IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

STATE ELECTION BOARD,

Petitioner,

v. Civil Action No. 2023CV382520

TRUE THE VOTE, INC.,

Respondent.

STATE ELECTION BOARD’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO

MOTION TO DISMISS
The State Election Board, the Petitioner in this action, served a

Subpoena Duces Tecum upon True the Vote, Inc. (hereafter “Respondent” or

“True the Vote”) on April 21, 2022, regarding a pending case and investigation

(SEB Case No. 2022-003) set in motion by the True the Vote’s multiple

complaints to the Georgia Secretary of State on November 30, 2021, regarding

alleged violations of the Election Code.

On April 21, 2022, Brock C. Akers, legal counsel for True the Vote,

consented to accept service of the Subpoena. See Ex. 3 to Petition. The

subpoena required that the production of documents occur no later than April

28, 2022. Ex. 1 to Petition. That date came and went with no production of

documents or objection of any kind being made by True the Vote. After many

good faith attempts to procure compliance with the subpoena, the State

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Election Board was forced to file a Petition for an Order to Compel Response

to State Election Board Subpoena with the Fulton County Superior Court as

directed by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-33.

True the Vote filed their Motion to Dismiss the above-styled case

arguing, inter alia, that the State Election Board did not domesticate the

original subpoena in Texas; there exists no underlying cause of action; the

Superior Court of Georgia has no general or specific personal jurisdiction over

True the Vote regarding the Petition to compel compliance with the subpoena;

and even if jurisdiction did exist, the subpoena is over broad and unduly

burdensome. The State Election Board responds to these allegations as follows:

I. The State Election Board was not required to domesticate the

subpoena in Texas to properly serve upon True the Vote.
True the Vote’s contention that it was an “out-of-state” party or “non-

resident” at the time of service of the original subpoena is erroneous. At the

time of service of the subpoena and at the time that compliance was required,

and a cause of action accrued, True the Vote was actively registered in Georgia

doing business as a foreign non-profit corporation with a registered agent

located in Fulton County, Georgia. The initial date of True the Vote’s

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registration was July 23, 20211. The Georgia Supreme Court has held that a

foreign corporation is considered a resident and may sue or be sued to the same

extent as a domestic corporation when it is validly registered in

Georgia. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 262 Ga. 599, 601 (1992); see also Cooper Tire

& Rubber Co. v. McCall, 312 Ga. 422, 437, cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2689 (2023).

Furthermore, the long arm statute “applies solely to persons who were

nonresidents of Georgia at the time the act or omission complained of

occurred.” Klein, 262 Ga. at 600 (citing Stewman v. Magley, 138 Ga. App. 545,

548 (1976)).

Brock C. Akers, counsel of record for True the Vote with authority to

receive service of process, accepted service of the subpoena in April 2022. Ex.

3 to Petition. At the time the subpoena was served and the subpoena response

was due, True the Vote was subject to the same liabilities and responsibilities

as any Georgia corporation, including the valid service and acceptance of a

State Election Board administrative subpoena. True the Vote existed on the

same legal footing as a domestic corporation, and there was no requirement for

the State Election Board to seek further domestication of the subpoena in a

Texas court to effectuate proper service. Therefore, service of the subpoena was

1 A subsequent revocation by the Secretary of State of the True the Vote’s

Certificate of Authority occurred on October 28, 2022. True the Vote’s assertion
in their Motion that their corporate registration “expired” is incorrect. (Motion
to Dismiss, p. 8.)
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valid, and True the Vote’s argument regarding the need for domestication in

this specific matter fails.

II. The State Election Board has an underlying cause of action

against True the Vote for its failure to comply with the
subpoena.
True the Vote contends that the State Election Board lacks “any extant

underlying ‘cause of action,’ which bars the exercise of both general and specific

personal jurisdiction” in this matter. (Motion to Dismiss, p. 9.) However, “[a]

cause of action may be said to consist of the right belonging to the plaintiff and

some wrongful act or omission done by the defendant by which that right has

been violated.” Rowland Co. v. H.V. Kell Co., 27 Ga. App. 107, 107 (1921)

(quoting 1 Words and Phrases (1st Ed.) vol. 2, p. 1015). “In other words, the

cause of action consists of two elements: The right of the plaintiff, and the

wrongful act of commission or omission by the defendant.” Rowland Co., 27 Ga.

App. at 107. Black’s Law Dictionary further defines it as “the fact or facts which

give a person a right to judicial redress or relief against another.”

The State Election Board has “full power to subpoena persons and papers

and to compel witnesses to answer under oath touching any questions which

may properly come before the board.” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-33. True the Vote filed a

complaint that is being investigated for the State Election Board, and True the

Vote remains a material party to this open and ongoing administrative

investigation. A valid subpoena to such an entity, in and of itself, is implicit

4
evidence of an extant “cause of action.” See, e.g., Ga. Gov’t Transparency &

Campaign Fin. Comm’n v. New Ga. Project Action Fund, 359 Ga. App. 32, 32-

33 (2021) (administrative subpoenas issued by a state regulatory agency as

part of a preliminary investigation into matters within its purview can be

judicially enforcement in the superior court pursuant to an enforcement action

following noncompliance). For the Court to determine that no cause of action

exists here would unnecessarily chill the ability of the State Election Board to

execute one of its primary duties under law: to thoroughly “investigate . . . the

administration of primary and election laws and frauds and irregularities in

primaries and elections.” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(5).

Clearly, the State Election Board, after opening a case file and beginning

to investigate a matter properly before them, had a statutory “right” to, both,

subpoena relevant documents from True the Vote, who submitted sweeping

allegations of misconduct in the 2020 Georgia Election to the Secretary of

State, and seek to enforce that subpoena when True the Vote wrongfully failed

to timely object or comply.

III. This Court has general and specific personal jurisdiction over
True the Vote to compel the production of documents in
response to the subpoena.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has “recognized two emergent subsets of

jurisdictional authority – general personal jurisdiction and specific personal

jurisdiction.” McCall, 312 Ga. at 427 (emphasis in original). Whereas specific

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personal jurisdiction covers “defendants less intimately connected with a State

… to a narrower class of claims”, id. at 428 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.

Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021)), general personal

jurisdiction “extends to any and all claims brought against a defendant.” Id. at

427 (citing Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024). However, only individuals with “a select

set of affiliations with a forum” are subject to such “sweeping jurisdiction.” Id.

A. General Jurisdiction

“Georgia courts may exercise general personal jurisdiction over any out-

of-state corporation that is “authorized to do or transact business in this state

at the time a claim or cause of action arises.” McCall, 312 Ga. at 430 (quoting

Klein, 262 Ga. at 601). The Georgia Supreme Court upheld this “consent by

registration” concept and held that this “consent” to general personal

jurisdiction of Georgia courts by virtue of its registration and authority to do

business in Georgia did not violate federal due process. Id. at 434. True the

Vote was authorized to do business in Georgia at the time this cause of action

accrued, as discussed supra. Generally, the determination of when a cause of

action accrued is “the time when the plaintiff could first have maintained his

action to a successful result.” Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804,

806 (1980) (internal quotations omitted). After April 28, 2022, True the Vote’s

noncompliance would have been actionable by the Petitioner.

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 McCall and Klein, when read in concert with the Georgia Business Code

provisions regarding the procedure and effect of the revocation of a foreign

corporation’s certificate of authority, support the continued jurisdiction over

this case. Specifically, O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1531 governs the revocation of the

certificate of authority for a foreign non-profit corporation, such as True the

Vote. O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1531(e) provides that the “[r]evocation of a foreign

corporation's certificate of authority does not terminate the authority of the

registered agent of the corporation.”2 Similarly, O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1531(d)

provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he Secretary of State's revocation of a

foreign corporation's certificate of authority appoints the Secretary of State as

the foreign corporation's agent for service of process in any proceeding based

on a cause of action which arose during the time the foreign corporation was

authorized to transact business in this state.” As such, service of process on the

Secretary under this subsection is service on the foreign corporation. Id.3 For

2 The State Election Board has served the registered agent listed on True the
Vote’s most recent filing with the Georgia Secretary of State’s office.
https://ecorp.sos.ga.gov/BusinessSearch/BusinessInformation?businessId=339
4898&businessType=Foreign%20Nonprofit%20Corporation&fromSearch=Tru
e (last visited Sept. 8, 2023); Affidavit of Service, filed July 24, 2023.
3 Counsel for the State Election Board submitted to the Secretary of State’s

office service of process for True the Vote pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1531(d),
which was perfected on September 15, 2023. Notice of Service, filed Sept. 18,
2023.
7
the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that True the Vote is subject to

general jurisdiction in Georgia.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

Even were this Court to find a lack of “general personal jurisdiction” as

to True the Vote, specific personal jurisdiction is available under the Georgia

“Long Arm Statute”, O.C.G.A. §9-10-91. The Georgia Long-Arm Statute states

that “[a] court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any

nonresident … if in person or through an agent, he or she … [t]ransacts any

business within this state[.]” O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1). The Supreme Court of

Georgia has interpreted this provision broadly. See, e.g., Innovative Clinical &

Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat’l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 675 (2005) (“[U]nder

that literal construction, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) grants Georgia courts the

unlimited authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident who

transacts any business in this State.”). However, this broad grant of

jurisdiction over nonresidents is limited by procedural due process. Id.

In determining the limits of procedural due process, Georgia courts apply

the following three-part test to determine if jurisdiction exists on the basis of

transacting business in Georgia: “(1) the nonresident defendant has

purposefully done some act or consummated some transaction in this State, (2)

if the cause of action arises from or is connected with such act or transaction,

8
and (3) if the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this State does not offend

traditional notions of fairness and substantial justice.” Sullivan v. Bunnell, 340

Ga. App. 283, 286 (2017); accord Pascarelli v. Koehler, 346 Ga. App. 591, 593

(2018); Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Ga. v. Pendergrass, 344 Ga. App. 888, 889-90

(2018). The first two factors “determine whether a defendant has established

the minimum contacts with the forum state necessary for the exercise of

jurisdiction.” Pascarelli, 346 Ga. App. at 593 (citation omitted). If the court is

satisfied the defendant has established such minimum contacts, then it

evaluates the third prong to “consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction is

reasonable – that is, to ensure that it does not result solely from random,

fortuitous or attenuated contacts.” Id.

For the reasons set forth below, True the Vote has met all three prongs

to warrant the determination that jurisdiction exists based on transacting

business in Georgia.

(1) True the Vote has purposefully committed some act in Georgia by
submitting complaints regarding alleged election misconduct in Georgia
to the Georgia Secretary of State’s office.

“Although the application of the minimum contacts rule will vary with

the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, … it is essential in each case

that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the

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benefits and protections of its laws.” Pascarelli, 346 Ga. App. at 594. “[I]t is

necessary that purposeful acts must have been performed by the defendant to

tie it to the State.” Home Depot Supply v. Hunter Management, LLC, 289 Ga.

App. 286, 289 (2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Winn

v. Vitesco Techs. GmbH, 365 Ga. App. 442, 444 (2022) (“Purposeful availment

exists in the circumstance where a nonresident purposefully directs its

activities toward forum residents.”).

Here, True the Vote purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting

activities in Georgia by submitting several complaints to the Georgia Secretary

of State regarding alleged ballot trafficking and other allegations during the

2020 election in Georgia, thereby directing its activity toward forum residents.4

See Sullivan, 340 Ga. App. at 286-89 (court had personal jurisdiction over

nonresident daughter in divorce contempt action where daughter

communicated with her father’s ex-wife regarding her father’s noncompliance

with certain terms in Georgia divorce decree and hired Georgia counsel to draft

and send correspondence to that effect).

Because of True the Vote’s complaint, the State Election Board and the

Secretary of State’s Investigation Division thereafter opened an investigation

4 Per True the Vote’s November 30, 2021, Complaint to the Georgia Secretary
of State, True the Vote also contracted private teams of individuals to conduct
its own investigation into the 2020 elections in Georgia. See Ex. 1 to Petition.
10
into the allegations of the complaint. In terms of additional acts within

Georgia, True the Vote presented its data and findings to representatives of

the Governor and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”). See Ex. 9 to

Petition; Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. Additionally, the letter correspondence

between counsel for True the Vote and counsel for the State Election Board

regarding the subpoena included a partial response to the subpoena and

statements indicating that True the Vote would be willing to produce the

materials requested in the subpoena, thus suggesting cooperation and

compliance. Ex. 9 to Petition.

Further, contrary to True the Vote’s argument that it merely exchanged

email and letter correspondence regarding the complaint and thus did not have

sufficient contact with Georgia as the forum state,

nothing in subsection (1) of [the Long-Arm Statute] requires the

physical presence of the nonresident in Georgia or minimizes the
import of a nonresident’s intangible contacts with the State. To the
contrary, Georgia allows the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants based on business conducted through
postal, telephonic, and Internet contacts. And a single event may
be a sufficient basis if its effects within the forum are substantial
enough.

Weathers v. Dieniahmar Music, LLC, 337 Ga. App. 816, 820 (2016); see also

Home Depot Supply, 289 Ga. App. at 289 (“[E]ven where a nonresident

defendant has no physical presence in Georgia, intangible contacts, such as

telephone communications, can be sufficient to establish ‘minimum contacts’

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which meet the constitutional standard for the exercise of personal

jurisdiction.”).

Here, prompting an investigation into the election process in Georgia to

“ensur[e] the fundamental right of citizens to vote and to have their votes

counted accurately[,]” Harris v. City of S. Fulton, 358 Ga. App. 788, 795 (2021)

(internal citation omitted), is an act that has a substantial effect on Georgia as

it has the potential resultant impact on both election administration as well as

one or more individuals exercising the fundamental, and constitutionally

protected, right to vote. See Georgia R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Barton, 169 Ga.

App. 821, 823-24 (1984) (economic effect of a default of $125,000 is a

substantial effect). Thus, True the Vote’s contact with Georgia is not

diminished simply because most of it occurred intangibly.

Accordingly, True the Vote has purposefully done some act in Georgia by

not only sending a complaint regarding Georgia elections to the Georgia

Secretary of State but also indicating that it would cooperate with the

subsequent investigation into its allegations. Thus, True the Vote has availed

itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State, and this initial prong

is met.

True the Vote’s argument that there are insufficient minimum contacts

with Georgia because of the “government contacts” exception as applied in

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Lamb v. Turbine Design, Inc., 273 Ga. 154 (2000) is unavailing because Lamb

is distinguishable. In Lamb, an individual alleged that a corporation

misappropriated a trade secret in the design modification of an aircraft and

improperly disclosed the trade secret to the Federal Aviation Administration

(“FAA”) by incorporating it in an application the corporation submitted to the

FAA to approve the modifications on its aircraft. The only point of contact the

corporation was alleged to have had with Georgia was the application it sent

to the FAA office in Atlanta. Here, True the Vote did not have a compulsory

interaction with a federal agency that happened to have a Georgia office as in

Lamb. Instead, True the Vote intentionally sent complaints to a Georgia

regulatory agency resulting in the initiation of a State Election Board

investigation; the volitional, intentional decision to interact with a Georgia

agency, concerning Georgia-specific concerns, and to affirmatively seek some

form of resultant criminal or civil enforcement related to its volitional

complaint, makes it clear that True the Vote’s reliance on Lamb is woefully

misplaced, as Lamb is completely inapposite to the facts of this enforcement

action. True the Vote’s contact with the Secretary of State and the State

Election Board cannot be discounted under the “government contacts”

exception.

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 (2) The case at bar arises from True the Vote’s complaint submitted to the
Georgia Secretary of State and the State Election Board’s subsequent
attempt at enforcing of the subpoena.

The State Election Board has “full power to subpoena persons and

papers” connected with the discharge of the Board’s duties. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-33.

Further, “[i]n case of the refusal of any person subpoenaed to attend or testify,

such facts shall be reported forthwith by the [B]oard to the appropriate

superior court, or to a judge thereof, and such court or judge shall order such

witness to attend and testify.” Id.

Here, because True the Vote submitted a complaint alleging election

fraud in Georgia, the State Election Board opened an investigation. The Board

thereafter issued a subpoena ordering True the Vote to produce the documents

and information related to the complaint and the ensuing investigation.

Despite initially agreeing to produce the documents at least partially, True the

Vote later refused to produce said documents. The State Election Board then

proceeded with this suit to enforce compliance with the suit. Thus, this cause

of action is directly related to True the Vote’s act in Georgia, and the second

prong is met. Accordingly, True the Vote has established minimum contacts

with Georgia.

14
 (3) The exercise of jurisdiction by Georgia courts over True the Vote in this
case does not offend traditional notions of fairness and substantial
justice.

“If a defendant has established minimum contacts, the court may then

evaluate other factors that impact on the reasonableness of

asserting jurisdiction, such as the burden on defendant, the forum state's

interest in adjudicating the dispute, plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient

and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the

most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the states

in furthering substantive social policies.” Stubblefield v. Stubblefield, 296 Ga.

481, 484 (2015) (citing Beasley v. Beasley, 260 Ga. 419, 421 (1990)).

Here, True the Vote may have a de minimis burden placed on it by

having to litigate in Georgia courts over its refusal to produce documents in

response to the State Election Board’s subpoena. However, Georgia has a

substantial interest in adjudicating the dispute, because the investigation is

related to alleged ballot trafficking in Georgia and possible election

interference in Georgia elections. Further, the State Election Board has an

interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief as to the enforcement of its

subpoena, as one of its duties is to “investigate, or authorize the Secretary of

State to investigate, when necessary or advisable the administration of

primary and elections laws and frauds and irregularities in primaries and

15
elections and to report violations of the primary and election laws either to the

Attorney General or the appropriate district attorney[.]” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(5).

True the Vote was not sued in Georgia because of random, fortuitous, or

attenuated contacts, but rather because of its complaint of alleged election

interference in Georgia. Thus, it was reasonable for True the Vote to expect to

appear in a Georgia court for noncompliance with a subpoena properly issued

by the State Election Board in Georgia to further the investigation regarding

True the Vote’s allegations. Accordingly, the exercise of jurisdiction by Georgia

courts does not offend traditional notions of fairness and substantial justice.

IV. This Court should reject True the Vote’s untimely demand to
modify the scope of the subpoena.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-33 is silent regarding the procedure by which the

recipient of a subpoena from the State Election Board should seek to quash or

modify the subpoena, and the only authority to which True the Votes cites to

this Court regarding modification of the subpoena is under Texas law and

Texas Civil Rules of Procedure, which are inapplicable in this case. (Motion to

Dismiss, p. 18-23.) Although it is not cited by True the Vote in its Motion to

Dismiss, O.C.G.A. § 24-13-23 governs a trial court’s power to modify a

subpoena, but the court may only do so “upon written motion made promptly

and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance

therewith.” O.C.G.A. § 24-13-23(b); see Ga. Gov't Transparency & Campaign

16
Fin. Comm'n v. New Ga. Project Action Fund, 366 Ga. App. 198, 203–04 (2022)

(“O.C.G.A. § 24-13-23 requires that [any attempt to quash or modify a

subpoena] be filed prior to the time for production specified in the subpoena.”)

(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

Furthermore, True the Vote’s unsupported assertion that it is being

asked “to turn over portions of work product valued at over $1.5 million” is not

sufficient grounds for this Court to modify the terms of the State Election

Board’s subpoena or to demand that the State Election Board “advance that

amount” to True the Vote. (Motion to Dismiss, p. 24.) And even if True the Vote

had made a timely motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-13-23(b), the only relief

regarding costs that a trial court could order would be to “[c]ondition denial of

the motion upon the advancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena

is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the evidence.” O.C.G.A. § 24-13-

23(b)(2). The cost of producing the evidence is not the same as the “worth” of

the materials that are being produced, and as such, True the Vote’s demand

that the State Election Board proffer $1.5 million before True the Vote will

produce any documents in response to the subpoena is nonsensical.

True the Vote’s allegation that the subpoena is “overbroad and

burdensome” are also unfounded because the True the Vote has categorically

refused to produce any documents to the State Election Board in response to

17
the subpoena. True the Vote makes this argument in its Motion to Dismiss

despite the fact that in June 2023, counsel for True the Vote confirmed that

some partial compliance with the subpoena was forthcoming. Ex. 9 to Petition

(stating that True the Vote would provide certain documents and records

“again” that True the Vote states it provided to the GBI, if the State Election

Board needed a copy). Regardless, True the Vote’s untimely, and apparently

specious, argument that a request to produce the evidence underlying their

complaint to the State Election Board is barred due to their failure to assert

that the request was allegedly overbroad and burdensome prior to April 28,

2022, the date for compliance with production pursuant to the served

subpoena. See New Ga. Project Action Fund, 366 Ga. App. at 203-04.

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-33 clearly authorizes an order compelling compliance

with the State Election Board’s subpoena and to hold True the Vote, a

heretofore noncompliant party, in contempt if applicable. None of True the

Vote’s arguments advanced against enforcement are either meritorious or

require dismissal of this enforcement action. As this Court lacks the authority

to consider True the Vote’s untimely efforts to modify or quash the subpoena,

and jurisdiction over True the Vote exists and has been established, this Court

18
should reject True the Vote’s attempt to block enforcement of the subpoena or

dismiss this enforcement action.5

CONCLUSION

True the Vote’s complete failure to respond to the State Election Board’s

subpoena flies in the face of the both the exercise of the Board’s duty to the

Georgia electorate and True the Vote’s own mission statement: “As American

citizens, we share a civic responsibility to participate in this essential

foundation of self-government…not just by voting, but by engaging in every

stage of the electoral process to ensure our elections are administered legally

and fairly. So that we may have confidence in the results.” 6 True the Vote’s

arbitrary and capricious withholding of relevant information that it claims to

possess, but, in the end, refused completely to produce, only serves to impede

the State Election Board’s lawful regulatory activities and further erode

confidence in Georgia’s free and fair elections.

5 In the conclusion of their Motion to Dismiss, True the Vote asks the Superior
Court to grant relief under “Rule 12(b)(2) and (6)”. Motion to Dismiss, p. 27.
Assuming that refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Motion fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
6 “About True the Vote,” https://www.truethevote.org/truethevote-mission/

(last visited Sept. 7, 2023).

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 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny True the Vote’s Motion

to Dismiss, direct True the Vote to fully comply with the State Election Board’s

subpoena, and grant any and all other relief the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 18th day of September 2023.

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR 112505

Attorney General

BRYAN K. WEBB 743580

Deputy Attorney General

RUSSELL D. WILLARD 760280

Senior Assistant Attorney General

/s/ Elizabeth Vaughan

ELIZABETH VAUGHAN 762715
Assistant Attorney General

/s/ John P. Smith

JOHN P. SMITH 655594
Assistant Attorney General

/s/ Danna Yu
DANNA YU 846403
Assistant Attorney General

PLEASE SERVE:
Elizabeth Vaughan
Assistant Attorney General
Georgia Department of Law
40 Capitol Square, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300
Telephone: (404) 458-3549
evaughan@law.ga.gov

20
John P. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Georgia Department of Law
40 Capitol Square, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300
Telephone: (404) 458-3379
jsmith@law.ga.gov
Danna Yu
Assistant Attorney General
Georgia Department of Law
40 Capitol Square, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300
Telephone: (404) 458-3682
dyu@law.ga.gov

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day electronically filed the foregoing with the

Clerk of Court using the electronic filing system, which will send notification

of such filing to all parties of record via electronic notification. I also certify

that counsel for True the Vote has been served by STATUTORY

ELECTRONIC SERVICE and by depositing a copy of the same to be delivered

via United States Mail, addressed as follows:

David E. Oles
Oles Law Group
5755 Northpoint Parkway
Suite 25
Alpharetta, GA 30022
davidsr@deoleslaw.com

Michael Wynne (pro hac vice pending)

Gregor Wynne Arney, PLLC
4265 San Felipe Street
Suite 700
Houston, Texas 77027
mwynne@gcfirm.com

Cameron Powell (pro hac vice pending)

Gregor Wynne Arney, PLLC
4265 San Felipe Street
Suite 700
Houston, Texas 77027
cpowell@gwafirm.com

Counsel for Respondent,

True the Vote

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Dated: September 18, 2023.

/s/ John P. Smith

JOHN P. SMITH 655594
Assistant Attorney General

23