CHAPTER 9 The Revolution that Never Was Toro days after his arrival from Hong Kong (27 June 1892) Rizal went around Central Luzon via the new railway, stopping over at Malolos, San Fernando (Pampanga), and Tarlac, to sound out fellow iustrados and Masons about his project. On Sunday, 3 July, he formally launched the Liga at a large evening gathering in a secluded house in Tondo, Manila, “at which every person of note in the progressive move- ment was present” (Coates 1968, 233). Among those present was Andres Bonifacio. The primary aim of the Liga was “to unite the whole archipelago into a compact body, vigorous and homogenous.” Thus, in the Liga, the meaning of Rizal’s concept of the Filipino nation was explicitly defined as covering the entire archipelago and including all stinolinguistie groups within it (Majul 1960, Corpuz 1989). Rizal had designed the Liga as a mass-based national organization with a separat- 'stagenda (Corpuz, 210). The Liga had a supreme council that rested on a base of popular councils through which the masses, largely through the recruitment work of Bonifacio, became organized and nobilized, However, the consternation and panic triggered by Rizal’s sudden ttst and deportation to Dapitan on 7 July 1892 led to the Liga’s im- ediate dissolution, On the evening of that fateful day, Bonifacio 253 Bee™ 2s4 The Revolution that Never Was launched the revolutionary movement by founding the Kataay Kagalanggalangan, Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The pia Most Honorable, Brotherhood of the Sons of the People), or Pad for short. The original membership included the radical members gq de c “roe I sie (among them, Andres Bonifacio) and some came g the traditional landed local elite (such as Dr. Pio Valenzuela). Cong to a commonly held view, the Katipunan, which initially could coy only about thirty members, remained dormant for a while (Majul 1969, Corpuz. 1989). Then Bonifacio hit on a brilliant idea: he would revive the and consequently hasten the growth of the Katipunan. In other words, by ce, (1) he would attract a bigger following for the separatist movement at a much faster rate; (2) he would also attract the more economically well-off ilustrados, from whom funding could be secured. Thus with the masses and ilustrados coming together, initially through the revived Liga, and later under the direction of the Katipunan, a united front can (Majul 1960). Through Bonifacio’s initiative and the collaboration of other founding members of Rizal’s Liga, in particular, Domingo Franco (the original Liga’s president) and Deodato Arellano (Marcelo H. del Pilar’s brother-in-law), the Liga was revived in April 1893. Apolinario Mabini (who was not a member of the original Liga; he had been re- cruited into the revived Liga by Arellano) was made the secretary of the Supreme Council. Bonifacio was the most active proselytizer and recruiter of the re- vived Liga, and it was through his indefatigable efforts and consummate skill in organizing numerous popular councils that the Liga gained its mass membership. This situation, however, created an ideological split in the revived Liga. The Supreme Council, with the exception of Bonifacio, consisted mostly of ilustrados like Arellano and Mabini (he had not turned radical yet) who still adhered to the reformist agenda of del Pilar. These ilustrado members, writes Corpuz (1989, 211) appa ently “did not understand that the is b i Pi ‘dari mist ‘campaign was a failure.” Arellano, del Pilar’s affinal relative and ®” original member of the Propaganda Committee that had financially supported del Pilar’s Solidaridad, “had to be the last man in Manilyr could sens ke Franco; The Revolution that Never Was aa ¢ Rizal’s design for the Liga” (ibid.). Thus with reform- Arellano, and Mabini in the Supreme Council, the li i iss f sasiotv iA: ped En popular councils, whose membership consisted of Li 3 recruits, had already concluded, like Rizal, that the reform oni seless, and that the only option was an armed uprising, sign was cat ical majonitys notes Corpu2 (211), stopped paying dues when it to the support of del Pilar’s Solidaridad. they jormist elements in the Liga, like Arellano and Mabini, fel a ered about the radical composition of the mass base. If and when aijons occurred, the radical elements would surely capture the feadership of the association (Bonifacio would end up the head, and Iefrmists like Mabini and Franco would lose their posts). Worst, the rowing dissensions might attract the attention of the authorities and “jto everyone’s arrest. Through the jittery reformists’ initiative, the 3 ke Sheme Council met and agreed to formally : chs after its revival. ‘According to Mabini, in his memoirs, this dissolution led to the formation of two associations: the GoerpajdeiConbeoraniey which consisted of the reformist ilustrados from the defunct Liga, and the , which comprised Bonifacio’s recruits. Mabini was not aware that Bonifacio’s Katipunan had been in existence since Rizal’s deportation in 7 July 1892. What Mabini thought was the formation of 4a new group was actually the consolidation and expansion of an al- ready existing one, that is to say, Bonifacio’s recruits for the Liga were in fact his recruits for the Katipunan. Thus when the revived Liga dis- banded, its popular councils were simply absorbed into the clandestine Sebenss (Majul 1960, 120-25; Corpuz 1989, 211-13). For its part, the i 't. However, interest in del Pilar’s Solidaridad started to wane after Rizal. h : Pema : Policy. Contributions decreased and then stopped altogether. By 1895, Mabini had to send del Pilar the painful directive: Close shop. ly. When Bonifacio founded the Katipunan in July 1892, it consisted mainly of the radical petty bourgeois intelligentsia and, by Valenzuela’s estimate, there were only “thirty members at the most.” By June of 1896, how- Even the year™ ‘The Revolution that Never Was 256 . Iready gained a huge following f fore, the Katipunan had alr ; f a ee towns of Nueva Hej, Bulacan, and Cavite, wie i ing gobernadorcllo(auisiipal captain) of the towar ge Kawit, yi young gober could eventually lead the Revolution, was recruited, In Why P) '6 Bonifacio went tq in the house of Bonifacio. April 1896 Bo OM ties led Katipu 4 the founding of an Aguinaldo: ipunan branch Cae clea ag OS) se Aged ea me : arpa (213) abuts the Katipunan phenomena ge we ec fa brilliant y i. ctors: one is the entry of , then a law student at San Juan de Letran, a Dominican College ie other was Bonifacio's organizational leadership. Corpuz dees not mention a thied factor, which was singled out by Valenzuela fre his memoirs): the printing and dissemination of th orp Kalayaan (Liberty). leto (1979) explains the Kalayaan's influence in terms ofits Pasyon discourse, which appealed to the popular conscious. ness. In support ofthis view, we may add Bonifacio’s use of Powerful symbols that evoked strong sentiments of patriotism: the pilgrimage tp Mount Tapusi (the abode of the legendary folk hero Bernardo Carpio), and the invoking of both Rizal’s name and the memory of 1872. The : ane Ride poomburZa” (the three martyred priests Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora). Rizal, moreover, had been made, without his “honorary president” of the Katipunan, Consequently many joined the Natipunan presuming that Rizal was its founder At any rate, Rizal was the Katipunan’s moral ji n: his picture was hung in every was becoming itrepressibi Katipunan convention in “me shy popular council heads, in Teason, Bonifacio called 4 6. In this meeting, attended by cluding Aguinaldo, Bonifacio‘The Revolution that Never Was 257 ae ken.” The agenda therefore was ee onashauncaing The house became di ro factions: Bonifacio was for immediate uprisings vided into he other hand, argued that in view of the lack of weap, agunaldo, Oy preparations, the uprising should be put off for a more 08 ad ‘To breakethe-deadlock,-Aguinaldo,-himself-a Rizal ad. OPT ed that a decision be deferred until after they had obtained Soe. This Was adopted unanimously, and Pio Valenzuela was “G che task of going to Dapitan to confer with Rizal (Corpuz, assign ‘as Valenzuela reported on his return, Rizal’s ewofold counsel 215 My wo make the necessary’ preparations (e.g., the securing of weap- we to enlist the support of the affluent ilustrados, suggesting An- sipio Luna a8 a liaison officer for this purposes (2)to fight rather than s ts. This advice was unanimously adopted, thus settling the question of what was to be done. However, the regime’s sudden crackdown on the Katipunan forced the latter’s hand before the necessary preparations could be made, The revolution had to start prematurely. Anyhow, the revolutionary tide could no longer be stemmed. Almost simultaneously, Manila and Cavite rose up in arms, followed soon after by Laguna, Batangas, Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, and Nueva Ecija (hence the cight rays in the Philippine flag). Finally, the “dawn of Redemption” envisioned by Elias in the Noli had arrived. Tewould have been nice if the story of the nation had ended here. However, two factors changed the script: the ascendancy of Aguinaldo and the coming of the Americans. As we shall see later, these two fac- ‘ors were not entirely unrelated: Aguinaldo’s rise to power within the revolutionary ranks facilitated, albeit unwittingly, the triumph of the Americans, Historic Blocs, Nationalist Narratives, and the Strugele for Hegemony re seems to be a direct relation between narrative and what Achat Sills the “historic bloc” in the case of Philippine nationalism: shange in the historic bloc seem: ee sto be accompanied by a correspond- tric Hoey he Baetative. As with the nationalist narrative, the his dines athe at Sonstituted the counterhegemonic struggle in the Philip- turn of the century was always fluid and unstable. Thus to development of Philippine nationalism, two interacting a258 The Revolution that Never Was levels of historical phenomena need to be explored. On the one hang the impact of colonialism/imperialism on the politi . culture of the colonized socieys on the other, is the internal dyna of the nationalist resistance, the formation of historic blocs and ye creation of nationalist narratives. Both Rizal and Bonifacio appreciated the crucial necessity of i 8 it historic bloc.” In fact, Rizal had warned the Katipunan, through Dr. Pio Valenzuela, of the “greg, harm” that “prominent Filipinos” could do should they “place them. selves on the side of the Spaniards,” and had suggested Antonio Ling as the liaison between the wealthy Filipinos and the Katipunan, Bonifacio fully agreed on this matter and took the necessary steps to obtain the support of the local elites; and when that was not forthcom. ing, undertook measures to neutralize them, as per Rizal’s advice, How. ‘ever, Bonifacio’s method of neutralizing the uncooperative native elite strayed from Rizal's ethical strictures. Bonifacio fabricated a roster of alleged financial contributors to the Katipunan and made sure that the list fell in the hands of the authorities, thereby leaving the compromised gentry no choice but to join the Katipunan, However, rather than seek- ing refuge in the Katipunan, they either surrendered o: 7 selves to be arrested, a move that proved suicidal. Thus a number of the wealthy ilustrados, the most prominent of whom was Francisco Roxas, were executed. This incident came to Rizal’s knowledge when he was already on his way to Cuba (see his 27 Sept. 1896 diary entry) and may have been a factor in writing his denunciatory 15 December manifesto. Probably because of this tragic incident, brought about by Bonifacio and his men, most ilustrados at the outbreak of the Revolution in late August 1896 shied away from the Katipunan, and some who were a rested, like Antonio Luna and Apolinario Mabini, even denounced it Thus, the i ii nila. This might have contributed to the setbacks that the Katipunan suffered. The situation in Cavite province, Aguinaldo’s bailiwick, 4 entirely different. Here, the local elite, ilustrados, wealthy native land owners, local officials (the principalia), were at the helm of the ea tionary forces. This may partly explain the initial successes ® Aguinaldo’s army. i % ‘ting of HE Bonifacio’s demise, an unfortunate event that led to a rewriting of i is the Katipunan agendes third part of the nationalist narrative. In the —‘The Revolution that Never Was a5 arvof the nationalist narracive was defined in terms ofthe ne era n. However, what this e notion of an i nd how 1 related to the notion o} " nae oe state a ” Jaetould it bea federal republic, as Rizal had envisioned? ud ce property ofthe friars be expropriated? Who would end wr would fhe Fuge haciendas? Would they be distributed to the ren- perl the expropoaied Inde become the property of the new 1001 ON pe sold later ro the highest bidder, or handed over to some i connected individuals, which is exactly what happened <> For that matter, did Bonifacio and Jacinto envision t state would be? Or how it would be run? Or what | boundaries would be? In their manifestos and writings, Jacinto had addressed the people as “Tagalogs” and fey had referred 10 stagalugan,” or the nation of Treas. This usage was alien to Rizal, who had always used the terms sflipino” and “Filipinas.” pith Aguinaldo’s ascendancy, the third part of the nationalist narrative acquired a new content. ‘The narrative of Redemption as the ong of a moral community was pushed aside by the narrative of stablshing an independent nation-state. In the ‘Tejeros Convention of March 1897, which was held co resolve the differences within the teoluionary camp, it was decided ro dissolve the Katipunan and re- pce it with a revolutionary government. When Bonifacio refused to thide by this decision, declaring the proceedings null and void, he was charged with conspiring against the duly constitured revolutionary gov" tment. Like Rizal before him, Bonifacio was executed for sedition. Unlike Rizal, however, there is bitter irony in Bonifacio’s case: his & teation had been ordered and carried out by men who he had earlier initiated into the Katipunan brotherhood. The arrest and execution of Bonifacio demoralized the ranks of the ae forces outside of the province of Cavite (Mabini 1969, is proved disastrous for Aguinaldo, who consequently suffered setbacks in the military struggle against the Spanish regime. Auinald eventually found it necessary (or convenient) 1 8 a brace; hence, the Truce of Biak-na-Bato in November 1897, which was aoe Possible through the mediation of the flamboyant ilustrado, ro Paterno, Aguinaldo and his military officers, in exchange for Hot is territorial —— ~ 260 The Revolution that Never Was P400,000 and the promise of reforms from the Spanish govern voluntarily exiled themselves to Hong Kong, where they set yp s™% lutionary government in exile." Fevo. However, the fighting in the Philippines did not stop, tn spread beyond Manila and the Tagalog.provinces. News of coy’ fighting may have contributed to the revolutionary exile’s deen I4-February 1898, to officially repudiate the Biak-na-Bato truce 4. ment. When news of the repudiation reached Manila, i fannet flames of Revolution even more. In April the Revolution flared aneyt the Tagalog provinces, and forthe fist time; it spread outward of La to the Visayas. All these developments point t0 a possibilty hitherto not explored by historians of the Philippine Revolution: thatthe truce signed at at Bato had been unnecessary, if not detrimental to the cause of th, Revolution, First ofall, had Aguinaldo not left, his return through ate naval ship would not have happened, he would not have depended on American sponsorship for his return to the Philippines. Second, revole tionary generals, who were left behind when Aguinaldo selfexiled 4, Hong Kong, were able not only to win decisive victories against the Spanish forces, but also set up local governments in the liberated towns of Tarlac, Pampanga, and some parts of Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, La Union, and Zambales. All these were done without the central com. mand of Aguinaldo. Most impressive is that General Francisco ‘Macabulos set up a government called the “Central Directive Commit. tee of Central and Northern Luzon,” which even had a cabinet with a foreign affairs portfolio added when it became known that the Ameri- cans had landed. When Aguinaldo reinstalled the revolutionary govern- ment, Macabulos voluntarily pledged his subordination to it, at the same time submitting a report of his successful military operations since Aguinaldo’s departure (Corpuz 1989, 286-87). Imagine what else could have been accomplished if Aguinaldo had not agreed to a truce and had not left the country! With Aguinaldo’s return to the Philippines, on 19 May 1898, the surging Revolution became unstoppable. A US intelligence report states that as of lare August the Filipino forces controlled eleven provinces. It added that “all Spaniards in Tayabas had been captured” (287). Gen- eral Paciano Rizal scored a signal victory when he took the surrender of the Spanish civil authorities and garrison of Laguna on 31 August 1898. Considering the earlier tragedy of Calamba and what had happened 0The Revolution that Never Was 261 al family, the liberation of Laguna provin the Rin pecial mention. We have an eyewitness account of 1 deserthe Spanish garrison in Calamba, after a six. der The account was recorded in the diary of ae a Katipunerofilustrado who, like D; Mendon i" gentry. His nom-de-guerre in the the Mie) and he served directly under Paci et 1898 diary (trans. and ed. by O. D, Corpuz 1988) ars, in its very simplicity, not only the sense of triumph of fonary forces but also the nobility and magnanimity of P, ce by General Paciang the surren- lay battle, to Antonio Guevarra y Pio Valenzuela, was of Katipunan was Matatag ano. We quote in full from as it cap. le revolu- ‘aciano, 2 June 1898: This day our forces took and occupied the pueblos of San P Tunasan, Bintang, Santa Cruz [eapital of Laguna Province), Cabuyao. Calamba was besieged by Sr, there. After six days of continuous atta St. Rizal took possession. While the defeated Spaniards were delivering their arms to the Filipino victors the Spanish commander addressed himself to S. Rial saying: “Twill probably be shot by my superiors in Manila for having surrendered. However, these friars who are now your prisoners cat save my life, [earnestly request and beg of you to spare theit lives; and also, if this be possible, that you permit me to keep custody of the 11,000 pesos that are in my charge.” “Keep the 11,000 pesos,” answered Sr. Rizal, “and acceding to Your pleas I spare the lives of these friars; on condition, however, that you make it known to them that they are the assassins of my brother Doctor Rizal, and moreover that they were the authors of the destrue- Son of my hometown Calamba, carried out by the Spaniards upon their instigation.” redro and Rizal, and we were reunited ick Calamba surrendered and Paciano’s magnanimity toward his Spanish captives stands out ep uote when seen in the light of what happened the year before 0 the five prisoners of the rebel forces in Cavite, among them two Spanish Priests. After being tried by the Sanguniang Bayan, Magdiwang, under theauthority of Andres Bonifacio, all five were executed in March 1897 Ricarte 1963, 11-12), Summarizing the revolutionary gains of 1898, the Jesuit historian lraco de La Costa (1965, 242) writes: “Fora few brief months, overr ~ 262 The Revolution that Never Was a large area of the Islands, Filipinos were free.” The victories g indicate that the Revolution against the Spanish regime had 6 cessful, and that an independent nation-state would have com note Americans arrived 0 nip tin the bud. As Cesar Majella (1360, 77), “The Revolution was a child that was not allowed toned Herein lies the tragedy of the nation. However, the tragic course Revolution had begun much earlier in the failure of Bonifaciy « Aguinaldo in 1897 to forge a united leadership. ind The year 1898 marked the heyday of the Revolution, when t historie bloe that Rizal and Bonifacio had dreamt of was finaly fonmen Iustrado colleagues of Rizal who were initially lukewarm to the es ment of Bonifacio, fearing that it was ill-prepared and ill-organieg now enlisted in Aguinaldo’s army. A number of ilustrados, among them Antonio Luna, came home from Europe to join the Revolutions Apolinario Mabini, who had carlier refused to join Bonifaciy Katipunan became, on 12 June 1898, Aguinaldo’s personal adviser (and ghost writer in Spanish), and then, albeit briefly during the Philippine. American War, the prime minister in the revolutionary government, Throughout Luzon and the Visayas, practically all revolutionary unity were organized, directed, and led by the local ilustrados, prominent members of the principalia, and even the native clergy (Schumacher 1981). What Elias had hoped for in the Noli became a reality in the Revolution of 1898, However, as a result of the Malolos Congress (15 Sept. 1898-21 Jan. 1899), the newly formed historic bloc was eventually jeopardized by the entry into the Revolutionary government of conservative ele- ments. Mabini had proposed to Aguinaldo the convening of a revolu- tionary congress in order to enlist the participation of all the prominent and wealthy ilustrados. Mabini had in mind a wartime congress whose principal role was not to legislate but to advise the president. When the congress was convened, however, the ilustrado delegates went beyond the advisory task that Mabini had laid out for them. They drafted a constitution and initiated the formation of a republican government with three separate and equal bodies: the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. The constitution drafted by the all-ilustrado congress gave "more powers to the legislature, that is, to themselves, than to the presi- dent, thus enabling themselves to pass laws and create structures that would ensure their political and economic dominance in a postcolonialThe Revolution that Never Was 263 ‘opine nation-state. Mabini bitterly ob he exigencies of war demanded a str. tht ihy and influential ilustrados won Aguinaldo te iy wel ustrados became casualties ofthis develong eat abin himself. Antonio Luna was feared and hang and My ilustrados because he threatened to arrest nn fg a varnvealthy ilustrado who collaborated or negotiated with cA, ihe, Mabini, on the other hand, was seen as the only ob peervatve ilustrados’ agenda of placing the executive hy the authority of the legislative. They therefore exerted pressure nn Aguinaldo to sack Mabini. Seeing the campaign against him, Mab our of a sense of honor, or delicadeza, relinquished his post of pine minister With the death of Antonio Luna and the dissolution of Mabins cabinet as a result of his retirement, the staunch anti-US imperialist na- in Aguinaldo’s new republic were eliminated, and Aguinaldo’s vali consequently came under the control of wealthy ilustrados, These men, who had contrived the means for Mabini's downfall and who had exacerbated Aguinaldo’s fears and insecurities regarding Antonio Luna, were the first to initiate peace talks with the Americans, And when the Revolution was lost, instead of campaigning peacefully for independence, the same ilustrados actively worked for autonomy merican rule, which was exactly what the Americans had under A " wanted to establish (Majul 1960, 76). ected to this on tf he gro ‘Ong president, Howe oWever, the side. Two Antonio Luna erely the Ameri- tacle to the anch under The New Narrative: America as the “Liberator” The coming of the Americans changed the nationalist script: the third part of the narrative had to be rewritten. But by whom? This opens up a whole new set of problems. We may argue, for example, that after the Americans invaded the islands and destroyed a budding repub- lican nation-state, the meaning of the tripartite narrative of Redempsion changed for those who opted to come to a modus vivendi i ! ene conquerors. The Americans, after quashing the Revolntion iar re enacted laws, such as the Sedition Law and the ei pers tions at the end of the war. We would have been spared the rane American hands the shock of a new colonization, the break ge ican culture, Yer what was Aguinaldo’s response? He enjoined Buencaming tg write a manifesto against Paterno. This Buencamino-Aguinaia countermanifesto, wryly notes Joaquin (131), “is a far more Painful reading today than the [Paterno] manifesto it mocked” (131), it de clared that Paterno had committed a great injustice in gratuitously and without any motive whatsoever imputing to the North Americans the intention of seizing the govern, ‘ment of these Islands, after we have vanquished the Spaniards, f there is, besides the lack of motives on which to make said imputation against an eminently humanitarian nation, as a Federal Republic, its constitution which strictly prohibits the absorption of territories out. side of America, in keeping with that principle of the immortal Monroe: America for the Americans; and furthermore there is the his- torical precedent that the independence of South America from the Spanish dominion is in great part due to the help and protection of the United Sates. (Exhibit 23 in Taylor Ill; cited in Joaquin, 131; italics mine) Considering its unreserved endorsement of American imperial myths such as the Monroe doctrine and the claim that South America {Cuba?] owes its independence to the US, in complete ignorance of the US’ annexation of a portion of Mexico and other imperial adventures in the rest of Latin America, one would think that this manifesto was written by an American adviser to Aguinaldo. The prevailing consensus among Filipino historians (e.g., Ileto and Constantino) is that this attirude toward the United States was typical of the ilustrados’ colonial mentality and that only the revolutionary masses espoused an unwavering anti-imperialism and nationalist com- mitment to genuine independence. Nevertheless no less than Macario Sakay, one of the grass-roots leaders of the Revolution, an original Katipunan member who continued the struggle long after Aguinaldo’s capture, expressed a view similar to Aguinaldo’s when ke finally yielded in 1906: “I surrendered because fighting is an uphill game and theThe Revolution that Never Was ie gilipinos will never succeed in gaining independence Until the semseles worthy oft. There is nothing 1 be aed pe ome Americans [italics mine; quote is from Springfictg Republics at the 19] eo (197.241) notes this fact without purus 21 Ju ‘One may question the veracity of Sakay’s statement. ome chat he was quoted by an American reporter in an Ane co sering Such an objection, however, cannot be raised 4 «ibed by Ronquillo from a beggar who used to sing i regulary, which leo (161-95) analyzes at length. Heto (93-93) conciedar that hi analysis has is shown how the struggle for independence was perceived in terms of the breaking of the relationship with Mother Spain, the chase hot ensued and the release of tremendous power and energy from ne masses, energy which was channelled by the Katipunan towand he reordering and unification of the masses under their true mother Mother Filipinas. The awit reveals that during the later republican pe. siod and the war with the United States, the experience of wary through struggle was perceived in some quarters to be lost. The a, thor of the awit attempted to relive it through the form and content of his work, so that anyone who heard the awit recited or sung could somehow experience that loss in himself through a juxtaposition of the poetic experience with the events of his time. Thus, there could be meaning and purpose in the continuing struggle. The awit’s account of the defeat of Spain, however, does not co- here with what Ilero considers as the revolutionary perspective of the masses: In the awit, it is the Americans, and not the Filipino revolution- aties, who are credited with having defeated Spain, a line consistent with American propaganda! The two stanzas (190) that refer to the Spanish defeat don’t even mention the Filipinos, Ileto notes this fact but does not consider the problem it poses for his interpretation: The Spaniards having failed repeatedly to turn the tide of battle against the Americans, the famed General Agustin abandoned his command and returned to Spain.268 The Revolution that Never Was Sa ualang magaua ang cacastilaan sa americano nang paquiquilaban, nalis si Agusting hayag na general naui sa Fspafa’t, ang mando’i iniuan. General Jaudenes because of fear applied foree, but none of his measures caused the wealth and numbers of the Americans to spill, General Jaudenes ang siyang nagdulot ng capangyarihan dahilan sa tacot, anoman ang gauin di macapamulos sa yaman at capal ng americanos. What was indicated by the idea that the Americans liberated Filipinas from Spanish colonial rule, that it was the Americans who defeated the Spaniards, that it is futile to resist the Americans, that we cannot secure our independence without American approval or coop: eration? These views are expressed not only by the misinformed General Aguinaldo and the collaborating ilustrados, but also by the masses like the die-hard Katipunero leader Macario Sakay, and the anonymous authors of the above-quoted folk song. Ileto simply brushes this problem aside. ‘We may approach this question by viewing it in terms of the im- pact of American conquest on popular consciousness. Could it be that the counterhegemonic grand narrative of emancipation, drawn from the traditions of the Pasyon and the Enlightenment, was inadequate in meeting the challenge of American imperialism? Yet why should the Filipinos had been ill-prepared to cope, even on the level of conscious: ness, with the American behemoth? Did not Rizal’s historical work, in particular his “Filipinas dentro de cien afios,” predict and warn against the coming of the Americans? And why did Aguinaldo and his advisers spend gruelling hours of discussion and debate trying to divine Amer can intentions? (Corpuz 1989, 2 Aaaiicr i 1 that clouded Fil: pino perception of tl States is the common belief among Filipino leaders that the democratic ideals and const tional principles of the United States militated against her colonizing the Philippines, an American line that is being parroted to this daThe Revolution that Never Wi er Was atedly a ginaldo repeatedly Ae North American Nation” would sy ‘ Philippine Revol , cause of the Philippine Revolution. Certainl a ‘ainly, Rizal and B, vith tm Samliae with the United State history, bur hey onifacio ere alrea vo ine. 8 ntiging tha none of gui, essa plicity isers nerican Indians, such as the Amerie nny VSlenee toward 5 ins” hi; set reaty with the Indians and then dishonoring no Onl len it suited them.! Yer the problem was more complex. First, ; aginaldo and his military officers and ieee coe eee fay ealize what the Americans were up to, This is strange ences fa the American imperialist project in the Pacific, and thes in paticulas had been predicted not only in Rial’ hi ney (presumably widely read by the ilustrados) but also nee «73 work on the Philippines, which some ilutrados must hng vor” Let us go back to the illustrious exiles of 1898. We may cos vr fafeched possiblity that none of them had ever read Riralt sony se fpr’ book. But what about Mabinis circular “A los Jes Revolucionarios,” which he issued immediately upon learning that swan had declared war against the United States on 24 April 1898 o sreount of the latter’ intervention in Cuban affairs? In his letter Mabini predicted the defeat of Spain and its ceding of the Philippines to the United States as part of its war indemnity. Mabini (in Majul 1960, 147) warned: considering and in the Philip. Letus not fool ourselves. The Americans, like the Spaniards and other European powers, covet this beautiful pearl of the Orient Seas. But we desire it more than them, not only because God gave it to us, but because we have already shed much blood for it. Even if we grant that Mabini’s circular did not reach the exiles in he returned Hong Kong, Aguinaldo would have known about it when in Philippines in early May 1898, and most certainly when Mani his personal adviser the following month. Howeves Aguado subsequently acted as if he did not take Mabini’ warnings seronY Why? i aware Second, even after Aguinaldo and his advisers bad become pcr of American intentions, the revolutionary leadership™ 20 The Revolution that Never Was ecisively to secure the surrender of the Spanish command that id detined been holed up in the walled city of Intramuros. a simply defeered to American wishes, doing everything thar gan? ing. “told hi to-do. He did not attack Intramuros when the Americans oj not 0, and on top of this, made way for the American troops ajo prepared to take Intramuros themselves. Mabini himself, “the bart’? fhe Revolution,” had, prior to the outbreak of hostilities Psi of Americans, counselled Aguinaldo against provoking a military confeé” tation with them, which in practice translated into not opposing the, troop mobilizations around Manila (ibid.). oer Aguinaldo’s wishful thinking and mendicant attitude towarg Apmiendidnatchenqvererates neied ionfieddemacan amareness.of American. imperialistdesigns over.the Philippines, Ths is revealed in a most stunning document issued by Aguinaldo entitled “General Outline of Means for Providing against Yankee Deceit” x. hibit 181, Taylor IM). O. D. Corpuz (1989, 384) reads this document approvingly, citing it as evidence that Aguinaldo “had lost faith in the politics of the powers and lumped the United States along with the imperialist European states.” Corpuz is right if we consider only the sec ond paragraph—which Corpuz surprisingly does nor cite—wherein the following is stared: The eyes of all the Great Powers are now directed toward the Pacific Ocean—the nations of Europe would like to be the only guests at the banquet but the United States desires a share and wants to occupy places in the Sandwich Islands, the Marianas, the Carolines and the Philippines for the benefit of her commerce. The appearance of the United States in the Pacific does not please the European Powers hence they will do what they can to prevent their taking much territory there, especially their occupation alone of the extremely rich territory of the Philippines.’ This is a very significant statement as it mentions, for the first time in any Filipino document of the period, the American interest ove" Hawai’i (Sandwich Islands). However, it appears surprisingly naive compared to Rizal’s “Filipinas dentro de cien afios” in its assertion that the European powers “will do what they can to prevent. .. the (United States] occupation alone of the extremely rich territory of the Phil pines.” In his prediction that none of the major European powers “"yr sage ve ued S crallemsiminated all Towever a ween s ‘The Revolution that Never Was i rates from coveting the Philippines, Rizal had possibility. The most incredible part of the articles under the heading, “What Should be 11 To offer aid to the United States in their present ambitions in re Pacific, to assist them in taking over Malayan islands if we can fais complete independence.” IN. The nation which in accordance with the teaty of peace remains in possession of the Philippines will also have to assume the “gation ofthe speedy pacification of the country to save the inter fas which the Great Powers have scattered through the Archipelago, 50 it is to the advantage of the sons of the land to prolong the war so that the transaction cannot be completed by Europe, ‘These statements are not only “simplistic and even wrong,” they are downright dangerous. Alas, even when Aguinaldo had realized that the United States was not a “liberator” but an “aggressor,” he still could 2ot disabuse himself from the subservient thought that Philippine i val. He believed this could be obtained by supporting the US? imperialistic am- bitions against the Philippines’ neighbors in the region. In other words, in exchange for US recognition of Philippine independence, Aguinaldo would have no qualms in bringing about the enslavement, if not slaugh- i ia! What a far cry from the pan-Malayan thrust of Rizal’s Indios Bravos! ‘The other articles, which Corpuz overlooks, bring out Aguinaldo’s incredible mendicancy more starkly: VL. Interior attack. Offer the United States a list of names for the Filipino Personnel, sufficient to occupy all the posts in the state so that ‘he United States will defend our Independence against other nations. VIL. Interior attack. Oblige the Yankee General to immediately ‘elegraph the following to President Mckinley: “The Filipino Revolutionists have shown great energy in the Present campaign and without the aid of the people of the country it bm~ would not have been possible to surround Manila and ¢ Sovereignty of Spain to fall there. ‘AUSe the. They would have escaped as before (Simon Anda) to Pam Bulacan, and Laguna Provinces. The Revolutionists who domes Luzon ask for the recognition oftheir Independence under spe niet torate of the United States like Cuba.” [Italics mine] Tie ty 7 States on a silver platter! And this was what half a million Fiji! died for? Fig Yet Corpuz (384) asserts that when Aguinaldo realized what the [American objective was, he thought of taking, Manila before the Amey cans could do so, As evidence Corpuz cites this article: 272 The Revolution that Never Was VI. Exterior attack. Above everything the Revolutionists must occupy all Manila including the Walled City [Intramuros] with the object and purpose that the nation possessing the Philippines accord. ing to the decision of the Powers will be forced to come to an under standing with the Filipinos to avoid the shedding of blood. (Italics mine) There is something very curious about this statement. If Corpuzis right that this document was issued prior to the surrender of the Span- ish command to the United States Armed Forces, which was on 13 August 1898, and therefore prior to the 10 December 1898 Treaty of Paris, in which Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States in ex change for US$20 million, why should Aguinaldo refer to the Unie States as “the nation possessing the Philippines according to the det sion of the Powers”? On the other hand, if Corpuz is wrong and if the document was issued after the Spanish surrender, thus making Intramuros effectively under American control, it would have been use" less and pathetic, if not altogether ludicrous, for Aguinaldo to enjet! the revolutionists to “occupy all Manila including the Walled ne ments However, assuming that Corpuz is right in dating the docu: prior to the Spanish surrender, why should Aguinaldo be so concs#d coon Tete omer an arden with the Filipinos”? independence ofthe Philippines on 12 June 1898. ll that Aguitt¥?The Revolution that Never W, fas 273 4 do was t0 assert the sovereignty ofthe Phil sa cans i gent C0 leave, Bot was Aguinad af Ane Mould provoke a military confrontation? , Jement “to avoid the shedding of bl fortunate lood”? ret patanding Agwinaldo's hope for a nonviolent contatscera , ed the Americans had no intentions of coming to + al bores settle- They were out to get the Philippines by ho a ‘Aguinaldo, or at least his ilustrado adviern ie eae sunerwise, why entitle the manifesto, “General Outline of Means faz providing against Yankee Deceit”? If that were so, however, then why IV (cited above)? : io ippines and ask the raid that the Ameri. W Ind article The reference to “the treaty of peace” in article IV proves that Coxpuz’s guess on the date of issuance of Aguinaldo’s “General Our Jine” is wrong: the manifesto had been issued after the Treaty of Paris, and therefore, after the Spanish surrender to the Americans, which therefore makes Aguinaldo’s guidelines against “Yankee deceit” pa- thetic indeed. But there is more: Aguinaldo is bidding the “sons of the land to prolong the war so that the transaction cannot be completed by Europe.” While Aguinaldo was rghoin assuming thar the speedy pac: fication of the Philippines was in the interest of the United States, it does not follow that prolonging the war would be in the Philippines’ inter- ests. Why conduct a war with the sole objective of prolonging it? The Vietnamese engaged the Americans in a long drawn-out war, but their objective was to win it. The Vietnamese, puny as they were, never doubted that they would win the war. Aguinaldo, on the other hand, was convinced at the outset that the war against the United States was not winnable, but nonetheless, horror of horrors, he instructed the Fili- pino forces to prolong it as much as possible, never mind the staggering casualty of 500,000 dead Filipinos later. When Antonio Luna joined Aguinaldo’s forces in November 1898 upon his release from a Madrid prison, he was too late: the Americans lad already cheated Aguinaldo of a total and decisive victory over the Spaniards, and thus, the tragic course of the Revolution had been a Sill, Antonio Luna was determined to rebuild a demoralized revel: “onary army, and transform it into a well-organized, cohesive, disci- Plined force. Luna's objective was not to prolo hh - Indue time, Luna got into trouble with Aguinaldos ofc, wh ntly disobeyed his orders, thus sabotaging his plans.~ The Revolution that Never Was ne on these insubordinate officers, Aguinaldo rent imposed discip! their race, The matter was getting out of hand, until Agung gay thewhole thing by having Luna assassinated, " However, going back to the time before Antonio Luna's aryyg Aguinaldo was, as Corpuz claims, aware of the need to seize Intranet o Nios before the Americans could do so, why did he dillydally on this sn and crucial move? Once the Americans had crossed Filiping je" thanks to Aguinaldo’s permission (or stupidity), they surrounded th. Walled City, hoisted the American flag, and sternly forbade the Fy” nos, under the threat of being fired upon, from crossing the Amerie lines and trom entering the Walled City during their mock assault gy the Spanish command. General Noriel, who commanded the Philipin forces along the bay in Baclaran and Pasay, is said to have wept with dismay when he realized what had happened (Joaquin 1977, 126), Thy, It was only some time later, at about eight in the evening of Satur day, 4 February 1899, when American troops fired at and killed some Filipino soldiers who had unwittingly crossed American lines, that the revolutionary army started to oppose the American forces. The Ameri cans could not have chosen a better time for provoking hostilities: The only Filipino officer on duty was Colonel Luciano San Miguel; al the generals were outside of Manila. Aguinaldo was in Malolos, some 50 kilometers from Manila, attending a gala dance with his officers. Antonio Luna himself, the director of War and in charge of all military operations, was on a weekend furlough with his family in San Fernando, Pampanga. Did Aguinaldo and his generals really think that the Americans would not attack? The continued presence of the American forces in the Philippines and the influx of successive reinforcements from the mainland should have been viewed by Aguinaldo as a direct threat ro the sovereignty of the newly formed Republican nation-state. And considering the te” sions that have been building up following the surrender of the Span's command to the Americans on 14 August 1898, and the ceding of the Philippines to the United States, as provided for by the Treaty of Par on 10 December 1898, why were Aguinaldo and his generals attend a dance party 50 kilometers away from Manila, instead of being 0" " —- The Revolution that Never Was 25 and making tHE NECESATY military preparations to secure the de. nes of te Filipino forces? Eyen when the war was already lost ss Wgakdo 2s fleeing with his defeated army from the advancing in forces, he and his generals sil managed to attend dance par- ‘hosted by some towns along their escape route (Joaquin 1977), se" conicallyy while Aguinaldo hag proven himself ruthless in swiftly jninaing lipino leaders who threatened im Bonifacio (execwed cpt after his arrival in Cavite) and then Antonio Luna (assss- paced barely si \do’s forces) —| s. Before the outbreak of the Philippine-American ‘Yar all responses from the Philippine side, including Aguinaldo’s pas- vray in the face of American mobilization in Cavite and Manila; the sesstance of the Filipino forces to American intrusions out of a de- aero avoid a military confrontation; the tendency to avoid displeasing “ye Americans Father than presenting them with strong demands backed srth decisive action—all these actually made it easier for the Americans to conquer the Philippines. Why did General Emilio Aguinaldo display Why was the revolutionary leadership so naive and ignorant about American designs in the Pacific? And what was the impact of such timidity on the popular consciousness? Ir would probably take several dissertations to sufficiently address these questions. Suffice it to say that the discourses on America cited ahove, that is, that America was a liberator or that it was futile to resist her, indicate that the grand narrative of emancipation was never a single, finished story. It was always being written and rewritten, told and retold, and though the form or structure, the basic tripartite plot remained the same (precolonial/Eden—colonial/lost Eden —postcolo- rialRedemption), the content of each epoch was never fixed. At each stage of the struggle the narrative, in particular, the third part—Re- demption/postcolonial independence—was being constructed and reconstructed, reflecting the unceasing internal struggles that perhaps never really got resolved within the ranks of the Filipinos. These narra~ alert and A eri x months after he arrived from Hong Kong to join Aguinall tive contestations, in fact, define the ideological struggles from the Pro~ Paganda Movement of the 1880s to the Revolution of the 1890s, until the Philippine-American War at the turn of the century. Indeed, there Was not one narrative but several narratives of Philippine nationalism at the turn of the century, and the counterhegemonic movement wasBe The Revolution that Never Was never a stable, solid process—it was always, as Gramsci would have Put “moving equilibrium.” "Nonetheless the movement had a center, and that center was, a5 Benedict Anderson had discerned, Jose Rizal. The most influential intel. lectual during the period, Rizal’s towering erudition and the sheer cha. tisma of his moral bearing, was acknowledged by everyone, even by the Spaniards, who considered him as their principal enemy. Rizal himself had participated in defining the nationalist narrative, through his work on the Morga and his novels. However, might things have been differ. ent had Rizal not opted to play the role of a martyr—if he had chosen instead, like his brother Paciano and his Indios Bravos buddies Antonio Luna, Jose Alejandrino, and Edilberto Evangelista, to serve in the Revo- lution? Rizal might have given better advice to Aguinaldo on the Ameri. can question. However, Aguinaldo might not have listened. Or worse, Rizal might have ended up dead like Bonifacio and Antonio Luna, or given the sack like Mabini, and the same sorry mess would have ex- Ploded in Aguinaldo’s face anyway. All these are counterfactual suppo- sitions. For Rizal to have acted differently, he would have had to think and feel differently: He, and for that matter, Bonifacio, should not have taken the Pasyon too seriously. Yet Rizal was a product of his times, and his link with the Pasyon is precisely the source of his appeal to the masses. That is also why Bonifacio could translate Rizal’s nationalist \ded as enthusiastically toa purely secular, Enlightenment narrative? Or, for that matter, to Antonio Luna’s romantic militarism? Was the Pasyon narrative capable of meeting the threat of an en- emy which did not think and act in terms of the Pasyon code? One ‘might say that it was Aguinaldo’s observance of the ethical code of the Fasyon, humility and honesty, transparency and truthfulness, in his dealings with the duplicitous and worldly wise Yankees that did him in, and thus led to the Revolution’s defeat. However, this is belied by Aguinaldo’s murderous duplicity and cunning in dealing with Bonifacio and Antonio Luna. Or could it be that the Pasyon cede is the weak Person's mode of relating to the strong—the morality of the slave, as Nietzsche would put it—a posture which Aguinaldo had assumed vis-2- vis the Americans because he not only saw them ag vastly more superior militarily, but also as invincible? Did thie thought ultimately overwhelm him? Indeed, as Joaquin (121-28) has asserted, Aguinaldo could have