A.

Read Articles 783-809

CHAPTER 2
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

SECTION 1. - Wills

SUBSECTION 1. - Wills in General

Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of this estate, to take effect after his death. (667a)
Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it cannot be left in whole or in part of the
discretion of a third person, or accomplished through the instrumentality of an agent or attorney.
(670a)

Art. 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the
determination of the portions which they are to take, when referred to by name, cannot be left to
the discretion of a third person. (670a)

Art. 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the distribution of specific property or sums
of money that he may leave in general to specified classes or causes, and also the designation
of the persons, institutions or establishments to which such property or sums are to be given or
applied. (671a)

Art. 787. The testator may not make a testamentary disposition in such manner that another
person has to determine whether or not it is to be operative. (n)

Art. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred. (n)

Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or property exactly answers
the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the context
of the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his
intention; and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the application of any of
its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations. (n)

Art. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a
clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained.

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that he was unacquainted with
such technical sense. (675a)
Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy. (n)

Art. 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have
made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. (n)

Art. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator
had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such
was his intention. (n)

Art. 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover all the interest which the testator could device or
bequeath in the property disposed of, unless it clearly appears from the will that he intended to
convey a less interest. (n)

Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at
the time it is made. (n)

SUBSECTION 2. - Testamentary Capacity and Intent

Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited by law may make a will. (662)
Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of age cannot make a will. (n)

Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution. (n)

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of
the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act. (n)

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month,
or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the
validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval. (n)
Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate an effective will, nor is the will of an
incapable validated by the supervening of capacity. (n)

Art. 802. A married woman may make a will without the consent of her husband, and without the
authority of the court. (n)

Art. 803. A married woman may dispose by will of all her separate property as well as her share
of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property. (n)

SUBSECTION 3. - Forms of Wills

Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the
testator. (n)
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that
the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them. (n)

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the Office of the Clerk of Court. (n)

Art. 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so;
otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some
practicable manner, the contents thereof. (n)

Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the
subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.
(n)
Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein
shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805. (n)

Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a)

Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.

In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court
deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (619a)

Art. 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of the testator written below his signature must be
dated and signed by him in order to make them valid as testamentary dispositions. (n)

Art. 813. When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without
being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and a date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions. (n)

Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the
testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. (n)

Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the
forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in
the Philippines. (n)

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. (n)

Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is
executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which
might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of the Philippines. (n)

Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for
their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. (669)
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country
shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where
they may have been executed. (733a)

B. Read the following cases:

In relation to Wills in General Articles 783 to 795)

Nepomuceno vs. CA (G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985)

Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he died.
Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally married
to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had been estranged
from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were married despite the
subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner. On
August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and
her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that
petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator.

The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his
Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the
respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the
probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in
favor of the petitioner is null and void.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament
of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision.

HELD:

No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of
the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of
inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is
not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)

The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made
between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and
Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall
apply to testamentary provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin
Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.

Seangio vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006)

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio... and praying for the appointment of private respondent
Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special... administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng
Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.

In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is
found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically... suspended and
replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.

Issues:

whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

issue on preterition

Ruling:

can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an
affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an
act of disposition in itself. In other words, the... disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis... causa... issue on preterition... the
Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will.

Principles:

it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and
within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that... intention. It is only when
the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given
effect.

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo's holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil
Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is... proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

De Roma vs. CA (G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987)

Buhay De Roma v. CA (July 23, 1987)

Facts: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died intestate.
When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed administratrix and filed an
inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties donated by
their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled
P10,297.50 and the value is not disputed. The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because
when Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation “sa
pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli” which the TC interpreted as a
prohibition to collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. On
appeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an express
prohibition to collate.
Issue: Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.
Held: The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition. (1035a)
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should
be reduced as inofficious. (1036)
The SC affirmed the appellate court’s decision and that it merely described the donation as
irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated
properties from collation as required under the provisions of the NCC. Given the precise
language of the deed of donation the decedent donor would have included an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donor’s intention. Absent such indication of that
intention, the rule not the exemption should be applied.-MJA

Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon (G.R. No. L-24561, June 30, 1970)

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA
DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
33 SCRA 554 (1970)

The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects
of partition submitted by the contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to
the testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the
specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used the
words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa,
rather than as an attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the designated
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were
deemed to be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of
devises.

The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886
which reads: "Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because
the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886
is couched upon a negative prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the
testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each property.
Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It
is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of the following
decision) with Article 886.

FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6
legitimate children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were
the appellants
1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries
were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million)
which included real and personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central
Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the
deceased’s estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her
testamentary disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and Tomas were to
receive more than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised
of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the
cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate
where Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907
NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC

ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case

HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to
every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the testator,
when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions
raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance
therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly
appears that his intention was otherwise."

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when
expressed clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must
imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and
legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion
for the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors’ proposition for partition cannot be given effect.

ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition.
In her will, the decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as
well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last
will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly
provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the
dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her
estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a
person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."

CAB: This was properly complied with in the executor’s project of partition as the oppositors
were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent
in her will and the differential to complete their legitimes were taken from the cash and/or
properties of Marina and Tomas, who were obviously favored by the decedent in her will.

Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrix-
appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary
disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would
consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion,
and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto
nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.

EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights
and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law

DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to
specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of
the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties
of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as
mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes
of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately
following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise
command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die
before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased."

COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and partition of
the entire estate was made by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations
during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor
having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Art 1061 to
1063 of the Civil Code on collation.

CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was
merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has
been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the
testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.

Vda. de Villaflor vs. Juico (G.R. No. L-15737, February 28, 1962)

Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and
bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina ½ of all his real and personal properties giving
the other half to his brother Don Fausto.

Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the widow’s death, she
became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its
8th clause of the will.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona
Faustina.

HELD:

The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doňa Fausta
because in his will he provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a
child and because she died without having begotten any children with the deceased then it
means that Doňa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property. Upon her death, because
she never acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are not included in her
estate. Those properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator.
Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doňa Fausta then he should have
specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doňa Fausta without mentioning
any condition.

Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975)

Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at
the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six
legitimate Children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.

Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of
his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will
Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half" of... nine conjugal
lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from
her father (par. III) and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among
her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes... should be satisfied out of the
fruits of the propertie

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two
years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my
properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of... her will.
She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed
of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjual assets.

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack
of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper
partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr.

should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice
to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys.
Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February 28, 1974... it dismissed
the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding,
ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on
April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of

June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and
published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974
that its publication be held in abeyance.

Issues:

whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on
its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

Ruling:

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious
legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court
assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court... acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the... intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
 even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527,
17 SCRA 449. Compare with Surnilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21
SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan,... L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in
the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not
have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not... been made" (Art. 792,
Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts
will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the
testator or interfering with the general testamentary... scheme, or doing injustice to the
beneficiaries"

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half" of the conjugal lands is
contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and
proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrgial and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion,... 38 Phil.
414). But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and
the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the
legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective... upon the death of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children
and the surviving spouse.

Bellis vs. Bellis (G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967)

 Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
 By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman
 By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin
G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
 August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his estate as
follows:
1.    $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen
2.    P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis
3.    remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives
 July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A
 September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on
 People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will directed
 Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the ground
that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
 Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will
HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed
 Doctrine of Processual Presumption:
 The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof,
otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.
 In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.  Apply Philippine laws.
 Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
 ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
 ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
 The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

In relation to Testamentary Capacity and Intent (Articles 796 to 803)

De Guzman vs. Intestate Estate of Francisco Benitez (G.R. No. 61167-68,

January 20, 1989)

24 DE GUZMAN V INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO BENITEZ, 169 SCRA 284

FACTS:
1. Francisco Benitez died single at the age of 61 years, without descendants, nor
ascendants, nor brothers and sisters. He left an estate consisting of fourteen parcels of coconut
land in Laguna, a residential lot, and a small savings account (P3,843.08) in the Philippine
National Bank.
2. Dionisia Valenzuela and her brother, Melquiades Valenzuela, first-cousins of the
deceased Francisco Benitez, filed a petition for administration of his intestate estate and for the
issuance of letters of administration to Dionisia.
3. However, the petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the
ground that the deceased left a will bequeathing his entire estate to him and he also filed a
petition for probate. De Guzman later died and was substituted by his heirs.
4. Dionisia, et. al moved to reject the will on account of insanity. The court rendered
judgment disallowing the will and appointing Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased.
5. The evidence shows that from January 18, 1929 up to March 12, 1941 Francisco
Benitez was confined at the National Mental Hospital for varying periods of time. This leads the
court to the conclusion that at the time Francisco Benitez executed his supposed will on August
18, 1945 he was not possessed of a sound and disposing mind. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the decision was affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in finding the deceased Francisco Benitez was not possessed
of a sound and disposing mind when he executed his will on August 18, 1945

RULING: No. Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which We are not at liberty to
review because in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth, may be raised. In any event, the decision of the Court of
Appeals reveals that the Court carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the
testamentary capacity or lack of it, of the deceased Francisco Benitez and found "no compelling
reason to disturb the lower court's findings and conclusions." The resolution of that question
hinged on the credibility of the witnesses. The cardinal rule on that point is that the trial courts,
assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate
court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its
findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

Baltazar vs. Laxa (G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012)

Paciencia was a 78 years old spinster when she made her last will and testament in the
Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin,
was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed
her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1,
2 and 4 thereof.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine.
Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came
to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother. Six days after the execution of the Will,
Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death.

Four years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of
Administration in his favor. Antonio Baltazar, petitioner filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition
and averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his
predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins and that that
Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she would sometimes leave her
wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. On cross examination, it was
established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia
was magulyan was based on her personal assessment.

Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will
on the grounds that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its
execution, that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threat
and that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence by Lorenzo.

Lorenzo testified that at the time of Paciencias death, she did not suffer from any mental
disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute. Lorenzo belied and denied having
used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he
was not in the Philippines when the same was executed.

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the
will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the
testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the
probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate.

HELD:

Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities
laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the
notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly
states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the
petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they
question of her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said
act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will
lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state
of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him
unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art.
799 of the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the
time of making the Will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of
his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.”

Ortega vs. Valmonte (G.R. No. 157451, December 16, 2005)

Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed
Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido
died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of 2
pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to
probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister. According to the notary public who
notarized the testator’s will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he
wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time
to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public
was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal
execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten
date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.

Petitioner’s argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no
longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to
sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation
of the will.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.

HELD:

1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property
he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The
omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing
of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is
cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or
contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which,
but for fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of
its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict
between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, “because the law
does not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.
The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.

In relation to Forms of Wills (Articles 804 to 808)

Suroza vs. Honrado (A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981)

Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless, reared a boy named
Agapito. Agapito and his wife Nenita de Vera had a daughter named Lilia. Nenita became
Agapito’s guardian when he became disabled. A certain Arsenia de la Cruz also wanted to be
his guardian in another proceeding but it was dismissed. Arsenia then delivered a child named
Marilyn Sy to Marcelina who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. Marilyn used
the surname Suroza although not legally adopted by Agapito. When Marcelina (who was an
illiterate) was 73 years old, she supposedly executed a notarial will which was in English and
thumbmarked by her. In the will, she allegedly bequeathed all her properties to Marilyn. She
also named as executrix her laundrywoman, Marina Paje. Paje filed a petition for probate of
Marcelina’s will. Judge Honrado appointed Paje as administratrix and issued orders allowing the
latter to withdraw money from the savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and instructing the
sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrix’s house, among whom was Nenita. She and the other
occupants filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that Agapito was the sole
heir of the deceased, and that Marilyn was not the decedent’s granddaughter. Despite this,
Judge Honrado issued an order probating Marcelina’s will.

Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition
for administration and preliminary injunction, and an opposition to the probate of the will and a
counter-petition for letters of administration, which were dismissed by Judge Honrado. Instead
of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings but Judge Honrado
dismissed it. The judge then closed the testamentary proceeding after noting that the executrix
had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid.

Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge Honrado with having
probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. She reiterated her contention that the testatrix was
illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not
know English, the language in which the will was written. She further alleged that Judge
Honrado did not take into account the consequences of the preterition of testatrix’s son,
Agapito. Judge Honrado in his comment did not deal specifically with the allegations but merely
pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion,
she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the house of the testatrix. Nenita
subsequently filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Honrado
wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate
case be declared void. The CA dismissed the petition because Nenita’s remedy was an appeal
and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari. Relying
on that decision, Judge Honrado filed a MTD the administrative case for having allegedly
become moot and academic.

ISSUE:

W/N disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will,
which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not
appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself.

HELD:

YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is
void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language “understood
and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read
to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”. That could only mean that the will was
written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the
mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a
language or dialect known to the testator.

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment
where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the “testator” instead of “testatrix”.
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly
as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the
supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who
was still alive. Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by the deputy clerk of court, respondent
judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness. In spite of the
absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on
the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

Reyes vs. Vda de Vidal (G.R. No. L-2862, April 21, 1952)

FACTS:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares,
more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land
under the operation of the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in
1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son,
Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.
• In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In
the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific
heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. 1A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to
Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children
thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.
• In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of
title for the whole property-OCT No. 255-was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete,
son-inlaw of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not
aware of this fact.
• On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431
square meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to
the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No.1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The
deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. I-A-14. The vendee immediately took
possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.
• In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan created on 1936. They
formally partitioned the property. Therefore, the heirs received their share of this land. Including
Rafael Reyes, Jr. Son of Rafael Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing the land which
should have been received by his father.
• Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that they are the true owners of the
land, as shown by the torrens title over the land.
• Gardiola’s defense was that he bought the land from Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr. could
not have inherited this land for it was disposed of by his father way before he inherited it.
• The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.’s heirs. Stating that there was no evidence that
the Gavino’s children had a written partition agreement. CA reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA IS correct in reversing the trial court?
Held:
NO. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes
in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs
to be in writing to be valid.24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public
document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed
with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights
of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of
an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from
those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a
writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an
oral partition is valid. Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral
partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or
renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for
the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a
confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another
heir accepting and receiving the inheritance. Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in
1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R.
No. 92811.25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partitio executed in 1936 was not valid for
some reason or another, we would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of
Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-own, era of his 70-hectare parcel of
land. The rights to the succession. are transmitted horn the moment of death of the decedent,26
The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-
owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that
the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-
ownership.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is
his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was
eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-
petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of
Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes,
Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter
never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The
issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is
concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial
settlement does not create a right in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case,
28 it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any
title of right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his
condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title
over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr, The latter cannot give
them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-
interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his
father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private
respondents the owner. ship and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As
categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or
about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them,
that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question. And yet,
despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the
property, it was only about thirteen and onehalf (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an
action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial
court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the
burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years from
their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.

Abangan vs. Abangan (G.R. No. L-13431, November 12, 1919)

On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan’s will executed July,
1916. From this decision the opponents appealed.

The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at
the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by
three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the
bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin
by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to
appellants’ contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.

Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.

YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the
testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its
object the avoidance of substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of
the testatrix. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet (as in the instant
case) signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, their signatures on the left
margin of said sheet are not anymore necessary as such will be purposeless.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know
whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are
written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this
single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and
is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the
attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary
that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be
paged.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that
adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the
testator’s last will, must be disregarded.

Taboada vs. Rosal (G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982

FACTS – Petitioner Apolonio Taboada filed a petition for probate of the will of the late Dorotea
perez. The will consisted of two pages, the first page containing all the testamentary
dispositions of the testator and was signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix
alone and at the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
consisted of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment was signed at the end of the
attestation clause by the three witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. The trial
court disallowed the will for want of formality in its execution because the will was signed at the
bottom of the page solely by the testatrix, while the three witnesses only signed at the left hand
margin of the page. The judge opined that compliance with the formalities of the law required
that the witnesses also sign at the end of the will because the witnesses attest not only the will
itself but the signature of the testatrix. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE – Was the object of attestation and subscription fully when the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions?
HELD –
(SHORT RULING)

On certiorari, the Supreme Court held a) that the objects of attestation and subscription were
fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left
margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the
will was properly identified by a subscribing witness to be the same will executed by the
testatrix; and b) that the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages used in
writing the will would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that it is really and actually
composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses.

(LONG RULING [VERBATIM])

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its
end by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in
witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those
things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of
the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses'
names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which
was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will
attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution
of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the
usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed.
(Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).
The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the
provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes
but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the
exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in
accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" (Report
of the Code Commission, p. 103).
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case
when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all
the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly identified by subscribing
witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of
fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.

Balonan vs. Abellana (G.R. No. L-15153, August 31, 1960)

The first page of the will is signed by Juan Bello and under his name appears typewritten “Por la
testadora Anacleta Abellana…”, and on the second page appears the signature of three (3)
instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian, Faustino Macaso and Rafael Ignacio, at the bottom of
which appears the signature of T. de los Santos and below his signature is his official
designation as the notary public who notarized the said testament.

ISSUE

Does the signature of another person above the name of the testator comply with the
requirements of law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be executed?

RULING
NO. The will must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s
name written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction (Section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure). Here, the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not
appear written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore,
a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign
the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his
express direction.

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Payad vs. Tolentino (G.R. No. 42258, September 4, 1936)

Victorio Payad filed a petition for the probate of the will of the decedent Leoncia Tolentino. This
was opposed by Aquilina Tolentino, averring that said Will was made only after the death of the
testatrix. The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the attestation clause
was not in conformity with the requirements of the law since it was not stated therein that the
testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express direction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Was it necessary that the attestation clause state that the testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write
her name at her express direction?

RULING:

The evidence of record establishes the fact the Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by Attorney Almario,
placed her thumb mark on each and every page of the questioned will and that said attorney
merely wrote her name to indicate the place where she placed said thumb mark. In other words
Attorney Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed by placing her thumb mark on each
and every page thereof. “A statute requiring a will to be ‘signed’ is satisfied if the signature is
made by the testator’s mark.” (Quoted by this court from 28 R. C. L., p. 117; De Gala vs.
Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 108.) It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that the
attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign
her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in accordance with law.

Icasiano vs Icasiano (G.R. No. L-18979, June 30, 1964)

Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will of
Josefa Villacorte, and for his appointment as executor thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano,
a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition thereto. During the course of the trial,
on 19 March 1959, Celso, started to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then
filed an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had left a will executed
in duplicate and with all the legal requirements, and that he was submitting the duplicate to the
court, which he found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enrique filed their opposition, but the
will and its duplicate was admitted to probate by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by the
oppositors.

Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect
that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or
affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents
were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure
because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of
those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts
and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions
thereof, whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as
attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-
appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to
oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.

ISSUE:

Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given the allegations
of forgery of the testator’s signature, or that the will was executed under circumstances
constituting fraud and undue influence and pressure?

(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and in Sir’s book) Is the
failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its validity?

HELD:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its duplicate are valid in
all respects.

On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:

The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been complied with. The
opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix’s signature failed to
convince the Court, not only because it is directly contradicted by another expert but principally
because of the paucity of the standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering
the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of writing
fatigue.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned
signatures does not appear reliable, considering that standard and challenged writings were
affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, the
testimony of the oppositor’s expert is insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two
instrumental witnesses as to the will’s execution, which were presented by Celso during the trial.

Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more
favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making
a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition
that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution
made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not suffice to
prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged
litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the
estate being diverted into the hands of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are
valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occasion. It is also well to note that fraud and
undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for
opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.

On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed all pages in the duplicate:

The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages, and while signed at the end
and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose
V. Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and
supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and
every page.

Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the original, admits that he
may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3
was signed in his presence.

The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown
by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of
signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the
Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty.
Natividad’s failure to sign page 3 of the original through mere inadvertence does not affect the
will’s validity.

Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two
other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the
seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three
witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix
on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control,
where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component
pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on
record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the
literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot
by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan
vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the
pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect
(Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court’s policy to require
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without
undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the
duplicate is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked
one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a
dilemma: if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly
signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated,
then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and
irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the
third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.

Nera vs. Rimando (G.R. No. L-5971, February 27, 1911)

'Test of Presence'

Facts:
1. At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room by a
doorway where a curtain hangs across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room when the
other witnesses were attaching their signatures to the instrument.

2. The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to the position of the witness
as of vital importance in determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta
v. Gustillo that the alleged fact being that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer
room while the signing occurred in the inner room, would not be sufficient to invalidate the
execution of the will.

3. The CA deemed the will valid.

Issue: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator and other witnesses
in the act of affixing their signatures.
HELD: YES
The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been proven to be in the outer
room when the testator and other witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would have
invalidated the will since the attaching of the signatures under the circumstances was not done
'in the presence' of the witnesses in the outer room. The line of vision of the witness to the
testator and other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating the rooms.

The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each other at the moment of the
attaching the signatures, they may see each other sign if they chose to.

In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not they actualy saw each
other sign but whether they might have seen each other sign if they chose to doso considering
their physical, mental condition and position in relation to each other at the moment of the
inscription of the signature.

Lopez vs. Liboro (G.R. No. L-1787, August 27, 1948)

ose Lopez vs Liboro On July 17, 2012 0 0 81 PHIL 429 – Succession – Pagination of the Will –
Witnesses to a Will – Language of th e Will – Thumb Mark as Signature In 1947, Don Sixto
Lopez executed a will where Jose Lopez was named an heir. Agu stin Liboro questioned the
validity of the said will based on the following grou nd, among others: 1. The first sheet, which is
also the first page) is not paged either in lett ers or in Arabic numerals. 2. That the witnesses to
the will provided contradictory statements. 3. That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to sign the
will. 4. There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is know n by Don Sixto
Lopez.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD: Yes, the will is valid. 1. The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be
necessary , is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the convent ional
numeral words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the
internal sense of its contents considered in relation to t he contents of the second page. By their
meaning and coherence, the first and se cond lines on the second page are undeniably a
continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at
the bottom of the preceding page. Further, the first pages is captioned “Testamento”. 2. The
contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are s et out in Liboro’s
appelant’s brief are incidents not all of which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to
have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred. 3. Don Sixto affixed his
thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was that he was
suffering from “partial paralysis.” There is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the
testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or
prefer ence. Both ways are good. 4. There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it
must be express ly placed in the will that the testator knows the language being used therein. I t
is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde.

Samaniego-Celada vs. Abena (G.R. No. 145545, June 30, 2008)

Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores
(Margarita) while respondent was the decedent’s lifelong companion since 1929. Sometime in
1987, Margarita died single and without any neither ascending nor descending heirs as her
parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her and were survived by her first cousins who
included petitioner.

Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament where she bequeathed one-
half of her undivided shares of a real property to respondent, Norma Pahingalo, and Florentino
Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each; bequeathed also one-half of her undivided
shares of a real property to respondent, Isabelo Abena, and Amanda Abena in equal shares or
one-third portion each. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she
likewise designated as sole executor of her will.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita a
month later respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita. On 1993, the RTC
rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and respondent
as the executor of the will. Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appealswhich
was however affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.

Issue:

1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the
formalities required by law. - NO

2. WON said court erred in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured through undue
influence and pressure, and – NO

3. WON it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita, and in
not issuing letters of administration to petitioner. – NO

Held:

1. With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors was not mentally capable of making a will at
the time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The oppositors failed to establish,
by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption that the testator
was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr.
Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to the testator months before her death,
testified that Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that
the illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization. Not one of the oppositors witnesses
has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that
could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be
physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. [The]
testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.

Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its
attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact,
the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will,
the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the
court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number
of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject
will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C
which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The
error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument
consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The
position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated in
Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:

In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

2. Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the testator to
execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was in a good mood and
smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will.

In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its
execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial will that was executed
and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will
have been substantially complied with in the subject notarial will.

3. Since, petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887
of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed
and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedent’s estate.

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from
them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

Lopez vs Lopez (G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012)

Christine Joymarie Perias

Succession

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ vs. DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ,
MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L. TUAZON
G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012

Doctrine:
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one
or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

Facts:
Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez (Lopez), and their four
legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard, Diana, Marybeth and Victoria as compulsory
heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and constituted Richard
as his executor and administrator.

Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC
with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition
contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required
by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of
Richard. Victoria also adopted the said opposition.

After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard presented the
attesting witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes Manalo
(Manalo); and the notary public who notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco).
The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the will on each
and every page, they also read and signed the same in the latter's presence and of one
another. Photographs of the incident were taken and presented during trial. Manalo further
testified that she was the one who prepared the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the
final copy of the will was made.

Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more than 20 years. The
latter consulted him in the preparation of the subject will and furnished him the list of his
properties for distribution among his children. He prepared the will in accordance with Enrique's
instruction and that before the latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the presence of one
another, he translated the will, which was written in English to Filipino and added that Enrique
was in good health and of sound mind at that time.

RTC: disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code
which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which
the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial
compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of
pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence
required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the
page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8
pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having been
executed and attested in accordance with law.

CA: found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC that the failure to state the
number of pages of the will in the attestation clause was fatal. It noted that while Article 809 of
the Civil Code sanctions mere substantial compliance with the formal requirements set forth in
Article 805 thereof, there was a total omission of such fact in the attestation clause. Moreover,
while the acknowledgment of the will made mention of "7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written," the will had actually 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion thus, necessitating the presentation of evidence aliunde to explain the
discrepancy.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision to disallow the probate of will.

Held:
The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil
Code provide:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that
the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein
shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the
subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will
actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde.

The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of
the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear
in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized.
All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them
in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether
all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the
attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.

Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will.

Testate Estate of Alipio Adaba vs. Abaja (G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005)

Garcia vs Lacuesta (G.R. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951)

Cagro vs. Cagro (G.R. No. L-5826, April 29, 1953)

Azuela vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006)

Vda. de Ramos vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978)

Guerrero vs. Bihis (G.R. No. 174144, April 17, 2007)

Cruz vs. Villasor (G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973)

Garcia vs. Gatchalian (G.R. No. L-20357, November 25, 1967)

Garcia vs. Vasquez (G.R No. L-26615, April 30, 1970)

Alvarado vs. Gaviola (G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993)

Gil vs. Murciano (G.R. No. L-3362, March 1, 1951)

Caneda vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103554, May 8, 1993)