Hegel’s Conception of Mutual Recognition and the Problem of other Minds:

The Implications of Zombies for Ethics

Introduction:
In discussion of the problem of other minds, there is always a hidden suspicion at play when
considering another being as having consciousness; a fear that one may have made a mistake
in attributing consciousness to a being or agent. When in fact, they could be a philosophical
‘zombie’ and my consciousness could be the only one of its kind in the totality of this world.
What becomes at stake if I, a (self-proposed) conscious being, attribute consciousness en masse
to objects of perception to be conscious subjects? Take for example the shape shifting alien-
race the Skrull in the Fantastic Four comic-book series, who have the ability to disguise among
us as human-beings, a scenario very much like the thought-experiment of the possible Zombie
world.1 In this scenario, I have every right to be suspicious that this could or may have already
taken place, due to the modal concepts at play. But by Hegel’s account in the Phenomenology
of Spirit and the section entitled ‘Mastery and Servitude’2, I will never be able to complete the
process of mutual recognition, and my experience as a conscious agent will be worse off for it.
It can also have moral, social and political implications if I choose not to acknowledge the
consciousness of other agents – Hegel is very clear on these historical parallels and real-world
scenarios – slavery, serfdom and the oppression of minority groups, that have much more
gravitas than the imaginary scenario of an alien Skrull invasion. For this reason, I will put
forward criticism of the way the problem of other minds is conceptualised by Chalmers and
the analytic tradition.3

My issue with Chalmers conception of the problem of other minds is that it presents this issue
as purely epistemological and metaphysical (due to conceivability); based on an agent’s
knowledge and the modal concepts at play in the Zombie scenario. Instead, it should also be
considered as an ethical issue much in the same way that Hegelian ethics characterises
philosophical problems via context, history, community and relations between agents.4 This
allows for a fuller and more fleshed out conception of the problem of other minds that does not
reduce it to pure epistemology and retains the real-world parallels that make the issue of urgent
philosophical importance. These historical and social elements allow for a fuller and broader
conception of the problem that takes account of more possible factors and criteria that are
relevant to the problem of other minds; and as I will discuss later, this is largely ignored by the
thought-experiment used by Chalmers in which the issue is considered ahistorical. From this,

1
we can see that the issue becomes between two ways of thinking about philosophy; analytic
and Hegelian.5

What I have in mind is the process of ‘Recognition’ described in Hegel’s exposition of lord-
servant bondship (or ‘master and slave’ dialectic to which it is sometimes referred to in the
literature).6 Whereby the ultimate end of this process is an attempt at mutual recognition
between two agents fighting for the recognition of their personhood, the recognition of which,
I will argue, the problem of other minds is also aiming to address. This differs from the
conceptualisation of the problem put forward by Chalmers and others, in which the problem of
other minds is an ahistorical thought-experiment by which to denounce traditional materialist
conceptions of mind, and not – from a Hegelian perspective – the lived reality of human
history.7 Usage of Hegel has not paid attention to the master and servant section of the
Phenomenology in its relation to the problem of other minds, and this is largely due to the
boundary between analytic philosophy and usage of Hegel, even by those influenced by Hegel
like Brandom and McDowell. As a result, Hegel has largely been ignored in discussion of the
problem of other minds due to considering him as having nothing to say about the problem of
other minds, or due to ignorance of Hegel’s insights.8 I will argue that Hegel’s discussion of
Recognition does have useful things to say about the problem of other minds and offers us an
alternative methodology to dealing with this problem that does not take the approach and
conceptualisation of Chalmers and the analytic tradition.

The paper will be structured as such; firstly, addressing the problem of other minds as it appears
in Chalmers (1998), followed by a discussion of Hegel’s exposition of the master and servant
relationship and the process of Recognition in the Phenomenology, and then concluding with
some solutions and changes that should be made when addressing the problem of other minds,
that takes account of the process of Recognition. The viewpoint I am working from is not one
that is trying to read things into Hegel’s text that might be deemed implicit but rather to
expound elements of the relevant sections of the Phenomenology that have significance for a
new approach to addressing the problem of other minds.

Zombies and other minds:

To briefly state, Chalmers (1998) characterises the problem of other minds – through the
zombie possible world or conceivability argument– as such:

“…the logical possibility of a zombie: someone or something physically identical to me (or to

any other conscious being) but lacking conscious experiences altogether. At the global level,

2
 we can consider the logical possibility of a zombie world: a world physically identical to
ours, but in which there are no conscious experiences at all. In such a world, everybody is a
zombie.”9

As it appears, the Zombie argument is used as an argument against materialism by Chalmers

to defend a type of property dualism.10 With the overall goal in using the problem of other
minds being in relation to the inclusion of consciousness within the scientific image i.e. the
inclusion of the manifest image of consciousness as experienced with the scientific conception
of the world. Fundamentally, the problem relies on modal concepts. Based on this, Chalmers
does not rule out the possibility that the problem of other minds might have the implications
that Hegel is considering, but rather that the issue itself should be taken as a philosophical
thought-experiment by which to reject materialist conceptions of mind (that is all it is used for
by Chalmers). In the perspective of Chalmers, the problem is still based around subjectivity,
since all others that are perceived to be agents are ‘Zombies’, issues of intersubjectivity and
communication between agents has not been discussed.

However, the methodology of a strict thought-experiment creates an artificial scenario that

becomes useless once the point or conclusion has been established, in this case, showing that
materialist conceptions of mind are false. With real-world parallels, we are given an urgency
to issues dealt with by the philosopher that are not apparent for the discussion produced through
though-experiments and puzzle cases.11 Thought-experiments being something that are
inherited by Chalmers and the analytic tradition from British empiricism and Kant.12
Furthermore, our thought-experiment does not necessitate there to be any explicit reference to
one or more individual agents at play, only that – from my perspective – I do not have the
necessary knowledge of other minds or that there is a possibility that the ‘person’ who appears
to me in experience is not conscious. This could be altered; as we shall see in Hegel’s scenario,
two agents may be argumentative over there right to be recognised as agents with conscious
processes, or the fact that the intricacies between two agents and their usage of language to
express these thoughts is never really discussed in much detail, and what it means to engage
with a philosophical Zombie without presupposing any sort of consciousness at play, i.e. is the
engagement of an agent with another agent who she is unsure of having a mind, how can
dialogue be established between them. These issues, as I will argue, fall within the social,
political and historical; they are not purely epistemological as the detached (in Heidegger’s
terminology; a present-at-hand13 epistemology) viewpoint of Chalmers would have us believe.
Furthermore, Chalmers does not consider the ethical implications of denying other beings’

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personhood; it can be entertained that a version of Chalmers Zombie argument, being as
popular as it is against materialist conceptions of mind, could also be used as an argument for
slavery or denying the personhood of minority groups if detached from its context as an
argument within the philosophy of mind. Therefore; Chalmers use of the Zombie argument is
not being attacked on its merits within the philosophy of mind, but on its weaknesses that it
presents to philosophical areas outside of the philosophy of mind. Conceivability arguments
present fundamental issues for those working in disciplines such as ethics and meta-ethics; do
conceivability arguments entail a restriction of the recognition of rights and political
freedom?.14

My proposal is that the problem of other minds is not purely epistemological; it is an ethical
issue and it may be helpful to consider it as such, and there are real-world consequences for
failing to engage with this aspect of the problem such that Chalmers presents fundamentally
flawed formulations of these issues. Hegel’s conception of these issues, via a dialectical method
that combines analysis and synthesis, will be shown as offering a better engagement with the
problem of other minds.15 Thus, in order to explain what is meant by this, Hegel’s engagement
with the problem of other minds via the issue of Recognition as a necessary practical postulate
will be discussed.

Hegel’s conception of the Master-and-Bondsman relation:

Now, Hegel’s description of the master and bondsman relation will be discussed. To briefly
state the central point of Hegel’s description of the master-and-bondsman relation and how it
arises; a conscious being can make value judgments about objects external to it, but this
becomes more complicated once those objects want to identify themselves as subjects, and a
host of difficulties ensues over the right to be recognised as subject rather than object. 16 The
master and bondsman relationship that Hegel describes is linked intrinsically with the concept
of ‘Recognition’, Recognition acts as a necessary practical postulate by which agents can be
given complex rights and liberties or basic recognition of personhood.17

The process of Recognition is only completable through the utilisation of another agent that I
encounter in experience and interact with in this conscious experience, the desired goal for the
mature self-conscious agent and any liberal society is mutual Recognition where all agents are
avowed their rights and liberties.18 The Recognition that Hegel is concerned with is the German
‘Anerkennung’; the acknowledgment of another agents liberties and rights and the
acknowledgement that they have these things in their personhood.19 By itself, this process of

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Recognition and the master and bondsman relationship is not intrinsically linked with the
problem of other minds – as Inwood argues – rather, that Hegel, when put into his historical
context, is dealing with an ethical issue of how an agent gains recognition of personhood via
external agents in experience giving or allocating this personhood to the agent. 20 Inwood, in
conceptualising it this way and deeming it as purely historical, fails to recognise that
Recognition and the issue of personhood is still an issue today for societies. Hegel believes that
recognition in the modern state will be mutual,21 but this presents a Europe-centred view of
world states that seems inadequate for the 21st century; rather, applying the concept of
Recognition in today’s globalised world requires awareness of societies outside of Europe
where minority or oppressed groups are not achieving Recognition. As a result, we can
establish that Recognition remains the necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood.22

Let us take as our starting point that there is a desire for Recognition by a self-conscious agent.23
By self-conscious agent is meant an agent whose object is itself, at its lowest form, it seeks
Recognition only for itself and at its most advanced form it desires mutual Recognition.24 This
desire in theory manifests itself as mutual (the best possible outcome) but in practice can turn
out inaccurate, i.e. that one agent receives Recognition while the other does not, becoming a
binary relationship in which one is the ‘master’ and the other is the ‘servant’. 25 This
‘inadequate’ relationship is the one we are concerned with due to its historical and real-world
parallels, while the instance of mutual Recognition is the desired goal.

In Hegel’s description, a self-conscious agent begins as existing in-and-for-itself (independent,

not relying on any other agent).26 From this, a scenario occurs in which this self-conscious
agent (or more phenomenologically, let us take ourselves as undergoing this experience) comes
into contact with another agent, an agent which will differ from other objects that can be
encountered in experience.27 This agent – as Pinkard notes – will always be conditioned,
meaning being situated within a specific historical time and zone, within a social-space and
specific individual existence, i.e. we can take this agent as existing in ancient Greece for
instance.28 From this, the scenario involving the concept of Recognition emerges between two
agents; being a relational concept due to intersubjective involvement.29

Recognition thus becomes external. This leads to an impasse between the two agents; both are
underdeveloped so want Recognition only for themselves (they are not yet at the stage of
wanting mutual Recognition which the mature self-conscious seeks), in scenarios in which both
want Recognition only for themselves, a life or death struggle ensues.30 Hegel is clear that the

5
dominance of one agent over another will not establish the conditions for mutual Recognition
– the historical parallels being serfdom and slavery – with one agent being subjected under the
other agent and the personhood of the subjected agent being lost so that the other gains
Recognition, this compromise should be seen as a failure to establish mutual Recognition. 31

Hegel is engaged in a form of externalism in the usage of the concept of Recognition here.
Hegel’s externalism is seen through the necessary requirement of another self in the process of
recognition, this form of externalism via multiple agents is reminiscent of Clarke and Chalmers
externalist thesis about the minds content.32 Thus, the active role of the environment plays a
part in cognitive processes as well as the involvement of assets and tools in the mind’s
cognition, the “manipulation of external media” and its assistance to the purely mental
content.33 Recognition requires an external agent that allows for the process to take place, it
cannot be achieved with a single isolated individual. The mental is no longer considered in
isolation, i.e. being a determinate, single subject in isolation from other subjects. Externality
and its considerations via Clarke and Chalmers thesis thus lead us on to the ideas of
intersubjectivity; from considering the role of external tools and assets in cognition to the
placement of other subjects in the cognitive experience of a self-conscious subject. As a result,
if an agent wants Recognition, there is a reason why it is achieved via another agent, and not
an object like a rock, book or tree; this is the externalism an agent is not looking for when it
wants Recognition to occur.

However, regardless of the move towards an intersubjective approach, the arbiter of what will
be considered a valid instance of Recognition will always be the agent experiencing the
process, or the other agent who is also experiencing the process.34 The relationship required for
recognition is a necessary one, such that the viewpoint of the agent or the conscious experience
of the agent is such that she can only attain validation through being recognised by another
(who claims) to also be an agent or thinking, conscious subject (the same concern as Chalmers
Zombie problem – ‘I’s’ who claim to be I’s – when the criterion we believe for this to be
established is necessarily subjective experience (or the best possible criterion of validation for
this), i.e. the ‘having’ of subjective experience. This “Struggle for Recognition” is described
by Harris (1997) as a first-person occurrence, in which:

“My insistence that the other must recognise me springs from me regarding myself as (or
from my being certain that I am) the Faustian ego that aims to determine itself and not to be
determined”35

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From this we can see that this underdeveloped self-conscious is at an impasse and unable to
achieve mutual Recognition because its mode of thinking is egoistical. The solution to this is
the introduction of a self-consciousness seeing itself in another; i.e. a projection of selfhood
onto another.36 However, Chalmers Zombie argument comes into play explicitly here, the
possibility that this other self could be a Zombie, or as Harris explains it, “only a passive
essence wanting for me to take possession of it [from the possession of a self-conscious agent
seeking Recognition]”.37 However, this becomes more complex once there is an
acknowledgement that the agent on which the first agent wants to emulate is not simply an
object, this agent has to make herself into an object for the other agents sake or for her
recognition of the other agent, this is a predominately egotistical usage of the other agent and
highlights how the issue at stake here centres around egotistical assumptions in methodological
approach; there is always the insistence that my perspective is the correct way in which to
engage with the other agent who is also seeking recognition – the validation of my conscious
experience is almost valid but requires approval from this other agent. From this, we can assess
that the process of Recognition requires the involvement of both agents, and that ultimately
mutual Recognition dispels the idea of the problem of other minds.38 This further highlights
that Hegel is not concerned with ‘objectively proving’ the existence of other minds through a
‘proof’ that the rationalists & empiricists would approve of, he is certainly not practising
classical metaphysics and epistemology in this sense, he is firmly executing a
phenomenological study of this process as it occurs and develops.

From this, we can discern that the scenario of Recognition would occur in a similar way if the
agent held firm to her belief that we cannot know other minds or that everyone else is a
philosophical Zombie; i.e. that a practical postulate like the concept of Recognition is
necessary. As a result, what is now needed is an ethical system that can take account of the
practical necessities that involve Recognition, one such example being Scanlon’s
contractualism: a thesis about the relations between agents.

Is Scanlon’s Contractualism the solution?

Now that we have discussed the complexities of Hegel’s conception of mutual Recognition
and linked it back to the initial discussion of the problem of other minds as it was presented by
Chalmers, I shall now further advance the suggestion of ethical solutions to epistemological
issues that the comparison between Chalmers and Hegel made clear. Scanlon’s (1998) usage
of the concept of recognition will be given as an example of an ethical system that takes account
of the issues that Hegel raised, and is an adequate counter to the approach of Chalmers. By this
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I mean that Scanlon proposes an ethical system that is able to provide useful practical
considerations to the problem of other minds that would have been ignored by the approach
proposed by Chalmers prior to the considerations of Hegel described earlier. The contention
being what is a valid reason for a decision that has practical consequences and practical
objections (such as the Zombie possible world and viewing persons as objects).

Scanlon, like Hegel, utilises the concept of mutual recognition for the ethical issue of agent’s
interactions with each other.39 Although he does not openly address the problem of other minds,
he is concerned with the way in which to value human life and the implications of recognition.40
Objections to Scanlon’s (1998) contractualism revolve around his conception of the wrongness
of actions and the reasons for rejecting a reason as wrong; this does not impact our concern
with the concept of mutual recognition.41 However, under a contractualist ethical theory I can
better achieve a situation of mutual recognition due to the awareness that I have the ability to
modify my own private reasons to better accommodate the position of others.42

As a result, we can now apply Scanlon’s thinking to the ethical developments shown by
thinking about the problem of other minds through Hegel’s ethical considerations; thinking
about right and wrong and the ethical implications of a possible Zombie world require us to
address what could be justified to others that they could not reasonably reject.43 Suppose that
as such we want to recognise and address what we owe to each other as agents, and we were
confronted with the possibility of a Zombie world, it would be reasonable to keep in mind the
mutual recognition between agents we want to preserve and to make the practical decision to
still think of these Zombies as other conscious agents in order to allow for this to be in place.
Coupled with the individualist restriction for rejection of reasons, there is a practical necessity
that we cannot deny another agent as having a mind or claim that he or she is a Zombie.44

Conclusion:
Hegel has taught us not to think of philosophical problems in a way that rejects other
components of the same problem; the theoretical aspect of any concept or dilemma always
alludes to the practical aspect of that same issue. We have seen that Chalmers (1998) has made
this mistake, Hegel described a phase of consciousness in his phenomenological study that
alluded to the practical consequences of this problem through historical parallels, and Scanlon
proposes an ethical system that can provide a foundation for an ethics which allows for the
mutual recognition of agents. As a result, the problem of other minds has been altered from a
thought-experiment in the philosophy of mind to a philosophical problem that has implications

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for both theoretical and practical philosophy; with the best outcome for the practical side of
that problem being mutual recognition, and that any ethical system that incorporates this
concept will be advantageous to the preservation of rights and liberties, specifically of minority
groups.

Bibliography:

Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998.

- The Character of Conciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Clarke, Andy and Chalmers, David. “The Extended Mind.” Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998): 7-19.
Deligiorgi, Katerina. “Religion, Love and Law: Hegel’s Early Metaphysics of Morals.” In A
Companion to Hegel, edited by Michael Baur & Stephen Houlgate, 23-44. Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011.
Glock, Hans-Johann. What is Analytic Philosophy?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008.
Harris, Henry Stilton, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason. Cambridge:
Hackett Publishing, 1997.
Hegel, G. W. F. The Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by Terry Pinkard. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Houlgate, Stephen. An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History. Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009.
Inwood, Michael. A Hegel Dictionary. Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992.
Jameson, Fredric. The Hegel Variations: On the Phenomenology of Spirit. London: Verso
Publishing, 2017.
Mulhall, Stephen. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time.
London: Routledge Publishing, 1996.
Pinkard, Terry. Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008.
Ridge, Michael. “Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent‐Relativity.” The Journal of
Political Philosophy 9, no. 4 (2002): 472-481.
Russon, John. “The Project of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.” In A Companion to Hegel,
edited by Michael Baur & Stephen Houlgate, 47-67. Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
Scanlon, T. M. What we owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
2000.

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Stern, Robert. “Why Hegel Now – and in What Form?” Royal Institute of Philosophy
Supplement 78, no. 1 (2016): 187-210.
Stratton-Lake, Phillip. On What we owe to Each Other. Oxford: Blackwell, 2009.
Wood, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Notes:

1
“Something similar applies to inverts and other duplicates.” This is due to the modal concepts
at play in these scenarios. David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 107.
2
G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Terry Pinkard (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2019), 108.
3
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 94.
4
Katerina Deligiorgi, “Religion, Love, and Law: Hegel’s Early Metaphysics of Morals,” in A
Companion to Hegel, ed. Michael Baur & Stephen Houlgate (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011),
23.
5
Robert Stern argues that Analytic Philosophy is taking an increasingly Hegelian turn, and the
relationship between Hegel and Analytic Philosophy should not be considered an ‘either/or’ –
citing the Pittsburgh Hegelians, McDowell and Brandom, as operating on the borderline
between the two viewpoints, likewise their influences, Pippin and Pinkard share in this. Robert
Stern, “Why Hegel Now – and in what Form?,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 78
(2016): 187, 191-192.
6
Allen W. Wood. Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
85-86.
7
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 123-125.
8
Inwood’s article on Recognition believes Hegel is not dealing with the problem of other
minds, and then goes on to say that Recognition for the German Idealists (Kant, Fichte,
Schelling) was an ethical problem. I disagree with the first point but agree with the later point.
Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), 245-246.
9
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 94; David Chalmers, The Character of Conciousness,
107-108.
10
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 123-133; David Chalmers, The Character of
Conciousness, 119
11
Hans-Johann Glock, What is Analytic Philosophy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008), 164, 151-160.
12
Hans-Johann Glock, What is Analytic Philosophy?, 164.
13
Stephen Mulhall. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time
(London: Routledge, 1996), 39-41.
14
H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Cambridge: Hackett,
1997), 371. Hegel’s relation to the issue of Recognition of rights has been described as similar
to Habermas. Fredric Jameson, The Hegel Variations: On the Phenomenology of Spirit
(London: Verso, 2017), 54.
15
Hans-Johann Glock, What is Analytic Philosophy?, 153-154.
16
In this regard, one aspect of Recognition is the “fundamental parameters of our identity”;
John Russon, “The Project of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,” in A Companion to Hegel,
ed. Michael Baur & Stephen Houlgate (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 58.
17
Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 109.
10
18
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 343; Hegel, The
Phenomenology of Spirit, 110.
19
Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, 245.
20
Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, 245.
21
Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, 246.
22
Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, 246.
23
Wood, Hegel's ethical thought, 85-86.
24
Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 68.
25
Wood, Hegel's ethical thought, 89.
26
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 343.
27
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason,52-53.
28
Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 48.
29
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 344; Hegel, The
Phenomenology of Spirit, 109-110.
30
Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History, 69.
31
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 344.
32
Andy Clarke and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998): 7..
33
Clarke and Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” 8-11.
34
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 344.
35
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 345.
36
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 345.
37
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 345.
38
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 347
39
T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
2000), 162, 194.
40
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 386.
41
Michael Ridge, “Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent‐Relativity,” The Journal of
Political Philosophy 9, no. 4 (2002), 472.
42
Philip Stratton-Lake, On What We Owe to Each Other (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 7-8.
43
Stratton-Lake, On What We Owe to Each Other, 9.
44
Stratton-Lake, On What We Owe to Each Other, 11.

11