CASE DIGEST: SIOCHI V. GOZON (G.R. NO.

169900; MARCH 18, 2010)

CASE DIGEST: MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO GOZON, et al., Respondents. G.R. No. 169900; March 18, 2010.

FIRST ISSUE: In this case, the Supreme Court once again had the chance to mention that sale of the property forming
part of the conjugal partnership without the consent of the other spouse is void. This is true even if the spouses were
separated in fact and Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property at the time of sale.

The sale is void absent such consent or authority. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire
sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the
other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s written consent to the
sale is still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written
consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing
offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was
subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already
withdrawn.

SECOND ISSUE: It was ruled by the CA that the one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited
in favor of their daughter based on the ruling of the RTC that the offending spouse in an action for legal separation is
deprived of his share in the net profits of the conjugal properties.

DECISION OF THE COURT: The Supreme Court found the ruling of the CA to be in error.

Under Article 63 of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article 43(2).

Article 43 of the Family Code likewise provides that, the termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the following:

xxx (2) the absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse.

Therefore, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and
liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership. It is only the share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of their daughter. Article 102(4) of the Family
Code provides that “[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No.
(2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.” Clearly, what is
forfeited in favor of their daughter is not his share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of
the conjugal partnership property
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2416-RTJ], November 07, 2017 - MARIE ROXANNE G. RECTO, Complainant,
v. HON. HENRY J. TROCINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Respondent.

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2416-RTJ], November 07, 2017

MARIE ROXANNE G. RECTO, Complainant, v. HON. HENRY J. TROCINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 62,
BAGO CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 against Judge Henry J. Trocino (Judge Trocino), former Executive Judge and
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City (RTC), filed by Marie Roxanne G. Recto (Complainant) for bias
and partiality, ignorance of the law, grave oppression, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for issuing an ex
parte Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in relation to Civil Case No. 1409, a case for Child Custody under the Family Code.

Antecedents:

The controversy stemmed from a petition 2 for Child Custody with Prayer for Protection Order under A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC 3 in
relation to A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC4 and damages filed by Magdaleno Peña (Peña) on December 20, 2005 against complainant,
entitled Magdaleno M. Peña, for himself and in behalf of his minor son, Julian Henri "Harry" R. Peña v. Marie Roxanne G.
Recto. The petition was raffled to the RTC-Branch 62.

On December 23, 2005, the RTC issued, ex parte, a Temporary Protection Order (TPO),5 granting, among others, the
temporary custody of their fifteen (15) month-old child, Julian Henri "Harry" R. Peña (Henri), to her former live-in partner,
Magdaleno Peña (Peña). Specifically, the December 23, 2005 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the court hereby directs the Clerk of Court to issue
Summons which shall be served, together with copy of the petition and its annexes thereto, personally to the respondent.

TEMPORARY CUSTODY OVER JULIAN HENRI "HARRY" R. PEÑA IS HEREBY VESTED UPON THE PETITIONER MAGDALENO M.
PEÑA; AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PNP-CIDG (NCR) IS ORDERED TO ASSIST THE SHERIFF OF THIS COURT IN [TAKING
CUSTODY] OF JULIAN HENRI "HARRY" R. PEÑA WHEREVER HE MIGHT BE FOUND WHO SHALL THEREAFTER BE IMMEDIATELY
TURNED OVER TO HIS FATHER, THE HEREIN PETITIONER.

A protection order, which shall be effective for thirty (30) days from service upon respondent Marie Roxanne G. Recto, is
hereby issued as follows:

1. prohibiting the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of
violence against the offended party;

2. prohibiting the respondent from harassing, annoying, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the
offended party, either directly or indirectly;

3. removing and excluding the offended party from the residence of the respondent or from any other place where said
offended party may be found;

4. requiring the respondent to stay away from the offended party and any designated family or household member at a
distance of two hundred (200) meters;

5. requiring the respondent to stay away from the residence, or any specified place frequented regularly by the
offended party and any designated family or household member;

6. prohibiting the respondent from carrying or possessing any firearms or deadly weapon, and ordering her to
immediately surrender the same to the court for proper disposition; and

7. directing the respondent to put up a bond of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) to keep the peace and to present
two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that respondent shall not commit any of the acts of violence on the
offended party and/ or the petitioner or violate the protection order.

Lastly, pursuant to Section 16 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC (Rule on Custody of Minors) a HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER is hereby
issued for the purpose of preventing the minor child from being brought out of the country without prior order from the
court, during the pendency of the petition.

Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is directed NOT to allow the departure of the minor child from the
Philippines without the court's permission. Likewise, the Department of Foreign Affairs is ordered NOT to issue any passport
to said minor without the prior authority of this court.

For the guidance of said government entities, hereunder are the pertinent information about the subject of the Hold
Departure Order:
Furnish copies of this order the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within twenty four
(24) hours hereof and through the most expeditious means of transmittal.

Likewise furnish copies hereof the petitioner and counsel.

SO ORDERED.6
The Complaint

In vehement protest, complainant filed this administrative complaint against Judge Trocino alleging that he (1) exhibited bias
and gross ignorance of the law; (2) acted with grave oppression; and (3) violated the Code of Judicial Conduct when he
issued the TPO, ex parte, vesting immediate custody of Henri to Peña based on hypothetical assumptions. Specifically, the
complainant alleged as follows:
9. Respondent judge is biased, ignorant of the law, and acted with grave oppression when he issued the TPO based on a
complaint for child custody. Respondent judge, in full disregard of the law and rule of the Supreme Court on Custody (A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC), issued ex-parte the so called "TPO" without giving herein complainant Recto opportunity to file
her answer, enter into Pre-trial, and without social worker's case study report. This conduct of the respondent
judge manifests patent bias in favor of Peña, who is a resident of Negros Occidental. Moreover, Peña is not the natural
guardian of Julian Harry, being an illegitimate child.

10. Respondent judge deliberately did not apply the Rule on Custody but instead erroneously used R.A. 9262 to
support his order giving temporary custody of minor Harry Peña to Magdaleno Peña, to the prejudice of herein
complainant;

11. Respondent Judge inappropriately issued the so called "TPO" considering that the case filed by Magdaleno Peña is for
Child Custody. The Rule on custody should have been observed by the respondent judge and not the Rule on Anti-
Violence against Women and their Children. A TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man because only women and their
children are protected by R.A. 9262. Moreso, respondent's Order giving temporary child custody to Magdaleno Peña has no
legal leg to stand on because in custody cases, only provisional orders for custody is issued after an Answer is filed
and after Pre-trial is conducted and a DSWD Social Worker Case Study Report is filed. Thus, the Temporary
Protection Order used by respondent Judge is not proper and patently illegal and void;

12. Respondent's obvious bias is further shown by the fact that he was aware that a TPO was previously issued against
Magdaleno Peña who is a respondent in a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Order in the RTC of Mandaluyong
City, yet he issued the so called "TPO" by deliberately mis-applying the provisions of R.A. 9262. The so called "TPO" of
respondent judge was not a product of innocent error in judgment. x x x

13. Likewise, it is gross ignorance of the law on the part of respondent judge in awarding temporary custody of minor Harry
to Magdaleno Peña based on hypothetical assumptions. Respondent judge in justifying his unfounded order said, and we
quote:
14. Under Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Court may issue an ex-parte TPO where there is reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against women and their children exists or is about to recur. There is complete
absence of allegation to this effect in the petition. Clearly, the basis of the so called "TPO" is hypothetical and not factual.
Thus, respondent issued the so called "TPO" without legal basis;

15. There is no legal basis to award custody of minor Harry (an illegitimate child) to Magdaleno Peña, based on the Preamble
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in the light of Article 213 of the Philippine Family Code that
clearly state: "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." Moreover, illegitimate children shall be under the sole parental
authority of the mother (Briones vs. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455);

16. The averments in the Petition for Child Custody are not compelling reasons to immediately award custody of the minor
child to Magdaleno Peña to overcome Article 213 of the Family Code and the ruling in the case of Briones vs. Miguel. Not to
be ignored is Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. Only the most compelling reasons, such as
the mother's unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of
custody to someone else (Briones vs. Miguel, Ibid). It is elementary that basic Philippine Law has greater weight than any
international law;

17. Likewise, Respondent Judge committed grave, whimsical and capricious abuse of discretion in the exercise of his judicial
function in taking cognizance over the petition despite apparent lack of jurisdiction and in issuing the so called "Temporary
Protection Order" against complainant;

18. Magdaleno M. Peña has no standing to institute an action in behalf of complainant's 15 month old child because being
illegitimate, only complainant has parental authority on Julian Henri "Harry" being the natural guardian, and yet
with such knowledge, the respondent judge abused his power with full disregard for the law and the right of complainant in
order to favor Magdaleno Peña;

19. The respondent judge could not have innocently missed the fact that the court had no jurisdiction because Magdaleno M.
Peña in filing for himself has no cause of action against herein complainant (Marie Roxanne G. Recto), and avail of TPO
[under] RA 9262 because the remedies of the law could not be availed of by a man;
20. Likewise clearly alleged in the petition is that Peña is bringing the action for and in behalf of the offended party JULIAN
HENRI (HARRY R. PEÑA) - his minor illegitimate son [with complainant]. As such, it is manifest that the real petitioner is
minor Harry Peña who is a resident of Mandaluyong City. Under Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the verified petition for
Temporary Protection Order may be filed with the Family Court of the place where the offended party resides.
Accordingly, the petition must be filed before the Family Court of Mandaluyong City;

21. Respondent Judge is fully aware of this defect of jurisdiction in the petition considering that the alleged offended party
Julian Henri "Harry" R. Peña is not within his territorial jurisdiction. His awareness of wrong venue is manifested in his
order stating in page 9 paragraph a) that "Harry" lives in Mandaluyong City and not in Negros. We quote the following:

xxxx

22. Respondent judge blindly issued the so called "TPO" without serious and judicious assessment of the contents of and
averments in the petition filed by Peña. This is an obvious fact because the hypothetical approach in the petition for
custody was based on psychological incapacity for annulment of marriage and not incapacity to rear a child. The
documents speak for themselves;

23. Apparently, respondent has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition before him and to issue the so called
"Temporary Protection Order" yet, he did so. In so doing, respondent judge committed grave abuse of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the so called "TPO" issued is null and void;

24. Respondent blindly assumed jurisdiction because respondent Judge Trocino and petitioner Peña were in connivance.
Complainant has personal knowledge that respondent judge was working under the dictates of Peña. On several occasions,
while complainant and Peña were still live-in partners, she has full personal and direct knowledge that respondent judge was
dictated upon by Peña to decide on cases at the desire of Peña in her presence. Aside from the personal knowledge of
complainant, the close relationship of Judge Trocino and Peña is evident in the case entitled Eric L. Lee vs. Hon.
Henry J. Trocino, et al., under G.R. No. 164648 x x x before the Supreme Court, where respondent and Judge
Trocino and Magdaleno Peña are co-respondents;7 [Emphases supplied]
Respondent's Position

In his Comment,8 Judge Trocino denied the allegations and pointed out that the TPO was sanctioned by Sections 11 9 and
1510 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC in relation to Section 3211 thereof as an ancillary remedy incident to the petition for custody
filed by Peña for himself and in behalf of his minor son. Judge Trocino asserted that the ex parte TPO was issued after a
careful evaluation not only of the material allegations in the petition but all other circumstances relevant to the welfare and
best interest of the minor offended party, and that it was issued judiciously in complete good faith, devoid of any grave,
whimsical and capricious abuse of discretion.

Judge Trocino explained that the December 23, 2005 TPO was a temporary order in contemplation of A.M. No. 04-1 0-11-SC
and not an order of temporary custody pursuant to A.M. 03-04-04-SC which requires the prior filing of an answer, pre-trial,
and a social worker's study report. Judge Trocino insisted that the TPO was properly issued considering that Civil Case No.
1409 was a case for child custody with ancillary prayer for the issuance of a protection order under Section 32 of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC and that said provision of the law authorizes an application for protection order as an incident in criminal or civil
actions.

Judge Trocino contended that the issuance of the TPO was not based on hypothetical assumptions but was made after a
thorough evaluation of the allegations set forth in the petition and its supporting documents, and after assessment, he
believed in good faith that the TPO was legal and necessary for the protection of the minor offended party. Judge Trocino
insisted that his act was a bonafide exercise of judicial discretion, the paramount consideration of which was the interest of
the minor child. And even assuming that the TPO was erroneously/improperly issued, the proper remedy lies with the proper
court as the matter was judicial in nature, and not with Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by means of an
administrative complaint.

On the issue of jurisdiction, Judge Trocino asserted that the petition for child custody and damages was within the
competence and jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 and A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. Judge Trocino argued that the petition substantially complied with the
requirements on non-forum shopping and that there was nothing in the Verification and Certification against Non Forum
Shopping that would indicate that the parties raised a similar issue or cause of action in another court, tribunal or agency.

As to the allegation that he worked under the dictates of Peña, Judge Trocino vehemently denied the same and asserted that
he never allowed anyone to either influence or dictate on him in the discharge of his official functions; and the fact that he
and Peña were co-respondents in a particular case filed before the Court was not an indication that he worked under Peña's
whims.

Meanwhile, on January 27, 2006, Judge Trocino voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the petition. 12

Complainant likewise questioned the December 23, 2005 TPO before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01394. 13

Report and Recommendation of the OCA

In a Resolution,14 dated July 17, 2017, the OCA found no basis to hold Judge Trocino liable for bias and partiality and grave
oppression. It, however, found him liable for gross ignorance of the law for issuing an ex parte TPO pursuant to A.M. No. 04-
10-11-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9262 and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60,000.00) considering that Judge Trocino compulsorily retired from the service on July 15, 2006 and was previously found
administratively liable of undue delay in rendering a decision in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936 15 and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2057.16

The Ruling of the Court

Upon review of the records, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA that Judge Trocino acted
with gross ignorance of the law when he issued, ex parte, the December 23, 2005 TPO pursuant to A.M. No. 04-1 0-11-SC in
relation to R.A. No. 9262, which granted, among others, the temporary custody of the minor child to Peña and issued a
protection order against complainant effective for thirty (30) days. He deliberately ignored the provisions of the Family Code,
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to Custody of
Minors and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC or the Rule on Violence against Women and their Children.

Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of the basic rules and settled jurisprudence. 17 A judge owes it to his office to
simply apply the law when the law or a rule is basic 18 and the facts are evident.19 Not to know it or to act as if one does not
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.20

On Child Custody

Article 176 of the Family Code explicitly confers the sole parental authority of an illegitimate child to the mother. This
preference favoring the mother is reiterated in Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise
sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. 21 The
mother's fitness is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. 22

On Provisional Custody

A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC is instructive. Specifically, Section 13 thereof provides:

Section 13. Provisional order awarding custody. - After an answer has been filed or after expiration of the period to
file it, the court may issue a provisional order awarding custody of the minor. As far as practicable, the following
order of preference shall be observed in the award of custody:

(a) Both parents jointly;

(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the minor over seven years of age
and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit;

(c) The grandparent, or if there are several grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor over seven years of age and
of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or disqualified;
(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;
(e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless the former is unfit or disqualified; or

(f) Any other person or institution the court may deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the minor. [Emphasis
supplied]
Clearly, a court is not authorized to issue a provisional order awarding custody of a minor child until after an answer to the
petition has been filed or when the period to file the same have expired and no such answer was filed in court.

Temporary Protection Order

Judge Trocino's contention that the TPO was a temporary protection order pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, and not an
order of temporary custody as contemplated in A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, is not tenable.

Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides:

SEC. 15. Ex parte issuance of temporary protection order. - (a) If the court is satisfied from the verified allegations of the
petition that there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against women and their
children exists or is about to recur, the court may issue ex parte a temporary protection order which shall be effective for
thirty days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined.

x x x. [Emphasis supplied]
Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 further provides:
SEC. 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. - The application for a protection order must be in writing, signed and
verified under oath by the applicant. It may be filed as an independent action or as an incidental relief in any civil or
criminal case the subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence as described in this Act. A standard protection order
application form, written in English with translation to the major local languages, shall be made available to facilitate
applications for protection orders, and shall contain, among others, the following information:
(a) names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;

(b) description of relationships between petitioner and respondent;

(c) a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;

(d) description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as specified in Section 8 herein;

(e) request for counsel and reasons for such;

(f) request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and

(g) an attestation that there is no pending application for a protection order in another court.
If the applicant is not the victim, the application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting
to (a) the circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the
victim for the filing of the application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it shall be
so stated in the application. In such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city
over which court has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purposes of service processmg.

An application for protection order filed with a court shall be considered an application for both a TPO and PPO. Barangay
officials and. court personnel shall assist applicants in the preparation of the application. Law enforcement agents shall also
extend assistance in the application for protection orders in cases brought to their attention.[Emphasis supplied]
A protection order is issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary reliefs.23 It is issued for the purpose of safeguarding the offended party from further
harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to
independently regain control over her life. 24 A protection order may be issued ex parte if the court finds that there is danger
of domestic violence to the offended party. This provisionary protection order, however, may be issued only if the court finds
that the life, limb or property of the offended party is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of violence or to prevent such violence, which is
about to recur.25 If after examining the verified petition and its accompanying affidavits the court is satisfied that there is,
indeed, a reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the offended party exists or is about to
recur, it may issue a TPO ex parte.26

In the case at bar, a reading of the petition for child custody filed by Peña would show that no specific allegation of violence
or abuse, whether physical, emotional or psychological was committed or was about to be committed against Henri. Not even
the affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition supported his positions. The averments in the petition that complainant
was suffering from personality disorder, that she subjected Henri to psychological violence as she would always shout at the
helpers, and that complainant always leave Henri to the yaya, to name a few, are not sufficient bases to issue the TPO.

Moreover, a perusal of the Verification with Certification of Non forum Shopping27 attached to the petition for child custody
would reveal that a similar case for protection order and child custody, docketed as Civil Case No. MC05-2779, was filed by
complainant against Peña before the RTC Mandaluyong City. Considering that there was such a declaration, it behooves upon
Judge Trocino to inquire first about the nature and the status of the said pending case before taking cognizance of the case
and eventually issue the TPO.

In fact, the December 23, 2005 TPO was eventually annulled and set aside by the CA in its Decision 28 dated September 15,
2006. In the same decision, Civil Case No. 1409 was likewise dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the petition for protection
order and child custody. The CA held that Judge Trocino gravely abused his discretion when he issued the December 23,
2005 TPO awarding the custody of parties' common child to Peña. It ruled that since the RTC-Mandaluyong City had already
taken cognizance of the petition for protection order and child custody, it exercises jurisdiction thereon to the exclusion of all
other courts. Hence, the RTC-Mandaluyong City has exclusive jurisdiction over said petition and no other petition involving
the same subject matter may be filed before any other court. The CA decision was affirmed by the Court in a
Resolution,29 dated June 20, 2007.

The Court has always reminded judges to be extra prudent and circumspect in the performance of their duties. This exalted
position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law. 30 Though not every judicial error bespeaks
ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the same, nonetheless,
applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. 31 Where the procedure is so simple and the facts so
evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law. 32 In the case
of Bautista v. Causapin Jr.,33 the Court explained thus:
Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the
laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. The mistake committed by respondent
Judge is not a mere error of judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor. The disregard of established rule of law
which amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a judge subject to disciplinary action. 34
Given the foregoing, Judge Trocino's actions cannot be considered a mere error in judgment that can be easily ignored. His
act of issuing the questioned TPO is not a simple lapse of judgment but a blatant disregard of the basic rules on child custody
and the rule on the issuance of a protection order. As held by the Court in a number of cases, a patent disregard of the basic
legal commands embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be
excused, not even a judge.35

Verily, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. 36 A
judge owes it to himself and his office to know by heart the basic legal principles and relevant doctrines. 37 It is highly
imperative that he be conversant with them because when a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the laws and
rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. 38

Previous Record; Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious
charge, punishable by dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 39 In the consolidated
cases of Department of Justice v. Judge Mislang40 and Home Development Mutual Fund v. Judge Mislang,41 the respondent
judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was dismissed from the service considering that he was previously
found administratively liable in two cases. The Court held that despite previous warnings that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely, he still continued to transgress the norm of judicial conduct.

Similarly, the records show that Judge Trocino was previously found administratively liable on two (2) cases for undue delay
in rendering judgments. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936,42 Judge Trocino was suspended for three (3) months; while in A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2057,43 he was fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

Doubtless, Judge Trocino's infraction on this instance would have warranted the ultimate penalty of dismissal had he not
compulsory retired from the service effective July 15, 2006.

Consequently, considering the past infractions of Judge Trocino, the Court finds that the OCA's recommended penalty of fine
in the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) is disproportionate to the present charge which he was found guilty of.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ret. Judge Henry J. Trocino, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City, Negros
Occidental, GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law. In lieu of dismissal from the service, the Court imposes the penalty
of FORFEITURE of all his retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Bersamin, Leonen, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., on official leave.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., on official leave.
Del Castillo, J., on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave.
Jardeleza, J., on leave.
Reyes, Jr., J., no part.

Endnotes:

 SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. - The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
9

(a) Prohibiting the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence
against the offended party;

(b) Prohibiting the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form
with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporally for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are
violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent
to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him
from the residence;

(d) Requiring the respondent to stay away from the offended party and any designated family or household member at a
distance specified by the court;

(e) Requiring the respondent to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment or any specified place frequented
regularly by the offended party and any designated family or household member;

(f) Directing lawful possession and use by the offended party of an automobile and other essential personal effects,
regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the offended party to the
residence of the parties to ensure that the offended party is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other
essential personal effects;

(g) Ordering temporary or permanent custody of the child/children with the offended party, taking into consideration the best
interests of the child. An offended party who is suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome shall not be disqualified from
having custody of her children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the batterer of a woman who is
suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome;
(h) Directing the respondent to provide support 'o the woman and/or her child, if entitled to legal import. Notwithstanding
other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be
withheld regularly by his employer and to automatically remit it directly to the offended party. Failure to withhold, remit or
any delay in the remittance of support to the offended party without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his
employer liable for indirect contempt of court;

(i) Prohibiting the respondent from carrying or possessing any firearm or deadly weapon and ordering him to surrender the
same to the court for appropriate disposition, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to
carry or possess a firearm. If the respondent is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order him to surrender his firearm
and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate him and take appropriate action thereon;

(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to prepare a program of intervention for the offended party that provides
advocacy, temporary shelter, crisis intervention, treatment, therapy, counseling, education, training and other social services
that the offended pany may need;

(k) Requiring the respondent to receive professional counseling from agencies or persons who have demonstrated expertise
and experience in anger control, management of alcohol, substance abuse and other forms of intervention to stop violence.
The program of intervention for offenders must be approved by the coun. The agency or person is required to provide the
court with regular reports of the progress and result of professional counseling, for which the respondent may be ordered to
pay; and

(l) Awarding the offended party actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property
damage, medical expanses, childcare expenses and loss of income; and compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages,
subject to Sections 26a and 35 of this Rule.

The court may grant such other fom1s of relief to protect the offended party and any designated family or household
member who consents to such relief.

10
 SEC. 15. Ex parte issuance of temporary protection order. - (a) If the court is satisfied from the verified allegation of the
petition that there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence  against women and their children
exists or is about to recur, the court may issue ex parte a temporary protection order which shall be effective for thirty days
from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined.

(b) The temporary protection order shall include notice of the date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits.
The following statements must be printed in bold-faced type or in capital letters on the protection order issued by the court:

"VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW."

"IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON
THE MERITS ON THE ISSUANCE OF A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR
POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT AND
IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH SAID HEARING."

"IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS
DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT SHALL ALLOW EX PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER AND
RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION OF THE RECEPTION
OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED."

(c) The court shall likewise order the immediate issuance of a notice requiring the respondent to file an opposition within five
days from service. It shall further order service of (1) the notices to file opposition and of dates of the preliminary conference
and hearing, (2) the protection order, and (3) copy of the petition, upon the respondent by the court sheriff, or any person
authorized by the court, who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement officers.

 SEC. 32. Applicability to applications for protection orders filed as incidents in civil or criminal cases. - The foregoing
11

provisions shall also apply to applications for protection orders filed as incidents in criminal or civil actions.

12
 Order, rollo, pp. 141-144.

13
 Promulgated on September 15, 2006. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Arsenio
J. Magpale and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring. Rollo (G.R. No. 176403), pp. 32-46.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 169900               March 18, 2010

MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., and ELVIRA
GOZON, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 169977

INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, ALFREDO GOZON, and WINIFRED GOZON, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review, 1 assailing the 7 July 2005 Decision2 and the 30
September 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447.

This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No. 5357. 4 The property is situated in
Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."

On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC) a petition for legal
separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then
annotated on TCT No. 5357.

On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into
an Agreement to Buy and Sell5 (Agreement) involving the property for the price of ₱18 million. Among the
stipulations in the Agreement were that Alfredo would: (1) secure an Affidavit from Elvira that the property is
Alfredo’s exclusive property and to annotate the Agreement at the back of TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of
the Cavite RTC to exclude the property from the legal separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice
of lis pendens pertaining to the said case and annotated on TCT No. 5357. However, despite repeated demands
from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the ₱5 million earnest money as partial
payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993. On 6 September 1993,
the Agreement was annotated on TCT No. 5357.

Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision 6 in the legal separation case, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation between petitioner and respondent.
Accordingly, petitioner Elvira Robles Gozon is entitled to live separately from respondent Alfredo Gozon without
dissolution of their marriage bond. The conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby declared DISSOLVED
and LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse, respondent is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same
is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.

Furthermore, said parties are required to mutually support their child Winifred R. Gozon as her needs arises.

SO ORDERED.7

As regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed conjugal property.

On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred
Gozon (Winifred). The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-
105088 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. M-
10508.

On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney 9 executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the
property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for ₱18 million. 10 IDRI paid Alfredo ₱18 million, representing full
payment for the property.11 Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued
TCT No. M-1097612 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order.

On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered a decision, 13 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

01. On the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:

1.1 The same is hereby made permanent by:

1.1.1 Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.
and Gil Tabije, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in their behalf from any
attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts of further alienating or disposing
of the subject property;

1.1.2. Enjoining defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. from entering and fencing the
property;

1.1.3. Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. to
respect plaintiff’s possession of the property.

02. The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993, between plaintiff and defendant Alfredo Gozon is
hereby approved, excluding the property and rights of defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-
half share in the conjugal property subject of this case.

03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August 1994, entered into by and between defendants Alfredo Gozon
and Winifred Gozon is hereby nullified and voided.

04. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, executed by defendant Winifred Gozon, through
defendant Alfredo Gozon, in favor of defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby nullified and voided.

05. Defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby ordered to deliver its Transfer Certificate of Title No.
M-10976 to the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.

06. The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to cancel Certificate of Title Nos.
10508 "in the name of Winifred Gozon" and M-10976 "in the name of Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.," and to
restore Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5357 "in the name of Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Robles" with
the Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993 fully annotated therein is hereby ordered.

07. Defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of plaintiff over
his one-half undivided share in the subject property and to comply with all the requirements for registering
such deed.

08. Ordering defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to sit with plaintiff to agree on the selling price of her undivided
one-half share in the subject property, thereafter, to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
same in favor of the plaintiff and to comply with all the requirements for registering such deed, within fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of this DECISION.

09. Thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Alfredo Gozon the balance of Four Million Pesos
(₱4,000,000.00) in his one-half undivided share in the property to be set off by the award of damages in
plaintiff’s favor.

10. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon the price they had agreed upon for
the sale of her one-half undivided share in the subject property.

11. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly
and severally, the following:

11.1 Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) as actual and compensatory damages;

11.2 One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as moral damages;

11.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) as exemplary damages;

11.4 Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and

11.5 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as litigation expenses.

 11.6 The above awards are subject to set off of plaintiff’s obligation in paragraph 9 hereof.

12. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.
jointly and severally the following:

12.1 Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000.00) which constitute the amount the former received from
the latter pursuant to their Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, with legal interest
therefrom;

12.2 One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as moral damages;

12.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

12.4 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as attorney’s fees.

13. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.14

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTC’s decision with modification. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 7 July 2005 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated April 3, 2001 of the RTC, Branch 74, Malabon is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:

1. The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is declared null and
void for the following reasons:

a) The conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-appellee Elvira Gozon;

b) Defendant Alfredo Gozon’s one-half (½) undivided share has been forfeited in favor of his
daughter, defendant Winifred Gozon, by virtue of the decision in the legal separation case rendered
by the RTC, Branch 16, Cavite;

2. Defendant Alfredo Gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant Siochi the amount of ₱5 Million which
the latter paid as earnest money in consideration for the sale of the subject land;

3. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant
Siochi jointly and severally, the following:

a) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;

b) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

c) ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

d) ₱20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and

e) The awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby ordered deleted for lack of basis.

4. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay defendant-appellant IDRI
jointly and severally the following:

a) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;

b) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

c) ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Defendant Winifred Gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of defendant Alfredo Gozon was awarded, is hereby
given the option whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the subject land.

The rest of the decision not inconsistent with this ruling stands.

SO ORDERED.15

Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his petition, Mario alleges that the Agreement
should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the
offer is withdrawn. Since Elvira’s conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct
Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of ₱9 million to Elvira.

On the other hand, IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Thus, IDRI prays that the Court should
uphold the validity of IDRI’s TCT No. M-10976 over the property.

We find the petitions without merit.

This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property occurred after
the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in
fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the
property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court.
Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. 16 The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the
entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the
sale.17 Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s
written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. 18 The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario
was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario’s contention that
the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the
fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that
the offer was already withdrawn.

However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the
property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the ruling of the Cavite RTC in the legal
separation case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the ruling of the Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending
spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to Winifred.

The Cavite RTC ruling finds support in the following provisions of the Family Code:

Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:

(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be
severed;

(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of
Article 43(2);

(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of
Article 213 of this Code; and

The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession.
Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by
operation of law.

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following
effects:

xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated
and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is
only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code
provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2)
and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is
forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of
the conjugal partnership property.

With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by
the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should
impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the property. The
representative of IDRI testified that he knew about the existence of the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 5357 and
the legal separation case filed before the Cavite RTC. Thus, IDRI could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC
decision declaring the property as conjugal.

Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
was highly irregular. Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 19 the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled
(a) upon order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the
registration of the lis pendens. In this case, the lis pendens was cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the
request of Alfredo. There was no court order for the cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did Elvira, the party who
caused the registration of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its cancellation.

Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredo’s donation
of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 20 of the Family Code, a conjugal
property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in
good faith.1avvphi1

Nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of the Malabon RTC for the reimbursement of the ₱18 million
paid by IDRI for the property, which was inadvertently omitted in the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’
decision.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74447 with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozon’s one-half undivided share in favor of
Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon whether or not to dispose of her undivided share
in the property; and

(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and
severally the Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-Dimensional Realty,
Inc. for the property, with legal interest computed from the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.