JOSEPH E.

ESTRADA, petitioner, 
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS
AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC.,
LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO,
JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 146710-15
March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, 
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
G.R. No. 146738
March 2, 2001

FACTS:

On October 4, 2000, then President Joseph Estrada was embroiled in a corruption scandal after a
close friend, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson, revealed that Estrada and his family allegedly
received money from Jueteng lords.

The revelation prompted Senator Teofisto Guingona to deliver a privilege speech, detailing the
anomalies done by President Estrada. The public now calls for Estrada’s resignation. Eventually, he had
to face an impeachment trial in the Senate by December 7.

On January 16, 2001, in a vote of 11-10, the Senator-Judges ruled against opening the second
envelope which allegedly contains evidence wherein Estrada held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name “Jose Velarde.”

At this point, everyone snapped. The prosecutors tendered their resignation – prompting the
Senate to postpone the impeachment proceedings indefinitely. People started marching towards EDSA to
call for Estrada’s resignation. On January 19, both the AFP and PNP declared that they are withdrawing
their support of the Estrada administration.

On January 20, (12 noon), Chief Justice Davide administered Vice President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo’s oath as the new President of the Republic of the Philippines. At around 2:30 PM, Estrada and
his family hurriedly left Malacanang. Estrada then issued the following statement:

“At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity
and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the
Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national

spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
 MABUHAY! (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter (sent to
House Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel):

“Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. (Sgd.)
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

On January 22, now President Arroyo started discharging her functions as President. She
appointed new cabinet members, ambassadors and special envoys. Foreign state leaders also expressed
their recognition to Arroyo’s administration (including then President George Bush from the White
House). Congress issued House Resolution 175 to express support to the new admin. The court also
issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:

“A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her
Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice — Acting
on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of
the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the
Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court
Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then
present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by
a proper party.”

The Senate then passed Resolution No. 83 which officially moved to terminate the impeachment
proceeding. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated “for the record” that she voted against the closure
of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case
and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another
elective post.

Estrada on the other hand is now facing charges of plunder, graft, and corruption under the office
of the Ombudsman. He then filed a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Ombudsman from
“conducting any further proceedings in or any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office,
until after the term of petitioner as President is over.

Thru another counsel, Estrada filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment to confirm him as
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent (Arroyo) to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question
2. Whether or not Estrada resigned as President
3. Whether or not Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President
4. Whether or not Estrada enjoys immunity from suit
5. Whether or not the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
HELD:

1. YES.

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.  It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency.
The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct
demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old
government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected.
In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly
resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not
political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.  It is important to follow the succession of
events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements
extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the
sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test:
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.

2. YES.

Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.  The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking
of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined
from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

3. NO.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
 premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioner's claim of inability.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v.
Cuenco, we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the
government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr, there is a "textually demonstrable or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court
cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.

4. NO.

The Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court
added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public
office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive
immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President.  From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit
is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds
office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right,
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

5. NO.

The Court held that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs
to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show more
weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a
bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary
investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No
allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this
special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity
against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot
second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.

The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias.
To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman “has been influenced by the
barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by
the mobs.” News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has
already prejudged the cases of the petitioner and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating
the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the
news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the
presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is
entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings
and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they
can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating
prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent
Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the
findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it
before the proper court.