Zabal vs Duterte, G.R. No.

238467, February 12, 2019

FACTS:
 President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a cabinet meeting held on April 4, 2018. This
was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson Harry L. Roque, Jr. in a press briefing the following day
wherein he formally announced that the total closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six
months starting April 26, 2018. Zabal and Jacosalem are both residents of Boracay who, at the time of the
filing of the petition, were earning a living from the tourist activities therein.

 Despite the fact that the government was then yet to release a formal issuance on the matter, petitioners
filed the petition on April 25, 2018 praying that upon the filing of petition, a TRO and/or a WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION be immediately issued and after proper proceedings, a
judgment be rendered DECLARING the closure of Boracay Island or the ban against petitioners, tourists,
and non-residents therefrom to be UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

 Petitioners then filed a Supplemental Petition stating that the day following the filing of their original
petition or on April 26, 2018, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475 formally declaring a state of
calamity in Boracay and ordering its closure for six months from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. The
closure was implemented on even date. Thus, in addition to what they prayed for in their original petition,
petitioners implore the Court to declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 475

ISSUE: Is Proclamation No. 475, which temporarily closed Boracay for rehabilitation, a valid exercise of police
power?

RULING: YES

 That the assailed governmental measure in this case is within the scope of police power cannot be
disputed. Verily, the statutes from which the said measure draws authority and the constitutional
provisions which serve as its framework are primarily concerned with the environment and health, safety,
and well-being of the people, the promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate objectives of
governmental efforts and regulations. The motivating factor in the issuance of Proclamation No. 475 is
without a doubt the interest of the public in general. The only question now is whether the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.

 Certainly, the closure of Boracay, albeit temporarily, gave the island its much needed breather, and
likewise afforded the government the necessary leeway in its rehabilitation program. Note that apart
from review, evaluation and amendment of relevant policies, the bulk of the rehabilitation activities
involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and construction. These works could not have easily
been done with tourists present. The rehabilitation works in the first place were not simple, superficial or
mere cosmetic but rather quite complicated, major, and permanent in character as they were intended to
serve as long-term solutions to the problem. In any case, the closure, to emphasize, was only for a definite
period of six months, i.e., from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018.

 To the mind of the Court, this period constitutes a reasonable time frame, if not to complete, but to at
least put in place the necessary rehabilitation works to be done in the island. Indeed, the temporary
closure of Boracay, although unprecedented and radical as it may seem, was reasonably necessary and
not unduly oppressive under the circumstances. It was the most practical and realistic means of ensuring
that rehabilitation works in the island are started and carried out in the most efficacious and expeditious
way. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or
oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb the executive determination that the closure of Boracay was
 necessitated by the foregoing circumstances. As earlier noted, petitioners totally failed to counter the
factual bases of, and justification for the challenged executive action.

Maynilad vs DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 06, 2019

FACTS:
 On April 2, 2009, the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Environmental Management Bureau-Region III (EMB-RIII) filed a complaint before the DENR's Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) charging MWSS and its concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila Water, with
failure to provide, install, operate, and maintain adequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for
sewerage system resulting in the degraded quality and beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water
leading to Manila Bay, and which has directly forestalled the DENR's mandate to implement the
operational plan for the rehabilitation and restoration of Manila Bay and its river tributaries.

 In an Order dated October 7, 2009, upon recommendation of the PAB, the SENR found MWSS, Maynilad,
and Manila Water liable for violation of the Clean Water Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR), imposing fines against them.

ISSUE: Was Maynilad denied due process when SENR imposed a fine without a valid complaint?

Ruling: NO
 The records disclose the fact that this case was spawned by the complaints commenced by the Regional
Directors of the DENR-EMB-RIII, DENR-EMB-NCR, and DENR-EMB-RVI-A before the DENR-PAB.

 In clear terms, the Notice of Violation (NOV) stated the charges against petitioners, gave a directive to
attend the technical conference for simplification of issues and stipulations of facts, and apprised them of
the liability imposed on violators under Section 28 of the Clean Water Act. Hence, petitioners were
notified of the charges against them, were given an opportunity to be heard during a technical
conference, and were informed of the penalty for possible violations of the Clean Water Act. These
charges were the same accusations for which petitioners were eventually found liable for. In addition,
petitioners wrote several letters addressed to the PAB and the Secretary of the DENR formalizing their
position in response to the Complaint-Affidavits of the Regional Directors of the DENR-EMB. In turn, the
Regional Directors filed their Comments thereto, which were amply refuted by the petitioners.
Demonstrably, the SENR, upon recommendation of the PAB, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, validly
imposed the fine after the charge, hearing, and due deliberation.
People vs Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019

FACTS:
 At around seven (7) o'clock in the morning of September 10, 2015 in Purok 2, Barangay San Juan, Gingoog
City, Alfredo Salucana (Salucana) went to the Gingoog City Police Station to report a mauling incident
where Acosta purportedly hit him with a piece of wood. He also reported that Acosta was illegally planting
marijuana. The police officers proceeded to Acosta’s home and arrested him. After the arrest, SPO4
Legaspi found thirteen (13) hills of suspected marijuana plants planted beneath the "gabi" plants just
outside Acosta's home, and around a meter away from where he was arrested.

ISSUE: Was the marijuana validly seized under the “plain view” doctrine?

RULING: NO

 One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is when the
"plain view" doctrine is applicable. In People v. Lagman, this Court laid down the following parameters for
its application":

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain
view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

 In this case, the first and third requisites were not seriously contested by Acosta. Instead, he argues that
the second requisite is absent since the discovery of the police officers of the marijuana plants was not
inadvertent as it was prompted by Salucana. After a careful review of the records, this Court is inclined to
agree.

 The testimonies of P/Insp. Gundaya, SPO4 Legaspi, and Salucana collectively paint the picture that the
police officers proceeded with the arrest of Acosta for the mauling incident armed with prior knowledge
that he was also illegally planting marijuana.

o It is clear from Salucana's testimony that he knew of Acosta's illegal activities even prior to the
mauling incident. In fact, it may be reasonably inferred that the mauling incident had something
to do with Acosta's planting of marijuana. It is also clear that Salucana apprised the police officers
of the illegal planting and cultivation of the marijuana plants when he reported the mauling
incident. Thus, when the police officers proceeded to Acosta's abode, they were already alerted
to the fact that there could possibly be marijuana plants in the area. This belies the argument
that the discovery of the plants was inadvertent.

 Verily, it could not be gainsaid that the discovery was inadvertent when the police officers already knew
that there could be marijuana plants in the area. Armed with such knowledge, they would naturally be
more circumspect in their observations. In effect, they proceeded to Acosta's abode, not only to arrest
him for the mauling incident, but also to verify Salucana's report that Acosta was illegally planting
marijuana. Thus, the second requisite for the "plain view" doctrine is absent