Jurisdiction over the Person

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte providing the information “RESIDENCE IN THE
CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.” Private respondent Montejo filed a
Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC on the grounds that she did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency as evidence by her voter’s registration
record and certificate of candidacy.  Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" but was informed by the
Provincial Election Supervisor that they cannot receive or accept the aforementioned
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time. Consequently, petitioner filed
the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995

Her Answer to private respondent's petition stated that the seven in her original
Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" which she sought to
rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

On April 24, 1995, COMELEC came up with a resolution finding the Petition for
Disqualification meritorious, striking of petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of
Candidacy, canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. Records showed that prior to her
registration in Tolosa, she was in fact a registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. The
accuracy of the 7 months residency can be taken from the 3 documents she filed, voter’s
registration in Tolosa, letter of request for cancellation of registration from San Juan, Metro
Manila so that it can be transferred to Tolosa and Certificate of Candidacy, show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte from Metro Manila that will only sum up to 7 months.
The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. On May 11,
1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
The petitioner was the winner of the elections based on the canvass. On account of the
Resolutions disqualifying petitioner and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner files for relief to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven
(7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as
she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since
childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte.
The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Issue: 

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held: Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte. Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency
or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin
by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to
proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORPORATION v. CA, GR No. 103493, 1997-06-19

Facts:
On January 15, 1983, private respondent Ventura O. Ducat obtained separate loans from
petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (hereafter called AYALA)[1] and Philsec Investment
Corporation (hereafter called PHILSEC) in the sum of US$2,500,000.00,... secured by shares of stock
owned by Ducat with a market value of P14,088,995.00. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans,
private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Drago Daic, assumed Ducat's
obligation under an Agreement, dated January 27,... 1983, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty
Deed with Vendor's Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (hereafter called ATHONA)
a parcel of land in Harris County, Texas, U.S.A., for US$2,807,209.02, while PHILSEC and AYALA
extended a loan to ATHONA in the... amount of US$2,500,000.00 as initial payment of the purchase
price. The balance of US$307,209.02 was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by
ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the US$2,500,000.00 from 1488,
Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA... released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the
shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.

On April 10, 1987, while Civil Case No. H-86-440 was pending in the United States, petitioners
filed a complaint "For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment" against private
respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 16563.

The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in Civil
Action No. H-86-440 of the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents
committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent... more than its true value of
US$800,000.00.

Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 16563 on the grounds of (1) litis
pendentia, vis-a-vis Civil Action No. H-86-440 filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic in the U.S., (2) forum non
conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of... action.

On the other hand, private respondents 1488, Inc. and its president Daic filed a joint "Special
Appearance and Qualified Motion to Dismiss," contending that the action being in personam,
extraterritorial service of summons by publication was ineffectual and did not... vest the court with
jurisdiction over 1488, Inc., which is a non-resident foreign corporation, and Daic, who is a non-resident
alien.

Issues: Whether Civil Case No. 16536 is barred by the judgment of the U.S. court.
Ruling:

Private respondents contend that for a foreign judgment to be pleaded as res judicata, a judgment
admitting the foreign decision is not necessary. On the other hand, petitioners argue that the foreign
judgment cannot be given the effect of res judicata without giving them an... opportunity to impeach it on
grounds stated in Rule 39, §50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."

Petitioners' contention is meritorious. While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to
foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under... the law.[8] It is not necessary for this
purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is
essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to
properly... determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam,
as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the... contrary.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of
private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the... trial court nor the
appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence
presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the
U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this... case such that the judgment that might be rendered
would constitute res judicata.

Nor is the trial court's refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non
conveniens. First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, §1, which does not
include forum non conveniens.[16] The... propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.

In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the pleadings filed by
private respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of the
plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the... defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino,
and that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt which was the object of the transaction under
litigation. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the
U.S. case.

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc. - 465 U.S. 770, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984)

RULE:The victim of a libel, like the victim of any other tort, may choose to bring suit in any forum with
which the defendant has certain minimum contacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a libel action against respondent magazine publisher, an Ohio corporation, in the Federal
District Court in New Hampshire, alleging jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship. Petitioner's
only connection with New Hampshire is the circulation there of a magazine that she assists in
producing. The District Court dismissed the suit while the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding  that
petitioner's lack of contact with New Hampshire rendered that State's interest in redressing the tort of
libel to petitioner too attenuated for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over respondent. The Supreme
Court reversed judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

ISSUE: Did petitioner have sufficient contact in New Hampshire to establish jurisdiction?

ANSWER: Yes. Respondent's regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is sufficient to
support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. New
Hampshire has clearly expressed its interest in protecting such persons from libel, as well as in
safeguarding its populace from falsehoods. Its criminal defamation statute bears no restriction to libels
of which residents are the victim.

Brief Fact Summary.

Plaintiff sued Defendant for libel in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
under its diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiff appealed.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Personal jurisdiction is proper over a nonresident magazine in any state where that corporation has sold
and distributed a substantial number of copies.

Facts:

Kathy Keeton (Plaintiff), a resident of New York, sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) and others
(Defendants) for libel in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire under its
diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff claims that Defendants committed libel against her in five issues of its
magazine published between 1975 and 1976. Plaintiff has no contacts with the state of New Hampshire
other than through a magazine she helps produce. Hustler is a corporation organized under the laws of
Ohio, and its principal place of business is in California. Hustler sells between 10,000 and 15,000 copies
of its magazine in New Hampshire per month. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that Plaintiff lacked sufficient contacts
with New Hampshire to justify the state’s personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Further, the court of
appeals placed significant weight on the fact that New Hampshire’s six-year statute of limitations for libel
made it the only state in which Plaintiff’s suit could still be brought and that the “single publication rule”
meant that, if successful, Plaintiff would be able to recover for damages suffered in all fifty states. For
these reasons, the court of appeals considered personal jurisdiction over Defendants unfair. Plaintiff
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted.

Issue:

Whether personal jurisdiction is proper in a libel action against a magazine in a state where its only
contacts are magazine sales.

Held:

Yes. The court of appeals’ ruling is reversed and the case is remanded.

Concurrence

Brennan, J. : The contacts between the Defendants and the forum State are sufficiently important and
sufficiently related to the underlying cause of action to foreclose any concern that the constitutional
limits of the Due Process Clause are being violated. These interests of the State should be relevant only
to the extent that they bear upon the liberty interests of Defendants that are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. "The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-292 (1980) must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.

Discussion.

Due process forbids the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation unless the
corporation has sufficient minimum contacts with the state. Hustler’s “regular circulation” of its
magazines within the state of New Hampshire constitutes sufficient contacts to justify the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over it for a libel claim related to statements made in the magazine. Defendants
purposefully sought to do business in the state of New Hampshire and regularly sells thousands of
magazines per month there. Further, New Hampshire has an interest in adjudicating harm that occurs
inside its borders. This includes a case involving libel committed in the state, even if committed against
a nonresident. The court of appeals’ concern with New Hampshire’s unusually long statute of limitations
and the possibility of an unfair damage award was misplaced. Choice of law matters have no bearing on
a forum’s right to assert personal jurisdiction over a party. In addition, a plaintiff’s contacts with a forum
state have no relevance to whether personal jurisdiction exists over the defendant. It is Defendants’
contacts that are at issue, and while they might not be sufficient to justify general personal jurisdiction
over unrelated claims, Defendants’ continued business justifies specific personal jurisdiction over claims
related to that business. Moreover, the fact that a plaintiff resides outside the state will not destroy
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Even though Plaintiff’s damages would likely be greater in her
home state, there is no prohibition on bringing libel actions elsewhere. Defendants purposefully availed
themselves of the privileges of doing business in New Hampshire, and should reasonably anticipated
being haled into court for claims related to the magazine it sells there. National publications may
properly be sued for their content anywhere “a substantial number of copies are regularly sold and
distributed.”

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson - 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980)

RULE:

The foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find
its way into the forum state. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum
state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there.

FACTS:

New York residents purchased a car from a retailer in New York, which was struck in the rear by
another vehicle in Oklahoma. The purchasers brought a products-liability action in Oklahoma against
the car retailer. The car retailer claimed a violation of its due process and questioned the Oklahoma
court’s jurisdiction over them considering they were incorporated in New York and had no minimal
contacts with the state of Oklahoma. The trial court rejected this claim, so the car retailer filed a writ of
prohibition with the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma denied the writ,
holding that personal jurisdiction was authorized under state law. The case was elevated on certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States.

ISSUE:

Can a state acquire personal jurisdiction over a subject that has no contact with the state?

ANSWER: No. The Court held that the car retailer had no contacts, ties, or relations with the
State of Oklahoma. A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant only so long as there exist minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum
state. The Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations.

Rush V Sauchuk

Citation. 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 100 S. Ct. 580, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980).
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs purchased a car in New York and were subsequently involved in a car
accident in Oklahoma. Plaintiffs sued the distributor and retailer of the car (Defendants) in Oklahoma
state court for injuries suffered in the car accident. Defendants moved to dismiss arguing Oklahoma did
not have personal jurisdiction.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A non-resident defendant must purposely avail himself of the forum state’s
privileges and protections for that state to have personal jurisdiction over him unless the case pertains
to a product connected with defendant’s business that was brought into the forum state by the plaintiff.
Foreseeability that the product might eventually enter the state is irrelevant if there is no purposeful
availment of that state’s privileges and protections.

Facts:  The Robinsons, Plaintiffs, bought a car in New York from Seaway, Defendant. Plaintiffs drove
the car to Oklahoma where they were in a car accident and injured. Plaintiffs sued Seaway, Audi (the
manufacturer), Volkswagen of America (the importer) and World-Wide Volkswagen (Worldwide; the
regional distributor) as Defendants in a strict liability action in Oklahoma state court claiming the gas
tank and fuel system were defective. There was no evidence that the retailers and distributors had ever
made any transactions in Oklahoma. The trial court held that it had jurisdiction over Defendants in
Oklahoma and denied World-Wide’s motion for reconsideration. World-Wide sought a writ of prohibition
from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. The writ was denied on the grounds that jurisdiction was
authorized by the Oklahoma long arm statute. World-Wide appealed.

Issue:  Can a state exercise in personam jurisdiction on the distributor and retailer of a product when
the distributor and retailer do not utilize the privileges of conducting activities within that state, and do
not distribute their product with the expectation that it will be purchased by consumers within the state?

Held:  No. Reversed.

The two goals of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945),
are to avoid unfair inconveniences for the defendant and to maintain the system of co-equal sovereignty
among the states.

Although the rule in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223
(1957), demonstrates that contact with the forum for an out-of-state defendant is not always
inconvenient, jurisdictional boundaries are still relevant. Contacts with the forum state are still required.
The defendant must purposely avail himself of the laws of the forum state in order for to satisfy the
minimum contacts test.

The foreseeability inquiry asks not whether the manufacturer or distributor can foresee his product
ending up in a particular state, but whether he can foresee being hailed into court there.

This case is distinguishable from Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Co., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961). In Gray, the company delivered its product to another state with the expectation
that consumers in that forum state would purchase it. This case involved a unilateral activity completely
out of the control of Defendants.

Dissent.  Justice Brennan: The analysis should be focused on fairness and reasonableness. The
constitutional consideration is not what the best forum is but whether the defendant is linked to that
forum and the burden is not unreasonable. The focus is on the relation among the parties, the
transaction, and the forum state.

Discussion. The majority opinion shows that a state does not necessarily have personal jurisdiction
over a corporate defendant simply because its product was brought into the forum state. There
defendant must still have voluntarily connected himself or herself with the forum state via the notion that
it purposely availed itself of the forum state’s laws.