EN BANC

G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

MARK ANTHONY V. ZABAL, THITING ESTOSO JACOSALEM, AND ODON S.

BANDIOLA, Petitioners, v. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES; SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND
EDUARDO M. AÑO, [SECRETARY] OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.

Even if it is otherwise, Proclamation No. 475 must be upheld for being in the nature of a valid police
power measure

Police power, amongst the three fundamental and inherent powers of the state, is the most pervasive
and comprehensive.40 "It has been defined as the 'state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare." 41 "As defined, it
consists of (1) imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common
good. It is not capable of exact definition but has been purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace."42 The police power "finds no specific Constitutional grant
for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter" 43 since "it is inborn in the very fact
of statehood and sovereignty."44 It is said to be the "inherent and plenary power of the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of the society." 45 Thus,
police power constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. 46 After all, "the Bill of Rights itself
does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties. 'Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will.' It is subject to the far
more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number."47

"Expansive and extensive as its reach may be, police power is not a force without limits." 48 "It has to
be exercised within bounds – lawful ends through lawful means, i.e., that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, require its exercise, and that the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose while not being unduly
oppressive upon individuals."49

That the assailed governmental measure in this case is within the scope of police power cannot be
disputed. Verily, the statutes50 from which the said measure draws authority and the constitutional
provisions51 which serve as its framework are primarily concerned with the environment and health,
safety, and well-being of the people, the promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate
objectives of governmental efforts and regulations. The motivating factor in the issuance of
Proclamation No. 475 is without a doubt the interest of the public in general. The only question now is
whether the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The pressing need to implement urgent measures to rehabilitate Boracay is beyond cavil from the
factual milieu that precipitated the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 475. This necessity is
even made more critical and insistent by what the Court said in Oposa v. Hon. Factoran, Jr. 52 in regard
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health, which rights are likewise integral
concerns in this case. Oposa warned that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are given continuing importance and the State assumes its solemn obligation to preserve and
protect them, the time will come that nothing will be left not only for this generation but for the
generations to come as well.53 It further taught that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.54

Against the foregoing backdrop, we now pose this question: Was the temporary closure of Boracay as
a tourist destination for six months reasonably necessary under the circumstances? The answer is in
the affirmative.

As earlier noted, one of the root causes of the problems that beset Boracay was tourist influx. Tourist
arrivals in the island were clearly far more than Boracay could handle. As early as 2007, the DENR had
already determined this as the major cause of the catastrophic depletion of the island's
biodiversity.55 Also part of the equation is the lack of commitment to effectively enforce pertinent
environmental laws. Unfortunately, direct action on these matters has been so elusive that the
situation reached a critical level. Hence, by then, only bold and sweeping steps were required by the
situation.

Certainly, the closure of Boracay, albeit temporarily, gave the island its much needed breather, and
likewise afforded the government the necessary leeway in its rehabilitation program. Note that apart
from review, evaluation and amendment of relevant policies, the bulk of the rehabilitation activities
involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and construction. These works could not have
easily been done with tourists present. The rehabilitation works in the first place were not simple,
superficial or mere cosmetic but rather quite complicated, major, and permanent in character as they
were intended to serve as long-term solutions to the problem.56 Also, time is of the essence. Every
precious moment lost is to the detriment of Boracay's environment and of the health and well-being of
the people thereat. Hence, any unnecessary distraction or disruption is most unwelcome. Moreover, as
part of the rehabilitation efforts, operations of establishments in Boracay had to be halted in the
course thereof since majority, if not all of them, need to comply with environmental and regulatory
requirements in order to align themselves with the government's goal to restore Boracay into
normalcy and develop its sustainability. Allowing tourists into the island while it was undergoing
necessary rehabilitation would therefore be pointless as no establishment would cater to their
accommodation and other needs. Besides, it could not be said that Boracay, at the time of the
issuance of the questioned proclamation, was in such a physical state that would meet its purpose of
being a tourist destination. For one, its beach waters could not be said to be totally safe for swimming.
In any case, the closure, to emphasize, was only for a definite period of six months, i.e., from April
26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. To the mind of the Court, this period constitutes a reasonable time
frame, if not to complete, but to at least put in place the necessary rehabilitation works to be done in
the island. Indeed, the temporary closure of Boracay, although unprecedented and radical as it may
seem, was reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive under the circumstances. It was the most
practical and realistic means of ensuring that rehabilitation works in the island are started and carried
out in the most efficacious and expeditious way. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion,
unreasonableness, arbitrariness or oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb the executive
determination that the closure of Boracay was necessitated by the foregoing circumstances. As earlier
noted, petitioners totally failed to counter the factual bases of, and justification for the challenged
executive action.

Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police power measure. To repeat, police power
constitutes an implied limitation to the Bill of Rights, and that even liberty itself, the greatest of all
rights, is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.

For the above reasons, petitioners' constitutional challenge on Proclamation No. 475 anchored on their
perceived impairment of the right to travel must fail.
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, Petitioner, v. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an expropriation
of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code
expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely
expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the
principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same
property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.

Statement of the Case

These principles are applied by this Court in resolving this petition for review on certiorari of the July
22, 1996 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA GR CV No. 48048, which affirmed in toto 3 the
Regional Trial Court's August 9, 1994 Resolution. 4 The trial court dismissed the expropriation suit as
follows:

The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not disputed. However, such right
may be exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A No. 7160). In the instant case, there is
no such ordinance passed by the Municipal Council of Parañaque enabling the Municipality, thru its
Chief Executive, to exercise the power of eminent domain. The complaint, therefore, states no cause
of action.

Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is barred by a prior judgment. On September
29, 1987, the plaintiff filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same parcels of land which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 17939 of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with
prejudice on May 18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the
same became final. The plaintiff can not be allowed to pursue the present action without violating the
principle of [r]es [j]udicata. While defendant in Civil Case No. 17939 was Limpan Investment
Corporation, the doctrine of res judicata still applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No.
17939) is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of
the late Anita de Leon). The herein defendant is the successor-in-interest of Limpan Investment
Corporation as shown by the "Deed of Assignment Exchange" executed on June 13, 1990.

WHEREFORE, defendant's motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. The order dated February 4,
1994 is vacated and set aside.

This case is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 5
 Factual Antecedents

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, 6 the Municipality of Parañaque

filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation 7 against Private Respondent V.M. Realty
Corporation over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a
combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro
Manila, and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for
the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the
homeless through a socialized housing project." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose
that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, 9 previously
made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter
did not accept. 10

Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134,
issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, 11 giving it due course. Acting on petitioner's motion, said
court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, 12 authorizing petitioner to take possession of the
subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair
market value based on its current tax declaration.

On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a
counterclaim, 13 alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it
was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res
judicata. On private respondent's motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. 14 On March
24, 1991, 15 petitioner filed its opposition, stressing that the trial court's Order dated February 4, 1994
was in accord with Section 19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of res judicata was not applicable.

Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution 16 nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order
and dismissing the case. Petitioner's motions for reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by
the trial court in a Resolution dated December 2, 1994. 17 Petitioner then appealed to Respondent
Court, raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993 is a
substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the exercise of
the power of eminent domain by the plaintiff-appellant.

2. Whether or not the complaint in this case states no cause of action.

3. Whether or not the strict adherence to the literal observance to the rule of procedure resulted in
technicality standing in the way of substantial justice.

4. Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present case. 18

As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision. Respondent
Court, in its assailed Resolution promulgated on January 8, 1997, 19 denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, this appeal. 20

The Issues

Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:

1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance
and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest
is primarily involved. 21

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

First Issue:

Resolution Different from an Ordinance

Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" 22 because the terms
"ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local
government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain." 23 Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention
by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
which provides. "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare
through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of
the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings." 24 (Emphasis
supplied.)

The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. 25 An LGU
may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations." 26 In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of
eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:

Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner,
and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the
amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent
domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over
a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution,
and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 27

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant
to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the
mayor be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals 28 to
show that a resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. 29 This case,
however, is not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337, 30 the previous Local
Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise
eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, 31 the present Local Government Code which was already in
force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.

We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. 32 An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary
in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently - a third reading is necessary for an ordinance,
but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. 33

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would
have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a
clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically
requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is
determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 34 In the instant case, there is no reason to
depart from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private
right of the people. 35 Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language - from "resolution"
under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 - demands a strict construction. "No species of property is
held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more
sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right
and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain
meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation." 36

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA
7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. 37 It is
axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere
administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a
mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also
requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU act pursuant
to an ordinance.

In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides that "territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy." It
merely upholds the law as worded in RA 7160. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its
powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has therefore no power to amend or act beyond the
authority given and the limitations imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent
domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" domain, since it must conform to
the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. 38 Indeed,
"the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it." 39

Complaint Does Not

State a Cause of Action

In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its Sangguniang Bayan passed an
ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified
all the acts of its mayor regarding the subject expropriation. 40

This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an
ordinance, but it did not present any certified true copy thereof. In the second place, petitioner did not
raise this point before this Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in
passing. 41 In any event, this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioner's Complaint for
expropriation filed on September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine that

. . . in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint itself. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is
hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? 42

The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation
which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is
equivalent to lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.

Second Issue:

Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals 43 and the trial court, 44 all the requisites for the application
of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior
expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.

Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally
all cases and proceedings, 45 cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that
the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata.
The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of property
which the State might need for public use." 46 "All separate interests of individuals in property are held
of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to
individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the
government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the
right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it." 47 Thus, the
State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of
previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent
domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment
dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit
raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with
this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over
the same property. 48 By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated
power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar
proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied
with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true of the principle of "law of the
case." In Republic vs. De Knecht, 49 the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise
eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be
expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may
still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are
complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but
also clearly defeat social justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's proper exercise of its
power of eminent domain over subject property. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.