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New Perspectives
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Disruptive technologies ª The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/2336825X20934975
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Elena Sokova
Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Austria

Abstract
The current security environment faces two major challenges. On the one hand, the international
arms control and security architecture are deteriorating. Doctrinal innovations, first in Russia and
then in the United States, allow for limited use of nuclear weapons, including potentially the low-
yield varieties. On the other hand, advanced conventional weapons, cyber warfare, artificial
intelligence, and other emerging technologies increase the risk of conflict, which could escalate to
the nuclear level. As risks increase, the political will to pursue cooperative solutions to prevent
arms race and war continues to diminish. Some nuclear states are even reluctant to recommit to
the Reagan-Gorbachev statement that ‘‘A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’’

Keywords
Arms control, cold war, emerging technologies, INF, nuclear weapons, un-cancelling the future

The impact of new technologies on nuclear weapons can not be discussed outside political,
technological, and historical developments that we encounter almost on a daily basis. Three
developments in the past few months stand out:

1. On August 2, 2019, one of the last pillars of the Cold-War era nuclear arms control regime
came tumbling down. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which banned
land-based missiles with a range between 500 km and 5000 km ceased to exist.
2. In October 2019, Google officials announced the company achieved ‘‘quantum supre-
macy.’’ Google says that its 54-qubit processor was able to perform a calculation in
200 seconds that would have taken the world’s most powerful supercomputer 10,000 years.
3. Thirty years ago, on November 9, 1989—citizens of West and East Berlin for the first time
since 1961 were reunited and their citizens were able to openly cross the border. This
became known as ‘‘the night the Wall came down.’’

Corresponding author:
Elena Sokova, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Vienna, Austria.
Email: esokova@vcdnp.org
2 New Perspectives XX(X)

How do these different events relate to each other and how are they relevant to the discussion of
the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear weapons?

Nuclear arms control

During the height of the Cold War, the US and Soviet arsenals, combined, amassed about 68,000
nuclear warheads. The Cuban Missile crisis brought the two nuclear superpowers to the realization
that they need to curb the nuclear arms race, to stabilize the strategic balance to remove incentives
to begin a war, and to find ways to communicate with each other in a crisis situation. That crisis
gave impetus to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the establishment of a hotline between the
leaders of the two countries.
In the late 1970s–early 1980s, the deployment of Soviet SS-20 medium range nuclear missiles
was followed by the deployment of US Pershing II missiles in Europe. These deployments were
met by large-scale protests in Europe and the United States. Originally, negotiations to curb these
weapons were unsuccessful but began to move forward after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in
the Soviet Union in 1985 and sought to shift arms control from a national to global perspective—a
shift shared by US President Ronald Reagan. In 1986, at the historic summit in Reykjavı́k, the two
leaders came very close to banning all ballistic nuclear missiles. Gorbachev was prepared to
discuss even a complete ban on nuclear weapons.
Although a breakthrough did not materialize in Reykjavı́k, the following year the two countries
successfully completed negotiations on the INF Treaty, which eliminated their land-based
intermediate-range missiles. In 1991, the INF Treaty was followed by an even larger-scale and
more consequential Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START I), which reduced their deployed
strategic forces from 10,000–12,000 to 6000 warheads on each side. In the fall of 1991, the two
countries adopted unilateral parallel politically binding obligations (known as Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives (PNIs)) to drastically reduce nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
These three regimes—two legally binding and verifiable and one politically binding—defined
the nuclear arms control landscape for the post-Cold War period. Today, only strategic weapons
remain regulated. In 2010, the United States and Russia concluded New START to replace START
I, which expired in 2009. New START limits their deployed strategic weapons to 1550. That treaty
expires in February 2021 and, at the time of this conference, it is still unclear whether it will be
extended.
All other categories of nuclear weapons are no longer regulated. The INF Treaty no longer
exists, as mentioned above. PNIs are not in effect either, although the parties have reduced their
nonstrategic nuclear weapons to levels below those promised in 1991.
Same as US-Soviet bilateral arms control saw major advances in the last years of the Cold War
and immediately after it, the multilateral agenda enjoyed equally significant breakthroughs,
including the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Chemical
Weapons Convention. In the wake of this progress, in 1995, the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons was extended indefinitely.
This is not to say that nuclear weapons have not been reduced. Combined, the United States and
the Russian Federation now have fewer than 10,000 nuclear warheads in active stockpile. Retired
warheads awaiting dismantlement bring this number to almost 14,000. It certainly constitutes a
very significant reduction since the height of the Cold War. However, these are still enormous
arsenals capable of eliminating the world many times. Moreover, these reductions have not been
complemented by adequate arms control measures. Even New START embodies the same
Sokova 3

framework as its Cold War predecessors and limits only the first-strike capability of the parties
rather than the entire stockpile. Moreover, the pace of reductions has grounded to a halt lately. And
qualitative modernization has not stopped either.
Recently, former leaders, such as Mikhail Gorbachev, former Soviet president, and William
Perry, former US secretary of defense, have warned that the risk of nuclear exchange is now greater
than 30 years ago and the greatest danger nowadays is that we can inadvertently stumble into a
nuclear war. The relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation reaches a new
low almost every day and disagreements between the two countries plague major international
fora. In contrast to the Cold War times, the two countries no longer practice arms control, coor-
dinate their efforts in nuclear nonproliferation, or pursue regular dialogue on these issues.
The deterioration of US–Russia relations is not the only case of concern. At the end of the Cold
War, we had five official nuclear-weapon states and Israel, which neither confirmed nor denied
possession of nuclear weapons. Now we have three additional de facto nuclear states—India,
Pakistan, and, more recently, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In addition to the dire
state of the US/NATO and Russia relations, the possibility of an intentional or unintentional
conflict in Asia involving nuclear weapons became a reality once India and Pakistan joined the
nuclear club in 1998 and nowadays each amass around 150 nuclear warheads. The history of the
relationship between these two states, continuing territorial disputes, and hostilities create a
breeding ground for mistrust, speculation, and mutual accusations.
Today’s dangerous situation did not happen overnight of course. Without going into a detailed
discussion of how we stumbled into this state of affairs, it is sufficient to emphasize that in the last
two decades, first Russia and recently the United States increased reliance on nuclear weapons
in their military doctrines. Nuclear weapons no longer serve only to deter a large-scale nuclear
war: increasingly, they acquire the role of deterring or ‘‘de-escalating’’ a conventional war as well.
Both countries actively pursue modernization of nuclear arsenals—delivery vehicles first of all,
but also low-yield (mistakenly seen as more usable) weapons. Expansion of missions and the
blunder about usability are particularly dangerous, given that both countries have their nuclear
arsenals on high alert. The entertaining of possible scenarios of limited use of nuclear weapons in
itself lowers the threshold of their use and puts into question the existence of the nuclear taboo.
To complicate things even more, new delivery vehicles are now built dual-capable—they can
carry both nuclear and conventional warheads. In the last two decades, this has been particularly
prominent in Russia, but the United States and China are joining the trend as well. When a dual-use
system is used, it is impossible to tell whether it carries a conventional or a nuclear warhead;
decision makers may be tempted to err on the side of worst-case scenario, of course. And we are
lucky that a cruise missile has not been used (yet) by one nuclear state against another.

Disruptive technologies
There are numerous other technologies that can potentially impact nuclear weapons and how states
feel about them as well as more broadly affect the risk of war and proneness for escalation. Some
are new, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing, some are maturing tech-
nologies such as drones and cyber, and some are old wine in new bottles—from hypersonic
technologies to robotics.
We witness today a dangerous combination of new technologies and nuclear weapons—a sit-
uation, in which it is increasingly difficult to ensure nonuse of the latter.
4 New Perspectives XX(X)

Threats stemming from cyber warfare, particularly the increased risk of an unintended, acci-
dental use of nuclear weapons, have been the focus of a number of publications and policy dis-
cussion in the past decade.
One recent example is the incident that took place at the end of October 2019, when a nuclear
power plant in India suffered a cyberattack (though the nuclear reactor was not affected). Some
media reports suggested it was done by North Korea, while in India some reports were eager to
blame Pakistan. Just imagine if the cyberattack had caused a serious radiation release—in that
case, the specter of armed conflict ‘‘in retaliation’’ would have been highly likely.
That incident highlighted the role of cyberattacks and the misuse of digital technologies in
increasing the insecurity of today’s world. These technologies are an integral, even irreplaceable
part of everyday life, but can be as easily misused not only by state but also by nonstate actors.
Cyber warfare technologies may also enhance the capabilities of nonstate actors, including terrorist
groups. That nonstate actors may acquire access to nuclear weapons or other elements of critical
security infrastructure is a worrisome scenario on its own, but nowadays or very soon they may not
even need that.
The most often cited scenarios involve a cyberattack on national command, control, and
communication systems, whether by a state or a nonstate actor, which could be perceived as an
attempt to disable that nation’s second-strike capability and prompt a nuclear response. The second
most-often cited scenario is a possibility that a third party, perhaps also a nonstate actor, might
effectively spoof (fake or hide the origin of) an attack on a nuclear armed state that could prompt a
response against the perceived aggressor.
Two other emerging technologies that merit close attention are AI and quantum technology.
As with many other new and emerging technologies, AI and machine learning could bring
considerable benefits but also create new risks and vulnerabilities. For example, AI, with the
assistance of enough sensors, may be able to detect hidden targets such as mobile launchers and
submarines enabling a disarming attack. This could lead a country to believe it has achieved
reliable counterforce capability. Even if that state does not seek to capitalize on that perceived
advantage, its opponents may conclude they have become unacceptably vulnerable and resort to
hedging behavior such as pre-delegating launch authority while keeping weapons on an elevated
alert level and that in turn could lead to inadvertent or accidental use. Some nations might try a
‘‘dead hand’’ or similar doomsday systems, possibly linking the majority of its national command,
control, and communication (NC3) system, including decision-making, to an AI, to avoid per-
ceived vulnerability.
AI also creates a major potential vulnerability. These systems can handle highly diverse data
from an almost unimaginably large array of sources assuring decision makers of better situational
awareness than ever before. At the same time, decision makers out of necessity will have to
increasingly rely on the product of AI analysis and perhaps even AI decisions, further reducing the
role of humans in command and control systems. The next-generation, hypersonic delivery
vehicles, by compressing decision timelines, could aggravate this situation even more.
In this scenario, interference with input data on a sufficiently large scale could skew the product
of AI. Thus, in a tense situation, decision makers may miss the signs of an impending crisis—even
attack—or, conversely, be led into believing the situation is more dangerous than it really is.
In a well-publicized 1983 incident, Col. Petrov decided to overrule data from an early warning
system, which showed an ongoing large-scale attack by the United States on the Soviet Union, and
helped avert a disaster. In the future, there might simply not be enough role and time for a Col.
Petrov to make a similar decision.
Sokova 5

On the other hand, AI could provide major benefits for international security by, for example,
helping with arms control and nonproliferation. AI-assisted reconnaissance could be used not only
for targeting but also for verification.
Quantum technology also has potentially far-reaching consequences for nuclear weapons and
can potentially affect almost every aspect of a nuclear weapons program: modeling and testing,
early warning, targeting, NC3, and more. The possibilities are seemingly endless, yet this is an
emerging technology whose basics are not readily understood by most laymen. It will take time to
discover which applications are real and which are illusory.
When we talk about quantum technology, we can broadly break the subject into quantum
computers and other quantum technology. Quantum computers—when they work—could poten-
tially be many orders of magnitude faster than classical computing. An actual quantum leap in
processing power would have far-reaching consequences at every level of the nuclear enterprise,
and it is difficult to predict how such an advancement may affect the way states view their nuclear
deterrent. Additionally, quantum computing could be a force multiplier for most other existing
technologies.
Other applications of quantum technology that could have an impact on nuclear enterprise are as
follows:

 Quantum compass: Unlike GPS, it would be un-spoofable, so submarines and missiles

would have more secure and reliable navigation.
 Quantum radar: Such a radar would not be fooled by current stealth technology or fake war-
heads and thus be more accurate and reliable.
 Quantum communications: Using quantum technology for communications would theore-
tically provide for communications that are cryptographically secure.

Policy challenges
As always, it is not about technologies. It is about the way we use them. These technologies can be
stabilizing or destabilizing depending on the choices people make. Growing concerns about their
potential misuse or unintended implications probably reflect widespread pessimism caused by the
long history of failures of the humankind to prevent the most dangerous applications of new
technologies.
Moreover, many of these technologies are being developed simultaneously. It is likely that their
effects will compound each other to possibly produce unforeseen synergies. Combining cyber with
AI and quantum computing may revolutionize cryptography and render nuclear secrets un-
securable. Combining drones and AI may lead to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
systems that are able to find all of a state’s second-strike assets. Such outcomes could increase
state insecurity and cause nations to rely more on nuclear weapons (even though that sounds
counterintuitive).
Unfortunately, with the rise of nationalism, great powers competition, ‘‘Realpolitik’’ thinking,
inability to take into consideration other parties’ security concerns, the gridlock in the functioning
of traditional multilateral and bilateral negotiation and coordination fora, we are likely to see the
continued and most probably even increased reliance on nuclear weapons, even as our under-
standing of the increased risks and uncertainties will continue to grow.
Symbolic of the conundrum in which humankind has found itself is the refusal of some nuclear
states to reconfirm the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev commitment that ‘‘nuclear war cannot be won and
6 New Perspectives XX(X)

must never be fought.’’ Nor they are prepared to discuss and negotiate the use and control of these
new, potentially destabilizing technologies and discuss nuclear risk reduction.
We need to relearn how to have a dialogue and recognize insecurities of others (not only our
own) and to separate common interest in the prevention of war from political conflicts. If we fail,
we can wait until when we witness, God forbid, an actual unauthorized, accidental, or mis-
calculated use of nuclear weapons.
One way to push for such a dialogue and negotiations is to engage the broader public and also
educate politicians and governments. Too often nowadays politicians and government leaders are
resorting to nuclear saber-rattling rhetoric and have become too comfortable with using phrases
like ‘‘my nuclear button is bigger than yours.’’ It is a moral and civic duty of academia and
nongovernmental experts to break this complacency and to amplify the urgency of addressing
nuclear risks and dangers of ignoring them.

Author’s note
This essay is based on Keynote Address 3A delivered at the Hamburg (Insecurity) Sessions on
November 22, 2019. The Hamburg (Insecurity) Sessions is a conference conceived and organized
by Benjamin Tallis (who edits New Perspectives) for the Institute for Peace Research and Security
Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). Specifically, the conference was supported by the
project on Arms Control and Emerging Technologies funded by the German Federal Foreign
Office.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

Author biography
Elena Sokova is the Executive Director of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation. Her primary research areas are fissile materials security and control, international
organizations and nonproliferation regime, nuclear nonproliferation issues in Eurasia, nonproli-
feration and disarmament education and training. Prior to her post in Vienna, she was the Deputy
Director at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, Monterey. She authored dozens of articles, book chapters, reports, and other pub-
lications on nonproliferation and nuclear security. In 2014–2015, she was a member of the Global
Agenda Council on Nuclear Security of the World Economic Forum. In 2015, she also chaired a
Fissile Material Working Group on ending the use of HEU in civilian applications.