G.R. No.

L-11154 March 21, 1916

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..
TRENT, J.:

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant was riding on a motorcycle toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura.

Prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, he (the one driving the car) turned suddenly and without
having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement, it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from
the southwestern point or from the post place there.

Take note that the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee (a
chauffeur) of the Government (defendant-appellant).

Both plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant appealed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila.

Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, was enacted. The title of which is: An Act authorizing E. Merritt to
bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands
to appear in said suit.

(THIS PART IS NOT PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE BUT GOOD TO KNOW IN CASE ATTY WILL ASK FOR MORE
DETAILS) Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff
suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff
was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of
P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."

(THIS PART IS NOT PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE BUT GOOD TO KNOW IN CASE ATTY WILL ASK FOR MORE
DETAILS) The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred (a) in finding that the
collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence
of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained
by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.

ISSUE:

1. (Waiver of Immunity: Consent to be Sued Through Special Law) Whether or not the state gave its consent
to be sued through enacting the special law of Act no. 2457.
2. (Suability or Liability) Whether or not the State conceded its liability to the plaintiff in enacting Act no. 2457.

RULING:

1. YES.
a. All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its
consent.
b. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is
our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
c. (By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature): Whereas the
Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by the
Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order
that said questions may be decided
d. Section 1 of Article 2457: “E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital,
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account
of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
 directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said
Government at the same.”
e. Section 2 of Article 2457: This Act shall take effect on its passage.

2. NO.
a. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede
its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause
not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
b. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability,
but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit.
c. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
d. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can
be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents
e. the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly
empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite
purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions
imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held
to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.

RULING:

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the
above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they
act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

The judgment appealed from must be reversed.

(THIS PART IS NOT PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE BUT GOOD TO KNOW IN CASE ATTY WILL ASK FOR MORE DETAILS)
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the
plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by
appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the
Legislature and not with the courts.