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Use of Technology Qualification in Offshore Oil and Gas Operations: An FMECA

Analysis for Mitigating Potential Failures

Article · June 2014

DOI: 10.1115/OMAE2014-23410

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 Proceedings of the ASME 2014, 33rd International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering
OMAE2014
June 8-13, 2014, San Francisco, USA

Draft OMAE2014-23410

USE OF TECHNOLOGY QUALIFICATION IN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS: AN

ANALYSIS FOR MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE

R.M. Chandima Ratnayake S.M. Samindi M.K. Samarakoon

Ove T. Gudmestad
Department of Mechanical and Structural Engineering and Material Science, Faculty of Science and
Technology, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway.

ABSTRACT and process facilities), their complexity multiply failure modes.

Such failure modes and their effect lengthen downtime, make
Implementation of a new technology introduces
repairs more difficult, increase equipment and training costs,
uncertainties. The uncertainties generate risks for the
and escalate the need to replace costly spare parts made in small
technology developers, manufacturers, vendors, operators and
production runs ([1], [3], [4]). The complexity here generates
end-users due to consequence of failures. In this context, the
additional consequences, for instance, in large-scale projects
application of proven technology in a new environment is also
that are highly capital-intensive; results costly loss of
considered as a new technology. Basically, a system as a whole
production necessitates knowledge-intensive repairs and creates
is considered to be a new technology when it has been
adverse impacts on the health, safety and environment as well
assembled in a novel way consisting of individual components
as the societal burden [3]. The aforementioned further
built using proven technology. The concerns in deploying new
exacerbates when a technology has been introduced to an
technology are significant in the offshore Oil and Gas (O&G)
atmosphere which has not been familiar with. In this
operations as they involve in hazardous operations. Moreover, a
manuscript, the application of proven technology in an
technology is considered as new when applied to offshore O&G
unfamiliar atmosphere has been considered as a ‘new
operations due to variability of technical challenges from field
technology’. Hence, aforementioned kind of situations, it is vital
to field, complexity of the systems with limited space, limited
to identify the potential failures associated with the
experience with harsh and sensitive environment. When a new
technological system (i.e. in a new atmosphere) prior to
technology is integrated into a large system, it requires
application via ‘technology qualification’ procedures that has
evaluating the effect on the total system’s reliability to increase
been established by universally accepted codes, standards and
the level of confidence via a technology qualification
practices.
procedure. Hence, it is vital to interpret how the risks are
managed by the provision of evidence to reduce uncertainties.
The concept of ‘technology qualification’ enables in
This manuscript presents an illustrative case of failure mode,
identifying opportunities to improve system design, minimize
effect and criticality analysis (FMECA) in qualifying a new
potential risk of failures (i.e.by reducing uncertainties and
technology when it is implemented in an unfamiliar atmosphere.
increasing reliability), develop operators’ confidence, allow
more efficient use of existing resources and to identify potential
1 INTRODUCTION
failure modes and necessary design changes at an early stage of
Inherently, technological systems and sub-systems fail
the life cycle ([2], [5], [6], [7], [8]). For instance, qualification
internally (e.g. component failures) as well as externally due to
programs enable to authorize the novel solutions whilst
unpredictable events such as severe weather and human
providing an acceptable level of safety (e.g. current offshore
interference ([1], [2]). In this context, large complex systems
and marine industrial practices during the life cycle of the
face challenges due to the failure of key components which
project) [5]. In this scenario, the use of risk and reliability
affect the entire system ([1], [3]). In addition, when it comes to
focused approaches together with qualification programs
energy related hazardous systems (e.g. Oil and Gas production
provides a better understanding about the risk and reliability

1 Copyright © 2014 by ASME

implications of implementation of a new technology in a project temperature gradients) when the corresponding pump is
during the decision making process ([1], [2], [6]). Although installed in an oil and gas facility located in the Arctic Norway].
new technology applications usually goes through a formal Hence, in order to focus on where uncertainty is greatest, the
qualification process, the analysis limits providing a qualitative novelty categorization has been established [7]. Table 1
prediction of the real system being assessed [9]. This creates an illustrates the novelty categorization of a new technology.
uncertainty in relation to potential outcome of a new technology
in a complex system, such as offshore oil and gas facilities Table 1. Novelty Categorization of a new technology [7]
(note: although the technology is being verified for certain Application areas Degree of novelty of technology
conditions in an isolated/ad hoc fashion) [1]. As the novelty of Proven Limited New or
a technique is dependent not only on the technique itself but field history unproven
also on the application environment, the operators need to have Known 1 2 3
sufficient confidence to implement solutions [10]. Hence, it is Limited knowledge 2 3 4
vital to develop methodologies to make the analysis in a formal New 3 4 4
manner.
This manuscript employs the risk-based approach that has been
This manuscript discusses use of FMECA (Failure Modes, adopted from DNV-RP-A203 [7]. Figure 2 illustrates the flow
Effect and Criticality Analysis) in a technology qualification (or chart that has been utilized for FMECA analysis that has been
assessment) process in minimizing the risk of failure when a carried out for the technology qualification (i.e. for a
new technology has been applied an unfamiliar atmosphere (or electrification project).
an environment). An illustrative analysis has been presented
Define the system
focusing on an electrification project that has been scheduled to
E.g. Identify the components, interfaces,
run in a harsh offshore environment. system schematics, specification etc.

2 TECHNOLOGY QUALIFICATION
Criticality (or risk) analysis-based approaches have been Categorize the system into elements
advocated in much of the literature to implement qualification
procedures in the offshore oil and gas related technical
applications ([1], [8], [11]). In this context, the reliability plays
Describe the qualitative severity and likelihood
a central role as this is a fundamental characteristic to meet safe
classification
operations of any modern technological system ([1], [11]).
Further, the criticality (or risk) analysis-based approaches
enable a consistent assessment of the system in identifying the
key features and actions to be addressed during the operational Document levels of acceptable risk
phase of the life cycle of the technology that has been employed
[8]. The criticality (or risk) analysis-based approaches also aids
protecting a system from the uncertainty of unknown failures Identify
behavior (of its components, systems and structures), without
directly quantifying them. This enables to provide reasonable
assurance that the system is possible to operate without undue Failure modes Causes of failure Effects of failure
risk. For instance, the technology qualification has been carried
out in the Norway for emerging CO2 capture and storage
Risk Mitigation actions
technologies providing a systematic risk-based procedure for
selection, characterization and qualification of sites and projects
for geological storage of CO2 [11]. Hence, similar approach has Effect on Effect on Effect on
been adopted in this manuscript to illustrate technology Effect on HSE and
the same the other the overall
finance
qualification in an electrification project. system systems system

2.1 Methodology
Document the analyis using
As a ‘new technology’ is evolved from existing proven
FMECA worksheet
technologies, most of the occasions, only some of the elements
of the selected technology becomes novel. Hence, the
uncertainty is mainly associated with the elements that are novel Figure 2. Flow chart: FMECA approach
to the new (e.g. arctic Norway) atmosphere [e.g. steels balls of a
baller bearing in a pump may under go inherent fatigue due to The DNV-RP-A203 [7] provides a systematic approach which
cyclic loads plus thermally induced fatigue (i.e. due to high consists of several steps in qualifying a technology (see Figure

2 Copyright © 2014 by ASME

3). The purpose of the first step, ‘qualification basis’, is to
define the expectations of the technology without referring to
relevant codes and procedure. Furthermore, it refers to details
of the technology, defines the requirements (e.g. HSE
requirements, authority requirements, reliability.) and functions
of the technology and defines the limits for the qualification
(e.g. capacities, dimensioning loads.) in all the phases of the
technology’s life cycle.
Figure 3. Activities in a technology qualification process
(adopted from DNV [7] )
Offshore transformers
FPSO
HV switchboard
Floater
Cable length (16 cm diameter)
Cable length (20 cm diameter)
from transition joint to FPSO 5 Km
Dynamic part of cable
Transition joint
Figure 4. Power from shore to offshore; System overview
As the next step, ‘identification and risk ranking of the failure
modes with a description of the underlying failure mechanism’,
is carried out for all the phases of the technology’s service life.
In addition, classification of a technological system into
manageable subsystems simplifies the identification of possible
failures. Each identified failure mode is expanded into cause,
effect and mitigation. In this case, the Failure Modes Effects
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and the criticality matrix
concepts enable to get the risk priority number. The mitigation
measures are outlined based on the results obtained. For this
reason, FMECA has been used routinely in various engineering
industries for more than 40 years for different applications [11].
However, it is essential to carry out HAZID (HAZard
IDentification) analysis for more complex systems. In this
process, it is also a requirement to identify the failures after
performing maintenance and modification activities to reduce
the risk of the failure modes of concern. Failure mode screening
(i.e. performed at an early stage to facilitate design for
maintenance activities); maintainability analysis (i.e. failure
modes with significant risk and a defined need of maintenance
is evaluated, including how to fulfill the given requirements,
ensure cost-effective operations and maintenance through the
life cycle of the system); and maintenance planning is also
included. Data collection is also an essential step in this process
to determine the margins of failure and reliability aspects. The
feedback loops between the steps indicate the modification
requirement in the design, specification and maintenance plan
where the outcome of the steps is not within the specified limits.
2.2 FMECA for Technology Qualification
The FMECA is examined on two levels [12]. In the first level of
the analysis, it consists of the identification of potential failure
modes of the constituent items (components or sub-systems)
and the effect on the system performance by identifying the
potential severity of the effect. The second level of the analysis
is a criticality analysis and criticality ranking of the items under
investigation. Both of these levels are intended to provide
information for making risk management decisions. This
analysis are performed iteratively in all stages of the design and
Onshore transformer station
upto transition joint 100 Km
Static part of cable
operation of a system (for instance, Figure 1 illustrates the basic
steps involved in the FMECA process).
3 CASE STUDY
The power supply system of an offshore oil and gas production
facility is addressed by the Integrated Pollution Prevention and
Control (IPPC) directive under the category of “combustion
3 Copyright © 2014 by ASME
 Power supply system

Power transmission Emergency Waste Heat Recovery

Gas turbines Electrical heaters
system from shore generators Unit(WHRU)

Starting system
• Cable (static)
• Cable (dynamic) Gas generator
• Transformers Components :air inlet,
• HV switchboard compressor rotor, stator,
combustion chamber, etc..

Control and monitoring

Lubricating system

Power turbine
Components; Rotor, stator,
casing, seals, etc..

Figure 5. Power Supply System Hierarchical break down

plants over 50 MW capacities” [13]. Power for an offshore risk/criticality-based approach to meet reliability goals in the
production facility is conventionally supplied using gas or qualification process of the new technology.
diesel combustion turbines. However, most gas or diesel
combustion turbine applications have low efficiencies under the In this context, as the electrification (or “power from shore to
best operating conditions, resulting in high emission and high offshore”) poses new challenges due to it is unfamiliarity.
power consumption. As an alternative, “power from shore to Hence, it is vital to review in the technology qualification
offshore” is one of the country-specific best available process in risk/criticality perspective. Hence, an FMECA
techniques (BATs) currently being under implementation on the assessment has been suggested to assess the technique viability
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). This is to overcome some in the suggested new technology and to identify the potential
of these drawbacks to satisfy the power demand of 60 MW (i.e. modification/ improvement/ risk-or-criticality-mitigation
> 50 MW) for a new installation. However, the heat demand requirements that can be incorporated at the design phase.
(36 MW) is supplied by both electrical heaters connected to Table 2 and 3 shows criticality classification and likelihood
power supply from shore. A waste heat recovery unit is classification respectively.
connected to a dry low Emission gas turbine, which is running
in parallel. Figure 4 illustrates the conceptual technical solution. Table 2. Criticality classification
It consists of an onshore power station connected to a substation Level Class Description
on an offshore platform via a (100 km length) subsea cable. 1 Catastrophic Total loss of the system involving the
significant property damage, health, safety and
This process is referred to as electrification.
environmental damage
2 Critical Significant reduction of functional
Figure 5 illustrates the overview of the total power supply performance with an immediate change in the
system. However, portion of the power demand is supposed to system
3 Marginal Some reduction in operational effectiveness
supply from conventional gas turbines with heat recovery unit 4 Minor No significant effect
and recycling to provide the necessary process heat. This
arrangement is advantageous as the two power supply sources
are independent. This enables operations to continue, at a Table 3. Probability/likelihood classification
reduced capacity, in case of loss of one of the power sources. Level Class Description
However, the introduction of a power transmission system from 1 Frequent Likely to occur frequently
onshore to offshore (i.e. considered as new due to application in 2 Probable Will occur in the life time of an item
new environment as the installation is located in the Barents 3 Occasional Likely to occur sometimes in the life time an
item
Sea) imposes the uncertainty of unknown failure behavior of its 4 Remote Unlikely but possible to occur in the life time
components, systems and structures. Also, there is a risk on of an item
overall system reliability due to new applications (Note: 5 Improbable So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may
electrification is a relatively new concept in oil and gas not be experienced
production and process facilities). Therefore, it is vital to use a

4 Copyright © 2014 by ASME

Furthermore, Table 4 illustrates the risk matrix that has been [2]. Fennell, B., Avignon, B., Henderson, W.D., 1994.
employed in the FMECA analysis. Qualification of an HP/HT retrievable production packer.
In: SPE. Proceedings of the European Petroleum
Table 4. Risk Matrix Conference, London (United Kingdom):28895-MS.
Severrity
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible [3]. Khan, F.I., Amyotte, P.R., 2002. Inherent safety in
Likelihood I II III IV offshore oil and gas activities: a review of the present
status and future directions. Journal of Loss Prevention in
Frequent(1)
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Occational(3) Aven, T., 1998. Utilization of principles from structural

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3
y

y
or

or
eg

Remote(4)

eg
offshore transport problem. Reliability Engineering &
at

at
C

C
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[5]. Ballesio, J., Patel, H., Revenga, A., Rynn, P., 2009. Risk
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technology Conference: SPE OTC20301.
4 RESULTS [6]. PSA, 2008. Petroleum Safety Authority
Figure 6 in the last page illustrates the final outcome of the (PSA),Regulations Relating to Design and Outfitting of
FMECA analysis. According to the results, it is observed that Facilities in the Petroleum Activities (The Facilities
dynamic part of the cable should be given major attention for Regulations),PSA, Stavanger, Norway (2008)
further assessment to identify the unknown failure modes. [7]. DNV, 2011. Recommended Practice DNV-RP-A203,
Qualification Procedures for New Technology, Oslo,
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS Norway.
Better understanding of the reliability issues in implementing a [8]. Levett, B.A., Brandt, H., 2005. The role of risk
new technology leaves an operator (i.e. the owner of operating management in development and application of new
assets) in a stronger position to make well-informed decisions technology. SPE/IADC Drilling Conference - Drilling
about the applications of the corresponding techniques. In this Technology, Amsterdam (Netherlands):92643-MS.
scenario, risk/criticality-based approaches provides value [9]. Masemore, S., Kirchgessner, D.A., 1999. Greeenhouse
adding exercises to identify critical failure modes in design, Gas (GHG) mitigation and monitoring technology
commissioning and operating phases of the technology performance: Activities of the GHG technology
applications and their impact on the environment, finance and verification centre. In: SPE. Proceeding of SPE/EPA
society. It also helps developing a mitigation plan for the exploration and production environmental conference,
majority of the perceived risks. SPE 52676.
[10]. Samarakoon, S.M.K., and O.T. Gudmestad. The IPPC
The FMECA approach suggested in this manuscript enables Directive and Technique Qualification at Offshore Oil and
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6 REFERENCES
[1]. Hother, J., Hebert, B., 2005. Risk minimization by the use
of failure mode analysis in the qualification of new
technology - Recent project experience in completions and
sand control. In: SPE. SPE Annual Technical Conference
and Exhibition, Texas (USA), 96335-MS.

5 Copyright © 2014 by ASME

Name: Power supply system from onshore transformer station
Level: Indenture level 3(Power supply system components)
Operating State: Continuous operations Updated

Severity

Severity
Likely.

Likely.
Failure Effect on other Effect on Mitigation of

Cater.

Cater.
Component Function Failure mode Detection method Cause of Remarks
mechanism Failure sysetm overall sysetm failure modes
Remotely operated Due to heave, No power Degradation Implement good
Electricity Cracking Wear and tear No power supply 3 2 or 3 1 or 2 3 4 3
Cable (dynamic) vehicles and by roll and pitch in supply to the rates O and M plan
Transmission to platform
maintenance FPSO Transformer predictable

Movements due to Small chance of

Electricity Deformation and
Cable (dynamic) Visual/loss of power Fatigue heave, wind, polar Do Do 3 2 or 3 1 or 2 fatigue if well Technology 3 4 3
Transmission disintegration
lows, waves, designed for qualification
movements
Frequent
Cable (dynamic Electricity Instability due to Forces applied Possible
Collision Visual/ marine radars Do Do 5 1 3 monitoring during 5 2 3
and static) Transmission overstress due to ice bergs sudden failure
winter
Electricity Due to fish or sea Possible Frequent
Cable (dynamic) Open circuit None Instability due to Do Do 4 2 2 4 3 3
Transmission animal attack sudden failure monitoring
overstress
Use of higher
Instability due to Commercial fishing Possible 4 4 3
Cable ( static) Do Open circuit None Do Do 3 3 2 cable burial
over tension activities, anchors sudden failure
depths
Use of anchor
Degradation
Movements in sea Scour and sediment 3 2 or 3 1 or 2 detection device,
Cable (static) Do Cracking By maintenance Do Do rates 4 3 3
bed due to sea current migration use of higher
predictable
cable burial
depths
Cable (dynamic Electricity Regular video Water- born sand, Do Degradation
Cracking Abrasion Do 3 2 or 3 1 or 2 Provide proper
and static) Transmission inspection chemical attack due to rates 3 4 3
cable armouring
salt predictable
Cable (dynamic Open circuit/ Implement good 3 4
Do By maintenance Overheating Insulation failure Do Do Possible 3
and static) Short circuit 3 2 or 3 1 or 2 sudden failure O and M plan

Man made or by other Degradation

Cable (dynamic Do Cracking Electric corrosion Careful cable
By maintenance circulating electric Do Do 3 2 or 3 1 or 2 rates 4 4 3
and static) route planning
current predictable
Cable (dynamic Measuring insulation Premature insulation Possible sudden Implement good
Do
Short cuircuit Water blocking failure Do Do 3 1 1 failure during installation plan 4 4 3
and static) resistance
installation
Transformer Transform Construction fault, Winding or bushing
Open circuit/ Alarm/loss of power/ No power Possible of Implement good
(Shore and voltages from over voltage, damage inside the Do 4 2 2
Short circuit blackout supply to cable sudden failure O and M plan 4 3 3
offshore) one level to generating of copper transformer
another sulfide
Transformer
(Shore and Do Open circuit/ Over current or Possible of Frequent
Alarm/loss of power Overheating Do Do 4 2 2 4 3 3
offshore) Short circuit shorting of windings sudden failure monitoring

Frequent
Transformer Degradation inspection of oil
High pressure, Mechanical
(Shore and Do Oil leak Visual/loss of power 4 2 2 rates tank or use tank 4 4 3
corrosion damage Do Do
offshore) predictable -ground
protection

Figure 5. FMECA sheet

6 Copyright © 2014 by ASME

 7 Copyright © 2014 by ASME

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