ARTICLE 1

THIS ACT SHALL BE KNOWN AS THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ARTICLE 2

LAWS SHALL TAKE EFFECT AFTER FIFTEEN DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THEIR
PUBLICATION IN AN OFFICIAL GAZZETTE OR A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE
PHILIPPINES, UNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED

TANADA VS TUVERA

DE ROY VS CA

FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ARTICLE 3

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW EXCUSES NO FROM COMPLIANCE THEREWITH

ADONG VS CHEONG SENG GEE

WONG WOO YIU VS VIVO, ET AL.

ARTICLE 4

LAWS SHALL HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT, UNLESS THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED

 Reasons why laws in general are prospective

 If the rule was that laws were retroactive, grave injustice would occur for these laws
would punish individuals for violations of laws not yet enacted
 While ignorance of the law does not serve as an excuse, such ignorance refers only to
laws that have already been enacted
 Exceptions to the Prospective Effects of Laws
 If the laws themselves provide for retroactivity but in no case must an ex post facto
law be passed
 If the laws are remedial in nature
 If the statute is penal in nature, provided that (1) it is favorable to the accused or to
the convict; (2) and provide further, that the accused or convict is not a habitual
delinquent
 If the laws are of an emergency nature and are authorized by the police power of the
government
 If the law is curative
 If a substantive right be declared for the first time, unless vested rights are impaired

PEOPLE VS. PATALIN

WoN the reenacted law has retroactive effect?

Held: No. Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.

BERNABE VS ALEJO

WoN a law has a retroactive effect when it impaired vested right?

Held: No, retroactive effect of law is not allowed when it impaired vested right.

Under Article 285 of the Civil Code the, illegitimate child has been vested with the
right of recognition which cannot be impaired by the enactment of the Family Code.

ARTICLE 5
 ACTS EXECUTED AGAINST THE PROVISIONS OF MADATORY OR PROHIBITORY LAWS SHALL BE
VOID, EXCEPT WHEN THE LAW ITSELF AAUTHORIZES THEIR VALIDITY

 Positive (when something must be done

 Negative or prohibitory (when something should not be done)
 Exceptions
 when the law makes the act not void but merely voidable (valid, unless annulled) at
the instance of the victim
 when the law makes the act valid, but subjects the wrong-doer to criminal
responsibility
 when the law makes the act valid, but subjects the wrong-doer to criminal
responsibility
 when the law makes the act itself void, but recognized some legal effects flowing
therefrom
 when the law itself makes certain acts valid although generally they would have been
void

MARCOS VS COMELEC

 WoN:
 Petitioner was a resident for election purposes of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections
 (Jurisdictional Issue: Prior to the elections): the COMELEC properly exercised its
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the
Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said
Code
 (Jurisdictional Issue: After the Elections): the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner’s
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections
 Held:
1. Yes, the facts established favors a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of
legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
2. Other issues are set aside

ARTICLE 6

RIGHTS MAY BE WAIVED, UNLESS THE WAIVER IS CONTRARY TO LAW, PUBLIC ORDER, PUBLIC
POLICY, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, OR PREJUDICIAL TO A THIRD PERSON WITH A RIGHT RECOGNIZED
BY LAW

 RIGHT- the power or privilege given to one person and as a rule demandable of
another, as the right to recover a debt justly due
 Rights may be real rights enforceable against the whole world (absolute rights); and
personal rights enforceable against a particular individual
 WAIVER- the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right
 Requisites for a Valid Waiver
 The person waiving must be capacitated to make the waiver
 The waiver must be made clearly, but not necessarily express
 The person waiving must actually have the right which he is renouncing;
otherwise, he will not be renouncing anything
 Must comply with the formalities of a donation
 Must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy
 Must not prejudice others with a right recognized by law
  Examples of Rights that cannot be waived
 Natural rights, such as the right to life
 Alleged rights which really do not yet exist
 Those which would infringe public policy
 When the waiver is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
 Example of Rights may be renounced
 Support in arrears
 Right granted to prepare at least two days before trial
 Right to object to testimony of a wife on information obtained because of her
domestic relations with her husband
 Right of the accused to be helped by a counsel
 Right of the accused in a criminal case to have preliminary investigation may be
waived
 The venue of actions
 Failure to ask for vacation and sick leave privileges after a period of more than
five years

CUI VS ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

WoN:

The contract between the plaintiff and the defendant whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarships was void against public policy

Held: Yes. A stipulation requiring the recipient of a scholarship grant to waive his right
to transfer to another school, unless he refunds the equivalent of his scholarship in cash is null and
void. The school concerned obviously understands scholarship awards as a business scheme designed
to increase the business potential of an educational institution. Thus, conceived, it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy, but also with good morals.

LEAL VS IAC

WoN: A right to repurchase in favor of the private respondent valid.

Held: No. The respondent’s right to redeem or repurchase expired already.

ARTICLE 7

LAWS ARE REPEALED ONLY BY SUBSEQUENT ONES AND THEIR VIOLATION OR NON-
OBSERVANCE SHALL NOT BE EXCUSED BY DISUSE, OR CUSTOM, OR PRACTICE TO THE CONTRARY

WHEN THE COURTS DECLARE A LAW TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION, THE
FORMER SHALL BE VOID AND THE LATTER SHALL GOVERN

ADMINISTRATIVE OR EXECUTIVE ACTS, ORDERS, AND REGULATIONS SHALL BE VALID ONLY

WHEN THEY ARE NOT CONTRARY TO LAWS OR THE CONSTITUTION

 Sources of Law
 The Constitution, laws or presidential decrees, administrative or executive acts,
orders, and regulations
 How Laws are Repealed
 Expressly or impliedly
 Requisites of an Implied Repeal: (1) there is an old law and new law; (2) both
laws cover the same subject matter; and (3) the new law is repugnant or
incompatible with the old law
 The new law will prevail
 The law losses its effect when it expired
  An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as though
it has never been passed (Chavez vs Judicial and Bar Council)
 Laws are repealed by subsequent ones. Congress cannot make a law that can never be
repealed.
 When an express repeal is repealed, there is no revival except when the repealing law
provides
 When an implied repeal is repealed, there is automatic revival except when the
repealing provides otherwise
 The constitution is the supreme law of the land.
 An unconstitutional law is a void law and the exception is the doctrine of operative act.

ARTICLE 8

JUDICIAL DECISIONS APPLYING OR INTERPRETING THE LAWS OR THE CONSTITUTION SHALL

FORM A PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PHILIPPINES

 Are judicial decisions laws?

 They are not laws
 The courts exists in order to state what the law is, not for giving it
 Judicial decisions are evidences of what the law means
 Be it noted that only the decisions of the Supreme Court, and unreversed decisions of
the Court of Appeals on cases of first impression establish jurisprudence or doctrines in
the Philippines (Miranda et. al vs Imperial)
 Tecson vs COMELEC, Civil Law is defines as the mass of precepts which determine and
regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among the members of
the family and those which exists among members of society for the protection of
private interests.
 STARE DECISIS – is a common law concept derived from the Latin maxim “Stare decisis
et non quieta movere” which means to stand by decisions and not disturb the
undisturb. It is there to promote judicial stability. It means that once a matter is
decided by the Supreme Court, the SC and all of the lower courts will follow this
ruling, for all future cases involving the same issues.
 OBITER DICTUM- is part of the main opinion of the court which is not necessary in the
resolution of the legal issue in the present case.

MIRANDA, ET AL. VS IMPERIAL

ARTICLE 9

NO JUDGE OR COURT SHALL DECLINE TO RENDER JUDGMENT BY REASON OF THE SILENCE,

OBSCURITY OR INSUFFICIENCY OF THE LAWS

 If the law be silent, obscure, or insufficient, what should the judge apply in deciding a case?
 The judge may apply any rule he desires as long as the rule chosen is in
harmony with general interest, order, morals, and public policy like: (1) customs
which are not contrary to law, public order, and public policy: (2) decisions of
foreign and local courts on similar cases; (3) opinions of highly qualified writers
and professors; (4) rules of statutory construction; (5) principles laid down in
analogous instances
 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (there is no crime and there is no penalty
in the absence of law

SUMMARY:
  ARTICLE 8 teaches us that the rulings of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land.
This applies only to the main ruling of the court.
 ARTILCE 9 imposes a duty upon judges to decide case even when the law is silent, unclear, or
obscure.
 ARTICLE 10 tells us that in cases covered by Article 9, the presumption is that right and justice
should prevail

FLORESCA VS PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

WoN: The cause of action is in the nature of workmen’s compensation claim or a claim for
damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code

Held: The Trial Court’s order of dismissal is hereby reversed and set aside and the case is
remanded to it for further proceedings. Should a greater amount of damages be decreed in favor of
herein petitioners, the payments already made to them pursuant to the workmen’s compensation act
shall be deducted.

ARTICLE 14

PENAL LAWS AND THOSE OF PUBLIC SECURITY AN

D SAFETY SHALL BE OBLIGATORY UPON ALL WHO LIVE OR SOJOURN IN PPHILIPPINE TERRITORY,
SUBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OR TO TREATY STIPULATIONS

 Principle of Territoriality means that our law/ penal laws /laws that affect public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory
 The principle of generality is also the principle behind why foreigners in the Philippines can be
apprehended and convicted by crimes like child prostitution, child abuse and human trafficking
 Exceptions of Principle of Generality
 Public international law-all states are equal; presidents, ambassadors but not consuls
are immune
 Treaty stipulations
 Laws of preferential application

ARTICLE 15

LAWS RELATING TO FAMILY RIGHTS AND DUTIES OR TO THE STATUS, CONDITION AND LEGAL
CAPACITY OF PERSONS ARE BINDING UPON CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVEN THOUGH LIVING
ABROAD

 When it comes to family rights and duties, the most basic example is Article 194 which provides
that “Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall include his school or training for some profession, trade or vocation even beyond the age
of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from the school or going to
and from the place of work .
 The family rights and duties of a person is determined by his national law
 Support includes food, shelter, clothing, school, medical expenses and transportation
 STATUS includes personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, and not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being married or not, or his being legitimate
or illegitimate; the sum total of a person’s right, duties, and capacities
 Example is paternity; Paternity is a status of being a parent to a child
 Example is filiation; Filiation is a relationship or status one person has of being a
child to the parent
 Legal capacity has 2 kinds: juridical capacity and the capacity to act
 Article 37 of the Civil Code provides that juridical capacity is the fitness to be the subject
of legal relations. It is inherent to every natural person and it is lost only through death.
  Capacity to act is the active aspect of legal capacity. It is the ability to make actions with
legally biding consequences. Exists in varying degrees

ARTICLE 16

REAL PROPERTY AS WELL AS PERSONAL PROPERTY IS SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE COUNTRY
WHERE IT IS SITUATED

HOWEVER, INTESTATE AND TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO THE ORDER
OF SUCCESSION AND TO THE AMOUNT OF SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS AND TO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
TESTAMENTARY PROVSIONS, SHALL BE REGULATED BY THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON WHOSE
SUCCESSION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION, WHATEVER MAY BE THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTY AND
REGARDLESS OF THE COUNTRY WHERE SAID PROPERTY MAY BE FOUND

 Article 415 of the Civil Code, Real property includes land, building any construction attached to
the land
 Article 416 of the Civil Code, Personal property includes movable properties; all not included in
Article 415; stocks
 Lex Rei Sitae means that real property is governed by the law of the place where it is located

MICIANO VS BRIMO

FACTS: An alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines stated in the will that his property
should be distributed in accordance with the Philippine Law, and not that of his nation.

ISSUE: Was the provision valid?

Held: No, for Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property. This is clear under Article 16.

IN THE MATTER OF TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD CHRISTENSEN

FACTS: Edward Christensen , though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided for a
period of nine years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary till the time
of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always
considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed, he instituted an acknowledged
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia, another acknowledged daughter of his. Counsel for the acknowledged natural
daughter Helen claims that under. Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied;
that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore,
Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the
successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. Upon the other hand, counsel for the
child Mary Lucy contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Art. 16, par. 2 of our Civil Code, the
national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of
California in that matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a
testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally,
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law, the will of he deceased giving
the bulk of the property to Mary Lucy must remain undisturbed.

ISSUE: WoN THE Philippine Law should prevail in administering the estate of the testator?

HELD: The Court in deciding granted more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter: the internal law; and the conflicts rule. The California conflicts rule,
found in Art. 946 of the California Civil Code, says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place
where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by
the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the
Philippines, ought to be followed.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS BELLIS VS EDWARD BELLIS

FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he
made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the other, disposing of his Philippine
properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no
conflicts rule governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no compulsory
heirs, and therefore, no legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the wills on the ground that they
have been deprived of their legitimes.

ISSUE: Were they entitled to their legitimes?

HELD: 1. Said children are not entitled to their legitimes-for under Texas law which we must apply
(because it is the national law of the deceased), there are no legitimes

ARTICLE 17

THE FORMS AND SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, WILLS, AND OTHER PUBLIC INSTRUMENTS
SHALL BE GOVERNED BY LAWS OF THE COUNTRY IN WHICH THEY ARE EXECUTED.

WHEN THE ACTS REFERRED TO ARE EXECUTED BEFORE THE DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR
OFFICIALS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY, THE SOLEMNITIES
ESTABLISHED BY THE PHILIPPINE LAWS SHALL BE OBSERVED IN THEIR EXECUTION

PROHIBITIVE LAWS CONCERCING PERSONS, THEIR ACTS OR PROPERTY, AND THOSE WHICH
HAVE FOR THEIR OBJECT PUBLIC ORDER, PUBLIC POLICY, AND GOOD CUSTOMS SHALL NOT BE
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE BY LAWS OR JUDGMENTS PROMULGATED, OR BY DETERMINATIONS OR
CONVENTIONS AGREED UPON IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY

GERMAN AND CO VS DONALDSON, SIM AND CO.

FACTS: A power of attorney was executed in Germany giving the recipient authority to bring an action
in the Philippines, Said power of Attorney was not authenticated by a notary public. In Germany, no
such authentication was needed, contrary to Philippine Rules.

QUESTION: Was the power of attorney of attorney properly made insofar as form was concerned?

HELD: Yes, because it was executed in Germany. There is no reason why the lex loci celebraciones
should not apply.
ARTICLE 21 ANY PERSON WHO WILLFULLY CAUSES LOSS OR INJURY TO ANOTHER IN A MANNER THAT IS
CONTRARY TO MORAL, GOOD CUSTOMS OR PUBLIC POLICY SHALL COMPENSAE THE LATTER FOR
DAMAGE

ARTICLE 22 EVERY PERSON WHO THROUGH AN ACT OF PERFORMANCE BY ANOTHER, OR ANY OTHER
MEANS, ACQUIRES OR COMES INTO POSSESSION OF SOMETHING AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LATTER
WITHOUT JUST OR LEGAL GROUND, SHALL RETURN THE SAME TO HIM.

ARTICLE 25 PROHIBITION ON THOUGHTLESS EXTRAVAGANCE IN EXPENSES FOR PLEASURE OR DISPLAY

DURING A PERIOD OF ACUTE PUBLIC WANT OR EMERGENCY MAY BE STOPPED BY ORDER OF THE
COURTS AT THE INSTANCE OF ANY GOVERNMENT OR PRIVATE CHARITABLE INSTITUTION
ARTICLE 27. ANY PERSON SUFFERING MATERIAL OR MORAL LOSS BECAUSE A PUBLIC SERVANT OR
EMPLOYEE REFUSES OR NEGLECTS, WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, TO PERFORM HIS OFFICIAL DUTY MAY FILE
AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES AND OTHER RELIEF AGAINST THE LATTER, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY
DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION THAT MAY BE TAKEN

 THE PURPOSE OF ART. 27 IS TO END THE PABAGSAK OR BRIBERY SYSTEM, WHERE THE PUBLIC
OFFICIAL FOR SOME FLIMSY EXCUSE, DELAYS OR REFUSES THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY
UNTIL HE GETS SOME KIND OF “PABAGSAK”.
 LEDESMA vs COURT OF APPEALS
 FACTS: A college student scheduled to graduate with magna cum laude honors was
deprived of the distinction because of her act of lending money to members of an
organization of which she was a member, purportedly in violation of existing school
rules and regulations, according to the president of the State College. This, despite the
intervention of the Bureau of Public Schools who instructed the state college not to
deprive her of the honors. But just the same, she was made to graduate as a plain
student.
 ISSUE: Was the state college president, being a public servant, be deemed liable for
damages for failure to perform his duties
 HELD: Yes, damages (both moral and exemplary) are proper, brought about by the
school president’s neglect of duty and callousness vis-à-vis the painful ordeal suffered
by the student.

LAW ON PERSONS

Article 37: Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only through date. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

DIFFERENCES
JURIDICAL CAPACITY CAPACITY TO ACT
PASSIVE ACTIVE
INHERENT MERELY ACQUIRED
LOST ONLY THROUGH DEATH LOST THROUGH DEATH AND MAY BE
RESTRICTED BY OTHER CAUSES
CAN EXIST WITHOUT CAPACITY TO ACT EXISTS ALWAYS WITH JURIDICAL CAPACITY

 Example: A one-year-old boy has juridical capacity but has no capacity to act. When he
becomes 18, he will have full civil capacity.
 A person is presumed to have capacity to act.

Article 38: Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from
certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements.

 Restrictions on Capacity to Act

 Minority (below 18)
 Insanity or imbecility
 State of being a deaf-mute
 Prodigality (the state of squandering money or property with a morbid desire to
prejudice the heirs of a person -Martinez vs Martinez)
 Civil interdiction (the deprivation by the court of a person’s right):
1. To have parental or marital authority
2. To be the guardian of the person and property of a ward
3. To dispose of his property by an act inter vivos (he cannot donate, for this is
an act inter vivos; but he can make a will, for this is a disposition mortis causa)
 4. To manage his own property

NOTE: The penalty of civil interdiction is given to a criminal punished by imprisonment for 12 years
and one day or more. (Article 41, RPC)

NATURAL PERSONS

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.

 Personality begins at conception.

 This personality is called presumptive personality.
 It is of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as
never having possessed legal personality.
 Rule in Case of Abortive Infants
 If a physician operates on a pregnant woman and succeeds in aborting the fetus, the
parents would normally be entitled only to moral damages (distress, disappointment of
parental expectation) and to exemplary damages, if warranted, but NOT to ACTUAL
DAMAGES (injury to rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical injury.)
 Newborn Screening Act of 2004 (R.A. 9288)
 Ensures that every baby born in the Philippines is offered the opportunity to undergo
newborn screening and, thus, be spared from heritable conditions that can lead to
mental retardation and death if undetected and untreated.
 Under RA 9288, the term “comprehensive newborn screening system” means a
newborn screening system that includes, but is not limited to:
1. Education of relevant stakeholders
2. Collection and biochemical screening of blood samples taken from newborns
3. Tracking and confirmation testing to ensure the accuracy of screening results
4. Clinical evaluation and biochemical/medical confirmation of test results
5. Drugs and medical/surgical management and dietary supplementation to
address the heritable conditions
6. Evaluation activities to assess long-term outcome
7. Patient compliance; and
8. Quality assurance

NOTE: A SIGNIFICANT provision of the law is a parnt or legal guardian’s decision to “refuse testing on the
ground of religious belief.” Said person “shall acknowledge in writing and understanding in refusal for
testing, places the newborn at risk for undiagnosed heritable conditions.

ARTICLE 42.

Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations
of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

 How Civil Personality is Extinguished

1. By death (physical death)
2. Civil interdiction (civil death) merely restricts, not extinguished, capacity to act.
 Effects of physical death is determined by:
1. Law
2. Contract
3. Will
 Examples of Determination by Laws

IF a person be made a voluntary heir in the will of another and he dies before the
testator, he cannot be represented by his own heirs.

Other legal effects of death:

 1. The right to support ends
2. A marriage, whether voidable or valid, also ends
3. The tenure of public office ends
4. If an individual dies, the property or estate left by him should be subject to the
tax in generally the same manner as if he were alive
5. If a person dies after he has authorized another to sell the former’s property,
the sale after such date is not valid, if made by the agent with knowledge of
the principal’s death. This is true even if the buyer be in good faith.
 Is a person’s “estate” a person by itself

In a questionable decision of the Supreme Court, it has held that the “estate” of a
deceased is a person that may continue the personality of the deceased even after death-for the purpose
of settling debts. (Limjuco v. Estate of Pedro Fragante, 45 O.G. No. 9, p. 397)

 Rallos vs Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation

If a person dies after he has authorized another to sell the former’s property, the sale
after such death is not valid, if made by the agent with knowledge of the principal’s death. This is true
even if the buyer be in good faith.

FACTS:

Concepcion and Gerundia Rallos were sisters and registered co-owners of a

parcel of land known as Lot No. 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 11116 of the Registry of Cebu.They executed a special power of attorney
in favor of their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him to sell such land for and in their behalf. 
After Concepcion died, Simeon Rallos sold the undivided shares of his sisters Concepcion and
Gerundia to Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation for the sum of P10,686.90. New TCTs
were issued to the latter. Petitioner Ramon Rallos, administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Concepcion filed a complaint praying (1) that the sale of the undivided share of the deceased
Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 be unenforceable, and said share be reconveyed to her estate;
(2) that the Certificate of ‘title issued in the name of Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation
be cancelled and another title be issuedin the names of the corporation and the “Intestate estate
of Concepcion Rallos” in equal undivided and (3) that plaintiff be indemnified by way of
attorney’s fees and payment of costs of suit.

ISSUES:

1) WON sale was valid although it was executed after the death of the
principal, Concepcion.

2) WON sale fell within the exception to the general rule that death extinguishes the
authority of the agent

3) WON agent’s knowledge of the principal’s death is a material factor.

4) WON petitioner must suffer the consequence of failing to annotate a notice of death
in the title

(thus there was good faith on the part of the Respondent vendee)

5) WON good faith on the part of the respondent in this case should be treated parallel
to that of an

HELD:
 CFI: Sale of land was null and void insofar as the one-half pro-indiviso
share of Concepcion Rallos Ordered the issuance of new TCTs to respondent
corporation and the estate of Concepcion in theproportion of ½ share each pro-indiviso
and the payment of attorney’s fees and cost of litigation Respondent filed cross claim
against Simon Rallos(*Simon and Gerundia died during pendency of case) juan T.
Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos was ordered to pay defendant
the price of the ½ share of the land (P5,343.45) plus attorney’s fees [Borromeo filed a
third party complaint against Josefina Rallos, special administratrix of the Estate of 
Gerundia]  Dismissed without prejudice to filing either a complaint against the regular
administrator of the  Estate of Gerundia Rallos or a claim in the Intestate-Estate of
Cerundia Rallos, covering the  same subject-matter

CA: CFI Decision reversed, upheld the sale of Concepcion’s share.MR: denied.innocent

purchaser for a value of a land.

 People vs Tirol and Baldesco

FACTS:

Tirol and Baldesco and other accomplice who were not captured were accused of
murder of the wife and 6 kids of Kosain Manibpol.

After found guilty of the crime, the accused filed an appeal in which during the
pendency of the appeal, Baldesco died.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Baldesco will be liable for civil damages

HELD:

The courts dismissed the case insofar as the criminal liability of Baldesco is
concerned. However following the doctrine in People vs. Sendaydiego, the appeal will be
resolved only for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the basis of the
civil liability for which his estate is liable. Art 42 states that criminal liability is extinguished
in death. The effect of death upon rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by
law, by contract and by will. Civil liability is not extinguished.

JURIDICAL PERSONS
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:
1. The State and its political subdivisions;
2. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or
purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have
been constituted according to law;
3. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and
distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member
 Classification of Juridical Persons
1. Public Juridical Persons
 Public corporations like the province and the city
 The state itself
2. Private juridical persons
  Private corporations
 Partnerships
 Foundations
 When personality of private juridical persons begin
A private corporation begins to exist as a juridical person from the moment a
certificate of incorporation is granted to it

ARTICLE 45
Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are
governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the
subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by
the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships.

ARTICLE 46
Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as
incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization.
 Rights of Juridical Persons
 To acquire and possess property of all kinds
 To incur obligations
 May a corporation form a partnership?
No, because the relationship of trust and confidence which is found in a
partnership, is absent in corporations. Moreover, if the corporation can be a partner,
any other partner may bind it which is contrary to the Corporation Law which says
that a corporation can be bound only by the act of its Board of Directors. However, it
may enter into joint venture with another corporation where the nature of that
venture is in line with the business authorized by its charter.
 Capacity to Acquire Lands
A religious corporation which is not controlled by Filipinos cannot
acquire lands, otherwise alien religious landholdings in this country would be
revived.
 Capacity to engage in retail trade
Under RA 1180, persons not citizens of the Philippines; and
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which is not owned wholly
by citizens of the Philippines, are prohibited from engaging in the retail trade
directly or indirectly.

CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE

 Citizenship and Nationality
  Citizenship is the status of being a citizen, or of owing allegiance to a
certain state for the privilege of being under its protection. It’s political
in character.
 Nationality refers to a racial or ethnic relationship.
 In the field however of Civil Law and Private International Law, the two
are possessed of the same meaning.
 Thus, when we say that successional rights depend on the national law
of the deceased, we really refer to the law of the country of which he
was a citizen at the moment of death.
 Three Kinds of Citizens
 Natural-born citizens- those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship.
 Naturalized citizens – citizens who become such through judicial
proceedings
 Citizens by election – citizens who become such by exercising the option
to elect a particular citizenship, usually within a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority
 Two theories on whether Place or Ancestry Determines Citizenship
1) Jus soli – if born in a country, a person is a citizen of the same (not
applied in the Philippines today)
2) Jus sanguinis – one follows the citizenship of his parents; this is
citizenship by blood
 Effect of the Exercise of the Rights of a Filipino Citizen
The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are
granted only to Filipino citizens is not conclusive proof that he or she is a Filipino
citizen.
 The Problem of Dual and Multiple Nationalities
Can hardly arise because citizenship is a matter to be exclusively
determined by a country’s own law. In other words, Philippine courts are only
allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not.
 Duals may now exercise the right of suffrage
 The problem of stateless individuals
 A person may become stateless by any of the following means:
1) He may have been deprived of his citizenship for any cause, such
as the commission of a crime;
2) He may have renounced his nationality by certain acts, express
or implied;
3) He may have voluntarily asked for a release from his original
state
4) He may have been born in a country which recognized only the
principle of jus sanguinis (citizenship by blood)
 The Hague Conference of 1928 on International Private Law suggested
that the personal law of stateless individuals shall be:
1) The law of the domicile (habitual residence)
2) The law of the place of temporary residence
 Citizenship of a Filipino woman who marries a foreigner
Rule under the 1973 Constitution
 A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her
Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have
renounced her citizenship.

FAMILY CODE
ARTICLE 1
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
 Two aspects of marriage
 It is a special contract
 It is a status or a relation or an institution.
As a status, the principle in contracts that the parties may, by mutual
agreement, put an end to it, cannot certainly apply, for the consequences of the marriage as
a rule are fixed by law. Notaries public who draw up instruments destroying the
inviolability of marriage are subject subject to disclipnary action.

NOTE: THE ENACTMENT OF RA 6955 DECLARING UNLAWFUL THE PRACTICE OF

MATCHING FILIPINO WOMEN FOR MARRIAGE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS ON A MAIL-
ORDER BASIS AND OTHER SIMILAR PRACTICES.
 Marriage as a STATUS or UNION
 It is the UNION of one man and one woman for the reciprocal blessings of a
domestic home life, and for the birth, rearing, and education of children.
 In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that marriage is also a new
RELATION in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
 Under the Muslim Code (PD 1083 also called the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, marriage has different concept in that a
Muslim can have as many as four wives at a time, provided he can give them
equal companionship and equal treatment.
NOTE: MARRIAGE AS A CEREMONY OR THE WEDDING ENDS WHEN A MARRIAGE AS A
STATUS BEGINS.
 Some Principles
 Union – physical and spiritual mating
 Of one man with one woman – this is monogamy which is the ideal
marriage
 Reciprocal blessing – marriage is a 50-50 proposition; the wife must not
henpeck the husband; neither must the husband oppress the wife
 Birth – since one of the purposes of marriage is the procreation of
children, the natural moral law prohibits artificial birth control
 Rearing – the care of both parents is essential; too often, the rearing is
done by the mother alone, which is tragic
 
Education of children- it is the natural right of parents to educate their
children
 Marriage Distinguished from ordinary Contracts
 Ordinary contracts are mere contracts; a marriage contract is also a
social institution
 In ordinary contracts, the agreement entered into casually depend on
the stipulations agreed into by the contracting parties unless those
stipulations are against the law, against public policy, against public
order, against morals, or good customs.
 In marriage, the nature and the consequences, as well as the incidents,
are governed by the law---except with reference to marriage
settlements. In marriage, therefore, as a general rule, stipulations are of
no value.
DIFFERENCES
MARRIAGE ORDINARY CONTRACT
Both a contract and a social institution Merely contract
Generally, stipulations are fixed by law— Stipulations are generally fixed by the
not by the parties (exception: marriage parties
settlement provisions)
Can be dissolved only by death or Can be ended by mutual agreement and by
annulment, not by mutual agreement other legal causes

 Republic vs Jennifer Cagandahan

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. 
During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed
that her ovarian structures had minimized.  She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. 
Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition
where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of
male hormones, androgen.  According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person.  She filed a petition at Regional Trial Court
Branch 33  in Siniloan, Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her
gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD: The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.  Supreme Court  is of the
view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex.  As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being a male.  Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.  It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. 

Supreme Court: " In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state
and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case."
  SILVERIO vs REPUBLIC

FACTS: Petitioner was born and registered as a male. He filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC. He admitted that he is a male transsexual who underwent sex
reassignment surgery. From the time he underwent such surgery, petitioner lived as a female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex from “male” to “female”.

RTC granted the petition. The Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration. CA ruled in favor of the OSG. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. WoN petitioner is entitled to change his name in his birth certificate

2. WoN petitioner is entitled to change his sex in his birth certificate.

HELD:

1. NO, since a person’s first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment. RA 9048 is the
law that governs the change of first name. Section 4 of the said law provides the Grounds for Change of
First Name or Nickname. The grounds are as follows: (1) the petitioner finds the first name or nickname
to be ridiculous, taineted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) the new first
name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) the change will avoid confusion. As such,
R.A. 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.

Furthermore, before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. But the petitioner in the present case
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.

2. NO, since no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The entries correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Article
408 of the Civil Code. These are entries in the civil register with regard to : births, marriages, deaths,
legal separations, annulments of marriage, judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning,
legitimations, adoptions, acknowledgments of natural children, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, etc. In relation to the present case, sex re assignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 408. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
Hence it cannot be allowed even under Rules 108.
 Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that “All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws”. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing
sex reassignment and its effects. Hence the petitioner is not entitled to change his sex in his birth
certificate on the ground of sex reassignment surgery.

 Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs NLRC

FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for
employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods. De Guzman was
again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee. She indicated in the portion of the job
application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few
months earlier.

When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy including a reminder about the company’s
policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company and
Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed de Guzman, who
had already gained the status of a regular employee. It was apparent that she had been
discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the
services of an employee.

HELD: No. Private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could
not be properly characterized as in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly
because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. Thus, could not be a ground to
terminate her services.

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is
free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and
best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage
is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by
our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved
principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in
the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right
of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the
nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively
required. However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should
be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted
temporary suspension of Grace from work.

 STAR PAPER CORPORATION VS SIMBOL

FACTS: Simbol was employed by the company and met a co-
employee and they eventually had a relationship and got married. Prior to the marriage, the ma
nager advise the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursu
ant to a company policy: 1) new applicant will not be allowed to be hired if he/she has a relative, 
up to 3rd degree of consanguinity, already employed by the company. 2) if the two employees go
t married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy  stated first. Simbol resigned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouse from working in the same company, a 
valid exercise of management prerogative.

HELD:
No, it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates the rights of employees und
er the constitution. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides “it shal
l be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employ
ment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon 
getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated , or to actually dismi
ss, discharge , discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her m
arriage.” The company policy of Star Paper, to be upheld, must clearly establish the requirement 
of reasonableness. In the case at bar, there was no reasonable business necessity. Petitioners fail
ed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then 
an employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. The ques
tioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportion
ate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a 
showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. Lastly, t
he absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot be
nefit the petitioners.

 ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin.
Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting
of diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her
Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta
filed the papers for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice
of medicine against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring
him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review
with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are
admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice. 

HELD: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
“the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it
is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. 

The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and
wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other
as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

 ZULUETA vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Annabelle and Reinel applied for a marriage license. However, when they went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to get married
as soon as possible, they executed an Affidavit dated 13 March 1995 to show that they had been
living together as husband and wife for the last five years, hence, exempt from the
marriage license requirement. They got married on the same date before a judge. After the
ceremony, however, they did not live together as husband and wife.

In November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia. 

In 1998, Annabelle filed a petition for support against Reinel, claiming that he had not given support
to her and their child. 

In 1998, Annabelle filed a petition for support against Reinel, claiming that he had not given support
to her and their child. 

In his answer, Reinel denied that he is married to Annabelle, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit. He alleged that they never cohabited with
each other five years before their marriage, hence they were not exempted from the requirement of
a marriage license. He also denied being the father of Tricia.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Annabelle and Reinel is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared Reinel as the natural father of the
Tricia, and thus obliged to give her support. Reinel appealed.

The CA ruled that since the case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare
the marriage of Annabelle and Reinel as null and void in the very same case. There was no
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no
collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. It also ruled that Tricia, having born during the subsistence of a marriage, is the legitimate
child of Reinel.

ISSUE: 1. Has the trial court jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between Reinel and
Annabelle even though the case before it is for support? In other words, may the marriage be
attacked collaterally?

2. Is the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle valid?

3. Is Reinna Tricia a legitimate child of Reinel?

HELD: 1.) Yes. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. In Nial v. Bayadog, we
held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a

marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

2.) No. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites

of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for
a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They
were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. 

3.)  Reianna Tricia is an illegitimate daughter of Reinel, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.

The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in
an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of
the child. (De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro,  G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008)

 NINAL vs BAYADOG

FACTS: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was
shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause
of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of
marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: (a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at
least five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal
is already dead

HELD: a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should
be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before the day the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—
that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

 MANZANO VS SANCHEZ

FACTS: Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the
late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that
marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with
one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized
said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated
the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife
for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their
joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he
would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged
with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for
being designed merely to harass him.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross

ignorance of the law.

Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question

in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid?

HELD: No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for the

marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. Respondent Judge cannot take
refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had
been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption
from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

 OBERGEFFEL VS HODGES

FACTS: Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man
and one woman. Several same-sex couples filed suits in Federal District Courts in their home
States, claiming that state officials violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the
right to marry or to give full faith and credit to their out-of-state marriages. Each District Court
ruled in their favor and the case was elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States.

ISSUE: Was the definition of marriage as a union between one man and one woman in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD: YES. The Court held that the laws of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee were held
invalid to the extent they excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and
conditions as opposite-sex couples. It explained that under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples have a fundamental right
to marry. Moreover, same-sex couples can exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states.
Thus, it follows that there is no lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex
marriage performed in another state on the ground of its same-sex character.

The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) must be
and is overruled, and state law-based restrictions are held invalid to the extent they exclude
same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.
 BOLOS VS BOLOS

 Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of

her marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the
Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition
for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent Danilo and he
thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.

 The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required
motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring
the marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion for
Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a
petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as
they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated
to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should
be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

 The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court
stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to
appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the
Family Code took effect.

 Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages

solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the
phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
“petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the
effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage
was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized
on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.

ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.

HELD: NO. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages

and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the
Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in
fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that
the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
“petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which
denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

 LEUS vs ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE

FACTS: petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic
educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual relations,
got pregnant out of wedlock... married the father of her child,... and was dismissed by SSCW,
in that order.
petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of the
petitioner's pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao... advised her to file a resignation letter effective
June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner... informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign
from her employment just because she got pregnant... without the benefit of marriage.[
. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she should not be
dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result
thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee... of
a Catholic school.
In a letter[11] dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital
sexual relations, even if between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry,
is considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which... are
grounds for the termination of employmen... petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
ISSUE: The validity of the petitioner's dismissal hinges on the determination of whether
pregnancy out of wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for
the termination of her employment.
HELD: The fact of the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough
to characterize the petitioner's conduct as disgraceful or immoral.
There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and,
consequently,... pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral
The totality of the circumstances... surrounding the conduct alleged to be... disgraceful or
immoral must be assessed... against the prevailing norms of conduct.
consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an
assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the... prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what
the society generally considers moral and respectable.
the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the Constitution.
when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not
religious morality. Thus, the proscription against "disgraceful or immoral conduct" under
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily...
refer to public and secular morality.
ARTICLE 2

No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

 Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female
 Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer

ARTICLE 3 THE FORMAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE ARE:

 AUTHORITY OF THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER

 A VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE EXCEPT IN THE CASES PROVIDED FOR IN CHAPTER 2 OF THIS TITLE
 A Marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age

 ABBAS VS ABBAS

FACTS: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license, as
provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code.

Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the
Philippines on December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized
by Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola.
Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria
signed a document. Syed claim that he did not know the nature of the ceremony until
Gloria told him that it was a marriage.

In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other
couple.

 
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

HELD: No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the
Family Code is the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).

Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the
absence of the essential and formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that
those marriages which are solemnized without a license are void from the beginning in
exception to those covered by the preceding chapter.

Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the marriage contract
and testimonies to prove the existence of the said license.

Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

 GO BANGAYAN VS BANGAYAN
FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father
was against the relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig
City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s
marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered. Sally
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn,
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity
of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was
bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also
asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator
of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice
and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the
subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.

1. ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not
having a marriage license
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
3. Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner

1. HELD: YES.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and
void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar
of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3
of Article 35which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus,
the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

2. YES.

The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which states: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the
trial court even admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of
properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x.”

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is more
in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722
was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title
“married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered
in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of
Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.
Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from
either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.

3. NO.

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or
former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and
there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract.
However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.In this
case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage

 CORPUZ VS TIROL STO. THOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent
Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional
commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce
by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario,
Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in
love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City
to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However,
despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former
marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the
Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto.
Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the
Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a
foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz
the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree.

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same
time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata
between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

 MALLION VS ALCANTARA

FACTS: On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court
seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent
was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.

Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and
forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.

ISSUE: Is the action of the husband tenable?

HELD: No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or
“estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same
rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of
auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause
of action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then
that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of
marriage license is barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

 EGAP, ET. AL VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

FORMAL REQUISITES

 SEVILLA VS CARDENAS

FACTS: n a Complaint, filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969,
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the
latter’s father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita
went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a
supposed Minister of the Gospel.

On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before
the said Minister of the Gospel.

According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita
and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage
license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married
civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila
and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after
having been married to her for 25 years.

ISSUE: WON the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No.
2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as
null and void ab initio.

HELD:
 NO.

RATIO:

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the
parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that “hope and understand our loaded work
cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.” It could be easily implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its “loaded work.” Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to
the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of
the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former
custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This
belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been
exerted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No.
2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be
found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily
accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

 
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings, now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. We
are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.

“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio – Always presume marriage.”

DISPOSITION: The instant Petition is DENIED.

 ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA

FACTS: Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage

against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita,
without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married
on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her
Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has
three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the
Rosita was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just
went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.
He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.  Assuming
a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita
was a resident of the place.

The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given
weight because the certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was
issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

ISSUE: Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this
case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage
license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified
the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage.

Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are
residents of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that
does not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is
not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error.  It does not
detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage
license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands, petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage
celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license.
Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise,
knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from
his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so
when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle

 MADRILEJO VS DE LEON

FACTS: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The
wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana
Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan,
Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which
was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo. On June 17,
1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the
father. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a
bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, July 9, 1920,
leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo,
as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May,
1928. Lower Court ruled that the marriage of Madridejo and Perez was valid and the Melecio
Madridejo was legitmated by that marriage. Appellant (Gonzalo de leon) contends that trial court
erred in declaring that the marriage in question was valid and that Pedro Madridejo was legitimated
by that marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro Madridejo is valid
Whether or not the marriage subsequently legitimated Melecio Madridejo

HELD: With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan,
Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not
appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony,
and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and
therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.

 EUGENIO SR. VS VELEZ

FACTS: On Sept. 27, 1988, respondent-brothers Vargas(es) filed a petition for

habeas corpus against Eugenio for forcibly taking Vitaliana (respondents’ sister)from her
residence in 1987 and confined by the former in his palacial residence in Misamis Oriental. The
respondent-brothers, however, were not knowledgeable of Vitaliana’s death on August 28, 1988
due to heart failure, prior to their filing of the writ of habeas corpus. Hence, Eugenio did not
release the body of Vitaliana claiming that the writ of habeas corpus is invalid because it was
filed after the death of Vitaliana. the respondent-brothers claimed that there was no existing
marital relationship between Eugenio and Vitaliana and therefore they have the custody over the
body of the latter. The RTC said that since there was no surviving spouse or children of Vitaliana
and that petitioner was merely a common law spouse , her brothers and sisters have the custody.
Also, it was held that Eugenio was legally married to another woman.

ISSUE: Whether the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to her full blood brothers and
sisters or her common law spouse.

HELD: The Philippines do not recognize common law marriages. And even if it was recognized,
the co-ownership requires that the man and the woman must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. In this case, Eugenio was legally married to another woman, which bars him
from being legally capacitated to contract marriages. Thye Civil Code of the Philippines defines
“spouse” as a lawfully wedded spouse not including common law spouses. Hence, the custody of
Vitaliana’s body is given to her brothers and sisters.

 RONULO VS PEOPLE

FACTS: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating priest
refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Church.
The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day where the couple
took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's knowledge of the
couple's lack of marriage license.

Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not
tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.

The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

HELD: Yes.

Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are: 

1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and 

2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage.

The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the Family
Code provides that it shall be necessary: 
1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and 
2. declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise present
since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law,
specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.

ARTICLE 4
THE ABSENCE OF ANY OF THE ESSESNTIAL OR FORMAL REQUISITES SHALL RENDER
THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO, EXCEPT AS STATED IN ARTICLE 35 (2)
A DEFECT IN ANY OF THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES SHALL RENDER THE MARRIAGE
VOIDABLE AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 45
AN IRREGULARITY IN THE FORMAL REQUISITES SHALL NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF
THE MARRIAGE BUT THE PARTY OR PARTIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IRREGULARITY SHALL
BE CIVILLY, CRIMINALLY AND ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.

 ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA
FACTS: Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage
against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita,
without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married
on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her
Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has
three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the
Rosita was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just
went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.

He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.  Assuming
a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita
was a resident of the place.

The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given
weight because the certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was
issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

ISSUE: Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this
case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage
license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified
the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage.

Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are
residents of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that
does not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is
not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error.  It does not
detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage
license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands, petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage
celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license.
Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise,
knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from
his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so
when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle

 MORIGO VS PEOPLE
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while
but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.
They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for
divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently
filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since
the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty
claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second
marriage in good faith.

ISSUE:

Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his
second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD:
No. considering that the first marriage was void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the Bigamy case.

As provided by Art. 3, part 3 of the Family Code “A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age”. “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
45.” As provided by Art. 4. Given these 2 articles, Morigo’s first marriage is considered void ab initio.

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when
he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted
in the case filed.

 ARRANES VS OCCIANO

FACTS: On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized the marriage of Mercedita Mata
Arañes and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” of Orobia was
not recognized, because the marriage was a null. She also cannot claim the pension of
her husband who is a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts
and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.

In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan
Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February
2000. He was assured that all the documents were complete, thus he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in his sala. However, on 17 February 2000, he acceded to the
request of Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua because Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan. Before starting
the ceremony he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite
marriage license, thus he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting
to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors,
and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage
out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate
the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that
same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but
the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be
delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent
judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001

confessing that she filed the complaint out of rage, and she realizes her own
shortcomings. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her
marriage and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same.

From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on
5 January
2000 to be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed
it. Also, the Civil
Registrar General and the Local Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur has no records of
the marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so
the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. The LCR informed the judge
that they cannot issue the same due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction and
without the requisite marriage license.

HELD:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to
their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. An appellate court Justice
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for
he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be
faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. Marriage
which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by

petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of
the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action
WHEREFORE,Judge Salvador M. Occiano, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

 GERONIMO VS CA
FACTS:

 NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY

FACTS: On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma D. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. in
relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife , and
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied in the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his wife have not seen each
other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate
Article 7, paragraph I of the Family code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1)
Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and that Article 8
thereof applies to the case in question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.

ISSUE:

In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest
error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by
the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage.

In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica

and Burgos, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law

Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these
cases, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of
this he is suspended for a period of six months.

ARTICLE 7 MARRIAGE MAY BE SOLEMNIZED BY:

 ANY INCUMBENT MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY WITHIN THE

COURT’S JURISDICTION

 ANY PRIEST, RABBI, IMAM, OR MINISTER OF ANY CHURCH OR

RELIGIOUS SECT DULY AUTHORIZED BY HIS CHURCH OR
RELIGIOUS SECT AND REGISTERED WITH THE CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL, ACTING WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE WRITTEN
AUTHORITY GRANTED BY HIM BY HIS CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS
 SECT AND PROVIDED THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BELONGS TO THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER’S CHURCH OR
RELIGIOUS SECT

 ANY SHIP CAPTAIN OR AIRPLANE CHIEL ONLY IN THE CASES

MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 3

 ANY MILITARY COMMANDER OF A UNIT TO WHICH A CHAPLAIN

IS ASSIGNED, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE LATTER, DURING A
MILITARY OPERATION, LIKEWISE ONLY IN THE CASES
MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 32

 ANY CONSUL-GENERAL, CONSUL, OR VICE CONSUL IN THE CASE

PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 10

 PEOPLE VS BUSTAMANTE

FACTS: Federic Bustamante married Maria Perez in August 1954. In September 1955, while

the first marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria Tibayan,
solemnized before Vice-Mayor Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as Mayor of
the said Municipality since the incumbent mayor was on leave of absence. Federic dwelt with
Demetria for about a month, after which a time he returned to live with Maria. In the course of her
search for him, Demetria discovered the previous marriage of Federic. Hence, Demetria filed a case
for bigamy against Federic.

Federic contended that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as Nato was
merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do so. He
laid stress on the distinction between “Acting Mayor” and “Vice Mayor acting as Mayor”, urging that
while the former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not. The trial court convicted Federic of
the crime. 

ISSUE: Was the second marriage valid? Has the Vice Mayor Nato the authority to solemnize
marriage?

HELD: Yes, the marriage was valid and Vice Mayor Federico Nato, acting as mayor, has the
authority to solemnize the marriage. When the issue involves the assumption of powers and duties
of the office of the mayor by the vice-mayor, when proper, it is immaterial whether it because
the latter is the Acting Mayor or merely acting as Mayor, for in both instances, he discharges all the
duties and wields the power appurtenant to said office. This instance does not involve a question of
title to the office, but the performance of the functions thereunto appertaining by one who is admitted
to be temporarily vested with it. The powers and duties of the Mayor devolve upon the Vice-Mayor
whenever the latter is in an acting capacity. (People vs. Bustamante,  G.R. No. L-11598, January 27, 1959)

ARTICLE 8

The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel, temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-
consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the
point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29, of this Code, or where both
of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which the case the marriage may
be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
  Reason for Public Solemnization

Is based on the premise that the state takes an active interest in the marriage

 Instances where public solemnization is not needed

 Marriages in chambers of the justice or Judge

 In marriages in articulo mortis

 In marriages in a remote place

 When both of the parties request in writing for solemnization in some other
place. The place must be designated in a sworn statement

ARTICLE 9

A Marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is
required in accordance with chapter 2 of this title.

 Marriages of Exceptional Character (no marriage license is required)

 In articulo mortis

 In a remote place

 Marriage of people who have previously cohabited for at least five

years

 Marriages between pagans or Mohammedans, who live in non-Christian

provinces, and who are married in accordance with their customs.

ARTICLE 18

IN CASE of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after the
completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a competent court at
his own instance or that of any interested party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition
nor a corresponding bond required for the issuance of the order

 Notice to Civil Registrar of Any Impediment to Marriage

-notice made to the local civil registrar of any impediment to the marriage shall not
prevent the issuance of the marriage license after the 10-day publication unless otherwise
ordered by a competent court upon petition of the civil registrar at his own instance or that
of any interested party

ARTICLE 19

The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or
regulations before the issuance of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the
nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said license. It shall, however, be issued
free of charge to indigent parties, that is, those who have no visible means of income or
whose income is insufficient for their subsistence, a fact established by their affidavit or by
their oath before the local civil registrar

ARTICLE 20 (LIFE OF THE MARRIAGE LICENSE)

The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred
twenty days from the date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically cancelled at the
expiration of said period if the contracting parties have not made use of it. The expiry date
shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of every license issued.

NOTE: UNDER Art. 350 OF THE revised Penal Code, any (solemnizing officer) who solemnizes a
marriage as well as the parties thereto after the license had expired may be held criminally
liable

ARTICLE 21 (CERTIFICATE OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO MARRY)

When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall
be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of
legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.

Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of
legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such
capacity to contract marriage.

 Certificate of Legal Capacity Required for Foreigners

In general capacity of foreigners to contract marriage in the Philippines is subject to

their personal law; thus, they are required under this Article to obtain a certificate of legal
capacity

NOTE: ART.21 APPLIES WHERE EITHER OR BOTH ARE CITIZENS OR SUBJECTS OF A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.

 Diplomatic Officials

1) Ambassador

2) Minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary

3) Resident minister

4) Charge d’affaires (in charge of affairs)

  Consular officials

1) Consular-general

2) Consul

3) Vice-consul

4) Consular agent

ARTICLE 22 (MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE)

THE marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as
husband and wife, shall also state:

1) The fullname, sex and age of each contracting party

2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence

3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage

4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in
marriages provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;

5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental
consent in appropriate cases

6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal
requirement regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and

7) That the parties have entered into a marriage settlements, if any, attaching a
copy thereof

 Marriage Certificate

-it is not an essential requisite of marriage. Thus, an oral solemnization of the

marriage is sufficient. Failure to sign the marriage contract does not invalidate the marriage.

-said marriage contract being notarized, the document now carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due executive, and documents acknowledged
before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regulating

-in the instant controversy, the penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may
either be suspension or disbarment, depending on the circumstances of the case.

 The marriage certificate distinguished from the License

-the marriage certificate must not be confused with the marriage license, the latter
being an essential requisite of marriage

 Proof of the Existence of a Marriage

 -the best evidence of the existence of a marriage is the marriage certificate—but it is
not the only evidence that can be admitted to prove the existence of a marriage.

-testimony of the witnesses may be admitted on this point.

 LIM TANHU VS RAMOLETE

FACTS: Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who
was a partner in the commercial partnership, glory commercial company with Antonio Lim Tanhu
and Alfonso Ng Sua’’. Defendants Antonio Lim Tan Hu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan,
and Eng Chong Leonardo, through fraud and conspiracy, took actual and active management of the
partnership and although tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of glory commercial company,
defendants managed to use the funds of the partnership to purchase lands and building in the cities
of Cebu, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue, and the municipalities of Talisay and Minglanilla.

She alleged in her complaint that at the time of death of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, the defendants,
without liquidation, continued the business of glory commercial company, by purportedly organizing
a corporation known as the glory commercial company, incorporated and sometime in the month of
November, 1967, defendants, particularly Antonio Lim Tan Hu, by means of fraud deceit, and
misrepresentations did then and there , induce and convince her to execute a quitclaim of all her
rights and interests, in the assets of the partnership of glory commercial company.

Thereafter, in the year 1968-69, the defendants who had earlier promised to liquidate the aforesaid
properties and assets in favor, among others of plaintiff and until the middle of the year 1970 when
the plaintiff formally demanded from the defendants the accounting of real and personal properties of
glory commercial company, defendants refused and stated that they would not give the share of the
plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether Tan Put has right over the liquidated properties of the partnership.

HELD: Tan has a right over the liquidated properties of partnership. The supreme court hold that
there is no alternative but to hold that plaintiff Tan Put’s allegation that she is the widow of Tee Hoon
Lim Po Chuan has not been satisfactorily established and that, on the contrary, the evidence on
record convincingly shows that her relation with said deceased was that of common-law wife.
Moreover, the Supreme Court said that the lower courts committed an error by awarding 1/3 of the
partnership properties to Tan because there has been no liquidation proceedings yet. And if there
has not been any liquidation of the partnership, the only rights plaintiff could have would be to what
might result after much liquidation to belong to the deceased partner (her alleged husband) and
before this is finished, it is impossible to determine, what rights or interest, if any the deceased had.
In other words no specific amounts or properties may be adjudicated to the heir or legal
representative of the deceased partner without the liquidation being first terminated.

Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other
as husband and wife “shall be set forth in an instrument” signed by the parties as well as by their
witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage
must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactory explained. Surely, the
certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such
marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production
is first presented to the court.

In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Philippine
Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no
showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the
signature of said certifies, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being
authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop
did not testify, the same is hearsay. As regards the testimony of the plaintiff herself on the same
point and that of her witness Antonio Nuñez, there can be no question that they are both self-serving
and of very little evidently value, it having been disclosed at the trial that plaintiff has already
assigned all her rights in this case to said Nuñez, thereby making him the real party in interest here
and, therefore, naturally as biased as herself. Besides, in the portion of the testimony of Nuñez
copied in Annex C of petitioner’s memorandum, it appears admitted that he was born only on March
25, 1942, which means that he was less than eight years old at the supposed time of the alleged
marriage. If for this reason alone, it is extremely doubtful if he could have sufficiently aware of such
event as to be competent to testify about it.

 PERIDO VS PERIDO

FACTS: Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His
first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita.
After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had 5 children: Eusebio,
Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Margarita is the only living child of the first marriage. The children and grandchildren of the
first marriage and second marriage filed a case regarding the partition of the properties of
Lucio Perido. Margarita et al asserted that the children and grandchildren of the second
marriage were illegitimate.

ISSUE: W/N the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of Lucio Perido were
legitimate, entitling them for the partition of lands

HELD: Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness
that the marriage did not take place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place
a man and a woman living together as husband and wife are presumed married.

 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND
GUILLERMO RUSTIA VS HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN ET AL.

FACT: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates
may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half-
and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the
alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his
illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside
from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio
Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.

The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place
is disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted.

The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home the
youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by
the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with
Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-
respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.

ISSUE:

1. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?

2.
Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right
of representation?
3.
Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?

HELD:

1. The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado

It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the
children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the
decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.

The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from
each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

 PUGEDA VS TRIAS

FACTS:

On January 5, 1916, plaintiff and the Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of
the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them, that
accordingly to Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses
one of them was Santiago Salazar and another Amadeo Prudente, and after the usual
ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage contract and after
the witness had signed the some, he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and
another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at that time the keeper
of the records of the civil register.  It is also stated that after the marriage, Pugeda and
Ferrer lived together as husband and wife for 18 years.

The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a phtostatic copy of
the marriages in the municipality of Rosario Cavite in the month of January 1916 which
showed that no records of the alleged marriage existed therein but the Justice of the Peace
explained perhaps the person who kept the register forgot to make an entry of the
marriage in the registry.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the marriage between Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer exist. 

HELD:
Yes, the marriage existed, in view of the proofs presented which are the
testimony of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage and the living
together of the parties as husband and wife for 18 years. The failure of the
solemnizing officer to send a copy of the marriage certificate as well when the
person who kept the register forgot to make an entry  are not a fatal defects.

 SY VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling.
Two children were born out of the marriage. Frederick, their son went to his father’s
residence. Filipina filed for legal separation.

The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of
their children to her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked
by him when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was
talking to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal
separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then
filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological
incapacity.

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court,
she assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and

2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said

marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

HELD:

The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by
petitioner and private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the
day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a
formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.

The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after

the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Under Article 80 of the
Civil Code. those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is
clearly applicable in this case.

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no

longer detain the Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was
solemnized.

ARTICLE 26 (LEX LOCI CELEBRACIONES RULE IN MARRIAGE)

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37, and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

 General rule for validity of marriages celebrated

If valid where celebrated, it is also valid here.

 Exceptions

Those prohibited under Arts. 35 (1,4,5, and 6), 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.
Article 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with
the consent of parents or guardians (1)

2) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41

(4)

3) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the

identity of the other; and

4) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53

-A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

-Article 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate

1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood

-Article 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy.
 1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;

2) Between step parents and step-children

3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law

4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child

6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter

7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter

8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that
other person’s spouse, or his or her own spouse

 Rule for void or voidable foreign marriages

Suppose the marriage is VOID in the place of celebration, should it be considered as

void in the Philippines?

ANS. The general rule is YES. If VOID where celebrated, the marriage shall be
considered VOID in the Philippines. Similarly, if voidable where celebrated, the marriage
would also be voidable here in the Philippines, without prejudice of course to the exceptions
under Art. 26.

 Requirements to prove a foreign marriage

1) The existence of the pertinent provision of the foreign marriage law

2) The celebration or performance of the marriage in accordance with said law.

 REPUBLIC VS CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were
blessed with a with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986.
After few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.

Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in
2000 and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit
in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.

HELD:

Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed, she remarried an American citizen while residing in the US. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he
was still barred from remarrying.

 GARCIA-RECIO VS RECIO

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson,

an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992,
respondent became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace
Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on

the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly
dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from
a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken
down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved
on the ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus
there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

HELD:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce
decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to
marry.

 QUITA VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
May 18, 1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner
obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16,
1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan,
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all
surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage
between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the

decedent?

HELD:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner
herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective
hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous
marriage considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her
not a surviving spouse.

The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

 LLORENTE VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente got married
in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.

In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that Paula was already living illicitly with
Ceferino Llorente, a brother of Lorenzo and the two even have a son. 

Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and
Paula agreed in writing that Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if the she will agree to waive all monetary
support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the US.

In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was represented by an American
counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became final.

Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.

In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and their children  and
left nothing for Paula. In 1983, Lorenzo went to the court for the will’s probate and to have Alicia as the
administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later,
Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate.

RTC ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo
Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on
January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void.

The CA affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized in the Philippines.

HELD:

YES. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when he obtained
the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen.

 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides, Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philippine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status are no longer
applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be respected. The rule is: aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the effects of the divorce
as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.

Regarding on the issue of Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be respected because he is an alien and is not
covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts for probate, then the case
was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove the validity of the will.

 VAN DORN VS ROMILLO

FACTS:

Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On
1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried to
Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and
be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the
divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged that they had
no community property. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties

HELD:

As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is

bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over
the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to
private respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

 PILAPIL VS IBAY SOMERA

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent

Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of
Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child named Isabella
Pilapil Geiling.

Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial
disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in
Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been
living apart since April 1982.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in
Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still
married to to Imelda, the latter had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be
dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move
for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the
ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of
divorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this
case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.
Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the
husband of the petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
  BAYOT VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They
had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which resulted
to judgment ordering the dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of conjugal properties

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological
incapacity, seeking for distribution of conjugal properties and support.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision. According to the
CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the
spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an American
citizen when she applied for the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

HELD:

Yes, the divorce is valid.

Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.”

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to
be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of
jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a
holder of American passport. She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as
an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix’s birth certificate, when she secured
divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as
a Filipino citizen by affirmation of the DOJ Secretary does not invalidate the foreign divorce secured
by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured
abroad would come within the jurisdiction of the country’s policy against absolute divorce, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

CHAPTER 2

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE

ARTICLE 27
 In case either both of the contracting parties at the point of death, the marriage may
be solemnized without the necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the
ailing party subsequently survives.

 When new marriage ceremony is needed

A marriage remains valid even without need of a new marriage ceremony if the
ailing party survives.

ARTICLE 28

IF THE Residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation

to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be
solemnized without the necessity of a marriage license.

 Rule if both parties are at the point of death

There can be a valid marriage in articulo mortis even if both parties are at the
point of death provided of course that all the essential requisites are present.

 Signature of dying party

 Danger of death vs point of death

If a soldier is about to go to war, he may be in danger of death, but not at the

point of death; hence, a marriage in articulo mortis would not be applicable to him.

 Marriage in a remote place

There is no prescribed minimum or maximum distance, unlike that in the Civil

Code

ARTICLE 29

IN the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall
state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally
authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the
residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no
means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil
registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship
of the contracting parties and the absence of a legal impediment to the marriage.

 Purpose of the affidavit

As basis for exemption from the marriage license

ARTICLE 30
 THE original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a
legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to
the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of 30
days after the performance of the marriage.

ARTICLE 31

A Marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members my also be

solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the
plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.

ARTICLE 32

A Military commander of a unit who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have

authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of
military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians

ARTICLE 33

Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may
be performed validly without the necessity of a marriage license, provided that they are
solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites, or practices.

ARTICLE 34

NO license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall estate the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediments to the marriage.

 NINAL VS BAYADOG

FACTS: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was
shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause
of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of
marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least
five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal
is already dead

HELD:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should
be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before the day the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—
that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

 MANZANO VS SANCHEZ

FACTS:

Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel
Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage.
On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated
the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife
for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would
have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged with
bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for
being designed merely to harass him.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty

of gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid?

HELD:

No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for the

marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. Respondent
Judge cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just
like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for
a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each
other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the
impediment of a prior existing marriage.

 DE CASTRO VS ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO

FACT:

Annabelle and Reinel applied for a marriage license. However, when they went back to the Office of
the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to get married as soon
as possible, they executed an Affidavit dated 13 March 1995 to show that they had been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years, hence, exempt from the
marriage license requirement. They got married on the same date before a judge. After the
ceremony, however, they did not live together as husband and wife.

In November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia. 

In 1998, Annabelle filed a petition for support against Reinel, claiming that he had not given support
to her and their child. 

In his answer, Reinel denied that he is married to Annabelle, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit. He alleged that they never cohabited with
each other five years before their marriage, hence they were not exempted from the requirement of
a marriage license. He also denied being the father of Tricia.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Annabelle and Reinel is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared Reinel as the natural father of the
Tricia, and thus obliged to give her support. Reinel appealed.

The CA ruled that since the case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare
the marriage of Annabelle and Reinel as null and void in the very same case. There was no
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no
collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. It also ruled that Tricia, having born during the subsistence of a marriage, is the legitimate
child of Reinel.

ISSUE:

1. Has the trial court jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between Reinel and
Annabelle even though the case before it is for support? In other words, may the marriage be
attacked collaterally?

2. Is the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle valid?

3. Is Reinna Tricia a legitimate child of Reinel?

HELD:

1.) Yes. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. In Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

2.) No. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites

of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for
a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They
were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. 

3.)  Reianna Tricia is an illegitimate daughter of Reinel, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.

The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in
an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of
the child. (De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro,  G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008)

 REPUBLIC VS DAYOT

FACTS:

On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of
maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on
August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.  Then
on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between
the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for
the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.  Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the
proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of the New
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that the
man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

HELD:

Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of valid
marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper
because they started living together five months before the celebration of their marriage.
That according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 “No
license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediments
to marry each other… “ it means that a five years period computed back from the date
of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties. 

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot
and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.