G.R. No.
133132           January 25, 2000
ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO, EDGAR DULA TORRES, and ROGELIO A.
PUREZA, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE, as Executive Secretary, HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
as Secretary of Budget and Management, JOSE PERCIVAL L. ADIONG, ROMEO L.
CAIRME and VIRGINIA U. CRISTOBAL,respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The central issue posed before this Court in the present case is the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 8851 (RA 8551), otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998,"1 by virtue of which petitioners herein, who were all members of
the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), were separated from office. Petitioners claim
that such law violates their constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.
The NAPOLCOM was originally created under Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975), entitled "An
Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department Of The
Interior And Local Government, And For Other Purposes." Under RA 6975, the members of
the NAPOLCOM were petitioners Edgar Dula Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A.
Pureza and respondent Jose Percival L. Adiong. Dula Torres was first appointed to the
NAPOLCOM on January 8, 1991 for a six year term. He was re-appointed on January 23, 1997
for another six years. Canonizado was appointed on January 25, 1993 to serve the unexpired
term of another Commissioner which ended on December 31, 1995. On August 23, 1995,
Canonizado was re-appointed for another six years. Pureza was appointed on January 2, 1997
for a similar term of six years. Respondent Adiong's appointment to the NAPOLCOM was
issued on July 23, 1996. None of their terms had expired at the time the amendatory law was
passed.2
On March 6, 1998, RA 8551 took effect; it declared that the terms of the current Commissioners
were deemed as expired upon its effectivity. Pursuant thereto, President Ramos appointed
Romeo L. Cairme on March 11, 1998 as a member of the NAPOLCOM for a full six year term.
On the same date, Adiong, was given a term extension of two years since he had served less
than two years of his previous term. Cairme and Adiong both took their oaths of office on
April 6, 1998.3 Completing the membership of the NAPOLCOM are Leo S. Magahum and
Cleofe M. Factoran, who were appointed by President Estrada on June 30, 1998 and who took
their oaths of office on July 2, 1998.4
According to petitioners, sections 4 and 8 of RA 8551 are unconstitutional. Section 4, amending
section 13 of Republic Act No. 6975, provides —
Sec. 13. Creation and Composition. — A National Police Commission, hereinafter
referred to as the Commission, is hereby created for the purpose of effectively
discharging the functions prescribed in the Constitution and provided in this Act.
The Commission shall be an agency attached to the Department for policy and
program coordination. It shall be composed of a Chairperson, four (4) regular
Commissioners, and the Chief of the PNP as ex-officio member. Three (3) of the
regular Commissioners shall come from the civilian sector who are neither active
nor former members of the police or military, one (1) of whom shall be designated
as vice chairperson by the President. The fourth regular Commissioner shall come
from the law enforcement sector either active or retired: Provided, That an active
1
member of a law enforcement agency shall be considered resigned from said agency
once appointed to the Commission: Provided further, That at least one (1) of the
Commissioners shall be a woman. The Secretary of the Department shall be the ex-
officioChairperson of the Commission, while the Vice Chairperson shall act as the
executive officer of the Commission.
Meanwhile, section 8 states that —
Upon the effectivity of this Act, the terms of office of the current Commissioners are
deemed expired which shall constitute a bar to their reappointment or an extension
of their terms in the Commission except for current Commissioners who have
served less than two (2) years of their terms of office who may be appointed by the
President for a maximum term of two (2) years.
Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their
security of tenure.1âwphi1.nêt
It is beyond dispute that petitioners herein are members of the civil service, which embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. 5 As such, they cannot be
removed or suspended from office, except for cause provided by law.6 The phrase "except for
cause provided by law" refers to ". . . reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize
as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the
appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient."7
Public respondents insist that the express declaration in section 8 of RA 8551 that the terms of
petitioners' offices are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to impliedly abolish the
NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975 pursuant to a bona fide reorganization. In support of their
theory, public respondents cite the various changes introduced by RA 8551 in the functions,
composition and character of the NAPOLCOM as proof of Congress' intention to abolish the
body created under RA 6975 in order to replace it with a new NAPOLCOM which is more
civilian in nature, in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Petitioners' posit the theory
that the abolition of petitioners' offices was a result of a reorganization of the NAPOLCOM
allegedly effected by RA 8551.8
The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function.9 It is
acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer's
right to continue in the position held10 and that such power may be exercised for various
reasons, such as the lack of funds11 or in the interest of economy.12 However, in order for the
abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in
order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. 13
An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and
permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes.14 Where one office is abolished and replaced
with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. Thus, in U.P.
Board of Regents v. Rasul15 we said:
It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the incumbent the
right to security of tenure. [De la Lanna v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)]. However, in
this case, the renaming and restructuring of the PGH and its component units
cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of the position of PGH
Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices created in its place have
 similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith. [Jose L. Guerrero v. Hon. Antonio
Arizabal, G.R. No. 81928, June 4, 1990, 186 SCRA 108 (1990)]. We hereby apply the
principle enunciated in Cesar Z. Dario vs. Hon. Salvador M. Mison [176 SCRA 84
(1989)] that abolition which merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid
and does not result in the removal of the incumbent.
The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of the
PGH Director and the creation of a UP-PGH Medical Center Director are valid, the
removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the duties and functions of
the two positions are basically the same. . . . (emphasis supplied)
This was also our ruling in Guerrero v.  Arizabal,16 wherein we declared that the substantial
identity in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in the removal of
petitioner pursuant to a reorganization.
We come now to the case at bench. The question that must first be resolved is whether or not
petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by Congress. More
specifically, whether the changes effected by RA 8551 in reference to the NAPOLCOM were so
substantial as to effectively create a completely new office in contemplation of the law. In
answer to this query, the case of Mayor v. Macaraig17 is squarely in point.
In that case, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 671518 insofar as it
declared vacant the positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission and provided for the removal of the
incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors.19 The Court held that
the removal of petitioners was unconstitutional since Republic Act No. 6715 did not expressly
or impliedly abolish the offices of petitioners, there being no irreconcilable inconsistency in the
nature, duties and functions of the petitioners' offices under the old law and the new law.
Thus:
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration' that that office is
vacant. While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain
offices, it can not be conceded the power to simply pronounce those offices vacant
and thereby effectively remove the occupants or holders thereof from the civil
service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on
that account. It can not be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the
higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and
to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments.
This is precisely what RA 8851 seeks to do — declare the offices of petitioners vacant, by
declaring that "the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired," thereby
removing petitioners herein from the civil service. Congress may only be conceded this power
if it is done pursuant to a bona fide abolition of the NAPOLCOM.
RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners' positions. In order to determine whether there
has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the changes introduced by the
new law in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM.
Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a collegial body within the Department of
the Interior and Local Government,20 (Department) whereas under RA 8551 it is made "an
agency attached to the Department for policy and program coordination."21 Contrary to what
2
public respondents would have us believe, this does not result in the creation of an entirely
new office. In Mayor, the NLRC, prior to the passage of the amendatory law, was also
considered an integral part of the Department of Labor and Employment. RA 6715, however,
changed that by declaring that it shall instead ". .be attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment for program coordination only. . . ." making it a more autonomous body. The
Court held that this change in the NLRC's nature was not sufficient to justify a conclusion that
the new law abolished the offices of the labor commissioners.
Another amendment pointed out by public respondents is the revision of the NAPOLCOM's
composition. RA 8551 expanded the membership of the NAPOLCOM from four to five
Commissioners by adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member. In addition, the new
law provided that three of the regular Commissioners shall come from the civilian sector who
are neither active nor former members of the police or military, and that the fourth regular
Commissioner shall come from the law enforcement sector either active or retired.
Furthermore, it is required that at least one of the Commissioners shall be a woman." 22 Again,
as we held in Mayor, such revisions do not constitute such essential changes in the nature of
the NAPOLCOM as to result in an implied abolition of such office. It will be noted that the
organizational structure of the NAPOLCOM, as provided in section 20 of RA 6975 as amended
by section 10 of RA 8551,23 remains essentially the same and that, except for the addition of the
PNP Chief as ex-officio member, the composition of the NAPOLCOM is also substantially
identical under the two laws. Also, under both laws, the Secretary of the Department shall act
as the ex-officio Chairman of the Commission and the Vice-Chairman shall be one of the
Commissioners designated by the President.24
Finally, the powers and duties of the NAPOLCOM remain basically unchanged by the
amendments. Under RA 6975, the Commission has the following powers and functions:
(a) Exercise administrative control over the Philippine National Police;
(b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and
administration;
(c) Foster and develop policies and promulgate rules and regulations, standards and
procedures to improve police services based on sound professional concepts and
principles;
(d) Examine and audit, and thereafter establish the standards for such purposes on a
continuing basis, the performance, activities, and facilities of all police agencies
throughout the country;
(e) Prepare a police manual prescribing rules and regulations for efficient
organization, administration, and operation, including recruitment, selection,
promotion and retirement;
(f) Establish a system of uniform crime reporting;
(g) Conduct surveys and compile statistical data for the proper evaluation of the
efficiency and effectiveness of all police units in the country;
(h) Render to the President and to Congress an annual report on its activities and
accomplishments during the (30) days after the end of the calendar year, which shall
 include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in the organization and 4) Conduct an annual self-report survey and compile statistical date for
administration of police agencies in the municipalities, cities and provinces the accurate assessment of the crime situation and the proper evaluation
throughout the country, and recommendation for appropriate remedial legislation; of the efficiency and effectiveness of all police units in the country;

(i) Approve or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel
disciplinary actions involving demolition or dismissal from the service imposed
upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine
National Police;
(j) Affirm reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel
disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon
members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National
Police;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over
administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police
benefits;
(l) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty (60) days before
the commencement of each calendar year, a crime prevention;
(m) Prescribe minimum standards for arms, equipment, and uniforms and, after
consultation with the Philippine Heraldry Commission, for insignia of ranks,
awards and medals of honor;
(n) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in matters pertaining to the discharge of
its own powers and duties, and designate who among its personnel can issue such
processes and administer oaths in connection therewith; and
5) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training,
logistical requirements, communications, records, information systems,
crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting;
6) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board,
personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the
service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the
Chief of the Philippine National Police;
7) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards
over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims
for police benefits;
8) Prescribe minimum standards for arms, equipment, and uniforms and
after consultation with the Philippine Heraldry Commission, for insignia
of ranks, awards, and medals of honor. Within ninety (90) days from the
effectivity of this Act, the standards of the uniformed personnel of the
PNP must be revised which should be clearly distinct from the military
and reflective of the civilian character of the police;
9) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in matters pertaining to the
discharge of its own powers and duties, and designate who among its
personnel can issue such processes and administer oaths in connection
therewith;

(o) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act
and as the President may direct.
Meanwhile, the NAPOLCOM's functions under section 5 of RA 8551 are:
10) Inspect and assess the compliance of the PNP on the established
criteria for manpower allocation, distribution, and deployment and their
impact on the community and the crime situation, and therewith
formulate appropriate guidelines for maximization of resources and
effective utilization of the PNP personnel;

a) Exercise administrative control and operational supervision over the Philippine 11) Monitor the performance of the local chief executives as deputies of
National Police which shall mean the power to: the Commission; and

1) Develop policies and promulgate a police manual prescribing rules and 12) Monitor and investigate police anomalies and irregularities.
regulations for efficient organization, administration, and operation,
including criteria for manpower allocation, distribution and deployment,
b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and
recruitment, selection , promotion, and retirement of personnel and the
administration;
conduct of qualifying entrance and promotional examinations for
uniformed members;
c) Render to the President and to the Congress an annual report on its activities and
accomplishments during the thirty (30) days after the end of the calendar year,
2) Examine and audit, and thereafter establish the standards for such
which shall include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in the organization and
purposes on a continuing basis, the performance, activities and facilities
administration of police agencies in the municipalities, cities and provinces
of all police agencies throughout the country;
throughout the country, and recommendations for appropriate remedial legislation;

3) Establish a system of uniform crime reporting;

d) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty (60) days before
the commencement of each calendar year, a crime prevention program; and

3
 e) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act and
as the President may direct.
Clearly, the NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative,
supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.
Public respondents argue that the fact that the NAPOLCOM is now vested with
administrative control and operational supervision over the PNP, whereas under RA 6975 it
only exercised administrative control should be construed as evidence of legislative intent to
abolish such office.25 This contention is bereft of merit. Control means "the power of an officer
to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the that of the latter."26 On the other
hand, to supervise is to oversee, to have oversight of, to superintend the execution of or the
performance of a thing, or the movements or work of a person, to inspect with authority; it is
the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties.27 Thus, the power of control necessarily encompasses the power of supervision and
adding the phrase "operational supervision" under the powers of the NAPOLCOM would not
bring about a substantial change in its functions so as to arrive at the conclusion that a
completely new office has been created.
Public respondents would have this Court believe that RA 8551 reorganized the NAPOLCOM
resulting in the abolition of petitioners' offices. We hold that there has been absolutely no
attempt by Congress to effect such a reorganization.
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between
them.28 It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions.29 Naturally, it may result in the loss of one's
position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it
must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in Dario v. Mison:30
. . . As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position
itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese
wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or
removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or
otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever
"abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is
merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are
belied by the existence of ample funds.
It is exceedingly apparent to this Court that RA 8551 effected a reorganization of the PNP, not
of the NAPOLCOM. They are two separate and distinct bodies, with one having supervision
and control over the other. In fact, it is the NAPOLCOM that is given the duty of submitting a
proposed reorganization plan of the PNP to Congress.31 As mentioned earlier, the basic
structure of the NAPOLCOM has been preserved by the amendatory law. There has been no
revision in its lines of control, authority and responsibility, neither has there been a reduction
in its membership, nor a consolidation or abolition of the offices constituting the same. Adding
the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member of the Commission does not result in a
reorganization.
4
No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8551,
insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as
expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office
without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.
Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now
new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular
government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law
and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to
replace petitioners are not valid.32
At this juncture, we note that it is alleged by public respondents that on June 30, 1998,
Canonizado accepted an appointment by President Estrada as the Inspector General of
Internal Affairs Services (IAS) of the PNP, pursuant to sections 40 and 41 of RA 8551 and that
he took his oath of office before the President on July 7, 1998. However, this is a mere
allegation on the part of public respondents of which this Court cannot take judicial notice.
Furthermore, this issue has not been fully ventilated in the pleadings of the parties. Therefore,
such allegation cannot be taken into consideration by this Court in passing upon the issues in
the present case.
Petitioners also assail the constitutionality of section 4 of RA 8551 insofar as it limits the law
enforcement sector to only one position on the Commission and categorizes the police as being
part of the law enforcement sector despite section 6 of Article XVI of the Constitution which
provides that the police force shall be civilian in character. Moreover, it is asserted by
petitioners that the requirement in section 4 that one of the Commissioners shall be a woman
has no rational basis and is therefore discriminatory. They claim that it amounts to class
legislation and amounts to an undue restriction upon the appointing power of the President as
provided under section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. 33
In view of our ruling upon the unconstitutionality of petitioners' removal from office by virtue
of section 8 of RA 8551, we find that there is no longer any need to pass upon these remaining
constitutional questions. It is beyond doubt that the legislature has the power to provide for
the composition of the NAPOLCOM since it created such body. Besides, these questions go
into the very wisdom of the law, and unquestionably lie beyond the normal prerogatives of
the Court to pass upon.34
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition, but only to the extent of declaring section 8 of RA 8551
unconstitutional for being in violation of the petitioners' right to security of tenure. The
removal from office of petitioners as a result of the application of such unconstitutional
provision of law and the appointment of new Commissioners in their stead is therefore null
and void. Petitioners herein are entitled to REINSTATEMENT and to the payment of full
backwages to be reckoned from the date they were removed from office.35
SO ORDERED.
Digest:
FACTS:
Dela Torres, Canonizado, Pureza and Adiong were appointed Commissioners of
NAPOLCOM. They were appointed separately, in various years and their terms had not
expired at the time the amendatory law to R.A. 6975 was passed. R.A. 8551 declared the terms
of sitting commissioners as expired upon its effectivity.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition.

HELD:
NO. Under R.A. 6975, the NAPOLCOM ws described a collegial body within the DILG
whereas R.A. 8551 made it an agency attached to the department for policy and program
coordination. This does not result in the creation of an entirely new office.