31. THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COMMISSION ON AUDIT v.

COURT OF APPEALS and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. 174788; April 11, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) filed a Petition for Prohibition with the CA dated 18 July 2005 against
petitioner Special Audit Team (SAT) of the Commission on Audit (COA) with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO), a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, and a writ of prohibition. Subsequently, GSIS also submitted a
Manifestation and Motion dated 21 July 2005 detailing the urgency of restraining the SAT. The CA issued a Resolution on 22 July
2005, directing petitioner SAT to submit the latter’s comment, to be treated as an answer. Additionally, the CA granted the prayer of
GSIS for the issuance of a TRO effective sixty (60) days from notice.
After requiring the submission of memoranda, CA issued the assailed Resolution dated 23 September 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90484,
granting the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of an injunction bond. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) and a Comment on the petition dated 10 October 2005, after it was
notified of the case, as the SAT had been represented in the interim by one of the team members instead of the OSG. The MR was
denied through a Resolution of the CA on 9 August 2006.
The present Petition seeks to nullify both the 23 September 2005 and the 9 August 2006 CA Resolutions and to prohibit the CA from
proceeding to decide the case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not prohibition is the correct remedy
2. Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued

HELD:
1. PROHIBITION IS NOT THE CORRECT REMEDY. There is an appeal or a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available. A rule of
thumb for every petition brought under Rule 65 is the unavailability of an appeal or any "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.”
Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are extraordinary remedies that historically require extraordinary facts to be shown in
order to correct errors of jurisdiction. The law also dictates the necessary steps before an extraordinary remedy may be issued.
To be sure, the availability of other remedies does not always lend itself to the impropriety of a Rule 65 petition. If, for instance,
the remedy is insufficient or would be proven useless, then the petition will be given due course. The failure to fulfill the
requirements of Rule 65 disallows the CA from taking due course of the Petition; otherwise appeals and motions for
reconsideration would be rendered meaningless.
2. Writs of injunction do not perfunctorily issue from the courts. For the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it
must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is
clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the
absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In this case, respondents
failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of
the said right.

58. Province of CAGAYAN VS. LARA 702 SCRA 183

The Facts

On September 14, 2007, Lara obtained an Industrial Sand and Gravel Permit[3] (ISAG Permit) from the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), authorizing him to conduct quarrying operations in
a twenty-hectare area situated in Barangay Centro, Muncipality of Peñablanca (Peñablanca), Cagayan. For the same purpose, Lara
obtained an Environmental Compliance Certificate[4] (ECC) from the DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).[5]

On January 3, 2008, Jovy Balisi (Balisi), Lara's representative, went to the Cagayan Provincial Treasurer's Office (Treasurer's Office) to
pay the extraction fee and other fees for Lara's quarrying operations but she was directed to first secure an Order of Payment from
the Environmental and Natural Resources Officer, petitioner Robert Adap (ENRO Adap). However, when Balisi went to ENRO Adap,
the latter refused to issue an Order of Payment. Despite various pleas from Balisi and Atty. Victorio N. Casauay (Atty. Casauay), Lara's
counsel, ENRO Adap remained adamant with his refusal. This prompted Atty. Casauay to tender and deposit the amount of
P51,500.00 with the Treasurer's Office corresponding to the said extraction fee and other related fees.[6]

On January 11, 2008, Lara commenced his quarrying operations. Later that day, however, a total of four trucks loaded with sand and
gravel extracted from the Permit Area were stopped and impounded by several local officials.[7] Consequently, Lara filed an action
for Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 7049, against the said
officials, seeking to enjoin the stoppage of his quarrying operations. After due proceedings, a writ of preliminary Injunction was
issued enabling Lara to restart his business.[8]

Nonetheless, on March 17, 2008, Lara received a Stoppage Order[9] dated March 13, 2008 (Stoppage Order) this time from Cagayan
Governor Alvaro T. Antonio (Gov. Antonio), directing him to stop his quarrying operations .

In their Answer dated June 10, 2008, petitioners raised the following defenses: (a) the mere issuance of the ISAG Permit does not
give Lara the right to commence his quarrying operations as he still had to comply with the terms and conditions stated therein; (b)
Lara has neither secured all the necessary permits nor paid the local fees and taxes; and (c) Gov. Antonio was merely performing his
duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the Province of Cagayan pursuant to the provisions of RA 7160,
[12] otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991."

In an Order dated August 11, 2008, the RTC granted Lara's application for a writ of preliminary Injunction based on a prima facie
finding that he is authorized to extract gravel and sand from the Permit Area. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which
was, however denied on September 26, 2008.

The RTC made permanent the writ of preliminary Injunction and thus, enjoined petitioners from stopping or disturbing Lara's
quarrying operations. Aggrieved, petitioners sought direct recourse to the Court via the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC properly issued the permanent Injunction subject of this case.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.It is well-settled that a writ of Injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2) requisites, namely:
(a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which are violative of the said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the
issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future
rights. Where the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, Injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an Injunction.[25]

87. Chinkoe vs. chingkoe 696 scra 729

Facts: Respondents Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe are the registered owners of a real property. They claim that in 1990, out of
tolerance and permission, they allowed respondent Faustino’s brother, Felix, and his wife, Rosita, to inhabit the property. Due to the
intercession of their mother, Tan Po Chu, Faustino agreed to sell the property to Felix on condition that the title shall be delivered
only after Felix and Rosita’s payment of the full purchase price, and after respondents’ settlement of their mortgage obligations with
RCBC. After further prodding from their mother, and at Felix’s request, Faustino agreed to deliver in advance an incomplete draft of
a Deed of Absolute Sale, which had not yet been notarized. While respondents themselves drafted the deed, the parties again
agreed that the document would only be completed after full payment.

On 24 July 2001, Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe sent a demand letter to petitioners Felix and Rosita asking them to vacate the
premises. To this date, petitioners have refused to do so, prompting respondents to file a complaint for unlawful detainer with the
MTC of QC.

In their Answer, petitioners presented a copy of a completed Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 October 1994, claiming that
respondents had sold the property for P3,130,000, which petitioners had paid in full and in cash on the same day. Due to
respondents’ adamant refusal to surrender the title to them as buyers, petitioners were allegedly constrained to file an action for
specific performance with QC RTC.
The MTC gave weight to the Deed of Sale presented by Felix and Rosita and dismissed the Complaint, citing their absolute ownership
as provided for in the Absolute Deed of Sale, and that Faustino and Gloiria never reserved their rights and interests over the
property after the sale,

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC but the CA reversed the findings and ruled that a mere plea of title over disputed land by
the defendant cannot be used as sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession. Citing Refugia v. Court of Appeals,
the CA found that petitioners’ stay on the property was merely a tolerated possession, which they were no longer entitled to
continue. The deed they presented was not one of sale, but a "document preparatory to an actual sale, prepared by the petitioners
upon the insistence and prodding of their mother to soothe in the temper of respondent Felix Chingkoe." Felix and Rosita appealed
the CA ruling, claiming that the Court’s assessment of the validity of the Deed of Sale was improper in summary proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not the court could rule on the validity of a notarized Deed of Sale in a summary ejectment action

Held:

. It should be noted that it was the petitioners who introduced the Deed of Sale in evidence before the MTC and the RTC, as
evidence of their claimed right to possession over the property.1The CA discovered that they falsified their copy of the document
denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale. They made it appear in the draft of the Deed of Absolute Sale that there indeed was a valid
and consummated sale when in truth and in fact, there was none.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states that when the defendant raises the question of ownership in unlawful detainer cases and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. This Court has repeatedly ruled that although the issue in unlawful detainer cases is physical
possession over a property, trial courts may provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the
issue of possession. The issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are
provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality. Trial courts
must necessarily delve into and weigh the evidence of the parties in order to rule on the right of possession.

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on
account of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendant's possession became illegal when the plaintiff
demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their
contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.

The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon
the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties' respective
evidence deserves more weight.