FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 66541. November 20, 1990.]

GUARDEX ENTERPRISES and/or MARCELINA A. ESCANDOR ,

petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
JUMBEE ORBETA , respondents.

Rogelio B. De Guzman for petitioners.

Vicente R. Guzman for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; PROBABLE CAUSE;

DEFINITION AND REQUISITES THEREOF. — The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is guaranteed under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
of the Philippines. Under this provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only
upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No.
64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800). In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine the . . witnesses personally; 2) the
examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the
form of searching questions and answers (Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SCRA 403, Ponsica v.
Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647). These requirements are provided
under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDING OR OPINION THEREOF BY THE EXAMINING JUDGE, MUST
BE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD; NOT OBSERVED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — It has been
ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-27511, Nov. 29,
1968), however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree, be
substantiated or supported by the record. In this case, We find that the requirement
mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuing the
warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any
searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by
the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes.
The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had
personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the
possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be
issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 687,
citing the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where
the applicant himself was not subjected to an interrogation but was questioned only "to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit) and only because the
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 application was not yet subscribed and sworn to," We held that: "It is axiomatic that the
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the
claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLES SOUGHT TO BE SEIZED, MUST BE DESCRIBED WITH
PARTICULARITY. — Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law
requires that the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The
items listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive
assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories" are so
general that the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading,
the premises searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioner's petition before respondent
Court of Appeals and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the business
of buying and selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories and empty
bottles. Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under
the list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged that
the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense; b) stolen or embezzled
property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended to be used as
a means of committing an offense.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING ARTICLES, CANNOT VALIDATE AN INVALID
WARRANT. — No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be,
their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R.
No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388: ". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of the
search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what
has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera: 'It has been said that of all
the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and
happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private
affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to
search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government." "Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly
comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal
construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment
upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it."

DECISION

NARVASA , J : p

A claim for alleged unpaid commissions of an agent is what is basically involved in the
action at bar. Somehow, it twice escaped outright rejection for lack of jurisdiction in the
Department of Labor where the case was resolved at the first instance and on appeal. Both
the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission appeared unaware of the
utter lack of labor-related issues in the parties' conflicting contentions as to the existence
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 of agency relations between them, and proceeded to decide the case. Neither of them of
course had competence to do so. Be that as it may, the instant petition for certiorari will be
decided on its merits to the end that the controversy may now be laid to rest without
further proceedings. cdrep

The protagonists in this case are:

1) Marcelina A. Escandor — engaged, under the name and style of Guardex Enterprises,
in (a) the manufacture and sale of fire-fighting equipment such as fire extinguishers, fire
hose cabinets and related products, and (b) occasionally, the building or fabrication of fire
trucks; and
2) Jumbee Orbeta — a "freelance" salesman. 1
It appears that Orbeta somehow learned that Escandor had offered to fabricate a fire
truck for Rubberworld (Phil.) Inc. He wrote to Escandor inquiring about the amount of
commission for the sale of a fire truck. Escandor wrote back on the same day to advise
that it was P15,000.00 per unit. Four days later, Orbeta offered to look after (follow-up)
Escandor's pending proposal to sell a fire truck to Rubberworld, and asked for P250.00 as
representation expenses. Escandor agreed and gave him the money.
When no word was received by Escandor from Orbeta after three days, she herself inquired
in writing from Rubberworld about her offer of sale of a fire truck. Having apparently
received an encouraging response, Escandor sent Rubberworld a revised price quotation
some ten days later.
In the meantime, Orbeta sold to other individuals some of Escandor's fire extinguishers,
receiving traveling expenses in connection therewith as well as the corresponding
commissions. He then dropped out of sight.
About seven months afterwards, Escandor herself finally concluded a contract with
Rubberworld for the latter's purchase of a fire truck. The transaction was consummated
with the delivery of the truck and full payment thereof by Rubberworld.
At this point, Orbeta suddenly reappeared and asked for his commission for the sale of the
fire truck to Rubberworld. Escandor refused, saying that he had had nothing to do with the
offer, negotiation and consummation of the sale.
Insisting that he was entitled to the commission, Orbeta filed a complaint against
Escandor with the Ministry of Labor. The Labor Arbiter agreed with him and rendered
judgment in his favor, on August 26, 1982. That judgment was affirmed by the National
Labor Relations Commission on December 29, 1983, on appeal taken by Escandor. 2
Hence, this petition for certiorari, to annul those judgments as having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion if not indeed without or in excess of jurisdiction.
It is claimed that an implied agency had been created between Escandor and Orbeta on
the basis of the following circumstances: Cdpr

1) the alleged verbal authority given to him to offer a fire truck to

Rubberworld;
2) the alleged written authority to sell the truck contained in a letter of
Escandor's dated August 14, 1978;
3) Escandor's having given Orbeta P250.00 as representation expenses;
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 and
4) Orbeta's submission of a price quotation to Rubberworld and his
having arranged a meeting between Escandor and Rubberworld's
Purchasing Manager.
The circumstances have not been correctly read by Orbeta and his co-respondents.
Escandor denies that she had ever given Orbeta any such verbal authority. Indeed, months
prior to Orbeta's approaching Escandor, the latter had already made a written offer of a
fire truck to Rubberworld. All that she consented to was for Orbeta to "follow up" that
pending offer. In truth, it does not even appear that on the strength of this "arrangement" —
vague as it was — Orbeta undertook the promised follow-up at all. He reported nothing of
his efforts or their fruits to Escandor. It was Escandor who, in the months that followed her
initial meeting with Orbeta, determinedly pushed the Rubberworld deal. Orbeta was simply
nowhere to be found. Furthermore, it seems fairly evident that the "representation
allowance" of P250 was meant to cover the expenses for the "follow-up" offered by Orbeta
— an ambiguous fact which does not of itself suggest the creation of an agency and is not
at all inconsistent with the theory of its absence in this case.

Even a finding that under these circumstances, an agency had indeed been constituted will
not save the day for Orbeta, because nothing in the record tends to prove that he
succeeded in carrying out its terms or even as much as attempted to do so. The evidence
in fact clearly indicates otherwise. The terms of Escandor's letter of August 14, 1978 —
assuming that it was indeed an "authority to sell," as Orbeta insists — are to the effect that
entitlement to the P15,000 commission is contingent on the purchase by a customer of a
fire truck, the implicit condition being that the agent would earn the commission if he was
instrumental in bringing the sale about. Orbeta certainly had nothing to do with the sale of
the fire truck, and is not therefore entitled to any commission at all.
Furthermore, even if Orbeta is considered to have been Escandor's agent for the time he
was supposed to "follow up" the offer to sell, such agency would have been deemed
revoked upon the resumption of direct negotiations between Escandor and Rubberworld,
Orbeta having in the meantime abandoned all efforts (if indeed any were exerted) to secure
the deal in Escandor's behalf. LLpr

It has of course already been stated at the outset that, given the sole issue raised by the
parties concededly from the case's inception (i.e., whether or not Orbeta is Escandor's
agent as regards the sale of a fire truck to Rubberworld), the competence to resolve the
controversy did not pertain to either the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. The jurisdiction vested
in them by the Labor Code extends, generally speaking, only to cases arising from
employer-employee relationships. 3 What has all along been at issue here, as advanced by
the parties themselves and as is evident from the facts, is the existence of a contract of
agency 4 — not employment or lease of services. It is indeed a puzzle how the fundamental
differences between the two 5 altogether escaped not only the parties' counsel in this case
but also the tribunals before which it had been brought. Nevertheless, since no one has
thought to question their authority even up to this late stage, as in fact all the parties
appear to have completely accepted the validity of their exercise of jurisdiction over the
case, the Court has opted, as already stated, to render judgment on its merits and end the
controversy once and for all. 6

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 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the judgment of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated December 29, 1983, and that of the Labor Arbiter
dated August 26, 1982, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered
dismissing respondent Jumbee Orbeta's claim for unpaid commissions. Cdpr

SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, p. 14.
2. Id., pp. 52-53.
3. which arise from "contracts of labor" treated of in Chapter 3, Title VIII Book IV of the Civil
Code. As provided by Art. 1700 thereof, an employment contract or lease of service (as it
is referred to in Arts. 1642 and 1644 of the Civil Code) is "subject to the special laws on
labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects" — which in this jurisdiction is the Labor
Code and other labor laws. SEE Art. 217 of the Labor Code for the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

4. Treated of in Title X, Book IV, Civil Code (Arts. 1868, et seq.).

5. Both involve the rendition of services by one party to the other, but the similarity ends
there. The basis of agency is representation, the agent being the representative of his
principal, while the basis of lease of service is employment. (Nielson & Company, Inc. vs.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining, 26 SCRA 540). Agency is merely a preparatory contract
which empowers the agent to execute juridical acts to bring about contractual relations
between his principal and third persons (Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, [1987 ed.], Vol. VI.,
pp. 248-249, citing Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining, supra, and
Philippine Free Press vs. P. Floro & Sons, Inc., 21 SCRA CAR [2s] 601, 606.

6. SEE Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29.

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