Case Digest

CASE DIGEST EVIDENCE
1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VICTOR COGAED
Facts:
Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan of the San Gabriel Police Station in San
Gabriel, La Union, received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer that
one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-oy, San
Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
A member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area
of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. A passenger jeepney
from Barangay Lun-oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The jeepney driver
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers
who were carrying marijuana.
SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified
as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag
and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.
Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were
transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin.
Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac arrested Cogaed and Dayao and brought them to the
police station. Cogaed and Dayao were still carrying their respective bags inside the
station.
The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside. It was only later
when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.
Issue:
Whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted.
Held:
No. The evidence obtained through the search should be admitted.
Under the law, evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be
excluded as evidence because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
1
2. ROMEO POSADAS VS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated
National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While
they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the
INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two
notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1)
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station
for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show
the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession but he failed to do so.
He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
Issue:
Whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted.
Held:
Yes. The evidence obtained through the search should be admitted.
A police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal
behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a
situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and
allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine
his identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more information.
2
3. TOMAS TAN VS HOSANA
Facts:
Jose G. Hosana married Milagros C. Hosana. During their marriage, Jose and
Milagros bought a house and lot. Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. the
subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as
attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed by Jose in
her favor.
Jose averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros, without his
consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose’s
signature making it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject
property to Tomas.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of
consideration paid.
Held:
Yes. The deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of consideration
paid.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law
prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse’s consent. It does not,
however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein.
The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of
the court to admit the evidence which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue
before the courts.
3
4. RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA VS BOARD OF MEDICINE
Facts:
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal
Medical Center (RMC) for check-up. The tests revealed that her right kidney is
normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-
visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation.
Private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson filed a complaint for gross
negligence and/or incompetence before the BOM against the doctors who allegedly
participated in the fateful kidney operation.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence
committed by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private
respondent’s fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and
non-visualizing kidney.
Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to
"D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their
proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence offered are valid evidence.
Held:
Yes. The evidence offered in the case were valid evidence.
Under the best evidence rule: Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office.
Since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Editha’s formal
offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof
when it decides the case.
4
5. JEANETTE MANALO VS TNS PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Petitioners were likewise assigned office-based tasks for which they were
required to be in the office from 9:00 o’clock in the morning to 6:00 o’clock in the
evening, but most of the time, they worked beyond 6:00 o’clock without receiving the
corresponding overtime pay. These office based tasks were not on a per project basis
and petitioners did not sign any contract for these jobs. These assignments were not
reported to the DOLE either.
Issue:
Whether the NLRC is correct.
Held:
Yes. The NLRC is correct.
The technical rules of evidence are not binding on labor tribunals. Such a rule,
however, is not a license for parties to a case to be remiss in their duty to present
every and all proofs, at the earliest opportunity, that will best support their claim and
help the courts to fully, exhaustively and speedily resolve the controversy.
TNS belatedly submitted the supposed lacking termination reports, it failed to
show the corresponding project employment contracts of petitioners covering the
period indicated in the said termination reports.
5
6. PEOPLE VS REYES
Facts:
A confidential informant went to PDEA office in San Fernando, La Union and
reported to SPO1 Rene Acosta that Reyes was selling shabu.
Reyes claimed that he was on board a bus bound for La Union to discuss a
business proposal with his wife’s nephew, Rolando Pinon, Jr. Tired from the long
journey, Reyes boarded a tricycle and instructed the driver to take him to the
cheapest hotel. A car suddenly blocked the road and three of the four men on board
the vehicle alighted and pointed their guns at him. His captors ordered him to face
the wall and take off his clothes. They also confiscated his bag and then asked him
why there was shabu inside. He denied possession of the same.
The RTC found Reyes guilty.
The CA rendered a decision affirming the RTC’s judgement of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not denial is valid.
Held:
No. the defense of denial is not valid.
The Supreme Court viewed the defense of denial with disfavor for being
inherently weak which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that Reyes committed the crime.
In this case, Reyes did not confess or admit the charge against him and even
raised the defense of denial and alibi. His guilt was established by the testimonies of
the police officers.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of La Union is AFFIRMED.
6
7. RUBIO VS ALIBATA
Facts:
Rufa Rubio and Lourdes Alibata were protagonists in an earlier case for
annulment of declaration of heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before the
RTC of Dumaguete. The case was decided in favor of Rubio.
Not in conformity, Alibata elevated the RTC decision to the CA. she, however,
later withdrew her appeal which paved the way for the RTC decision to lapse into
finality. The CA resolution granting Alibata’s motion to withdraw became final and
executory.
Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed. Rubio’s claim that their counsel
at PAO-Dumaguete was never informed that the entry of judgment had already been
issued.
More than ten (10) years from the date when the RTC decision was entered in
the CA, Rubio found out that the said decision had become final and executory when
their nephew secured a copy of the Entry of Judgment.
Rubio, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of judgment. The
RTC ordered Rubio’s case for revival of judgment dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
Rubio then interposed an appeal before the CA which affirmed the RTC
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA is correct.
Held:
No. The CA is not correct.
The law provides that although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is
desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the
rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under
the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would
result.
In this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes the
rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by Rubio.
WHEREFORE, the petition id granted.
7
8. INTER ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISE VS CREER III
Facts:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision of the Court of
Appeals which reversed and set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The said NLRC decision affirmed the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter which dismissed the complaint filed by Victor Creer III against Inter Orient for
permanent disability benefits, medical reimbursement, sickness allowance, moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Held:
Yes. The NLRC’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of
proving.
In this case, there are so many possibilities how and when Victor could have
acquired pulmonary tuberculosis.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted and the decision of the NLRC is
reinstated.
8
9. REPUBLIC VS GALENO
Facts:
Carmen Galeno filed a petition for correction of the subject property before the
RTC. She alleged that she is one of the co-owners of the subject property by virtue of
the Deed of Sale. The survey and subdivision of the subject property was duly
approved by the DENR.
There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC allowed the presentation of
evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk as well as for the satisfaction of the
jurisdictional requirements.
Herein, Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the adjoining owners had not been
notified, stressing that such notice is a jurisdictional requirement. The RTC denied
such motion.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the presentation of evidence was valid.
Held:
No. The presentation of evidence was not valid.
The law provides that hearsay evidence, whether objected or not, has no
probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.
In this case, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because Galeno’s
sole witness and attorney-in-fact was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their
contents, as she did not prepare any of the certification nor was she a public officer
of the concerned government agencies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERESED and SET ASIDE.
9
10. PEOPLE VS BELGAR
Facts:
Bobby Belgar, with lewd designs, with force and intimidation and after entering
and pulling the victim from her house, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie and have carnal knowledge with AAA, a 15-year-old lass, against her
will and without her consent.
Belgar denied raping AAA and interposed alibi, insisting that he was sleeping in
his house, that he did not leave the house in that period of time; and that it was his
first time to see AAA when she was identified him inside the Municipal Jail of Tigaon
as the one who had raped her.
The RTC ruled for the conviction of Belgar. The CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not alibi is valid.
2. Whether or not the Court erred in finding Belgar guilty of the crime of rape
when the said victim was unconscious when the incident happened.
Held:
1. No. The defense of alibi is not valid.
The law provides that for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
substantiated with clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, Belgar failed to adequately support his alibi.
2. No. The Court did not err in finding Belgar guilty for the crime of rape.
Proof of the commission of the crime need not always be by direct evidence, for
circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish the crime
beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the commission of the rape was competently established although
AAA had been unconscious during the commission of the act.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
10
11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JOEREL GALLENO
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged for the crime of Statutory Rape.
The prosecution claimed that appellant took advantage of the situation by
sexually molesting Evelyn. After lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap,
facing him. Then forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. As Evelyn was only five-
years old while appellant was a fully-grown man, the penetration caused the child’s
vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain.
Appellant tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of
“madre de cacao” leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left Evelyn
grimacing and crying in pain.
On the other side, accused asserted that when he arrived at the Obligar
residence that afternoon he found the two children. While seated at the balcony,
accused-appellant was approached by Evelyn. He cajoled her by throwing her up and
down, his right holding the child and his left hand covering her vagina. His left ring
finger was accidentally inserted into the vagina of the child since his fingernail was
long and the child was not wearing any underwear.
However, the testimonies of the three (3) doctors that examined Evelyn provides
that Evelyn’s vaginal laceration could have been caused by a blunt instrument
inserted into the vagina, that it was possible that a human penis in full erection had
been forcibly inserted into her vagina and that a human penis in full erection is
considered a blunt instrument.
The trial court ruled against accused-appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the
medical doctors.
Held:
No. The trial court did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the
medical doctors.
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give
opinions. It is the court’s duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form
opinions upon the facts proved.
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the
aid of the expert’s testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible
11
cause of the victim’s laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution
witnesses, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely
solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided
the trial court in the exercise of its judgement on the facts. Hence, the fact that the
experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim’s laceration does not mean
that the trial court’s inference is wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina does not negate the
conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim’s vagina. In rape,
the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the
female genitalia by male organ. Verily, it is entirely probable that climax on the part
of accused-appellant was not reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the
profuse bleeding of her vagina.
12
12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RODRIGO SALAFRANCA
Facts:
Bolanon was stabbed. After stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away. Bolanon
was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo in order to seek help. His
uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital. On their way to the hospital
Bolanon told his uncle that it was Salafranca whi had stabbed him. Bolanon
eventually succumbed at the hospital despite receiving medical attention.
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca.
Issue:
Whether or not a dying declaration may be admissible.
Held:
Yes. A dying declaration may be admissible.
The law provides that a dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as
evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the
following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death;
(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered
in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a
victim.
In this case, all the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his ante-
mortem statement to Rodolfo, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed
him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death,
having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Rodolfo, was then
experiencing great difficulty in breathing.
Hence, the dying declaration is admissible.
13
13. SPOUSES OMAR AND MOSHIERA LATIP VS ROSALIE CHUA
Facts:
Respondent Rosalie is the owner of the Roferxane Building.
Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against
petitioners.
A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already
occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter
demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the lease
cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she instituted the
aforesaid complaint.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie’s claims. They averred that the
lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts
showing payment to Rosalie.
Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated
by their purchases of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised
to receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel and the subsequent filing of a
complaint against them.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie. However, in stark contrast, the RTC
reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. On appeal, the CA reversed
the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA took judicial notice of the
common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church
regarding the payment of goodwill money. According to the appellate court, this
judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at
Roferxane Bldg that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying
the stalls.
Issue:
Whether or not the judicial notice was valid.
Held:
No. The judicial notice was not valid.
The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts.
The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must
be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
14
In this case, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took
judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. Only the CA took judicial
notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran
area. Neither the MeTC or the RTC found that the practice was of “common
knowledge” or notoriously known.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had the knowledge of the
practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As held, justices and judges
alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised
with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for
the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.
15
14. BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK VS COURT OF APPEALS, COURT

OF TAX APPEALS AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
Facts:
It appears that petitioner had a refundable amount being claimed as tax refund
in the present case. However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income tax
Return that the said refundable amount will be applied as tax credit to the
succeeding taxable year.
Petitioner filed a written claim for refund with the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount to its
1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business
losses it incurred for the same year.
Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the
claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review with the respondent Court of
Tax Appeals.
The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner’s petition on the
ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its Corporate Annual Income Tax
Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount
to its 1990 income tax liability.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration however, the same was denied.
The CA affirmed the CTA. Hence this petition.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to a decision rendered by the Tax
Court in the CTA Case No. 4897 involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In
that case, the Tax Court held that petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year
1990. Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said
case.
Issue:
Whether or not this Court may take judicial notice of the said case.
Held:
Yes. This Court may take judicial notice of the said case.
16
Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the
Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the
Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at
all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even
dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take
judicial notice thereof.
Respondents’ reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they had
really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily
proved that it did not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that
respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing therein that petitioner suffered a
net loss in 1990 in the same way that it refused to controvert the same fact
established by petitioner’s other documentary evidence.
17
15. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS VS JESUSA REYES
Facts:
Plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter went to BPI Zapote branch to
open an ATM account.
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the
amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her existing
savings account with BPI bank.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for
P200,000.00.
Minutes later after the slip were presented to the teller, Capati returned to
where the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable balance
could not accommodate P200,000.00.
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and
then changed and correct the figure from 2 to 1 with her signature super-imposed
signifying the change.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her
deposit slip reflecting the amount of P200, 000.00.
Plaintiff instructed one of her employees update her savings account at the
BPI. After presenting the passbook to be updated and when the same was returned,
Luna noticed that the deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at
the back portion thereof.
Plaintiff asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was validated,
whereupon the manager assured her that the matter will be investigated into.
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. Plaintiff filed this
instant case.
Defendant claimed that BPI admitted Jesusa had effected a fund transfer in the
amount of P100, 000.00 from her ordinary savings account to the express teller
account however, it was the only amount she deposited and no additional cash
deposit was made.
RTC issued a decision upholding the versions of respondents.
18
Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA is correct in resolving the issue based on a conjecture
and ignoring physical evidence in favor of testimonial evidence.
Held:
No. The CA is not correct in resolving the issue based on a conjecture and
ignoring physical evidence in favor of testimonial evidence.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own
affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of
evidence or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that
which is in opposition to it.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks
high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. Where the physical evidence on record
runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we
consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail.
In fine, respondent failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence.
19
16. ROMEO SISON et al VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon
C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public for
a by “Marcos loyalists,” supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence
which resulted in the murder if Stephen Salcedo, a known “Coryista.”
The prosecution established that a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta
by the Marcos loyalists. However, they failed to secure a permit hence the police
asked them to dispersed. The loyalist leaders said that “Gulpihin ninyo lahat ng mga
Cory infiltrator.” The police then pushed the crowd and used tear gas and truncheons
to disperse them. The loyalist scampered away but some of them fought back and
threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and
the situation later stabilized.
A small group of loyalist converged at the Chinese Gardem, phase III of the
Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer a popular star and supporter of President
Marcos. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and she angrily
said “Gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers!” Then they saw a man wearing yellow t-
shirt being chased by group of persons. The man was Salcedo. They caught Salcedo
and boxed and kicked him and mauled him.
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the
blood from his face.
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas
Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness.
Salcedo died of hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic. He sustained various
contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the post-
mortem.
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people,
both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became
20
front-page news the following day, capturing the international and national attention.
This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional Command and the
Western Police District to investigate the incident. A reward of then thousand pesos
was put up for persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers.
Several persons, including the accused were apprehended and investigated.
The principal accused denied their participations in the mauling of the victim
and offered their respective alibis.
The RTC ruled against the accused. On appeal, the CA modified the decision of
the RTC imposing a higher penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding the accused guilty based on the
photographs submitted as evidence.
Held:
No. The CA did not err in finding the accused guilty based on the photographs
submitted as evidence.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence,
must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence
lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the
crime. Photographs can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent
witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
In this case, when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its
evidence, appellants objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification.
However, the same photographs were adopted by appellant as part of the defense
exhibits.
The court ruled that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to
show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness
and accuracy thereof.
21
17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS FRANCISCO JUAN

LARRAŃAGA et al
Facts:
Brothers James Anthony and James Andrew Uy, co-accused, filed a motion for
reconsideration praying for the reduction of penalties imposed upon the latter on the
ground that he was a minor at the time the crimes were committed.
Accused were convicted of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape; (b) simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
To substantiate his claim, accused submitted his Certificate of Live Birth
issued by the National Statistics Office and Baptismal Certificate.
Issue:
Whether or not accused is entitled to a reduced penalty.
Held:
Yes. The accused is entitled to a reduced penalty.
The court gives a higher credence to physical evidence.
In this case, the submission of the birth certificate of the accused, evidenced
that he was indeed a minor during the commission of the crime. Hence, he was
entitled to a much lower penalty.
22
18. PEOPLE VS REYES
Facts:
A confidential informant went to PDEA office in San Fernando, La Union and
reported to SPO1 Rene Acosta that Reyes was selling shabu.
Reyes claimed that he was on board a bus bound for La Union to discuss a
business proposal with his wife’s nephew, Rolando Pinon, Jr. Tired from the long
journey, Reyes boarded a tricycle and instructed the driver to take him to the
cheapest hotel. A car suddenly blocked the road and three of the four men on board
the vehicle alighted and pointed their guns at him. His captors ordered him to face
the wall and take off his clothes. They also confiscated his bag and then asked him
why there was shabu inside. He denied possession of the same.
The RTC found Reyes guilty.
The CA rendered a decision affirming the RTC’s judgement of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not denial is valid.
Held:
No. the defense of denial is not valid.
The Supreme Court viewed the defense of denial with disfavor for being
inherently weak which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that Reyes committed the crime.
In this case, Reyes did not confess or admit the charge against him and even
raised the defense of denial and alibi. His guilt was established by the testimonies of
the police officers.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of La Union is AFFIRMED.
23
19. PEOPLE VS SOLINA
Facts:
Ma. Fe Solina enlist, transport and refer workers for employment abroad, did
then and there, without any license or authority, recruit for overseas employment
and for a fee. Thus in a large scale amounting to economic sabotage but Solina failed
to deploy said complainants and likewise failed to return the money incurred by them
and the documents submitted despite demands.
Solina maintains her denial that she was engaged in the business of recruiting
possible workers for jobs abroad. She alleges that private complainants conspired
together, used her name, and represented themselves to the other applicants as
being authorized to collect documents and fees and that she only met the other
private complainants in the trainings/seminars she attended.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court gravely erred in rejecting Solina’s defense.
Held:
No. The Court did not err in rejecting Solina’s defense.
Greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than the accused’s denial and explanation concerning the
commission of the crime.
In this case, Solna’s defense of denial cannot overcome the positive testimonies
of the witnesses presented by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
24
20. PEOPLE VS SALUHUDDIN
Facts:
Zaldy Saluhuddin being then armed with a .45 caliber pistol and other
handguns, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one
another, by means or treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and shoot with the use of said weapons Atty. Segundo
Sotto, Jr, employing means, manner and form which tended directly and specially to
insure its execution without any danger to the persons of Zaldy Saluhuddin, as a
result of which attack, said Atty. Sotto sustained mortal gunshot wounds on the fatal
parts of his body which directly caused his death.
To establish its murder case against Saluhuddin, the prosecution presented
the testimonies of nine witnesses.
Saluhuddin on the other hand, interposed the defense of denial. He averred
that he was on duty as a Barangay Tanod .
The RTC convicted Saluhuddin for the crime of murder.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite the
failure of the prosecution to provide evidence of his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Whether or not defense of denial is valid.
Held:
1. No. The trial court did not err in convicting Saluhuddin.
It is well-settled that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to great respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the stand, and
the manner in which they gave their testimonies.
25
In the present case, the factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of
the witnesses’ credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by the Court,
particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms the said findings, and will not be
disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case.
2. No. The defense of denial is not valid.
In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise
be shown that he was so far way that it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.
In this case, denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution
witnesses who were not shown to have any ill motive to testify against Saluhuddin.
26
21. PEOPLE VS GANDUMA
Facts:
Nestor Ganduma was convicted of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim, Eva Comista for damages
in a decision rendered by RTC Leyte.
Ganduma in his testimony declared that Eva was his sweetheart, their love
affair having started two years before the alleged crime happened when Ganduma
was still employed as a helper in the household of Eva.
Issue:
Whether or not trial court’s judgement was proper.
Held:
No. The trial court’s judgment was not proper.
Physical evidence being of the highest order, this absence of external injuries
belies the complainant’s testimony that she was dragged to the bushes thus
rendering her credibility in doubt.
In this case, the said bruises, if there were indeed any, ould not have been
missed by the physician for he had the duty to examine physically the complainant.
Neither could the alleged bruises have already healed for the physical examination
was conducted barely a week after the alleged crime of rape was committed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED.
27
22. PEOPLE VS MALIMIT
Facts:
Jose Malimit charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.
Malimit questions the credibility of prosecution witness by pointing out their
alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the incident.
Also, Malimit derided the non-presentation by the prosecution of the police
blotter which could prove if Malimit was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the
crime.
Malimit insisted that he merely found Malaki’s wallet by chance while
gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the crime
for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone.
Malimit demurs the prosecution’s evidence contending that they are
insufficient to sustain his conviction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not police blotter should be presented as evidence.
2. Whether or not the testimony is credible.
3. Whether or not trial court is correct in convicting Malimit.
4. Whether or not conviction is proper.
5. Whether or not alibi is a valid defense.
Held:
1. No. Police blotter need not be presented as evidence.
Where entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the
uncontroverted testimony of a witness, the presentation of the police blotter as
evidence is not indispensable.
In this case, if Malimit believed that he was not identified therein, then he should
have secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police Station and utilized the same as
controverting evidence to impeach Batin’s credibility as witness. Having failed to do
so, Malimit cannot now pass the blame on the prosecution for something which
appellant himself should have done.
28
2. Yes. The testimony is credible.

The non-disclosure by a witness to the police officers of the accused’s identity
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human
experience- the natural reticence of most people get involved in criminal prosecutions
against immediate neighbors is of judicial notice.
In this case, even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified Malimit
only after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does
not render their testimony less credible.
3. Yes. The trial court is correct for ruling for conviction.
It is established rule of evidence that the findings of the trial court with regard
to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by
the appellate court. This rule admits certain exceptions, (1) when patent
inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2)
when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence.
In this case, the exceptions mentioned are not present.
4. Yes. The decision for conviction is proper.
There can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as perpetrator of the
crime.
In this case, there were at least five circumstances constituting an unbroken
chain of events which by their concordant combination and cumulative effect satisfy
the requirements for the conviction of Malimit.
5. No. Alibi as a defense is not valid.
As the defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses, it becomes weaker by reason of the
unexplained failure of the defense to present an corroboration.
In the present case, Malimit’s version of the story does not inspire belief.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction id hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
29
23.PEOPLE VS ENOJAS
Facts:
Eduardo Gregorio testified that he and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling. A taxi
that was suspiciously parked. The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver
for his documents. The latter complied but having doubt regarding the veracity of
documents they asked him to come with them to the police station.
On reaching a 7/11 convenience store, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went
down to relieve himself. As he approached the store’s door, he came upon two
suspected robbers and shot it out with them. Po2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead
and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan
causing his death.
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messags in
accused Enojas’ mobile phone and posting as Enjoas, communicated with the other
accused.
Issue:
Whether or not text messages a valid evidence.
Held:
Yes. Text messages are a valid evidence.
The law provides that text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.
In this case, PO3 Cambi posting as the Enojas, exchanged text messages with
the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
30
24.PEOPLE VS DAHIL
Facts:
Dahil and Castro were charged in three separate information before the RTC
with violation of RA 9165 for the sale of marijuana.
Issue:
Whether or not evidence was validly marked.
Held:
No. The evidence was not validly marked.
The Chain of Custody rule provides that the identity of the dangerous drugs
should be established beyond reasonable doubt by showing that the items offered in
court were the same substances bought during the buy-bust operation.
In the present case, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office, the seized
items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked
drugs were handled.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED.
31
25.PEOPLE VS VALLEJO
Facts:
Gerrico Vallejo with lewd design by means of force and intimidation, did and
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
Daisy Ditalo, a nine-year-old child against the latter’s will and while raping the said
victim, strangled her to death.
The defense presented the testimony that victim came to ask Vallejo to draw
her school project. After making such request, victim left. Vallejo claimed that he
finished the drawing at about three in the afternoon and gave it to the victim’s aunt.
Issue:
Whether or not conviction is proper.
Held:
Yes. The decision for conviction is proper.
An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond
doubt that the accused committed the crime.
In this case, there is enough circumstantial evidence establishing beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of Vallejo.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED.
32
26.ARCEO VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Arceo obtained a loan from Josefina Cenizal. Several weeks thereafter, Arceo
obtained an additional loan from Cenizal. Arceo then issued in favor of Cenizal, Bank
of the Philippine Islands postdated checks. When the maturity of the checks came,
Cenizal did not deposit the check immediately because Arceo promised that he would
replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times.
However, Arceo failed to make good the amount of the check.
Cenizal executed his affidavit and submitted documents in support of his
complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Arceo. The check in question and
the return slip were however lost by Cenizal as a result of a fire that occurred near
his residence. Cenizal executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in
question and the return slip.
Arceo was found guilty as charged. Aggrieved, he appealed to the Court of
Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. Arceo
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Arceo despite the failure of
the prosecution to present the dishonored check during the trial.
Held:
No. the trial court is correct in ruling for the conviction of Arceo.
In this case, petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence
as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors
his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court. However, the rule applies
only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry.
The best evidence rule applies only where the content of the document is the
subject of inquiry, and not where the issue is the execution or existence of the
document or the circumstances surrounding its execution.
33
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby denied. The resolution of the Court of Appeals

are affirmed.
27.CHUA GAW VS CHUA
Facts:
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders if three business
enterprises namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corportation and Columbia
Wood Interprise. The couple had seven children. Chua Chin died leaving his wife and
his seven children as his surviving heirs the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber.
His surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in favor of co-heir. In said document, Chan Chi
and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares
over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir Chua Sioc Huan.
Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked Suy Ben Chua
to lend them money which they will use for the construction of their house. The
parties agreed that the loan will be payable within six months without interest.
The Spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed within the
designated period. Suy Ben Chua sent the couple a demand letter requesting them to
settle their obligation with the warning that he will be constrained to take appropriate
legal action if they fail to do so.
Failing to heed his demand, Suy Ben Chua filed a complaint for sum of money
against Spouse Chua Gaw with the RTC.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Suy Ben Chua.
Aggrieved, Spouse Chua Gaw appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the testimony of the witness is valid.
2. Whether or not a notarized document is a valid evidence.
3. Whether or not best evidence rule applies.
Held:
1. Yes. The testimony made by the witness is valid.
34
In the present case, Spouses Chua Gaw failed to discredit Suy Ben Chua’s
testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property.
The rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the defendant’s evidence. Preponderance of evidence is
determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from
the evidence regardless of who actually presented it.
2. Yes. A notarized document is valid as an evidence in court.

In this case, Spouse Chua Gaw maintains that the RTC erred in admitting in
evidence a mere copy of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the
best evidence rule.
The law provides that a notarized document carries evidentiary weight as to its
due execution and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their
favor the presumption of regularity. The notarization of a private document converts
it into a public document and makes it admissible in court without further proof of is
authenticity.
3. No. The best evidence rule is inapplicable in this case.

In this case, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed. Spouse Chua
Gaw never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of
Partition.
The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence applies only when the content of such document is the subject of
the inquiry.
WHEREFORE, petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals are
affirmed.
35
28. SKUNAC CORPORATION VS SYLIANTENG
Facts:
Sylianteng base their claim over the subject lots a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed in their favor by their mother. Their mother acquired the lots from the late
Luis Pujalte through a Deed of Sale.
Skunac Corp on the other hand claim that a certain Romeo Pujalte sold the
lots to them.
The RTC of Pasig rendered judgment in favor of Skunac Corp.
Sylianteng then filed an appeal with the CA which ruled in favor of Sylianteng.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it.
Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the best evidence rule is applicable.
2. Whether or not a signed copy is valid.
3. Whether or not a notarized document may be admissible in court as
evidence.
Held:
1. No. The best evidence rule is inapplicable in this case.
In the present case, what is being questioned is the authenticity and due
execution of the subject deed of sale. There is no real issue as to its contents.
The best evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was
actually executed, or exits, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to
account for the original.
2. Yes. The signed copy is valid.
36
In the present case, Skunac Corp do not dispute that the copy of the deed of
sale that Sylianteng submitted as part of their evidence is a duplicate of the original
deed of sale.
It is settled that a signed carbon copies or duplicate of a document executed at
the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced
in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the original.
3. Yes. Notarized document is admissible in court.

In the present case, evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the
subject deed is the fact that it was notarized.
The notarization of a private document converts it into a public document.
29. HEIRS OR MARGARITA PODON VS HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALVAREZ
Facts:
Heirs of Maximo Alvarex avers that their parents were the registered owner of
the subject property. Their parents had been in possession of the property during
their lifetime; that upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of
the property as heirs, paying the real property taxes dues thereon; that they could
locate the owner’s duplicate copy but the original copy on file with the RD was intact;
that the original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to
Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously
done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the
property did not exist.
Heirs of Prodn claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez had executed the deed of
sale with the right to repurchase with the RD and duly annotated on the title; that
the late Maximo Alvarez had been granted six months within which to repurchase the
property; and that she had then become the absolute owner of the property due to its
non-repurchase within the given period.
During the trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the
copy of the deed of sale with the right to repurchase could not be found in the files of
RD.
The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Prodon.
The CA reversed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had
been complied with.
Held:
No. The pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had not been
complied with.
37
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written
document the original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes
any evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the
offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and
destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the
absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the
original ca be affirmed.
In this case, Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due
execution of the deed of sale with the right to repurchase.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals.
30. REPUBLIC VS MARCOS-MANOTOC
Facts:
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, President Aquino created
PCGG.
One of the civil case filed before the Sandiganbayan to recover the Marcoses’
alleged ill-gotten wealth.
The Republic as petitioner, presented and formally offered its evidence against
Marcos-Manotoc. However, the latter objected to the offer primarily on the gorund
that the documents violated the best evidence rule of the Rules of Court, as these
documents were unauthenticated and moreover, the Republic had not provided any
reason for its failure to present originals.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the evidence presented was in violation of the best evidence
rule.
2. Whether or not the affidavits may be considered as evidence.
Held:
1. Yes. The evidence offered was in violation of the best evidence rule.
In this case, the Republic did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason
why the originals were not presented or any compelling ground why the court should
admit these documents as secondary evidence absent testimony of the witnesses who
had executed them.
Hence, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec 3 of the Rules
of Court which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself.
2. No. Affidavits may not be considered as evidence in court.

In this case, neither did the Republic present witnesses the affiants of theses
Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court.
38
Basic is the rule that while affidavits may be considered as public documents if
they are acknowledged before a notary public, these affidavits are still classified as
hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by
the affiant but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the
affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by
the one writing them.
31. CIR VS HANTEX TRADING CO INC
Facts:
Hantex is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It is required to file a Consumption Entry with the BOC under Section
1301 of the Tariff and Custom Code.
Based on photocopies of 77 Consumption Entries furnished, the 1987
importations of Hantex were understated in its accounting records.
The CTA ruled in favor of CIR.
Issue:
Whether or not photocopies are admissible as evidence.
Held:
No. The best evidence rule under Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC does not include
mere photocopies of records/documents.
In this case, CIR in making a preliminary and final tax deficiency assessment
anchored the said assessment on mere machine copies of records/documents.
The law provides that such copies are mere scraps of paper and are of no
probative value as basis for any deficiency income or business taxes against a
taxpayer.
39
32. REPUBLIC VS MUPAS
Facts:
The CA ordered the Republic of the Philippines and etc to pay the PIATCO just
compensation for the expropriation of the NAIA III.
President Arroyo declared that the Government would not honor the PIATCO
contracts.
The Government filed a complaint for expropriation of the NAIA. The RTC
issued a writ of possession in favor of the Government.
Issue:
Whether or not hearsay may be accepted as evidence.
Held:
No. the hearsay is inadmissible as evidence in court.
In the present case, PIATCO cannot rely on the affidavit of Atty. Tolentino who
allegedly identified the photocopied documents supporting attendant costs.
The law provides that hearsay evidence has no probative value and should be
disregarded whether objected to or not.
40
33. SY VS CA
Facts:
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage. Fernando left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the
custody of their mother.
Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando.
The RTC denied the petition of Filipina. She appealed to the CA which affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of marriage license at the time of
the ceremony.
Held:
No. The marriage is not void.
In the present case, the marriage certificate and marriage license are only
photocopies, however no objection was interposed to Filipina’s testimony in open
court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of marriage.
The law provides that although the marriage certificate and other documents
were only photocopies, the fact that these have been examined and admitted by the
trial court with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due
execution, means that these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts
contained therein.
41
34. MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP VS SSANGYONG CORP
Facts:
MCC a domestic corporation is engaged in the business of importing and
wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyang an
international trading company. The two corporations conducted business through
calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions.
Despite Ssangyong’s letters, MCC failed to open a letter of credit.
Ssangyong then filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract
against MCC. Ssangyong alleged that MCC breached their contract when they
refused to open the letter of credit.
MCC filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the
original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Ssangyong.
Issue:
Whether or not the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are
electronic evidence and admissible.
Held:
Yes. Such facsimile transmissions are considered electronic evidence and are
admissible in court.
In this case, MCC argued against the admissibility of the Pro Forma Invoices
that the said documents are inadmissible being violative of the best evidence rule.
The law provides that an electronic document is also the equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable
by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
42
35. GARVIDA VS SALES JR
Facts:
Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Sk Chairman.
Election officer disapproved Garvida’s certificate of candidacy again due to her age.
Garvida, however, appealed to COMELEC who set aside the order of respondents and
allowed petitioner to run.
Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sanggunianng Kabataan, filed
with the COMELEC en back a Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy against Garvida. The petition was sent by facsimile.
The COMELEC en banc issued an order to suspend Garvida’s proclamation.
Issue:
Whether or not petition filed thru facsimile is valid.
Held:
No. Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court.
In this case, the uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should
have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the
questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the
petition filed by registered mail.
The law provides that facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is,
at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original,
there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine
and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It any, in fact,
be a sham pleading.
43
36. SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORP VS AUTOCORP GROUP
Facts:
Seaoil Petroleum Corporation purchased one unit of Robex LC Excavator from
Autocorp Group. The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle Sales Invoice.
The relationship turned sour when the remaining 10 checks were not honored
by the bank since Seaoil requested that payment be stopped.
Despite demands, Seaoil refused to pay the remaining balance. Hence,
Autocorp filed a complaint for recovery of personal property with damages and
replevin in RTC of Pasig. The trial court ruled for Autocorp.
Seaoil filed a petition for review before the CA which dismissed the petition and
affirmed the RTC’s decision in toto.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the testimony offered is valid.
2. Whether or not parol evidence may apply.
3. Whether or not sales invoice is a valid evidence.
4. Whether or not oral testimony is valid.
Held:
1. No. the testimony is not valid.
In this case, petitioner only had its bare testimony to back up the alleged
arrangement with Rodriguez.
The law provides that unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal
agreements which tends to vary the terms of a written agreement, is inadmissible
under the parol evidence rule.
2. No. the parol evidence is not applicable in this case.
44
In this case, Seaoil would have the Court rule that this case falls within the
exceptions, particularly that the written agreement failed to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties.
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a
written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different
terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract,
although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud
or mistake.
3. Yes. The sales invoice is valid.
In the present case, the vehicle sales invoice is the best evidence of the
transactions.
The law provides that a sales invoice is a commercial document. Commercial
documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transactions.
4. No. The oral testimony is not valid.
In this present case, Seaoil contends that the document falls within the exception of
the parol evidence.
The law provides that the exception obtains only where the written contract is so
ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot
be understood from a mere reading of the instrument.
45
37. EDRADA VS RAMOS
Facts:
Upon the signing of the document, Edrada delivered to Ramos 4 postdated
checks. The 4th check was dishonored because of a stop-payment order.
Ramos filed an action against Edrada for specific performance with damages
before the RTC.
The RTC rendered a petition in favor of Ramos. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence is valid.
Held:
Yes. The evidence is valid.
In this case, the Court acknowledge that the contending parties offer vastly
differing accounts as to the true nature of the agreement.
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of
the written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written
contract.
46
38. ORTAŃEZ VS CA
Facts:
Ortanez filed with the RTC Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage
against Teresita Salcedo on the grounds of lack of marriage licnese and/or
psychological incapacity of the Ortanez.
Among the exhibits offered by Teresita were 3 cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between Ortanez and unidentified persons.
The trial court admitted all Teresita’s offered evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the cassette tapes are valid evidence.
Held:
No. The cassette tapes are not valid evidence.
In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question.
RA 4200 expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
47
39. INCIONG VS CA
Facts:
Inciong’s liability resulted from the promissory note which he signed with Rene
Naybe and Gregorio Pantanosas holding themselves jointly and severally liable to
Philippine Bank of Communications.
Said due date expired without the promisors having paid their obligation. PBC
sent Inciong et al telegrams demanding payment thereof. Since they did not respond
to the demands made, PBC filed a complaint for collection of money against Inciong
et al.
The complaint was dismissed for failure of PBC to prosecute the case. However, the
lower court reconsidered the dismissal order and required the sheriff to serve the
summonses.
Inciong alleged that five (5) copies of blank promissory note were brought to
him by Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy. He
indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of P5,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not parol evidence may apply.
Held:
Yes. Parol evidence is applicable in this case.
In this case, Inciong asserts that since the promissory note is not a public deed
with the formalities prescribed by law but a mere commercial paper which does not
hear the signature of attesting witnesses.
48
The law provides that for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract
need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule,
bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or
contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
40. EAGLERIDGE DEV CORP VS CAMERON GRANVILLE ASSET INC
Facts:
Eagleridge development corporation filed their motion to admit attached
opposition. Subsequently, Cameron Inc filed its reply and Eagleridge their motion to
admit attached rejoinder.
Eagleridge argue that the parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because
they were not parties to the deed of assignment and they cannot be prevented from
seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the Deed of Assignment.
Issue:
Whether or not parol evidence rule is applicable to Eagleridge.
Held:
No. The parol evidence rule is inapplicable to Eagleridge.
In this case, since the deed of assignment was produced in court by
respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was
made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its
understanding may also be inquired into by petitioners.
The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the
deed of assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented
from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment.
49
41. SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS VS. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS:
Lucia Paras (Lucia) was a "concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at
Kabulihan, Toledo City. Kimwa is a "construction firm that sells concrete aggregates
to contractors and haulers in Cebu. On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered
into a contract denominated Agreement for Supply of Aggregates (Agreement) where
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were allotted by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa.
Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia's permitted area in Toledo City
at P240.00 per truckload.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates.

Sometime after this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates. Claiming that in so
doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia, joined by her husband, Bonifacio, filed
the Complaint for breach of contract with damages that is now subject of this
Petition.
Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated the parties' true intent that 40,000
cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a
deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were
barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed
differently.
50
On May 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court rendered the Decision in favor of Spouses
Paras. The trial court noted that the Agreement stipulated that the allotted
aggregates were set aside exclusively for Kimwa. It reasoned that it was contrary to
human experience for Kimwa to have entered into an Agreement with Lucia without
verifying the latter's authority as a concessionaire. The trial court noted that Kimwa
must have been aware that the 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates allotted to it must
necessarily be hauled by May 15, 1995. As it failed to do so, it was liable to Spouses
Paras for the total sum of P720,000.00, the value of the 30,000 cubic-meters of
aggregates that Kimwa did not haul, in addition to attorney's fees and costs of suit.
[33]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court's Decision. It
faulted the trial court for basing its findings on evidence presented which were
supposedly in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. It noted that the Agreement was
clear that Kimwa was under no obligation to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
by May 15, 1995.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
is liable to petitioners Spouses Paras for (admittedly) failing to haul 30,000 cubic
meters of aggregates from petitioner Lucia Paras' permitted area by May 15, 1995.
RULING:
Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity
which it was obliged to acquire from petitioner Lucia Paras.
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence
Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced into writing:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement
of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
51
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities observed,[36]
"forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon
by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract."[37]
From an evidentiary standpoint, this is also because "oral testimony . . . coming' from
a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on
human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words
could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language."[38] As illustrated in Abella v. Court of Appeals:[39]
Without any doubt, oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
"I would sooner trust the smallest slip of paper for truth," said Judge Limpkin of
Georgia, "than the strongest and most retentive memory ever bestowed on mortal
man." This is especially true in this case where such oral testimony is given by a
party to the case who has an interest in its outcome, and by a witness who claimed
to have received a commission from the petitioner.[40]
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its
pleading any of the four (4) items enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130,
Section 9, "a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
agreement[.]"[41] Raising any of these items as an issue in a pleading such that it
falls under the exception is not limited to the party initiating an action. In Philippine
National Railways v. Court of First Instance of Albay,[42] this court noted that "if the
defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the
complaint does not express the true agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is
admissible to prove the true agreement of the parties[.]"[43] Moreover, as with all
possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party's failure to timely object is
deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained.
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence
sought to be introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it.
That is, it must be relevant, tending to "induce belief in [the] existence"[44] of the
flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to
introduce parol evidence.
52
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first,
that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party's
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol
evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed
by the presenting party.
42. NENITA CARGANILLO vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija,
gave the petitioner the amount of ₱132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The
petitioner, who was alleged to be an "ahente" or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay,
agreed to deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November
28, 1998. According to the "Kasunduan" signed by the petitioner, the parties agreed
that for every kilo of palay bought the petitioner shall earn a commission of twenty
centavos (P0.20). But if no palay is purchased and delivered on November 28, the
petitioner must return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita within one (1) week after
November 28.
After failing to receive any palay or the ₱132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1)
week thereafter, respectively, Teresita made oral and written demands to the
petitioner for the return of the ₱132,000.00 but her demands were simply ignored.
She thus filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the petitioner before the
Fiscal’s Office. Thereafter, an Information4 for the crime of estafa was filed in court.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime and denied that she entered into a
"principal-agent" agreement with, and received the ₱132,000.00 from, Teresita. She
alleged that she owed Teresita a balance of ₱13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that
she purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996,5 and that, in November 1996, she
53
was made to sign a blank "Kasunduan" that reflected no written date and amount.6
She likewise denied personally receiving any written demand letter from Teresita.
The petitioner maintains that she isnot engaged in the business of buying and selling
palayand that the "Kasunduan" between her and Teresita does not contain their real
agreement of a simple money loan. She argues that the prosecution failed to establish
all the elements of estafa because she never received the ₱132,000.00 from Teresita;
that an element of the crime is that "the offender receives the money, or goods or
other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same."
In a decision dated November 19, 2004, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime
of estafa and sentenced her to suffer, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.8 Also, the RTC
ordered the petitioner to indemnify Teresita the sum of ₱132,000.00 representing the
amount embezzled and to pay the costs of suit.9
On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction.10 The CA held that the
prosecution properly established the elements of the crime of estafa. In debunking
petitioner’s claim that her agreement with Teresita was merely a money loan, the CA
stated that:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the
petitioner, however, failed to support her claims.
RULING:
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal
expression of the parties’ rights, duties, and obligations and is the best evidence of
the parties’ intention.Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.14 However, this rule, known as the Parol
Evidence Rule, admits of exceptions.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to a written agreement
may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading the following:
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
54
In this case, the petitioner alleges that the subject "Kasunduan" failed to express the
real agreement between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan
agreement and not that of a principal-agent relationship in the buy-and-sell of palay.
The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the petitioner, however, fail
to support her claims.
43. PILIPINAS BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ELOY R. BELLO, in his

capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-Manila, Branch 15, and MERIDIAN
ASSURANCE CORPORATION
FACTS:
On January 8, 1995, petitioner obtained from private respondent Meridian

Assurance Corporation a Money Securities and Payroll Comprehensive Policy which
was effective from January 13, 1985 to January 13, 1986. On November 25, 1985, at
about 9:15 a.m., while the policy was in full force and effect, petitioner’s armored
vehicle bearing Plate No. NBT 379 which was on its way to deliver the payroll
withdrawal of its client Luzon Development Bank ACLEM Paper Mills, was robbed by
two armed men wearing police uniforms along Magsaysay Road, San Antonio, San
Pedro, Laguna. Petitioner’s driver, authorized teller and two private armed guards
were on board the armored vehicle when the same was robbed. The loss suffered by
petitioner as a result of the heist amounted to P545,301.40.
On June 18, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Recall Witness, praying that it be
allowed to recall Tubianosa to testify on the negotiations pertaining to the terms and
55
conditions of the policy before its issuance to determine the intention of the parties
regarding the said terms and conditions. Private respondent objected thereto, on the
ground that the same would violate the parol evidence rule.
The RTC issued an Order dated July 24, 1999, denying petitioner’s motion to recall
Tubianosa to the witness stand, ruling that the same would violate the parol evidence
rule. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied by the lower court.
On December 21, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the aforementioned Orders of the RTC. In its Decision dated July
30, 1999, the appellate court dismissed the petition and held that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge. It held that there is no ambiguity
in the provisions of the Policy which would necessitate the presentation of extrinsic
evidence to clarify the meaning thereof. The Court of Appeals also stated that
petitioner failed to set forth in its Complaint a specific allegation that there is an
intrinsic ambiguity in the insurance policy which would warrant the presentation of
further evidence to clarify the intent of the contracting parties.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said witness’ testimony regarding the negotiations on the
terms and conditions of the policy would be violative of the best evidence rule.
RULING:
No. Petitioner’s Complaint merely alleged that under the provisions of the
Policy, it was entitled to recover from private respondent the amount it lost during
the heist. It did not allege therein that the Policy’s terms were ambiguous or failed to
express the true agreement between itself and private Respondent. Such being the
case, petitioner has no right to insist that it be allowed to present Tubianosa’s
testimony to shed light on the alleged true agreement of the parties, notwithstanding
its statement in its Pre-Trial Brief that it was presenting said witness for that
purpose.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly requires that for
parol evidence to be admissible to vary the terms of the written agreement, the
56
mistake or imperfection thereof or its failure to express the true agreement of the
parties should be put in issue by the pleadings.
As correctly noted by the appellate court, petitioner failed to raise the issue of
an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the terms of the Policy, or of the
failure of said contract to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto
in its Complaint. There was therefore no error on the part of the appellate court when
it affirmed the RTC’s Order disallowing the recall of Tubianosa to the witness stand,
for such disallowance is in accord with the rule that when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of
such other terms other than the contents of the written agreement. 8
The rationale behind the foregoing rule was explained in Ortanez v. Court of
Appeals,
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private

respondents’ oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has
an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is
not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be
notoriously undesirable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed
to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted
other than the contents thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
57
44. EDENBERT MADRIGAL AND VIRGILIO MALLARI vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS AND JOSE MALLARI
FACTS:
Private respondent Jose Mallari and his wife Fermina Mallari are the owners of
a 340-square meter residential lot with a 2-storey residential house erected thereon,
situated at Olongapo City. The couple had ten (10) children, five (5) of whom are
staying with them in the same house while the other five (5) are either residing
abroad or elsewhere in the Philippines.
In need of money for his wife’s planned travel to the United States, Jose thought of
mortgaging the above property with a bank. However, his son Virgilio Mallari who is
residing with his own family somewhere in San Ildefonso, Bulacan convinced Jose
not to proceed with the intended mortgage and to instead assign to him a portion of
the same property, assuring his father that the latter could continue in occupancy of
the property and that he will allow his sister Elizabeth who operates a store thereat
to continue with the same. Virgilio told his father, however, that he will occupy one of
58
the rooms in the house in case he goes to Olongapo City on vacation and that he will
renovate the other room and reserve it for his mother when she comes back from the
States. Virgilio assured his father that he will not dispose of the property without his
father’s consent and that the latter could redeem the said property any time he
acquires money.
And so, finding no reason to doubt Virgilio’s words, Jose did not anymore
proceed with his original idea of mortgaging the property with a bank. Instead, on 22
October 1987, he and his wife Fermina executed a document denominated as "Deed
of Absolute Sale", whereunder the couple appeared to have conveyed to their son
Virgilio Mallari the house and lot in question for a consideration of ₱50,000.00
although the property easily commands much more at that time. Worse, the deed of
conveyance described the properties sold as a one-storey residential house and the
135-square meter lot whereon it stands even as the subject properties actually
consist of a 2-storey residential house sitting on a 340-square meter parcel of land.
Things turned for the worse to the unsuspecting Jose Mallari when, without
his knowledge, his son Virgilio, via a document bearing date 25 June 1988 and
entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan", sold the same property for the same
amount of ₱50,000.00 to Edenbert Madrigal, a longtime neighbor of the Mallaris in
the area.
True enough, sometime thereafter, to Jose’s great shock, he was demanded by
Edenbert Madrigal to vacate the subject property. It was then that Jose came to know
for the first time of the sale of his property by his son Virgilio in favor of Edenbert
Madrigal thru the aforementioned June 25, 1988 "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan".
Jose Mallari filed against his son Virgilio Mallari and Edenbert Madrigal the
complaint for annulment, redemption and damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order in this case.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff Jose
Mallari by ordering defendant Edenbert Madrigal to allow the former to redeem the
subject property based on the same amount it was sold to him by his co-defendant
Virgilio Mallari. This Court finds and so holds that since plaintiff has sufficiently
established preponderance of evidence against the defendants, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering defendant Edenbert Madrigal to allow plaintiff to redeem the
subject property based on the consideration of sale.
Hence, their present recourse, submitting for our consideration the following
issues:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the questioned deed of sale is a
mortgage
RULING:
59
Consistent with their thesis that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Virgilio’s parents is clearly a document of sale as its very language unmistakably
states, petitioners fault the trial court for receiving parol evidence to establish that
the instrument in question is actually one of equitable mortgage. Indirectly,
petitioners also put the Court of Appeals to task for giving weight to those evidence
instead of rejecting them, conformably with the Parol Evidence Rule under Section 9,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, we cannot view the Deed of Absolute Sale in question in isolation of
the circumstances under which the same was executed by Virgilio’s parents, more so
in the light of his father’s disavowal of what the document, on its face, purports to
state.
Then, too, there is the ruling of this Court in Lustan vs. CA6 to the effect that even if
the document appears to be a sale, parol evidence may be resorted to if the same
does not express the true intent of the parties. In the very words of Lustan:
"Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property
may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the
fact that the document does not express the true intent of the parties. In this case,
parol evidence then becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument
was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And
upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or
understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the
execution of the contract".
In any event, at bottom of petitioners’ first submission is their inability to
accept the factual findings of the two (2) courts below that the transaction between
petitioner Virgilio Mallari and his parents, albeit denominated as one of absolute sale,
is in reality an equitable mortgage. In short, petitioners would want us to revisit the
factual findings of both courts, scrutinize and examine those findings anew and
calibrate the validity of their conclusions on the basis of our own factual assessment.
60
45. SPOUSES ARCEGA REGALADO SANTIAGO and ROSITA PALABYAB,

JOSEFINA ARCEGA, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE HON. CAMILO C.
MONTESA, JR., Presiding Judge of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, and
QUIRICO
FACTS:
Paula Arcega was the registered owner of that certain parcel of land. Her
residential house stood there until 1970 when it was destroyed by a strong typhoon.
On December 9, 1970, Paula Arcega executed what purported to be a deed of
conditional sale over the land in favor of Josefina Arcega and the spouses Regalado
Santiago and Rosita Palabyab, the petitioners herein, for and in consideration of
P20,000.00. The vendees were supposed to pay P7,000.00 as downpayment. It was
expressly provided that the vendor would execute and deliver to the vendees an
absolute deed of sale upon full payment by the vendees of the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of P13,000.00.
61
Subsequently, on July 18, 1971, supposedly upon payment of the remaining

balance, Paula Arcega executed a deed of absolute sale of the same parcel of land in
favor of petitioners. Thereupon, on July 20, 1971, the said land, in the name of Paula
Arcega, was cancelled and a new title, was issued in the name of petitioners.
On April 10, 1985, Paula Arcega died single and without issue, leaving as heirs his
two brothers, Narciso Arcega1 and private respondent Quirico Arcega.
Incidentally, before Paula Arcega died, a house of four bedrooms with a total floor
area of 225 square meters was built over the parcel of land in question. Significantly,
the master's bedroom, with toilet and bath, was occupied by Paula Arcega until her
death despite the execution of the alleged deed of absolute sale. The three other
bedrooms, smaller than the master's bedroom, were occupied by the petitioners who
were the supposed vendees in the sale.
Private respondent Quirico Arcega, as heir of his deceased sister, filed, seeing
to declare null ad void the deed of sale executed by his sister during her lifetime in
favor of the petitioners on the ground that said deed was fictitious since the
purported consideration therefor of P20,000.00 was not actually paid by the vendees
to his sister.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, both the trial court and the respondent court should have
followed the Parole Evidence Rule and prevented evidence.
RULING:
No. Petitioners, nevertheless, insist that both the trial court and the
respondent court should have followed the Parole Evidence Rule and prevented
evidence, like the testimony of Notary Public, Atty. Luis Cuvin, private respondent
Quirico Arcega, among others, which impugned the two notarized deeds of sale.
The rule on parole evidence under Section 9, Rule 130 is qualified by the
following exceptions:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
The term "agreement" includes wills."
In this case, private respondent Quirico Arcega was able to put in issue in his
complaint before the Regional Trial Court the validity of the subject deeds of sale for
being a simulated transaction
62
Moreover, the parol evidence rule may be waived by failure to invoke it, as by
failure to object to the introduction of parol evidence. And, where a party who is
entitled to the benefit of the rule waives the benefit thereof by allowing such evidence
to be received without objection and without any effort to have it stricken from the
minutes or disregarded by the trial court, he cannot, after the trial has closed and
the case has been decided against him, invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal
of the judgment by an appellate court. Here, the records are devoid of any indication
that petitioners ever objected to the admissibility of parole evidence introduced by the
private respondent in open court. The court cannot disregard evidence which would
ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the
failure of a party to object thereto. Petitioners have no one to blame but themselves in
this regard.
46. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs FRANCISCO BUSTOS, ET AL
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by the accused Francisco Bustos and Antonio
Macaspac from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal convicting each of
them of the crime of homicide.
On the afternoon of October 24, 1925, while trying to determine the boundaries
of the lands which they respectively occupied on the Gadalupe, Estate, the accused
Francisco Bustos and Antonio Macaspac, on meeting Felipe del Castillo, son of Angel
del Castillo, with whom Francisco Bustos had just had a quarrel, and in which
Antonio Macaspac had intervened, the said accused pursued him; that Felipe del
63
Castillo threw a stone at his pursuers which struck Francisco Bustos wounding him
on the forehead; that the accused continued to pursue their victim until they
overtook him, inflicting several wounds upon him as a result of which he died a few
minutes later.
On this point Laureana Yumul testified to the effect that when she repaired to the
place pointed out by her deaf-mute daughter, she found her son stretched out on the
ground, wounded, and she asked him who had inflicted the wounds on him; that her
son answered: "Mother, go to the municipality and report this, because Francisco
Bustos and Antonio Macaspac have hacked me up;" that upon hearing this, should
shouted for help several times; that after the lapse of sufficient time for one to finish
smoking a cigarette, her son expired; that some time thereafter, the agents of
authority arrived, but her son was already dead.
The defense impeached the veracity of this witness by means of the testimony
of the municipal president, Nicanor Garcia, and Cristino Basay, who testified that
they were the first to arrive at the place where the deceased lay and that when
Laureana Yumul came up, she asked them what had happened to her son, and who
had killed him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court is correct in accepting the testimony of a deaf-mute
witness.
RULING:
Yes. The court finds Laureana Yumul's testimony more credible. Taking into
account the circumstances of the case and the number of persons in the vicinity who
must have gone to the place of the occurrence.
Aside from the ante-mortem declaration of Felipe del Castillo, as to who had
inflicted the wounds that caused his death, we have the testimony of Mariano del
Castillo, the 8-year-old brother of the deceased, to the effect that on his return from
having pastured his carabaos, he saw his brother pursued by Francisco Bustos and
Antonio Macaspac, the former armed with a dagger and the latter with a bolo. As he
became frightened he ran to his house, where he met his father, Angel del Castillo, to
whom he related what he had seen. When Angel del Castillo had heard his son's
story, he picked up a bolo and went in search of his son's aggressors, but did not find
them in their respective homes.
The prosecution also presented Soledad Encarnacion, deaf-mute daughter of
Laureana Yumul, who was interpreted by a teacher from the deaf and dumb school
who had never taught the witness; nor had the latter ever been to such a school.
While it is true that modern pedagogy has made tremendous strides in the
instruction and education of persons so afflicted, even to the extent of enabling the
blind to read by means of the sense of touch and deaf-mutes to receive instruction
through conventional signs and objects, nevertheless, with respect to deaf-mutes, it
64
is necessary that he who is to communicate with them know the meaning of their
signs, either from having had them taught to him, or from having acquired a
knowledge of them through frequent contact with the same. Without these
circumstances, although it is possible to guess part of what deaf-mutes mean by
their signs even without having had much to do with them, still much of what they
wish to say escapes us, and in our eagerness to understand them, we resort to
enjecture. It will be seen how dangerous then in such a procedure to arrive at the
truth, and above all when the life and liberty of an accused man are at stake. This
was shown in the present case, in which during the course of interpretation, there
were times when the interpreter could not make out what the witness meant by such
signs as she uses, and this is due to the fact that the deaf-mute had never been a
pupil of the interpreter, nor had the latter previously had anything to do with the
former, such as would have given her an opportunity to acquire some knowledge of
the meaning of the signs the deaf-mute used. In view of this, it would not be prudent
to admit the deaf-mute's testimony as interpreted by the teacher.
The character of the wound on the accused Francisco Bustos's forehead when he
presented himself to the municipal president Nicanor Garcia and his declaration that
he had been stoned by someone, contradicts his own testimony. The blood stains
found in his house do not corroborate his testimony, because if Felipe del Castillo
had received the fatal wound in said accused's house, he would not have had
strength enough to get to where he was found stretched out, which is 150 meters
from said house, and besides, there would have been blood stains along the trail. The
said blood stains are not incompatible with the prosecution's version, since after
having been stoned by Felipe del Castillo, when the latter was pursued by the
accused, Francisco Bustos must have repaired to his house where some of the drops
of blood issuing from his forehead must have fallen.
Francisco Bustos's declaration, then, far from detracting the evidence
presented by the prosecution, actually corroborates it.
The accused Antonio Macaspac pleaded an alibi, maintaining that he was
absent from Guadalupe from 6:30 in the evening until 11:30 at night, having gone to
Manila.
Taking into consideration the time when Felipe del Castillo was found wounded,
which must have been shortly before nightfall, it is not improbable that he might
have left for Manila after the assault with the object of preparing an alibi.
The wounds found on Felipe del Castillo's body, besides the stab, show that the
assault upon he was made with two kinds of weapons, one sharp-edged and the
other pointed, thus corroborating the deceased's ante-mortem declaration and
witness Mariano del Castillo's testimony.
Therefore, the evidence of the alibi presented by the accused Antonio Macaspac
cannot prevail over the clear and positive proof of the prosecution concerning his
participation in the assault upon Felipe del Castillo.
65
47. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZHENG BAI HUI @ CARLOS TAN TY and
NELSON HONG TY @ SAO YU.
FACTS:
In the morning of October 24, 1994, a police informant code-named Stardust
arrived at the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Camp Ricardo Papa, Bicutan,
Taguig, and informed Police Sr. Insp. Franklin Moises Mabanag of two Chinese
nationals who were supposedly big time drug pushers. She claimed to have regular
66
contact with one of the alleged drug pushers, a certain Carlos Tan Ty. Stardust, the
informant, was a woman who had previously provided the police with information
that led to the confiscation of one (1) kilo of shabu.
Acting on the information furnished by Stardust, the NARCOM agents
organized a buy-bust operation to apprehend the reputed drug pushers (herein
appellants).
The defense (People) offered the testimony of Sr. Insp. Franklin Moises Mabanag, who
was presented as a hostile witness. Sr. Insp. Mabanag was the chief of the Second
Operation Group-Special Operation Unit of the NARCOM when the accused were
arrested. He testified to certain aspects of the buy-bust operation that led to the
arrest of the accused.
(1) At the time he testified, Sr. Insp. Mabanag had known Stardust for
more than two (2) years, having first met her in the place where she worked
nightly. He eventually convinced her to work with them, and gave her the code-
name Stardust. Sr. Insp. Mabanag declined to divulge Stardusts real name in
court for security reasons. He revealed, however, that Stardust was neither a
drug pusher nor a drug user; she did not have any arrest record. She was
usually given cash as incentive for the information she provided; Sr. Insp.
Mabanag, though, could not remember how much he gave her in this case. He
described Stardusts participation in the operation as indispensable.
(2) The first time Sr. Insp. Mabanag first heard about Carlos Tan Ty was
when Stardust reported on October 24, 1994 that the accused was actively
engaged in the business of selling shabu. They conducted a backgrounder on
the accused, and their investigation yielded several persons with the same
name as Carlos Tan. They could not verify, however, if any one of these persons
was actually the accused Zheng Bai Hui.
(3) The accused were immediately brought to Camp Crame after their
arrest. Sr. Insp. Mabanag prepared a spot report, which he submitted to Supt.
Charles Galinan, chief of the NARCOM Special Operation Unit. The buy-bust
operation was not only reflected in said spot report but also in a pre-operation
report prepared by Sr. Insp. Mabanag before the operation, and in a logbook
containing the details thereof. Not all the entries in the pre-operation report,
such as the denominations of the bills used as boodle money, were entered in
the logbook, however. Sr. Insp. Mabanag claimed they did not maintain a police
blotter since they were a special operation unit.
(4) Sr. Insp. Mabanag denied that his operatives demanded money from
the accused in exchange for the latters release.[i]
The defense also presented, as hostile witnesses, SPO3 Gilbert Santos, PO3 Elleonito
Apduhan and PNP forensic chemist Leslie Maala, all of whom previously testified for
the prosecution.
The testimony of SPO3 Santos yielded the following additional information:
67
1) The serial numbers and the denominations of the genuine money used
in the buy-bust operation were not recorded in their police logbook, since their
Commanding Officer said it was no longer necessary. They did not place any
fluorescent powder on the boodle money.
2) He had never met either of the accused before their arrest nor did he
have any record or any A-1 information regarding them.
3) They did not conduct a test-buy or a surveillance of the activities of
the accused to determine the veracity of the information Stardust had
provided.
(4) They were not armed with a warrant when they effected the arrest of
the accused.
PO3 Elleonito Apduhan also testified that he did not know any of the accused
before their arrest. He confirmed that no test buy was conducted by their office. He
denied having gone to the house of accused Carlos Tan Ty and demanding money
from the latters wife.[iii]
Leslie Maala, for her part, expounded on the examinations she conducted on
the subject substance. Quite pertinently, she testified that the tests she performed,
namely, the Simons test, the Marquis test and the thin layer chromatography, are
qualitative, not quantitative tests. They are not designed to determine the purity of
the specimen. Ms. Maala admitted she never conducted any quantitative test on the
substance since there was no request for such an examination.[iv]
RTC ruled against the accused. The case is now before this Court for automatic
review.
Accused-appellants raised several contentions, one is that the trial court erred in
sustaining the refusal by Sr. Insp. Mabanag to divulge the identity of Stardust, the
woman who informed the police about the two accused. It is claimed that such
refusal violated the right of the accused to confront and cross-examine said witness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in sustaining the refusal by Sr. Insp.
Mabanag to divulge the identity of Stardust, the woman who informed the police
about the two accused.
RULING:
NO. As a rule, informers are not presented in court because of the need to
preserve their cover so they can continue their invaluable service to the police.
Equally strong reasons include the maintenance of the informants health and safety
and the encouragement of others to report wrongdoing to police authorities.
The rule against disclosure is not absolute, however. In Roviaro v. United States,[vi]
the United States Supreme Court declared:
What is usually referred to as the informers privilege is in reality the
Governments privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who
68
furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that

law. [Citations omitted.] The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and
protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes
the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of
crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages
them to perform that obligation.
The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose. Thus, where the
disclosure of the contents of a communication will not tend to reveal the identity of
an informer, the contents are not privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the
informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the
communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from the
fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informers identity,
or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if the Government
withholds the information, dismiss the action.
The SC believes that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The
problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of
information against the individuals right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper
balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible
defenses, the possible significance of the informers testimony, and other relevant
factors.
Before disclosure of the informers identity may be allowed, however, the
defense must, before or during the trial, request the production of the confidential
informant or his identification
48. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ADEL TUANGCO, NELSON PINEDA, JR.
and SONNY TUANGCO, ADEL TUANGCO and SONNY TUANGCO
FACTS:
On Jan. 4, 1995, the naked cadaver of on Aure Eugenio, employee of CEU
Credit Coop, Manila was found lying beside a creek 50 m from the national highway
69
of Apalit. With multiple stab wounds and the private part bloodied showed signs of
sexual abuse.
On May 8, 1995, 2 Informations of Rape with Hom and Theft were filed against Adel
Tuangco and Sonny Tuangco. (All accused took turns in having sexual intercourse
with the victim after inserting a Pidol cough syrup bottle on the latter’s private part
and stabbed her on the neck that caused her death.
Prosecution evidence:
Principal evidence consists of testimony of eye witness Sylvestre Sanggalan, a
deaf-mute and corroborated by Dr. Dominic Aguda, the one who conducted the
autopsy upon the victim. Sanggalan was assisted by a sign language expert.
Witness Sanggalan averred that on Jan 3, 1995 around 6pm, he was in a beer house
with 7 companions. During nighttime, he left along with other 3 companions in the
person of Nelson Pineda @ Jun Tattoo, Sonny Tuangco @ Baba and Adel Tuanco. The
witness both identified accused Adel Tuanco and Sonny Tuangco on different
occasions as the perpetrators of the crime. Even he was asked to leave, he decided to
stay and hide from the grasses and trees near the waiting shed by rice field where the
raping and slaying happened. He was able to narrate what had actually transpired
during the said fatal night.
Dr. Dominic Aguda conducted autopsy and testified that the injuries sustained
by Eugenio was caused not only by human penis but by hard foreign object like a
bottle. The stab wounds was caused by a single bladed weapon. Proximate cause of
death was severe haemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds.
Defense evidence:
Both accused raised the defense of alibi and denied the charges. They alleged
that they were at home during the said happening of the crime.
The trial court decided as against the accused. Both accused were convicted with the
crime of Theft and Special Complex Crime of Rape with Homicide.
Automatic Review by the SC
PAO submits assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in giving full faith and credence to
witness who is deaf-mute and unschooled
Ruling:
Sol. Gen prays for affirmance as a deaf-mute is qualified to testify so long as:
a. he can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath;
b. can comprehend facts they are going to testify on;
c. can communicate through a qualified interpreter.
Inconsistencies pointed out by the defense are minor and does not make the
testimony of Sanggalang as incredible. The court affirmed judgment of conviction and
70
took cognizant of physical handicap and carefully scrutinized his testimony and
noted that on several occasions, he testified in a candid and straightforward manner.
The competence of the sign language expert Eva Sangco was also very carefully
evaluated. The defense of alibi must yield to the positive identification of the accused
by witness Sanggalan. No evidence was adduced to show the physical impossibility of
the accused at the crime scene during the fateful night of Jan. 3, 1995. Likewise, the
testimony was corroborated by Dr. Aguda. It was also held that indeed there was
conspiracy committed by all the three accused. Judgment was AFFIRMED with
modification as to civil indemnity increased to P100,000.00.
49. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC vs. RODELIO ALBERTO and ENRICO
ALBERTO REYES
FACTS:
71
At around 5 o’clock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an accident

occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving four (4)
vehicles, to wit: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit with plate number NYS
381; (2) an Isuzu Tanker with plate number PLR 684; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck with
plate number PDL 297; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number TLM 732.[4]
Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, Senior Police
Officer 1 Alfredo M. Dungga (SPO1 Dungga), the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the
Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before the vehicular
incident. All three (3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction
when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the
Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong
impact, these two vehicles were shoved forward and the front left portion of the
Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker.
Previously, particularly on December 15, 1994, Malayan Insurance issued Car
Insurance Policy No. PV-025-00220 in favor of First Malayan Leasing and Finance
Corporation (the assured), insuring the aforementioned Mitsubishi Galant against
third party liability, own damage and theft, among others. Having insured the
vehicle against such risks, Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint dated
October 18, 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by the assured amounting to
PhP 700,000.
Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of the assured by
operation of law upon its payment to the latter, Malayan Insurance sent several
demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes
(Reyes), the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck,
requiring them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured. When respondents
refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance was constrained to file a complaint
for damages for gross negligence against respondents.
In their Answer, respondents asserted that they cannot be held liable for the
vehicular accident, since its proximate cause was the reckless driving of the Nissan
Bus driver. They alleged that the speeding bus, coming from the service road of
EDSA, maneuvered its way towards the middle lane without due regard to Reyes’
right of way. When the Nissan Bus abruptly stopped, Reyes stepped hard on the
brakes but the braking action could not cope with the inertia and failed to gain
sufficient traction. As a consequence, the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the
Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. The
Nissan Bus, on the other hand, sideswiped the Fuzo Cargo Truck, causing damage to
the latter in the amount of PhP 20,000. Respondents also controverted the results of
the Police Report, asserting that it was based solely on the biased narration of the
Nissan Bus driver.
After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial ensued. Malayan
Insurance presented the testimony of its lone witness, a motor car claim adjuster,
who attested that he processed the insurance claim of the assured and verified the
72
documents submitted to him. Respondents, on the other hand, failed to present any
evidence.
In its Decision dated February 2, 2009, the trial court, in Civil Case No. 99-
95885, ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance and declared respondents liable for
damages. The dispositive portion reads:
Judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff against defendants.
The CA held that the evidence on record has failed to establish not only
negligence on the part of respondents, but also compliance with the other requisites
and the consequent right of Malayan Insurance to subrogation. It noted that the
police report, which has been made part of the records of the trial court, was not
properly identified by the police officer who conducted the on-the-spot investigation
of the subject collision. It, thus, held that an appellate court, as a reviewing body,
cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified and unidentified
document, much less accord it evidentiary value.
Subsequently, Malayan Insurance filed its Motion for Reconsideration, arguing
that a police report is a prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it. And inasmuch
as they never questioned the presentation of the report in evidence, respondents are
deemed to have waived their right to question its authenticity and due execution.
In its Resolution dated October 29, 2010, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, Malayan Insurance filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the police report is admissible as evidence.
RULING:
Admissibility of the Police Report
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the police
investigator who prepared the police report, said report is still admissible in evidence,
especially since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its presentation in
evidence. Respondents counter that since the police report was never confirmed by
the investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as part of the evidence on
record.
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which
the witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from
the witness’ own perception.Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters
which he or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told or
read or heard those matters. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as the
hearsay rule.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
73
Sufficiency of Evidence
Malayan Insurance contends that since Reyes, the driver of the Fuzo Cargo
truck, bumped the rear of the Mitsubishi Galant, he is presumed to be negligent
unless proved otherwise. It further contends that respondents failed to present any
evidence to overturn the presumption of negligence. Contrarily, respondents claim
that since Malayan Insurance did not present any witness who shall affirm any
negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo truck before and after the incident,
there is no evidence which would show negligence on the part of respondents.
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary
evidence is absent or not available.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the
defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the
plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the
fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is
practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
In the case at bar, aside from the statement in the police report, none of the parties
disputes the fact that the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant,
which, in turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. Respondents, however,
point to the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver as the proximate cause of the
collision, which allegation is totally unsupported by any evidence on record. And
assuming that this allegation is, indeed, true, it is astonishing that respondents
never even bothered to file a cross-claim against the owner or driver of the Nissan
Bus.
As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are
the following: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the person injured.
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end
of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck
was under the exclusive control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability
by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving
and totally unfounded. Finally, no contributory negligence was attributed to the
driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a reasonable
presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.
50. MARINA PORT SERVICES, INC. v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE
CORPORATION
74
FACTS:
On September 21, 1989, Countercorp Trading PTE., Ltd. shipped from
Singapore to the Philippines 10 container vans of soft wheat flour with seals intact on
board the vessel M/V Uni Fortune. The shipment was insured against all risks by
AHAC and consigned to MSC Distributor (MSC).
Upon arrival at the Manila South Harbor on September 25, 1989, the shipment
was discharged in good and complete order condition and with safety seals in place
to the custody of the arrastre operator, MPSI. After unloading and prior to hauling,
agents of the Bureau of Customs officially broke the seals, opened the container
vans, and examined the shipment for tax evaluation in the presence of MSC's broker
and checker. Thereafter, the customs inspector closed the container vans and
refastened them with safety wire seals while MSC's broker padlocked the same. MPSI
then placed the said container vans in a back-to-back arrangement at the delivery
area of the harbor's container yard where they were watched over by the security
guards of MPSI and of the Philippine Ports Authority.
On October 10, 1989, MSC's representative, AD's Customs Services (ACS), took
out five container vans for delivery to MSC. At the compound's exit, MPSI issued to
ACS the corresponding gate passes for the vans indicating its turn¬over of the
subject shipment to MSC. However, upon receipt of the container vans at its
warehouse, MSC discovered substantial shortages in the number of bags of flour
delivered. Hence, it filed a formal claim for loss with MPSI.
From October 12 to 14, 1989 and pursuant to the gate passes issued by MPSI,
ACS took out the remaining five container vans from the container yard and delivered
them to MSC. Upon receipt, MSC once more discovered substantial shortages. Thus,
MSC filed another claim with MPSI.
Per MSC, the total number of the missing bags of flour was 1,650 with a value
of £257,083.00.
MPSI denied both claims of MSC. As a result, MSC sought insurance indemnity
for the lost cargoes from AHAC. AHAC paid MSC the value of the missing bags of
flour after finding the tetter's claim in order. In turn, MSC issued a subrogation
receipt in favor of AHAC.
Thereafter, AHAC filed a Complaint6 for damages against MPSI before the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MPSI is liable for the loss of the bags of flour.
RULING:
It is significant to note that MPSI, in order to prove that it properly delivered
the subject shipment consigned to MSC, presented 10 gate passes marked as
Exhibits 4 to 13.30 Each of these gate passes bore the duly identified signature31 of
MSC's representative which serves, among others, as an acknowledgement that the
75
issuance of [the] Gate Pass constitutes delivery to and receipt by consignee of the
goods as described above in good order and condition, unless an accompanying B.O.
certificate duly issued and noted on the face of [the] Gate Pass appears.32
As held in International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee &
Assurance Co., Inc.,33 the signature of the consignee's representative on the gate
pass is evidence of receipt of the shipment in good order and condition.34redarclaw
Also, that MPSI delivered the subject shipment to MSC's representative in good
and complete condition and with lock and seals intact is established by the
testimonies of MPSFs employees who were directly involved in the processing of the
subject shipment. Mr. Ponciano De Leon testified that as MPSI's delivery checker, he
personally examined the subject container vans and issued the corresponding gate
passes that were, in turn, countersigned by the consignee's representative. MPSI's
other witness, Chief Claims Officer Sergio Icasiano (Icasiano), testified that the
broker, as the consignee's representative, neither registered any complaints nor
requested for an inspection.
Verily, the testimonies of the aforementioned employees of MPSI confirm that
the container vans, together with their padlocks and wirings, were in order at the
time the gate passes were issued up to the time the said container vans were turned
over to ACS.
AHAC justifies the failure of ACS to immediately protest the alleged loss or
pilferage upon initial pick-up of the first batch of container vans. According to it, ACS
could not have discovered the loss at that moment since the stripping of container
vans in the pier area is not allowed. The Court cannot, however, accept such excuse.
For one, AHAC's claim that stripping of the container vans is not allowed in the pier
area is a mere allegation without proof. It is settled that "[m]ere allegations do not
suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof."37 For another,
even assuming that stripping of the container vans is indeed not allowed at the pier
area, it is hard to believe that MSC or its representative ACS has no precautionary
measures to protect itself from any eventuality of loss or pilferage. To recall, ACS's
representative signed the gate passes without any qualifications. This is despite the
fact that such signature serves as an acknowledgment of ACS's receipt of the goods
in good order and condition. If MSC was keen enough in protecting its interest, it
(through ACS) should have at least qualified the receipt of the goods as subject to
inspection, and thereafter arrange for such an inspection in an area where the same
is allowed to be done. However, no such action or other similar measure was shown
to have been undertaken by MSC. What is clear is that ACS accepted the container
vans on its behalf without any qualification. As aptly observed by the RTC.
51. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VICTOR P. PADIT
76
FACTS:
In the morning of May 5, 2006, the victim, AAA,3 a four-year-old girl, was
playing inside their house while her mother was looking after her younger brother.
After a while, AAA went out of the house to buy bread. On her way to the store, she
was called by accused-appellant, who is their neighbor and the uncle of her mother,
and whom AAA calls as Lolo Victor. Accused-appellant brought AAA inside his house
and allowed her to play. He then brought her upstairs, caused her to lie down and
removed her short pants. Accused-appellant also removed his short pants and
proceeded to rub his penis against AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain but was rendered
helpless and prevented from making any sound as accused-appellant covered her
mouth with his hand. Thereafter, accused-appellant threatened to hurt AAA with his
knife if she tells anybody about the incident.
Meanwhile, AAA's mother was about to serve lunch when she noticed that AAA
was not yet around. She then went out of their house and around their neighborhood
calling for AAA. While she was in accused-appellant's yard, the latter came out of his
house and told her that AAA is inside watching him weave baskets. Accused-
appellant then went back inside the house and, after a few minutes, brought AAA
outside.
Back at their house, her mother asked AAA why she did not respond to her calls.
AAA then told her mother about what accused-appellant did to her. Upon hearing
AAA's account of her sexual molestation committed by accused-appellant, AAA's
mother immediately went to accused-appellant's house to confront him. Accused-
appellant, however, denied having molested AAA. Unable to elicit an admission from
accused-appellant, AAA's mother went back to their house and proceeded to give AAA
a bath. While she was washing AAA's vagina, the latter cried and asked her not to
touch it because it was very painful.
The following morning, AAA's parents filed a complaint with their Barangay
Chairman. They also caused AAA to undergo physical/medical examination on May
8, 2006 wherein it was found that the child's vulva
showed a slight hymenal abrasion.
Subsequently, AAA's mother filed a criminal Complaint4 with the Prosecutor's
Office of Guiuan, Eastern Samar. In an Information5 dated August 2, 2006, the
Office of the Public Prosecutor of Eastern Samar charged accused-appellant with the
crime of rape, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
The undersigned, Public Prosecutor of the Province of Eastern Samar, accuses Victor
Padit y Padual of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Art. 335, Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of May 2006, at about 12:00 noon, Brgy.
Naparaan, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused with lewd design and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
77
place and rub his penis into the vagina of [AAA], 4-year-old girl minor, without
her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law.
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the prosecution
contending that he could not have raped AAA because his wife was with him at the
time that the alleged molestation was committed. Accused-appellant's wife
corroborated his testimony on the witness stand.
During pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense entered into a stipulation of
facts wherein it was admitted that the victim was four (4) years old at the time of the
alleged rape; accused-appellant is the same person who has been charged and
arraigned; and, accused-appellant and the victim and her parents are neighbors.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the testimony of the child victim is admissible as evidence.
2. Whether or not the testimony of AAA's mother that it was accused-appellant
who molested her child is nothing but hearsay.
RULING:
1. Yes. Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full
weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has, in fact,
been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are
inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her
relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter
to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity. Considering that AAA was only four (4) years old when she was
raped and was only five (5) years old when she took the witness stand, she could not
have invented a horrible story. For her to fabricate the facts of rape and to charge the
accused falsely of a crime is certainly beyond her mental capacity.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant's contention that the
prosecution failed to prove carnal knowledge on the ground that AAA explicitly stated
in her testimony that accused-appellant merely rubbed his penis against her vagina.
AAA, who was then four years old at the time of the molestation, was not expected to
be knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof.
The fact that she claimed that accused-appellant rubbed his penis against her
vagina did not mean that there was no penetration. Carnal knowledge is defined as
the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.21 This explains
why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape.22 As
such, a mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating
the sexual act already constitutes consummated rape.23 In the present case, AAA
testified that she felt pain when accused-appellant "rubbed his penis [against her]
vagina."24 This Court has held that rape is committed on the victim's testimony that
78
she felt pain.25 In fact, AAA still felt severe pain in her vagina when she was being
given a bath by her mother after her molestation.26 This kind of pain could not have
been the result of mere superficial rubbing of accusedappellant's sex organ with that
of the victim. Such pain could be nothing but the result of penile penetration
sufficient to constitute rape.27
Besides, the testimony of AAA is corroborated by the findings of the physician who
examined her indicating the presence of slight hymenal abrasion upon examination
of her vulva.28 Thus, the RTC and the CA are correct in concluding that both the
victim's positive testimony and the findings of the medico-legal officer complemented
each other in the conclusion that there was penetration, however slight.
The Court is neither persuaded by accused-appellant's insistence that while
there is no question that children, like AAA, at such an age are incapable of lying,
their credibility is not only limited to their capacity to tell the truth but also their
capacity to grasp things that have happened, to intelligently recall them and to
completely and accurately relate them. The fact that the offended party is a minor
does not mean that she is incapable of perceiving and of making her perception
known.30 In fact, AAA had consistently, positively, and categorically identified
accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid, and replete with
details of the rape.
2. No. Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of AAA's mother that it
was accused-appellant who molested her child is nothing but hearsay, considering
that she only came to know of the alleged molestation when she found AAA inside
accused-appellant's house and after the child told her about it when they got back
home.
The Court does not agree.
The term "hearsay" as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is
not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited and
which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the
confidence which the court may have in him; its value, if any, is measured by the
credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to that fact, and
consequently, not subject to crossexamination.31 If one therefore testifies to facts
which he learned from a third person not sworn as a witness to those facts, his
testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence.
The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against
whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to
cross-examine the person to whom the statements are attributed. Moreover, the court
is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the
demeanor of the person who made them.
In the instant case, the declarant, AAA herself, was sworn as a witness to the fact
testified to by her mother.1âwphi1 Accused-appellant's counsel even cross-examined
AAA. Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to observe AAA's manner of
79
testifying. Hence, the testimony of AAA's mother on the incident related to her by her
daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.
Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of AAA's mother is hearsay, its
non-admission would not save the day for accused-appellant.
52. JOSE ESPINELI A.K.A. DANILO ESPINELI VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The facts show that in the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon
y Downie (Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station DZMM,
was shot in the head and different parts of the body in front of his house in Imus,
Cavite by unidentified malefactors who immediately fled the crime scene on board a
waiting car.
Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes (Reyes) for the
crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the group of Atty.
Dizon that he was willing to give vital information regarding the Berbon case. In due
course, NBI Agent Dave Segunial (NBI Agent Segunial) interviewed Reyes on February
10, 1997 and reduced his statement into writing whereby Reyes claimed that on
December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes (Paredes) board a red car
while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite, respectively; and that petitioner
told Paredes that “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon.”12
Subsequently, Reyes posted bail and was released on February 14, 1997.
Thenceforth, he jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI Agent Segunial
testified on these facts during the trial.
The victim’s widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise testified. According to
her, sometime in the third week of February 1997 Reyes sought financial help so he
could transfer his family to the province and protect them from any untoward
consequence that may result from his giving information to the NBI regarding the
death of Sabina’s husband. Sabina gave him the total amount of P1,500.00 and
promised to help him in applying for the witness protection program. This was
affirmed on the witness stand by Sabina’s brother, Bartolome Pakingan. After that,
however, Reyes never came back.
Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo), testified that he sold his
red Ford Escort car to three persons who came to his residence in the afternoon of
September 1, 1996. He later identified the said car from the photographs presented
to him by the police officers.
Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who conducted
a post-mortem examination on Alberto, declared in his Autopsy Report that the
victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the head and body. He also stated that
based on the size of the gunshot wounds or entrance, high-powered guns were used
in the killing.
80
Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his defense. Instead,
he filed a Demurrer to Evidence13 without leave of court. As no action whatsoever
was taken thereon by the trial court, petitioner just moved that the case be deemed
submitted for decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals
sufficiently support petitioner’s conviction.
RULING:
Truly, “direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from
which a court may draw its finding of guilt.”27 The rules of evidence allow a trial
court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence “which indirectly proves a fact in issue
through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established.”28
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would
be sufficient to convict the offender “if i) there is more than one circumstance; ii) the
facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”29 All
the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others as the guilty person.
The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence presented in this case in the
light of the standards discussed above and finds the foregoing circumstantial
evidence sufficient to support a judgment of conviction. Several reasons deserve our
acceptance of the circumstances upon which petitioner’s conviction was based, to
wit:
The effect of the alleged established circumstances, which essentially were the same
circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate court, to have satisfied the
requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the incriminating
circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain of events enough
to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was responsible for the killing of the victim.
Besides, it is “[a]n established rule in appellate review x x x that the trial
court’s factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from
the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual
findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA,”40 as
in this case.
81
53. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS REGGIE VILLARIEZ ALIAS "TOTI
FACTS:
On 22 September 1995, Villariez, together with his two brothers, Amado
Villariez (Amado) and Tomas Villariez (Tomas), was charged in an Information for
murder.
That on July 3, 1995, at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon at the compound of the
Catholic Cemetery in Brgy. Casanayan, Pilar, Capiz, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all armed with guns
of unknown caliber and with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and without any warning or
provocation shot from behind one ENRIQUE OLIMBA, thereby inflicting upon the
latter a fatal gunshot wound in the body causing the instantaneous death of said
Enrique Olimba.
On 20 July 1995, warrants of arrest were issued against the three accused
brothers - Villariez, Amado, and Tomas. Amado and Tomas surrendered and posted
bail. On 26 August 1995, Amado was shot dead and the case against him was
dismissed. On 17 November 1995, Tomas was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On 29 January 1997, the prosecution filed a Motion to Dismiss Tomas from the
case. Perla Olimba (Perla), the wife of the victim Enrique Olimba (Enrique), executed
an Affidavit of Desistance because of the insufficiency of evidence to prove Tomas'
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On 30 January 1997, the motion was granted by the
RTC.
On 6 October 1999, the RTC ordered the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest
against Villariez. On 14 February 2003, the alias warrant of arrest was returned to
the RTC after Villariez was arrested. On the same day, Villariez was taken into
custody by the provincial warden of the Capiz Rehabilitation Center.
On 5 May 2003, Villariez was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Dr.
Florentino Bermejo (Dr. Bermejo), postmortem examiner; (2) Perla; (3) Randy Olimba
(Randy), son of the victim; (4) Ana Olimba (Ana), daughter of the victim; and (5)
Antonio Bacto, Chief of Police of Capiz.
Ana testified that on 3 July 1995, she, together with her family -parents
Enrique and Perla and sibling Randy, attended the burial of Perla's uncle in the
82
cemetery of Barangay Casanayan, Pilar, Capiz. At around 3:30 in the afternoon, while
praying the novena before the burial, Ana, who was on top of a tomb and about eight
meters from her father, heard a gun explode. When she turned to look at her father,
she saw him spinning. Ana then shouted to her mother that her father was shot. Ana
ran towards her father and saw Villariez waving a gun, accompanied by his brothers
Amado and Tomas. Ana held her father's head with her dress drenched in blood. She
asked her father the identity of the person who shot him. At the brink of death and
with a voice she could hardly hear, her father uttered the name "Toti." Thereafter, she
ran towards the road and told her mother to bring her father to the hospital. She also
saw Villariez and his two brothers pointing their guns to people who were scampering
away. The three then fled on a motorcycle.
Randy testified that he was two to three meters away from his father prior to
the shooting. He saw Villariez and the latter's two brothers Amado and Tomas
position themselves behind his father's back. Thereafter, he saw Villariez, with a
short firearm, shoot his father. When the three started running away, he rose and
followed them. Randy saw Amado ride a motorcycle while Tomas and Villariez passed
by the rice fields. He then saw Villariez waving the short firearm he was carrying to
some tricycle drivers. Afterwards, Randy saw Villariez riding on a motorcycle.
Perla testified that while attending the burial of her uncle, she heard an
explosion. She went out and saw Villariez and his two brothers run away from the
place where her husband was lying. Then she saw Ana cradling the head of her
husband who was lying on the ground. Randy approached Perla and told her that
Toti was the one who shot his father. Perla went to the Barangay Captain to inform
him that Villariez shot her husband. Perla then returned to the cemetery. There, she
found her husband already dead. Thereafter, Perla, Ana and Randy brought
Enrique's body to their house and summoned Dr. Bermejo.
Dr. Bermejo, the Rural Health Physician of Pilar, Capiz, performed the
postmortem examination on Enrique's cadaver. Dr. Bermejo testified that the victim's
cause of death was severe hemorrhage, antecedent to a gunshot wound with the
entrance of the bullet at the back. He further testified that both the victim and
assailant were possibly standing when the incident happened.
The defense, on the other hand, presented (1) Villariez; (2) Tomas; and (3)
Reynaldo Jalbuna (Jalbuna), Villariez's friend and co-worker.
Villariez testified that he was at the Casanayan Cemetery attending the burial
of his uncle at around 3:30 in the afternoon of 3 July 1995. He was with Jalbuna, his
friend for more than 10 years. His elder brother Tomas was also present and was
standing about 20-30 meters ahead of them. Around 200 people attended the burial
and while they were praying, he heard a sudden outburst and saw a person fall
down. The person was later identified as Enrique, the husband of his second cousin
Perla. Everyone scurried away to different directions. Together with Jalbuna, Villariez
then proceeded to Balasan, Iloilo.
83
Jalbuna testified that he was Villariez's co-worker and at the time of the
incident they were employed by Vice Mayor Samson Vedro of Balasan, Iloilo. Jalbuna
corroborated Villariez's testimony and stated that he was with Villariez in the
afternoon of 3 July 1995 attending the funeral of Villariez's relative. They saw Tomas
at the funeral but Tomas did not see them. When the shooting incident occurred,
Jalbuna saw people running away. They followed everyone else and left the cemetery.
They then headed back to work in Balasan, Iloilo.
Tomas testified that he, together with his brother Amado, attended the burial of
his uncle on 3 July 1995. He did not see his brother Villariez during the burial.
Tomas stated that he was about 10 meters away when he saw the man who shot
Enrique but he did not recognize the lone gunman. He further said that Perla could
not have seen the shooting incident since her husband was way behind her and that
their two children, Randy and Ana, were not present during the burial.
In its Decision dated 22 August 2007, the RTC found Villariez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
On 20 September 2007, Villariez filed an appeal with the CA. Villariez. The CA
affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dying declaration made by Enrique which should be held
inadmissible.
The Ruling of the Court:

No. For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the dying declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) at the time of making his
declaration, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (3) the
declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness; and (4) the declaration
was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the
declarant was the victim.
These requisites are all present in the case at bar.
First. Enrique's utterance pertains to the identity of the one who shot him.
Second. Contrary to the allegation of accused-appellant, it was established that
the declarant Enrique, was under a consciousness of his impending death. In the
case at bench, although he made no express statement showing that he was
conscious of his impending death, it was clear however, considering the fatal quality
of his injury and that he was barely heard by Ana when he uttered accused-
appellant's name, that his death was imminent, x x x.
Third. Declarant Enrique would have been competent to testify had he
survived.
Last. His dying declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder
where he was the victim.
84
54. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JUAN BRIOSO and MARIANO TAEZA
FACTS:
Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the
barking of dogs. She peeped through a crack in the wall of her house and saw
appellants herein pass southward in the direction of the house of Silvino Daria that
was six meters away. Brioso was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions awakened, she
went downstairs and, shielded by the fence, witnessed each appellant point a gun at
the bamboo wall of Daria's house. Two detonations followed, and thereafter she heard
Daria moaning and his wife call for help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal
went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The
widow, however, testified that right after being shot, she rushed to her husband's
side and he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino
Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the abdomen and leg.
A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits
pointing to the two accused as the killers.
The cause of the death of Silvino Daria was "Shock due to severe hemorrhage
secondary to gunshot wounds at the abdomen and leg," as found by Dr. Isabelo B.
Lucas, Municipal Health Officer of Tayum, Abra, contained in his Medico-Legal
Necropsy Report, Exhibit "A".
The motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval by the spouses
Silvino and Susana Daria of Mariano Taeza's courtship of their daughter, Angelita.
Angelita was even sent to Manila for her to avoid Mariano Taeza. The courtship is
admitted by Mariano Taeza.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and
contradictory testimony and statement of the prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal on
the physical identity of the accused.
85
RULING:
No. We find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material
points. She stated that she did not see Mariano Taeza carry a gun when both the
accused passed by. But this brief observation does not necessarily mean that he was
not actually armed or carrying a gun on his person. The fact that he did was proved
when both the said accused were seen pointing their respective gun at the victim and
each subsequently fired once at him, Taeza using a short weapon that could have
been carried concealed in his person.
The house of Cecilia Bernal was only six meters away from that of Silvino
Daria's. The night was brightly illuminated by the moon. Cecilia Bernal had known
both accused for a long time and it is admitted that they also know her. There could
have been no difficulty in identifying the accused under the circumstances.
Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder
against the above-said accused, considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the
deceased by a first degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of
no reason why she should testify against him. Hence, her statement that she came to
court only to tell the truth should be believed. The witness also stated that she was
hard of hearing and could not understand some of the questions; thus, the alleged
inconsistencies in her testimony do not detract from the "positive and straightforward
identification of the accused as the ones who were seen at the scene of the crime and
who actually shot Silvino Daria.
It is noteworthy that the trial judge observed witness Bernal closely, warning
her several times not to exaggerate, yet in the decision gave her full credence, being
obviously satisfied of her truthfulness. The general rule, based on logic and
experience, is that the findings of the judge who tried the case and heard the
witnesses are not disturbed on appeal, unless there are substantial facts and
circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might
affect the result of the case, which in this case have not been shown to exist.
Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration
of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot
him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement.
Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the
seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same
under the consciousness of impending death, considering that he died only one hour
after being shot.
The defense of both the accused is alibi. Mariano Taeza's own account was that
in the evening of 23 December 1966 he was at the barrio clinic of Tiker playing the
guitar with Antonio Daria (son of the deceased), Narciso Valera and Jose Cabais.
While in the said place, they heard two gun explosions. Soon afterwards, Macrino
Arzadon and Taurino Flores came running towards them, informing Antonio Daria
that his father was already dead.
86
55. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SONNY GATARIN Y CABALLERO @ “JAY–

R” AND EDUARDO QUISAYAS, ACCUSED, EDUARDO QUISAYAS
FACTS:
Appellant and accused Sonny Gatarin y Caballero were charged in an
Information with Robbery with Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 2004, at about 8:00 o’clock (sic) in
the evening, at Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Batangas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named
accused, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and confederating together, acting
in common accord and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain, without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof and with violence against or intimidation
of person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry
away cash money amounting to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), Philippine
Currency, belonging to Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias “Ka Maning,” to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount and that on the
occasion and by reason of said robbery, the said accused with intent to kill and
taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon Januario Castillo y
Masangcay alias “Ka Maning,” thereby inflicting upon the latter the stab wounds to
[the] anterior chest and right shoulder and right axilla, which directly caused his
death.
Contrary to law.
Appellant was arrested, while his co–accused remained at–large. When
arraigned, he pleaded “Not Guilty.” Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
From the testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution established the
following facts:
On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle
on his way home when he saw Januario being mauled by two persons opposite Dom’s
Studio in Poblacion, Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front
87
of the church until such time that the accused ran away and were chased by
policemen who alighted from the police patrol vehicle.
On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol
vehicle performing their routine patrol duty when they met two men, later identified
as the accused, who were running at a fast speed. When asked why they were
running, the accused did not answer prompting the policemen to chase them. The
policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and when it became evident
that they could no longer find them, they continued patrolling the area. There they
saw Januario lying on the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was severely injured,
the policemen immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to
the Zigzag Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who
hurt him. He answered that it was “Jay–R and his uncle” who stabbed him. The
uncle turned out to be the appellant herein, while Jay–R is his co–accused who
remains at–large.
At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him in
critical condition. Three fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in
Januario’s body which eventually caused his death.
Maria Castillo, for her part, testified on how she learned of what happened to
her husband, the victim herein, the amount allegedly stolen from her husband, as
well as on the expenses and loss incurred by reason of Januario’s death. She,
further, quantified the sorrow and anxiety the family suffered by reason of such
death.
In his defense, appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that
he is from the Province of Samar but has been residing in Cupang, Muntinlupa City
since 1987. He denied knowing, much more residing in, Mabini, Batangas, as he only
heard about the province from his employer who happens to be a resident therein. He
claimed that he did not know Januario and that he was, in fact, working in
Muntinlupa City on the date and time the crime was allegedly committed.
The prosecution’s rebuttal witness Mr. Bienvenido Caponpon, however, belied
appellant’s claim and insisted that appellant was renting a house in Mabini,
Batangas and that he was seen there until the day the crime was committed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dying declaration should be held inadmissible.
RULING:
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its
hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites
concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be
imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the
88
declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the
dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant’s death.
In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration
are present. From the records, no questions relative to the second requisite was
propounded to Januario. It does not appear that the declarant was under the
consciousness of his impending death when he made the statements. The rule is
that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death
and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration
admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival
and looked on death as certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario
could not be considered as a dying declaration.
However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying
declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected
with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was
referring to a startling occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his co–
accused. At that time, Januario and the witness were in the vehicle that would bring
him to the hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his identification of the
assailant. His utterance about appellant and his co–accused having stabbed him, in
answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant because it
identified the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario,
perpetrated by appellant, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
From the evidence presented, we find that as alleged in the information, abuse
of superior strength attended the commission of the crime, and thus, qualifies the
offense to murder.
89
57. TALIDANO VS. FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED SERVICES, INC
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon Maritime and
Allied Services, Inc. (private respondent) and was assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a
vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is based in Korea.
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated against and
maltreated the vessel’s Filipino crew. This prompted him to send a letter-complaint to
the officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a
measure that allegedly was resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was
dismissed on 21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27
October 1999. Private respondent countered that petitioner’s dismissal was due to
his incompetence, insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his
superior. s proof, it presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date of
incident, reporting the vessel’s deviation from its course due to petitioner’s neglect of
duty at the bridge, as well as a copy of the report of crew discharge issued by the
master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident. The LA ruled in favor of
private respondent. The NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA ruled in
favor of private respondents on the basis that the fax messages were part of res
gestae.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fax messages can be considered as part of res gestae.
HELD:
90
No. Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form
part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In
spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in
verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements accompanying the equivocal act. We
find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae:
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that:
a) the principal act be a startling occurrence;
b) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or
devise a falsehood; and
c) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.
Assuming that petitioner’s negligence—which allegedly caused the ship to
deviate from its course—is the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the
statements contained in the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged
incident. In addition, no dates have been mentioned to determine if these utterances
were made spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the critical element of
spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the first
kind.
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its
admissibility are:
a) the principal act to be characterized must be equivocal;
b) the equivocal act must be material to the issue;
c) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and
d) the statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act.
Petitioner’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at

least proved to be one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act,
it is nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements
adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to
determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with the purported
equivocal act. Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear.
The matter of route encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who
is the author of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such
information only from the Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be
characterized as double hearsay.
91
58. PEOPLE VS. QUIDATO
FACTS:
Accused Bernardo Quidato Jr was accused of parricide. He and two co-
conspirators allegedly attacked with a bolo and iron bars hack and stab the victim,
Bernardo Quidato Sr., appellant’s father and namesake, which caused the victim’s
untimely demise.
Among those presented as witness were accused’s wife and brother. Also
presented were the extrajudicial confessions of appellant’s two other co-accused.
Appellant’s wife testified that while the accused were drinking tuba she overheard
them saying that they were planning to go to the victim’s house on the night of the
incident in order to “get money” and that she had no idea of what later transpired.
Appellant objected to his wife’s testimony as it was prohibited by the rule on marital
disqualification. Appellant likewise denies the allegations of his co-accused who in
their extrajudicial confession pointed to the participation of appellant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions should be given credence as they were
obtained in violation of the constitutional right of appellant to confront witnesses.
2. Whether or not the testimony of appellant’s wife is disqualified.
HELD:
92
1. NO. They should not be given credence, and indeed, appellant should be acquitted.
The prosecution relied heavily on appellant’s co-accused’s affidavits. However, the
failure to present the affiants in the witness stand gives these affidavits the character
of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the
witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be
excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. “The voluntary
admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against
his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify
and cross-examine him.”
Section 30, Rule 130 is not applicable in this case because it refers to
confessions made during the existence of the conspiracy. In this case, the conspiracy
had clearly ended by the time the confession was made.
2. YES. The testimony of appellant’s wife must be disregarded since the accused-
appellant timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly
observed by the court, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not
precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused, but not
where the testimony will be used against the accused-husband directly or indirectly.
59. GARCIA VS. ROBLES
FACTS:
Eugenio is the holder of a leasehold right over land in Malolos. Eugenio died in
1974. Amanda, as agent of the owner of the land, legally instituted Pedro as the sole
replacement of Eugenio through a 1979 agreement. Pedro died in 1984 and his wife,
Dominga, legally replaced him as agricultural lessee. In 1996, petitioners Garcia and
Salamat (siblings of Pedro) filed a complaint to nullify the 1979 agreement, and be
instituted as co-lessees. Petitioners base their complaint on an affidavit by Amanda
executed in 1996 stating that Pedro told her that notwithstanding the terms of the
1979 agreement, he (Pedro) and the 2 petitioners were really co-lessees. The PARAD,
DARAB, and CA denied the petition
ISSUE:
WON Amanda’s affidavit and the Agreement made in 1996 between and
Amanda and Petitioners made the latter co-lessees of the land.
HELD:
No. The Court cited the Dead Man’s Statute: If a party to an alleged transaction
is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other
party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
unexplained account of the transaction. Thus, since Pedro is deceased, and
93
Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with
petitioners, and which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim
against Pedro’s surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such
declaration cannot be admitted and used against the latter, who is placed in an
unfair situation by reason of her being unable to contradict or disprove such
declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death.
The rule is to avoid an unfair situation wherein a party is unable to contradict or

disprove a declaration because of incapacity of the person who could contradict/
disprove it.
60. RAZON VS. IAC AND CHUIDIAN
FACTS:
Vicente Chuidian (administrator of the estate of his deceased father) filed a
complaint for the delivery of the certificates of stocks representing the 1,500 share
holdings of his deceased father, Juan Chuidian, in the E. Razon, Inc. (organized for
the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila). In the
answer, Razon alleged that he owned the shares and the same remained in his
possession. It was alleged that the late Juan Chuidan did not pay any amount
whatsoever for the 1,500 shares in question.
CHUIDIAN’s EVIDENCE: On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for
1,5000 shares of stock of defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan
Chuidian (Juan). Razon had not questioned (not until the demand was made) Juan’s
ownership of the shares and had not brought any action to have the certificate of
stock over the said shares cancelled.
RAZON’s EVIDENCE (In the answer and in his oral Testimony): After organizing
E. Razon, Inc., Razon distributed shares, previously placed in the names of the
withdrawing nominal incorporators, to some friends including Juan. The shares of
stock were registered in the name of Juan only as nominal stockholder and with the
agreement that the said shares were owned and held by the Razon (as he was the one
who paid for all the subscription). Juan was given the option to buy the same but did
not do so.
94
CFI (RTC) declared that Enrique Razon is the owner of the said shares. IAC
(CA) reversed and ruled that Juan Chuidian is the owner. IAC excluded the testimony
of Razon under the dead man’s statute rule (DMS) under Section 20 (a) Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, although such testimony was not objected to during trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Razon’s testimony is within the prohibition under DMS Rule.
HELD:
No. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it
filed upon claims against the estate.
The purpose of DMS Rule is that “if persons having a claim against the estate
of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed
statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute
statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus
unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or
demands. The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.”
However, the rule is only applicable to “a case against the administrator or its
representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.”
In this stance, the case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late
Juan Chuidian to recover shares Juan allegedly owned (IOW, it is the estate which
instituted the action or initiated the attack). Hence, the testimony of the petitioner is
not within the prohibition of the rule.
Records also show that Razon’s testimony was not objected to. It was subjected
to cross-examination. Granting that it is within the prohibition under DMS, Chuidian
is deemed to have waived the rule. The court cannot disregard evidence which would
ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the
failure of a party to object thereto.
95
61. SUNGA-CHAN VS. CHAN
FACTS:
Respondent alleged that, he verbally entered into a business partnership with
Jacinto. Respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of
their partnership, under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. The
partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, a sister of
the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy.
Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his
daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition
and management of Shellite without respondent's consent. Despite respondent's
repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up
and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with
the trial court, the CA dismissed the appeal. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from
1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written document to show such
partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argue that these courts
were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness,
Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To
support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship
Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
96
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render
respondent's testimony and that of Josephine inadmissible.
HELD:
No. The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his
own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule
can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessary that:
a) The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf
a case in prosecuted;
b) The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
c) The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
d) His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their
answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners
themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute".
Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the
deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute"
for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered
the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of
respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party
means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right
assigned before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
97
62. SANTOS VS. SANTOS
FACTS:
Petitioner Zenaida M. Santos is the widow of Salvador Santos, a brother of
private respondents Calixto, Alberto, Antonio, all surnamed Santos and Rosa Santos-
Carreon.
The spouses Jesus and Rosalia were the parents of the respondents and the
husband of the petitioner. The spouses owned a parcel of registered land with a four-
door apartment administered by Rosalia who rented them out. On January 19, 1959,
the spouses executed a deed of sale of the properties in favor of their children
Salvador and Rosa. Rosa in turn sold her share to Salvador on November 20, 1973,
which resulted in the issuance of new TCT. Despite the transfer of the property to
Salvador, Rosalia continued to lease and receive rentals from the apartment units.
On January 9, 1985, Salvador died, followed by Rosalia who died the following
month. Shortly after, petitioner Zenaida, claiming to be Salvador’s heir, demanded
the rent from Antonio Hombrebueno, a tenant of Rosalia. When the latter refused to
pay, Zenaida filed an ejectment suit against him with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, which eventually decided in Zenaida’s favor. private respondent instituted an
action for reconveyance of property with preliminary injunction against petitioner in
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, where they alleged that the two deeds of sale were
simulated for lack of consideration. The petitioner on the other hand denied the
material allegations in the complaint and that she further alleged that the
98
respondents’ right to reconveyance was already barred by prescription and laches.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of private respondents. Hence, this appeal. Petitioner
raised a question before a court of whether or not she can invoke the Dead Man’s
Rule Statute (DMS).
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can invoke the Dead Man’s Rule Statute (DMS).
HELD:
No. Lastly, petitioner in her memorandum seeks to expunge the testimony of
Rosa Santos-Carreon before the trial court in view of Sec. 23, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court, otherwise known as the Dead Man’s Statute. It is too late for
petitioner, however, to invoke said rule. The trial court in its order dated February 5,
1990, denied petitioners motion to disqualify respondent Rosa as a witness.
Petitioner did not appeal therefrom. Trial ensued and Rosa testified as a witness for
respondents and was cross-examined by petitioner’s counsel. By her failure to appeal
from the order allowing Rosa to testify, she waived her right to invoke the dead man’s
statute. Further, her counsel cross-examined Rosa on matters that occurred during
Salvador’s lifetime. In Goi vs. CA, 144 SCRA 222, 231 (1986), we held that protection
under the dead man’s statute is effectively waived when a counsel for a petitioner
cross-examines a private respondent on matters occurring during the deceased’s
lifetime. The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted in ignoring petitioner on Rosas
disqualification.
63. GLOBE TELECOM VS. NTC
FACTS:
Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a
Complaint to effect the interconnection of their SMS or texting services with
petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe). Globe pointed out procedural defects in
Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also pointed out that another
network, Islacom, was allowed to provide such service without prior NTC approval.
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ruled that both Smart and
Globe were “equally blameworthy” and issued an Order penalizing both on the
ground of providing SMS under Value Added Services (VAS) without prior approval
from the NTC. The Court of Appeals sustained the NTC Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Order issued by NTC is valid.
HELD:
No. It is essential to understand that the assailed Order was promulgated by
NTC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The case arose when Smart had
99
filed the initial complaint against Globe before NTC for interconnection of SMS.71
NTC issued a Show Cause Order requiring Globe to answer Smart's charges.
Hearings were conducted, and a decision made on the merits, signed by the three
Commissioners of the NTC, sitting as a collegial body.
The initial controversy may have involved a different subject matter,
interconnection, which is no longer contested. It cannot be denied though that the
findings and penalty now assailed before us was premised on the same exercise of
jurisdiction. Thus, it is not relevant to this case that the process for obtaining prior
approval under the PTA and its Implementing Rules is administrative in nature.
While this may be so, the assailed NTC's determination and corresponding penalty
were rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, all the
requirements of due process attendant to the exercise of quasi-judicial power apply to
the present case. Among them are the seven cardinal primary rights in justiciable
cases before administrative tribunals, as enumerated in Ang Tibay v. CIR. They are
synthesized in a subsequent case, as follows:
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings
of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence
in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must
there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of
the assailed Order.
100
64. LADIANA VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
On December 1989, petitioner, a public officer, being then a member of the INP
assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, confronted Francisco San
Juan while the latter was removing the steel pipes which were previously placed to
serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay
Salac, Lumban, Laguna, when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the latter
has no business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, with
intent to kill and did then and there feloniously attack and shoot Francisco San Juan
with the firearm thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused’s confession is an extrajudicial admission.
HELD:
No. We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayan’s characterization of
petitioner’s Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission.
101
Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one
from the other as follows:
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
SEC. 33. Confession. – The declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may
be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is
merely a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the
criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at
bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against
him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a
confession.
The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner
actually shot the victim when the latter was attacking him. We quote the pertinent
portion:
"[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may
leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi
ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang
magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko
alam na siya ay tinamaan;"
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which
eventually led to the latter’s death -- but denies having done it with any criminal
intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized
as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him.
65. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BAUTISTA
FACTS:
Petitioner Department of Health (DOH), represented by its then Regional
Director, Dr. Ricardo T. Trinidad, engaged the services of Rescue Security Services
(Rescue Security), owned by respondent Donatilla Bautista, to guard the DOH
premises against theft, pilferage, robbery, arson and other unlawful acts of strangers.
petitioner’s personnel discovered that the ceiling of Storeroom No. 1 was forcibly
detached and discovered that medicines worth ₱4,244,385.32 were missing.
Petitioner sent Rescue Security a notice of termination of the contract of services.
Rescue Security refused to pay the total amount of loss, prompting petitioner to
institute an action for damages against respondents based on Rescue Security’s
contractual undertaking that it would guarantee the payment of any loss or damage
to petitioner’s property. Respondent Palma denied the loss of the medicines and
further alleged that they were never placed under the custody of Rescue Security or
any of its security guards assigned at the DOH premises. Respondent Palma also
pointed out that no notification was made within 48 hours from discovery of the loss
102
in violation of Paragraph 6 of the Contract of Security Services. The RTC dismissed

the complaint. The CA affirmed the Decision of RTC and ruled in favor of private
respondents. The petitioner argued before the court that the findings of fact by the
CA are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conclusions of CA is without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based.
HELD:
No. In civil cases, the party bearing the burden of proof must establish his case
by preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence means evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.
From a reading of the Contract of Security Services, it can be fairly deduced
that the fact of negligence on the part of Rescue Security cannot be presumed in the
event of loss. Thus, in order to impute liability to Rescue Security in case of loss, it is
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that Rescue Security and or its security guards
were guilty of negligence in performing the security services it undertook to provide
under the contract which include shielding the DOH premises from robbery and
other unlawful acts. the Court finds that petitioner failed to present preponderant
evidence showing that the negligence or carelessness of the security guards was the
proximate cause of the loss of the medicines. A perusal of their testimonies reveals
that the security guards posted at petitioner’s premises during the period that the
robbery took place had performed their duties in the manner reasonably expected of
them under the circumstances. Petitioner failed to present proof to rebut this
evidence. Further, the rule is that the positive and categorical assertions of witnesses
generally prevail over bare denials. Such accordance of greater probative value to
evidence that is positive in nature than that which is negative in character is a time-
honored principle. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot be given
greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters. Accordingly, Liangco’s testimony that he was informed about the incident
must be upheld.
103
66. ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO
FACTS:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Then-Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis
"Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the
latter, his family, and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. House
Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives
to the Senate. The Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21
senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., presiding.
When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the
2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel
104
resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA

Shrine and speeches were delivered against Estrada and the 11 senators.
January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for
petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted candles formed a
human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to
the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding Estrada’s
resignation.
Then-Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together
with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo
Reyes declared that "on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of
the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major
service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement. Subsequently, Chief
Justice Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as President of the Philippines.
Estrada and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
Estrada files this present MR to challenge the ruling of the SC affirming the
legality of Arroyo’s appointment as President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of
Estrada on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of
hearsay evidence;
2. Whether or not the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence
were violated.
HELD:
1. To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary
is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Estrada cannot complain he was not
furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be
sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. Thus,
he had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to
do so.
It is also argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of Estrada, hence, non-
binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An
adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person
when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something
stated or implied by the other person. The basis for admissibility of admissions made
vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the
statements which the other person had made.
105
In the Angara Diary, the options of Estrada started to dwindle when the armed
forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus,
Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise Estrada
to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. He did not object to the
suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. His silence on this
and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.
Estrada further contends that the use of the Angara Diary against him violated
the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
This is incorrect. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of
them is with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. In this case, Executive
Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of Estrada. He was the Little President.
Indeed, he was authorized by the latter to act for him in the critical hours and days
before he abandoned Malacañang Palace.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are
binding on the principal (Estrada). Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not
cover independently relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant
independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1)
those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which
are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.
The Angara Diary contains statements of Estrada which reflect his state of
mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains
statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce Estrada’s
intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay.
This has long been a quiet area of our law on evidence and the attempt to foment a
belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.
2. It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara
Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing
so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book
on evidence, states that: Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial
court’s discretion, whenever, in the case in hand, the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.
Suffice it to say here that the objection should be made in proper season that
is, whenever it appears that there is better evidence than that which is offered and
before the secondary evidence has been admitted. The objection itself should be
sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for the court’s consideration. There
was no such objection made.
Therefore, the two MRs filed are denied for lack of merit
106
67. D.M. CONSUNJI, INC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center
in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on
arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District
investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s
widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a
favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000. DM
Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision on the ground that the police report
submitted by PO3 Villanueva was a hearsay and therefore, inadmissible.
ISSUE:
107
Whether or not said police report is a hearsay. Hence, considered inadmissible.
HELD:
No. Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. A
witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. This is
known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that
excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies,
suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare
untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test
of cross-examination. The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be
tested by cross-examination.
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, among which are
entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al., this Court, citing the work of Chief
Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so;
b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law; and
c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of
the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner
contends that the last requisite is not present.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which
were of his personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a
result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the morgue,
making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular
inspection of the premises of the building the day after the incident and saw the
platform for himself. He observed that the platform was crushed and that it was
totally damaged. PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain
108
block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was
detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.
68. ALVAREZ VS. PICOP
FACTS:
1952 - Timber License Agreement (TLA) 43 was issued to PICOP. TLA is valid
for 25 years or until 1977 and renewable for another 25 years. It was issued under
the condition, among others, that the DENR may amend or alter the description of
the boundaries in the area covered by the license agreement.
1969 – President Marcos signed the 1969 Document purported to be
Presidential Warranty in response to the request of the Board of Investments of
PICOP for a warranty on the boundaries the concession area under TLA 43.
1977 - TLA 43 (valid from 1952-1977) was renewed for another 25 years or
until 2002.
1999 - DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53 was issued providing for
the conversion of TLA to Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA). This is a
late response to the change in the constitutional provisions on natural resources
109
from the 1973 Constitution, which allowed the granting of licenses to private entities,
to the present 1987 Constitution, which provides for co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements as the permissible schemes wherein private entities
may participate in the utilization of forest products.
a) Since the granting of timber licenses ceased to be a permissible scheme for the
participation of private entities under the present Constitution, their operations
should have ceased upon the issuance of DAO No. 99-53, the rule regulating the
schemes under the present Constitution. This would be iniquitous to those with
existing TLAs that would not have expired yet as of the issuance of DAO No. 99-53,
especially those with new TLAs that were originally set to expire after 10 or even 20
or more years.
b) The DENR thus inserted a provision in DAO No. 99-53 allowing these TLA
holders to finish the period of their TLAs, but this time as IFMAs, without the rigors
of going through a new application, which they have probably just gone through a
few years ago.
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its TLA 43 converted into an
IFMA. In the middle of the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused
to attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP
filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR
Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of
mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to
PICOP.
PICOP based its action on the 1969 Document which it claimed to be an
enforceable contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution, and
asserted that it has complied with all the legal and constitutional requirements for
the issuance of IFMA.
• Among the requirements are (1) a consultation with and approval from the
Sanggunian concerned under Sections 26 accordance with an approved CDMP, and
under which both parties share in its produce. (DAO 99-53) and 27 of the Local
Government Code; and (2) a Certification from the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) that the concession area does not overlap with any
ancestral domain.
• PICOP’s TLA No. 43 traverses the length and breadth of Surigao del Sur,
Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental. However, it secured only the
approval of the Sangunian of Surigao del Sur.
• PICOP claimed that it did not need to secure the certification from NCIP
because the subject lands are not ancestral domain RTC granted the Petition for
Mandamus and award damages to PICOP. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by
DENR Secretary Alvarez, the damages awarded was deleted. CA affirmed RTC
decision. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Upon petition for review, the
Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and ruled that PICOP failed to
110
pay forest charges as one of the requirements for the issuance of IFMA. Hence, this
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PICOP comply with all the administrative and statutory
requirements for the issuance of an IFMA?
2. Did PICOP pay all forest charges?
HELD:
1. No. PICOP submitted the required forest protection and reforestation plans. It also
paid the required forest charges as found by the DENR.
In its Motion for Reconsideration, PICOP asserts that, in its Letter of Intent, there
was a reference to a Ten-Year Sustainable Forest Management Plan (SFMP), in which
a Five-Year Forest Protection Plan and a Seven-Year Reforestation Plan were allegedly
incorporated. This was not disputed or questioned by the DENR Secretary. Thus, the
pronouncement in the original ruling that PICOP did not submit such plans was
withdrawn.
2. As regards the forestry charges, SFMS Evangelista testified that PICOP failed to
pay the forest charges. SFMS Evangelista had not relied on the Memoranda of
Orlanes and Arayan. On the contrary, he traveled to Surigao del Sur in order to verify
the contents of these Memoranda. SFMS Evangelista, in fact, revised the findings
therein, as he discovered that certain forest charges adverted to as unpaid had
already been paid.
This does not mean, however, that SFMS Evangelista’s testimony was not hearsay. A
witness may testify only on facts of which he has personal knowledge; that is, those
derived from his perception, except in certain circumstances allowed by the Rules.
Otherwise, such testimony is considered hearsay and, hence, inadmissible in
evidence.
SFMS Evangelista, while not relying on the Memoranda of Orlanes and Arayan,
nevertheless relied on records, the preparation of which he did not participate in.
These records and the persons who prepared them were not presented in court,
either. As such, SFMS Evangelista’s testimony, insofar as he relied on these records,
was on matters not derived from his own perception, and was, therefore, hearsay.
Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which speaks of entries in official records
as an exception to the hearsay rule, cannot excuse the testimony of SFMS
Evangelista. Section 44 provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
In Africa v. Caltex, we enumerated the following requisites for the admission of
entries in official records as an exception to the hearsay rule:
111
a) the entries were made by a public officer or a private person in the performance
of a duty;
b) the performance of the duty is especially enjoined by law;
c) the public officer or the private person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
stated by him, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
The presentation of the records themselves would, therefore, have been
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the public officer/s who
prepared them was/were not presented in court, provided the above requisites could
be adequately proven. In the case at bar, however, neither the records nor the
persons who prepared them were presented in court. Thus, the above requisites
cannot be sufficiently proven. Also, since SFMS Evangelista merely testified based on
what those records contained, his testimony was hearsay evidence twice removed,
which was one step too many to be covered by the official-records exception to the
hearsay rule.
SFMS Evangelista’s testimony of nonpayment of forest charges was,
furthermore, based on his failure to find official receipts corresponding to billings
sent to PICOP. As stated above, PICOP attached official receipts in its Addendum to
Motion for Reconsideration to this Court. While this course of action is normally
irregular in judicial proceedings, we merely stated in the assailed Decision that "the
DENR Secretary has adequately proven that PICOP has, at this time, failed to comply
with administrative and statutory requirements for the conversion of TLA No. 43 into
an IFMA," and that "this disposition confers another chance to comply with the
foregoing requirements."
In view of the foregoing, we withdraw our pronouncement that PICOP has
unpaid forestry charges, at least for the purpose of determining compliance with the
IFMA requirements.
69. FERIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the
judgment, was lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor
of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his
112
continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his
constitutional right to due process.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of
the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of
the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of
the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision. Petitioner
argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment
as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the
evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus
proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.
In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than
sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued
incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102
of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment is not authorized.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a legal basis to detain the petitioner after the
destruction or loss of his criminal records.
HELD:
Yes. The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated
January 1985 19 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that
petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985.
Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule
130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein
stated. Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of People’s
Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2, issued by the National Library, containing a
short news article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles
amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed" and are therefore not only inadmissible
but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a
purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news
article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor
of the news therein stated.
113
70. PATULA VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Ana Lerima Patula, a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., was
accused of having collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several
customers of said company and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said company. Petitioner was charged with estafa but pleaded not
guilty to the offense. Trial on the merits then ensued. The Prosecution presented as
114
witnesses; Lamberto Go, the branch manager of Footluckers, and Karen Guivencan,
the store auditor. The Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioner’s various
customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives.
Petitioner’s counsel continually objected on the ground that the figures entered in
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, were hearsay because the persons who had
made the entries were not themselves presented in court. The RTC rendered its
decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa. Petitioner insisted that the RTCs judgment
grossly violated her Constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against her.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for estafa as charged
despite their not being duly authenticated.
2. Whether or not Guivencan’stestimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to
YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner’s misappropriation or
conversion was inadmissible for being hearsay.
HELD:
1. No. Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, states that a witness can testify only to
those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal
knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial
evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. The theory of the hearsay rule
is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact
asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the
assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject
to the test of cross-examination.
However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove
the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the
hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness
testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this
testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but
merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is
hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between:
a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule
does not apply, and
b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the
hearsay rule applies.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the
only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from
consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the
115
opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a

direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the
right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be
stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the
only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is
essential to the administration of justice. To address the problem of controlling
inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also
safeguarding party’s right to cross-examine her adversary’s witness, the Rules
of Court offers two solutions.
The first solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or
hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court formalizes this solution, viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall
be given orally. (1a)
The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures
this solution thus:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by
the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit
all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept
relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,
which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the
right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx," the rule requiring the cross-
examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon
serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to
its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being
subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception,
memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan’s testimony as well as
Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of
petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion.
116
2. Yes. Lack of their proper authentication rendered Exhibits B to YY and their

derivatives inadmissible as judicial evidence. Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court distinguishes between a public document and a private document for the
purpose of their presentation in evidence. The nature of documents as either public
or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A
public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has
been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent
public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of
a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument
executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person
legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.
Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed
by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The
requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically:
a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section
21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court;
b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document
have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;
c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been
admitted; or
d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private
documents because private individuals executed or generated them for private or
business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of
the four exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against
petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the
manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. – Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Further, Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen
117
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting
the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
(Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or
signing of the documents, the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to
YY and their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to
YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as
evidence.
Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private. Private
documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 20 of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by
anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent’s documentary
exhibits are private documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19;
thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they can be
admitted in evidence.
Furthermore, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application
of the hearsay rule by also tersely stating that the ledgers "were prepared in the
regular course of business.” Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who
was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC. The terse yet sweeping manner of
justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show the
concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course of business could be
excepted from the hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:
a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer;
c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or religious;
118
e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of

business or duty.
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In the trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the
State’s evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adheres to the basic
rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged
upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge; otherwise, the guarantee
of due process of law is nullified. The accused need not adduce anything to rebut
evidence that is discredited for failing the test. Acquittal should then follow.
71. Gen. Emmanuel Bautista et. al. vs. Atty. Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon
FACTS:
The respondent is a lawyer who is also a human rights advocate. In March
2014, she was at a lunch meeting with the relatives of a detained political prisoner
client who was allegedly among several leaders of people's organizations who were
119
falsely charged in a murder and frustrated murder case pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Lagawe, Ifugao. William Bugatti, her paralegal who was working with
her on said case informed her that he had personally observed that surveillance was
being conducted at them. Later that evening, Buggatti was fatally gunned down.
That same evening, the respondent was informed by a client working as a
civilian asset for the PNP Intelligence Section that the Regional Intelligence of the PNP
has issued a directive to conduct a background investigation of her and confirm if
she was a "Red Lawyer." She was also reportedly included in the military's Watchlist
of so-called communist terrorist supporters rendering legal services.
The respondent reported the incidents tot he NUPL and other human rights
group who agreed to help her with her instant petition.
Petitioners denied the allegations that the respondent was under surveillance
by the military and/or police under the command of petitioner's officials.
The Court of Appeals granted the respondent's petition to the Issuance of the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in admitting and considering Atty. Salucon's
evidence despite being largely based on hearsay information.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the hearsay evidence of Atty. Salucon,
assuming its admissibility for the sake of argument, satisfied the requirement of
substantial evidence.
RULING:
The appeal lacks merit.
1. The CA properly admitted Atty. Salucon's proof even if it supposedly consisted of
circumstantial evidence and hearsay testimonies. The evidentiary difficulties compel
the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances,
without transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.
The fair and proper rule, is to consider all the pieced of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual
rules to be admissible it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other
words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e. to the relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisifies the basic
minimum test.
2. The directive was factually and procedurally wanted. There was no question that
the civilian asset of the PNP Intelligence Section relayed to the respondent that there
was a standing order issued by PNP Isabela to conduct a background investigation if
she was a "Red Lawyer." She was also under actual surveillance. The objective f these
moves taken against her was unquestionably to establish a pattern of her movements
120
and activities, as well as to obtain the records of the cases she was handling for her
various clients.
72. PEOPLE VS. LUPAC
FACTS:
Lupac had originally been living with his niece, AAAa and her mother (BBB) in
the same house but he eventually transferred to another place in the neighborhood.
121
His transfer notwithstanding, he continued going to BBB's house where he

occasionally took afternoon naps. On May 21, 1999, BBB left AAA in the house alone
with Lupac. AAA told Lupac that she would take a nap. Upon waking up, she found
herself naked from the waist down and felt soreness in her body and pain in her
genitalia.
AAA, BBB and Terry then went to the barangay to report the rape that had
happened. They then went to the police to file a complaint for rape against Lupac.
The medico-legal officer who examined AAA, attested that he had found AAA at the
time of the examination to have recently lost her virginity.
Lupac's defense consisted of denial and alibi.
Lupac was convicted of statutory rape in the RTC of Antipolo City. Lupac
appealed and he assailed the credibility of AAA and argues that the RTC erred in
accepting AAA's testimony as proof of her date of birth and her minority under 12
years.
The CA affirmed the conviction but modified it by holding that Lupac was guilty
of simple rape because the Prosecution was not able to effectively establish the
victims minority under 12 years because of the non-submission of AAA's birth
certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lupac was guilty of simple rape and not statutory rape because
the Prosecution failed to establish the victim's minority under 12 years because of
non-submission of AAA's birth certificate.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision.
The State did not reliably establish such age of the victim in accordance with
the guidelines for competently proving such age laid down by the Court in People vs.
Pruna guidelines 4 and 5, to wit:
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victim's mother and relatives concerning the victim's age, the
complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.
The Court also holds that AAA's denunciation of Lupac as her rapist to Tita
Terry and her mother without any appreciable length of time having intervened
following her discovery of the rape was part of the res gestae (Sec. 42, Rule 130,
Rules of Court)
122
73. PEOPLE VS. BLANCAFLOR
FACTS:
123
Petitioner had been employed as a watchman from May 1995 to May 1998
when he was terminated on the ground that the project he was assigned to was
already finished, he being a project employee. petitioner asserted he was a regular
employee having been engaged to perform works which are "usually necessary or
desirable" in respondent's business.
Respondent maintained that petitioner was hired as a project employee and
was assigned as a watchman from one project to another until the termination of the
project. He refutes the claim of underpayment, presenting payroll sheets.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision which says that the complainant is a
project employee and his termination was for an authorized cause. However,
respondent was also found liable to pay complainant's salary differential.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was fraud in the payroll sheets given that it was written
in pencil and was prone to erasures and alteration.
RULING:
It is elementary in this jurisdiction that whoever alleges fraud or mistake
affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns and private transactions have been fair
and regular. Persons are presumed to have taken care of their business.
Absent any indication sufficient enough to support a conclusion, we cannot
uphold the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Moreover, absent any evidence to the contrary, good faith must be presumed in
this case. Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the
presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of Court. Hence,
while as a general rule, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on
the employer, when fraud is alleged in the preparation of the payroll, the burden of
evidence shifts to the employee.
74. BP OIL AND CHEMICALS INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. TOTAL

DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTIC SYSTEMS INC
124
FACTS:
A complaint for sum of money was filed by petitioner against respondent,
seeing to recover the sum representing the total value of the moneys, stock and
accounts receivables that TDLSI has allegedly refused to return to BP Oil.
According to the allegations in the complaint, the defendant entered into an
Agency Agreement with BP Singapore, whereby it was given the right to act as the
exclusive agent of the latter for the sales and distribution of its industrial lubricants
in the Philippines. The agency was for a period of five years. In return, the defendant
was supposed to meet the target sales volume set by BP Singapore for each year of
the Agreement. As agreed in the Supplemental Agreement they executed in January
1998,the defendant was supposed to deposit the proceeds of the sales it made to a
depositary account that the defendant will open. Then, BP Singapore assigned its
rights under the Agreement to the plaintiff.
The defendant did not meet its target sales volume for the first year of the
Agreement and the plaintiff informed the defendant that it was going to appoint other
distributors to sell the BP's industrial lubricant products in the Philippines. The
defendant did not object to the plan of the plaintiff but asked for P10,000,000.00 as
compensation for the expenses. Plaintiff did not agree.
Instead of heeding the consequences of its proposed illegal acts, the plaintiffs
took steps to take over the distribution of BP products in the Philippines and to
appoint new agents for this purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Exhibit "J" qualifies as an actionable document whose
authenticity and due execution were deemed admitted by respondent or TDLSI
following his failure to specifically deny the same under oath and if it has met the
quantum of proof required by law.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the petition is devoid of merit.
To the mind of the Court, Exhibit "J" is not an actionable document but is an
evidence that may be admissible and; hence, need not be denied under oath as
provided in Sections 7 & 8 of the Rules of Court.
A document is actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon such
written instrument or document. The complaint filed by petitioner is an action for
collection of sum of money arising from the termination of Agreement with TLDSI.
Petitioner was also able to prove its case by a preponderance of evidence and
that respondent failed to disprove petitioner's claim.
75. PEOPLE VS. ESUGON
FACTS:
125
On or about the 22nd day of October 2003, the appellant, with intent to gain,
with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and violence, did steal and carry
away cash money belonging to Josephine Castro and also stabbed the latter, thereby
inflicting upon her physical injuries which caused her death.
The son of the victim, Carl, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his
younger sister, Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor
of their house. He saw apellant enter the house and stab her mother with a knife,
while Carl peeped through a chair. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor
who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-
examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father's pocket.
Next to testify was Dennis, the victim's husband. He did not actually see the
perpetrator but he said that it was his son who saw the appellant. Sharon, the
victim's sister-in-law, also testified. Carl positively identified to her the appellant who
entered their house and stabbed his mother. PO1 Fabela and PO2 Sazon also
testified and said that Carl pointed to them the suspect who was one of the
bystanders. Appellant was then arrested and brought to the police station.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the 5-year old Carl may be admitted in Court
and that he may be qualified as a witness.
RULING:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others
the acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
makes clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, al persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a
crime unless otherwise provided by law, hall not be a ground for disqualification.
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. -
The following persons cannot be witnesses:
a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production
for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others;
b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and
of relating them truthfully.
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or
incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others
126
can be a witness. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for
disqualification. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, every child is
now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of
proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency. Only when substantial
doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in Court will
the Court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination
of a child.
The appellant did not object to Carl's competency as a witness. All that the
defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the
Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to
communicate his perception to the trial court.
76. LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC. VS. PNB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.
AND UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.
127
FACTS:
Petitioner Lara's Gifts and Decors, Inc. (LGDI) is engaged in the business of
manufacturing, selling, and exporting various handicraft items and decorative
products. It leased buildings/warehouses, particularly Buildings RI, R2, R3, R4, Y2,
Y3, Y4, and Y4 Annex, from J.Y. & Sons Realty Co., Inc., located at JY & Sons
Compound, Philippine Veterans Center, Taguig City, for its business operations. The
warehouses leased also served as production and storage areas of its goods and
stocks.
The handicraft products, raw materials, and machineries and equipment of petitioner
were insured against fire and other allied risks with respondent PNB General
Insurers Co., Inc. covering the period of February 19, 2007 (4:00 p.m.) to February
18, 2008 (4:00 p.m.). The insurance policy, was covered by Fire Insurance Policy No.
FI-NIL-H0- 0018666, wherein PNB Gen assumed 55% of the total amount insured.
Meanwhile, respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. (UCPB), as coinsurer,
assumed the remaining 45%.
On February 19, 2008, approximately four hours before the policy was about to
expire, a fire broke out and razed Buildings Y2, Y3, and Y4 of the JY & Sons
Compound. Petitioner immediately claimed from the respondents for the loss and
damage of its insured properties.
CLPJ, an independent adjuster, required the petitioner to submit supporting
documents material for the proper determination of the actual amount of loss,
however, the petitioner failed to comply. The respondents appointed a new adjuster,
ESTEBAN, to undertake the valuation of loss. ESTEBAN similarly found petitioner's
documents insufficient.
Hence, respondents denied petitioner's claim fr coverage of liability under the
insurance policy.
During the trial, petitioner's counsel produced the Questioned Documents in
open court and asked Mr. Villafuerte to identify those documents, seeking to
introduce and mark them as exhibits. Respondents immediately objected in open
court to the introduction and presentation of the Questioned Documents on the
grounds that they were neither touched upon nor covered by the witness' cross-
examination, and that the same were being introduced for the first time at this late
stage of proceeding, without giving the parties opportunity to verify their relevance
and authenticity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the introduction of additional
documentary exhibits during trial and the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial
Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte.
128
RULING:
The Supreme Court found merit in the petition.
The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the
submission of additional evidence even after trial had already commenced.
The trial court has the discretion to allow the introduction of additional
evidence during trial other than those that had been previously marked and
identified during the pre-trial, provided there are valid grounds.
The trial court precisely exercised this discretion. It allowed the introduction of
the Questioned Documents during the re-direct examination of Mr. Villafuerte upon
petitioner's manifestation that the same are being presented in response to the
questions propounded by PNB Gen's counsel, Atty. Mejia, during the cross-
examination.
129
77. NG MENG TAM vs. CHINA BANKING CORP.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a collection suit filed by China Banking Corporation
against Ever Electrical Manufacturing Company Inc. (Ever), the heirs of Go Tong,
Vicente Go, George Go and petitioner Ng Meng Tam. The loan was allegedly backed
by two surety agreements executed by Vicente, George and petitioner in its favor,
When Ever defaulted in its payment, China Bank sent demand letters collectively
addressed to George, Vicente and petitioner. The demands were unanswered. China
Bank filed the complaint for collection which was raffled off to RTC Branch 62,
Makati City.
When the case was called for the presentation of George Yap as a witness,
China Bank objected citing Section 5 of the JAR. China Bank said that Yap cannot
be compelled to testify in court because petitioner did not obtain and present George
Yap’s judicial affidavit. The RTC required the parties to submit their motions on the
issue of whether the preparation of a judicial affidavit by George Yap as an adverse or
hostile witness is an exception to the judicial affidavit rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC Br. 139 of Makati erred in interpreting the Judicial
Affidavit Rule.
RULING:
The petition was granted.
While we agree with the RTC that Section 5 has no application to Yap as he
was presented as a hostile witness we cannot agree that there is need for a finding
that witness unjustifiably refused to execute a judicial affidavit.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories,
the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party
from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
In sum, Section 5 of the JAR expressly excludes from its application adverse
party and hostile witnesses. For the presentation of these types of witnesses, the
provisions on the Rules of Court under the Revised Rules of Evidence and all other
correlative rules including the modes of deposition and discovery rules shall apply.
130
78. LAGON VS. VELASCO
FACTS:
Sometime in December 2000, Lagon obtained a cash loan from private
respondent Gabriel Dizon. In payment thereof, Lagon issued a Check postdated
January 12, 2001, in an equal amount. However, when Dizon presented the check for
payment, it was dishonored for being Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.
Consequently, Dizon sent a demand letter but Lagon refused to pay. On June 6,
2011, Dizon field a Complaint for Sum of Money, Damages and Attorney's Fees
against Lagon.
Meanwhile, during the preliminary conference, the parties were directed to file
their respective pre-trial briefs within five (5) days from receipt of the trial court's
order.
Thereafter, Judge Velasco issued a Pre-Trial Conference Order.
At the initial trial, neither of the parties submitted their judicial affidavits or
those of their witnesses. Hence, Judge Velasco issued the assailed Order requiring
the parties to submit their respective judicial affidavits five (5) days before the trial.
On June 27, 2013, Lagon filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. In his
Motion, Lagon requested that he be allowed to submit the judicial affidavit of his
witnesses after the plaintiff shall have adduced his evidence. Lagon claimed that
Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which mandates the submission by both
parties of their judicial affidavits before the pre-trial conference is violative of his right
to due process, hence unconstitutional.
Judge Velasco issued the assailed Order denying Lagon's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. Judge Velasco opined that "the requirement of the submission of
judicial affidavits of witnesses, not later than 5 days before the pre-trial or
preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing, under Section 2 of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule is not violative of Lagon's right to due process.
Dissatisfied with the ruling, Lagon sought direct recourse to this Court by filing
the instant Petition for Certiorari19 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which requires a
defendant to adduce is testimony and that of his witnesses by judicial affidavits, and
submit his documentary evidence before the pre-trial or preliminary conference,
offends his right to due process of law.
RULING:
The instant petition is bereft of merit.
131
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not apply to the instant case
because there was no grave abuse of discretion. Judge Velasco was actually enforcing
the Judicial Affidavit Rule promulgated by the Court.
Clearly, both the Judicial Affidavit Rule and Demurrer to Evidence can co-exist
harmoniously as tools for a more efficient and speedy administration of trial
procedures. On the one hand, the Judicial Affidavit Rule simply dispenses with the
direct testimony, thereby reducing the time at which a case stands for trial, in the
same way that the Demurrer to Evidence abbreviates proceedings by allowing the
defendant to seek for an early resolution of the case should the plaintiff be unable to
sufficiently prove his complaint. These rules do not conflict, and when used hand in
hand will lead to an efficient administration of the trial.
Moreover, by no stretch of the imagination may it be concluded that Lagon was
deprived of due process of law. There is nothing in the provisions of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule, which prohibits a defendant from filing a demurrer to evidence, if he
truly believes that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is insufficient. Besides, in the
resolution of the demurrer to evidence, only the evidence presented by the plaintiff
shall be considered and weighed by the Court.
132
79. REPUBLIC vs. CAGUIOA
FACTS:
The case stems from a Complaint filed by petitioner, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, for "Accounting, Reconveyance,
Forfeiture, Restitution, and Damages" before the SB for the recovery of ill-gotten
assets allegedly amassed by the individual respondents during the administration of
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Velasco, one of the defendants, was the
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC). Herein respondent De Borja is Velasco' s nephew.
It appears from the records that PNOC, in the exercise of its functions, would
regularly enter into charter agreements with vessels and, pursuant to industry
practice, vessel owners would pay "address commissions" to PNOC as charterer,
amounting to five percent (5%) of the total freight. 11 Allegedly, during the tenure of
Velasco, no address commissions were remitted to PNOC.
Instead, the percentage of the address commission no longer appeared in the
charter contracts and the words "as agreed upon" were substituted therefor, per
instructions of Velasco. As a result, the supposed address commissions were
remitted to the account of Decision Research Management Company. Velasco was
likewise alleged to have diverted government funds by entering into several
transactions involving the purchase of crude oil tankers and by reason of which he
received bribes, kickbacks, or commissions in exchange for the granting of permits,
licenses, and/or charters to oil tankers to service PNOC.
Petitioner claimed that it was De Borja who collected these address
commissions in behalf of Velasco, basing its allegation on the testimony of Epifanio F.
Verano, a witness for petitioner.
Respondent De Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence stating that te evidence
presented was insufficient.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SB committed reversible error in granting respondent De
Borja's Demurrer to Evidence.
RULING:
After a judicious review of the records and the submissions of the parties, the
Court rules in the negative.
In a demurrer to evidence, it is premature to speak of "preponderance of
evidence" because it is filed prior to the defendant's presentation of evidence; it is
133
precisely the office of a demurrer to evidence to expeditiously terminate the case

without the need of the defendant's evidence. Hence, what is crucial is the
determination as to whether the plaintiffs evidence entitles it to the relief sought.
Nothing in the testimony of Verano reasonably points, or even alludes, to the

conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy or conduit of Velasco in receiving
address commissions from vessel owners.
The Court joins and concurs in the SB's observations pertaining to Verano's
want of knowledge with respect to the contents of the envelopes allegedly delivered to
respondent De Borja's office, which remained sealed the entire time it was in Verano'
s possession. As admitted by Verano himself, he did not and could not have known
what was inside the envelopes when they were purportedly entrusted to him for
delivery. In the same vein, Verano did not even confirm respondent De Borja's receipt
of the envelopes, despite numerous opportunities to do so.
134
80. BJDC CONSTRUCTION VS. LANUZO
FACTS:
Nena E. Lanuzo filed a complaint for damages against BJDC Construction. The
company was the contractor of the re-blocking project to repair the damaged portion
of one lane of the national highway at San Agustin, Pili, Camarines Sur.
Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of the late Balbino Los Baños
Lanuzo who figured in the accident that transpired at the site of the re-blocking
work, resulting in his instant death; and that the company’s failure to place
illuminated warning signs on the site of the project, especially during night time, was
the proximate cause of the death of Balbino.
In its answer, the company denied Nena’s allegations of negligence, insisting
that it had installed warning signs and lights along the highway and on the
barricades of the project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was due to the negligence on the part of Balbino which caused his
death.
RULING:
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law. It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a
mere allegation is not evidence.
Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and
rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not
establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the
company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino.
Negligence, the Court said in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,17 is
"the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great
weight and respect - even considered as conclusive and binding on this Court.
Absent any showing that the trial court's calibration of the credibility of the
witnesses was flawed, we are bound by its assessment. This Court will sustain such
findings unless it can be shown that the trial court ignored, overlooked,
135
misunderstood, misappreciated, or misapplied substantial facts and circumstances,

which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.
81. NFF INDUSTRIAL CORP VS. G&L ASSOCIATED BROKERAGE
FACTS:
Petitioner NFF Industrial Corporation is engaged in the business of
manufacturing bulk bags, while respondent G & L Associated Brokerage, Inc. is
among its customers.
According to petitioner, respondent company ordered bulk bags from
petitioner, payable within 30 days from delivery. Shortly thereafter, respndent
ordered an additiona one thousang pieces. Accordingly, petitioner made deliveries of
the bulk bags to Hi-Cement.
No payment was effected by respondent company. The petitioner sent demand
letters to respondent company repeatedly but the latter failed to respond.
Hence, the instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was preponderance of evidence in proving that there was
a valid delivery on the part of petitioner in accordance with law, which would give rise
to an obligation to pay on the part of respondent for the value of the bulk bags.
RULING:
Sifting through the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence submitted, the
evidence of petitioner preponderantly established that there was valid delivery of bulk
bags, which gives rise to respondent company’s corresponding obligation to pay
therefor. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to that of the other side. Essentially, preponderance of
evidence refers to the comparative weight of the evidence presented by the opposing
parties. As such, it has been defined as "the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side," and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is proof
that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.66 Contrary to respondents’ view, We find that petitioner has
successfully established its case. Accordingly, We give greater weight, credit and
value to its evidence.
136
82. BOGNOT VS. RRI LENDING CORPORATION
FACTS:
RRI Lending Corporation is an entity engaged in the business of lending money
to its borrowers within Metro Manila. Sometime in September 1996, the petitioner
and his younger brother, Rolando A. Bognot, applied for and obtained a loan from the
respondent. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note and was secured by a post
dated check.
The petitioner renewed the load on several times on a monthly basis.
The last loan was made by petitioner's wife in which she presented an IBE
check as security.
Petitioner failed to pay for the loan. Respondent filed a complaint for sum of
money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is relieved from liability by reason of the material
alteration in the promissory note.
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
In the present case, the petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that his
obligation had already been extinguished by payment. As the CA correctly noted, the
petitioner failed to present any evidence that the respondent had in fact encashed his
check and applied the proceeds to the payment of the loan. Neither did he present
official receipts evidencing payment, nor any proof that the check had been
dishonored.
The petitioner is not relieved from liability by reason of the material alteration
in the promissory note. Even assuming that the note had indeed been tampered
without the petitioner’s consent, the latter cannot totally avoid payment of his
obligation to the respondent based on the contract of loan.
Under this evidentiary situation, the petitioner cannot validly deny his
obligation and liability to the respondent solely on the ground that the Promissory
Note in question was tampered. Notably, the existence of the obligation, as well as its
subsequent renewals, have been duly established.
137
83. SINDOPHIL INC. VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
This case involves a 2,791-square-meter parcel of land currently in Sindophil's
possession. Sindophil anchors its right to the Tramo property on Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 132440, which was purportedly issued by the Register of Deeds of
Pasay City.
On July 27, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint for
revocation, annulment, and cancellation of certificates of title before the Pasay City
Regional Trial Court, and impleaded Sindophil as one of the defendants.
Despite the issuance of certificates of title over the Tramo property, the
Republic claimed that TCT No. 10354 in the name of Teodoro was "spurious or of
doubtful authenticity."
During trial, only the Republic was able to present its evidence. Defendants
Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil were all deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence when they failed to present any evidence or witness despite several
settings.
On the claim of defendants that they were innocent purchasers for value, the
Regional Trial Court stated that defendants failed to discharge the burden of proving
that they were purchasers in good faith and for value, thus, rejecting their argument.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ismissing Sindophil's appeal for failure to file
an appeal brief within the required period.
RULING:
This petition must be denied.
The same extraordinary circumstances similar to Bigornia and Aguam are not
present here.
A party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all
the evidence he relies upon and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The
obvious rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party
and the consequent delay in the administration of justice.
A party's declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence
prevents him from introducing further evidence; but where the evidence is rebuttal in
character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of
138
evidence from one party to the other; or where the evidence sought to be presented is
in the nature of newly discovered evidence, the party's right to introduce further
evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy
of certiorari.
84. PEOPLE VS CA
FACTS:
The accused mutually helping one another, with lewd designs forcefully drunk
AAA, a 16-year-old minor. Brought said AAA at Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding,
Lala, Lanao del Norte. Once inside said lodging house, accused CARAMPATANA and
OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused
MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and consent.
RTC found private respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
CA, reversed the trial court’s ruling and, consequently, acquitted private
respondents.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N CA committed grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of
petitioner’s right to due process.
HELD:
Yes, CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias
in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in
violation of petitioner’s right to due process.
In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by
itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it
has been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says
in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her
testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis
alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can
usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony
itself. The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation,
she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial.
More importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case
claims that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was
consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now
139
enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative

defense that needs convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence
that the intercourse was indeed consensual.
85. PEOPLE VS ISON
FACTS:
Ison offered to sell two parcels of fishpond to Atty. Hermenegildo Ramos, Jr.
and Edgar Barroga. Ison persuaded Ramos and Barroga to buy the fishponds after
showing them Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) permits and receipts
either in
her name or in the name of her husband.
Ramos and Barroga were convinced of Ison's ownership of the fishponds and
agreed to buy the same.
Thereafter, Ramos and Barroga received a call from a certain Ligaya Tupas who
told them that Colonel Pedro Vergara was the real owner of the fishponds.
Ison admitted that she first sold the fishponds to Vergara before she sold the
same to Ramos and Barroga. Ramos and Barroga then asked Ison to return their
money but Ison failed to comply. Ramos and Barroga then filed a complaint for estafa
against her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not deceit, an essential element of estafa has been proven.
RULING:
The Court grants the instant petition.
Other pieces of circumstantial evidence further cast a cloud of doubt upon the
private complainants' allegation of misrepresentation by Ison. As pointed out by the
defense, Jess was among the three agents, who introduced Ison to the private
complainants. Jess is the father of private complainant Edgar. It is thus more logical
to infer that Jess informed his son about matters pertinent to the status and
ownership of the fishponds. Besides, the private complainants visited the fishponds
and talked to Genodipa, the caretaker. It can be presumed that Atty. Ramos knows
the intricacies of the law, had made the necessary inquiries as to the fishponds'
ownership, and had observed due diligence and precaution before agreeing to part
with the amount of P150,000.00 given to Ison.
140
Considering the above, the Court is thus unpersuaded by the claim that Ison's
representation or misrepresentation constituted the very cause or the only motive
which induced the private complainants to part with their money.
86. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AMOR HACHERO AND THE RD OF

PALAWAN
FACTS:
Hachero filed his Free Patent Application covering subject land before the
CENRO of Palawan, which was later approved by the PENRO of Palawan. Later on, it
was discovered that the subject land was still classified as timberland and so not
susceptible of private ownership under the Free Patent provision of the Public Land
Act.
The Republic, represented by the Regional Executive Director, DENR-Region IV,
Manila, filed the Complaint for the Cancellation of Free Patent. Despite personal
receipt of the summons and the complaint, however, Hachero did not file any
responsive pleading within the period required by law. Upon the Republic's motion,
the RTC declared Hachero in default. Thereafter, the Republic was allowed to present
its evidence ex-parte.
The Republic presented its lone witness, Diosdado Ocampo, former CENRO
officer of Palawan, and formally offered the following documents: a) Application for
Free Patent of Amor Hachero; b) Orders of Approval of the Application and Issuance
of Free Patent; c) Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384; d) OCT No. E-18011 issued in the
name of Amor Hachero; e) Inspection Report, dated July 24, 2000; and f) Verification,
dated July 17, 2000, both issued by one Sim Luto.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Hachero. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
W/N presumption of regularity applies.
HELD:
Yes, presumption of regularity applies.
There being a controversion, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties applies favorably to the Republic. This means that the DENR's
141
inspection report and the verification stating that the subject land is still inalienable
have become conclusive.
The doctrine in Bustillo vs. People, the presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
87. SPOUSES MANZANILLA AND VELASCO vs. WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION
FACTS:
The spouses Manzanilla leased a portion of the property to Waterfields, as
represented by its President Aliza R. Ma (Ma). On 1998, the spouses Manzanilla filed
before the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment against Waterfields. They alleged that
Waterfields had committed violations of the lease agreement by not paying the rentals
on time. And in yet another violation, it failed to pay the ₱18,000.00 monthly rental
for the past six months prior to the filing of the Complaint, in the total amount of
₱108,000.00. Demands upon Waterfields to pay the accrued rentals and vacate the
property were unheeded so the spouses Manzanilla considered the contract
terminated and/or rescinded. And since Waterfields still failed to comply with their
final demand to pay and vacate, the spouses filed the Complaint and prayed therein
that the former be ordered to (1) vacate the subject property and, (2) pay the accrued
rentals of ₱108,000.00 as of May 1998, the succeeding rentals of ₱18,000.00 a month
until the property is vacated, the interest due thereon, attorney’s fees, and cost of
suit.
The MTC declared that Waterfields violated the lease agreement due to non-payment
of rentals. RTC affirmed.
The CA, however, reversed the decision of MTC and RTC. In its Decision, gave
weight to the spouses Manzanilla’s allegation that they terminated the Contract of
Lease. Upon such termination, it held that the rental deposit should have been
applied as payment for unpaid utilities and other incidental expenses, if any. MR was
denied.
ISSUE:
W/N there is a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
HELD:
142
Yes, there is a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

In Fideldia v. Sps. Mulato, the Court held that:
For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, two requisites must concur: (1)
there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, and (2)
there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate. The first requisite refers
to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers
to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be
pursued. Implied in the first requisite, which is needed to establish the cause of
action of the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentation of the contract
of lease entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant, the same being needed to
establish the lease conditions alleged to have been violated. Thus, in Bachrach
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the evidence needed to establish
the cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is (1) a lease contract and(2) the
violation of that lease by the defendant.
Here, the existence of a lease contract between the parties is undisputed, the focus is
on the supposed violation of the lease, that is, Waterfields’ alleged non-payment of
rent.
The rental deposit cannot be utilized as payment for the rentals in view of the said
amendment. As things thus stood, the rental for the months of December 1997 to
May 1998, as stated in the Complaint, remained unpaid. Clearly, there was failure on
the part of Waterfields to pay rent and, consequently, it committed a violation of the
lease. It is this violation which gave rise to a cause of action for unlawful detainer
against Waterfields as well as to the right of the spouses Manzanilla to consider the
contract terminated. And as the two requisites of an unlawful detainer suit are
obtaining in this case, i.e.,cause of action and demand.
Therefore, the Court sustains the RTC in affirming the MTC's grant of the
spouses Manzanilla's Complaint for ejectment against Waterfields.
143
88. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LARRY MENDOZA y ESTRADA
FACTS:
Policemen Diocena and Lim testified that they received reports that an alias
‘Larry’ was selling shabu. They organized a buy-bust operation where Diocena acted
as the poseur buyer while Lim served as back-up. They proceeded to the target area
with their asset. There Diocena and the asset waited in the corner on their
motorcycle while Lim and the other cops positioned themselves in the perimeter. The
asset texted Larry and they waited for him to arrive. Larry took out two plastic
sachets of shabuand gave it to Diocena who gave him a marked ₱500 bill. Diocena lit
the left signal light of his motorcycle to signal Lim and the other cops that the deal
was done. They then arrested Larry who turned out to be the accused. After frisking
him, they recovered another sachet of shabu from him.
The RTC find accused Larry Mendoza guilty of violating Section 5 and 11 of
R.A. No. 9165. The accused appealed, CA affirmed the conviction of the accused.
Prosecution of cases for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act arising from buy-bust
operations largely depend on the credibility of the police officers who conducted
them. Unless clear and convincing evidence is proffered showing that the members of
the buy-bust team were driven by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.
ISSUE:
W/N presumption of regularity applies.
HELD:
No, presumption of regularity does not apply in this case.
144
The Supreme Court (SC) has usually presumed the regularity of performance of
their official duties in favor of the members of buy-bust teams enforcing our laws
against the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.— We have usually presumed the
regularity of performance of their official duties in favor of the members of buy-bust
teams enforcing our laws against the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Such
presumption is based on three fundamental reasons, namely: first, innocence, and
not wrongdoing, is to be presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and,
third, a republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed
upon controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental
department or agent by every other such department or agent, at least to the extent
of such presumption. But the presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or of any failure to perform a duty. Judicial reliance on the presumption
despite any hint of irregularity in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law
will thus be fundamentally unsound because such hint is itself affirmative proof of
irregularity.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no
reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of
official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of regularity will not be
stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a
mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed
innocent.
145
89. TOMAS P. TAN, JR. vs. JOSE G. HOSANA
FACTS:
Spouses Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot during their marriage.
Milagros sold the subject property to petitioner Tomas, as evidenced by a deed of sale
executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a SPA
executed by Jose in her favor.
On 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of
Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds
of Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan,
Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the
SPA by forging Jose’s signature making it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros
to sell the subject property to Tomas.
Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness.
Bonifacio testified that he learned of the sale of the subject property from Milagros’
son. When Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose would get angry because of the
sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property because she needed the money.
Bonifacio immediately informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of the sale.
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the Philippines.
Jose and Bonifacio verified with the Register of Deeds and discovered that the title
covering the disputed property had been transferred to Tomas.
Bonifacio further testified that Jose’s signature in the SPA was forged.
Bonifacio presented documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison:
Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA dated 16 February
146
2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax certificate, voter’s affidavit, specimen
signatures, and a handwritten letter.
The RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property
to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly
appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void. CA affirmed.
MR was denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual purchase price
of the sale.
HELD:
No, Tomas’ bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00
cannot be considered as proof of payment, without any other convincing evidence to
establish this claim. Tomas’ bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not
automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.
It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it; the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the
plaintiff to prove non-payment. A mere allegation is not evidence, and the person who
alleges has the burden of proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of
evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
“greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.”—In civil
cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving
them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength
of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
“greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.”
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of
the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its admissibility as
evidence.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is
deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence
to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each
party has given in the execution of the contract.
Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth
respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The purpose of
147
introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at

issue, which can be the entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the
truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of
introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the
contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale,
rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of
such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void
contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by
the law of these rules. There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes
the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is
relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility.
Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing
it as evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the
terms of the document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears
to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be
liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless
plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found
relevant or competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or
ignoring them.
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive
provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse’s
consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the
consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is
consistent with the liberal policy of the court to admit the evidence which appears to
be relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.
The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima facie evidence of
the truth of the facts stated therein.
Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.61
In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes
prima facie evidence of the amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to
his name. Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the
consideration stated as the actual consideration and amount paid to Milagros and
Jose.
148
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring
the consent of both spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no
question on the presence of the consideration of the sale, except with respect to the
actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it
remains prima facie evidence of the actual consideration paid.
As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to
Milagros the amount of P700,000.00, instead of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in
the deed of sale. No documentary or testimonial evidence to prove payment of the
higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas’ sole testimony. Tomas’ sole
testimony of payment is self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that
Milagros received P700,000.00 for the subject property.
Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence
of the actual amount the petitioner paid and the same amount which should be
returned under the principle of unjust enrichment.
90. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DINA CALATES y DELA CRUZ
FACTS:
Insp. Lorilla received an information from a reliable informant that alias
"Dangdang" Calates is engaged in sale of illegal drug activities. Insp. The group all in
civilian clothes, entered the place, a woman with "semi-calbo" and sporting blond
hair, met the duo and asked if they would buy shabu. PO1 Sonido and the asset,
alias "Toto", wiped their nostrils with their right finger, meaning their answer to the
question is "yes". The accused extended her left hand to receive the marked money
which PO1 Sonido gave her (accused), while the latter took a small sachet of
suspected shabu from her right pocket and gave it to PO1 Sonido. Thereafter, PO1
Sonido immediately arrested the accused, identified himself as police officer, PO1
Sonido informed her of the reason of her apprehension and her rights to remain
silent and counsel. When the other member of the team saw that the accused was
arrested, they rushed towards PO1 Soni do and rendered assistance by putting the
accused to a manacle. The marked money was recovered and the sachet of shabu
was marked. Thereafter, the incident was recorded in the police blotter and the
plastic sachet of shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The accused was charged in the RTC with violation of Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165. The RTC convicted the accused. CA affirmed the conviction upon noting that
the Prosecution had successfully proved all the elements of the crime charged; that
149
the Prosecution had showed that the police authorities had preserved the integrity
and evidenciary value of the dangerous drug confiscated from the accused until its
presentation as evidence in court; that the alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of
the Prosecution's witnesses became immaterial considering that Dina had personally
sold the dangerous drug to PO1 Sonido; that there had been no gap or missing link
in the chain of custody of the confiscated drug despite the fact that no inventory and
pictures had been taken; and that the lack of inventory and photographing was not
fatal. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N guilt beyond reasonable doubt was established.
HELD:
No, the Prosecution failed to established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Hence,
the acquittal of Dina.
In prosecutions for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the State bears the
burden not only of proving the elements of the offenses of sale of dangerous drug and
of the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drug, but also of proving the corpus
delicti, the body of the crime. The dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of
the violation of the law prohibiting the illegal sale or possession of dangerous drug.
Consequently, the State does not comply with the indispensable requirement of
proving the corpus delicti when the drug is missing, or when substantial gaps occur
in the chain of custody of the seized drugs as to raise doubts about the authenticity
of the evidence presented in court. As such, the duty to prove the corpus delicti of the
illegal sale or possession of dangerous drug is as important as proving the elements
of the crime itself.
A review of the records reveals that the non-compliance with the procedural
safeguards prescribed by law left serious gaps in the chain of custody of the
confiscated dangerous drug.
To start with, PO1 Sonido, who testified having marked the confiscated drug at
the place of arrest, did not claim that he did the marking in the presence of Dina. The
unilateral marking engendered doubt about the integrity of the evidence presented
during the trial, for determining if the drug he thereby marked was the same drug
confiscated from Dina became literally impossible.
Secondly, although P/Insp. Jonathan Lorilla attested on cross-examination
that an inventory of the confiscated drug had been conducted, his testimony had no
corroboration in the records. That he was also unsure if photographs of the
confiscated drug had been taken in the presence of Dina accented the non-
observance of the safeguards. At the very least, his declared uncertainty reflected the
inexcusability of the oversight on the part of the apprehending lawmen regarding the
safeguards considering that the arrest of Dina had been effected during the pre-
planned buy-bust operation. Worse, the lack of the inventory and his professed
150
uncertainty about the taking of photographs in the presence of Dina could only mean
that no inventory and photograph had been taken, in violation of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165.
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to
justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending team failed to show why an
inventory and photograph of the seized evidence had not been made either in the
place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as required by the
Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for the saving
clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been
preserved. In other words, the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven
as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
Clearly, the Prosecution did not discharge its burden to prove the guilt of Dina
beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
On the other hand, a reasonable doubt of guilt, according to United States v.
Youthsey, is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a
captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate
position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a
fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion
that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on
the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life, you may properly
convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical
demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
With the failure of the Prosecution to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the acquittal of Dina should follow.
151
91. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO
FACTS:
Nestor Roxas y Castro was charged with the crime of murder. Because the
accused-appellant could not be apprehended by the police, the case was archived on
February 10, 1997. It was only on September 18, 2010 that the accused-appellant
was arrested by virtue of an alias warrant of arrest issued by the RTC. As a result,
the case was revived.
In the evening of October 1995, Severino Manalo (Severino/victim) and Vicente
were talking to each other in front of the house of Alfredo. Then, Vicente saw the
accused-appellant approach Severino from behind and suddenly stab the latter thrice
with a white sharp bladed weapon. For fear that he might also be attacked, Vicente
scampered away to a safer distance until he reached his place where he called for
help. Vicente, together with some people, returned to the crime scene where they
found Severino sprawled on the ground already dead.
After receiving the report on the stabbing incident, P/Insp. Magtibay and SPO4
Lopez arrived at the crime scene and conducted an investigation. They took pictures
of the crime scene and the body of the victim. Vicente volunteered to the responding
officers that he witnessed the accused appellant stab the victim three times with a
bladed weapon. Acting on this information, the police officers looked for the accused-
152
appellant at his house as well as the residence of his relatives but he was nowhere to
be found.
Serapio testified that the victim was his brother and that he learned of his
brother's death from Vicente. He witnessed the police investigators take pictures of
the crime scene, make measurements of the cadaver and note the wounds inflicted
on the body of the victim. He admitted that he was the one who went to the police
station to file the complaint against the accused-appellant.
The accused-appellant invoked self-defense.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellant. CA affirmed the RTC Decision. The
appellate court ruled that the accused-appellant's self-serving testimony must fail
when weighed against the positive, straightforward and overwhelming evidence of the
prosecution. The CA noted the flight of the accused-appellant from the place of the
incident and construed the same as indicative of his guilt.
ISSUE:
W/N Nestor is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
HELD:
Yes, Nestor is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
The Court affirms the conviction of the accused-appellant. Basic is the rule
that in every criminal case, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused falls upon
the prosecution which has the duty of establishing all the essential elements of the
crime. However, in cases where the accused interposes the justifying circumstance of
self-defense, this prosecutorial burden is' shifted to the accused who himself must
prove all the indispensable ingredients of such defense.
The Court is convinced that the trial court was correct in giving great weight
and respect to Vicente's testimony detailing who, when, where and how the crime
was committed in this case. As such, the Court agrees with the trial court's ruling
that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
In sharp contrast, the accused-appellant fails to establish the requisites of self-
defense. Only the accused-appellant himself testified regarding his allegation that the
incident started with a sudden punch thrown at him by the victim. No other
witnesses were presented by the defense to bolster their theory of self-defense. Aside
from being uncorroborated, the trial court observed that the version of the accused-
appellant is doubtful.
153
92. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. v. ARNOLD CUARESMA AND JERRY B.

CUARESMA
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured with petitioner
Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and the other owned by respondent Arnold Cuaresma
and driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma, figured in an accident at North
Avenue, Quezon City. Consequently, the damage on the vehicle driven by Cham was
repaired, the cost of which was borne by petitioner.
An Information was filed with the MeTC of Quezon City charging Cham of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. During the pendency
thereof, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with the MeTC of Manila
against respondents, demanding payment of the sum of P256,643.26 representing
the cost of repairs on Cham's vehicle.
The MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner, finding that petitioner sufficiently proved
its claims by preponderance of evidence.
The RTC, however, reversed the ruling of the MeTC. Contrary to the findings of the
MeTC, the RTC found that not only were there inconsistencies in the evidence
presented by petitioner as to its corporate identity as well as the amount of the
supposed cost of indemnification, but petitioner also failed to sufficiently prove that
154
the proximate cause of the damage incurred by Cham's vehicle was respondents'
fault or negligence. In addition, on respondents' argument that the instant case must
be consolidated with the prior criminal suit they filed against Cham, the RTC
disagreed and ruled that criminal and civil cases can proceed independently.
On appeal, the CA likewise found that the evidence proffered by petitioner is
insufficient to support its averment of negligence. Consequently, it affirmed the RTC's
Decision. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the preponderance of evidence was sufficient.
HELD:
No, the preponderance of evidence was not sufficient.
In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by his
opponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the defendant had not been given
the opportunity to present evidence because of a default order.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. The reason for this is that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Mere allegations, therefore,
cannot be deemed as evidence.
To prove the allegations in its complaint, herein petitioner presented
testimonies of its assured and its Assistant Vice-President, the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report, and documents evidencing the assured's insurance policy with
petitioner as well as the payment of repair expenses. As aptly ruled by the RTC and
the CA, however, the evidence presented by petitioner failed to preponderantly
establish negligence on the part of the respondents.
While petitioner may have proven the fact of its payment of the expenses for
the repair of Cham's vehicle through the testimony of its Assistant Vice-President and
other supporting receipts and documents, it fell short in proving that the damage
caused on said vehicle was due to the fault of the respondents.
Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above. As
correctly noted by the courts below, while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report
was exhibited as evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the same was not
presented in court to testify that he had sufficient knowledge of the facts therein
stated, and that he acquired them personally or through official information.23
Neither was there any explanation as to why such officer was not presented. We
cannot simply assume, in the absence of proof, that the account of the incident
155
stated in the report was based on the personal knowledge of the investigating officer
who prepared it.
Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the events that
transpired during the vehicular collision, his lone testimony, unsupported by other
preponderant evidence, fails to sufficiently establish petitioner's claim that
respondents' negligence was, indeed, the proximate cause of the damage sustained
by Cham's vehicle.
93. ASIAN INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., vs. DOLE
FACTS:
The Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch of the POEA, pursuant to Surveillance
Order No. 033, Series of 2006, conducted a surveillance of AIMS to determine
whether it was operating as a recruitment agency despite the cancellation of its
license on August 28, 2006.
On February 20, 2007, another surveillance was conducted. This time the
POEA operatives observed that there were people standing outside its main entrance,
and there were announcements of job vacancies posted on the main glass door of the
office. Posing as applicants, the POEA operatives, Atty. Romelson E. Abbang and
Edilberto V. Alogoc, inquired as to the requirements for the position of executive staff:
and a lady clerk of AIMS handed them a flyer. Through the flyer, they learned that
AIMS was hiring hotel workers for deployment to Macau and grape pickers for
California. They also saw applicants inside the office waiting to be attended to. The
POEA operatives later confirmed through the POEA Verification System that AIMS
had regained its license and good standing on December 6, 2006, but that it had no
existing approved job orders yet at that time.
156
POEA Administrator Rosalinda Baldoz ruled that on the basis of the

Surveillance Report, AIMS was liable for misrepresentation under Section 2(e), Rule I,
Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules, since the POEA records showed that AIMS had no
job orders to hire hotel workers for Macau, nor grape pickers for California, as its
flyer allegedly advertised.
DOLE affirmed the order of the POEA. MR was denied. AIMS filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA.
CA dismissed AIMS's charge of denial of due process for failure of POEA to
furnish it with a copy of the Surveillance Report dated February 21, 2007. It held
that AIMS' misrepresentation with regard to the recruitment of workers for non-
existent overseas jobs was supported by substantial evidence.
ISSUE:
W/N AIMS right to due process was violated.
HELD:
Yes, AIMS right to due process was violated because it was never furnished
with a copy of the POEA Surveillance Report dated February 21, 2007, upon which
both the POEA and DOLE anchored their factual finding that it misrepresented to job
applicants that it had existing job orders.
Since AIMS was provided with only the Surveillance Report dated November 8,
2006, it could only have been expected to respond to the charge contained in the
Show Cause Order. Thus, in its answer, it needed only to point to the POEA
operatives' own admission in their Surveillance Report dated November 8, 2006 that
when they came posing as job applicants, the staff of AIMS advised them that it had
no job vacancies for waiters and that its license had been cancelled. As POEA now
also admits, AIMS 's license to recruit was restored on December 6, 2006.
It is true that in administrative proceedings, as in the case, only substantial
evidence is needed, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Unfortunately, there is no evidence against AIMS
to speak of, much less substantial evidence. Clearly, AIMS 's right to be informed of
the charges against it, and its right to be held liable only upon substantial evidence,
have both been gravely violated.
157
94. ANNA MARIE L. GUMABON vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages before
the RTC against the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the PNB Delta branch
manager Silverio Fernandez (Fernandez). The case stemmed from the PNB’s refusal to
release Anna Marie’s money in a consolidated savings account and in two foreign
exchange time deposits, evidenced by Foreign Exchange Certificates of Time Deposit
(FXCTD).
In its answer, the PNB argued that: (1) Anna Marie is not entitled to the
balance of the consolidated savings account based on solutio indebiti; (2) the PNB
already paid the $10,058.01 covered by FXCTD No. 993902; (3) the PNB is liable to
pay only $10,718.87 of FXCTD No. 993992, instead of the full amount of $17,235.41;
and (4) Anna Marie is guilty of contributory negligence.
In her reply, Anna Marie argued that the best evidence of her withdrawals is
the withdrawal slips duly signed by her and the passbooks pertaining to the
accounts. PNB, however, failed to show any of the withdrawal slips and/or
passbooks, and also failed to present sufficient evidence that she used her accounts’
funds.
158
The RTC ruled in Anna Marie’s favour.

The RTC held that the PNB had not yet paid the remaining balance of
$10,058.01 under FXCTD No. 993902. Anna Marie’s SOA, which the PNB relied
upon, is a mere photocopy and does not satisfy the best evidence rule. Moreover, the
PNB failed to obtain the deposition of a PNC Bank officer or present any other
evidence to show that the amounts stated in the SOA came from FXCTD No. 993902.
The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling.
The CA also considered Anna Rose’s SOA as proof that the PNB had paid the
remaining balance of $10,058.01 on FXCTD No. 993902. The CA held that the PNB
verified the SOA and it was corroborated by the affidavit of the PNB Branch
Operations Officer in New York. The CA stated that the RTC should have allowed the
taking of the deposition of the PNB bank officer.
Anna Marie moved but failed to obtain reconsideration of the CA’s decision;
hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the PNB presented sufficient evidence of payment.
HELD:
NO, the PNB’s evidence was not sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to
Anna Marie.
It is a settled rule in evidence that the one who alleges payment has the burden
of proving it. The burden of proving that the debt had been discharged by payment
rests upon the debtor once the debt’s existence has been fully established by the
evidence on record. When the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the
burden of going forward with the evidence – as distinct from the burden of proof –
shifts to the creditor. Consequently, the creditor has a duty to produce evidence to
show non-payment.
In the present case, the RTC denied the admission of the manager’s check and
the miscellaneous ticket since the original copies were never presented.
Evidence, to be admissible, must comply with two qualifications: (a) relevance and (b)
competence. Evidence is relevant if it has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce a
belief in its existence or nonexistence. On the other hand, evidence is competent if it
is not excluded by the law or by the Rules of Court.
One of the grounds under the Rules of Court that determines the competence
of evidence is the best evidence rule. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the
content of the document is under inquiry.
However, there are instances when the Court may allow the presentation of
secondary evidence in the absence of the original document. Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court enumerates these exceptions:
159
(a) when the original has been lost, or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office.
While the RTC cannot consider the excluded evidence to resolve the issues,
such evidence may still be admitted on appeal provided there has been tender of the
excluded evidence under Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The PNB cannot simply substitute the mere photocopies of the subject documents for
the original copies without showing the court that any of the exceptions under
Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies. The PNB’s failure to give a
justifiable reason for the absence of the original documents and to maintain a record
of Anna Marie’s transactions only shows the PNB’s dismal failure to fulfill its
fiduciary duty to Anna Marie.
SOA is inadmissible because it fails to qualify as relevant evidence. As the RTC
correctly stated, the SOA "does not show which of the amount stated therein came
from the funds of Certificate of Time Deposit No. A-993902."
The affidavit of the PNB New York’s bank officer is also inadmissible in the light of the
following self-explanatory provision of the Rules of Court:
"Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. x x x."42
Formal offer means that the offeror shall inform the court of the purpose of
introducing its exhibits into evidence. Without a formal offer of evidence, courts
cannot take notice of this evidence even if this has been previously marked and
identified.
In Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha, we reiterated the importance of a formal offer of
evidence. Courts are mandated to rest their factual findings and their judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. The formal offer
enables the judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. It also affords the opposing parties the chance to examine
the evidence and to object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the
appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by
the trial court.
In People v. Napat-a, People v. Mate, and Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. v.
Escolastico Saves, et al., we recognized the exceptions from the requirement of a
formal offer of evidence, namely: (a) the evidence must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded; and (b) the evidence must have been incorporated in the
records of the case.
160
It is unmistakable that the PNB did not include the affidavit of the PNB New
York’s bank officer in its formal offer of evidence to corroborate Anna Rose’s SOA.
Although the affidavit was included in the records and identified by Fernandez, it
remains inadmissible for being hearsay. Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is
merely hearsay evidence when its affiant or maker did not take the witness stand.
In the present case, Fernandez is not the proper party to identify the affidavit
executed by the PNB New York’s bank officer since he is not the affiant. Therefore,
the affidavit is inadmissible.
Thus, the PNB failed to present sufficient and admissible evidence to prove
payment.This failure leads to conclude that the PNB is still liable to pay the amount.
95. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B.

GIMENEZ
Facts.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the PCGG instituted a Complaint for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against Spouses
Gimenez before the Sandiganbayan. The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth
allegedly acquired by them as dummies, agents, or nominees of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos. During trial, the Republic presented
documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business interests, income,
and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. The Republic several witnesses
who testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by them.
Thereafter, the Republic then manifested that it was “no longer presenting further
evidence.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic thirty (30) days to file its formal
offer of evidence. The Republic moved for an extension of thirty (30) days to file its
161
formal offer of evidence. This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan.

Subsequently, the Republic moved for an additional fifteen (15) days within which to
file its Formal Offer of Evidence which was likewise granted by the Sandiganbayan.
Following this, no additional motion for extension was filed by the Republic.
Ignacio Gimenez, joined by his wife, Fe, then filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer
to Evidence, arguing that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no
evidence to support its cause of action.
The Sandiganbayan granted Spouses Gimenez’ Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of Demurrer to Evidence, ratiocinating that the Republic failed to make a
formal offer of evidence despite the extensions of time given to it. Due to Republic’s
failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, the court excluded several of the exhibits it
presented previously. According to the court, the reasons invoked by the Republic to
justify its failure to timely file the formal offer of evidence fail to persuade. The
missing exhibits mentioned by the Republic’s counsel appear to be the same missing
documents since 2004, which was almost two (2) years ago. It had more than ample
time to locate these documents for its purpose. Since they remain missing after the
lapse of the period indicated or given by the court, there is no reason why the search
for these documents should delay the filing of the formal offer of evidence.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan considered the Republic to have waived its right to
file its Formal Offer of Evidence. Also, the court noted that the documentary evidence
presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies. However, the
persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not presented.
Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.
Aggrieved, the Republic filed the present petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court, assailing, among others, the Sandiganbayan’s resolution
granting the spouses’ Motion to Dismiss on the ground of Demurrer to Evidence.
ISSUE:
W/N the Motion to Dismiss on the ground of Demurrer to Evidence correct or
proper.
HELD:
No, the grant of such Motion to Dismiss on the ground of Demurrer to
Evidence was not proper because the Sandiganbayan excluded the exhibits
previously presented by the Republic, which should all have been considered in
determining the propriety of the demurrer to evidence, pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence.
Here, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan cannot just arbitrarily disregard
evidence especially when resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of demurrer to
evidence, which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. The Sandiganbayan
should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al. where the Supreme Court
162
held that it is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative
value than to outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds.
The Court ruled, although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict
enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear
to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
It is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical
grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for
the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission,
if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding them or ignoring them.’
A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-
gotten wealth.
In case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to
dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a
judgment on the merits. This is because while a demurrer ‘is an aid or instrument for
the expeditious termination of an action,’ it specifically pertains to the merits of the
case.
In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza, this court defined a judgment rendered on
the merits:
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections; or when the judgment is
rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.
(Citations omitted)
To reiterate, demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case
without the defendant having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she]
would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he [or she] is not
entitled to the relief sought. The order of dismissal must be clearly supported by facts
and law since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the merits.
To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer
documentary evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.
163
96. SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE
FACTS:
These are petitions for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in three Criminal Cases.
On April 1988, the accused, all public officers, while responding to information
about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with
automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ridden by
Leodevince and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on
the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of
the latter.
164
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty only of HOMICIDE for the eventual
death of Licup, and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva.
ISSUE:
W/N the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has been
established beyond cavil of doubt.
HELD:
Yes, the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has been
established beyond cavil of doubt.
The precept in all criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound by the
invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does not relieve
the prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. By
reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole
proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt. The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either
by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence. Corpus delicti
consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the
commission of the act. In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the
death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not
the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the
criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced
the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible
evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with
malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such evidence may consist in the use of weapons
by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately
after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.138 In such case, even if there is
no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal
violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the
unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.
139 Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and attempted
homicide, as the same is an essential element of these offenses, and thus must be
proved with the same degree of certainty as that required of the other elements of
said offenses.
165
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution.

It is interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to
kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan,
whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners’
affidavits as well as Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with suggestions that it was
Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who
their (petitioners’) minds that which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as
to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had
once reported to him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently
meeting with NPA members and that the San Miguel Corporation plant where the
victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed
Yapyuco’s claim that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against
members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly
by NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the pendency of these
cases even before his opportunity to testify in court emerged.
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did
not intend to kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service
firearms; and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side of
the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the shots were intended for the
persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound where the
discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of
intention to kill, and that there are instances where the attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact animated by intent to kill.
Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a specific act is
committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but
to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle
and .30 caliber carbine.145 While the use of these weapons does not always amount
to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level
the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility
of the passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the
subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is
not as much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the
peril to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was
aimed at the tires – especially considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere
rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless elements in
the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the
firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver – and in fact
even the driver himself – of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the
least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of
166
petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to
them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their
natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires
thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence
we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners’ actuations leaned towards the
latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup
who was seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the
wheel, together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances
of the shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not
attributable.
97. DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Gerald Albert Gercayo was born with an imperforate anus. On May 17, 1995,
Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-
through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was
assisted by several doctors including the petitioner as the anesthesiologist. During
167
the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma
lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no
longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo
lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with
the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
An information was filed solely against Dr. Solidum (anesthesiologist), fail to monitor
and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to Gerald and using 100%
halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a consequence Gerald
suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy
meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering Gerald incapable
of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and prejudice.
The RTC finds Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. CA affirmed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable.
HELD:
No, the Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
inappropriate.
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks
for itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes
injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." It is simply
"a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and
experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the
injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with
negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on
the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge."
Jarcia, Jr. v. People has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive
law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine,
when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and
does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the
party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence
thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be
168
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential
requisites must first be satisfied, to wit:
(1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
inappropriate.
Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third
elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments
were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then
unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the
care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for
the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his
submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the operation,
causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency
of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically
termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through
operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact
alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including
the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending
to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have
been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the
patient.
98. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated the
purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Africa
and Nieto held beneficially for respondents Marcoses. The petitioner Republic,
169
through the PCGG, filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 0009) against the respondents
for reconveyance and damages before the Sandiganbayan.
A case (Civil Case No. 0130) was filed by respondents Africa before the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner to nullify the PCGG’s order whereby the latter
directed Africa to account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist
from exercising voting, to refrain from representing himself as a director, officer,
employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or indirectly, in the
management of ETPI.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among
others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with 009 as the main case and the 130 merely an
incident. In the proceedings in Civil Case 0130, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane
(former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon
oral examination. The petitioner asked the Sandiganbayan to take Judicial Notice in
the main case (Civil Case 0009) of the Bane Deposition (from the Civil Case 0130
proceedings). The Sandiganbayan refused.
ISSUE:
W/N the Sandiganbayan commited GADALEJ by refusing to take judicial
notice.
HELD:
NO, according to the SC, the issue does not involve the applicability of the rule
on mandatory taking of judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on
discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner
approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating
whatever evidence offered in any of the “children” cases (Civil Case 0130) as evidence
in the “parent” case (Civil Case 0009) or “of the whole family of cases.” To the
petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial
notice. (See doctrine for what is the rule)
The SC refused, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioner’s argument
that it should take judicial notice of the Bane deposition. First, the supporting cases
the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because these cases involve only a single
proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. Second, the petitioner’s
proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. If the logic of the
petitioner’s argument is followed, the SC would be espousing judicial confusion by
indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was
presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the
supposed lineage of the cases.
As a General Rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried
170
or are actually pending before the same judge. However, as a matter of convenience
to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when:
(1) with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference
is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or
(2) when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives at the court’s direction, at the request or with the consent of the
parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
99. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. P/SUPT. LAMSEN, PO2 ABULENCIA, and
SPO1 RAMOS
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide. MR
and MNT (due to newly found evidence) were filed by accused-appellants.
171
Accused-appellants state, that they obtained affidavits from prosecution

witnesses and Marcelo whose testimonies implicated accused-appellants of the crime
of robbery with homicide. In their affidavits, the aforesaid prosecution witnesses
claim that they made their testimonies under duress as they were forced by elements
of the PNP, the NBI, and the former mayor of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Julian
Resuello, to point at accused-appellants as perpetrators of the aforesaid crime. They
equally claim that they did not actually see who committed the crime and that they
only testified against accused-appellants out of fear of their own lives.
ISSUE:
W/N affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is
reliable.
HELD:
No, it is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after
conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The
rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted
testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later
be repudiated. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which when
coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement
given, can retractions be considered and upheld.
In Firaza v. People:
Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken
before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely
sought to discourage and forestall falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who
had given the testimony later on changed his mind. Such a rule will make solemn
trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses.
This Court has always looked with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies
previously given in court. The asserted motives for the repudiation are commonly
held suspect, and the veracity of the statements made in the affidavit of repudiation
are frequently and deservedly subject to serious doubt.
Especially when the affidavit of retraction is executed by a prosecution witness after
the judgment of conviction has already been rendered, "it is too late in the day for his
recantation without portraying himself as a liar." At most, the retraction is an
afterthought which should not be given probative value.
In the case at bar, the trial court gave great weight and credence to the
collective statements of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, including those of Reyes
and Marcelo, as their testimonies were candid, straightforward, and categorical. It is
likewise worthy to mention that their respective testimonies were deemed credible as
they withstood extensive cross-examination, and possibly, even re-direct and re-cross
172
examinations. Absent any special circumstances attendant to this case, Reyes’ and
Marcelo’s recantations fail to cast doubt to the truth and veracity of their earlier
testimonies, and to the collective statements of all of the prosecution witnesses as a
whole.
Moreover, it should be noted that Reyes and Marcelo only executed their
respective affidavits of recantation after the Court issued its Resolution dated
February 20, 2013 upholding accused-appellants’ conviction of the crime of robbery
with homicide, or more than a decade after they gave their testimonies in open court.
These affidavits should be seen as nothing but a last-minute attempt to save
accused-appellants from punishment.
100. CARLOSE JAY ADLAWAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
While Georgia was talking to Cornelio, the Adlawan’s houseboy, the petitioner
came back and angrily asked Georgia "asa ang kwarta?" ("where is the money?"). She
replied saying, "unsa, wa mo kahibalo nga na ospital inyong amahan?" ("why, don't
173
you know that your father is in the hospital?"). Apparently earlier that day, Georgia
instructed her secretary Maria Reina Lastimosa to withdraw ₱100,000.00 to pay for
the hospital bills of Alfonso.
Thereafter, the petitioner furiously told her "mura kag kinsa!" ("as if you are
somebody!"), and started hacking her using a katana. Georgia ran towards the garage
in front of the house, but petitioner pursued her and continued his attack. Sensing
that petitioner would finish her off, she summoned all her strength, kicked his leg,
and then grabbed and squeezed his sex organ.
After petitioner fell down, Georgia walked towards Baking Medical Hospital located a
few meters away where she was given immediate medical attention. Thereafter, she
was transferred to Perpetual Succour Hospital in Cebu City.
Georgia's version of the incident was corroborated by prosecution witness Fred, the
Adlawans' multicab driver who testified having witnessed Georgia being chased and
hacked by petitioner. The prosecution also presented Maria Reina, Georgia's
secretary, who confirmed that she was instructed to withdraw ₱100,000.00 for
Alfonso's hospital bills.
The prosecution also presented as witnesses the police officers who
investigated the crime. However, in the course of his cross-examination, PSI Mallari
admitted that they searched petitioner's room and seized the weapons they found
therein without a search warrant and without petitioner's consent.
Aside from the medical certificate, the nature of the injuries sustained by
Georgia was shown in the photographs taken by a certain Charlita Gloria who was
also presented as witness and who identified the photographs. Further, Dr. Kangleon,
during his testimony, based on their appearance, the injuries were indeed hack
wounds. He also testified that Georgia's wounds, particularly the hack wound on the
left neck, would have been fatal if not for the timely medical intervention.
The RTC acquitted petitioner of attempted robbery but convicted him of the crime of
frustrated homicide. CA affirmed. MR was denied.
The petitioner, with Georgia's conformity, filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss and to
Admit Private Complainant's Affidavit of Recantation and Desistance. Georgia
executed an Affidavit of Recantation and Desistance wherein she admitted fabricating
the accusations against the petitioner. She claimed that she sustained injuries when
she accidentally smashed herself against the clear glass door of their dining room
and after she slipped when she was about to board their multicab.
CA ruled that an affidavit of desistance, by itself, cannot be a ground for the
dismissal of the present case.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to establish intent to
kill, and that her injuries were not so serious as to cause her death; and
2. W/N petitioner asserts that Georgia committed material inconsistencies which
clearly show that she had merely fabricated the alleged assault.
174
HELD:
1. NO. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses sufficiently to establish intent
to kill, and that her injuries were serious as to cause her death if she was not given
immediate medical attention.
It is a fundamental rule, however, that when the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, an appellate court will normally not disturb the factual findings of the trial
court, unless the lower court has reached conclusions that are clearly unsupported
by evidence, or unless it has overlooked some facts or circumstances of weight and
influence which, if considered, would affect the results. As aptly observed by the
appellate court, no ground exists which would prompt it to overturn the factual
findings of the trial court.
Although the Court agrees that the "katana" that the prosecution offered in
evidence is indeed inadmissible, such fact would not benefit him.
The non-identification or non-presentation of the weapon used is not fatal to
the prosecution's cause where the accused was positively identified. Thus, the CA
correctly affirmed petitioner's conviction for frustrated homicide despite the
inadmissibility of the weapon presented in evidence. Georgia positively identified
petitioner as the person who hacked him. Her testimony was corroborated by Fred
who categorically declared that petitioner chased and hacked Georgia. The
testimonies of the witnesses were further buttressed by other evidence including the
photographs of Georgia's wounds and the medical certificate. The credibility of these
testimonies and evidence is now beyond dispute.
2. After reviewing the alleged inconsistencies, the Court opines that they refer
only to minor particulars which do not affect the credibility of Georgia's testimony.
Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution
witness.
Here, the Court finds credible the testimony given by Georgia in open court.
Her testimony was clear, candid, and straightforward. She positively identified
petitioner as the person who hacked her several times. She did not waver in her
identification despite the arduous direct and cross-examinations conducted on her.
The Court notes that a total of four settings were needed to complete Georgia's
examinations. Despite this, she remained steadfast in her testimony and her
narration of the incident was consistent in all material aspects. The credibility of
Georgia's testimony is clear.
The photographs showing Georgia's wounds and the medical certificate
prepared by Dr. Kangleon tell a story different from what Georgia would now want
this Court to believe. By the appearance and nature of these wounds, only a gullible
person would believe that they were the result of accidentally smashing oneself
against a glass door. Indeed, crystal clear from the photographs is the fact that her
wounds were inflicted by a long bladed weapon. Georgia's wounds, especially the
ones on the neck, abdomen, and shoulder, were long, deep, and straight gashes
inconsistent with injuries sustained from broken glass.
175
Thus, though the parties have already reconciled, the fact remains that
petitioner committed a crime for which he must suffer the penalties prescribed by
law.
176

Case Digest

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CASE DIGEST EVIDENCE

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VICTOR COGAED

2. ROMEO POSADAS VS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

3. TOMAS TAN VS HOSANA

4. RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA VS BOARD OF MEDICINE

5. JEANETTE MANALO VS TNS PHILIPPINES

8. INTER ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISE VS CREER III

10. PEOPLE VS BELGAR

11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JOEREL GALLENO

12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RODRIGO SALAFRANCA

13. SPOUSES OMAR AND MOSHIERA LATIP VS ROSALIE CHUA

14. BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK VS COURT OF APPEALS, COURT

15. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS VS JESUSA REYES

Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision.

16. ROMEO SISON et al VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS FRANCISCO JUAN

18. PEOPLE VS REYES

19. PEOPLE VS SOLINA

20. PEOPLE VS SALUHUDDIN

21. PEOPLE VS GANDUMA

22. PEOPLE VS MALIMIT

2. Yes. The testimony is credible.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby denied. The resolution of the Court of Appeals

27.CHUA GAW VS CHUA

2. Yes. A notarized document is valid as an evidence in court.

3. No. The best evidence rule is inapplicable in this case.

28. SKUNAC CORPORATION VS SYLIANTENG

2. Yes. The signed copy is valid.

3. Yes. Notarized document is admissible in court.

30. REPUBLIC VS MARCOS-MANOTOC

2. No. Affidavits may not be considered as evidence in court.

31. CIR VS HANTEX TRADING CO INC

32. REPUBLIC VS MUPAS

34. MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP VS SSANGYONG CORP

35. GARVIDA VS SALES JR

36. SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORP VS AUTOCORP GROUP

37. EDRADA VS RAMOS

40. EAGLERIDGE DEV CORP VS CAMERON GRANVILLE ASSET INC

Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates.

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

42. NENITA CARGANILLO vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

43. PILIPINAS BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ELOY R. BELLO, in his

On January 8, 1995, petitioner obtained from private respondent Meridian

Hence, the present petition.

The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the

44. EDENBERT MADRIGAL AND VIRGILIO MALLARI vs. THE COURT OF

45. SPOUSES ARCEGA REGALADO SANTIAGO and ROSITA PALABYAB,

Subsequently, on July 18, 1971, supposedly upon payment of the remaining

46. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs FRANCISCO BUSTOS, ET AL

furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that

At around 5 o’clock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an accident

51. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VICTOR P. PADIT

53. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS REGGIE VILLARIEZ ALIAS "TOTI

The Ruling of the Court:

54. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JUAN BRIOSO and MARIANO TAEZA

55. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SONNY GATARIN Y CABALLERO @ “JAY–

57. TALIDANO VS. FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED SERVICES, INC

Petitioner’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at

58. PEOPLE VS. QUIDATO

2. Whether or not the testimony of appellant’s wife is disqualified.

59. GARCIA VS. ROBLES

The rule is to avoid an unfair situation wherein a party is unable to contradict or