Concise for Constitutional Law Review Notes on State Powers and Police Power

REVIEW NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PART II.
Selected Recent Jurisprudence (January 2010 – September 2019) 1
By Atty. Alexis F. Medina2
State Powers,
Individual Liberties and Public Rights, and
Remedies for the Enforcement
of Constitutional Rights
STATE POWERS
POLICE POWER
Police power: Regulations for the general welfare. -- Police power is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. It is the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare, and flows from the recognition that salus
populi est suprema lex. It is co-existent with the concept of the State and is the very foundation
and one of its cornerstones, and therefore even precedes the written Constitution. (Pimentel v.
Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019)
Requisites for valid exercise: The proper exercise of the police power requires
the concurrence of lawful subject and lawful means. The interests of the public
generally require its exercise, and that the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, while not being unduly
oppressive. -- Police power is the 'state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. It has to be exercised within
bounds - lawful ends through lawful means, i.e., that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, require its exercise, and that the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose while not being unduly
oppressive upon individuals. (Zabal v. Duterte, February 12, 2019, G.R. No. 238467)
The overriding purpose of the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare, public
health and safety, among others, even to the point of interfering with personal liberties or property
rights. To warrant such interference, two requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State;
and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The proper exercise of the police
power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. (Southern Luzon Drug
v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
1 This collection of summaries, excerpts or capsules of selected recent jurisprudence is a work in progress, subject to continuing
revision and updating. Reproduction for purely academic purposes with due attribution to the author is permitted.
2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of Law; Valedictorian,
San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Teaches Constitutional Law at San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila,
College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; Taught Constitutional Law at New Era
University, College of Law; Litigation Lawyer; Partner and Head of Public Private Partnership (PPP) Group, LIBRA LAW,
https://libralaw.com.ph/
Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - PART II Version 1.9. Page 1
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
(Fernando v St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. Lacking
a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause. (Fernando v. St.
Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
Police power prevails over the non-impairment clause. -- The constitutional

guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power. The law is
deemed written into the contract between the parties. Thus, survey firms may be compelled by
the Comelec, through regulation, to reveal the identities of subscribers to election surveys, despite
the confidentiality clause in their contracts. (Social Weather Station v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 208062, April 27, 2015)
Examples of Valid Exercise of Police Power
Boracay closure and rehabilitation
Lawful subject requirement: Proclamation No. 475 ordering the closure and
rehabilitation of Boracay satisfies the lawful subject requirement for a valid
exercise of police power, as the issuance was in the interest of the public in general,
specifically, for the environment, health, safety, and well-being of the people. --
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475, formally declaring a state of calamity in Boracay
and ordering its temporary closure for six months from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018 as a
tourist destination to ensure public safety and public health, and for rehabilitation. The
Proclamation cites the continuous rise of tourist arrivals, the insufficient sewer and waste
management system, and environmental violations of establishments degrade and destroy the
ecological balance of the Island of Boracay. The assailed governmental measure in this case is
within the scope of police power as it is primarily concerned with the environment and health,
safety, and well-being of the people. Proclamation No. 475 is in the interest of the public in
general. (Zabal v. Duterte, February 12, 2019, G.R. No. 238467)
Lawful means requirement: Proclamation No. 475 also satisfies the lawful
means requirement for a valid exercise of police power as the means employed --
temporary closure of Boracay as a tourist destination for six months -- was
reasonably necessary for the rehabilitation of Boracay and not unduly oppressive. -
- One of the root causes of the problems that beset Boracay was tourist influx. Tourist arrivals is
a major cause of the catastrophic depletion of the island's biodiversity. Certainly, the closure of
Boracay, albeit temporarily, gave the island its much-needed breather, and likewise afforded the
government the necessary leeway in its rehabilitation program. The bulk of the rehabilitation
activities involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and construction, which could not
have easily been done with tourists present. Moreover, operations of establishments in Boracay
had to be halted since majority, if not all of them, need to comply with environmental and
regulatory requirements. Besides, the beach waters could not be said to be totally safe for
swimming. In any case, the closure, was only for a definite period of six months, which is a
reasonable time frame, if not to complete, but to at least put in place the necessary rehabilitation
works. The temporary closure of Boracay, was reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive
under the circumstances. Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police power measure.
(Zabal v. Duterte, February 12, 2019, G.R. No. 238467)
Mandatory discounts for senior citizens and

PWDS
Lawful subject and lawful means requirements: The laws on discounts for
senior citizens and PWDs meets the requirements for a valid exercise of police
power - lawful subject and lawful means. -- The laws mandating a 20% discount on
purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs meet the two requirements for a valid
exercise of police power: (a) the interests of the public generally require the interference of the
State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of
the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subjects
of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, i.e., senior citizens and PWDs, are individuals whose well-being is a
recognized public duty. As a public duty, the responsibility for their care devolves upon the
concerted efforts of the State, the family and the community. The Court also entertains no doubt
on the legality of the method taken by the legislature to implement the declared policies of the
subject laws, that is, to impose discounts on the medical services and purchases of senior citizens
and PWDs and to treat the said discounts as tax deduction rather than tax credit. The measure is
fair and reasonable and no credible proof was presented to prove the claim that it was
confiscatory. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No.
199669, April 25, 2017)
Mandatory discounts do not amount to taking of property: The law

mandating senior citizens’ discounts does not amount to a compensable taking of
private property because there is no private property invaded or appropriated, as
what is supposedly taken is not earned profits but merely an expectation of profits.
-- The laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and
PWDs do not amount to a taking of private party that requires just compensation. The
requirements that expropriator must enter a private property and the entrance is for more than a
momentary period are absent. There is no private property that is invaded or appropriated by the
State. What was supposedly taken is not even earned profits but merely an expectation of profits,
which may not even occur. There can be no taking of a contingency or of a mere possibility. Also,
the supposed taking is not permanent because establishments are not prevented from adjusting
their prices to accommodate the effects of the granting of the discount, and thus, losses are not
inevitable. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No.
199669, April 25, 2017)
The law mandating senior citizens’ discount is not a taking of private property
without just compensation, as the regulation affects only the seller's right to profit,
not earned profits. -- The laws mandating a 20% discount for senior citizens’ and PWDs are
not confiscatory as no private property is taken without just compensation. The subject provisions
only affect the petitioner's right to profit, and not earned profits. The right to profit is not a vested
right but an inchoate right, a mere expectation, which may or may not come into existence.
(Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669,
April 25, 2017)
The law mandating senior citizens’ discounts is a valid exercise of police

power affecting the ability of private establishments to price their products and
services. -- Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. The laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of
medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs are a valid exercise of police power and do not
require the payment of just compensation. The 20% discount is a police power regulation affecting
the ability of private establishments to price their products and services relative senior citizens. It
is not an exercise of the power of eminent domain that requires just compensation. This is because
there is no taking of property involved, but only an imposition of burden. (Southern Luzon Drug
v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
The law mandating senior citizens’ discounts is a valid police power

regulation, as the state may impose burdens on private entities, even if it may affect
their profits -- The laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior
citizens and PWDs are police power regulations similar to the minimum wage law, zoning
ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting
the working hours to eight, and the like. It is within the bounds of the police power of the state to
impose burden on private entities, even if it may affect their profits. (Southern Luzon Drug v.
Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
Regulation of the real estate service profession
Lawful subject: The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or

trade is a legitimate subject of a valid exercise. -- R.A. No. 9646 aims to professionalize
the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision
of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and
salespersons) in the country. Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are
unduly oppressive and infringe the constitutional rule against deprivation of property without due
process of law. They stress that real estate developers are now burdened by law to employ licensed
real estate brokers to sell, market and dispose of their properties. The contention has no basis.
The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a
legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the State particularly when their
conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State,
public health and welfare and public morals. In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at
most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider.
To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violate the due process clause is to ignore
the settled practice, under the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various
trades or professions. Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the
ranks of real estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards as
real property transactions are "susceptible to manipulation and corruption, especially if they are
in the hands of unqualified persons working under an ineffective regulatory system." We thus find
R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the State’s police power. Property rights must bow to the primacy
of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare. (Remman Enterprises v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R. No.
197676, February 4, 2014)
Examples of Invalid Exercise of Police Power
Ordinance requiring fences to have a 5-meter

setback for parking and be 80% see-thru
Unlawful means: When the means employed was not reasonably related to
the purpose of the law: Requiring fences to be built five meters back to provide
parking space for the public is not reasonably necessary to prevent the commission
of unlawful acts. -- The ordinance -- which requires property owners to (1) demolish their
existing concrete wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% see-thru, and
(3) build the said fence five meters back in order to provide a parking area – is invalid. Providing
for a parking area has no logical connection to, and is not reasonably necessary for, the
accomplishment of prevention or concealment of unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness.”
(Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
Unlawful means: Limiting the height of fences of private properties to one

meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru has no
reasonable relation to its purpose of ensuring public safety and security. -- Limiting
the height of fences of private properties to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter
to be at least 80% see-thru has no reasonable relation to its purpose of ensuring public safety and
security. Such exposed premises could even entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property.
The ordinance is thus an invalid exercise of police power. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College,
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
Ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural

practice
Lawful subject: The ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice to

protect the health of the people satisfies the lawful subject requirement in the
exercise of police power. -- Davao City passed Ordinance No. 0309-07 banning aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all agricultural entities in Davao
City. The City reasoned that aerial spraying produces more drift that causes discomfort, and is
extremely offensive and obnoxious to the residents; that spray drift cannot be controlled even
with use of highly advanced apparatus, that as soon as fungicides are released in the air, they
become air pollutants and that the ordinance does not only seek to protect and promote human
health but also serves as a measure against air pollution. The City of Davao has the authority to
enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its
constituents. (Mosqueda v. City Government of Davao, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Unlawful means: The ordinance is unduly oppressive as it mandates the shift

from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying within a span of 3 months under pain
of penalty despite the fact that the 3-month period is inadequate. -- A local government
unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being unreasonable and
oppressive in that it sets the effectivity of the ban at three months after publication of the
ordinance. They allege that three months will be inadequate time to shift from aerial to truck-
mounted boom spraying, and effectively deprives them of efficient means to combat the Black
Sigatoka disease. The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application
within three months can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations and
the corresponding resources required therefor. Even the RTC recognized the impracticality of
attaining a full-shift to other modes of spraying within three months in view of the costly financial
and civil works required for the conversion. Requiring the respondents and other affected
individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain
of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be
oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power. (Mosqueda v. City Government of Davao, G.R.
No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
EMINENT DOMAIN
Meaning of taking: “Taking” in eminent domain includes deprivation of the

ordinary use of property. -- "Taking" of property takes place when: (1) the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property;(2) there is a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of his property; (3) the owner is deprived of the ordinary use of the
property, or (4) when he is deprived of the jurisdiction, supervision and control of his property.
(Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September 2015)
Meaning of taking: Taking becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the

owner of the beneficial use of its property. -- Taking only becomes confiscatory if it
substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property. An ordinance which
permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.
It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. A regulation that
permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point
of view, equivalent to a "taking”, which will require compensation under the takings clause.
(Mosqueda v. City Government of Davao, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Examples of “Taking” of Property
Mandatory five-meter setback of fences to provide for public parking space

amounts to a deprivation of the beneficial use of private property, and thus, is a
compensable taking. -- A city ordinance requiring land owners to setback their fences by five
meters to provide for parking space for the general public is tantamount to a taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition
of title nor the total destruction of value is essential to taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where
the title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the
impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking The
implementation of the ordinance requiring a five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a
parking area for the public would be tantamount to a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s
College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the
aesthetic appearance of the community. -- Moreover, the State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve
or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The ordinance will substantially divest
property owners of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. (Fernando v.
St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
Easement of right-of-way on the land is equivalent to the taking of property.

(Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September 2015)
Examples Where There is No Taking of Private Property
Mandatory discounts on price of goods: The law mandating senior citizens’

discounts does not amount to a compensable taking of private property because
there is no private property invaded or appropriated, as what is supposedly taken is
not earned profits but merely an expectation of profits. There can be no taking of a
contingency or of a mere possibility. -- The laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases
of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs do not amount to a taking of private party that
requires just compensation. The requirements that expropriator must enter a private property
and the entrance is for more than a momentary period are absent. There is no private property
that is invaded or appropriated by the State. What was supposedly taken is not even earned profits
but merely an expectation of profits, which may not even occur. There can be no taking of a
contingency or of a mere possibility. Also, the supposed taking is not permanent because
establishments are not prevented from adjusting their prices to accommodate the effects of the
granting of the discount, and thus, losses are not inevitable. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department
of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
The law mandating senior citizens’ discount is not a taking of private property
without just compensation, as the regulation affects only the seller's right to profit,
not earned profits. -- The laws mandating a 20% discount for senior citizens’ and PWDs are
not confiscatory as no private property is taken without just compensation. The subject provisions
only affect the petitioner's right to profit, and not earned profits. The right to profit is not a vested
right but an inchoate right, a mere expectation, which may or may not come into existence.
(Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669,
April 25, 2017)
Mandatory buffer zones around agricultural plantations: The ordinance

requiring a buffer zone within plantations (to be planted with diversified trees that
grow taller than those usually planted in the plantation to protect the people in
nearby areas from pesticide drift) does not permanently and completely deprive the
owners of their landholdings because landowners can still cultivate or make other
productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer zones. -- The ordinance
requires agricultural plantations to have a buffer zone, which must be planted with trees that grow
taller than what are usually planted and grown in the plantation to protect those within the
adjacent fields, neighboring farms, residential area, schools and workplaces from pesticide drift
due to spraying). The landowners assert that the ordinance violates due process for being
confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao
City of the beneficial use of their property and amounts to taking without just compensation. The
position of the respondents is untenable. Taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially
divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property. An ordinance which permanently restricts
the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and
must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals. A regulation that permanently denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to
a "taking”, which will require compensation under the takings clause. The establishment of the
buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial spraying within and near
the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees
within the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as
confiscatory requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to
compensation if the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or
productive uses of the land. The respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely
deprived of their landholdings because they can still cultivate or make other productive uses of
the areas to be identified as the buffer zones. (Mosqueda v. City Government of Davao, G.R. No.
189185, August 16, 2016)
Requirements for a Valid Exercise of Eminent Domain
Constitutional limitations on the power of eminent domain: Just

compensation and due process. -- First, private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation; and second, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. (Republic v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8
September 2015)
Just compensation: Full and fair equivalent of the property taken: Fair
market value as standard. -- Just compensation means the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The standard value is the "fair market value"
of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of the
taking of property, whichever is earlier. (Republic v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917,
209696, 8 September 2015)
No requirement of full payment of just compensation prior to government

takeover of property. -- The full payment of just compensation is not a prerequisite for the
Government's effective taking of the property, nor is the transfer of property title from the
property owner to the Government a condition precedent to the taking of property. (Republic of
the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September 2015)
Reckoning point for determination of just compensation. -- The reckoning

period of the valuation of just compensation is the date of taking or the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, whichever is earlier. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana,
G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)
The reckoning point for determination of just compensation is the value of

the property at the time of taking, even if the valuation is outdated. -- Even if the
government taking was in 1940, and the action for payment of just compensation was only filed
in 1995, the reckoning point for determining just compensation is still the value of the property at
the time of taking. Thus, just compensation should be fixed not as of the time of payment but at
the time of taking, that is, in 1940, even though this valuation appears outdated. (Secretary of
the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
Interest from the date of the taking should be part of just compensation. --
When the taking of the property precedes the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the Court
orders the condemnor to pay the full amount of just compensation from the date of taking whose
interest shall likewise commence on the same date. (Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892,
September 8, 2015)
Legal interest must be computed from the time the property is taken to the
time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. -- Interest must
be paid in case of delay, to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. (Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Santiago, G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012)
Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest per annum (p.a.). from the time
of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just
compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in
line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799,58 series of 2013.59.
(Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)
Actions for just compensation are not barred by laches. -- An action for payment
of just compensation is not barred by laches. Laches as a doctrine of equity does not apply because
law and equity dictate payment of just compensation. Thus, even after the lapse of more than 50
years, a property owner may still file a claim to demand just compensation for the taking of his
property without the benefit of expropriations proceedings. (Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
Actions for just compensation are not barred by prescription. -- An action for
payment of just compensation does not prescribe. If private property is taken by the Government
for public use without expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover
the land or the value thereof does not prescribe. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. -- Statutes and

executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are not
binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines or standards in ascertaining the
amount thereof. (National Power Corporation v. Spouses Zabala, G.R. No. 173520, January 30,
2013)
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against the actions of private individuals:
Thus, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of a private entity for its own
and private purposes, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked. -- The Bill of Rights does
not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of private
individuals. Thus, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, and without the intervention of police authorities,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked, for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. The protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R.
No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
When private individuals are considered State agents: Barangay tanods and
barangay chairmen are considered law enforcers for purposes of the prohibitions
in the Bill of Rights. -- Barangay tanods and barangay chairmen can be deemed law
enforcement officers for purposes of the application of the Bill of Rights. Similarly, port security
personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions are deemed agents of government
for purposes of the application of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Dela Cruz
v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
When private individuals are considered State agents: Bantay Bayan civilian
volunteers are deemed law enforcers for purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of
Rights. -- The acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any barangay-based or other civilian volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace and order in
their respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, they should be deemed
as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights. Consequently,
evidence obtained by them during an illegal search is inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the
exclusionary rule under the Constitution. (Miguel v. People, July 31, 2017, G.R. No. 227038)
When private individuals are considered State agents: Port personnel who
oversee security at ports are considered government agents for purposes of the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. -- The Cebu Port Authority is
clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and vehicles within its ports.
While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in this case,
considering that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered
agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during
routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function. (Miguel v. People, July
31, 2017, G.R. No. 227038)
The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against the action of a political party,
which is a private organization. -- The right to due process guards against unwarranted
encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens. It cannot be invoked in
private controversies involving private parties. A political party is still a private organization, not
a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life,
liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. (Atienza v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010)
THE RIGHT TO LIFE
An ordinance that promotes economic benefits over the very basic rights to
life, security and safety is invalid. -- An ordinance to promote the constituents’ general
welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and
safety of the people. In the absence of any convincing reason that the life, security and safety of
the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan,
Ordinance No. 8187 in favor of the retention of the oil depots is invalid and unconstitutional.
(Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014)
DUE PROCESS
When the State deprives a person of life, liberty or property, due process,
whether substantive or procedural, must be observed. -- The Constitution states that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. It is a fundamental
principle that no property shall be taken away from an individual without due process, whether
substantive or procedural. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, G.R. No. 213948, April 18, 2017)
Substantive and procedural due process. -- Due process of law has two aspects:
substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the
due process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the procedural
requirements thereof. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that
interferes with the rights of a person to his property. Procedural due process, on the other hand,
means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in
conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are
called upon to administer it. (Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)
The requirement of “deprivation” in the invocation of due process: Only

rights which have completely and definitely accrued and settled are entitled
protection under the due process clause. Workers in the informal sector who earn
from tourist arrivals in Boracay have no vested rights to their sources of income as
whatever they may earn from tourist arrivals in Boracay is merely an inchoate right,
a mere expectation, which may or may not come into fruition. -- A profession, trade or
calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. Under this
premise, petitioners claim that they were deprived of due process when their right to work and
earn a living was taken away from them when Boracay was ordered closed as a tourist destination.
In any case, petitioners cannot be said to have already acquired vested rights to their sources of
income in Boracay. They are part of the informal sector of the economy where earnings are not
guaranteed. Their asserted right to whatever they may earn from tourist arrivals in Boracay is
merely an inchoate right, a mere expectation, which may or may not come into fruition. Said
petitioners' earnings are contingent in that, even assuming tourists are still allowed in the island,
they will still earn nothing if no one avails of their services. Certainly, they do not possess any
vested right on their sources of income, and under this context. Only rights which have completely
and definitely accrued and settled are entitled protection under the due process clause. (Zabal v.
Duterte, February 12, 2019, G.R. No. 238467)
Substantive due process requires that the ordinance serves a legitimate

public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that
purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated. -- Substantive due
process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's
action. This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily,
whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the
ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals
regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge. (Mosqueda v. City Government of
Davao, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Mandatory compliance with the ban on aerial spraying within a 3-month

period under pain of fine or imprisonment despite impossibility of carrying out a
shift to another mode of pesticide application within the same period is oppressive
as to constitute abuse of police power. -- The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance
No. 0309-07 for being unreasonable and oppressive in that it sets the effectivity of the ban at three
months after publication of the ordinance. They allege that three months will be inadequate time
to shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying, and effectively deprives them of efficient
means to combat the Black Sigatoka disease. The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another
mode of pesticide application within three months can readily be appreciated given the vast area
of the affected plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor. To recall, even the
RTC recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to other modes of spraying within three
months in view of the costly financial and civil works required for the conversion. Requiring the
respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the
three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power. (Mosqueda
v. City Government of Davao, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Substantive due process: To stop the construction of a building in a private

property even though there is no law, ordinance, or rule that prohibits such
construction would violate substantive due process. -- The Constitution states that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. It is a fundamental
principle that no property shall be taken away from an individual without due process, whether
substantive or procedural. The dispossession of property, or in this case the stoppage of the
construction of a building in one's own property would violate substantive due process. In the
present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that
matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is
within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on
the part of the City of Manila "to consider," the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119". While
the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is
being built is a privately-owned property that is "not part of the Rizal Park that has been declared
as a National Heritage Site in 1095," and the Torre de Manila area is in fact "well-beyond" the
Rizal Park. Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a "heritage zone, a
cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure." There is no standard in
Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining the background sightline that is supposed to be
protected or that is part of the "physical integrity" of the Rizal Monument. The ordinance does
not prescribe how sightline is determined, neither is there any way to measure by metes and
bounds whether al construction that is not part of the historic monument itself or is outside the
protected area can be said to violate the Rizal Monument's physical integrity, except only to say
"when you stand in front of the Rizal Monument, there can be no doubt that your view is marred
and impaired." This kind of a standard has no parameters. Obviously, the Court cannot apply such
a subjective and non-uniform standard that adversely affects property rights several kilometers
away from a historical site or facility. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, G.R. No. 213948, April
18, 2017)
Procedural due process in administrative cases: Basic requirements. --

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles,
such as the right to due process. In Ang Tibay v. CIR, the Court laid down the cardinal rights of
parties in administrative proceedings, as follows: 1) The right to a hearing, which includes the
right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; 2) The tribunal must consider
the evidence presented; 3) The decision must have something to support itself; 4) The evidence
must be substantial; 5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; 6) The tribunal or body
or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and 7)
The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered. (Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)
Procedural due process: FDA certification of contraceptive drugs and devices

without notice and without public hearing, despite the constant opposition from the
petitioners is a violation of procedural due process. -- Although the FDA is the primary
agency that determines whether a contraceptive drug or certain device has no abortifacient effects,
the FDA should allow its findings and conclusion to be questioned and those who oppose the same
must be given a genuine opportunity to be heard. (Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No.
217872, August 24, 2016)
The FDA certified, procured and administered such contraceptive drugs and devices,
without the observance of the basic tenets of due process, without notice and without public
hearing, despite the constant opposition from the petitioners. Thus, the certifications/re-
certifications and the distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs by the FDA should be
struck down as violative of the constitutional right to due process. A decision rendered in
disregard of the right to due process is void for lack of jurisdiction. (Alliance for the Family v.
Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)
A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio. -- A decision rendered

without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is
void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. The
cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
of their jurisdiction. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Conti, G.R. No. 221296, February 22, 2017)
Procedural due process requires opportunity to be heard; opportunity to be

heard through motion for reconsideration is sufficient compliance with due
process. -- What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence
and lack of opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to be heard through motion for
reconsideration is sufficient compliance with due process. Any initial defect in due process, if any,
is cured by availing of this remedy. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014)
Procedural due process in administrative proceedings means opportunity to

explain one's side, or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. -
- In administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend oneself. The essence of due process,
therefore, as applied to administrative proceedings, is an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Conti, G.R. No. 221296, February 22, 2017)
Meaning of “to be heard”: One may be “heard” through pleadings. -- “To be

heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
(Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)
Administrative due process: A formal or trial-type hearing is not always

necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. -- The essence of
due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always
necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. The petitioner actively
participated in the entire course of the investigation and hearings conducted by PAGCOR. He was
also given the opportunity to appear before the Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory
questions. Lastly, he was informed through a memorandum of the decision of the Board of
Directors dismissing him from the service. No denial of procedural due process where the
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded. (Vivo v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013)
Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in

administrative investigations: Recourse to discovery procedures is not mandatory.
-- The Court has consistently held that technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings are not
exact replicas of those in administrative investigations. Recourse to discovery procedures as
sanctioned by the Rules of Court is then not mandatory for an administrative body. In proceedings
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, decisions may be reached on the basis of position
papers or other documentary evidence only. They are not bound by technical rules of procedure
and evidence. (Sibayan v. Alda, G.R. No. 233395, January 17, 2018)
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. In administrative proceedings, due process entails "a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. Thus, a denial of a respondent’s motion to avail of discovery procedures to obtain evidence in
her defense is not a violation of due process if she was afforded the opportunity to be heard and
to explain her side before the administrative body and was allowed to submit her answer and all
documents in support of her defense. (Sibayan v. Alda, G.R. No. 233395, January 17, 2018)
Right to counsel is not imperative in administrative proceedings. -- In an

administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel. As
such, the right to counsel is not imperative. Thus, there is nothing objectionable in the denial by
an adjudicating body of a request to reschedule an administrative conference because the counsel
for the respondent would not be available. (Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013)
Any procedural defect in an administrative proceeding is cured by the filing
of a motion for reconsideration. -- In any event, any procedural defect in the proceedings
taken against the petitioner was cured by his filing of the motion for reconsideration and by his
appealing the adverse result to the CSC. Any defect in the observance of due process is cured by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and that denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who was afforded the opportunity to be heard. Defects in procedural due
process may be cured when the party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013)
There is still a denial of due process if the respondent was able to file a motion
for reconsideration but he had no fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently
answer the accusations against him as he was not furnished with the affidavits
against him. -- Even in his motion for reconsideration, he never had the fair opportunity to
squarely and intelligently answer nor refute the accusations against him as he was not furnished
with the affidavits against him. Thus, he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process.
(Office of the Ombudsman v. Conti, G.R. No. 221296, February 22, 2017)
A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel. -

- A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such
body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. As such, the admissions made by
petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. (Carbonel v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010)
Procedural due process and NBI investigations: Opportunity to be heard for
the person under investigation is not required because the NBI does not exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial powers and its findings are merely recommendatory. --
There is no violation of due process in an NBI investigation if the respondents are not given an
opportunity to file an answer or submit counter-evidence. The NBI does not exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial powers and its findings are merely recommendatory. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573,
April 23, 2014)
Counsel’s mistake as a denial of due process: For counsel’s mistake to amount

to a denial of due process, the negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client
is deprived of his day in court. -- The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even
mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique, unless the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law. The negligence of counsel must be
so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court. To properly claim gross negligence on the
part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear
abandonment of the client’s cause. (Uyboco v. People, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014)
Due process is a must in military academy disciplinary proceedings. -- A cadet

facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private
interests (life, liberty, or property). Hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds
of procedural due process is a must. The PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process.
(Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February
24, 2015)
Due process in student disciplinary cases: Formal trial-type hearing is not

required at all times. -- Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those in courts of justice. A formal trial-type hearing is not,
at all times and in all instances, essential to due process - it is enough that the parties are given a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the
Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)
Void-for-vagueness doctrine: Why vague laws are void under the due process
clause -- Vague laws are void because first, these violate due process for failure to accord persons
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; second, these leave law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle." Petitioners must properly identify a)
any provision in the law, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and
notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly; or b) an
ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular
conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon
City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
When Lack of Prior Notice and Hearing
Does Not Violate Due Process: Examples
Clamping of illegally parked vehicles without prior notice and hearing: The
immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires is necessary
because the transgressors are not around at the time of apprehension and thus
notice and hearing would be superfluous. Moreover, the transgressors have the
chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest, which procedure
equally satisfies the need for a hearing. -- Notice and hearing are the essential requirements
of procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances under our laws in which the absence of
one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process.
Immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires is not a violation of due process,
despite the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping. The immobilization of illegally
parked vehicles by clamping the tires is necessary because the transgressors are not around at the
time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous.
Moreover, the transgressors have the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely
protest which procedure equally satisfies the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior
intervention of a court of law is not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty of due
process. (Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013)
Ex-parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in VAWC cases

does not violate due process, because time is of the essence to prevent further
violence and the respondent has an opportunity to present his case after a TPO is
issued. -- The ex-parte issuance of temporary protection order (TPO) - before notice and hearing
- is valid because time is of the essence to prevent further acts of violence against women and
children. Moreover, after a TPO is issued, the respondent is afforded an opportunity to present
his side. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)
As a general rule, notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of
executive, administrative, or legislative functions. But where a public
administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, the person whose
rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. --
Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-
making power. Previous notice and hearing, as elements of due process, are constitutionally
required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation
or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent
upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity
of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of persons or
enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. As a general rule, notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise
of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts
in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general
and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to
notice and hearing. (Quezon City PCTA Federation v. Department of Education, February 23,
2016, G.R. No. 188720)
EQUAL PROTECTION
Equal protection requires similar treatment for persons or things similarly

situated. -- The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
(Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August
16, 2016)
The equal protection clause requires a valid classification that is based on

substantial distinction and germane to the purpose of the law. -- The guaranty of equal
protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may
be treated and regulated differently from another. In other words, a valid classification must be:
(1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class. (Mosqueda v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
A valid classification rest on substantial distinction and the classification

must be germane to the purpose of the law. -- If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. The
law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are
real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. (Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R.
No. 210551, June 30, 2015)
Three tests in Equal Protection: Rational scrutiny, intermediate

scrutiny and strict scrutiny. -- The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the
justification given by the Government for its conduct is gauged by using the means-end test. This
test requires analysis of: (1) the interests of the public that generally require its exercise, as
distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2) the means employed that are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three levels of
scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. (Mosqueda v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
When to apply the tests: Rational basis scrutiny for economic and social
welfare laws, intermediate scrutiny for classifications based on gender or
illegitimacy and strict scrutiny for laws that affect fundamental right or operates
to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. -- The rational basis scrutiny (also
known as the rational relation test or rational basis test) demands that the classification
reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in cases involving
economics or social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class. When the
classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under intermediate or
heightened review. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny.
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental
interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must
be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations. The strict scrutiny review applies when
a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries the burden
to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the
least restrictive means to protect such interest. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers &
Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Rational basis test: Reviewing the reasonable relationship between the

means and the purpose of the ordinance. -- Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1)
discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2)
examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or
reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law. Applying the test, the established classification under
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to be viewed in relation to the group of individuals similarly situated
with respect to the avowed purpose. This gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the classification
under Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative classification); and (2) the classification based on
purpose (elimination of the mischief). (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
No Violation of Equal Protection: Examples
Socialized housing tax: Requiring real property owners but not informal
settlers to pay socialized housing tax to provide funds for the housing of informal
settler is not discriminatory. For the purpose of urban development and housing
program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as
two distinct classes are obvious. -- For the purpose of urban development and housing
program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct
classes are too obvious. The differentiation is not discriminatory within the meaning of the
Constitution. Thus, a socialized housing tax on real property owners to provide funds for the
housing of informal settler is a not class legislation that violates the equal protection clause.
(Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)
JBC policy requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-level courts before

they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts does not violate the equal
protection clause. Classifying judges between those with 5 years of experience as
opposed to those with less is reasonable and relevant to JBC’s legitimate purpose of
selecting those with proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. -- The
policy of JBC requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicant to second-level courts does not violate the equal protection clause. There is a substantial
distinction between judges with 5 years of experience and those with less than 5 five years. The
classification is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose of selecting those with proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R.
No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause: Examples
Banning aerial spraying of pesticide (but not others modes of spraying

pesticide) to prevent pesticide drift violates the equal protection clause because
pesticide drift may result not just from aerial spraying but also from other modes of
pesticide application. -- The mischief that the prohibition sought to address was the fungicide
drift resulting from the aerial application. The four most common pesticide treatment methods
adopted in Davao City are aerial, truck-mounted boom, truck-mounted mechanical, and manual
spraying. However, Ordinance No. 0309-07 imposes the prohibition only against aerial spraying.
However, the occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the
conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom
spraying produces drift that may bring about alleged health risks to the community. A ban against
aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve. In the process,
the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all
individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification that is
drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to
the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law. As such, the decision
of prohibiting only aerial spraying is tainted with arbitrariness. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
A total ban on aerial spraying without any distinction as to the substances

being sprayed (whether pesticides or vitamins) violates the equal protection clause,
because the ban is "overinclusive," affecting groups that have no relation to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose of preventing pesticide drift. There
should be reasonable distinctions in terms of the effects of liquid substances to the
public health, livelihood and the environment. -- The assailed ordinance (which bans
aerial spraying on agricultural land) tends to be "overinclusive" because its impending
implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the legislative
purpose. The imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the
substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The
respondents admit that they aerially treat their plantations not only with pesticides but also
vitamins and other substances. The imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of substances
other than fungicides and regardless of the agricultural activity being performed becomes
unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the purported inconvenience,
discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the ordinance, seeks to address. The total
ban on aerial spraying runs afoul with the equal protection clause because it does not classify
which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially even as reasonable distinctions
should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid substances to the
public health, livelihood and the environment. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers &
Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Imposing garbage fees based on whether the payee occupies a lot,

condominium or socialized housing unit violates the equal protection clause,
because there is no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one
hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, on the other hand, because most likely, garbage output produced by
these types of occupants is uniform. -- Imposing an annual garbage fee on all domestic
households based on rates that depend on land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant
of a lot, condominium, social housing project or apartment – violates the equal protection clause.
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is no substantial distinction between an occupant of
a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants
is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and
equitable. (Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)
Prohibiting private vehicle owners from posting election campaign materials

on their vehicles violates the equal protection clause. If owners of private vehicles
are allowed to express their political ideas by posting election campaign materials
on their vehicles, there is no reason to deny the same right to owners of PUVs. --
Prohibiting owners of Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals from posting
election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause. If owners of private vehicles and
other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting election
campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right
to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. (1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Meaning of the right to privacy: The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
-- The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. Right to privacy may extend to places where one
has the right to exclude the public or deny them access, such as a business office. (Spouses Hing
v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
There are the three strands of the right to privacy: locational; informational;
and decisional privacy. -- (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and
(3) decisional privacy. The right to informational privacy is usually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No.
202666, September 29, 2014)
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test: 1) subjective expectation of

privacy and 2) society recognizes the expectation as reasonable. -- The reasonableness
of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
To have an expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show

intention to keep posts private through the use of privacy tools. -- To have an
expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show intention to keep certain posts private
through the use of privacy tools. A Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant
or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy
right which necessarily accompanies said choice. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No.
202666, September 29, 2014)
Surveillance cameras should not cover places where there is reasonable

expectation of privacy. -- In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy,
unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor
should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as
it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the
Anti-Wiretapping Law. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
Mandating see-thru fences violates the right to privacy of property owners. --

An ordinance requiring property owners to expose their property by limiting the height of fences
to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru is a violation
of the right to privacy of the property owners. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No.
161107, March 12, 2013)
A Facebook user cannot invoke his right to privacy with respect to his
Facebook post, unless he manifests the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the use of Facebook's privacy tools. The utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy. -- The respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar
and obscene remarks about complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense,
however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on his "private
account" that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the
same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. The defense is untenable.
Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion
registered accounts and with 1.71 billion monthly active users. To address concerns about privacy,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user's
profile, as well as information uploaded by the user. Consequently, before one can have an
expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is
first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation
of his or her right to informational privacy. The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook
posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private
view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or
features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a
select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject
posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends,
respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. (Belo-
Henares v. Guevarra, A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016)
Restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not

guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not
belong to one's circle of friends. -- The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or
tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged,
the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." Under the circumstances, therefore,
respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated. Moreover, even if the Court were to
accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only,
there is no assurance that the same - or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his
Facebook profile - will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy. Restricting the privacy of
one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of
another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. Under the circumstances, therefore,
respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated. (Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, A.C.
No. 11394, December 01, 2016)
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a component of the

right to privacy. -- The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our
Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
(People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
As a component of the right to privacy, the fundamental right against unlawful searches
and seizures is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. (Veridiano v. People, June 7, 2017,
G.R. No. 200370)
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section
2 [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures) of the Constitution is essential to allow
citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. (People
v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
There is a “search” within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition if
there is an intrusion into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. -- In the
seminal case of Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the electronic surveillance
of a phone conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment [constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures]. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, what the
Fourth Amendment protects are people, not places such that what a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection
in much the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected. Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his
concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the application of the Fourth
Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Second, the
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right
to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which
society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person
does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society,
the alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
(Saluday v. People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right
to privacy of communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,
February 11, 2014)
Examples of a “Search”
Mandatory drug testing as a search. -- Drug testing effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)
In the present case, the petitioner was arrested for extortion, he resisted having his urine
sample taken, and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis
for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs. The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have
his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was
adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled
to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
In the face of the constitutional guarantees [against unreasonable searches and seizures
and self-incrimination], we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the
crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July
23, 2014)
Restricting and blocking access to computer data as a search and seizure. Sec.
19 of RA 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, provides: Restricting or Blocking Access
to Computer Data — When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer
data. Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines
of code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings.
It is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors may
constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures, whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes
and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant. (Disini v. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
Use of surveillance cameras as a search. -- In this day and age, video surveillance
cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The
installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be
affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s
residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. (Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June
26, 2013)
The State Action Requirement in Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it
cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals, and thus the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be invoked against acts
committed by private individuals. -- The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships
between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals. If the search is
made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass
the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted
by private persons are not covered by the exclusionary rule. (Dela Cruz v. People, January 11,
2011, G.R. No. 209387 citing People v. Marti, 18 January 1991)
When civilians are considered agents of the

State, and thus, evidence obtained by them
during an illegal search is inadmissible as
evidence
A search by agents of persons in authority, such as barangay tanods, is
covered by the Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. -- However, barangay tanods sought by the police authorities to effect the search
warrant act as agents of persons in authority. The Local Government Code also contains a
provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority.
Thus, the search conducted by such barangay tanods is covered by the Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012)
Barangay tanods and barangay chairmen are also considered law enforcers or
agents of the government for purposes of the application of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. -- Barangay tanods and barangay chairmen can be
deemed law enforcement officers for purposes of the application of the Bill of Rights. Similarly,
port security personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions are deemed agents
of government for purposes of the application of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
Bantay Bayan civilian volunteers are deemed law enforcers for purposes of the
prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. Consequently, evidence obtained by them during
an illegal search is inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under
the Constitution. -- The acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any barangay-based or other civilian
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace and
order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, they should be
deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights.
Consequently, evidence obtained by them during an illegal search is inadmissible as evidence
pursuant to the exclusionary rule under the Constitution. (Miguel v. People, July 31, 2017, G.R.
No. 227038)
Reasonable and Unreasonable Searches
The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and
seizures. It is only directed against those that are unreasonable. -- The Constitutional
guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures. It is only directed against those
that are unreasonable. Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the scope of the
prohibition and are not forbidden. As a general rule, searches conducted with a valid warrant are
reasonable. (Veridiano v. People, June 7, 2017, G.R. No. 200370)
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18,
2011)
Search with a Warrant: Requirements for Validity
As a general rule, searches conducted with a valid warrant are reasonable. (Veridiano v.
People, June 7, 2017, G.R. No. 200370)
Requirements for a valid search warrant. -- (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)
Meaning of probable cause for a search warrant. -- There must be probable cause
– the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or
object(s) sought in connection with said offense is in the place to be searched. (People v. Tuan,
G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)
Duty of a judge in issuing a search warrant. -- The judge must personally and
thoroughly examine the applicant and his witnesses. (Ogayon v. People, September 2, 2015)
There must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances that were considered by
the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the existence of probable cause to
justify the issuance of the search warrant. In the absence of records indicating that the issuing
judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses – such as depositions
and transcripts of the examination and the application for the search warrant and supporting
affidavits – the Search warrant is a nullity. (Ogayon v. People, September 2, 2015)
In an application for search warrant, the mandate of the judge is for him to conduct a full
and searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The searching
questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses must depend on a large extent upon the
discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule as to how a judge may conduct his
examination, it is axiomatic that the said examination must be probing and exhaustive and not
merely routinary, general, peripheral or perfunctory. He must make his own inquiry on the intent
and factual and legal justifications for a search warrant. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April
18, 2018)
Description of the place in search warrants: A description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer can identify the place intended and distinguish it
from other places in the community. -- A description of the place to be searched is sufficient
if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. The specific room in the house
to be searched need not be identified. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)
Requirement of one specific offense: A search warrant must be issued in
relation to one specific offense. -- The Rules of Court requires that a search warrant must be
issued in relation to one specific offense. A search warrant applied for and issued in connection
with the crime of kidnapping with murder does not violate this rule because the kidnapping with
murder or homicide is one special complex crime. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18,
2018)
Reason for the one specific offense requirement in search warrants: One of the
constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based on
probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense to prevent
the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant. In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined
as such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. For a judge to find probable cause to issue a warrant, there
must be competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts,
or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. The one-
specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search warrant
should issue only on the basis of probable cause. (People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February
21, 2018)
One specific offense requirement: A search warrant for violation of
Securities Regulation Code and Estafa is invalid for violation of the requirement
that the warrant must be in connection with one specific offense. -- A search warrant
for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)”
violates the requirement that the warrant must be in connection with one specific offense.
Violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the said
law such as manipulation of security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or broker without
being registered with the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use of unregistered clearing agency,
and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers among others.
Moreover, the violation of the SRC and estafa are offenses entirely different from each other and
neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. (People v. Pastrana, G.R.
No. 196045, February 21, 2018)
To be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to
be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. If the search warrant does not
state the specific offense committed, it is not possible for the issuing judge as well as the applicant
to determine that the items sought to be seized are connected to any crime. Thus, a search warrant
for violation R.A. 8799 and (The Securities Regulation Code) and Estafa and ordering the seizure
of telephone bills showing the companies’ calls to clients abroad; list of brokers and their personal
files; incorporation papers of all these companies, sales agreements with clients; copies of official
receipts purposely for clients; fax messages from the clients; company brochures; letterheads --
is null and void for having been issued for more than one offense and for lack of particularity in
the description of the things sought for seizure. The terms used in this warrant were too all-
embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the transactions of respondents, whether
legal or illegal, to search and seizure. (People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)
Description of the area to be searched: The specific area to be searched inside
a large compound need not be identified in the warrant. -- A description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable
effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. The search
warrant identifying the place to be searched, as (1) the house of Jaylord Dimal and (2)
the palay warehouse in the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction, Echague,
Isabela – without identifying the two houses, one nipa hut, two external bathrooms, one garage,
one warehouse utilized as a palay depot, and one warehouse for a palay drying machinery inside
the compound -- sufficiently describes the place to be searched. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No.
216922, April 18, 2018)
Description of items to be searched: Items must have direct relation to the
offenses for which the warrant is being issued. -- A search warrant may be said to
particularly describe the things to be seized (1) when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the description expresses a conclusion of fact -
not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; (3) and
when the things to be described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offenses for
which the warrant is being issued. The purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be
seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant in order to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what items they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable
searches and seizures will be committed. Only objects that are (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen
or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) those used or intended to be used
as the means of committing an offense, can be the proper subject of a search warrant. Having no
direct relation to the crime of kidnapping with homicide, the 1,600 sacks of palay that were
supposedly sold by the victims to the accused and found in his warehouse, cannot be a proper
subject of a search warrant. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
The seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole seizure illegal,
and the seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to seize; and (2) the fact that
the officers, after making a legal search and seizure under the warrant, illegally made a search and
seizure of other property not within the warrant does not invalidate the first search and seizure.
(Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Valid Warrantless Searches

Valid warrantless searches: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be
carried out through a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and. seizure violates the
Constitution. Any evidence resulting from it "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding." The constitutional proscription only covers unreasonable searches and seizures.
Jurisprudence has recognized instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures, which
are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. (Manibog v. People, March 20, 2019, G.R. No.
211214; Lapi v. People, February 13, 2019, G.R. No. 210731; People v. Sison, July 31, 2019, G.R.
No. 238453)
Valid warrantless search:

Search incident to a lawful arrest
The rule on searches incident to a lawful arrest: A person lawfully arrested

may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. --
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without
a search warrant. (Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
The requirement of lawful arrest prior to the search: For a valid search
incident to a lawful arrest, the lawful arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed. -- A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a
lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search;
"the process cannot be reversed." (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
The determination of validity of the warrantless arrest would also determine the validity
of the warrantless search that was incident to the arrest. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898,
March 13, 2019)
In a search incident to a lawful arrest, there must be a lawful arrest preceding

the search, the process cannot be reversed. An arrest is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. -- There must be a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which must precede the search. For this
purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of
the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. (Homar v. People, September 2, 2015,
G.R. No. 182534)
A lawful arrest must precede the search, the process cannot be reversed: An
arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. There is no
valid search incident to a lawful arrest when the search and discovery of illegal
drugs in the possession of a person preceded the arrest. -- A search as an incident to a
lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The law requires that the search be incidental to
a lawful arrest. Therefore, a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings;
the process cannot be reversed. Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no
arrest prior to the conduct of the search. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest. Even casting aside the petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this
case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, no arrest was effected by the police
operatives upon the person of Sanchez before conducting the search on him. After the police
caught up with the tricycle, its driver and the passenger, Sanchez, alighted from it; the noticed
Sanchez holding a match box and requested Sanchez if he could see the contents of the match box,
to which the petitioner acceded and handed it over to him. The arrest of Sanchez was made only
after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the shabu inside the match box. Evidently, what happened
in this case was that a search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was effected based on
the evidence produced by the search. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
A lawful arrest must precede the search: There is no valid search incident to
a lawful arrest when the police conducted the search after they accosted a person
for jaywalking, without any intent to arrest. -- When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw the
petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted him and pointed to him the right place
for crossing. In fact, they immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the designated area.
Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his liberty.
From Tan's testimony, the intent to arrest the petitioner only came after they allegedly confiscated
the shabu from the petitioner. The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines.
The respondent’s argument that there was a lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest
for jaywalking appears to be an afterthought in order to justify a warrantless search conducted on
the person of the petitioner. (Homar v. People, September 2, 2015, G.R. No. 182534)
A lawful arrest must precede the search: There is no valid search incident to
a lawful arrest if a motorcycle driver, to whom a traffic violation ticket issued by the
police for an offense punishable by a fine, is subjected to a search, as there is no
lawful arrest to speak of. -- The seized items were confiscated from Cristobal as he was being
issued a traffic violation ticket. His violations consisted of (1) not wearing a helmet while driving
a motorcycle, and (2) being unable to show the original receipt (OR) and certificate of registration
(CR) of the motorcycle he was riding. A violation of the law requiring the use of helmets while
driving a motorcycle is only punishable by fine. Meanwhile, Cristobal's second violation - failure
to furnish the OR and CR of the motorcycle - is likewise punishable only by fine. Stated simply,
the police officers involved in this case conducted an illegal search when they frisked Cristobal on
the basis of the foregoing violations. It was not, as it could not have been a search incidental to a
lawful arrest as there was no, as there could not have been any, lawful arrest to speak of.
In the case of Luz vs. People, a case strikingly similar to the present case, a man who was
driving a motorcycle was flagged down for violating a municipal ordinance requiring drivers of
motorcycles to wear a helmet. While the police officer was issuing him a ticket, the officer noticed
that the man was uneasy and kept touching something in his jacket. When the officer ordered the
man to take the thing out of his jacket, it was discovered that it was a small tin can which contained
sachets of shabu. When the man was prosecuted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
Court acquitted the accused as the confiscated drugs were discovered through an unlawful search,
observing that there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing
a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking
of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender,
but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter. It also appears that, according to City
Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while
riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need
not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may
be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. The case
of Luz squarely applies in the present case. There was similarly no lawful arrest in this case as
Cristobal's violations were only punishable by fine. There was thus no valid search incidental to a
lawful arrest. (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019)
Purpose of search incident to a lawful arrest: Protect the arresting officer

from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. -- Searches
and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 13. Search incident to a lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with
a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. It is
therefore a reasonable exercise of the State's police power to protect: (a) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (b) evidence
from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the
integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee. (Vaporoso v.
People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
Immediate control test: A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or

dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of
his immediate control. The area of his immediate control" means the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. --
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers
to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible
area within the latter's reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in
front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested. Case law requires a strict application of this rule, that is, "to
absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at
the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to 'dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense.' Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made
in a place other than the place of arrest." (Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
Immediate control test: There is no valid search incident to a lawful arrest

when the second police search (which yielded the drugs) on the accused was
conducted at a venue other than the place of actual arrest and after a substantial
amount of time had already elapsed from the time of the arrest to the time of the
second search. -- Having ascertained that petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant
pursuant to the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the Court now examines the two (2) searches made on
them, namely: (a) the body search after the police officers apprehended them; and (b) a "more
thorough" search conducted at the Panabo Police Station where the seized drugs were allegedly
recovered from them, as to whether these may fall within the purview of a valid search incidental
to their lawful arrest. The first search made on petitioners, i.e., the cursory body search which,
however, did not yield any drugs but only personal belongings of petitioners, may be considered
as a search incidental to a lawful arrest as it was done contemporaneous to their arrest and at the
place of apprehension. On the other hand, the same cannot be said of the second search which
yielded the drugs subject of this case, considering that a substantial amount of time had already
elapsed from the time of the arrest to the time of the second search, not to mention the fact that
the second search was conducted at a venue other than the place of actual arrest, i.e., the Panabo
Police Station. In sum, the subsequent and second search made on petitioners at the Panabo
Police Station is unlawful and unreasonable. Resultantly, the illegal drugs allegedly recovered
therefrom constitutes inadmissible evidence pursuant to the exclusionary clause enshrined in the
1987 Constitution. Given that said illegal drugs is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
petitioners must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability. (Vaporoso v.
People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
Valid warrantless arrests: In flagrante delicto, hot pursuit and escaped

prisoner arrests. -- Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
the general parameters for effecting lawful warrantless arrests, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
Based on the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests
may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of
a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that
said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during
the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
(Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
Grounds for a valid warrantless arrest. -- A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07
June 2017)
Requirements for a valid warrantless arrest. -- Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the general parameters for effecting lawful warrantless
arrests, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Based on the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests
may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest
of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause
that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest
of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. (Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
In flagrante delicto arrest requirements: (1) the person to be arrested must

execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. -- For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in
flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. Trying to run away when approached by a police officer, even when no crime has been
overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. Flight per se is not synonymous
with guilt. (People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014)
In flagrante delicto arrest requirements. -- Requirements for a valid in flagrante

delicto arrest to justify a subsequent warrantless search: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
In flagrante delicto arrest: Reliable information alone is not enough to justify

a warrantless in flagrante delicto arrest. There must be an overt act from the person
to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed. -- Reliable information alone is not enough to
justify a warrantless arrest. The accused must perform some overt act that would indicate that he
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (People v. Racho,
G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)
Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt
act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed. The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified as a
hot pursuit arrest if the law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a
warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. (Veridiano v.
People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
Over act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: The mere act of leaving a
residence of a known drug peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest. -- The mere act
of leaving a residence of a known drug peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest, unless there is
an overt manifestation that the person had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. (Sanchez v. People,
G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: The act of walking while
reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act that justifies an in
flagrante delicto arrest. -- The mere act of a person who smells of liquor in passing by police
officers without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong is not an overt act that shows that
she has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime to justify a warrantless in
flagrante delicto arrest. The act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a
criminal act. (Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018)
Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: The mere act of carrying
a bag while riding a bus is not an overt physical act that could have raised suspicion
in the minds of the arresting officers that the person to be arrested had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime to justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. -- A confidential informant (CI) sent a text message to Police
Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate) that an alleged courier of marijuana together
with a female companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his
possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan
de Oro City. At 9:30 in the evening, the CI called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the alleged
drug courier had boarded a bus with body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for
Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet
colors. Thus, at about 9:45 in the evening, the police officers put up a checkpoint. At 11:00 o'clock
in the evening, the policemen stopped the bus bearing the said body and plate numbers. The police
officers boarded the bus and saw a man matching the description given to them by the CI. The
man was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap. After P/Insp. Orate asked
the man to open the bag, the police officers saw a transparent cellophane containing dried
marijuana leaves.
No overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse

suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime. In the case at bar, accused-appellant was just a passenger carrying
his bag. There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such circumstance,
by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe that accused-appellant was in
possession of marijuana. Here, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, accused-
appellant could not be said to have executed any overt act in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officers 'which would indicate that he was committing the crime of illegal possession
of marijuana. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that
accused-appellant had just committed an offense. (People v. Comprado, April 4, 2018, G.R. No.
213225)
Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrests: The acts per se of

walking along the street and examining something in one's hands cannot in any way
be considered criminal acts. -- From a meter away, even with perfect vision, SPO1 Parchaso
would not have been able to identify with reasonable accuracy the contents of the plastic
sachet. Dominguez' acts of standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in his hands, are
not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause
enough to justify a warrantless arrest. In fact, SPO1 Parchaso's testimony reveals that before the
arrest was made, he only saw that Dominguez was holding a small plastic sachet. He only
mentioned that the plastic contained "pinaghihinalaang shabu" after he had already arrested
Dominguez and subsequently confiscated said plastic sachet. The Court finds it inconceivable how
PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle,
a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet
allegedly held by appellant. Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest,
no other overt act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of
PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one's hands
cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
The Court reached the same conclusion in the case of Comerciante v. People: On the basis
of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has
perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy — especially from a distance of
around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour —
miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by
Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to
Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal
acts. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)
Over act requirement for a warrantless arrest: The smell of marijuana

emanating from the carton baggage, the irregular shape of the baggage, flight at the
sight of the uniformed police officer and leaving behind his baggage establish
probably cause to conduct a warrantless arrest. -- There were numerous circumstances
and overt acts which show that PO1 Falolo had probable cause to effect the said warrantless arrest:
(1) the smell of marijuana emanating from the carton baggage; (2) the irregular shape of the
baggage; (3) the hardness of the baggage; (4) the assent of petitioner in the inspection of his
baggage but running away at the sight of SPO2 Suagen; and (5) leaving behind his baggage to
avoid the police officers.
Petitioner's flight at the sight of the uniformed police officer and leaving behind his
baggage are overt acts, which reinforce the finding of probable cause to conduct a warrantless
arrest against him. The flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight,
when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the
wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion.
Based on these facts, PO1 Falolo had probable cause to believe that there was a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that petitioner is guilty of the offense charged. Petitioner was caught in
flagrante delicto of transporting marijuana bricks by PO1 Falolo.
Consequently, when PO1 Falolo and SPO2 Suagen captured petitioner in front of the St.
Rita Parish Church, they had probable cause to arrest him and bring him and his baggage to the
police station. There, the police officers properly conducted a search of petitioner's baggage, which
is an incident to a lawful arrest. Indeed, numerous devious circumstances surround the incident,
from the time petitioner boarded the bus until he was caught after fleeing at the sight of the police
officer, that constitute as probable cause to arrest him and to conduct the warrantless search
incidental to such lawful arrest. (Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 01, 2018)
Requirements for a valid hot pursuit arrest: Law enforcers need not personally
witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it. (Veridiano v.
People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
Example: Lack of probable cause for a warrantless arrest: The police officers
proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused based solely on the report of a
concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house. -- A review of the facts
reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were confiscated as an
incident thereof. According to the testimony of the police officers, they proceeded to, and entered,
the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session
was going on in said house. As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had
no personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were
committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house
of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had
no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that the
accused had just committed an offense. As admitted by the police, the tip originated from a
concerned citizen who himself had no personal knowledge of the information that was reported
to the police: (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)
Requirements for a valid hot pursuit arrest: The elements of personal

knowledge and immediacy. -- In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), Rule
113, it is required that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
Verily, under Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is essential that the element of personal knowledge must
be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly,
the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in
consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. The clincher in the element of
"personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within
which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances
within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to
base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive
investigation. (Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
Example of a valid hot pursuit arrest: A police officer ordered a motorcycle-

riding suspect -- who held a bag that appeared stolen from a parked vehicle -- to stop
but the suspect sped away, and immediately thereafter, the owner of the vehicle
reported to the same police officer that the suspect broke her car window and stole
her bag, prompting the police officer to chase the suspect in a continuous and
unbroken pursuit until he was arrested six hours later. -- In this case, a judicious review
of the records shows that while PO2 Torculas was cruising on his motorcycle, he personally saw
petitioners holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a parked vehicle.
Suspicious of the incident, PO2 Torculas told petitioners to halt, prompting the latter to speed
away aboard their motorcycle. Immediately thereafter, the owner of the vehicle, Dombase,
approached PO2 Torculas and sought for his assistance, narrating that petitioners broke the
window of her vehicle and took her belongings. To the Court, petitioners' sudden flight upon being
flagged by a police officer, coupled with Dombase's narration of what had just transpired is
enough to provide PO2 Torculas with personal knowledge of facts indicating that a crime had just
been committed and that petitioners are the perpetrators thereof. Moreover, upon gaining such
personal knowledge, not only did PO2 Torculas chase petitioners until they entered a dark,
secluded area, he also called for back-up and conducted a "stake-out" right then and there until
they were able to arrest petitioners about six (6) hours later. These circumstances indubitably
show that the twin requisites of personal knowledge and immediacy in order to effectuate a valid
"hot pursuit" warrantless arrest are present, considering that PO2 Torculas obtained personal
knowledge that a crime had just been committed and that he did not waver in his continuous and
unbroken pursuit of petitioners until they were arrested. From the foregoing, the Court concludes
"that the police officers validly conducted a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest on petitioners.
(Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless hot pursuit arrest,
because the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. -- That the
police obtained prior information from two persons that the woman had just bought illegal drugs
– does not justify a “hot pursuit” arrest because the arresting officers had no personal knowledge
of any fact or circumstance indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. A hearsay tip
by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of
facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime
(Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018)
Hot pursuit arrest: Police presence during the commission of the offense is
not required for a hot pursuit arrest. It is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to
believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to
be arrested has recently committed the crime. -- In a hot pursuit arrest, police presence
at the scene while the crime was being committed is not required. It is enough that evidence of
the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe,
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently
committed the crime. Thus, if the police officers respond to the scene of the crime in less than one
hour and talked to the bloodied mauling victim who identified his attackers in the same
neighborhood, and these alleged attackers did not deny the incident but had a different version –
the police officers had personal knowledge to justify the warrantless arrest of the alleged attackers.
(Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)
The arrest of a person who had presented himself before the police station to clear his
name and prove that he was not the accused -- was not valid, as he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense
that he might have committed. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang
Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
Failure to question the legality of the arrest constitutes a waiver only as to any
question concerning any defects in their arrest, and not with regard to the
inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. -- At this
point, the Court notes that petitioners failed to question the legality of their arrest, and in fact,
actively participated in the trial of the case. As such, they are deemed to have waived any
objections involving the same. Nonetheless, it must be clarified that the foregoing constitutes a
waiver only as to any question concerning any defects in their arrest, and not with regard to the
inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. It is well-settled that a
waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. (Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June
03, 2019)
Valid Warrantless Search:

Search of a Moving Vehicle or Search at
Checkpoints
Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. A checkpoint

search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June
2017)
A search of a moving vehicle is one (1) of the few permissible exceptions where warrantless
searches can be made. This exception is easy to understand. It is impracticable to obtain a warrant
when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since
they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.
(People v. Sison, July 31, 2019, G.R. No. 238453)
Routine visual checkpoint searches: Valid even without probable cause. --

Routine checkpoint searches are valid for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search.
(Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
Extensive checkpoint searches: Valid when probable cause is present. --

Extensive checkpoint searches are valid when law enforcers have probable cause to believe that
the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an
offense. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped
information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion. Although the
Supreme Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped information,
there were other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted by the authorities.
(Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
For a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, probable cause remains

imperative. Law enforcers do not enjoy unbridled discretion to conduct searches. The mere
mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and
in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause
to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case. (People v. Sison,
July 31, 2019, G.R. No. 238453)
Requirement for the existence of probable cause: Bare suspicion is not

enough. Law enforcers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. What is
required is the presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity. -- In determining the
existence of probable cause, bare suspicion is never enough. While probable cause does not
demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify conviction, it requires the existence of "a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged." In warrantless searches, law enforcers "must not rely on a single suspicious
circumstance." What is required is the "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity,
which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." There have been a
number of cases where this Court considered warrantless searches made in moving vehicles to be
valid. In these cases, probable cause was founded on more than just a solitary suspicious
circumstance.
In People v. Malmstedt, Narcotics Command officers set up a temporary checkpoint in

response to "persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana
and other prohibited drugs." These included information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession. At the checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus and
inspected it, starting from the front, going towards the rear. The bus turned out to be the vehicle
boarded by the accused. Upon reaching the accused, an officer noticed a bulge on his waist. This
prompted the officer to ask for the accused's passport and identification papers, which the accused
failed to provide. The accused was then made to reveal what was bulging on his waist. It turned
out to be hashish, a derivative of marijuana. In Malmstedt, this Court ruled that the warrantless
search was valid because there was probable cause-- premised on circumstances other than the
original tip concerning a Caucasian person for the arresting officers to search the accused. (People
v. Sison, July 31, 2019, G.R. No. 238453)
Lack of probable cause: Radio message cannot be the sole basis for the police
to conduct an extensive search of a moving vehicle. -- The accused (Yanson) noted that
the radio message supposedly received by the police officers was the sole basis for their belief of
the alleged transportation of marijuana Yanson contended that the two (2) sacks of marijuana
supposedly seized from him, Bautista, and Sison are inadmissible evidence since the police
officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search on their vehicle. He noted that the radio
message supposedly received by the police officers was the sole basis for their belief of the alleged
transportation of marijuana. Yanson asserted that searches at checkpoints, in the absence of
probable cause, should be limited only to a visual search. Thus, he maintained that the further
instruction for Sison to open the hood of their pickup amounted to an unreasonable intrusion and
violation of privacy. Yanson added that Sison could never have freely consented to an extensive
search considering how, when they were flagged down and asked about opening the hood, he was
surrounded by police officers and could not feel secure in declining. The arresting officers' search
and subsequent seizure are invalid. As such, the two (2) sacks of marijuana supposedly being
transported in the pickup cannot be admitted in evidence. (People v. Sison, July 31, 2019, G.R.
No. 238453)

Stop and Frisk Search
Requirement in stop-and-frisk search: Not probable cause, but genuine

reason that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person may be armed and
dangerous. -- Probable cause is not required but a genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous. (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with his
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons concealed about him. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
Stop-and-frisk procedure for the police: Stop a citizen on the street,

interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or contraband. -- A stop-and-frisk is the act
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check
the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must
have a genuine reason, in accordance with his experience and the surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons concealed about him. (Sanchez v.
People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
"Stop and frisk" searches should be allowed only in the specific and limited
instances: (1) it should be allowed only on the basis of the police officer's reasonable
suspicion, in light of his or her experience, that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous; (2) the search must only be a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing; and (3) conducted for the purpose of discovering weapons which might be
used to assault him/her or other persons in the area. -- In Terry vs. Ohio, the Decision
of the United States Supreme Court from which our local "stop and frisk" doctrine was based, it
was clearly stated that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
In Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that in Terry, what justified
the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Verily, the "stop and frisk" doctrine was developed
in jurisprudence, and searches of such nature were allowed despite the Constitutionally-
enshrined right against unreasonable searches and seizures, because of the recognition that law
enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. It must be
emphasized, however, that these "stop and frisk" searches are exceptions to the general rule that
warrants are necessary for the State to conduct a search and, consequently, intrude on a person's
privacy. In the words of the Court in People vs. Cogaed, this doctrine of "stop and frisk" "should
be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution."
"Stop and frisk" searches should thus be allowed only in the specific and limited instances
contemplated in Terry: (1) it should be allowed only on the basis of the police officer's reasonable
suspicion, in light of his or her experience, that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; (2) the search must only be
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing; and (3) conducted for the purpose of discovering
weapons which might be used to assault him/her or other persons in the area. (People v.
Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019)
Genuine reason for a “stop and frisk”: The combination of the police asset's
tip and the arresting officers' observation of a gun-shaped object under person's
shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop
and frisk search. -- In direct contrast with warrantless searches incidental to a lawful arrest,
stop and frisk searches are conducted to deter crime. People v. Cogaed[ underscored that they are
necessary for law enforcement, though never at the expense of violating a citizen's right to privacy:
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission
of offenses. For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must have had personal
knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit
act. Cogaed emphasized that anything less than the arresting officer's personal observation of a
suspicious circumstance as basis for the search is an infringement of the "basic right to security
of one's person and effects." Malacat instructed that for a stop and frisk search to be valid, mere
suspicion is not enough; there should be a genuine reason, as determined by the police officer, to
warrant a belief that the person searched was carrying a weapon. In short, the totality of
circumstances should result in a genuine reason to justify a stop and frisk search. Accordingly, to
sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have personally observed
two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then create a reasonable
inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer to investigate further. Here, while the
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search was conducted on petitioner, the facts
on record do not point to a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Rather, what
transpired was a stop and frisk search. Chief Inspector Beniat received information that
petitioner, whom he knew as a kagawad and security aide of Mayor Gamboa, was carrying a gun
outside the Municipal Tourism Office during an election gun ban. With a few other police officers,
he went there and spotted petitioner right in front of the building with a suspicious-looking bulge
protruding under his shirt, around his waist. The police officer deduced this to be a firearm based
on the object's size and contour. The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police officers' visual
confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband, led to a reasonable
suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban. However, a reasonable suspicion
is not synonymous with the personal knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a
valid warrantless arrest. The combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting officers'
observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason
for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner. (Manibog v. People, G.R.
No. 211214, March 20, 2019)
A “stop and frisk” becomes unlawful the moment the police officers continue
with the search on a person’s body even after that finding this person has no
weapon. -- The RTC, in its Decision, ruled that the search was valid because it was a "stop and
frisk" situation, justified by the police officers' suspicion over Cristobal as the latter supposedly
tried to flee as he was being issued a traffic violation ticket. Even if this version of events were
true, i.e., that Cristobal tried to run away while he was being issued a ticket for his traffic violation,
the same did not justify the intensive search conducted on him. By the prosecution's own
narration of the facts - in other words, by their own admission - after Cristobal was successfully
apprehended after he ran away, "PO2 Ramos searched the accused for any deadly weapon but he
found none." Even if the Court accepts wholesale the police officers' version of the facts, the search
that led to the supposed discovery of the seized items had nevertheless become unlawful the
moment they continued with the search despite finding no weapon on Cristobal's body. The police
officers' act of proceeding to search Cristobal's body, despite their own admission that they were
unable to find any weapon on him, constitutes an invalid and unconstitutional search. (People v.
Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019)

Plain View Doctrine
Plain view doctrine requirements. -- The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March
13, 2019)
Plain view doctrine requirements: 1) prior justification for an intrusion; 2) discovery is
inadvertent; and 3) object is immediately apparent. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589,
November 19, 2014)
Contraband lying outside of a suspect’s house and exposed to the sight of police officers
serving a search warrant can be seized under the plain view doctrine. (Crescencio v People, G.R.
No. 205015, November 19, 2014)
When items not described in the search warrant may be seized under the
plain view doctrine. -- Under the plain view doctrine, during the conduct of the search, objects
falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject
to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. For the "plain view
doctrine" to apply, it is required that the following requisites are present: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Example of lack of valid intrusion: Without a search warrant, the police

officers intentionally peeped first through the window of the house before they saw
and ascertained the activities of accused inside the room. -- The police proceeded to,
and entered, the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that
a pot session was going on in said house. The objects were not seized in plain view. First, there
was no valid intrusion. The accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e.,
the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police
officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the
activities of accused-appellants inside the room. The apprehending officers should have
conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits
were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of
probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior
to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search
was likewise illegal. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)
Example of contraband not immediately apparent: Contraband inside a

match box being held by a person unlawfully arrested. -- Contraband inside a match box
being held by the person unlawfully arrested, and which was not readily apparent to the police
officers cannot be validly seized under the plain view doctrine. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No.
204589, November 19, 2014)
Immediately apparent test: There can be no valid plain view seizure if at the
time of the warrantless seizure, it was not readily apparent to the police that the
very small plastic sachet contained anything, much less shabu. – In the case at hand,
while it can be said that the presence of the police officers was legitimate as they were patrolling
the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent, it should be emphasized that, as
to the third requisite, it was clearly not apparent that such plastic sachet is an evidence of a crime,
a contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. To recall, when SPO1 Parchaso saw Dominguez, he
only saw that Dominguez was holding a very small plastic sachet. A very small plastic sachet is not
readily apparent as evidence incriminating Dominguez, such that it can be seized without a
warrant. A very small plastic sachet can contain just about anything. It could even be just that —
a very small plastic sachet — and nothing more.
Although laboratory results later showed that the plastic sachet taken from Dominguez
indeed contained shabu, this cannot justify the seizure of the plastic sachet from Dominguez
because at the time of the warrantless seizure, it was not readily apparent to SPO1 Parchaso that
the very small plastic sachet contained anything, much less shabu. Thus, the circumstances of this
case do not justify a seizure based on the plain view doctrine.
In sum, despite the fact that Dominguez can no longer question the validity of his arrest,
it is crystal clear that the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is
inadmissible in evidence against him. There being no warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest or seizure of evidence in plain view, the shabu purportedly seized from Dominguez is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
(Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)
Immediately apparent test: Items not inherently unlawful cannot be seized
under the plain view doctrine. -- The "immediately apparent" test only requires that there is
a probable cause to associate the property with a criminal activity. The plain view doctrine cannot
justify seizure of items the possession thereof is not inherently unlawful. Thus, the following items
not described in the warrant but also seized are inadmissible: (a) 3 torn cloths; (b) black bag pack;
(c) a piece of gold-plated earing; (d) a suspected human hair; (e) a piece of embroidered cloth; (f)
3 burned tire wires; (g) empty plastic of muriatic acid; and (h) white t-shirt. (Castillo v. People,
G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
The requirement of inadvertence: The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. –The
"plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the "plain
view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for
an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant
for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where
it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view"
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13,
2019)
Seizure under a search warrant and under plain view doctrine: The items
supposedly seized in plain view must be confiscated in relation to the seizure of the
items identified in the search warrant: Other items subsequently found cannot be
admitted. -- The plain view doctrine cannot apply if it is not clear whether the items supposedly
seized in plain view were confiscated in relation to the seizure of the items identified in the search
warrant -- whether prior to, contemporaneous with or subsequent to such seizure. The "plain view
doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found.
(Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)

Consented Search
Consent must be given voluntarily, intelligently and without duress. -- The

constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which
may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. If a police officer,
without coercion or intimidation, asks for permission to open a bag and the bag owner says, “yes,
just open it,” there is consent to the search of the contents of the bag. (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No.
200334, July 30, 2014)
Silence is not necessarily consent to a search but mere passive conformity

given under intimidating or coercive circumstances. -- The police carry the burden of
showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from
any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed. (Veridiano v. People, June 7, 2017,
G.R. No. 200370)
Reasonable Search:
Airport Security Search
Routine airport security searches: Valid because of their minimal

intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. -- Airport security searches are valid even
without a warrant, because of their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. (Sales v. People,
G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013)
Reasonable Search:
Seaport Security Search
Routine x-ray scanning of baggage at seaports by port authorities: Valid just

like routine airport security searches. -- The security measures of x-ray scanning and
inspection in domestic seaports -- akin to routine security procedures in airports – are reasonable.
The reason is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into airports
or ports of travel. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
Routine baggage inspections at seaports by port authorities: Opening of baggage by port

inspector is reasonable. The port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and policy to
ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. It is a permissible intrusion to privacy
when measured against the possible harm to society caused by lawless persons. (Dela Cruz v.
People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
Reasonable Search:
Search by a government employer of an

employees’ office computer in connection
with investigation of work-related
misconduct
A government employee’s expectation of privacy in a regulated office

environment is reduced. -- A government employee’s expectation of privacy in a regulated
office environment is reduced. The employee’s privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
limited by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. (Pollo v.
Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)
A government employee cannot have a subjective expectation of privacy in his

government-issued computer containing his personal files, if the government office implemented
a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they
create, store, send or receive on the office computers. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No.
181881, October 18, 2011)
A warrantless search by a government employer of an employees’ office in

connection with investigation of work-related misconduct is justified at inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. -- A warrantless search by a
government employer of an employees’ office in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will
turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, a search of a
government employee’s files in the government-issued computer, conducted in connection with
investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint -- is a
reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of an employer to ensure operational
effectiveness and efficiency. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)
Reasonable Search
Public Bus Search:

Guidelines, Limitations, Application
The State can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going
in a public bus, which is accessible to the public. A person's expectation of privacy
is diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that arc accessible to the
public. -- A bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property accessible
to the public. The State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and
filter those going in. A person's expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters
private premises that arc accessible to the public. Thus, a bus inspection at a military checkpoint
constitutes a reasonable search. (Saluday v. People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
Guidelines for reasonable public bus searches
Prior to entry: Passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a
routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. -- Prior to entry,
passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport
and seaport security protocol. Metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installed at
bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be
required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, in the passenger's presence.
Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal. (Saluday v.
People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
While in transit: A bus can still be searched by government agents or the

security personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. -- While in transit,
a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus owner in the
following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband
or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an
inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced
to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger
onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passenger en route, the prospective passenger can be
frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government
agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is
because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it
possible for these passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be
flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the
vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages. (Saluday v. People,
April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
Conditions for a reasonable public bus searches: The search a) must be least
intrusive and uphold the dignity of the person being searched; b) must not be
motivated by discrimination, profiling, stereotyping or similar motives; c) must be
confined to ensuring public safety. Courts must also ensure that precautionary
measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.-
- The inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search
of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable
search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the
dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any
cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result
from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar
motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities,
children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it
must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable
search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no
evidence was planted against the accused.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at
risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses
and their terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category. (Saluday v. People,
April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
Vehicles covered by the guidelines on public bus searches: Aside from public
transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the
terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines: -- Aside from
public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the terminal and
along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these
guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes
a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the
constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. (Saluday v. People, April
3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
Vehicles not covered by the guidelines on public bus searches: Privately-

owned cars or moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use. -- The guidelines
do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for
private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers
such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person unti1 the passengers on
board alight from the vehicle. (Saluday v. People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
Effect of unlawful search and seizure: Evidence obtained is inadmissible for

any purpose in any proceeding. -- Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This
exclusionary rule instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. (People
v. Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018)
FREE SPEECH
Freedom of expression as a preferred right. -- Freedom of expression has gained

recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and given a preferred
right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties. In no
equivocal terms did the fundamental law of the land prohibit the abridgement of the freedom of
expression. Section 4, Article II of the 1987 Constitution expressly states: No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. (Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)
Freedom of expression includes the right to vote and express one's preference
for a candidate or the right to influence others to vote for a particular candidate. --
A fundamental part of this cherished freedom is the right to participate in electoral processes,
which includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to express one's preference for a
candidate or the right to influence others to vote or otherwise not vote for a particular candidate.
(Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)
Facial review of a law encroaching on free speech on the ground of

overbreadth or vagueness: Facial review is justified to avert the "chilling effect" on
protected speech. -- A facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech
on the ground of overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction. The allowance of a
review of a law or statute on its face in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling
effect" on protected speech. (Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)
Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, as facial challenges, apply only to free speech cases,
not for testing the validity of penal statutes. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,
February 18, 2014)
Overbreadth doctrine: A proper governmental purpose may not be achieved

by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms. -- Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily
sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. Put differently, an
overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts even constitutionally-protected rights. (Nicolas-
Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)
Void-for-vagueness doctrine: A law or statute suffers from vagueness when it

lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. -- On the other hand, a law or statute
suffers from vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The allowance of a review of
a law or statute on its face in free speech cases is justified, however, by the aim to avert the "chilling
effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. (Nicolas-
The void-for-vagueness challenge aims to counter a statute’s chilling effect on

free speech. -- When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge
grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. This is to counter the "chilling effect"
on protected speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under
an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking to avoid being charged of a
crime. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552,
October 5, 2010)
Prior restraints on free speech: Governmental restrictions on expression in

advance of actual publication. -- Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions
on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.
(Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)
Content-based v. content-neutral prior restraints on speech: Content-based

restraint refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of speech, while content-
neutral regulation refers to restrictions on time, place, or manner of the speech. --
The right to freedom of expression is not absolute. The degree of restriction may depend on
whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral. Content-based regulations can either
be based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the expression. Content-based restraint
or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In
contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such
as time, place, or manner of the speech. (Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015)
A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content - neutral regulation, i.e.,
merely concerned with the incidents of speech, or one that merely controls the time, place, or
manner, and under well-defined standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e.,
the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction
determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with. (Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 223705, August 14, 2019)
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of

the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. (Diocese of Bacolod v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
A content-based prior restraint on free speech is presumed invalid, unless it

passes the clear and present danger test. -- A content-based regulation, however, bears a
heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The
latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions
imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.” (Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
Clear and present danger test to test the validity of a content-neutral prior
restraint: Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger
test will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. The question is whether the words
used create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. -- On the other hand, a governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light
of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. Unless the government can overthrow this
presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down. With respect to content-based
restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained
would bring about - especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm - otherwise
the prior restraint will be invalid. The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. (Nicolas-Lewis v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)
A content-neutral government regulation: Requirements for validity: [1] it is

within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incident restriction on freedom of
speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest: A content-
neutral government regulation is sufficiently justified: [1] if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. (Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a
substantial governmental interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of this are not
subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach: A governmental
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom
of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (Nicolas-
Examples of Invalid Restraints on Free Speech
Banning partisan political activities or campaigning

even during the campaign period within embassies,
consulates, and other foreign service establishments,
regardless of whether it applies only to candidates or
whether the prohibition extends to private persons
The ban on partisan political activity (the act of campaigning for or against
any candidate) abroad during the 30-day overseas voting period is a sweeping
prohibition against all forms of expression considered as partisan political
activities, without any qualification. It is an invalid content-neutral regulation
because the prohibition is more than what is essential to the furtherance of the
contemplated governmental interest. -- Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section
36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as amended by R.A. No. 10590, which prohibits "any person to engage in
partisan political activity abroad during the 30-day overseas voting period." A violation of this
provision entails penal and administrative sanctions. The term "election campaign" or "partisan
political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office. On its face, the questioned provision prohibits the act
of campaigning for or against any candidate during the voting period abroad. It is an
impermissible content-neutral regulation for being overbroad, violating, thus, the free speech
clause under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The questioned provision is clearly a restraint on one's exercise of right to campaign or

disseminate campaign-related information. Undoubtedly, the prohibition under the questioned
legislative act restrains speech or expression, in the form of engagement in partisan political
activities, before they are spoken or made. The restraint, however, partakes of a content - neutral
regulation as it merely involves a regulation of the incidents of the expression, specifically the time
and place to exercise the same. Being a content-neutral regulation, we, therefore, measure the
same against the intermediate test, viz.: (1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of
the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) such
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of the free expression; and (4) the incidental
restriction on the alleged freedom of expression is no greater than what is essential to the
furtherance of the governmental interest.
The failure to meet the fourth criterion is fatal to the regulation's validity. In this case, the
challenged provision's sweeping and absolute prohibition against all forms of expression
considered as partisan political activities without any qualification is more than what is essential
to the furtherance of the contemplated governmental interest. On its face, the challenged law
provides for an absolute and substantial suppression of speech as it leaves no ample alternative
means for one to freely exercise his or her fundamental right to participate in partisan political
activities. The risk of compromising the integrity and order of our elections may occur only within
premises where voting is conducted, i.e., in embassies, consulates, and other foreign service
establishments. There is, therefore, no rhyme or reason to impose a limitation on the protected
right to participate in partisan political activities exercised beyond said places. (Nicolas-Lewis v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)
The ban on partisan political activity abroad during the 30-day overseas
voting period is void for being overbroad. -- Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189 should be struck
down for being overbroad as it does not provide for well-defined standards, resulting to the
ambiguity of its application, which produces a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech and
expression, and ultimately, resulting to the unnecessary invasion of the area of protected
freedoms. For the foregoing reasons, this Court declares Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as
amended by R.A. No. 10590, unconstitutional for violating Section 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. (Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)
Comelec regulation of political speech on oversized

tarpaulins posted on private property by non-
candidates during elections
The tarpaulins are political advocacy of private individuals and not election
propaganda subject to Comelec regulation. COMELEC does not have the authority
to regulate the enjoyment of freedom of expression by a non-candidate. --
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had
the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom
of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case. Speech with political consequences enjoys
a high degree of protection. Tarpaulins put up by private individuals that contain statements of
their approval or criticisms of public officials’ vote on the RH Law, as part of these private
individuals’ advocacy campaign against the RH Law, and not paid for by any candidate or political
party – are not election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by non-candidates or who

do not speak as members of a political party which are principally advocacies of a social issue
during elections -- is unconstitutional. Regulation of election paraphernalia involving speech of
persons who are not candidates is valid, if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a
whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should
be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation
must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message.
The Comelec’s general role includes ensuring equal opportunities and reduce spending
among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of
the electorate in the electoral exercise. Expression by the electorate on contemporary issues is a
form of speech protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. (The Diocese
of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
The prohibition is a content-based prior restraint that is presumed invalid

and there is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting
of the tarpaulin. -- Prohibiting non-candidates from posting on their private property
tarpaulins containing their opinions that may affect elections is a content-based regulation that is
presumed invalid. A content-based prior restraint will only be valid it if passes the clear and
present danger test. Even with the clear and present danger test, there is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of
the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-
candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. (Diocese of Bacolod v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
The prohibition is an impermissible encroachment on the right to property. -

- The act of the Comelec in restraining private individuals from posting tarpaulins expressing
political views in their own private property is an impermissible encroachment on the right to
property. The Comelec prohibition is a deprivation of property without due process. (The Diocese
of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
Aggregate-based time air-time limits on election

campaign advertising
Restriction on freedom of speech and of the press. -- The Comelec’s rule -- limiting
the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes for political campaigns or advertisements -- is unreasonable and arbitrary, as it
unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and of the press. It unduly restricts and constrains
the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
Violation of the right to suffrage. -- The COMELEC’s aggregate time-limit rule [rule
limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred
eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements] violate the people’s right to
suffrage by restricting the right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise
of their right to determine their own destiny. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 205357, September 2, 2014)
Comelec prohibition on posting of an election

campaign material during an election period in
Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport
terminals
The prohibition constitutes a content-based prior restraint on the right to

free expression which is presumed invalid. -- The Comelec prohibition on posting of an
election campaign material during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and
transport terminals --constitutes a prior restraint on the right to free expression. Prior restraints
are presumed invalid. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
206020, April 14, 2015)
Assuming it is a content-neutral regulation, it is still not valid because first, it
is not within the constitutionally delegated power of the Comelec, and second, there
is no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and
transport terminals. -- A content-neutral regulation, which merely controls the time, place or
manner of speech, is valid if the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is
within the constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals
from posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation because, first,
it is not within the constitutionally delegated power of the Comelec, and second, there is no
necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. (1-
United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)
No captive audience. -- Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from

posting election campaign materials cannot be justified under the captive-audience doctrine. The
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs
and transport terminals, nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained
therein. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14,
2015)
Penalizing the act of “aiding and abetting” the

commission of internet libel
The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the commission of internet libel is
void for being vague and overbroad. -- The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the
commission of internet libel is void for being vague and overbroad. The terms "aiding or abetting"
unnecessarily sweep broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms, generating a
chilling effect on those who express themselves in cyberspace. Also, netizens are not given "fair
notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. Its vagueness also
causes a chilling effect on the freedom of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014)
Prohibition on spam
Spam is protected speech, prohibition on spam is invalid. -- The prohibition on

the sending of internet “spam” under Republic Act (R.A.) 10175 (the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012) is a violation of freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads
would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to
him; commercial speech is also entitled to protection. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014)
Examples of Valid Regulations Affecting Speech
Comelec’s regulation of election surveys by

requiring disclosure of names of those who
commission or pay for election surveys
When published, election surveys partake of the nature of election

propaganda subject to Comelec regulation. -- Election surveys may influence voter
preferences. When left unregulated, election surveys can undermine the holding of "fair"
elections, which is the purpose of the Fair Election act. The Fair Election Act aims to realize the
policy under the 1987 Constitution to guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service,
and reduce political inequalities.
Election surveys may tend to shape voter preferences. When published, election surveys
partake of the nature of election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation. The requirement of
disclosing the names of subscribers to election surveys is valid regulation of declarative speech by
private entities in the context of an election campaign because 1) it has basis in a statute, 2) it
furthers not just an important or substantial state interest but even a compelling one, which is to
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and 3) narrowly tailored to meet the
objective and is least restrictive means to achieve that objective. (Social Weather Station v.
Mandatory after-election disclosure of names of those who commission

election surveys is not a prior restraint. -- The Comelec’s regulation requiring disclosure of
names of those who commission or pay for election surveys is not a prior restraint as the
disclosure requirement kicks in only upon, not prior to, publication. (Social Weather Station v.
Comelec requirement on media to give political

candidates and parties the right to reply to charges
aired or printed against them
The Comelec rule providing that all registered political parties, party-list
groups or coalitions and bona fide candidates shall have the right to reply to charges
published or aired against them and mandating newspaper, television, and/or radio
station which first printed or aired the charges to give publicity to such reply – is
valid and reasonable. -- The Comelec’s “right to reply" provision is reasonable and consistent
with the constitutional mandate. Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, as revised by Resolution No.
9631, provides: “SECTION 14. Right to Reply. - All registered political parties, party-list groups
or coalitions and bona fide candidates shall have the right to reply to charges published or aired
against them. The reply shall be given publicity by the newspaper, television, and/or radio
station which first printed or aired the charges with the same prominence or in the same page
or section or in the same time slot as the first statement. xxx” The attack on the validity of the
"right to reply" provision is primarily anchored on the alleged ground of prior restraint,
specifically in so far as such a requirement may have a chilling effect on speech or of the freedom
of the press. The Constitution itself provides, as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest,
fair and credible elections, a task addressed to the COMELEC to provide for a right to reply. The
Constitution itself mandates the right to reply. Moreover, radio and TV broadcasting companies
do not own the airwaves but are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. The exercise
of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form
of public. In fine, when it comes to election and the exercise of freedom of speech, of expression
and of the press, the latter must be properly viewed in context as being necessarily made to
accommodate the imperatives of fairness by giving teeth and substance to the right to reply
requirement. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)
UNPROTECTED SPEECH
Libel is unprotected speech and may be penalized. -- Libel is unprotected speech

and may be penalized. The government has an obligation to protect private individuals from
defamation. The cybercrime law penalizing the author of a libelous online statement or article is
valid. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)
The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the commission of internet libel is
void for being vague and overbroad. -- The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the
commission of internet libel is void for being vague and overbroad. The terms "aiding or abetting"
unnecessarily sweep broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms, generating a
chilling effect on those who express themselves in cyberspace. Also, netizens are not given "fair
notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. Its vagueness also
causes a chilling effect on the freedom of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014)
Actual malice in libel cases: To be convicted of libel for criticisms of public

officials on matters of public interest, the prosecution must be prove that the
offender had actual malice, meaning he made the defamatory statement with the
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
-- The conduct, moral fitness, and ability of a public official to discharge his duties are
undoubtedly matters of public interest. The statements on the "lousy performance" and
"mismanagement" of Domingo are matters of public interest as these relate to his moral conduct,
his capacity to lead the DTI Region VIII employees, and to manage and supervise the affairs of
the office. These statements undoubtedly make it to the grade of qualifiedly privileged
communication and thus, would require actual malice to be actionable. It must be stressed,
however, that once it is established that the article is of a privileged character, the onus of proving
actual malice rests on the plaintiff who must then convince the court that the offender was
prompted by malice or ill will. There is "actual malice" or malice in fact when the offender makes
the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. It was evident that the statements as to the "lousy performance" and
"mismanagement" of Domingo cannot be regarded to have been written with the knowledge that
these were false or in reckless disregard of whether these were false, bearing in mind that Batuigas
had documentary evidence to support his statements. (Manila Bulletin v. Domingo, G.R. No.
170341, July 5, 2017)
Example of unprotected speech: A lawyer’s inappropriate and obscene
language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of
another person through Facebook posts are in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his
public or private life. -- A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of
disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation
of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan,"
"Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing
people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name
and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence
upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client
Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all
these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against
complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence
and estafa which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."
In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of
publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook
posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. By
posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent
disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in
his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an
officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and
rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive
way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation. (Belo-Henares v.
Guevarra, A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016)
In the exercise of free speech, one must act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. -- The Court cannot accept the argument that the
subject remarks were written in the exercise of his freedom of speech and expression. Freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. While the freedom of
expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected rights
in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. As such, the constitutional
right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others,
destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute. (Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, A.C.
No. 11394, December 01, 2016)
That the subject of the criticism is a public figure and/or a celebrity and
therefore, a public personage does not justify a lawyer’s disrespectful language that
breaches the walls of decency. -- That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and
therefore, a public personage who is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent's
disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's remarks against
complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively
sanctioned. Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity,
as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character
being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of
such privilege. The Court finds that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year. (Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016)
RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION
Right to form associations and government regulations of associations: The

right to organize does not equate to the state’s obligation to give official status to
every single association that comes into existence. It is one thing for individuals to
form themselves as a collective, but it is another for the group that they formed to
be formally recognized by the state and given all the benefits and privileges that are
attendant to official status. -- Reference to an approving authority in order that an
organization may be given official recognition by state organs, and thus vested with the
competencies and privileges attendant to such recognition, is by no means unique to PTAs. By
way of example, similar processes and requirements are observed and adhered to by organizations
seeking recognition as business organizations (e.g., corporations), government contractors,
legitimate labor organizations, and political parties participating in the party-list system. The
demarcation of the broad right to form associations vis-à-vis regulations such as registration,
requisite approval by defined authorities, and other such formalities is settled in jurisprudence.
In case of registration of labor organizations, the registration and approval, as requisites to the
acquisition of legal personality and the exercise of rights and privileges that are accorded to an
officially recognized organization, are not incompatible with the right to form associations. The
establishment of these requirements is a valid exercise of police power as public interest underlies
the conduct of associations seeking state recognition. The registration is not a limitation to the
right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or without said registration. The
latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor
organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by
law to legitimate labor organizations." The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and
privileges, much less said personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and
exercise of which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses,
fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union they
purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the
activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of workers are engaged affect
public interest, which should be protected.
The right to organize does not equate to the state’s obligation to accord official status to
every single association that comes into existence. It is one thing for individuals to galvanize
themselves as a collective, but it is another for the group that they formed to not only be formally
recognized by the state, but also bedecked with all the benefits and privileges that are attendant
to official status. In pursuit of public interest, the state can set reasonable regulations—
procedural, formal, and substantive—with which organizations seeking state imprimatur must
comply. (Quezon City PTCA Federation v. Department of Education, February 23, 2016, G.R.
No. 188720)
Regulation of PTAs: A parent-teacher association is a mechanism for effecting

the role of parents as an indispensable element of educational communities; Giving
a parent-teacher association official status not only enables it to avail of benefits
and privileges but also establishes upon it its solemn duty as a pillar of the
educational system: Petitioner’s question the constitutionality of Department of Education’s
Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 (Department Order), which ordered the cessation of
recognition of existing parents-teachers community associations (PTCAs) and of their federations
effective school year 2009–2010. The Department Order gave them until June 30, 2009 to
dissolve and wind up their activities. Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation claims that the
Department Order undermines the independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively amend the
constitutions and by-laws of existing PTAs and PTCAs, and violate its constitutional rights to
organize and to due process.
Our educational system demonstrates the integral role of parents. It is a system founded
not just on the relationship between students on the one hand and educators or schools on the
other, but as much on the participation of parents and guardians. A parent-teacher association is
a mechanism for effecting the role of parents as an indispensable element of educational
communities. A parent-teacher association is an adjunct of an educational community having a
particular school as its locus. It is an "arm" of the school. Given this view, the importance of
regulation vis-à-vis investiture of official status becomes manifest. According a parent-teacher
association official status not only enables it to avail itself of benefits and privileges but also
establishes upon it its solemn duty as a pillar of the educational system. (Quezon City PTCA
Federation v. Department of Education, February 23, 2016, G.R. No. 188720)
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Non-Establishment Clause: Government neutrality in religious matters. -- The

constitutional mandate that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion," is
known as the non-establishment clause. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church;
nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force
nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion. What non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. (In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon
City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
Under the Establishment Clause, the State is prohibited from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April
2014)
It is a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of a party from registration. The government must act for
secular purposes. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April
8, 2010)
Free exercise clause: Freedom to act on one’s belief is subject to government
regulation. -- The guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to
believe and the freedom to act on one's belief; the first part is absolute; the second part is limited
and subject to regulation where the external acts affect the public welfare. In case of conflict, the
court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8
April 2014)
When freedom of religion and government regulation conflict: Benevolent

Neutrality allows accommodation. -- Government accommodation of religion may be
allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of accommodation is to remove
a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)
Benevolent Neutrality allows for exemption from government regulation. --

Pursuant to the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality, the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. To compel a conscientious objector to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction would be violate "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the right to
free exercise of religion. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses
to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a
patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of religious freedom. (Imbong
v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)
A 2010 CHED Memorandum has imposed a positive duty on all Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic activities in
case such activities interfere with their religious obligations. Thus, HEI officials are duty bound
to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum insofar as it requires the exemption of students who are
Seventh-Day Adventists from academic responsibilities that conflict with the schedule of their
Saturday worship. (Almores v. Achacoso, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 217453)
That a student is being made by a state university to choose between honoring his religious
obligations and finishing his education is a patent infringement of his religious freedoms.
(Almores v. Achacoso, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 217453)
When the government can compel a conscientious objector to act contrary to

his religious belief and conviction: Compelling state interest, such as to save the life
of the mother or a child. -- In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the
compelling state interest test is proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion
that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny. Thus, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an
exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating
a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. If it is
necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted
to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. Whatever burden
imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering
the life he would be able to save. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)
Why the holding of religious rituals such as Catholic masses at the basement
of any hall of justice may be allowed
The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to freely exercise their
religion: Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation
of Church and State. -- Allowing the practice does not violate the principle of separation of
Church and State. The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to freely exercise their
religion. Our very own Constitution recognizes the religiosity of our people. Allowing religion to
flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State.
There is no state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of

religious freedom in the halls of justice. -- Although religious freedom is not absolute, a
compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. To
successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC
Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and employees in
the performance of their official functions. In this case, there is no state interest compelling
enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice.
Allowing the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of

Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. -- Allowing the
holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment,
but merely accommodation. To give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State
adopts a policy of accommodation. Benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under
certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically
into account, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals
to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. (In re: Holding of
Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7,
2017)
LIBERTY OF ABODE
The law allows evictions and demolition without any court order in cases
where persons occupy danger areas or areas where government infrastructure
projects are about to be implemented but the prescribed procedure must be
followed. -- The Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor
their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. RA
7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases where persons or entities occupy danger
areas (such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways) and
when persons occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are
about to be implemented. To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and
humane manner, RA 7279 requires compliance with a prescribed procedure in executing eviction
and/or demolition orders, including prior 30-day notice and adequate consultation. Evictions and
demolitions without any court order under RA 7279 are valid. (Kalipunan Ang Damay Ang
Mahihirap v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014)
TRAVEL
Power of the Supreme Court to curtail the right to travel of members of the
judiciary and court personnel. -- The Supreme Court, under its power of administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof, has the power to oversee all matters relating
to the effective supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it, including the
rules and regulations on their foreign travels. (Leave Division v. Heusdens, Dec 13, 2011, AM No.
P-11-2927)
The Supreme Court regulations on foreign travels of members of the judiciary and court
personnel is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court personnel
can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could be
a disruption in the administration of justice. (Leave Division v. Heusdens, Dec 13, 2011, AM No.
P-11-2927)
Constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations on the right to travel.

Under the Constitution, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this
right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health; and (2) are provided by law. -- The right to travel is part of the guarantee of
freedom of movement that the Constitution affords its citizen. However, the right to travel is not
absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel.
The liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, but the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public
health" and "as may be provided by law." (Genuino v. De Lima, April 17, 2018, G.R. No. 197930)
The right to travel is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may
impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law. (Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special
protection to children. Article 139 of PD 603 explicitly authorizes local government units, through
their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. PD 603 provides sufficient
statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to
travel. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8,
2017)
There is no law authorizing the Secretary of Justice to curtail the exercise of

the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.
-- The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 -- which authorizes the DOJ to restrain the right to travel
-- has no legal basis. There is no law authorizing the Secretary of Justice to curtail the exercise of
the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. (Genuino v.
De Lima, April 17, 2018, G.R. No. 197930)
In the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the accused is

not necessary, and thus, the DOJ cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of
movement on the ground that it is necessary to ensure attendance in the
preliminary investigation of the complaints. -- In the conduct of a preliminary
investigation, the presence of the accused is not necessary for the prosecutor to discharge his
investigatory duties. If the accused chooses to waive his presence or fails to submit countervailing
evidence, that is his own lookout. The DOJ therefore cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of
movement imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 on the ground that it is necessary to ensure attendance
in the preliminary investigation of the complaints. There is also no authority of law granting it the
power to compel the attendance of the subjects of a preliminary investigation. (Genuino v. De
Lima, April 17, 2018, G.R. No. 197930)
The DOJ cannot keep an individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that
he may not be able to evade criminal prosecution. -- That there is a risk of flight does not
authorize the DOJ to take the situation upon itself and draft an administrative issuance to keep
the individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that he may not be able to evade criminal
prosecution and consequent liability. It is an arrogation of power it does not have; it is a
usurpation of function that properly belongs to the legislature. (Genuino v. De Lima, April 17,
2018, G.R. No. 197930)
How restricting travel may constitute a violation of freedom of religion,

speech, assembly, and association. -- Whenever the freedom of religion, speech, assembly,
and association require one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected.
Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that these rights cannot be exercised
without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Why the State may restrict the right to travel of minors. -- The restrictions on the
right to travel that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. Minors do
possess and enjoy constitutional rights, but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those
of adults. They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s
and/or guardian/s, and the State. As parens patriae, the State regulates and restricts the minors'
exercise of their rights, such as in voting, executing contracts, employment, and travelling. The
differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights is justified by: first, the peculiar
vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and
mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing. (Samahan ng mga
What the government must show to validly restrict a fundamental right, such
as the right to travel: The strict scrutiny test - Compelling state interest and least
restrictive means. -- Limitations on the fundamental right to travel of minors are
constitutionally permissible if these pass the strict scrutiny test. Under the strict scrutiny test, a
legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the
burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest,
and (2) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly
tailored to accomplish the interest. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City,
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Restricting the right to travel: The compelling state interest requirement of

the strict scrutiny test. -- Compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.
That children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae
constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State. In this case, respondents have
sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not
totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure
and influences. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442,
August 8, 2017)
Restricting the right to travel: The least restrictive means requirement: While
fundamental rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to
the extent necessary to achieve the State's compelling interest. -- While fundamental
rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to
achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights,
then they must be so narrowly drawn. The curfew ordinances, in restricting the right to travel,
must also sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Curfew ordinances must provide for exemptions that allow the exercise of the
rights to association, free exercise of religion, travel, peaceably assemble, and free
expression. -- The curfew ordinances, in restricting the right to travel, must also sufficiently
protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble,
and of free expression. The Navotas and Manila curfew ordinances protect the rights to education,
to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work. However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not
account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion,
rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others. (Samahan ng mga
Proclamation No. 475 ordering the closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists
and non-residents therefrom which were necessary incidents of the island's
rehabilitation does not actually involve the right to travel in its essence. The impact
of Proclamation No. 475 on the right to travel is not direct but merely consequential;
and, the same is only for a reasonably short period of time or merely temporary. --
Petitioners claim that Proclamation No. 475 impairs the right to travel because it orders the
temporary closure of the Island as a tourist destination for six (6) months starting 26 April 2018,
or until 25 October 2018 and mandates that no tourist will be allowed entry to the island of
Boracay until such time that the closure has been lifted by the President. The activities proposed
to be undertaken to rehabilitate Boracay involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and
construction. These could not have been implemented freely and smoothly with tourists coming
in and out of the island. Hence, the need to close the island in its entirety and ban tourists
therefrom. This case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential sense contrary to
what petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to
travel is merely corollary to the closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents
therefrom which were necessary incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no
showing that Proclamation No. 475 deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. The
questioned proclamation is clearly focused on its purpose of rehabilitating Boracay and any
intention to directly restrict the right cannot, in any manner, be deduced from its import. This is
contrary to the import of several laws recognized as constituting an impairment on the right to
travel which directly impose restriction on the right. Also significant to note is that the closure of
Boracay was only temporary considering the categorical pronouncement that it was only for a
definite period of six months. Hence, if at all, the impact of Proclamation No. 475 on the right to
travel is not direct but merely consequential; and, the same is only for a reasonably short period
of time or merely temporary. (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019)
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has
the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law;
(c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present
when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any
questioning if he so desires. (People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014)
Miranda rights apply only during a custodial investigation, when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person. -- Miranda rights apply only
during a custodial investigation, when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police
who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements." Custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed.
(People v. Cabanada, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 221424)
What custodial investigation means: Person is a suspect, under custody and

being questioned by the police. -- Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken
into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and
the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to
elicit an admission. If a person, before he is arrested and placed under custodial investigation,
voluntarily confesses to the police his commission of a crime, such confession, even if done
without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of his constitutional right, and is admissible
as evidence. (People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015)
Confession to the police when the person was not yet a suspect is admissible
as evidence because he was not yet under custodial investigation. -- An uncounseled
confession elicited during the initial police interview at the residence of an alleged theft victim at
the time when the person confessing was not yet identified by the police as a suspect -- is
admissible as evidence against that person, because the person was not yet under custodial
investigation. However, a subsequent confession to the police after being brought to the police
station is inadmissible because her appearance before the police station already falls within the
definition of custodial investigation. (People v. Cabanada, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 221424)
Miranda rights are not available in administrative investigations. Thus, an

employee’s written statement given during an administrative inquiry conducted by
an employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in
the course of his employment is admissible as evidence against the employee. --
Rights in custodial interrogation, such as the right to counsel, apply only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. Thus, an
employee’s written statement given during an administrative inquiry conducted by an employer
in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment -- is admissible as evidence against the employee, even if he was not assisted by a
lawyer when he signed the written statement. (Manila Water Company v. Rosario, G.R. No.
188747, January 29, 2014)
A person under custodial investigation must be assisted by counsel at all

times. If the lawyer assisted only during the time the accused executed his
extrajudicial confession, the extrajudicial confession is invalid. -- The law requires that
"any person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel. The extrajudicial confession of the accused is inadmissible as evidence. No lawyer
assisted the accused at the time he was arrested and brought to the police station to answer
questions about the crime and he was assisted by his lawyer only during the time he executed his
extrajudicial confession. (People v. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018)
The counsel must be independent: a legal consultant in the Office of the

Municipal Mayor is not. -- A legal consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor -- whose
duty is to provide legal advice to the Mayor whose duty, in turn, is to execute the laws and
ordinances and maintain peace and order in the municipality -- cannot be considered as an
independent counsel since protecting the rights of the accused as a suspect is in direct conflict
with his duty to the Municipal Mayor and the local government of the Municipality. (People v.
Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018)
The lawyer must be competent: He should not merely give a routine,

peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. -- The
lawyer who will assist the accused should be competent, independent and prepared to fully
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely
be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights.
A lawyer is not vigilant in protecting the rights of the accused, if during the course of the custodial
investigation, he allows the accused to answer each question without reminding him that he can
refuse to answer and/or remain silent. (People v. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018)
SELF-INCRIMINATION
Paraffin test without a lawyer is valid: The right against self-incrimination

extends only to testimonial compulsion, and not when the body of the accused is
examined. -- The right against self-incrimination extends only to testimonial compulsion, and
not when the body of the accused is examined. (People v. Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005, October 1,
2014)
BAIL
Purpose: Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)
Who are entitled to bail: Any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. -- The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his
guilt is strong. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)
Before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is

punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua; bail becomes a matter of
discretion if the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment that is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. -- The right
to bail is recognized in the Bill of Rights, as stated in Section 13, Article III of the Constitution:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
In this regard, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable
by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. Bail becomes a matter of discretion if the offense
charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment that is, bail will be
denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. (People v. Tanes, G.R. No. 240596, April 03, 2019)
Procedure when bail is discretionary: In this case, Tanes was charged with violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 which carries the penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes'
bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is not strong. To determine
whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail hearings is required where
the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to the right of the defense to cross-examine
witnesses and introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to conduct only a summary hearing,
consistent with the purpose of merely determining the weight of evidence for purposes of bail.
The court's grant or denial of the bail application must contain a summary of the prosecution's
evidence. On this basis, the judge formulates his or her own conclusion on whether such evidence
is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. (People v. Tanes, G.R. No. 240596, April 03,
2019)
When bail may be allowed regardless of the crime charged and independently
of the merits of the charge: When the incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious
to his health or to endanger his life. -- Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger
his life. The objective of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial. (Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)
SPEEDY TRIAL &
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
The right to a speedy disposition of cases: Protection against vexatious,

capricious, and oppressive delays. -- The Constitution declares that all persons shall have
the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies. The right to speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. (People v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018)
Balancing Test: Four factors to consider to determine a violation of the right

to a speedy trial: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's
assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant." -- To determine whether
accused-appellant's right to speedy trial was violated, "four factors must be considered: (a) length
of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice
to the defendant." (People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018)
Under the “balancing test,” in the determination of whether that right has been violated,
the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the
reason/s for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018)
Example of violation of the right: Pre-trial was not held for more than 1 year-
after the arrest; the prosecution failed to present any evidence during the 4 settings
with any justifiable reason; the accused was in detention during the trial; and the
accused moved for the dismissal of the case for violation of his right to a speedy trial.
-- In this case, all the factors showing a violation of his right are present: (a) length of delay; (b)
the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the
defendant. (People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018)
The court must consider the length of delay and the reason for the delay: The
more than eight years it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a rather
routine issue (like venue in libel cases) is inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified.
-- The length of delay must be commensurate with the reason thereof. The more than eight years
it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a rather routine issue (like venue in libel cases)
is clearly inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified. Furthermore, the silence of the accused
during such period could not be viewed as an unequivocal act of waiver of their right to speedy
determination of their cases. That the accused could have filed a motion for early resolution of
their cases is immaterial. The more than eight years delay the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor incurred
before issuing his resolution of the complaints is an affront to a reasonable dispensation of justice
and such delay could only be perpetrated in a vexatious, capricious and oppressive manner.
(People v. Macasaet, G.R. No. 196094, March 05, 2018)
Dismissal on the ground of violation of the right to speedy trial amounts to an

acquittal. -- The dismissal of a case on the ground of violation of the right of the accused to a
speedy trial amounts to an acquittal and will bar another prosecution for the same offense or even
the filing of a motion for reconsideration by the prosecution as it will violate the right of the
accused against double jeopardy, even if it is the accused who moved for the dismissal of the case.
(People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018)
When an OMB investigation lasting 7 years is not necessarily a violation of the

right to speedy disposition of cases. -- An Ombudsman investigation lasting seven years
does not necessarily amount to a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases, considering
the following circumstances. In spite of the prescribed periods to act upon complaints and
motions are set by the rules, the concept of speedy trial, or speedy disposition of cases for that
matter, is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Moreover, the following
circumstances do not show a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases: a) the
investigating officer had to embark into the detailed investigation of 63 cash advance transactions
in the two complaints to investigated upon, covering the period of four years; b) the motions for
reconsiderations filed by the respondents; c) the other cases pending before the OMB; d) there is
nothing on record that would show that respondents asserted this right to speedy disposition
during the OMB proceedings when they alleged that the delay occurred; e) neither was there a
considerable prejudice caused by a delay upon the respondents, as there is no showing of any
persecution of the respondents, political or otherwise, or that he they were made to endure any
vexatious process during the two-year period before the filing of the proper Informations. (People
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018)
The right to speedy trial and right to speedy disposition of cases: The right to
speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions, while the right to speedy
disposition of cases may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-
judicial. -- The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial.
While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in
criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however,
may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that
the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of
cases to be invoked. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018, G.R. No. 206438)
A case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a

conduct of a preliminary investigation: The period taken for fact-finding
investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the
determination of whether there has been inordinate delay. -- A case is deemed initiated
upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court
acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary
investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this
period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior
to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there
has been inordinate delay. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018, G.R. No. 206438)
If the right is invoked within the given time periods, the defense has the
burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond
the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of
justifying the delay. -- Courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If
the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions
and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the
defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond
the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the
delay. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018, G.R. No. 206438)
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove that the case is a)
motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and attended by utter lack
of evidence, and b) that the defense did not contribute to the delay. -- If the defense
has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only
politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did
not contribute to the delay. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018, G.R. No. 206438)
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must
prove that: a) it followed the prescribed procedure; b) the complexity of the issues
and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and c) that no prejudice was
suffered by the accused. -- Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution
must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary
investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the
volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result of the delay. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018, G.R. No. 206438)
If the prosecution of the case is solely motivated by malice, such as when the
case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter
lack of evidence malicious prosecution, the case would automatically be dismissed
without need of further analysis of the delay. -- Determination of the length of delay is
never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of
evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised. An exception to this
rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice,
such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter
lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout
the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case
would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay. Another exception
would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy
trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no
longer be invoked. In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must
be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31,
2018, G.R. No. 206438)
The right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be
timely raised, by filing the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or
procedural periods; otherwise, the right may be deemed to have waived. -- The right
to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent
or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.
(Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018, G.R. No. 206438)
Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial

proceedings against the accused, the period of investigation will not be counted in
the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.
For the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to
have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent
conduct of the preliminary investigation. The ruling that fact-finding investigations
are included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is abandoned. -- A
dilemma arises as to whether the period includes proceedings in quasi-judicial agencies before a
formal complaint is actually filed. The Office of the Ombudsman, for example, has no set periods
within which to conduct its fact-finding investigations. They are only mandated to act promptly.
When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman conducts a motu
proprio fact-finding investigation, the proceedings are not yet adversarial. Even if the accused is
invited to attend these investigations, this period cannot be counted since these are merely
preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point, the Office of the Ombudsman will
not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge the accused. Considering that fact-finding
investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings against the accused, the period of investigation
will not be counted in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was
violated. Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay
exists, a case is deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the
subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. In People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division, the ruling that fact-finding investigations are included in the period for determination
of inordinate delay is abandoned. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018, G.R. No. 206438)
The right to a speedy disposition of a case before all judicial, quasi-judicial or

administrative bodies is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as in
all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. -- Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution guarantees every person's right to a speedy disposition of his case before all judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature,
as well as in all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. The right is deemed violated only
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. (Revuelta v.
People, G.R. No. 237039, June 10, 2019)
The fact-finding investigation by the Ombudsman conducted before the filing

of a formal complaint, as in investigations relating to anonymous complaints or
motu proprio investigations by the Ombudsman, will not be counted in determining
the attendance of delay. During such fact-finding investigations and prior to the
filing of a formal complaint, the party involved cannot yet invoke the right to speedy
disposition of his case since he is not yet subjected to any adverse proceeding. -- In
Elpidio Magante v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), a distinction was made between fact-
finding investigations conducted before and after the filing of a formal complaint for the purpose
of establishing the reckoning point for computing the start of delay. We ruled that in case a formal
complaint was initiated by a private complainant, the fact-finding investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman after the filing of the complaint is necessarily included in computing the aggregate
period of the preliminary investigation. On the other hand, the fact-finding investigation
conducted before the filing of a formal complaint, as in investigations relating to anonymous
complaints or motu proprio investigations by the Ombudsman, will not be counted in determining
the attendance of delay. During such fact-finding investigations and prior to the filing of a formal
complaint, the party involved cannot yet invoke the right to speedy disposition of his case since
he is not yet subjected to any adverse proceeding. (Revuelta v. People, G.R. No. 237039, June 10,
2019)
Prior to a person’s inclusion as respondent in the preliminary investigation,

his right to speedy disposition of case cannot be invoked as he was not yet subjected
to any adverse proceeding. -- It was only on September 21, 2011 when petitioner was required
by the Office of the Ombudsman to submit his counter-affidavit. Prior to his inclusion as
respondent in the preliminary investigation, his right to speedy disposition of case cannot be
invoked as he was not yet subjected to any adverse proceeding. Thus, the reckoning point for
purposes of computing inordinate delay should start on September 21, 2011. The length of period
from September 21, 2011, when petitioner was required to submit counter-affidavit, up to the time
of the filing of information before the Sandiganbayan cannot be construed as vexatious, capricious
or oppressive to the petitioner. Due process considerations and other factors not attributable to
the Office of the Ombudsman factored in on the length of time consumed before the filing of the
information before the Sandiganbayan. (Revuelta v. People, G.R. No. 237039, June 10, 2019)
Failure to invoke the right to a speedy disposition during the preliminary

investigation may be considered a waiver of such right. It is the duty of the
respondent to bring to the attention of the investigating officer the perceived
inordinate delay in the proceedings of the formal preliminary investigation. --
Petitioner did not assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case at the earliest possible time.
In fact, petitioner took more than a year after the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan
before he invoked his right. Petitioner's failure to invoke his right to a speedy disposition of his
case during the preliminary investigation amounted to a waiver of said right. It is the duty of the
respondent to bring to the attention of the investigating officer the perceived inordinate delay in
the proceedings of the formal preliminary investigation. Failure to do so may be considered a
waiver of his/her right to speedy disposition of cases. (Revuelta v. People, G.R. No. 237039, June
10, 2019)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Requirements for jeopardy to attach. -- The first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Jamaca v. People, G.R. No. 183681, July 27,
2015)
Jeopardy will not attach in case of dismissal of a complaint during

preliminary investigation. The preliminary investigation stage is not part of the
trial, and the dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation would not put the
accused in danger of double jeopardy. -- Since the preliminary investigation stage is not
part of the trial, the dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation would not put the accused
in danger of double jeopardy in the event of a re-investigation or the filing of a similar case.
(Jamaca v. People, G.R. No. 183681, July 27, 2015)
If the accused were never arraigned in lower court, and the criminal case was dismissed
upon the order of the Supreme Court, a first jeopardy never attached. (Ocampo v. Abando, G.R.
No. 176830, February 11, 2014)
Double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical
offenses: Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other. -- The protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. Where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is
no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each
crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. There is nothing
common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes of falsification of private
document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as
alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to
necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for double jeopardy
to attach—a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first—is, therefore, absent. (Assistio
v. People, G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015)
Provisional dismissal is not an acquittal; hence, jeopardy will not attach. --

The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal is made
with the express consent of the accused; thus, double jeopardy does not attach. (Saldariega v.
Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015)
Jeopardy does not attach in case of a void dismissal, because it is as if there

was no acquittal or dismissal: If the court’s dismissal of the cases was void for
having been done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess or
jurisdiction, it is as if there was no acquittal or dismissal of the cases at all. -- A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to annul the resolutions of Sandiganbayan for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion which granted respondents' motion to dismiss premised on
the ground of inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation violating their right to speedy
disposition of their cases – does not put the accused twice in jeopardy. In this case, the order of
dismissal was rendered by a court who acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and thus if is as if there was no acquittal or dismissal; respondents have not
yet been arraigned for their refusal to appear therein, instead they filed a motion to dismiss; and
the cases were dismissed at respondents' instance and thus, with their express consent. (People
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018)
A judgment of acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. -- A judgment
of acquittal may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without
placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the prosecution is burdened to
establish that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. (People
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 233557-67, June 19, 2019)
Finality-of-acquittal doctrine: A judgment of acquittal is final and

unappealable. However, if the order of acquittal is void for grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, there will be no double jeopardy, if a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is filed to question a verdict of
acquittal. -- A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a
verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. We adhere to the finality-
of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however,
is not without exception. The Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the
acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Double jeopardy is not triggered
when the order of acquittal is void. An acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really 'acquit' and therefore does not terminate the case
as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment. Simply stated, a decision rendered
with grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction. In turn, this lack of jurisdiction
prevents double jeopardy from attaching. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 233557-67, June
19, 2019)
CONFRONTATION
The right to confront and cross-examine a witness is not available during

preliminary investigation, which is not part of trial. -- Preliminary investigation is not a
part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights,
such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. (Estrada
v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015)
CRUEL AND DEGRADING PUNISHMENT
Perpetual disqualification from public office is not cruel, degrading and

inhuman punishment. -- The prohibition against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
extends only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the
individual of his humanity. It applies only to a punishment that is flagrantly and plainly
oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense
of the community. Perpetual disqualification from public office for the repeated failure to file the
SOCE does not constitute cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. (Maturan v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017)
PUBLIC RIGHTS
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Right to information and the State’s duty of full public disclosure. -- The
people’s constitutional right to information is intertwined with the government’s constitutional
duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. The people have the right
to access the papers and documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the
winning bidder for a government project. (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through
Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)
The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern

enunciated in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s policy of
full public disclosure in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article
II of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in the
Government. (Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters, February 1, 2016, G.R. No.
175210
Requisites for invoking the right to information: 1) the information sought
must be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest; and 2) it must
not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. -- The
people’s right to information is not absolute. Two requisites must concur before the right to
information may be compelled by writ of mandamus: 1) the information sought must be in
relation to matters of public concern or public interest; and 2) it must not be exempt by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. (Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related
Matters, February 1, 2016, G.R. No. 175210)
Closed-door cabinet meetings are not covered by the right to information. --
The constitutional guarantee of the people’s right to information does not cover national security
matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal
matters, diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting, executive sessions of either
house of Congress, and internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. Close-door Cabinet meetings
are not covered in order to allow the free exchange of ideas among Government officials. (Sereno
v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters, February 1, 2016, G.R. No. 175210)
Not covered by the right to information - information on on-going evaluation
or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review
committee. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official
acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. -- Information on on-going
evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is
not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However,
once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on
the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches. The
constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before
a final contract. (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No.
210858)
Not covered by the right to information – privileged information such as the
deliberative process privilege. Deliberative process privilege protects from
disclosure advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part
of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. --
Privileged information is outside the scope of the constitutional right to information, just like
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.
The deliberative process privilege -- involving as it does the deliberative process of reaching a
decision -- is one kind of privileged information. Deliberative process privilege protects from
disclosure advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. (Department of Foreign Affairs v.
BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)
Fundamental requirements for the communication to be covered by the
deliberative process privilege: 1) pre-decisional; and 2) deliberative: First, the
communication must be pre-decisional, i.e., "antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy."
Second, the communication must be deliberative, i.e., "a direct part of the deliberative process in
that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters." Records which
are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature - part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e.,
notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations, and similar papers - are protected and cannot be the subject of a subpoena.
(Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)
The reasons for the deliberative process privilege: first, the privilege protects
candid discussions within an agency; second, it prevents public confusion from premature
disclosure of agency opinions before the agency establishes final policy; and third, it protects the
integrity of an agency's decision; the public should not judge officials based on information they
considered prior to issuing their final decisions. (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA
International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)
REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT

OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
THE WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Writ of Kalikasan: A remedy against violation of constitutional right to a

balanced and healthful ecology. The violation must involve environmental damage
of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two
or more cities or provinces in order to arrant the issuance of the writ. -- The writ
of kalikasan is a remedy to anyone whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission. However, the violation
must involve environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces in order to arrant the issuance of
the writ. (Braga v. Abaya, G.R. No. 223076, September 13, 2016)
Requirements for a writ of kalikasan: 1) actual or threatened violation of the

constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; 2) the actual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and 3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. -- Petitioners contend
that respondents' failure to implement environmental laws and executive issuances resulted in
the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the
petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and may even be tantamount
to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government without due
process of law. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: 1. there is
an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity; and 3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The petitioners failed to show that public
respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the
petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, apart from adducing expert
testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on public health, the petitioners did not go beyond
mere allegation in establishing the unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public
respondents that have a causal link or reasonable connection to the actual or threatened violation
of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated
under the Rules, as required of petitions of this nature. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission,
G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017)
Requisites to avail of the Writ of Kalikasan: 1) there is an actual or threatened

violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the
actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened
violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces. -- The Writ of Kalikasan is categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as
an extraordinary remedy, covers environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The writ is available
against an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity.
The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is an actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual
or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. (LNL Archipelago Minerals v. Agham Party List,
April 12, 2016, G.R. No. 209165)
Burden of proof in a Writ of Kalikasan: Petitioner has the burden to prove the
(1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated; (2)
act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. -- Section 2(c), Rule 7, Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases provides: “The verified petition shall contain the following: xxx (c) The environmental law,
rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated, the act or omission complained of, and
the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.” The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan
petitioner has the burden to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or
threatened to be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage
of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities
or provinces. Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that
the magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for the issuance
of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition. (LNL Archipelago Minerals
v. Agham Party List, April 12, 2016, G.R. No. 209165)
The filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan does not require
that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly
allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened
with violation. -- Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the
Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. – San Juan Chapter, Zonta
Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation,
as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy
in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution. This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule
clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation. (West Tower
Condominium Corporation v. First Philippine Industrial Corporation, .R. No. 194239, June 16,
2015)
Locus standi in environmental cases - Writ of Kalikasan v. Writ of Continuing
Mandamus. -- There is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced
by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful
act or omission. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017)
Precautionary principle: When there is lack of full scientific certainty in

establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the
court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case. This rule applies
when the link between the cause, that is the human activity sought to be inhibited,
and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with
full scientific certainty. -- Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary Principle, provides that “[w]hen there is lack of
full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental
effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.” The
precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity
sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established
with full scientific certainty. (West Tower Condominium Corporation v. First Philippine
Industrial Corporation, .R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015)
Precautionary principle in environmental cases: Where there is lack of full

scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and
environmental effect, the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting either
judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting the
environment. -- Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation: The oft-cited Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development (1992 Rio Agenda), first embodied this principle, as follows:
Principle 15 - In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation. In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution
appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves
matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal
link between human activity and environmental effect. In such an event, the courts may construe
a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and
protecting the environment. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association,
Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Elements required for the application: uncertainty, threat of environmental

damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively
certain, or that the causal link between an action and environmental damage can be
established, or the probability of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not
precautionary measures, may be taken. -- The petitioners finally plead that the Court
sustain the ordinance banning aerial spraying as an agricultural practice based on the
precautionary principle, despite the lack of scientific certainty, to prevent harm to the
environment and human health. The petitioners' plea and argument cannot be sustained. The
principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No.
09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect. In such an event, the
courts may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of
preserving and protecting the environment. The precautionary principle shall only be relevant if
there is concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and
serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively certain, or that the causal
link between an action and environmental damage can be established, or the probability of
occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither
will the precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of a threat of environmental harm;
or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible. We cannot see the presence of all the
elements. To begin with, there has been no scientific study. (Mosequeda v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Precautionary principle requires scientific basis. As much as possible, a

complete and objective scientific evaluation of the risk to the environment or health
should be conducted and made available to decision-makers for them to choose the
most appropriate course of action. -- Although the precautionary principle allows lack of
full scientific certainty in establishing a connection between the serious or irreversible harm and
the human activity, its application is still premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still
a necessary basis for effective policy choices under the precautionary principle. Precaution is a
risk management principle invoked after scientific inquiry takes place. This scientific stage is
often considered synonymous with risk assessment. As such, resort to the principle shall not be
based on anxiety or emotion, but from a rational decision rule, based in ethics. As much as
possible, a complete and objective scientific evaluation of the risk to the environment or health
should be conducted and made available to decision-makers for them to choose the most
appropriate course of action. Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of an activity is also
important in the application of the principle. The potential harm resulting from certain activities
should always be judged in view of the potential benefits they offer, while the positive and negative
effects of potential precautionary measures should be considered. The only study conducted to
validate the effects of aerial spraying appears to be the Summary Report on the Assessment and
Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations. Yet, the fact-
finding team that generated the report was not a scientific study that could justify the resort to
the .precautionary principle. In fact, the Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions
of the fact-finding team that recommended only a regulation, not a ban, against aerial spraying.
We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against aerial spraying if
little or nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the
health of the residents within and near the plantations and to the integrity and balance of the
environment. It is dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of aerial spraying would be
adverse even in the absence of evidence. Accordingly, for lack of scientific data supporting a ban
on aerial spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-07 should be struck down for being unreasonable.
(Mosequeda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, G.R. No. 189185, August 16,
2016)
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Waiver under Art. 125 of RPC: Not a license to detain a person indefinitely:
The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the
unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and
caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the
RPC is not a license to detain a person ad infinitum. Every person's basic right to liberty is not to
be construed as waived by mere operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. A detainee
must be promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver
of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No.
91659) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases
where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was
appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or
automatic review. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 232413,
July 25, 2017)
The writ of habeas corpus: A speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, meaning any restraint that will preclude freedom of action.
-- The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty" was devised as a "speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal." Under the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. As to what kind of
restraint against which the writ is effective, case law deems any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action as sufficient. Thus, as provided in the Rules of Court under Section 1, Rule 102
thereof, a writ of Habeas Corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto." (Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No. 232395)
A Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly

deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court because
since then, the restraint has become legal. The element of illegal deprivation of
freedom of movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional in petitions for habeas
corpus. -- Section 4, Rule 102 spells the instances when the writ of Habeas Corpus is not allowed
or when the discharge thereof is authorized:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Accordingly, a Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly
deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court because since then,
the restraint has become legal. When the incarceration was already by virtue of a judicial order,
the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. Where the subject person had already been released
from the custody complained of, the petition for habeas corpus then still pending is already moot
and academic and should be dismissed. With the release of the persons in whose behalf the
application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the petition for the issuance of the
writ becomes moot and academic. Moreover, the element of illegal deprivation of freedom of
movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional in petitions for habeas corpus. Consequently, in the
absence of confinement and custody, the courts lack the power to act on the petition for habeas
corpus and the issuance of a writ thereof must be refused. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R.
No. 232395)
A person is illegally arrested and detained because of a mistaken identity can avail himself
of a petition for habeas corpus. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang
Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Nature of the Writ of Amparo: For the protection of the right to life, liberty,
and security, to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. -- The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to
expeditiously provide relief to violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and
security, and more specifically, to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September
19, 2017)
Meaning of enforced disappearance. -- The arrest, detention, or abduction of

persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of a State or a political organization
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the
fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. (Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September
19, 2017)
Characteristics of enforced disappearance: a) deprivation of liberty; b) by

authority, support or acquiescence of the State; c) refusal to give information as to
the whereabouts of the person; and d) intention to remove the person from
protection of the law for a prolonged period. -- Enforced disappearances are attended by
the following characteristics: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political
organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. There is no enforced
disappearance if the detention is carried out by the State through the Bureau of Immigration,
which admits that the petitioner is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility and there is no
intention to remove him from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time because his
detention is in connection with a pending criminal case against her. (Callo v. Commissioner
Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)
Meaning of extralegal killings: Killings without due process of law. -- Killings

committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. (Callo
v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)
The Amparo Rule is confined to extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances, or to threats thereof. If the petitioners admit that their petition
does not cover extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof,
the petition for the writ of amparo should be dismissed. -- Petitioners and co-petitioner
Marcos failed to show, by prima facie evidence, entitlement to the issuance of the writ. In the
landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., the Court categorically
pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it presently stands, is confined to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without
due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
which places such persons outside the protection of law. The privilege of the writ of Amparo is a
remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a
similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public
official or employee or a private individual. Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily
admit that the instant Omnibus Petition does not cover extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition for the issuance of a
writ of Amparo is dismissible. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No. 232395)
A writ of Amparo shall not issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. The
Court must be preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of the threat to or
violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party. -- A writ
of Amparo shall not issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, every petition for
the issuance of a writ of Amparo should be supported by justifying allegations of fact. The writ
shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what
extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was
or is being committed. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No. 232395)
The writ of Amparo cannot be issued in cases where the alleged threat has
ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing. -- The writ of Amparo cannot be issued
in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing. In this case,
the alleged unlawful restraint on petitioners' liberty has effectively ceased upon their subsequent
release from detention. On the other hand, the apprehension of co-petitioner Marcos that she will
be detained is, at best, merely speculative. In other words, co-petitioner Marcos has failed to show
any clear threat to her right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo. (Agcaoili
v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No. 232395)
Judgment in writ of amparo proceedings: Writ of amparo proceedings do not

determine criminal, civil or administrative liability, but only whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof has transpired. -- Writ of amparo
proceedings do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability. The principal objective of
its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal
killing or threats thereof had transpired. (Roxas v. Macapagl Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155,
September 7, 2010)
In the proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the guilt or innocence of the
respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor
to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty
or security. (Republic v. Cayanan, November 7, 2017, G.R. No. 181796)
There is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability

in amparo and habeas data proceedings. Courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial
killing. -- There is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability
in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility
or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, G.R. No. 193160, November 15, 2011)
Responsibility and/or accountability: The legal basis or bases for impleading

military commanders in amparo cases. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have participated in an enforced disappearance. Accountability refers to the
measure of remedies against those who exhibited involvement but not
responsibility in the enforced disappearance. -- Responsibility refers to the extent the
actors have participated in an enforced disappearance. Accountability refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility, or who
are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure, or those who carry, but have failed to discharge the burden of extraordinary diligence
in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. (Balao v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December
13, 2011)
Duty of respondents in amparo proceedings: Show extraordinary diligence in

the conduct of investigation. The respondent public official cannot invoke the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty to evade the responsibility or
liability. -- The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance
of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed to evade the responsibility or liability. (Republic v. Cayanan,
November 7, 2017, G.R. No. 181796)
Extraordinary diligence in investigation: Passive certificates to the effect that

the missing person was not being detained by any of them are severely inadequate
and amount to a general denial, which is not allowed. -- A public official or employee
impleaded as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo should submit with the verified
written return supporting affidavits, which detail among other things, the steps or actions taken
by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or
persons responsible for the threat, act or omission. Passive certificates to the effect that the
missing person was not being detained by any of them are severely inadequate, and amount to a
general denial, which is not allowed. (Republic v. Cayanan, November 7, 2017, G.R. No. 181796)
Extraordinary diligence: Details of the investigation conducted must be

given. -- Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the
investigations conducted by the authorities in a manner that would enable the court to judiciously
determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain a missing person’s whereabouts had been sincere
and adequate. (Republic v. Cayanan, November 7, 2017, G.R. No. 181796)
The failure of the police to conduct a fair and effect investigation may amount
to a violation of or threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of a person. The
right to security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to
ensure the observance of the duty to investigate. -- The failure of the police and military
authorities to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or threat to the
rights to life, liberty and security of a person who claims to have been abducted and tortured by
the military. The right to security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government
to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate. The Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection
to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed
by the State as its own legal duty. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November
15, 2011)
THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
The writ of habeas data is a remedy in case a person’s right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened. -- he writ of habeas data is a remedy in case a
person’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual or a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)
Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be
granted: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be granted. Thus, the existence of a person’s
right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable
before the privilege of the writ may be extended. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No.
202666, September 29, 2014)
The petitioner must show that the supposed dissemination of a sex video will
violate his right to privacy in life, liberty or security. -- The petition must adequately show
that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty
or security on the other. The allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence.
Thus, it must be shown that the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the
subject sex video will violate the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the petitioner. (Lee
v. Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014)
Remedies under the writ of habeas data: The remedies against the violation
of the right to privacy can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. -- The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy
to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents.
(Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
The right to privacy is not absolute and may yield to a compelling state
interest. -- The right to privacy is not absolute. It may succumb to an opposing or overriding
state interest deemed legitimate and compelling. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24,
2012)
An application for a writ of habeas data may be denied if the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest, such
as dismantling of private armed groups (PAGs). -- An application for a writ of habeas data
may be denied if the right to privacy in life, liberty or security must yield to an overriding
legitimate state interest, such as dismantling of private armed groups (PAGs). The state interest
of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa. Thus, the
act of the police in collecting information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, such as
Gamboa, and in sharing and forwarding such information to a government body tasked to
investigate PAGs was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life,
liberty or security. The fact that the PNP released information to the government investigating
commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity
to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that
act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. (Gamboa v.
Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

Concise for Constitutional Law Review Notes on State Powers and Police Power

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Concise for Constitutional Law Review Notes on State Powers and Police Power

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REVIEW NOTES

Selected Recent Jurisprudence (January 2010 – September 2019) 1

By Atty. Alexis F. Medina2

Police power prevails over the non-impairment clause. -- The constitutional

Examples of Valid Exercise of Police Power

Boracay closure and rehabilitation

Mandatory discounts for senior citizens and

Mandatory discounts do not amount to taking of property: The law

The law mandating senior citizens’ discounts is a valid exercise of police

The law mandating senior citizens’ discounts is a valid police power

Regulation of the real estate service profession

Lawful subject: The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or

Examples of Invalid Exercise of Police Power

Ordinance requiring fences to have a 5-meter

Unlawful means: Limiting the height of fences of private properties to one

Ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural

Lawful subject: The ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice to

Unlawful means: The ordinance is unduly oppressive as it mandates the shift

Meaning of taking: “Taking” in eminent domain includes deprivation of the

Meaning of taking: Taking becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the

Examples of “Taking” of Property

Mandatory five-meter setback of fences to provide for public parking space

Easement of right-of-way on the land is equivalent to the taking of property.

Examples Where There is No Taking of Private Property

Mandatory discounts on price of goods: The law mandating senior citizens’

Mandatory buffer zones around agricultural plantations: The ordinance

Requirements for a Valid Exercise of Eminent Domain

Constitutional limitations on the power of eminent domain: Just

No requirement of full payment of just compensation prior to government

Reckoning point for determination of just compensation. -- The reckoning

The reckoning point for determination of just compensation is the value of

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. -- Statutes and

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

THE RIGHT TO LIFE

The requirement of “deprivation” in the invocation of due process: Only

Substantive due process requires that the ordinance serves a legitimate

Mandatory compliance with the ban on aerial spraying within a 3-month

Substantive due process: To stop the construction of a building in a private

Procedural due process in administrative cases: Basic requirements. --

Procedural due process: FDA certification of contraceptive drugs and devices

A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio. -- A decision rendered

Procedural due process requires opportunity to be heard; opportunity to be

Procedural due process in administrative proceedings means opportunity to

Meaning of “to be heard”: One may be “heard” through pleadings. -- “To be

Administrative due process: A formal or trial-type hearing is not always

Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in

Right to counsel is not imperative in administrative proceedings. -- In an

A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel. -

Counsel’s mistake as a denial of due process: For counsel’s mistake to amount

Due process is a must in military academy disciplinary proceedings. -- A cadet

Due process in student disciplinary cases: Formal trial-type hearing is not

When Lack of Prior Notice and Hearing

Does Not Violate Due Process: Examples

Ex-parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in VAWC cases

Equal protection requires similar treatment for persons or things similarly

The equal protection clause requires a valid classification that is based on

A valid classification rest on substantial distinction and the classification

Three tests in Equal Protection: Rational scrutiny, intermediate

Rational basis test: Reviewing the reasonable relationship between the

No Violation of Equal Protection: Examples

JBC policy requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-level courts before

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause: Examples