THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING

CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
LAUREL, J.

DOCTRINE
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is
placed on probation. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a
proper case, in substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For
this reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law
deemed applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the
criminal law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is
thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation
Act for this cause.

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of
the legislature.

FACTS
This case was connected with a criminal case wherein respondent Unjieng was convicted and
sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4y and 2m to 8y. Upon appeal, it was reduced
to 5y and 6m to 7y 6m and 27d. After several MRs and successive motions for new trial were
denied, the Court ordered the remand of the case for the execution of judgment.

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by Unjieng under Act
No. 4421 stating that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no
criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Insular Probation
Office recommended its denial but Judge Vera of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. Upon
knowing this, the fiscal and HSBC filed their opposition alleging that Act No. 4221, assuming
that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless
violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because
section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law
effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private
prosecution also alleged its unconstitutionality as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces.

Motions were set for hearing but was postponed at the petition of counsel for Unjieng because a
motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae had just been filed. Later, the fiscal filed a motion
for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment to commit Unjieng to jail. Judge Vera,
however, proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae. But this
junction, petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they
alleged was an interminable proceeding.

ISSUE
WON Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive
WON Act No. 4221 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power

RULING
1. NO. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not
finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law
inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that
he is placed on probation. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a
proper case, in substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For
this reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law
deemed applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the
criminal law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is
thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation
Act for this cause.

Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. A
"pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws
which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed. "Commutation" is a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally
imposed. A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time.

That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to
grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction
between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution
of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time.

We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive.
The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full
and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon
the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.

2. YES. We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional
and void. The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral
Legislature by the Jones Law and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution. Any
attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas
delegata non delegare potest. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any
other body or authority.

The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and
inflexible. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body
to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. It is a cardinal principle of our system of
government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the
central authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws
cannot be delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self-government has
never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of
general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations,
according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases
of necessity.

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of
the legislature.

For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative
bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective
provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules
governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable
or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. As a rule, an act of the
legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard
by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it.

In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their
discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective
provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed
to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix
and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the
exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in
their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none
has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of
its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise
of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in
the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial
boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does not
seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in
reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the
provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the
Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards.

The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress,
but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to
such agencies as it may designate. ut, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the
operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained
by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-operation
of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and
unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the
happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, — limited by no principle of
expendiency announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or
conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give
any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a
probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future
time — we cannot say when — the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of
probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the
statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of
the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon
the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself.

The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the
operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions
provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. True, the statute
does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation
Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate
or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute
discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective
provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the
provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of
a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions.