Angeles University Foundation

Manuel Roxas St., Angeles City, Pampanga

School of Law
 

   

DIGESTED CASES UNDER THE NEW

CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

Submitted to:

Atty. Noel T. Canlas

Submitted by:

Puno, Andrei Hans

Ryan, Ronquillo

Rosales, Dianne
In Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Hearing Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, AM No. SB-14-21-J, 23
September 2014

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 In the middle of 2013, the “pork barrel scam” controversy spawned massive
protest actions all over the country. Some government officials and other
individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees
of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-
military officer. Among the said personalities who allegedly transacted with
Mrs. Napoles was the incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory
S. Ong.

 Incriminating evidence surfaced implicating Associate Justice of the

Sandiganbayan Gregory Ong. Multiple sworn statements and verbal
testimonies of Marina Sula, pointed out that Ong had visited the office of
key Pork Barrel Scam player Janet Lim Napoles. Before the warrant of arrest
was issued against Ms. Napoles, Sula was told by Napoles that that case
could take four to five years to clear, claiming that she was already in
contact with someone from the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan.

 Ong explained himself in a letter to CJ Sereno, saying that the photo was
taken in one of Sen. Estrada’s birthday parties and it would have been rude
of him not to pose with other guests. He categorically stated that he did not
attend any event hosted by Napoles during or after she had a case (the
Kevlar cases) in the Sandiganbayan in which she was acquitted.

 Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an

investigation motu proprio under this Court's power of administrative
supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal
profession.
 Upon the court finding possible transgressions to the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, they Re-docketed the case and assigned it to retired SC Justice
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation.

 In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez found that there were two criminal
cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 for Falsification
 of Public Documents and for Violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law.
Charged were several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian
employees including Napoles, her mother, her brother and wife, and
Napoles' three employees. These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case
because the issue involved is the same - the questionable purchase of 500
Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of
₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by Napoles. Napoles
and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both
cases. The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the
transaction in question. Even if she owns the bank account where the 14
checks were later deposited, this does not in itself translate to her conspiracy
in the crimes charged."

 Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez examined the statements made by Benhur Luy

during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigations pointing out that
because he is Napoles’ second cousin, she divulged to him, prior to the
release of the Kevlar case decision, that her contact in the Sandiganbayan
was Ong. He also testified that he kept ledgers showing that Napoles spent a
total of P100M in the Sandiganbayan when she gave various amounts to
different people during the pendency of the case and to Ong in particular
after which, she was already confident that she would be acquitted. He also
testified to a transaction between Ong and Napoles regarding P25, 5M of
which they wanted to put into an account so that it would accrue 13%
interest and that he personally prepared the checks used for this transaction.
Justice Sandoval- Gutierrez also examined the statements made by Sula, an
employee of JLN corporation in charge of formation of corporations,
applying for licenses and the like. She corroborated the testimony of Benhur
Luy and reiterated her previous testimony on Napoles promising her that a
TRO would be issued in the case investigating the PDAF case. She said that
every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say
that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case.

 In his defense, Ong denied that he ever met Napoles prior to or during the
pendency of the Kevlar case, denied that he received any money from
Napoles , that the Kevlar case was decided based on the merits, he never had
any transactions with Napoles, he only visited her office for the purpose of
thanking her for a previous favor which involved the Black Nazarene, and
that the whistleblowers’ testimonies were conflicting and lack credibility.
  Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez evaluated and concluded that the testimonies of
Benhur Luy and Marina Sula were not lies because they were only denied
and in no way challenged or refuted by Ong via adverse testimony. Ong did
not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula and he
failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. His act of visitng
Napoles’ office is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit
as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers
on him. Dishonesty violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code
providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above
reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary
and further constitutes gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on
Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

 It was thus recommended that that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be

found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH
FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits,
and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

Held: Yes. The SC adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the
Investigating Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character,
improper or wrong behavior; while “gross” has been defined as “out of all
measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused.” The Supreme Court (SC) agrees with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez
that respondent’s association with Napoles during the pendency and after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence
of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
 A judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the
court commits a serious misconduct and the Court has condemned such act
in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed
by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and
rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the
courts. The evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and
corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not
witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange
for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged
bribe to respondent.

 Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the

respondent, the Court found credible evidence of his association with
Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The
totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates
respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception
of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to
respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the
suspicion that he was partial to Napoles.

 In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when
improper acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under
constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public
criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution.
As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with Napoles has
unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy
which initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse,
Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of
the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. The
Court cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider
respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.
Ramirez v. Macandog, 144 SCRA 634

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts: Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan

City, Branch CXX, stands charged in several complaints of various forms of
misconduct in the performance of her official duties. One of which is as follows:

Administrative Matter No. R-684-RTJ.

 The gravamen of the complaint filed before this Court on July 7, 1986 is the
alleged failure of respondent judge to decide Civil Case No. C-9831 entitled,
"Federico S. Cruz v. Esperanza Lazaro," despite the case having been
submitted for decision for more than 18 months. Complainant who is the
defendant in Civil Case No. C-9831, claims that the case was submitted for
decision on October 2, 1984 with the filing of defendant's memorandum.
She further alleges that as respondent judge had been drawing her salary
during the entire time that the case was pending decision, respondent judge
is likewise guilty of falsification in view of the certification required of
judges before they could draw their salaries to the effect that they have
decided all cases assigned to them on or before the end of three months
counted from the time a case is submitted for decision.

 In her answer filed on August 11, 1986, respondent judge states that nothing
on the record shows that the case has been submitted for decision; that
defendant in said case [herein complainant] never appeared in court during
the hearing of the case nor during the series of conferences called by her for
the purpose of effecting an amicable settlement between the parties, as per
manifestation of her counsel, complainant and her husband were always
abroad; that defendant in fact told the court interpreter that she did not want
to appear in court for the amicable settlement; that it was only after she
received a telephone call from an alleged close relative of an associate of a
national official saying " If you don't decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro
you will be removed, but if you decide in her favor then you will stay," that
she looked into the records of the case where she found the motion of Mrs.
Lazaro, received by the court on March 12, 1986, praying for the early
resolution of the case; that because of the telephone calls and with the point
in mind that "this is a revolutionary government," she had no recourse but to
decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro, which she did in a decision dated
July 18, 1986; that in view of complainant's manifestation dated July 7,
1986, the instant complaint is already moot and academic.
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 1 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct?

Held: Yes. Her confessed act of succumbing to this pressure on the telephone is a
patent betrayal of the public trust reposed on respondent as an arbiter of the law
and a revelation of her weak moral character.

Ratio Decidendi:
 While it appears that the complaint was filed under a misapprehension of
facts, in that it was not indubitably established that the case had been
submitted for decision as alleged in the complaint, and dismissal of the
charge should have followed as a matter of course, the case had taken an
unexpected twist. In her answer, respondent judge admitted to have
succumbed to pressure in deciding the case in favor of herein complainant,
Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro. Thus, "In order to promote peace so nobody
would call me again by telephone telling the same purpose, the respondent,
then decided the case with the point in mind that this [sic] a revolutionary
government and she had nor [sic] recourse but to decide the case in favor of
Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro.

 Even accepting for the nonce that there was this supposed pressure from a
source twice removed from the national official mentioned earlier, her
confessed act of succumbing to this pressure on the telephone is a patent
betrayal of the public trust reposed on respondent as an arbiter of the law
and a revelation of her weak moral character. By her appointment to the
office, the public has laid on respondent their confidence that she is mentally
and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this
reason, they expect her to be fearless in her pursuit to render justice, to be
unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a
moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in her office.
Regrettably, respondent has dismally failed to exhibit these qualities
required of those holding such office.

 In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decision in Civil Case No.
C-9831 was rendered under undue pressure and influence, the party
aggrieved thereby may take such remedial steps as may be warranted.
Tahil v. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378

Ponente: ANTONIO, J.

Facts:
 Respondent Municipal Judge Carlito A. Eisma, of Parang, Sulu, is charged
by complainant Hadjirul Tahil with dishonesty in not reporting regularly to
his office, contrary to the recitals of his daily time record. In his
"Investigation, Report and Recommendation" dated February 29, 1973,
Judge Felix V. Barbers of the Court of First Instance of Sulu, Branch III,
16th Judicial District, who investigated the case, recommended the dismissal
of the charge.

 According to the respondent, the filing of this complaint, is motivated by

hatred, anger and revenge on the part of the complainant. As when
complainant brought the bail bond of his nephew Bakkal Ilahal charged in
Criminal Case No. 241-N before the Court of respondent, for approval of the
latter. Because of the failure of the bondsmen to appear before him,
respondent did not approve of the bail bond.

 Again, on another occasion, complainant filed in the Court of respondent a

motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 372-N, wherein the same nephew of
the complainant, Bakkal Ilahal, is also charged with the crime of illegal
possession of firearms. A scrutiny of the motion to dismiss and its annexes,
offered in evidence by respondent, will show that the same is based on
documents merely certified to by the clerk of the counsel of Bakkal Ilahal.

 It appears, however, that in the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 241-N for
murder, respondent admitted having granted bail to the accused upon the
request of a congressman, despite his belief that the evidence of guilt against
the accused was strong."

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Section 2 of Canon 1 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct?

Held: No. It is not clear from the record whether or not a summary hearing was
conducted by respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 241-N for the purpose of bail
and, on the basis of his appreciation of the evidence submitted, granted bail to the
accused.
Ratio Decidendi:
 Under the Constitution, all persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence
of guilt is strong. The discretion of the court to grant bail in a capital offense,
before conviction, must be based upon the Court's determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be
exercised after the evidence is submitted at the summary hearing conducted
pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules.

 Respondent's admission that he granted bail because of the request of a

congressman, despite his belief that the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong, is indeed reprehensible. But it is not clear from the record whether
or not a summary hearing was conducted by respondent Judge in Criminal
Case No. 241-N for the purpose of bail and, on the basis of his appreciation
of the evidence submitted, granted bail to the accused. Moreover, respondent
was not specifically charged and investigated in this regard, and in the
absence of any specific finding that respondent gravely abused his discretion
in granting bail to the accused in said case, this Court has no basis to impose
a fine upon respondent.
Contreras v. Solis, 260 SCRA 572

Ponente: MELO, J.

Facts:
 On November 8, 1992, prior to the filing of a petition for habeas corpus
before the sala of herein respondent Judge Solis, an information was filed
against Rufino Mamangon, a PNP member, for the murder of Gener
Contreras.

 The case was raffled to Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of the Third
Judicial Region stationed in Malolos, Bulacan, presided over the Judge
Demetrio Macapagal Sr. On May 31, 1994, Judge Macapagal dismissed the
criminal case for lack of jurisdiction and accordingly directed the branch
clerk of court to forward the complete record of the case to the
Sandiganbayan.

 Mamangon was not, however, released from detention despite the dismissal
of the criminal case, prompting him on July 20, 1994, to file a petition for
habeas corpus. The petition was raffled to the branch (No. 21) presided over
by of herein respondent Judge Cesar M. Solis.

 Respondent, in an order dated July 27, 1994, dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. On August 4, 1994, acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
Mamangon, respondent issued an order authorizing the release of
Mamangon from the provincial jail upon the posting of a cash bond in the
amount of P25,000.00.

 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the provincial prosecutor which

prompted respondent judge to cancel the cash bond posted by Mamangon
and to order his re-arrest. Thereupon, Armando Contreras, brother of the
victim Gener Contreras, filed the instant complaint.

 Complainant alleged that on the morning of August 1, 1994, when he went

to the office of respondent, he was told by the latter that Mamangon is
willing to give P25,000.00 for his release. It appears, according to
complainant, that if he would give the same amount of money, respondent
would no longer release Mamangon.
  In his defense, respondent insists he never asked money from complainant.
He merely instructed one of his staff to advise Armando Contreras about the
habeas corpus proceeding so that he can participate in it. It was quite late in
the afternoon of that day and the "clerks were no longer available to type the
notice or order." He also explains that complainant misconstrued his
mentioning an amount, i.e., P20,000.00 to be extortion when all he meant
was that this would be how much he will spend to hire a lawyer to represent
his cause in the proceedings.

 On July 3, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepano submitted

her report with the following evaluation:

The protestations of respondent Judge are not exactly persuasive. At

once certain questions beg to be asked. For instance, if his sole interest in
asking Contreras to see him in his office was to afford the former the
opportunity to "participate" in the habeas corpus case, why express such
interest at a very late stage , i.e., after he had issued a decision thereon and
after petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision. Judge
Solis could have very well notified complainant about the proceeding as
soon as the petition was filed by simply furnishing him copy of his Order
setting the case for hearing on 26th July. But he did not. Strangely enough,
he waited until after the last working hour of Friday, 29th July, to "notify"
Contreras of his desire to meet him at the very early hour of 7 o'clock in the
morning of 1 August.

While no proof has been submitted to the Court by complainant as to

the attempted extortion by respondent judge other than his verified letter-
complaint, still, the actuations of respondent leave much to be desired since
these easily lend[s] to suspicions of dishonesty. On this score alone,
respondent should be properly advised to avoid occasions where his acts
may arouse suspicions of irregularity.

The judge denies that he propositioned complainant, and complainant

informs the Court that he did not pay the amount "proposed". At any rate on
8 August 1994 Judge Solis motu proprio issued two Orders for the posting
of a cash bond for P25,000.00 by accused Mamangon and his release from
jail, and the transmittal of the records of the case to Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Section 3 of Canon 1 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct?
Held: Yes. The intention of respondent in meeting with complainant and in giving
him advice is, to say the least, far from the behavior of a member of judiciary, who
should, at all times, avoid the slightest of hint of anomaly and corruption.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Our minds cannot sit easy with regard to the charge of extortion. Respondent
admitted having met complainant in the early morning of August 1, 1994,
for the purpose of informing complainant that he could participate in the
habeas corpus proceeding. During said meeting, respondent also admitted
having told complainant of the "potency" of Mamangon's motion for
reconsideration and the amount of money which complainant would spend
to hire a good lawyer to represent him in the proceeding.

 Respondent's seemingly benign conduct of advising complainant on matters

pending before respondent puzzle our minds since we are not told of any
special circumstance which would justify respondent's special interest over
complainant's concern. Respondent, however, gives no other reason for
meeting and advising complainant that could dispel ill thoughts in reference
to respondent's motives. Any person with a reasonable mind would deduce
that respondent's actuation meant something much more than what he
explicitly suggested, for what could be respondent's reason, in mentioning
the "potency" of Mamangon's motion for reconsideration and the amount of
money which complainant might spend in resisting the same, than to
insinuate that complainant could save on expenses and be certain of the
result by spending the same amount for the judge.

 Certainly, it is simply naive to say that a proposal to that effect could be

done only through the use of direct words expressing respondent's intention
to be willing and able to decide the case in complainant's favor for a
consideration. Respondent's pretended innocence over the perceived
meaning of his insinuation is unpersuasive considering his long years in the
practice of law. Thus, the intention of respondent in meeting with
complainant and in giving him advice is, to say the least, far from the
behavior of a member of judiciary, who should, at all times, avoid the
slightest of hint of anomaly and corruption.

 Verily, the duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to
conduct himself in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity.
He has the avowed duty of promoting confidence in the judicial system.
 A judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of his duties
should be free from appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach
(Alazar vs. Reyes, 131 SCRA 445, 453). Any act which would give the
appearance of impropriety is in itself reprehensible, calling for disciplinary
action. This is the price which must be paid by one who joins the Judiciary.
Whatever may have been respondent judge's motive in meeting with
complainant, such action certainly could but be said as giving rise to
questions on his honesty. Respondent judge is thus guilty of committing act
of impropriety prejudicial to the integrity of the judiciary.

 Complainant herein alleged that the order of respondent judge releasing the
accused on bail was maliciously motivated for having been issued several
days after the attempted extortion. We find the decision of respondent
erroneous but its malicious intent, however, may not be presumed in the
absence of any evidence to prove the same. It might be suggested that,
respondent's ill motives may be presumed considering his actuation prior to
the issuance of the questioned erroneous order. We are, however, unable to
find a clear and definite connection between an attempt at extortion and the
subsequent erroneous orders. It would be unjust to presume wrong intentions
considering that respondent's questioned orders are not totally unjustifiable.
Romero v. Valle, 147 SCRA 197

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 In a verified complaint dated November 28, 1984, Atty. Arturo A. Romero
charged Judge Gabriel O. Valle, Jr;. of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City, Branch XII with grave misconduct and oppression. In the words of
complainant himself, the acts complained of consisted in:

That instead of directing complainant to proceed with the marking of

exhibits and to continue the direct examination, respondent continued to
utter embarrassing remarks which hurt complainant and, therefore, the latter
tried to make further explanations on said exhibits and to defend his integrity
in a controlled and respectful manner, but his honor, the respondent judge
suddenly banged his gavel producing such a deafening noise that several
persons from the adjoining branches of the Court came: that without
declaring a recess, said respondent judge unceremoniously REMOVED his
coat and told, angrily, herein complainant: "You step out and we will finish
the matter"; immediately thereafter, respondent judge stepped down from the
rostrum and left;

That, shaken and stunned by such sudden aggressive behavior of

respondent, complainant then stood by his seat, and as some people in the
Courtroom rushed out of the Courtroom, complainant looked around and
then saw respondent judge outside the courtroom holding a gun with his
right hand, in front of him, facing towards complainant, in an angry and
menacing manner, and waited for complainant to go outside; confronted by
such alarming and threatening stance of respondent, complainant could not
move for a moment, as complainant was totally unarmed, surprised and
shocked; and when complainant saw respondent Judge briskly walked to and
fro still holding a gun, complainant then asked the Court stenographer:
"Please put in the record that the Judge is holding a gun"; that luckily
thereafter, Atty. Isidro Madamba, member of the Sangunian Panlalawigan,
succeeded in pacifying respondent judge and shortly, said respondent
returned to the Court; that after some remarks by respondent judge,
complainant moved that the Honorable respondent voluntarily inhibit
himself from further trying the case in the light of the antecedents, but
denied it and ordered the resetting of the case
 Required to comment on the complaint, respondent judge denied the charges
and branded the same as "exaggerated, sensationalized, fabricated and
inherently improbable and contrary to human experience and one-sided.
Respondent judge likewise explained that he has been issued by the
provincial commander the necessary permit to carry his licensed pistol
outside his residence on account of a threat on his life from the New People's
Army.

 On January 31, 1985, the Court en banc resolved to refer the case to
Associate Justice of the then Intermediate Appeallate Court, Abdulwahid
Bidin, for investigation, report and recommendation. From the evidence
adduced at the hearings, Associate Justice Bidin made the following findings
of facts and conclusions:

During the trial of said case on November 19, 1984, complainant

requested that an inventory book of plaintiff be marked as Exhibit F.
Respondent Judge interrupted the complainant with a remark that the said
inventory book should be marked Exh. G since there is already an Exh. F of
the plaintiff which was marked during the last hearing of the case when
complainant was absent. The fact that there was already an Exh. F for the
plaintiff was confirmed by the manifestation of Atty. Rafael Ruiz, counsel
for the defendant after verifying his notes as requested by respondent judge.
Nevertheless, the complainant in a loud voice insisted that his proposed
marking of the Exhibit is the correct one as the Exhibit F referred to by
respondent judge and Atty. Ruiz was not initialed by the Clerk of Court.
This remark of complainant irritated the respondent judge who retorted that
complainant is not prepared for trial and admonished the latter to be
prepared with his trial brief before coming to court so that he will not bangle
(sic) the marking of his exhibit.

As the complainant continued insisting in a loud voice that his proposed

marking of the inventory book as Exhibit F is correct, despite the fact that
respondent judge had admonished him [complainant] not to bring his
"passion" to the court and if complainant does not respect the Judge, he
should respect the court, the respondent banged his gavel left the rostrum
and went to his chamber.

According to Atty. Leandro Rafales [complainant's own witness], that

respondent judge did not remove his coat when he left the rostrum and while
respondent was holding his gun which was inside its holster with his right
 hand when he came out of his chamber on his way towards the stairs, the
gun was not pointed at anyone, although the respondent turned his face
towards the people inside the courtroom as he walked towards the stairs. As
regards the charge that respondent challenged the complainant to step out
and we settle the matter the evidence is inconclusive.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Section 4 of Canon 1 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct

Held: Yes. Respondent judge, in losing his temper and engaging complainant in a
heated discussion, not only failed to observe the proper decorum expected of
judicial officers, but as a consequence thereof likewise failed to preserve and
enforce order in his court.

Ratio Decidendi:
 It is evident from the foregoing that complainant and respondent judge are
equally to blame for the incident under consideration. We have enunciated in
the case of Lugue vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165, that:
It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the
high esteem and regard for courts. Any act on the part of one or the other
that tends to undermine the people's respect for, and confidence in, the
administration of justice is to be avoided. And this, even if both may have to
restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To be expected then
of petitioner and respondent is a sense of shared responsibility, a crucial
factor in the administration of justice.

 The relations between counsel and judge should be based on-mutual respect
and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of the other. Thus, counsel
is expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial of officers. Although allowed some latitude of remarks or
comment in the furtherance of causes he upholds, his arguments, written or
oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such
words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another.

 Certainly, and most especially in our culture, raising one's voice is a sign of
disrespect, improper to one whose "investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior towards the courts."
 Complainant is an active law practitioner in the province of Ilocos Norte. He
was director of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Ilocos Norte-Laoag
City Chapter in 1982, Chairman of the Legal Aid Committee of said chapter,
president of PHILCONSA, Ilocos Norte-Laoag City Chapter from 1981-83
and president of the Ilocos Norte Lions Club in 1983. As a recognized
community leader, complainant should provide an example in proper court
decorum to his brothers in the profession, and not to foment discord in the
courtroom. Considering complainant's obvious high standing in the legal
profession and the community, he should have observed humility to accept
mistakes graciously and to treat the same as the proverbial learning
experience.

 On the other hand, respondent judge exhibited shortness of temper and

impatience, contrary to the duties and restrictions imposed upon him by
reason of his office. In Calalang vs. Fernandez, Adm. Case No. 175-J, June
10, 1971, we stated that a judge should show no shortness of temper for it
merely detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness that should be the
constant marks of a dispenser of justice.

 In the case at bar, respondent judge, in losing his temper and engaging
complainant in a heated discussion, not only failed to observe the proper
decorum expected of judicial officers, but as a consequence thereof likewise
failed to preserve and enforce order in his court. Precisely, judicial officers
are given contempt powers in order that without being arbitrary,
unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the court. Respondent judge could very well
have cited complainant in contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums
by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously
walking out of the courtroom.

 Respondent judge appears to have a valid explanation for gun, but such
explanation cannot be taken as carrying a satisfactory for his having chosen
to carry the same in plain view of the complainant and other lawyers inside
the courtroom when he came out of his chambers on his way to the stairs.
Taken in the light of what had just transpired, the actuation of respondent
judge was not an innocent gesture, but one calculated to instill fear in or
intimidate complainant. We cannot let this pass unnoticed. Respondent
judge's behavior constitutes grave misconduct. It is a serious violation of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which require that a "judge's official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
Galman v. SB, 144 SCRA 43

Ponente: TEEHANKEE, C.J.

Facts:
 This case has to do with the cold-blooded assassination of foremost
opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. Where, the
assassin was shortly identified by military investigators to be one Rolando
Galman, a communist-hired gunman.

 Because of the incident, Former President Marcos was constrained to create

a Fact-Finding Board to investigate the treacherous and vicious assassination
of former Senator Aquino, Jr.

 This was to mark another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority
report was submitted one day ahead by the ponente thereof, the chairman,
who was received congenially and cordially by the then President who
treated the report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report
of one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final
resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan
which was better known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four
other members was submitted on the following day to the then President
who coldly received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of
their report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your
conscience with what you have done."

 According to the fact-finding board, the fact is that both majority and
minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as propounded by
the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the
NPA-hired assassin, stating that “the evidence shows [to the contrary] that
Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations.” They were in agreement
that Ninoy’s assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot.

 The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found
all the 26 private respondents headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C.
Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore “indictable for the
premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman
at the MIA on August 21, 1983” while the chairman’s minority report would
 exclude 19 of them and limit as plotters “the six persons who were on the
service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending” and “General Luther
Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could not have been planned and
implemented without his intervention.”

 It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public
acts and statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own
Board’s above findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being
Ninoy’s assassin. In his reply to General Ver's letter of the same date going
on leave of absence upon release of the Board's majority report implicating
him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that the
circumstances under which the board has chosen to implicate you in its
findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of opinion and
testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called
evidence, you have been so accused by some members of the Board," and
extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy
resolution of your case,"

 It was against this setting that petitioners Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo
Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and
twenty-nine (29) other petitioners filed the present action alleging that
respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and
gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

 They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the
people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital
and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and
that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor
of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the
sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino
assassination."

 Thus,petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary

restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a
decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled
on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial
 and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-
trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor.

 However, ten days later, after granting petitioners’ prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in
reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days
earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision.

 Eventually, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the

accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving
them of any civil liability. This marked another unusual first in that
respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very victim Rolando
Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very
information and evidence submitted by the prosecution.

 In opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan’s verdict

of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. The same
Court majority denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. Petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the
startling and theretofore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan
Manuel Herrera as reported in issue of the Manila Times entitled “Aquino
Trial a Sham,” that the then President had ordered the respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution
panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26
respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.

 Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective

comment stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and
regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law
applicable, but manifested that “if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and
the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel were pressured into
suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial,
answering respondents would not interpose any objection to the reopening of
those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course.”

 Afterwards, the Court resolved to appoint a three-member commission

composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and
 retired Intermediate Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo
Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and
documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters,
upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court for
proper disposition.

 The Commission conducted hearings and on the said last day, respondents
announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the
projected deposition of former President Marcos, as his testimony would be
merely, corroborative of the testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and
Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page
Report wherein it discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a
recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as follows:

1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the

Special Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe
and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the
twenty-six (26) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report
should all be charged as principals of the crime of double murder for the
death of Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacañang learned of the impending filing of the said charge
before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel having already
prepared a draft Resolution recommending such course of action,
President Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the three members of the
Special Investigating Panel, and Justice Pamaran to a conference in
Malacañang in the early evening of January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement
with the recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel and disputed
the findings of the Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot
Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the
advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that, after being
acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of
the doctrine of double jeopardy
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be
denied bail during the trial, considering that they would be charged with
capital offenses, President Marcos directed that the several accused be
‘categorized’ so that some of them would merely be charged as
accomplices and accessories.
 6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be
handled personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the
earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacañang conference were followed to
the letter; and compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific
instances in the course of the proceedings, such as, the changing of the
resolution of the special investigating panel, the filing of the case with the
Sandiganbayan and its assignment to Justice Pamaran, suppression of
some vital evidence, harassment of witnesses, recantation of witnesses
who gave adverse testimony before the Agrava Board, coaching of
defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of proceedings, and even in
the very decision rendered in the case.
8. That that expression of President Marcos’ desire as to how he wanted the
Aquino-Galman case to be handled and disposed of constituted sufficient
pressure on those involved in said task to comply with the same in the
subsequent course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no
revulsion against complying with the Malacañang directive, Justice
Herrera played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10.Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the AquinoGalman
murder case, as stage-managed from Malacañang and performed by
willing dramatis personnaeas well as by recalcitrant ones whipped into
line by the omni-present influence of an authoritarian ruler.

 The Commission recommended that the prayer in the petition for a

declaration of a mistrial shall be granted, since proceedings in the said case
have been vitiated by lack of due process.

Issue: Whether or not respondents violated Section 5 of Canon 1 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct?

Held: Yes. The Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist,
producing a pre-determined final outcome which resulted to total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability.

Ratio Decidendi:
 The Court adopts and approves the Report and findings of the Commission
that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and
 from Malacañang Palace “a scripted and predetermined manner of handling
and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;” and that the prosecution
in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same
acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist; and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully
ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have
otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case of
total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and
civil liability.

 The fact of the secret Malacañang conference at which the authoritarian

President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the
entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal
charges against all the twenty-six accused is not denied. It is without
precedent. This was illegal under our penal laws, supra. This illegality
vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court
headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission
noted: “The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their ready
acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in
themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. x x x Verily, it can be said
that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacañang
Palace on January 10, 1985.”

 No court whose Presiding Justice has received “orders or suggestions” from

the very President who by an amendatory decree made it possible to refer the
cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very
essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote, “jurisdiction over
cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive,
which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining
the outcome of individual cases.” This criminal collusion as to the handling
and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel
Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict.

 The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty
of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are
courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if
they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
 duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial
power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to
all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention
or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures
of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and
the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial
system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy
had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law
and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the “treacherous and vicious
assassination” and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved
parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to
declare the sham trial a mock trial—the non-trial of the century—and that
the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.

 Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring
public faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither
the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in public
confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its judgments. This has
been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity and impartiality, integrity
and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law
which compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The
lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this Court’s
judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal
and directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of
becoming instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its
victims. The end of one form of injustice should not become simply the
beginning of another. This simply means that the respondents accused must
now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had
denied the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be
assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will
assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when
it has failed.

 The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public
office owe their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are
accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be
discarded. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the
people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the
appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of
rendering public service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio
and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the
Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of
office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States
Supreme Court, the Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public
interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
Lorenzo v. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 In a sworn statement executed by Mercedita G. Lorenzo and in an
indorsement of the Chief State Prosecutor transmitting the report of the
NBI , the herein respondent Judge Primo L. Marquez of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) is charged on three counts, one of which was namely: For
violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court in deciding Civil Case
No. 1202 entitled Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya vs. Gilda
Balid, et al., when he was the former counsel of the plaintiff;

 There is no question that the respondent was the counsel for the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 1202 entitled "Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya
(KBPS) vs. Gilda Balid, et al.". The complaint was filed by Crisostomo L.
Luna, president and board chairman of the plaintiff, who is his uncle. The
respondent was then a member of the board of directors of the plaintiff. In an
order, Judge Parentela declared defendants in default for failure to file their
answer.

 When the respondent assumed office, he issued an order requiring plaintiff

to secure the services of another counsel in his place and he set the case for
hearing. On March 9, 1987, he issued an order considering the case
submitted for decision. Judgement is hereby rendered in favor of the above-
named plaintiff and against the above-named defendants. An appeal
therefrom was interposed by the defendants to the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena City.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Section 6 of Canon 1 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct?

Held: Yes. The act of the respondent manifests his unusual personal interest in the
case which prevailed over and above his sworn duty to administer the law
impartially and without any fear or favor.

Ratio Decidendi:
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily. interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

 From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in
which he was a counsel without the written consent of all the parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The respondent alleged
that since there was no objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to
preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law.
The rule is explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the parties,
not a mere verbal consent much. less a tacit acquiescence. More than this,
said written consent must be signed by them and entered upon the record.

 The failure of the respondent to observe these elementary rules of conduct

betrays his unusual personal interest in the case which prevailed over and
above his sworn duty to administer the law impartially and without any fear
or favor.
Salud v. Alumbres, 404 SCRA 411

Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.

Facts:
 This is an administrative case filed by Pastor Salud against the Hon.
Florentino M. Alumbres, then presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Piñas City, Metro Manila, Branch 255, for undue delay in the
resolution of Civil Case No. LP-96-300.

 The instant matter originated from the double sale of a parcel of land. It
appears that a certain Ricardo Forneza, Jr., and Cynthia S. Forneza were the
original owners of a house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. (106597) T-5251-A. In a brief span of four (4) days, the Fornezas
managed to sell the same property twice.

 The first sale took place to one Ferdinand Jimenez as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale. Then the Fornezas executed in favor of Maria Belen Salud and
Laurina Salud, a Contract to Sell over the same house and lot.

 The first buyer (Jimenez) successfully caused the transfer of the title of the
subject property in his name.Subquently, Jimenez sold the property to the
spouses Eduardo and Josefina Laurito. The Laurito spouses then secured a
new title in their names. When the Laurito spouses visited the subject
property, they discovered that the spouses Pastor and Marcosa Salud were
occupying the house and lot. Notwithstanding the demand made by the
Lauritos, the Salud couple refused to vacate the property. Hence, the
Lauritos filed a suit for unlawful detainer against them. the MeTC held that
the Saluds failed to present any document to show that they were the owners
of the property.

 On appeal, the case was raffled to Branch 255 of the RTC of Las Piñas City,
presided over by herein respondent. Notwithstanding the pendency of said
appeal,Judge Alumbres issued an Alias Writ of Execution, stating that
"judgment [is] now final and executory."

 Hence, the instant complaint. Salud argued that the RTC had the period from
May 1997 to August 1997 to decide Civil Case No. LP-96-300, but had not
resolved the matter. They likewise pointed to another case pending before
 the respondent, where the litigants had been waiting at least six (6) months
for the court’s judgment. The complainants herein asked the OCA to look
closely at the docket of respondent judge’s sala, as they were of the belief
that several cases ripe for decision remained unacted upon. On November
20, 1998, or after more than fifteen (15) months from submission, the RTC
handed down its judgment in Civil Case where it affirmed in toto the
decision of the MeTC, which found the Saluds have failed to present a better
title to the subject property.

 In his defense, the respondent judge does not deny that there was a delay in
the rendition of judgment. However, he sought to put the blame for the delay
squarely on the complainant herein. According to respondent, after he
decreed the issuance of a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal, complainant
herein filed numerous pleadings not only before the RTC but also with the
Court of Appeals, which sought to thwart the implementation of the writ
issued and, obviously, to harass him. Respondent avers that complainant
even went to the extent of charging him with contempt of court before the
Court of Appeals. As a result, respondent said his time was virtually used up
by answering baseless and unwarranted pleadings filed by the complainant.

 The court administrator recommended that the respondent judge be

suspended without pay and benefits for a period of two (2) months for delay
in the disposition of a case. Said recommendation took into consideration the
fact that respondent had previously been admonished for having decided a
case beyond the reglementary period.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Section 7 of Canon 1 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct

Held: Yes. Inability to decide a case despite the ample time prescribed is
inexcusable, constitutes gross inefficiency, and warrants administrative sanction of
the defaulting judge.

Ratio Decidendi:
 It is not disputed that; it took respondent judge over 16 months to render his
decision in Civil Case No. LP-96-300 after it was submitted for decision.
The Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within ninety
(90) days from its submission. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates judges to administer justice without delay and directs every judge
to dispose of the court’s business promptly within the period prescribed by
 the law and the rules. We have emphasized strict observance of this duty in
order to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion
and delay that have long plagued our courts. It is an oft-repeated maxim that
justice delayed is often justice denied.

 Thus, any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, may
result in depriving the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
Delay ultimately affects the image of the judiciary. Failure to comply with
the mandate of the Constitution and of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constitutes serious misconduct, which is detrimental to the honor and
integrity of a judicial office. Inability to decide a case despite the ample time
prescribed is inexcusable, constitutes gross inefficiency, and warrants
administrative sanction of the defaulting judge.

 Delay in the rendition of judgments diminishes the people’s faith in our

judicial system, and lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. In the
event that judges cannot comply with the deadlines prescribed by law, they
should apply for extensions of time to avoid administrative sanctions. The
Court allows a certain degree of latitude to judges and grants them
reasonable extensions of time to resolve cases upon proper application by
the judges concerned and on meritorious grounds. At the very least,
respondent judge should have requested for an extension of time to render
judgment once he knew that he could not comply with the prescribed 90-day
period to render a judgment. In so doing, he would have been able to apprise
litigants as to the status of the case and the reason for the delay, if any. It
would have shown his mindfulness of the deadlines.

 Also, the record shows that this is not the first time that respondent has been
called to account by this Court. In 1992, he was fined for gross partiality to a
party. In 1996, he was admonished for delay in the disposition of a case. In
1999, he was reprimanded. Although respondent has retired on June 3, 2001,
the recommendation of the OCA that a fine be imposed on him is still in
order.

 It is worth stressing that even after a judge has retired from the service, he
may still be held administratively accountable for lapses and offenses
committed during his incumbency.
Alfonso v. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.

Facts:
 In this case, the complainant, a doctor of medicine by profession, filed with
this Court a sworn complaint charging the respondent with immorality and
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses the respondent of
maintaining illicit sexual relations with his wife, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso.

 Sometime in February 1991, the complainant received a phone call from the
wife of the respondent who informed him that Sol and her husband
(respondent) have been carrying on an affair and that she has in her
possession the love letters of Sol which she wants to show to the
complainant.

 Although he did not believe the information and even berated Mrs. Juanson
for trying to ruin his family, he, nevertheless, told Sol about it. Sol assured
him of her love and concern for the family and claimed that the respondent
was just a client of her former office, the Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao
Branch).

 On 12 June 1992, he and Sol left for the United States of America (USA) for
a vacation. He stayed there up to 19 July 1992; however, Sol returned ahead
of him on 10 July 1992. During his absence, specifically on 17 June 1992,
Mrs. Juanson called up his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso, and divulged to
the latter the illicit affair between the respondent and Sol.

 When Sol arrived in the Philippines on 10 July 1992, Atty. Alfonso decided
to hire a private investigating agency to undertake an inquiry on the alleged
illicit affair between Sol and the respondent. Through surveillance
conducted by its private investigators, the agency found that Sol had met
with the respondent on 11 and 17 July 1992 at Unit 412-A of Citihomes at
130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and that they stayed
inside the unit for two to three hours.
 Complainant further alleges five days after his arrival from the USA, his
sister Celestine told him about the illicit relationship between Sol and the
respondent. Celestine showed him the pictures taken by the private
investigators and the alleged love letters of Sol.
 In the evening of the said date, in the presence of their respective parents,
the complainant confronted Sol and showed her the proofs; Sol still denied
the affair and insisted that she was just discussing some business with the
respondent. Later, however, at about 1:30 a.m. in their house, Sol finally
admitted to having an illicit affair with the respondent since late 1983 when
she was an employee of Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch) and that
before they left for the USA, she met with the respondent at Unit 412-A
Citihomes. Sol also admitted to the Complainant that when she went to
Hongkong on December 26, 1989 up to December 29, 1989 she was with
Respondent Judge, and records of the Commission on Immigration for said
dates show that both Sol Alfonso and Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson
departed for Hongkong via Cathay Pacific plane on December 26, 1989 and
returned to Manila on December 29, 1989.

 Complainant submits that the respondent is undeserving of the noble office

of the judiciary and prays that he be meted the appropriate administrative
sanction for immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

 In his comment, the respondent admits that he knows Sol and that "they have
been communicating with each other casually and innocently," but denies
that they are lovers and were having an illicit affair. He asserts that he came
to know Sol sometime in 1987 when she engaged his professional services
in connection with five criminal cases filed by her in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal and the in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.

 In June 1992, he received an overseas call from Sol who was then in the
USA. Sol asked for advice concerning her problem with her employer, the
Security Bank and Trust Co. (Dau Central Branch). They agreed that Sol
would see him upon her return to the Philippines. He reassures the
complainant "that his wife has always been faithful to him and that he would
do nothing as would tarnish their warm relationship, much less destroy the
complainant's family." As to the Hongkong trip, Respondent Judge simply
accompanied a former client who was looking for a house to buy in
Hongkong and as to the visit in the Citihomes unit, Respondent Judge
 claimed that he was only visiting his godson George Zari who spent a
vacation in the Philippines for a month.

 Respondent further suggests that it was impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse with Sol because he was suffering from two debilitating diseases
— diabetes mellitus, for which he has been "taking insulin" since 1987, and
prostatitis — which have seriously affected his sexual potency. In his own
words, he "could hardly make it," and that he has "no erection whatsoever."

 Here, Associate Justice Lourdes T. Jaguros of the Court of Appeals for

investigation gives full faith and credit to the complainant's version for she
finds no reason not to believe the complainant. She then concludes that the
immoral conduct of the respondent has ruined two families — his own and
that of the complainant. Finally, she recommends the imposition upon the
respondent of the severest administrative penalty — dismissal from the
service.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct

Held: Yes. Considering their prior special relationship, the respondent and Sol's
meetings could reasonably incite suspicion of either its continuance or revival and
the concomitant intimacies expressive of such relationship. Such indiscretions
indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety.

Ratio Decidendi:
 There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed
between the respondent and the complainant's wife. For one, there are the
cards or notes, which the complainant and the Investigating Justice described
as love letters. For another, if we were to give full credit to the complainant's
testimony that during their confrontation Sol had admitted having sexual
intercourse with the respondent on five occasions, it would appear that the
relationship had developed into an extra-marital liaison.

 From the foregoing, it is clear that their affair began before Sol and the
complainant were married on 10 December 1988 and might have blossomed
from the attorney-client relationship between respondent and Sol. Her
marriage to the complainant did not diminish Sol's love for the respondent,
for even after she committed herself to the complainant alone and made a
 vow of fidelity to him till death at the solemn ceremony of marriage, she still
sneaked out her love notes to the respondent.

 It must, however, be stressed that the respondent is not charged with

immorality or misconduct committed before he was appointed to the
judiciary. As to the post-appointment period, we find the evidence for the
complainant insufficient to prove that the respondent and Sol continued their
extramarital affair. No love notes written by her after November 1990 were
presented in evidence. Sol's admission or confession to the complainant that
she had carnal knowledge of the respondent on five occasions made no
reference to specific dates and is hearsay. In his direct examination, the
complainant's counsel exerted no further effort to obtain clarifications as to
the dates thereof.

 He perhaps realized its futility because the narration by the complainant of

the information clearly indicated that the complainant did not ask Sol to
elaborate on the five illicit sexual acts. The transcripts of the stenographic
notes discloses that the counsel for the respondent objected and entered a
continuing objection to questions directed to elicit or which tended to elicit
statements or admissions supposedly made or given by Sol on the grounds
that any such statements or admissions would be hearsay or otherwise barred
by the res inter alios acta rule. Justice Jaguros recognized the merit of the
objection; hence, she allowed the answers to be taken merely as part of the
narration nut not as evidence of the truth thereof. Elsewise stated, the
admission in evidence of the words spoken by Sol is not to be used in
determining the issue of their truth.

 This being so, the acts of sexual intercourse admitted by Sol cannot, insofar
as the respondent is concerned, be deemed proven by the said admission or
confession. While it is true that technical rules of evidence should not be
applied in administrative cases, however, since the Investigating Justice
herself had specifically allowed the hearsay answers merely as part of the
narration, or more specifically as independently relevant statements, it would
be unfair and arbitrary to thereafter disregard the ruling. All told, there is in
this case no direct and competent evidence against the respondent that he
had illicit sex with Sol.

 But even if the admission of Sol were to be taken as proof of the truth of the
facts so admitted, considering, however, that Sol's admission that she
 engaged in sexual intercourse on five occasions made no reference to
specific dates, that their affair antedated Sol's marriage, that their last proven
tryst was in Hongkong in 1989, and that there is an absence of positive and
competent evidence to show that any of the five acts of sexual intercourse
took place after the respondent's appointment to the judiciary , it cannot be
safely presumed that the respondent committed any of the sexual
indiscretions after he became a judge.

 Respondent is not charged for immorality committed before his

appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis
for his administrative discipline in this case. The respondent may have
undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his appointment
could have completely transformed him upon the solemn realization that a
public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives. (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).

 It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered

from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and
walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond reformation and
redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate
knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor — his
private and official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of
impropriety. And the lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto must
perforce be presumed to have solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct
free from any hint or suspicion of impropriety. The imputation of illicit
sexual acts upon the incumbent judge must be proven by substantial
evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases.
This the complainant failed to do.

 However, considering their prior special relationship, the respondent and

Sol's meetings could reasonably incite suspicion of either its continuance or
revival and the concomitant intimacies expressive of such relationship. In
short, the respondent suddenly became indiscreet; he succumbed to the
sweet memories of the past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked
for his legal advice on a matter which involved her employment. Such
indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of
impropriety.
 He thus violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates
that "[a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be
beyond reproach," and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
provides that "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities."
 Finally, a word on the respondent's defense that he could not have sexual
congress with Sol because he was suffering from diabetes mellitus and
prostatitis. The claim is both self-serving and irrelevant. No expert testimony
was presented to prove the stage, extent or degree of seriousness of the
diseases and their effects on his capacity to copulate. The physicians who
purportedly issued the medical certificates did not testify thereon. Besides,
immorality — for which the respondent is charged — is not based alone on
illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled that: immorality has not been confined
to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare.
Castillo v. Calanog, 199 SCRA 75

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 In a sworn complaint dated January 17, 1990, docketed as Adm. Matter No.
RTJ-90-447, Emma J. Castillo charged Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr.,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, with
immorality and conduct unbecoming of a public official.

 In said complaint, she alleged that when she intervened in the case for
intestate estate of her late common-law husband which was then pending
before the branch where Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. was temporarily
holding office at that time, the latter was referred to her as a person who
could assist her.

 When they met, he invited her to eat in a restaurant and even asked her to
ride with him in his car but instead, to her surprise, he took her to a motel
where he made sexual advances. As he did not succeed in his evil design, he
asked her if she would agree to the proposition that he be her sub-husband
and in exchange promised to give her a condominium unit as well as to
provide financial support for her two (2) minor children and place them in an
exclusive school for girls. With this, he was able to convince her and as a
result of their relationship, she gave birth to a baby boy which they named
Jerome Christopher Calanog.

 However, following the birth of their son Jerome Christopher Calanog, said
Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. has then refused to provide them financial
support and has not placed complainant’s two (2) minor daughters to an
exclusive school as he had promised.

 Worst, to the present, he fails and refuses to pay the monthly installments of
the condominium unit he gave to her. Finally, despite her repeated verbal
demands for him to give them, or at least his son Jerome Christopher
Calanog, financial support, Judge Manuel M. Calanog Jr. just ignored her
pleas.

 In his answer respondent simply averred that the complainant "has expressly
stated that she is no longer interested in pursuing the same (complaint) and
 therefore, pray that the said complaint be considered withdrawn." The
respondent prayed "that the instant case be considered withdrawn and/or
Dismissed. In his Supplemental Answer he vehemently denies for being
untrue the material allegations of complainant in her letter-complaint dated
January 17, 1990." The complainant even submitted a formal "Affidavit of
Desistance" in which she denied totally the allegations of her complaint.

 Notwithstanding the turn of events, the Court, as a matter of procedure in

cases of this serious nature issued a Resolution referring the case to
Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report, and recommendation.

 In her investigation, Justice Paras heard the testimonies of Ernesto

Bustamante and Jose Javier, both employees in the sala of the respondent.

 According to Javier,” during his stay with the respondent’s branch, he would
be routinely asked by the respondent to bring the weekly allowance of Ms.
Emma J. Castillo and to pay the monthly electric and water bills of the
condominium where complainant was staying at. Also, he was tasked to
bring Ms. Emma J. Castillo to the Chinese General Hospital to give birth
and was further instructed me to fetch from the hospital Ms. Emma J.
Castillo after.

 In addition, the National Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Service, upon

the instruction of this Court, carried out a discreet verification of the facts
raised in the testimonies and reaffirmed the allegations initially made by the
complainant. They found from another source who is familiar with EMMA
J. CASTILLO, that EMMA J. CASTILLO is indeed the mistress of a Judge
of a Quezon City Court and has three children. Accordingly, this Judge has
been frequently seen at EMMA J. CASTILLO's unit, especially during the
afternoon and that when they go out, they walk separately, pretending not to
know each other. It was also confirmed that respondent purchased the
condominium in question and that all the copies of said Absolute Deed of
Sale are with EMMA J. CASTILLO.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Section 2 of Canon 2 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct
Held: Yes. Judge Calanog has behaved in a manner not becoming of his robes and
as a model of rectitude, betrayed the people's high expectations, and diminished the
esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance,
especially when executed as an afterthought, as in the case at bar. Also, even
if Emma Castillo had not filed her "Affidavit of Desistance," we would not
have been swayed solely by her allegations, and we find from the testimony
of Jose Javier that the former's charges, indeed, rest on sufficient grounds.

 As alleged by the complainant, verified by Justice Gloria C. Paras, and

confirmed by Jose Javier and agents of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Judge Calanog did establish an intimate, albeit immoral, relationship with
complainant Emma Castillo although he, Judge Calanog, is a married man.
Out of that liaison Emma Castillo gave birth to Judge Calanog's child,
Jerome Christopher, whom he housed in a condominium unit together with
his (Jerome's) mother and her two older children.

 It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove

beyond reasonable doubt the facts of concubinage having indeed existed and
been committed. This is not a criminal case for concubinage but an
administrative matter that invokes the power of supervision of this Court
over the members of the judiciary. The circumstances show a lack of
circumspection and delicadeza on the part of the respondent judge by failing
to avoid situations that make him suspect to committing immorality and
worse, having that suspicion confirmed.

 The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his
judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained,
a judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence.
 It is worth noting here that the respondent judge, in violating a judicial
precept, has also committed a grave injustice upon the complainant, who had
sought his assistance in expediting the intestate estate proceedings of her
deceased common-law husband. The judge, who was in the first place,
prohibited by the Code of Judicial Conduct from intervening in a case in any
court, took advantage of the complainant's helplessness and state of material
deprivation and persuaded her to become his mistress. The exploitation of
women becomes even more reprehensible when the offender commits the
injustice by the brute force of his position of power and authority, as in this
case.
In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595

Ponente: FERIA, J.

Facts:
 This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty.
Vicente Sotto, who was required by their Court , to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt to court for having issued a written
statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo
for contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila Times
and other daily newspapers of the locality , reads as follows:

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.)

interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a
local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to
divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it
is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow
mindedness of the majority of its members, In the wake of so many
mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I
believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of
the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of
the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may
hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.

 In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above
quoted threat, and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges
against this Supreme Court. But he therein contends that under section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
"this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens,
and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by
virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of
the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise
of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent
 made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no
intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this
high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but
he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.

Issue: Whether or not the court was correct in citing the accused for contempt

Held: Yes. Respondent attacked the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading
the administration of justice.

Ratio Decidendi:
 As the court as held in In re Kelly, the publication of a criticism of a party or
of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has always been
considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice,
and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a
constitutional right to have their fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice
administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from
outside coercion or interference. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting
upon the upon court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc.,
with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the
controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all court. The summary power to commit and punish
for contempt tending to obstructed or degrade the administration of justice,
as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the
maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land.

 Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or

unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court
and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in
reversing or modifying its decision.

 Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that
our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is
not correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of the original
bill which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be
 tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the
Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill
presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses of Congress, and
the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the
interest of the State" was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed
by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the intention of
Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be determined by
this Court in applying said act.

 But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published

in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the
decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending
reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a
bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing
the Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme
Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to
change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the
honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the
Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of
justice.

 To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say,
that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and
justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor
the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years,
would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court.

 As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like
any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect
to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
 It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press
must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the
press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense.
As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise
of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the
judiciary. It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is
under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication
to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
Jamsani-Rodrigues v. Justice Gregory S. Ong, et al., AM No. 08-19-SB-J, 24
August 2010

Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.

Facts:
 Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez, an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman initiated this
administrative matter by filing an affidavit-complaint to charge
Sandiganbayan Justices Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong); Jose R. Hernandez
(Justice Hernandez); and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada), who
composed the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), with
Justice Ong as Chairman, at the time material to the complaint, with (1)
grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the interest of the service; (2) falsification of public
documents; (3) improprieties in the hearing of cases; and (4) manifest
partiality and gross ignorance of the law.

 It was alleged that Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools
they had graduated, and frequently inquired whether the law school in which
Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated was better
than his (Justice Ong’s) own alma mater. The complainant opined that the
query was manifestly intended to emphasize that the San Beda College of
Law, the alma mater of Justice Ong, and the UP College of Law, that of
Justice Hernandez, were the best law schools.

 In imputing manifest partiality to respondent Justices, the complainant cited

the Fourth Division’s resolution granting accused Ronaldo V. Puno’s
demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801, and dismissing the case
upon a finding that the assailed contracts had never been perfected, which
finding was contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution.

 The complainant insisted that the conclusion that the assailed contracts had
never been perfected was based on a National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) resolution, which the Fourth Division appreciated in the
guise of taking judicial notice. She contended that taking judicial notice of
the NAPOLCOM resolution upon a demurrer to evidence was highly
erroneous, and constituted gross ignorance of the law.
 In their respective answers, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pointed out
that the Supreme Court had already sustained their action by dismissing the
petition for review of the Special Prosecutor through the resolution issued in
G.R. No. 171116 on June 5, 2006. Justice Ponferrada’s separate comment
echoed his co-respondents’ assertions in their joint comment.

 In his report, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, now a Member of the
Court, recommended the dismissal of the charges for lack of merit; stating
the folowing:
As regards the charge of improprieties, it appears that the complainant
has not discharged the onus of proof by substantial evidence. The
intemperate and immoderate statements attributed to respondents are, to
repeat, without sufficient substantiation. What comes near to but is not
equivalent to impropriety is the jocular banter admitted by respondents about
their respective alma maters, the intention being to break the usual
monotony and seriousness of the courtroom setting or to put practitioners
appearing before them at ease. It cannot be said that public confidence in the
Judiciary was eroded by the conduct. No discourtesy was shown towards
either the parties or to each other.
As for the charge of manifest partiality insofar as the grant of the
demurrer in Criminal Case No. 25801 is concerned, suffice it to say that
members of the bench like respondents are presumed to have acted regularly
and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Because notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in
the performance of a judge’s function, the rule is settled that bias, prejudice
and undue interest cannot be presumed lightly.
Mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party is, consequently, not
enough; there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge. As a matter
of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action- he cannot be subject to civil, criminal or administrative
liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he
acts in good faith. These principles find resonance in the case at bench
where, in addition to the total dearth of evidence to prove the charge of
manifest partiality, it appears that respondents’ grant of the demurrer in
Criminal Case No. 25801 was affirmed in the following wise in the June 5,
2006 resolution issued by the Second Division of the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 171116, to wit:
"G.R. No. 171116 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REYNALDO
PUNO). xx xx On the basis thereof, the Court resolves to DENY the petition
for review on certiorari dated 2 March 2006 assailing the resolutions of the
 Sandiganbayan for petitioner’s failure to submit a valid affidavit of service
of copies of the petition on respondent and the Sandiganbayan in accordance
with Sections 3 and 5, Rule 45 and Section 5(d), Rule 56 in relation to
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules, there being no jurat and signature of the
affiant in the attached affidavit of service of the petition.

In any event, the petition is an improper remedy and failed to

sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error
in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case x x x."

Issue: Whether or not respondents’ actions give rise to the suspicion or appearance
of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the
legal profession who practice regularly in their courts?

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court points out that publicizing professional
qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from certain law
schools might have even revealed their bias for or against some lawyers.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels
appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their
engaging during the hearings in casual conversation about their respective
law schools. They thereby publicized their professional qualifications and
manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public magistrates.
Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. The Supreme Court view their
acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no
judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially during their
performance of judicial functions. They should not exchange banter or
engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter
how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to
believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act
with courtesy towards all who appear before their court.

 The Supreme Court also points out that publicizing professional

qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from certain
law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the
part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some
lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
 demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations
with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in
their courts.

 Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In

performing their judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice
by word or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds. It is
very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble
position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and
measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.

 In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of
unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance.
Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules
not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method."

 The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the
demurrer to evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is
dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution
on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have "failed to
sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error
in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction."

 At any rate, it is worth stressing that a judge will be held administratively

liable for rendering an unjust judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice,
revenge, or some other similar motive.
In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1

Ponente: SMITH, J.

Facts:
 On the 29th of August, 1900, during the progress of a trial then being held
before the CFI at Bacolor, in the Province of Pampanga, the court had
occasion to caution Angel Alberto, a witness in the case, not to look at the
attorney for the defendant but to fix his attention on the judge who was at the
time examining him.

 It seems that the witness did not give heed to this warning, and the judge
thereupon arose from his seat and approaching the witness, seized him by
the shoulders, and using the expression, "Lingon ang mucha" ("Look at
me"), either shook him, as insisted by the attorney for the defendant, or only
turned him about, as claimed by the judge and others.

 Whether the witness was shaken or only turned about, at all events "seizing
him," brought the defendant’s attorney to his feet, who, protesting against
the action of the judge as coercive of the witness, demanded that a record be
made of the occurrence and that the further hearing of the case be postponed.

 Two days afterward the clerk entered in his record a recital of the incident
substantially as above, the attorney, Marcelino Aguas, had been wanting
in respect to the court by making use of "improper phrases," and by
interrupting opposing counsel in their examination of witnesses.

 The court on this record adjudged the attorney to be in contempt of court and
suspended him from the practice of his profession for a period of twenty
days. The attorney appealed, but his appeal having been disallowed by the
lower court, he asked to be heard in justification, which was granted.

Issue: WON the actions of the appellant constitute contempt

Held: No. Against the conduct of the judge the appellant had the right to protest
and to demand that the incident be made a matter of record.

Ratio Decidendi:
 In our opinion the action of the judge in seizing the witness, Alberto Angel,
by the shoulder and turning him about was unwarranted and an interference
 with that freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every witness is
entitled while giving testimony in a court of justice.

 Against such conduct the appellant had the right to protest and to demand
that the incident be made a matter of record. That he did so was not
contempt, providing protest and demand were respectfully made and with
due regard for the dignity of the court.

 The only question, therefore in this case is, Was the appellant respectful and
regardful of the court’s dignity in presenting his objection and asking that it
be recorded in the proceedings? The witnesses say and the judge finds that
"his attitude was menacing" (bastante amenazadora) in the moment of
making his protest, but beyond that there is nothing in the record which even
tends to show that he was disrespectful to the court or unmindful of its
dignity.

 The specific act from which it was inferred that his attitude was menacing
should have been testified to by the witnesses and found by the court, and
failing that, the record does not show concrete facts sufficient to justify the
conclusion that he was disrespectful to the court or offensive to its dignity.

 The judgment appealed from must therefore be reversed, and it is so ordered,

with costs de oficio.
Cabulisan vs. Pagalilauan, 297 SCRA 593 [1998]

Ponente: Bellosillo, J.,

Facts:
 Cabulisan filed an administrative complaint against respondent for grave
misconduct committed as follows : (1) peeping into the bathroom where
Marilyn C. Dumayas, a public health nurse, and daughter of the owner of the
house where he was boarding, was then taking a bath; (2) having a mistress
in the neighboring town; and (3) allowing local practitioners to write
decisions for him.

 In his undated letter-comment, respondent denied the charges but admitted

that while presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sanchez Mira,
Cagayan, he boarded in the house of Isabelo P. Castillo, father of Marilyn C.
Dumayas and his former sheriff. Respondent explained that since he was not
accustomed to sitting on the toilet bowl in the comfort room, he would squat
on the bowl with his feet and not his buttocks resting on it. Respondent
claimed that under that circumstance, he had to balance himself by placing
one hand on the divider while mounting the bowl and dismounting from it.
He concluded that Marilyn who was at the adjacent bathroom must have
interpreted the movement of her hanging clothes as a deliberate and
malicious act on his part thus giving rise to her suspicion that he was
actually peeping at her. With regard to the charge that he had a mistress,
respondent surmised that the woman alluded to was Divina Calaycay,
widow of Infante S. Calaycay, his predecessor in the Regional Trial Court.
He insisted that he and Divina Calaycay were merely friends, as he and her
late husband were former classmates. On the accusation that respondent
allowed local practitioners to write decisions for him, respondent maintained
that it was baseless and merely fabricated.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of voyeurism for his disgraceful acts

Held: The respondent is guilty of voyeurism for his disgraceful acts.

Rationale Decidendi:
 The respondent’s excuse is feeble considering his stature and educational
background. It was improbable for him to move the clothes of Marilyn and
cause them to almost fall off the partition unless he was nervously
committing something mischievous. Moreover, he callously abused the
confidence of his landlord who had welcomed him into his home. In this
administrative case, we are principally concerned with the moral fiber of
respondent. We have repeatedly held that while every office in the
government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary.

 People who run the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must not only
be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but
more importantly, they must possess the highest degree of integrity and
probity and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in their public and
private lives. By committing the prurient acts in question, respondent
violated the trust reposed in him and utterly failed to live up to the noble
ideals and rigid standards of morality required in the judicial profession. For
the charge of keeping a mistress and allowing practitioners to write decisions
for him, these were dismissed.
Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 522

Ponente: Fernandez, J.,

Facts:
 The Respondent-Judges committed a clear error when they dismissed the
election protests filed by the herein petitioners against the private
respondents who had been proclaimed elected and had assumed their
respective positions for a four year term as a result of the November 8, 1971
elections. The principal ground of the dismissal orders now challenged
before Us on certiorari is that the election protests filed by the petitioners
have become moot and academic, for the reason that the private respondents
are now holding their respective positions under a new term, indefinite as it
is, the original four-year term to which they have been elected having
expired upon the ratification of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.

 An additional issue is involved in G.R. No. L-36927-28 pending before the

respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First Instance of
Ifugao, and that is the matter of his disqualification to continue hearing the
election protests for the position of Governor and Vice-Governor filed by the
petitioners Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against the private
respondents Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan. The reasons adduced
by the petitioners are "said petitioners opposed the confirmation of the
nomination of said respondent to his present position before the Commission
on Appointments; that petitioners filed criminal charges against said
respondent before the COMELEC for violation of the Election Code of 1971
which are still pending until this date; and that this respondent was
recommended to his present position by his co-respondent Gualberto
Lumauig, the protestee in Election Case No. 5, and the latter's brother,
Congressman Romulo Lumauig."

Issue: Whether or not Judge Abad is disqualified for hearing the election protests
filed by Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against the private respondents
Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan.
Held: Judge Abad is disqualified for hearing the election protests filed by
Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against the private respondents Gualberto
Lumauig and John Langbayan.

Rationale Decidendi:
 Whatever be the merit of the charge of the petitioners that the respondent
Judge Abad campaigned in support of the candidacy of the private
respondents and their line-up of candidates; that they filed criminal charges
against and opposed the confirmation of the appointment of the said
respondent Judge; that said respondent Judge was recommended to his
present position by private respondent Gualberto Lumauig and the latter's
brother, Congressman Romulo Lumauig, the fact is that a strained personal
relationship must have arisen between the petitioners, on the one hand, and
the respondent Judge Abad, on the other. And not only the petitioners but
even their political supporters as well may not be in a position to have full
faith, trust and confidence on the impartiality of said respondent Judge.

 A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one
party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the courts of Justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that
he reflects on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of
his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of
justice against him. That passion on the part of the judge may be generated
because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his
counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other
men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up
his mind to act or "withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is
involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be
heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be
occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or
not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily, desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might
 be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and
substance to the second paragraph of Section 1. Rule 137. He serves the
cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.

 In the case at bar, the respondent Judge Abad is hereby declared disqualified
to continue hearing the election protests filed by Cresencio Paredes and
Venancio Uyan against the private respondents Gualberto Lumauig and John
Langbayan. For, as we have already observed above, there must already be a
strained personal relationship between the petitioners, on the one hand, and
the respondent Judge Abad on the other; and not only the petitioners but
even their political supporters as well may not be in a position to have full
faith, trust and confidence on the impartiality of said respondent Judge. And
"next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of
doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and
integrity of a judge."
Fecundo v Berjamen 180 SCRA 235 (1989)

Ponente: Padilla, J.,

Facts:
 Petitioner is a mayoralty candidate and won over private respondent. Private
respondent then filed an election protest against petitioner. The case was
then assigned to Branch 20 RTC presided over by public respondent.
Petitioner filed a motion for inhibition but was denied by the public
respondent (presiding judge) because of the petitioner’s failure to comply
with the 3-day notice rule. No motion for reconsideration was filed by the
petitioner because of the public respondent’s statement in open court that:

"If you intend to file another pleading, [sic] you can do and the Court will
cross the bridge when it comes to it, without considering the merits and
demerits of this motion, the Court resolved to deny said motion. So, if you
file another one, the Court will just deny when it received (sic) it."

 According to the petitioner, the acts of the public respondent show partiality
or antipathy towards him. Private respondent on the other hand, contends
that petitioner is guilty of deliberately delaying the resolution of the election
protest. First is through a petition for certiorari with the SC. Second, by
disqualifying the judge (motion to inhibit). Respondent judge, for his part,
denies all the accusations, imputing them to petitioner's wild imagination,
political immaturity and childish mentality. Contends further, that the
petition for inhibition is another way of delaying the resolution of the
election protest.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge should inhibit himself from hearing
and deciding the case because of his alleged partiality.

Held: Yes, but not because the judge is proven to be partial but only to remove any
taint of suspicion that the decision of the judge might be biased.

Rationale Decidendi:
 Canon 3 Section 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct of the Philippine
states that: Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could
come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

 While it is true that partiality and prejudgment may constitute a just or valid
reason for the trial judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case,
it is not enough that the same be merely alleged. It is now settled that mere
suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties to the case is not
enough; there should be evidence to prove the charge. Moreover, second
only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a
manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity
of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law
stated in general terms that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not
wholly free, disinterested impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra)
because, however upright the judge, and however free from the slightest
inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or
prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed exparte may still linger to affect
unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed
unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or
stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will
can shut out memory; there is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that
the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that which it
knows, but which it should forget in that process.

 The language used by the judge in an order issued by him manifests at the
very least an exasperation bordering on indignation at petitioner and his
tactics, which may unnecessarily cloud his impartiality in deciding the
election case at hand. The judge rendering it must, at all times, maintain the
appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language, both written and
spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued construed.
Aparicio v. Andal, G.R. Nos. 86587-93 July 25, 1989

Ponente: Sarmiento, J.,

Facts:
 Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
are the orders of the respondent judge dated October 11 and 12, 1988 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1371, 1439, 1475,1480, and 1476 and Civil Cases Nos.
742 and 755, denying the petitioner's Motion for Inhibition. The petitioner
maintains that there is between him and Judge Andal an existing state of
hostility sparked off by the filing by him of petitions for certiorari and
administrative cases against the latter. He theorizes that the Judge in refusing
to inhibit himself from the cases subject of the Motion for Inhibition and in
all the other cases pending before him in which the petitioner is acting either
as counsel or a party litigant, Judge Andal violated his constitutional rights
to due process, equal protection of the law, access to the court and speedy
disposition of cases, making Judge Andal civilly liable under Art. 32 of the
new Civil Code. He asserts that because of Judge Andal's refusal to inhibit
himself, he (petitioner) and his family suffered mental anguish and incurred
expenses for which they must be compensated.

 On the other hand, Judge Andal maintains that the motion for inhibition did
not cite any valid grounds to justify his inhibition.6 He submits that when he
denied the motion for inhibition, he was not aware that A.M. No. RTJ-88-
245 was filed against him as it was only on November 4, 1988 when he
received a resolution of this Court directing him to comment thereon, that he
first came to know about it. He asseverates that he does not normally resent
the filing of certiorari cases against him as he has neither the reason nor the
luxury of time to entertain such a feeling. Moreover, he is so preoccupied
with his case load to even think of it. He further stresses that he has nothing
personal against petitioner, as he does not know the latter personally.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Andal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the petitioner's Motion for Inhibition in the
several criminal and civil cases subject thereof and in thereafter continuing to take
cognizance of said cases and all the other cases pending before him.
Held: Judge Andal did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he denied the petitioner's Motion for Inhibition in the several
criminal and civil cases subject thereof and in thereafter continuing to take
cognizance of said cases and all the other cases pending before him.

Rationale Decidendi:
 It must be observed that the Motion for Inhibition, as correctly stated by
Judge Andal in his orders denying the same, cited no valid ground. There is,
therefore, no doubt that the denial of the said motion was not whimsical or
capricious nor was the said denial intended to spite the petitioner, as the
petitioner would want this Court to believe, but was done in the valid and
judicious exercise of his function and duty as judge. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the state of hostility being pressed by the petitioner is
purely imaginary. Indeed, the petitioner had not presented any evidence to
support his conclusion.

 Having denied the Motion for Inhibition, Judge Andal acted within his
jurisdiction when he continued to take cognizance of all the cases pending
before him, there being no writ of injunction or a restraining order issued,
enjoining him to cease and desist from acting on the said cases.

 Likewise, "the mere filing of an administrative case against respondent

judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case, for if on
every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either
stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired
disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the
basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept
pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges to handle all the cases
pending in all the courts. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the
judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased or partial, 16 and on this regard the
petitioner failed.

 In Pimentel vs. Salanga, we rationalized: It ill behooves this Court to tar and
feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party
litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge
has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has
not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his
would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what
respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before
him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made
before trial that a party "will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing
is "premature." Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed
against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice
without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich." To
disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is
concerned, is a matter of conscience.
Gandionco v. Penaranda, G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987

Ponente: Padilla, J.,

Facts:
 Private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in
Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint
against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a
petition for support and payment of damages. On 14 November 1986,
application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a
decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in
the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge, as already stated,
ordered the payment of support pendente lite.

 Petitioner seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from hearing the
case, as the grant of support pendente lite and the denial of the motion to
suspend hearings in the case, are taken by the petitioner as a disregard of
applicable laws and existing doctrines, thereby showing the respondent
Judge's alleged manifest partiality to private respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge should be disqualified from hearing
the case because of the alleged manifest partiality to the private respondent.

Held: Respondent Judge should not be disqualified from hearing the case because
of the alleged manifest partiality to the private respondent.

Rationale Decidendi:
 Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a
judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and
jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing
the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is more so, in
this case, where we find the judge's disposition of petitioner's motions to be
sound and well-taken.

 Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife

must also fail, as we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a
remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the
discretion of the judge. 6 If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente
lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce
the same.
Lorenzo v. Marquez, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-87-123, June 27, 1988

Ponente: Per Curiam

Facts:
 Judge Primo L. Marquez (respondent) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Sariaya, Quezon is charged on three counts, namely: (1) harassment in
failing to indorse the reappointment of complainant Mercedita G. Lorenzo as
Municipal Trial Court Aide; (2) for violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court in deciding Civil Case No. 1202 entitled Kilusang Bayan
Pampananalapi ng Sariaya vs. Gilda Balid, et al., when he was the former
counsel of the plaintiff; and (3) for issuing a subpoena for the appearance of
Jose D. Obosa, a prison inmate of the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) to
appear before him when said person has no case pending before him nor is
he a witness in any pending case therein.

 Under the second charge, there is no question that the respondent was the
counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1202 entitled "Kilusang Bayan
Pampananalapi ng Sariaya (KBPS) vs. Gilda Balid, et al." filed in the
Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon. The complaint was filed by
Crisostomo L. Luna, president and board chairman of the plaintiff, who is
his uncle. The respondent was then a member of the board of directors of the
plaintiff. In an order of November 28, 1986, Judge Parentela declared
defendants in default for failure to file their answer. When the respondent
assumed office, he issued an order on February 10, 1987 requiring plaintiff
to secure the services of another counsel in his place and he set the case for
hearing. On March 9, 1987, he issued an order considering the case
submitted for decision. on April 2, 1987, he rendered a decision favorable to
the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Primo L. Marquez violated Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court.

Held: Judge Primo L. Marquez violated Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.

Rationale Decidendi:
 Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
 Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit
in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniary interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons
other than those mentioned above.

 From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in
which he was a counsel without the written consent of all the parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The respondent alleged
that since there was no objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to
preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law.
The rule is explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the parties,
not a mere verbal consent much. less a tacit acquiescence. Moreover, said
written consent must be signed by them and entered upon the record. The
failure of the respondent to observe these elementary rules of conduct
betrays his unusual personal interest in the case which prevailed over and
above his sworn duty to administer the law impartially and without any fear
or favor.
Talens v. Arceo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336 July 25, 1996

Ponente: Per Curiam

Facts:
 The complainant, Atty. Jocelyn "Joy" C. Talens-Dabon, is the Assistant
Clerk of Court of the RTC, San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent Judge
Hermin E. Arceo is the Presiding Judge of the RTC Branch 43 in San
Fernando, Pampanga. On the first day of her employment to the RTC,
respondent looked at her from head to foot as if undressing her. She
observed respondent to be rude and disrespectful. He talked in a loud voice
and shouted at them; used offensive words such as "walang isip", "tanga";
told green jokes and stories; made harsh and negative comments about court
personnel in the presence of others.

 Whenever he had the opportunity, he would make bodily contact

("chancing") with her (Joy) and certain female employees. One time "Illegal
in Blue" VHS brought by respondent was played at respondent's bidding.
Marilyn Senapilo-Leander, 23, court stenographer, testified of the time that
respondent summoned her to his chamber and she found him clad only in
briefs. When she turned around to flee, respondent called after her saying
"why are you afraid. After all, this is for you."

 Respondent gave Joy a poem containing the following words, among others:

Ako ngayo'y naririto bigong-bigong umiiyak."

Kapalaran ay malupit, di kita makatalik
Sa ngayon o bukas pagkat di mo ibig
Aangkinin kita kahit sa panaginip
Gano'n kita kamahal Joy, aking pag- ibig."

 Respondent tried to kiss complainant after giving the said poem. She tried to
escape but he again caught her. In the ensuing struggle, complainant slipped
and fell on the floor, her elbows supporting the upper part of her body while
her legs were outstretched between respondent's feet. Respondent then bent
his knees in a somewhat sitting (squatting) position, placed his palms on
 either side of her head and kissed her on the mouth with his mouth open and
his tongue sticking out.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge violated Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct

Held: Respondent Judge violated Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

Rationale Decidendi:
 The Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality and
decency which every member of the judiciary must observe (Sicat vs.
Alcantara, 161 SCRA 284 [1988]). A magistrate is judged not only by his
official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private
morals are externalized (Junio vs. Rivera, 225 SCRA 688 [1993]). He should
not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral
integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man. In Dy
Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 SCRA 493 [1981]),
the Court laid down the rationale why every judge must possess moral
integrity, thusly:
The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must
be beyond reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the
people in the administration of justice cannot be maintained if a judge who
dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral
integrity and if he obtusely continues to commit affront to public decency. In
fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary.

 In Castillo vs. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991]), it was emphasized that:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his
judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained,
a judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence.
 Thus, being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify integrity and exemplify
honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of his official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.

 Respondent has failed to measure up these exacting standards. He has

behave in a manner unbecoming of a judge and as model of moral
uprightness. He has betrayed the people's high expectations and diminished
the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.
Liwanag v. Lustre, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1168, April 21, 1999

Ponente: Quisumbing, J

Facts:
 Liwanang alleged through her sworn statement that prior to July 1994 her
husband filed 12 counts of violation of B.P. 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante
Chua and Rowena Chua for issuing checks amounting to approximately 3.5
million pesos, that were dishonored when presented for payment. The said
cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna
presided by Judge Paterno Lustre. Their arraignment was postponed several
times at the instance of the accused. on December 16, 1994, one day after
the hearing, at about 7:00 A.M., Liwanag went to see Judge Lustre at his
chamber. There, respondent told the complainant that he prepared an order
for the accused. She thanked him and told him that if the accused will pay
us, she and her husband will give him five (5%) percent of it as token of
gratitude. At that point, Judge Lustre stood up and told her that he does not
need money. While Judge Lustre was giving a copy of the order, he touched
complainant’s shoulder, down to her breast. He was telling her that he
acceded to her request. Later, he told her that he is available during Mondays
and Fridays as there are no scheduled hearings and for her to come back to
him before the hearing on January 17, 1995 which she did not comeback.
Judge Lustre cancelled hearings on all dates and reset the same on Feb. 22,
28 and March 7, 1995. Liwanag went to Judge Lustre and asked why he
cancelled the hearings. He responded that he was fooled since she did not
come to him as per his request and told her that she must obey his wishes if
she want the case to go smoothly since he is the one who will decide the
cases. told me that he was already free and for me to wait for him outside
the courtroom. We boarded his white Toyota car, with Plate No. PLN-513
and he brought me to Canlubang Tollway.

 While in the car, he kissed her on the lips and caressed her breast. At that
instant, she told him to set hearings for April and May, 1995 since according
to his staff, there would be no hearings in May and in April. He told her, he
will take care of it and ordered her to come to his office on March 13, 1995
at 7:00 A.M and talk about the settings. On March 13, 1995 she went to see
Judge Lustre as ordered he kissed her and caressed her body which she could
 not do anything but obey. He exposed his penis and ordered me to
masturbate him. I could not do anything but obey. There was a fluid that
oozed from his penis, which was somewhat bloody. He then asked her to go
with him to Laguna de Bay Inn to see him on March 23, 1995 at 7:00 A.M.
at Laguna de Bay Inn in Sucat since his house is near the area which she
declined. The hearings were again cancelled.

 On June 15, 1995 she went to Judge Lustre in his office because she was
told that her next hearing would be in September despite previous settings.
She requested Judge Lustre to give her monthly hearings, in July and
August. He told her that he would oblige if she would follow his wishes. As
he was saying that, he was already touching her breast. He exposed his penis
at told her to perform "fellatio. she refused. She was then told to return the
following day, the same time and he will wait for her, which she complied.
They went to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex in Crossing, Calamba,
Laguna. They went inside the room undressed himself and ordered her to do
the same He ordered her to perform "fellatio" on him and she obeyed. There
was blood that oozed from his penis and she also saw black rashes on his
body, especially on his legs. Before they left, he told her to see him again on
July 10 in his office which she didn’t come back. On June 23, 1995, the
same thing happened. Judge Lustre is deliberately delaying the prosecution
of the cases to prolong his abusive acts towards her. Apart from the letter
and the sworn statement, complainant also sent the Court 11 photographs
showing her and respondent together in various places. Five of these were
allegedly taken at the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna. She also
submitted a receipt issued by said resort dated June 23, 1995 and two
transcripts of phone conversations she had with respondent.

 Respondent denied the charges leveled against him and dismissed them as
"the vile products of (complainant's) malicious and prejudiced mind."
According to him, complainant and her common-law husband thought of
filing charges against him when he "refused to bend to, and accommodate,
(their) haughty and arrogant demands to hastily schedule, try continuously,
finish and decide arbitrarily within a very short period of time" the B.P. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) cases filed by complainant's husband. The
complaint was, according to respondent, likewise prompted by respondent's
refusal to accept complainant's offer to "reward" him with five percent of the
 P3.5 million her husband seeks to recover. Respondent further pointed out
that at age 67, with a heart ailment and diabetes, "sex is beyond (his)
physical capacity." He said he is "no longer capable of what ordinary men
indulge in, lest (he) die in the attempt." He sought the dismissal of the
complaint filed against him.

 Complainant pointed out that, indeed, he did not engage in sexual

intercourse with her but only engaged in foreplay and asked her to perform
oral sex on him; and while diabetes might have diminished respondent's
sexual urge, it did not totally erase the same.

Issue: Whether or not such acts of impropriety of the respondent judge in his
public and private life are violative of the high standard of conduct required of the
members of the bench

Held: Respondent’s Judge acts of impropriety of the respondent judge in his public
and private life are violative of the high standard of conduct required of the
members of the bench

Rationale Decidendi:
 Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the
unjustifiable delays in the hearing of their B.P. 22 cases. But would she
falsely accuse respondent with sexual molestation only to get back at him?
This goes against the grain of human nature and therefore unlikely. She
should know that by revealing her sexual misadventures with respondent,
graphically describing each and every detail, she would only be exposing
herself and her family to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain
nothing from the exercise, save the hope that her dignity may somehow be
vindicated in the process.

 As the records now stand, we are constrained to agree with the Court
Administrator's assessment that respondent has failed to live up to the high
standard of conduct required of members of the bench. He grossly violated
his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety not
only in his public but in his private life as well. All to the grave prejudice of
the administration of justice, indeed.
 The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the
officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather
than enhances the public's faith and trust in the judiciary. Respondent's
disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already retired as
of November 1, 1998. For the serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty
provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine
in the maximum amount should be imposed.
People v. Maceda, G.R. No. 89591-96, August 13, 1990

Ponente: Padilla, J.,

Facts:
 During Atty. Avelino Javellana’s hearing for petition for bail on September
14, 1989, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor John Turalba. He manifested that
he was appearing only to reiterate the Señor State Prosecutor’s motion for
deferment of the scheduled hearings on Atty. Javellana’s motion for bail.
Judge Maceda denied the said motion. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Turalba moved for reconsideration, claiming that his position is subservient
to that of the Senior State Prosecutor who is the duly designated principal
prosecutor and as a matter of conviction, he cannot proceed with the trial as
well as with the subsequent trials. Respondent Judge denied the motion for
reconsideration, and, again, directed the prosecution to present its evidence.

 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Turalba manifested that he was not

participating in the proceedings and begged to be allowed to leave the
courtroom, which the respondent Judge refused. Nevertheless, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Turalba walked out and, while walking towards the
door, respondent Judge ordered the Sheriff to arrest him. Judge Maceda
issued an order finding Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Turalba in contempt
of court; declaring the prosecution to have waived its right to present
evidence in opposition to private respondent's petition for bail; and
considering the said petition for bail submitted for resolution. The
respondent Judge imposed upon the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor the
penalty of ten (10) days imprisonment.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Maceda committed grave abuse of discretion when he
insisted in continuously hearing Atty. Javellana’s petition for bail and in ordering
the arrest of APP Turalba of contempt of court

Held: Judge Maceda committed grave abuse of discretion when he insisted in

continuously hearing Atty. Javellana’s petition for bail and in ordering the arrest of
APP Turalba of contempt of court
Rationale Decidendi:
 Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or
arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court. While courts are inherently
empowered to punish for contempt to the end that they may enforce their
authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and insure the
effectiveness of the administration of justice, nevertheless, such power
should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle,
for the power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its
nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

 A perusal of the transcript of the hearing held on 14 September 1989 shows

that Assistant Provincial Prosecutor John Turalba had not made any
statement that could be considered as "contumacious" or an affront to the
dignity of the court. And, while the act of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Turalba of "walking out" does not meet our approval — as he should have
stayed after the respondent Judge had denied his motion for permission to
leave the courtroom — yet, the respondent Judge, in ordering the
incarceration of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Turalba, acted beyond the
permissible limits of his power to punish for contempt.

 A restraining order was issued on August 31, 1989 ordering Judge Maceda
to cease and desist from continuing the hearing of Atty. Javellana’s petition
for bail until the motion for discharge of Oscar Tianzon as state witness is
resolved. When respondent Judge, therefore, denied the prosecution's motion
for deferment of the scheduled hearings on private respondent's petition for
bail and in proceeding to hear the said motion, by ordering the prosecution
to present its evidence — which precipitated the walk-out of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor and his consequent arrest and commitment to the
Provincial Jail — he (respondent judge) was acting in violation of the
restraining order issued by this Court. Had the respondent Judge granted the
prosecution's motion for deferment, this incident could have been avoided.
Javier v. De Guzman, A.M. No. RTJ-89-380, December 19, 1990

Ponente: Per Curiam

Facts:
 Complainants allege that, on 7 December 1987, Efren Javier, and his mother,
Lolita Javier, borrowed P200,000.00 from Respondent Judge with interest
orally agreed upon at ten per cent (10%) monthly. They tendered to the latter
UCPB Check No. BNE 012872, dated 7 January 1988, in the amount of
P220,000.00. The drawer of the check was actually Donato Belen, a brother-
in-law of Efren, as the Javiers had no personal checking account. The
following day, Respondent required them to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement, which they did. Two of the conditions imposed were interest at
the rate of twenty per cent (20%) per month, compounded monthly, and
should they fail to pay the loan and its interest upon maturity on 7 January
1988 and the check is deposited and dishonored, an appropriate charge for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 may be filed at Respondent's option.
When the Javiers defaulted on due date because of business reverses, partial
payments in the total amount of P177,000.00 were made to Respondent
between 6 January 1988 and 16 June 1988. Meanwhile, the check, which
was deposited by Respondent on 14 April 1988, was dishonored by the
drawee bank.

 On 8 September 1988, Respondent instituted suit for a "Sum of Money and

Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment".
Still later, Respondent filed in Manila two (2) criminal complaints, the first,
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Efren, who, however, was acquitted, and
the second, for Estafa against Complainants and Lolita Javier, which
complaint was dismissed (Rollo, p. 194). On 21 March 1989, Respondent
further filed an administrative charge against Complainant father, Pedro,
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue where the latter was employed.

 Feeling harassed, Complainants filed this administrative charge against

Respondent Judge on four counts of "dishonorable conduct," as follows:
 1. Respondent had loaned money to Complainants at usurious interest as can
be gleaned from the fact that after receiving P177,000.00 in installments, he
still seeks to recover the amount of P622,817.67;
2. Respondent took advantage of his position as Regional Trial Court Judge
of Makati, Metro Manila, by filing a collection case against Complainants
and Lolita Javier before the same Court and making false and fraudulent
manifestations that Complainants had failed to pay any amount as of 8
September 1988;
3. Respondent resorted to harassment by filing a criminal complaint for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Complainant, Efren, despite knowledge that
the latter was not the drawer of the UCPB check; and
4. Respondent failed to reveal the true facts of the case, in violation of
Articles 182 and 183 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing "False
testimony," when he filed the administrative charges with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the Civil Service Commission against Complainant
Pedro notwithstanding knowledge of the fact that Pedro was not involved in
the transaction in question.

 In his Comment, Respondent denied that he lent any money to the Javiers
alleging that it was his wife who had asked her first cousin, Mrs. Hedy Laca,
to make available the amount of P200,000.00. The real lender, therefore,
was the latter. When the Javiers failed to repay the loan, they were
compelled to pay back the amount to Mrs. Laca. Respondent, therefore,
became the creditor of the Javiers "by force of circumstances."

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of Rule 4.04, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct

Held: Yes

Rationale Decidendi: The complainants’ allegations on four counts of

dishonorable conduct were disposed by the Court as follows:

(1) Respondent loaned money to complainants at usurious interest. While

respondent had every right to protect his investment, and while the contract
of loan entered into between him and the Javiers was legal per se,
Respondent rendered it unconscionable by imposing a penalty of 20%
 interest per month compounded monthly. Although not illegal under the
terms of the Memorandum of Agreement, as in fact, the Trial Court had
ruled in Respondent's favor, it does not necessarily follow that it was moral
and fair. Respondent is not a hard-boiled and callous businessman. He is a
Judge.

(2) Respondent took advantage of his position as Makati RTC Judge in

filing the suit in Makati where he sits as one of the Trial Judges, instead of
filing the suit in Quezon City where the Javiers reside or in Manila where
respondent resides. While Respondent may have had reasons of
convenience, a sense of propriety should have impelled him to desist. In the
eyes of the public, it arouses suspicion, rightly or wrongly, that advantage is
being taken of one's position and that a Judge's adversary is sure to get a raw
deal. As it turned out, respondent in his official stationery, upbraided the
Sheriff who enforced the Writ of Preliminary Attachment for not having
taken into custody all the items he had levied upon and "asked" him to do so
"within 48 hours". In this regard, Respondent had exposed the Bench to
possible charges of exertion of undue pressure and influence.

(3) Respondent harassed complainants in continuing with the criminal

prosecution of Efren for violation of B.P. 22 despite knowing that Efren was
not the owner and drawer of the check, and, therefore, is not the proper
person to be charged. It was respondent's duty to disregard his personal
animosity towards the Javiers and to see to the forthright dismissal of the
case. He failed to comply with this duty when he instead saw to the
continuation of the prosecution of the case until it reached the RTC and up
to its termination (acquittal of Efren).

(4) The filing of BIR and CSC administrative charges against Pedro was
found to be unsubstantiated. Pedro is not a party nor a signatory of the
agreement, nonetheless, his wife and son are parties thereof. There was
reason for respondent to believe that Pedro was not an 'innocent' party and
had in reality a 'behind-the-scenes' participation in the transaction.

 A judge's official conduct should be free from and be untainted by the

appearance of impropriety, and his or her personal behavior, not only upon
the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his or her
 everyday life, should be beyond reproach. A Judge's official life cannot
simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. A Judge should
so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the Judiciary.

 Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper

conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance
thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely
and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify judicial
integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a
judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion. All told, traces of animosity and harassment on the part of
Respondent Judge are all too evident, in sharp contrast to what a Judge
should — be the embodiment of what is judicious, proper and fair.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Floro, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, March 31,
2006

Ponente: Chico-Nasario, J.,

Facts:
 Judge Florentino Floro is faced with a multitude of charges, concerning his
qualifications as a judge. The charges alleged certain and multiple abuses of
his role as administrator of justice. Above all these charges, he is also
purported to believe in “duwendes” and psychic powers. The court ruled that
some of the charges were substantial enough to be violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and that his unusual beliefs, irrespective of whether valid
or not, has affected his actions, and threw shade on the cold impartiality
required of him as a member of the judiciary.

 It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship.
A pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the SC Clinic
revealed “evidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic
process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June
1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed
problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal
deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both
1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
But because of his impressive academic standing, the JBC allowed Atty.
Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second
opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to atty. Floro's appointment
as RTC judge.

 An administrative complaint was filed against him by court administrator

Alfredo L. Benipayo. Then he recommended as well that Judge Floro be
placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation
against him. In a Resolution dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted
the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the acts or omissions as reported
by the audit team.
  One of those reported is for his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he
declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01,
Canons of Judicial Conduct or Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members
thereof that in criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused" particularly
concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually
pay for the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.

 Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart
upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his
predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused
whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor
assigned to his sala. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single
evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he
sided with the accused. Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the
other hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff
meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of
his PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated
with them especially those under detention as he, himself, had been accused
by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of Rule 4.06, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct

Held: Respondent Judge violated Rule 4.06, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct

Rationale Decidendi:
 Judge Floro’s utterances against the judicial system on account of his
perception of injustice in the disposition of his brother’s case are not far
removed from his reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed
against him by the OCA and by the persons who were either in charge of the
cases against him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently,
although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to
have said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as intellectually
superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go
his way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of
 Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct.
Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding
of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In this case, there is ample
and competent proof of violation on Judge Floro’s part.

 Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and
movements. He must always keep in mind that he is the visible
representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.’s claims that he is endowed with
psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the
angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" are manifestations of
his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to
carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to
subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to
ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary.
Aquino v. Lontok, G.R. No. 84324, April 5, 1990

Ponente: Regalado, J.

Facts:
 The present petition raises a question, apparently of first impression,
concerning the validity of a writ of preliminary injunction issued beyond the
20-day period of the effectivity of a restraining order and during the
extended efficacy of such order. The records show that petitioners, in their
capacity as Provincial Auditor of Camarines Sur, State Auditor I of the
Provincial Auditor’s Office and State Examiner of the Provincial Auditor’s
Office, respectively, conducted an audit of private respondent’s accounts as
Municipal Treasurer of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and found a cash shortage
of P274,011.17 under his accountability.

 Allegedly pursuant to Section 157, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, petitioners

seized private respondent’s cash, books, papers and accounts and the latter
was suspended from office. Forthwith, respondent judge issued the TRO of
August 27, 1987, enjoining all respondents therein, their agents and or
representatives, for a period of twenty (20) days from date thereof, to desist
from proceeding or taking action against private respondent based on
petitioner Yumang’s report and from exercising such derivative powers and
functions. In a petition dated October 27, 1987, petitioners instituted in the
Court of Appeals an original action for certiorari, with an application for
preliminary injunction and or restraining order, precisely putting in issue and
assailing the validity of the aforesaid multiple restraining orders dated
August 27, 1987, September 16, 1987 and October 6, 1987.

 While said petition was pending, respondent judge issued an order, dated
November 4, 1987, granting the application of private respondent for a writ
of preliminary injunction. A day later, respondent judge issued another
order, dated November 5, 1987, approving the bond filed by private
Respondent. On November 11, 1987, respondent judge issued the
corresponding writ of preliminary injunction.

 Petitioners claim that the injunction was issued in utter disregard of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, private respondent having
 brought the action below pending his request for reinvestigation with the
Commission on Audit. On the charge of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, although it is well-settled in our jurisdiction that, unless otherwise
provided by law or required by public interest, before bringing an action in
or resorting to the courts of justice all remedies of administrative character
affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be
exhausted by the aggrieved party this doctrine is not a hard and fast rule. In
the present case, we are inclined to subscribe to private respondent's
invocation of the urgency of judicial intervention, as one of the admitted
exceptions to the rule, 18 which likewise would be in keeping with the
court's broad discretion in granting injunctions. Whatever circumstances
warranted the grant of injunction in the court below would be no different
than the circumstances which created the urgency, and there can ordinarily
be no better judge to determine the existence thereof than the trial court
itself.

Issue: Whether or not the interlocutory order or writ issued by the court as a
restraint on the defendant until the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction
can be determined

Held: No

Rationale Decidendi:
 In the instant case, the Supreme Court note that the protection of such bond
has been required. Also, it is of record that herein petitioners and private
respondent were given an opportunity to be heard and, in fact, a hearing was
conducted by the trial court before the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction to determine the existence of a valid ground therefor.
Consequently, there being no other sufficient ground to dissolve the
injunction in controversy, the grant of the writ must sequences of the upheld
but without prejudice to the consequences of the conduct of respondent
judge. The circumstances under which the writ was granted after a
protracted delay, punctuated by dubious orders issued in the interim,
certainly cannot be countenanced lest such conduct be replicated in
circumvention of the rules. Specifically, respondent judge failed to observe
Rule 3.01 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which calls for a
judge to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence, and
Rule 3.05 which admonishes all judges to dispose of the court's business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Definitely, this Court
cannot gloss over the challenged actuations of respondent judge which are
amply reflected in the records of this case. The petition was dismissed and
the respondent judge was reprimanded.
Umale v. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-33508, May 25, 1973

Ponente: Makasiar, J.,

Facts:
 Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order dated April 15,
1971 of respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court
sitting at Pasig, Rizal, disqualifying or inhibiting himself from trying the
robbery charge against sixteen (16) accused including the six (6) herein
private respondents Eduardo Feliciano, Antonio David, Virgilio Chico,
Benjamin Escandor, Rolando Samson, and Alfonso Co, entitled "People vs.
Marina Geronimo, et al." and docketed as CCC-VII-660-Rizal.

 On April 15, 1971, without any party moving for his disqualification or
inhibition, respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz voluntarily inhibited himself
from trying the case "for the peace of mind of the parties concerned and to
insure an impartial administration of justice" on the ground that before the
criminal case was filed in his court, he already had personal knowledge of
the same; and directed the immediate forwarding of the records of the case
to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, for
proper disposition. Petitioner posted a bond and a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued on June 21, 1971 enjoining respondent Judge
Benjamin Aquino from taking cognizance of and exercising jurisdiction over
the criminal case.

Issue: Whether respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court
of Pasig, Rizal, can voluntarily, inhibit himself, without any motion therefor by the
parties, on the ground of his personal knowledge of the case even before the same
was filed.

Held: Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, can
voluntarily, inhibit himself, without any motion therefor by the parties, on the
ground of his personal knowledge of the case even before the same was filed.

Rationale Decidendi:
 Undoubtedly, personal knowledge of the case pending before him is not one
of the causes for the disqualification of a judge under the first paragraph of
 Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which took effect on
January 1, 1964. But paragraph 2 of said Section 1 of Rule 137 authorizes
the judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reason other than those mentioned" in
paragraph 1.

 Herein respondent Judge, because of his personal knowledge of the case, at

least had conducted a careful self-examination after hearing some incidents
on the criminal case wherein petitioner is the complainant, because such
personal knowledge on his part might generate in his mind some bias or
prejudice against the complaining witness or any of the accused or in an
manner unconsciously color his judgment one way or the other without the
parties having the opportunity to cross-examine him as a witness. Herein
respondent Judge therefore harkened to the injunction announced by this
Court in Pimentel versus Salanga that when a Judge "might be induced to act
in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary
norm is that he reflects on the probability that a losing party might nurture at
the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the
scales of justice against him."

 It is possible that the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal

knowledge of the case when he tries and decides the same on the merits,
which would certainly constitute a denial of due process to the party
adversely affected by his judgment or decision. It is best that, after some
reflection, the respondent Judge on his own initiative disqualified himself
from hearing the robbery case filed by herein petitioner and thereby rendered
himself available as witness to any of the parties and therefore maybe
subject to cross-examination.

 Herein respondent Judge should be commended this time for heeding Our
ruling in the case of Geotina vs. Gonzales that "a judge, sitting on a case
must at all times be fully free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision
and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to his
fairness and as to his integrity."
In re Manzano, 166 SCRA 246

Ponente: PADILLA, J.

Facts:
 On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter, the pertinent
portion of it reads:

Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the
powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial
Committee on Justice(created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No.
856), may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable
Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and
discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the
Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or
of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the
Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my
present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary
functions of an Executive Judge.

 An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that

Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and
indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail
conditions.

 It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform

administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve
the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for;
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated
Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
  Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No.
856, it is provided that—
Section 6. Supervision. —The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall
be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Justice

Issue: Whether or not the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will
be in violation of the Constitution

Held: Yes. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other
courts established by law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Ratio Decidendi:
 Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative
functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request.

 While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be

enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a
plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in
him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that
there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected,
to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary
can be satisfied with nothing less. This declaration does not mean that
RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or
unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to
the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an
orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on
Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help
promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial
duties. 
Tuazon v. Purungganan, 370 SCRA 511

Ponente: PARDO, J.

Facts:
 The case under consideration is an administrative complaint against Judge
Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
Branch 3, for illegal practice of law, gross ignorance of the law, serious
misconduct, evident bias and partiality, knowingly rendering unjust
judgment, and willful violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

 Victor G. Tuzon filed with the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the order
of the Regional Trial Court presided over by respondent Judge Loreto
Cloribel-Purugganan in Civil Case No. 4269.The order denied Tuzon’s
motion to allow cross-examination of his witness and directed that the case
be submitted for resolution.

 The Court of Appeals issued a resolution "directing private respondent

Raymundo E. Catral to file the comment thereon and to show cause why the
prayer for injunctive relief should not be granted both within ten (10) days
from notice hereof." Respondent judge filed the comment for Raymundo
Catral and herself, and affixed her name and signature on the comment.
Thereafter, the CA dismissed the petition.

 With this, Tuzon filed with the Supreme Court an administrative complaint
against respondent judge deploring the act of filing a comment in the civil
case as illegal private practice of law.

 Respondent Judge admitted authoring the comment filed with the CA in the
civil case involving complainant. She stated that she did so because Atty.
Isidro Reyes, counsel for the private respondent Raymundo E. Catral in that
civil case, was sick and unable to perform his work.

 Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada submitted to the Court

a recommendation that respondent judge be imposed a fine for filing an
answer in behalf of the respondent Catral and defending her questioned
order.
Issue: Whether or not respondent’s act of filing a comment in a civil case
constitute a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct

Held: Yes. Pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial
Conduct, judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law.

Ratio Decidendi:
 The Court has reminded judges of the lower courts that a judge whose order
is challenged in an appellate court need not file any answer, or take an active
part in the proceedings unless expressly directed by order of the Court. In
the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent judge filed a comment on
behalf of the respondent Raymundo E. Catral in the case on review with the
Court of Appeals. Respondent judge signed the pleading herself and
submitted it to the court notwithstanding that it was her decision that was the
subject of the petition in the said court.

 In filing such comment, respondent judge violated the provision in the

Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is
pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or
comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If either party elevates the
case to a higher court, the public respondents shall be included therein as
nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed, they shall
not appear or participate in the proceedings therein."

 Respondent argues that she filed a comment on behalf of one of the parties
to the case because the counsel was suffering from an illness at the time.
However, a judge must maintain a detached attitude from the case and shall
not waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding that relates to
official actuations in a case. He is merely a nominal party and has no
personal interest or personality therein.

 Respondent Judge in signing and filing a comment with the court on behalf
of one of the parties, engaged in the private practice of law. The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court
proceedings but includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation
of litigation.
 Furthermore, under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and
Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law. This is based on public policy
because the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official functions,
duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge.
Ompoc v. Torres, 178 SCRA 14

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 Mr. Ramon J. Liwag, Service Chief, Technical Staff, Ministry of Justice
(now Department of Justice) referred to the Court Administrator a sworn
letter complaint dated of Atty. David G. Ompoc against Judge Norito E.
Torres; which charged the latter for gross misconduct in office. Pertinent
details of the complaint read as follows:

A civil case for ejectment was assigned to Judge Norito Torres. While
the case was being tried on the merits, at one time he invited me to see him
at his residence and he instructed me to bring my client, Mr. Charlie
Taguiam, proprietor of Deco Sales. In the course of our intimate
conversation he gave us a guide what evidence and argument we have to
present. Also, Judge Torres requested Mr. Charlie Taguiam to install a brand
new airconditioner on his Toyota Hi-Ace which was installed without Judge
Norito Torres paying for it.

As the ejectment case progressed Judge Norito Torres had been

pestering my client with request for loans which he never acknowledged by
means of a receipt and he was given by my client sums of money totalling
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) in various amounts and on
different dates. These loans have never been paid up to now and this
certainly will not be paid.

Before he penned (sic) his decision, Judge Torres called my client and
pressured him to enter into an amicable settlement with the plaintiff by
paying the back rentals amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) because he may have entered into an agreement with the
plaintiff in the division of the spoils just in case my client would accede to it.
My client refused to enter into any kind of settlement because he believed in
the justness of his cause

 Respondent tried to account for the checks that were submitted in evidence
through a strange, involved story concerning an alleged entrepreneurial
effort on the part of some of his townmates to raise money.
  While he found the charges against respondent Judge to have been proven,
the Investigating Judge refrained from making a recommendation on the
appropriate administrative penalty for respondent.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Sections 13 of Canon 4 the New Code
of Judicial Conduct

Held: Yes. In receiving P5,000.00 and P3,000.00 from a party to a litigation before
him, as loans which he never paid back and he never intended to pay back, and in
refusing or failing to pay for an airconditioner installed in his wife's automobile
van by a shop owned by a party litigant before him, respondent Judge is guilty of
serious misconduct in office and of acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary.

Ratio Decidendi:
 As enunciated by the court inn the case of Cabrera v. Pajares, members of
the judiciary should display not only the highest integrity but must at all
times conduct themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach and
suspicion. (Quiz vs. Cantano, 107 SCRA 196; Montemayor vs. Collado, 107
SCRA 258) The Court had likewise stressed in De la Paz vs. Inutan (64
SCRA 540) that 'the judge is the visible representation of the law and, more
importantly of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness
to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two
conflicting interests, ... Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be
the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow.
He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the
law.' (See also Fonacier-Abaño v. Ancheta, 107 SCRA 538).
People v. Ibasan, 129 SCRA 695

Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts:
 In this case, the original information charged the appellants with the crime of
homicide which was amended to murder before the accused could be
arraigned.

 Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., filed a motion to quash the information on the ground
that the filing of the amended information constituted double jeopardy, as he
had already been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty under the original
information for HOMICIDE, and the same had been dismissed without his
consent when the new information was filed for the graver offense of
MURDER.

 Denying said motion, the court reasoned that by his own acts the accused
was estopped to interpose the defense of double jeopardy and that his
manifestation was express consent on his part to the amendment of the
original information.

 Furthermore, the appellants alleged that they had intended to present two
witnesses, namely: Atty. Gubatan and Atty. Esteves. However, the judge had
expressed displeasure against the appearance of the two witnesses when the
defense requested that they be subpoenaed, to wit:
You know, Esteves is a persona non grata in this court. He filed a case
against me in Lingayen. I don't like to see his face. Never, forever, never in
my whole life. Gubatan, Ancheta, Esteves, as far as I am concerned, they are
already buried a long time. (con't. of order) subpoena the following; Erlinda
Relosemon, Bonuan Gueset, Dr. Dominador Gutierrez, c/o GSIS, Dagupan
City. (tsn., March 16, 1982, p. 196).

 Also, the appellants state that they did not take certain steps they should
have taken because the presiding judge had impressed upon the accused and
counsel "that the case of the prosecution was weak and that it was not
airtight nor foolproof, and that eventually he was going to acquit the accused

 After the trial, the court found the four appellants guilty as charged. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the judge’s disposition constitutes a violation of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct

Held: No. Although the judge manifested impatience against the appellants, he did
not preclude them from adequately presenting their case. Neither did the initial
refusal of the trial judge to subpoena the two supposed witnesses prevent their
being presented in court if they were really willing to testify for the defense.

Ratio Decidendi:
 The emotional outburst of the presiding judge is rather unfortunate. Even if a
judge sincerely believes that a counsel is deliberately exasperating or
inciting him through the introduction of witnesses publicly known to be
personally anathema to the judge and not because their testimony may prove
or disprove matters in issue, the judge should avoid any unseemly display of
shortness of temper or other unbecoming behavior.

 A judge should not allow himself to be led by counsel or witnesses into

showing that he can be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in
the performance of his official functions (Austria v. Masaquel, 20 SCRA
1247). It is precisely during such trying moments that a judge should be
studiously careful about his conduct and in the measures he takes to uphold
the court's authority and dignity. However, the actuations of the trial judge
showing some impatience against the appellants did not preclude them from
adequately presenting their case, We have examined the records carefully
and we find that the appealed decision was not based on any matters
improperly elicited by the trial Judge during his examination of the
witnesses nor has it been affected by the quoted remarks. Appellants were
given all the opportunity to present their evidence.

 Neither did the initial refusal of the trial judge to subpoena the two supposed
witnesses prevent their being presented in court if they were really willing to
testify for the defense. There are remedies available to parties for such
situations. In fact, the records show that, later, the trial judge was amenable
to their being present in court as witnesses and it was the defense which
found no more need for the testimony.

 With regard to the judge’s statement concerning the strength of the

prosecution. The court here stated that the statement shows no bias nor
intention to give false hopes to either party. The judge merely expressed the
 need for a speedy trial. The statement should not be relied upon as a
suggestion that the case for the defendants was stronger than the case for the
prosecution. Notwithstanding any remarks of any judge, a lawyer should
continue giving his client entire devotion to the latter's interest, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of the lawyer's
utmost learning and ability appropriate for the circumstances.

 With this, the Supreme Court took this opportunity to remind members of
the bench that judges' undue interference, impatience, or participation in the
examination of witnesses or a severe attitude on the court's part towards the
witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual
circumstances of a trial may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the
cause or ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto. (People v. Catindihan,
97 SCRA 196). Thus, a judge should exercise more care and patience in
conducting a case, his right to intervene to be used sparingly, if at all. He
must bear in mind that witnesses may be easily intimidated by an overly
inquisitive judge considering the unusual circumstances which they find
themselves in, especially when testifying in criminal cases.
In Re: Anonymous Letter – dated August 12,2010, complaining against Judge
Ofelia T. Pinto Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga,
AM No. RTJ-11-2289, 2 October 2012

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 An anonymous letter-complaint was filed before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) against Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga. Judge Pinto was
charged with dishonesty, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Gross Misconduct in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in connection with the reopening of
a criminal case whose decision was already final and executory and subject
of an entry of judgment in the Court of Appeals (CA).

 Subsequently, Judge Pinto alleged that the outright denial of the motion to
reopen the case was improper, without violating the accused’s opportunity to
be heard, given the exculpatory evidence presented and considering the lack
of objection by the public prosecutor and the private complainant who were
properly notified of the motion. Judge Pinto also alleged that even granting
that her acts were indeed erroneous, they were done in the exercise of her
adjudicative functions which cannot be made subject of a disciplinary, civil
or criminal action absent fraud, dishonesty and corruption on her part.

 The OCA observed that Judge Pinto misapplied the law despite the clear
wordings of Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The OCA also found that Judge Pinto subsequently disregarded
the final and executory decision of the CA, a higher court, when she
dismissed the criminal case against the accused-movant. The OCA
recommended, thus – Judge Pinto be held guilty of Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Procedure and be SUSPENDED from service for a period of Six
(6) Months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
infraction shall be dealt with utmost severity.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge should be held guilty of Gross Ignorance
of the Law

Held: Yes. Judge Pinto had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion filed by the
accused-movant because the CA’s decision had become final and executory. Her
conduct was contrary to the clear language of Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Judge Pinto had no jurisdiction to reopen the criminal case because it was
already final and executor decision of the CA. Violation of Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure Section 24.

 To reopen the case is not the proper procedural recourse. To do otherwise

is a violation of the “doctrine of finality of judgment”. Even if it was
done in good faith, it will not justify the disregard of laws and rules of
procedure.

 The court finds Judge Pinto liable of simple misconduct and imposed a
fine in the amount of P 10,000.00 for charges of gross ignorance of the
law, partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order.

 In both cases, we sternly warned Judge Pinto that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Judge Pinto's continued
failure to live up to the exacting standards of her office is clear. Her
escalating violations, taken collectively, raise the question of her
competency in continuing to perform the functions of a
magistrate.17Ï‚rνll Bearing this in mind and the warnings she earlier
received from the Court, we find the imposition of the supreme penalty
of dismissal from the service justified.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Liberty O. Castaneda, AM No.
RTJ-12-2316, 9 October 2012

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 This administrative matter is a consequence of the judicial audit and
physical inventory of cases conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, presided over by Judge Liberty O. Castañeda
(Judge Castañeda).

 The team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reported that as
of audit date, Branch 67 had a caseload of 1,123, consisting of 406 criminal
cases and 717 civil cases. Of the 70 cases submitted for decision, 18 have
not been decided notwithstanding the lapse of the 90-day period within
which to resolve them. Likewise, of the seven (7) criminal and three (3) civil
cases with pending incidents submitted for resolution, seven (7) have been
awaiting resolution beyond the reglementary period.

 However, notwithstanding her failure to decide the 18 cases and resolve the
incidents in the seven (7) cases mentioned above, Judge Castañeda certified
in her Certificates of Service that she has decided and resolved all cases and
incidents within three (3) months from the date of submission.

 The audit team also reported that 164 cases have not been acted upon for a
considerable length of time; there are 14 cases with pending incidents; and
no initial action has been taken in 27 cases. Apart from these figures, the
audit team likewise noted that Branch 67 had a poor case and records
management, particularly citing the absence of minutes of the court
proceedings, lack of stamp receipts on the pleadings filed before it, official
receipts reflecting that filing fees were paid days after the cases had been
filed, registry receipts containing no registry numbers, and lack of proofs of
receipts of court processes or issuances. Case records were not even properly
stitched together.

 The audit also revealed that there were criminal cases that were ordered
archived even before the expiration of the 6-month period reckoned from the
delivery of the warrant of arrest to the police authorities, in violation of
OCA Circular No. 89-2004.
 Prompted by reports that Branch 67 is fast becoming a haven for couples
who want their marriages to be judicially declared null and void or annulled,
or those who merely want to be legally separated, the audit team gave
special attention to cases for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of
marriage and legal separation, and found that of the 717 civil cases, 522 or
72.80% involved nullity of marriage, annulment and legal separation.
Further investigation of these cases revealed various irregularities in the
proceedings, consisting of blatant violations of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as well as A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC, or the
Rule on Legal Separation.

 In her defense, Judge Castañeda claimed that when she assumed her judicial
functions, the court was actually housed in a dilapidated old school building,
with leaky ceilings and faulty wiring, and that the records were in bundles
and complete disarray. When her predecessor retired, she inherited quite a
number of cases, and she was taken to task with rickety typewriters, limited
office supplies, and lack of personnel. In July 2008, when the construction of
a new judiciary building commenced, the court was transferred to a 6x10
square-meter session hall in the barangay. Judge Castañeda declared that this
was the situation in which the OCA team found Branch 67 when they
conducted the audit. With regard to her alleged failure to decide cases within
the reglementary period, Judge Castañeda insisted that she had already
resolved them, thereby prompting her to declare such fact, in good faith, in
her Certificates of Service.

 Finally, Judge Castañeda denied that she failed to observe the provisions of
A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC. Instead, she asseverated that,
since the petitions filed before her were all verified, it was no longer
incumbent upon her to confirm the veracity of the contents thereof,
including the parties' addresses. She contended that she merely allowed the
issuance of summons even before the filing fees had been paid when no
receipts were readily available to be issued. She likewise explained that it
was not the duty of the court to order the petitioner to furnish the OSG or the
OPP with copies of the petition, and that it was only upon the petitioner's
failure to do so that the court arrogates unto itself the duty to furnish the
OSG a copy of the petition.
  Meanwhile, Judge Castañeda blamed the clerk in-charge for allegedly
forgetting to attach the court orders requiring the public prosecutor to
conduct a collusion investigation in declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage, and legal separation cases.

 Eventually, the OCA recommended that Judge Castañeda be dismissed from

the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
-controlled corporations, for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, gross misconduct and incompetency.

 In arriving at its recommendation insofar as Judge Castañeda is concerned,

the OCA found that she failed to decide cases within the reglementary
period, and that her inaction or procrastination was inexcusable. The OCA
touted Judge Castañeda's explanation as unsatisfactory, especially since she
attempted to use her staff as scapegoats to evade administrative liability.

 Moreover, the OCA also considered the irregularities and procedural lapses
in the manner in which Judge Castañeda handled cases for nullity,
annulment of marriage and legal separation, as she completely disregarded
the basic provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC. In 2010
alone, Judge Castañeda granted the extremely high total of 410 petitions of
this nature. From this observation, the OCA explained that Judge Castañeda
demonstrated an utter lack of competence and integrity in performing her
duties as a judge, which amounted to grave abuse of authority.

Issue: Whether or nor respondent judge should be imposed the penalties as

recommended by the OCA, for her various infractions in the performance of her
official duties

Held: Yes. After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court wholly concurs with
the findings and recommendations of the OCA as enumerated above.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Judge Castañeda's case, both judicial audits conducted in the RTC of
Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 revealed that there were many cases that were
undecided notwithstanding the lapse of the 90-day reglementary period
within which they should be disposed, apart from those that have
 remained dormant or unacted upon for a considerable amount of time.
Judge Castañeda failed to decide, within the prescribed period,
 A judge who fails to decide cases within the reglementary period but
continues to collect his salaries upon his certification that he has no
pending matters to resolve transgresses the constitutional right of the
people to the speedy disposition of their cases

 The serious infractions committed by Judge Castañeda were in cases

involving petitions for nullity and annulment of marriage and legal
separation, the most disturbing and scandalous of which was the haste
with which she disposed of such cases. For the year 2010 alone, Judge
Castañeda granted a total of 410 petitions of this nature.

 Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and
maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a
good judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as
well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the
competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who
accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the
duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a
sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a
judge’s hands.33 Moreover, the reprehensible haste with which she
granted petitions for nullity and annulment of marriage and legal
separation, despite noncompliance with the appropriate rules and evident
irregularities in the proceedings, displayed her utter lack of competence
and probity, and can only be considered as grave abuse of authority.
OCA v. Lansang, 186 SCRA 646

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Virgilio S. Lansang,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Clark Field, Angeles City, based on the following
findings of the Judiciary Planning Development and Implementation Office
and the Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez in the course of an
investigation conducted in his court, as follows:
"1. Cases deemed submitted for decision, some of which had been submitted
since 1979 and 1982 had remained undecided as of January 3, 1990,
contrary to his monthly certification that he has no pending civil and
criminal cases under submission for decision or determination beyond the
90-day period.
"2. Cases calendared for hearing during the month of June 1989 to
December 1989, show that for the month of October 1989, only one (1)
hearing was conducted; for November, only one (1) hearing also; for
December, also one (1) hearing; for the month of January 1990, only two (2)
days have been set for trial hearing; for the month of February 1990, only
one (1) and for the month of August 1989, it appears that no case has been
disposed of.
"3. While it has been verified from reports and records in his office that he
has been solemnizing several marriages between Filipino citizens and
Americans or foreigners on an average of about three (3) marriages a day
aside from notarizing public documents for a fee, his monthly reports for
1989 to the Statistic Division of this Court do not show any marriage
solemnized or document notarized by him.
"4. The accumulated caseload of 182 cases has remained invariably a back
log which has not been reduced over the year despite the few cases that are
filed averaging from 4 to 6 cases a month only."

 Prompted by various complaints, respondent Judge submitted his irrevocable

resignation. Summing up his reasons as follows:
My failure to decide, to settle cases load was the non-apprehension or arrest
of the accused, the existence of rift between me and the Clerk of Court,
became almost irreconcilable, as manifested in the inconsistent monthly
report, which was full of intrigue and inaccuracy, which lead me to say I
could no longer stay, and happy working with them.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of violating the New Code of
Judicial Conduct
Held: Yes. Considering all the allegations, issues and arguments raised in the
complaint and in the Comment and the resignation letter of respondent Judge, the
Court finds Judge Virgilio S. Lansang GUILTY of the charges complained of.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Court ruled that the civil action can proceed simultaneously with a criminal
case arising from the same offense.
o Rule 107 Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses.-
Except as otherwise provided by law, the following rules shall he
observed: 
 (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately; 
 (b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense
may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has
been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; 
 (c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action
arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.

 The civil action is not suspended since it does not intend to produce the civil
liability from the criminal action but intends to obtain the right to live
separately with legal consequences. The Support Pendente Lite is correctly
granted

 Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from

hearing the case, as the grant of support pendente lite and the denial of the
motion to suspend hearings in the case, are taken by the petitioner as a
disregard of applicable laws and existing doctrines, thereby showing the
respondent Judge's alleged manifest partiality to private
respondent. Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions
between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws
and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from
 hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is more
so, in this case, where we find the judge's disposition of petitioner's motions
to be sound and well-taken. 

Longboan v. Polig, 186 SCRA 547

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 A letter-complaint was addressed to the Court Administrator charging the
respondent judge with gross negligence of duty or abuse of authority for his
failure to apprise complainant of the status of Civil Case No. 641 despite the
former's registered letters requesting the status.

 Civil Case No. 641 involved a dispute for collection of a sum of money
between the complainant as plaintiff and one Arsenic Cunaden as defendant.
The complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal Circuit.

 However, it appears that, the complainant was informed by Regional Trial

Court Judge Nicasio A. Baguilat that respondent judge, his predecessor, was
in possession of the records of Civil Case No. 641 considering that the
appeal thereto had been perfected prior to respondent judge's transfer.

 Judge Baguilat's Clerk of Court certified, among others, that Civil Case No.
641 was among the cases retained by respondent judge and that as of the
said date no decision therein had been received from the said judge.

 Meanwhile, the complainant had sent five registered letters inquiring about
the status of Civil Case No. 641. Due to respondent Judge's failure to make
any reply as requested, the Office of the Court Administrator sent
respondent judge three tracers but the respondent judge still made no reply.
After which, the respondent judge was suspended for his willful
disobedience and disregard of our previous resolution.

 Because of this, the court resolved to dispatch an audit team to conduct a

physical inventory of the cases pending in the respondent judge's sala on the
basis of the communication from Judge Baguilat informing the Office of the
Court Administrator that Civil Case No. 641 had already been decided by
him and that he could not decide the other cases pending before the
 respondent judge's former sala because the records thereof could not be
located and the respondent judge could not be contacted.

 Respondent judge stated that he failed to ask for extension of time to make
and submit his comment to our show-cause resolution due to "awful shock
and anxiety at the thought that the record of the said case may have been lost
beyond recovery"; that it took respondent judge a long time to plead for the
lifting of his suspension due to "self-reproach and disgust of himself for his
omission"; and that upon realizing that he still has to support two boys in
high school and two boys in college and considering the present high cost of
living, respondent judge deemed his two-year suspension as enough
punishment for his omission, thus, resumption of his judicial functions
should be ordered.

 In a memorandum , the audit team reported that all the cases inventoried
were accounted for except four (4) criminal cases where the accused are not
under detention and four (4) civil cases which remained missing.

 After hearing, the investigating officer recommended the lifting of

respondent judge's suspension and the resumption of his official duties.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge’s suspension should be lifted and he be

allowed resumption of his official duties

Held: No. After a careful perusal of the records of the instant administrative case
coupled with painstaking deliberations, the Supreme Court was convinced that the
respondent judge's continued silence as to the status of Civil Case No. 641 despite
repeated written queries from one of the parties, his failure to reply to the tracers of
the Office of the Court Administrator, and his willful disobedience and disregard to
our show-cause resolutions constituted grave and serious misconduct affecting his
fitness and the worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office.

Ratio Decidendi:
 After careful perusal of records and deliberations the court is convinced
that the Judge continued silence on the case despite request and his
willfill disobedience of the show cause order constitutes grave and
serious misconduct.
 Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the said Code provides
that: A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities,
maintain professional competence in court management and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court
personnel.
 The judge impeded the speedy disposition of the case on the account of
the missing records. This reflects an inefficient and disorderly system in
the recording of cases assigned to him.

 A judge is expected to ensure that the records of cases assigned to him

are intact. The loss of not only one but eight records is indicative of gross
misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge.

 In sum, the Court finds respondent judge guilty of inexcusable

negligence, gross inefficiency and grave and serious misconduct in the
discharge of his functions. 
People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163

Ponente: CRUZ, J.

Facts:
 Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI of Cebu but
before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the
prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was
filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial
commenced, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for
homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him
bail and ordering his release; and so, he escaped.

 The respondent judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail
bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the
prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the
constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain
circumstances. The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and
suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. The order of the
trial court was then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in suspending all proceedings
until the return of the accused

Held: Yes. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal reading of

the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its
intendment.

Ratio Decidendi:
 The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the
1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows: 

Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
 notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.
 The purpose of the rule os for speedy disposition of criminal cases. The
Judge was probably still thinkin of the old doctrine about “In absentia”.
But he forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such
notice precisely because he has escaped. We admonish against a too-
literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually
found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which
is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must look beyond
and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our
own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may
properly apply it according to its ends, we need and must use not only
learning but also vision. 

 The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario
Abong in securing bail from the city court of Cebu on the basis of the
withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result of his
investigation within sixty days.
Enriquez v. Caminade, 485 SCRA 98

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, CJ.

Facts:
 Judge Anacleto Caminade was charge with gross misconduct, knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and gross ignorance of law by Imelda
Enriquez pertaining to a murder case.

 The judge ruled that was no preliminary investigation completed on the

accused as they were denied the opportunity to file MR or petition for
review hence, he remanded the case to the city prosecutor for completion
of process.

 Enriquez contends that a sale is not applicable to criminal case because of

significant factual and procedural distinction between the two.

(1) The Sales case proceeded under the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, while subject criminal case was conducted under the
Rules of Court. Respondent Judge alleged that his challenged order is
in accordance with law and jurisprudence. That his order was an
honest response to the pending matters before him and merely granted
reliefs consistent with those granted by the Supreme Court in the
Sales case.

 Judge Caminade defense: His judgment was an honest response

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

Held: Yes. Respondent clearly strayed from the well-trodden path when he grossly
misapplied the ruling of the Court in Sales.

Ratio Decidendi:

 Judge grossly misapprehended the doctrine. The case was decided with
the rules of procedure of the ombudsman. But the case was not covered
by the rules of procedures of the ombudsman but by the Rules of Court
 Diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a
commendable virtue of judges and, of course, members of the bar.
Respondent clearly strayed from the well-trodden path when he grossly
misapplied the ruling of the Court in Sales. Canon 6 New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be
embodiments of judicial competence and diligence. Those who accept
this exalted position owe the public and this Court the ability to be
proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at
all times. Competence is a mark of a good judge. This exalted position
entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the
law.

 Respondent judge fell short of these standards when he failed in his

duties to follow elementary law and to keep abreast with prevailing
jurisprudence. Service in the judiciary involves continuous study and
research from beginning to end. Essential to every one of them is
faithfulness to the laws and maintenance of professional competence.

 Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. In all good faith, they must know the laws
and apply them properly. Judicial competence requires no less. Where the
legal principle involved is sufficiently basic and elementary, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan v. Albano. 260 SCRA 561

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 The following are the allegations against Judge Efren Albano

(1) The stay of Judge Albano in the Municipality of Batac as the

Presiding Judge of its Municipal Trial Court has been marred by
controversial decisions coupled with habitual absence from office
which hampered speedy resolution of cases to the prejudice of (their)
constituents, and

(2) There have been reported cases and complaints from (their)
constituents that due to the indiscretion, inefficiency and
incompetence of the incumbent Presiding Judge, it has clogged the
dockets of the court, caused misery to litigants which resulted to the
filing of certiorari cases against the Presiding Judge.

 Upon investigation 40 criminal case was discovered and got dismissed

after preliminary investigation. In all the cases, Judge Albando failed to
transmit resolution and records to the provincial prosecution. It was also
discovered that the Judge Albano issued warrants of arrest without
examining the complainant and witnesses.

 Judge Albano defense: Since there were no preliminary investigations

conducted and concluded that there is nothing to forward.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

Held: Yes. Respondent judge's stance clearly demonstrates his gross ignorance of
the proper procedure in conducting a preliminary investigation.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Under the old rules, the preliminary investigation conducted by a municipal
judge had two stages: (1) the preliminary examination stage during which
the investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held
 for trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or
information is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the
substance of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to
present evidence in his favor if he so desires. Presidential Decree 911, upon
which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary examination stage
and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. Now, the
proceedings consist only of one stage.

 Respondent judge's failure to transmit the resolution and records of the cases
disregards the clear mandate of Section 5 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Under this provision, it is mandatory for the investigating judge to transmit
to the provincial or city prosecutor his resolution dismissing or admitting the
complaint, together with the entire records of the case.

 It is true that the determination of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is a judicial function which is beyond the
reviewing power of the prosecutor. However, distinction should be made
between a preliminary inquiry for the determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest and a preliminary investigation to
ascertain whether or not a person should be held for trial. The first is a
judicial function while the second is an executive function. Even if the
investigating judge finds no sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest, he
is still duty-bound to transmit the records to the provincial or city
prosecutor. The prosecutor's reviewing power shall affect only his
conclusion as to whether or not a criminal complaint or information should
be filed against the respondent, but not his conclusion as to the propriety of
issuing a warrant of arrest.

 With regard to the warrants of arrest issued by the respondent judge. The
issuance of a warrant of arrest is addressed to the sound discretion of a
judge. Provided there is no grave abuse of discretion or malice, a mistake on
his part in the determination of probable cause will not subject him to
disciplinary action. He is nevertheless expected to follow strictly the
procedure laid down in the rules regarding its issuance. Failure to comply
with such procedure will make him administratively liable. In the case at
bar, respondent judge issued several warrants of arrest without examining
the complainant and his witnesses in writing and under oath, in violation of
Section 6 of Rule 112.
 The records show that respondent judge has violated the rules on preliminary
investigation and issuance of a warrant of arrest since the start of his term as
municipal judge. The gross ignorance of respondent judge has immensely
prejudiced the administration of justice.
 Our Constitution requires that all members of the judiciary must be of
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. Respondent judge's
stubborn adherence to improper procedures and his constant violation of the
constitutional provision requiring him to personally examine the
complainant and the witness in writing and under oath before issuing a
warrant of arrest makes him unfit to discharge the functions of a judge.
Romero v. Valle, 147 SCRA 197

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Facts:
 Atty Arturo Romero charged judge Gabriel Valle for grave misconduct
and oppression for:

Judge Valle uttered embarrassing remarks that hurt complainant.

During presentation of exhibits, Judge Valle banged his gavel
producing deafening noise and unceremoniously removed his coat and
told, angrily “You step out and we will finish the matter”,
immediately the Judge stepped down from the rostrum and left. He
saw the Judge outside the courtroom holding a gun waiting for him
outside.

 Judge Valle defense: the allegation was exaggerated, sensationalized,

fabricated and inherently improbable and contrary to human experience
and one-sided.

 In the investigation it was found out that the Atty. Romero irritated the
Judge by raising his voice and kept on pressing his point that left the
judge irrigated.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct

Held: Yes. Respondent judge, in losing his temper and engaging complainant in a
heated discussion, not only failed to observe the proper decorum expected of
judicial officers, but as a consequence thereof likewise failed to preserve and
enforce order in his court.

Ratio Decidendi:
 It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the high
esteem and regard for courts. Any act on the part of one or the other that
tends to undermine the people's respect for, and confidence in, the
administration of justice is to be avoided. And this, even if both may have to
restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To be expected then
of petitioner and respondent is a sense of shared responsibility, a crucial
 factor in the administration of justice. The judge showed shortness of temper
and impatience, contrary to the duties and restrictions impose upon him by
reason of his office.

 A judge should show no shortness of temper for it freely detracts from the

equanimity and judiciousness that should be the constant marks of a
dispenser of justice. In the case at bar, respondent judge, in losing his temper
and engaging complainant in a heated discussion, not only failed to observe
the proper decorum expected of judicial officers, but as a consequence
thereof likewise failed to preserve and enforce order in his court. Precisely,
judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without being
arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a
proper appreciation of their duties to the court. Respondent judge could very
well have cited complainant in contempt of court instead of indulging in
tantrums by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and
unceremoniously walking out of the courtroom