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the
total votes cast, the same “cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications
and disqualifications.” In Velasco v. COMELEC, 575 SCRA 590 (2008), this Court pronounced that election
victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain
provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive qualifications of local government officials.
Arnado vs. Commission on Elections, 767 SCRA 168, G.R. No. 210164 August 18, 2015

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A Pre-Proclamation Controversy is Summary in Character and Limited in Scope

A pre-proclamation controversy is to be promptly decided so as not to delay canvass and proclamation.

Hence, the Board of Canvassers (BOC) will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on
the face of Election Returns (ERs) that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. Consistent with
its summary character, compliance with the procedure on contested ERs before the BOC under Sec. 20 of
RA 7166 is mandatory. Such provides that any candidate may contest the inclusion of an ER by making an
oral objection at the time the questioned return is submitted for canvass. Saño vs. Commission on
Elections, 611 SCRA 475, G.R. No. 182221 February 3, 2010

In Exceptional Cases, the Certificate of Votes May Be Used to Controvert the Authenticity of ER

By requiring that the certificate of votes be duly authenticated by at least two members of the Board of
Election Inspector (BEI) who issued the same, the law seeks to safeguard the integrity of the certificate
from the time it is issued by the BEI to the watcher after the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the
time that it is presented to the board of canvassers to prove tampering. The legislature may have reasonably
foreseen that the certificate may be easily altered while in the hands of the watcher in order to orchestrate
a sham pre-proclamation controversy. To counterbalance this possibility, the law imposes the condition that
the certificate, aside from complying with Section 16, must be subsequently authenticated at the time of its
presentment to the board of canvassers in the event that it shall be used to prove tampering. This way the
COMELEC may be assured that the certificate of votes issued by the BEI to the watcher of a protesting
candidate contains the same entries as the one thereafter presented before the MBC to prove tampering.
The procedure is consistent with the over-all policy of the law to place a premium on an election return,
which appears regular on its face, by imposing stringent requirements before the certificate of votes may
be used to controvert the election return’s authenticity and operate as an exception to the general rule that
in a pre-proclamation controversy, the inquiry is limited to the four corners of the election return. Doromal
vs. Biron, 613 SCRA 160, G.R. No. 181809 February 17, 2010

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Devolution Confers Power and Authority upon the LGUs to Perform Specific Functions

Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans to the Republic. As defined,
"devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various
local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities." It includes "the transfer to local
government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and
offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities." While the breeding station
may have been transferred to the Province of La Union by the Department of Agriculture as a consequence
of devolution, it remained as such, and continued to function as a breeding station; and the purpose for
which the donations were made remained and was carried out. Besides, the deeds of donation did not
specifically prohibit the subsequent transfer of the donated lands by the donee Republic.

Republic vs. Daclan, 754 SCRA 125, G.R. No. 197115 March 23, 2015

A Sanggunian Member Cannot Appear as Counsel of a Party Adverse to Instrumentality of Gov’t

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It is not disputed that the National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Therefore following Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987, the NPC is clearly an
instrumentality of the government. Section 446 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides that "the
sangguniang bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vice mayor
as the presiding officer" Thus, pursuant to Sec. 90 (b), (1) of the Local Government Code, Atty. Rambuyong,
as sanggunian member, cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC, which is an
instrumentality of government. Republic vs. Rambuyong, 632 SCRA 66, G.R. No. 167810 October 04,
2010

The Sangguniang Bayan is Empowered to License Establishment and Operation of Cockpits

Under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC, it is the Sangguniang Bayan which is empowered to "authorize and
license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and
commercial breeding of gamecocks." Considering that no public bidding was conducted for the operation
of a cockpit from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, petitioner cannot claim that he was duly authorized
by the Sangguniang Bayan to operate his cockpit in the municipality for the period January 1, 1997 to
December 31, 1997. Respondent members of the Sangguniang Bayan, therefore, had every reason to
suspend the operation of petitioner’s cockpit by enacting Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997. Du
vs. Jayoma, 670 SCRA 333, G.R. No. 175042 April 23, 2012

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Yogyakarta Principles on Sexual Orientation are NOT Obligatory on the Philippines

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated
by various international law professors, are—at best—de lege ferenda—and do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the
“soft law” nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation,
harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires,
without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Elections, 618 SCRA 32, G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

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